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
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EVANGELICAL REVIEW.


VOL. IX.

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THE

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EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

VOL IX.


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
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* * * The Papers marked with an asterisk are Original Contributions to the *Review*. The other Papers are selected from the sources indicated above.



BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JANUARY 1860.

ART. I.—*Lectures on the Moral Government of God.* By
NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D.D., late Dwight Professor of
Didactic Theology in Yale College. New York: Clark,
Austin, & Smith. 1859.

THE great prominence of Dr Taylor in the theological conflicts which issued in the disruption of the Presbyterian Church, the loosening of the bonds between Presbyterians and Congregationalists, the formation of opposing parties among the latter, and the planting of rival theological seminaries to propagate their respective views, will lead many to scrutinise this full and authentic exposition of his system with peculiar interest. We say full, for although these volumes comprise but a portion of his theological lectures, which are, as we understand, to be published, yet they contain his entire series of lectures and disquisitions on the moral government of God. On this subject, and its applications, he laid out his chief strength. In this department chiefly he claimed to have made decisive and momentous contributions to theological science. Here he and his adherents challenged, in his behalf, the honours of discovery and invention. Here the cardinal principles of all that is distinctive and peculiar in his metaphysics and theology are most elaborately stated and defended. All that has been known as the cardinal principles of Taylorism is here subjected to exhaustive discussion.

Although these volumes are posthumous, they are not unfinished or fragmentary. They, with the volumes yet to follow, are the mature products of the author's life-long labour, and of continual retouching, with a constant eye to their ultimate publication. Indeed, few publications bear more une-

quivocal marks of the *labor limæ*. In some cases it goes to a length of inducing weak and cumbrous forms of statement, while the more free and unstudied expressions of the author are generally remarkable for precision and force.

This authentic exposition and defence of his system is welcome, because it enables us to settle some questions of historical justice. Dr Taylor's previous outgivings of his system were partial and fragmentary, as they came forth in the discussions of occasional controversies. He and his adherents claimed that he was injuriously misunderstood and misrepresented by his adversaries; and that the recoil from his system which rent our Church, and founded new institutions for the support of orthodoxy in his own communion, was largely due to groundless prejudice and "devout calumny." These volumes will brush away all mist that may still overhang these allegations. We deem them quite as important for the light they shed upon past conflicts, and the merits of the respective polemics, as for any power they possess to revive controversies already fought through, or to revitalise a system whose first meteoric success was only eclipsed by the rapidity of its decline. We do not intimate that this system is yet extinct, or absolutely effete. But we do assert, without fear of plausible contradiction, that since its first flooding irruption upon our American churches, it has been steadily ebbing. Old School doctrines have been steadily gaining influence and ascendancy. They have shewn their power in the quiet but rapid growth of the bodies which cling to them most tenaciously; in the comparatively stationary or retrogressive condition of most of the bodies which repudiate them; in the extensive reactionary movement within these bodies, in order to their conservation from further waste and decay; in the new forms of latitudinarian theology itself which overshadow the issues of Taylorism, so obtrusive twenty years ago; and in the fact that many admiring pupils of Dr Taylor, who still eulogise him as the oracle of his day, are forward to discard his fundamental ethical principle. How much of any peculiar theory of *moral* government can survive the overthrow of its fundamental ethical principle, it is not difficult to imagine.

In order to appreciate Dr Taylor justly, it is necessary to look, not merely at his theories—which, of course, stand or fall upon their own merits—but at the circumstances and surroundings which evoked and largely moulded his thinking. All men, while they have the roots of their character and achievements in themselves, are strongly impelled and guided in their development and outworking by the external influences in which they find themselves immersed. Even if they sturdily withstand all that besets them, they are not unaffected by it. The conditions and objects that environ them

are the provocatives and objects of their thinking. If these do not sway them—even if they are strenuously resisted—still, they incite this very antagonism, and give it their own “form and pressure.” It is impossible to understand the genesis of Dr Taylor’s theories irrespective of the atmosphere he breathed, the training he enjoyed, the forms of doctrinal and practical opinion which, in his view, most urgently required an antidote, and the evils, real or supposed, which he aimed to remedy. Much less is it possible, without this, to account for a certain two-sided or ambiguous aspect of many of his writings, which has been an enigma to multitudes; or to reach the most favourable construction of his spirit and aims of which his case admits, and in which Christian charity will rejoice.

The principal circumstances affecting Dr Taylor’s early theological development, which require to be noted in this connection, are, 1. The wide prevalence of Infidelity and Atheism, which appalled good men during the period of his theological training and early ministry. Its focus was France, but it radiated thence over Christendom, and shot its most baleful rays over our own country, then so deeply in sympathy, on political grounds, with revolutionary France. Presidents, senators, jurists, public men of every grade, caught the infection—colleges and literary institutions were deeply inoculated with the virus. It was quite a matter of *ton* to be sceptical. The consequence was, that the mind of the Church was largely engrossed with the refutation of Deism, Atheism, and the various forms of scepticism, open or masked. The great theological works of this period were mostly apologetic. Dr Dwight, Dr Taylor’s theological instructor, achieved his highest fame and his grandest success by his celebrated discourses on infidelity. They revolutionised the current of opinion and feeling in Yale College, prepared the way for those revivals of religion which signalised his administration, and exorcised the fell spirit of infidelity from the institution. His whole system of theology, and tone of preaching, bear traces of being shaped with the especial design of confronting and overpowering infidels. Dr Taylor’s mind, both from its own peculiar structure, and from the impulses given it by his teacher, would inevitably gird itself for the conflicts which then agitated the Christian world, and with ample confidence in its ability to solve difficulties which had before embarrassed the ablest defenders of the faith. This explains why most of his theological peculiarities, while they have to do with the very nature of the Christian life, are yet adopted for the purpose of strengthening the apologetic side of theology, and silencing infidels and sceptics.

2. At this period, scepticism began to develop itself openly

within the precincts of the New England churches, under the title of improved and liberal Christianity. Unitarianism and Universalism had obtained control of the metropolis of Puritan Congregationalism, of its most ancient and renowned seat of learning, and from these centres of influence had already propagated themselves into the very heart of Massachusetts, poisoning her more powerful churches, and commanding the favour of her educated and aristocratic classes. These heresies, which repudiate nearly all that distinguishes Christianity from heathen morality but the name, began to worm themselves into the adjacent States, having strong ecclesiastical and social ties with the old home of their birth and dominion; and to assume a formidable attitude, which engaged the anxious attention of the friends of truth and piety throughout the land, but especially in New England. Dr Taylor's speculations have a special respect to the objections levelled at the evangelical system from this source. Endorsing many of their objections to old orthodoxy, he endeavours to reconstruct the evangelical system so as to evade them. To this point much of his strenuous argumentation tends. He concedes much to the cavils of these errorists against the doctrines of the church, for the sake of proving that the doctrine of eternal punishment, which they most of all abhor, is demanded by the benevolence of God, on which they rely to subvert it. In maintaining and denouncing the eternal misery of the wicked to the uttermost, no divine is more emphatic, uncompromising—we had almost said, unrelenting.

3. Orthodoxy in New England had been undergoing transmutations in the laboratories of successive metaphysical schools, until it began to crystallise into the arctic dogmas of Emmons. What these were, we have so recently pointed out, as to supersede the necessity of distinct specification here.* This system in its higher or lower potencies, tinctured much of the practical, and even revival preaching, of many of the most able and earnest orthodox divines of New England. Divine sovereignty, election, and decrees were intensified and pressed out of their scriptural relations and proportions, into that foreground which the Scriptures award to Christ and him crucified. They were largely employed to offend, startle, and alarm the unconverted, to perform the office of the law in producing conviction of sin; while submission to, or acquiescence in them, was often made the hinge-point of true conversion. Thus the love of God in Christ, the true inspiration of evangelical preaching—the power of God unto salvation—was often shaded into relative unimportance. Of course, all this arrayed

* Article on Edwards and the Successive Forms of New Divinity, in the April Number, 1859.

orthodoxy in gratuitous horrors, which invigorated the Universalist and Unitarian defection, while it was like an ague-chill, alternating with the warm life of the gospel, in congregations still cleaving to the faith once delivered to the saints. This was keenly felt by Dr Dwight, and the large class whom he represented in New England, who lost no opportunity of denouncing the sublimated hyper-Calvinism of Hopkins and Emmons, especially the latter, in regard to decrees, the divine production of sin, exercises, resignation, &c. It was inevitable that, to a mind like Dr Taylor's, surveying this whole subject from the stand-point of one striving to clear the gospel of incumbrances which hindered its access to the unconverted heart, and exposed it to the assaults of Universalists, Unitarians, and Deists, the whole doctrinal system in vogue should seem to require reconstruction. The peculiar state of speculative theology in New England, as may readily be seen by those conversant with the facts, had much to do with determining the drift of Dr Taylor's speculations. This was so, not only as it presented the offensive features already noted, but also as, in other respects, it furnished the germs of those peculiarities which constituted the essence of his own system, and which he employed in assailing, not merely Hopkinsianism and Emmonism, but the whole Augustinian, or Calvinistic system. We refer here to the doctrine of natural ability, then naturalised and nearly universal in New England; to the dogma that moral quality pertains exclusively to exercises, which was prominent in Emmon's scheme; to the wide prevalence of the dogma, that all virtue consists in benevolence; to the nearly universal rejection of the doctrine of imputation, whether of Adam's sin, or Christ's righteousness, inaugurated by the younger Edwards; to the governmental scheme of atonement, no less in vogue, and having the same author. Here we find the seed-principles of a large part of the treatise on Moral Government. The peculiar chaotic state of New England theology, when Dr Taylor came upon the theatre, furnished the motives, the means, and the objects of his innovations. As his reading and theological culture scarcely extended beyond the astute metaphysical theologians of New England, he knew little of standard Augustinian and Reformed theology, beyond the fragmentary representations and misrepresentations of it, found in these second-hand, and in many respects, hostile authorities. To the day of his death he never comprehended this theology in its import, spirit, logic, power. He often confounds it with certain dogmas which it disowns, mere New England provincialisms, and quite as often with the caricatures of its adversaries.

4. It deserves consideration in this connection, that Dr

Dwight held the utilitarian theory of the nature of virtue; that it consists exclusively in benevolence, or a desire to promote the happiness of the universe. Dr Dwight did not work this theory out to many of its logical and practical results. Nor did it so figure in his published writings, as to attract any marked attention. Yet there is reason to suppose it was a favourite theory with him, and that he signalized it even more in his private instructions than in his published works. And we do not doubt that his influence encouraged Dr Taylor's speculations on this subject, till they culminated in startling dogmas, from which Dr Dwight probably would have recoiled—at all events which, after being distinctly brought to public notice, justly awakened the deepest distrust and dislike of his whole system.*

Passing now from these objective moulding influences to notice the subjective peculiarities of inward life and intellectual constitution that contributed to make Dr Taylor the theologian he was, it is to be observed that his extraordinary power was rather in the line of logical acuteness and ingenuity, than in that breadth and depth of insight, without which the mere logical faculty is quite as likely to precipitate us into error, as guide us to the truth. There are three ways in which the mind comes to the knowledge of truth: 1. Intuition. 2. Testimony. 3. Logical deduction from what is known by intuition and testimony. It is obvious that logical processes can unfold only what is enveloped in the premises from which they start; that the truth of the conclusions reached depends on the truth of the premises, and the accuracy of the reasoning process. It is obvious still further, that all reasoning must ultimately start from truths given by intuition or testimony, else it is but a chain without a staple; that it can have no stronger evidence than the self-evidence of its ultimate premises; that the longer and more involved the steps which intervene between first premises and the conclusion, the greater is the liability to error; and that if any conclusion reached by reasoning militates against any self-evident truth, the process is thereby clearly evinced to be faulty, either in the premises or the reasoning, whether we can detect the flaw or not.

* In a letter from Dr Taylor respecting Dr Dwight, we find the following: "In my senior year, I read as an exercise before Dr Dwight an argument on the question, 'Is virtue founded in utility?'—a question in which he always felt a peculiar interest. To those who preceded me he said, 'Oh, you do not understand the question;' but when I had finished my argument he remarked with great emphasis—'that's right,' and added some other commendatory remarks, which, to say the least, were adapted to put a young man's modesty to rather a severe test. But it had certainly one good effect—it determined me to make intellectual efforts, which otherwise I probably never should have made; not to say the very kind which, above all others, I love to make."—*Sprague's Annals*, vol. i., pp. 162, 163.

Now when we say that Dr Taylor's breadth and depth of insight were not commensurate with his logical power, we refer to that want of insight into the intrinsic nature of moral good and evil, the self-evident excellence and obligation of first moral truths, which an inspection of his reasonings will bring to light. Discerning no intrinsic good but happiness, he reasons at all lengths, and in all directions from this hypothesis; he follows the remorseless bent of his logic, whatever first principles and sacred instincts it overbears—even though, to use his own favourite phrase, it "go down Niagara." A consequence of this was, that within the field of his vision he saw with the greatest confidence and assurance, while he pushed his reasonings within this circumscribed area with all the greater force and momentum, because he did not take that broader survey of first truths which would have made them brakes to check the impetus that bore him so rapidly and confidently to startling conclusions. Hence the remarkable assurance and self-reliance with which he propounded principles confessedly at war with the doctrines of all branches of the church, his marvellous confidence in the power of his reasonings to enforce the assent of adversaries, and his difficulty of understanding how men should reject them on grounds creditable to the head and heart. It is further to be observed, that Dr Taylor believed that the true power of Christianity was to be found in those bodies that hold certain elements of the reformed and evangelical faith. Especially did he regard the doctrine of eternal punishment as vital to effective Christian preaching. On the whole, he found more in the practical and doctrinal tone of the Presbyterian and Congregational churches that was congenial to him than elsewhere. On the other hand, he regarded Unitarianism and Universalism as emasculating the gospel of all that can arouse the soul to salutary concern and earnest religious efforts, yet he deemed it necessary to reconstruct the accepted orthodox system, so as to obviate certain objections, to which he agreed with these errorists in thinking it obnoxious. This accounts for the double-faced aspect so often and plausibly charged against him and his system. He was often charged with seconding Unitarians in their assaults on the orthodox faith. In response, he claimed to be the most earnest and relentless adversary of these heretics, and to be unwaveringly devoted to the doctrines of Calvinism, which he was undertaking, not to overthrow, but to place on a firmer basis. Within certain limits, and in a certain sense, all this is true. It is quite certain that he adopted and echoed the arguments of Socinians against important parts of the orthodox system. It is no less true that he expected thus more effectually to vanquish them, and retain

intact the essentials of the orthodox faith. Did he succeed? The answer to this question will bring us at once to the consideration of the distinctive features of his system.

Dr Taylor's estimate of his own theological achievements in comparison with those of his predecessors, appears in such passages as the following:—

"All the attempts made by theologians to systematize the great and substantial truths of both natural and revealed theology have hitherto proved utter and complete failures, by a necessity arising from the manner in which they have been made. For in all these attempts there never has been any exhibition, nor even professed attempt at exhibition, of that great and comprehensive relation of God to men, to which all things besides, in creation and providence, are subordinate and subservient; *his relation to men as administering a perfect moral government over them as moral and immortal beings, created in his own image.*"—Vol. ii. p. 2.

"So unreflective and careless on this subject have been the prominent theological writers, Catholic and Protestant, Orthodox and Latitudinarian, that from the times of Origen, not to say of Irenæus, they have scarcely, to any extent worthy of notice, given any form to the great scriptural doctrine of justification, which has not in my view involved downright Antinomianism, the subversion of the law of God in one of its essential elements."—*Ib.* p. 151.

"Have the Orthodox ministry, then, thus pressed men to act morally right under God's authority, grace or no grace? . . . Have they not, to a great extent, taught *a mode of dependence* on the Holy Spirit, which, instead of enhancing as it does, man's obligation to act morally right in obedience to God's authority, absolutely subverts man's obligation so to act, and God's authority to require him so to act? . . . And more than this,—where, in the whole range of theological literature, can be found anything, which even in pretence can be esteemed a thorough treatise on the high relation to God, to which his every other relation is subservient—that of the supreme and rightful moral Governor of his moral creation?"—*Ib.* pp. 25, 26.

This is extraordinary language. The moral government of God is his government of moral beings. Every treatise on theology is a treatise in regard to God's government of such moral beings as we have knowledge of. It treats of the being, attributes, law and gospel of God, of our relations thereto, and of what is necessarily implied therein. Dr Taylor could not have meant that his assertion is true, except in a narrow sense corresponding to his own arbitrary restriction of the meaning of the words "moral," "government," etc. It is quite true that no one has treated the subject after the method of these two volumes, or founded his reasonings upon the same fundamental principles. It is in these that the primary peculiarity of Dr Taylor's system lies. To these are to be traced its strength and its weakness.

Dr Taylor undertook to silence those who insist that the eternal punishment of the wicked is incompatible with benevolence in God. In doing this, he contended that benevolence in God as moral governor, required the everlasting punishment of incorrigible sinners, and that failure on his part to threaten it would prove him to be a malevolent being, without right to govern his creatures, or claim to their confidence. He undertook to prove this by argument as cogent as mathematical demonstration. The argument is simply this: The happiness of sentient beings, or the means of such happiness, is the only good; therefore benevolence, or the desire and purpose to promote such happiness, is the only virtue, or the sum of all virtue. Sin, as the opposite of benevolence, consists in selfishness, or the preference of other sources of enjoyment to seeking the happiness of the universe. A moral governor cannot shew himself truly benevolent, entitled to reign, or to command the confidence of his subjects, unless he promotes benevolence in his subjects by the highest rewards, and discourages selfishness by the extremest penalties. So far as he comes short of this, he fails to shew perfect benevolence; for he fails to do what he might do to promote perfect benevolence, and thereby perfect happiness. This is the sum of the argument developed by the author in manifold forms, and occupying a large portion of his book. It seems, if the premises be granted, to be quite conclusive. The conclusion, however, though with a single qualification yet to be noted, proved by Scripture and not discordant with reason, does not prove the truth of the premises. A false conclusion proves the premises from which it is deduced false. A true conclusion, however, may happen to come from false premises as well as true, and therefore proves nothing with regard to their truth or falsity. From the premise, "all colleges have astronomical observatories," it follows that Yale College has such an observatory. The conclusion is true, the premise false. If the foregoing is a true account of morality, and if this gives us the differentia of moral government, then we must award to Dr Taylor the honour of having first given it, as he claims, a thorough and systematic treatment. But it is time for us to verify our account of his system.

"Benevolence then, as the primary, morally right affection, is the elective preference of the highest happiness of all—the *sentient* universe—to every conflicting object."—*ib.* 255. On the next page and elsewhere, he speaks of veracity and justice as "forms of benevolence." Each of them, "contemplated as including this principle, is truly and properly said to be *morally* right, and is properly called a virtue. But then its *moral rectitude* consists exclusively in the element of *general benevo-*

lence, since, if we conceive the particular disposition, affection, or purpose to exist, as it may, without this element of *general benevolence*, we necessarily conceive of it as a form of selfishness. If, again, we conceive of the element of general benevolence as existing in the same degree without the particular disposition, affection, or purpose, we necessarily conceive of the same degree of moral rectitude. . . . When, however, we contemplate justice or veracity, or any particular disposition, purpose, volition, separately from, or as not including either the benevolent or selfish principle of the heart, it is neither morally right nor morally wrong. At the same time, it must be admitted that justice, veracity, &c., each being conceived as a particular subordinate purpose or disposition without general benevolence, and including its appropriate executive action, are in some sense *right*, but not *morally right*. They are *right* as they are fitted to promote some limited good necessary to the general good. It may be truly said of any of these subordinate acts, that it *ought* to be done. But its *rightness* or *oughtness* is not *moral* rightness or *moral* oughtness, for this is a predicate only of (general) benevolence, or that which includes it."—Pp. 256–7. He proceeds to describe this *oughtness* or *rightness* as being like that of a watch or pen, with reference to the end for which it is made—a "*mere natural fitness*." The italics are all the author's. This representation clearly annihilates all virtue but benevolence, all sin but selfishness. Truth, justice, lying, fraud, cruelty, aside from the benevolent or selfish spirit which may prompt them, are void of moral character. They belong to adiaphorous things as truly as running or walking. The consequence is, they become morally good or evil, according to circumstances.

Says Dr. Taylor,—

"There is no kind of subordinate action which in any circumstances is fitted to subserve the end of benevolence, which in other circumstances may not be fitted to subserve the end of selfishness, and be prompted by this principle."—Vol. i. p. 53. "At the same time there are few, if any, kinds of subordinate action, which in all cases are fitted only to promote the end of selfishness, or which in some possible circumstances may not be fitted to *subserve the end of benevolence, and be performed from this principle*."—Ib. p. 54.

"And now, if we suppose the essential nature of things to be so changed, that the authority of law and the public good as depending upon it would be destroyed, and absolute and universal misery follow, unless the innocent were to be punished, would it not be right to make innocence, now become the true and necessary cause of such fearful results, the ground of punishment? If it is now right or just to punish the disobedient, it would then be so to punish the obedient—to punish for a thing having the same relative nature, though it should have another name."—Ib. pp. 134, 135.

We do not see how any language could more utterly confound and vacate all moral distinctions. Actions are right and wrong not intrinsically, but solely as they are instrumental of happiness. The end sanctifies the means, whatever they may be. Desert of punishment and the righteousness of its infliction depend not upon the culpability of the victim, but upon its relation to the public good. This determines whether the woes of punishment may righteously be inflicted upon the innocent or the wicked! These are the inevitable logical results of the theory that virtue is founded in utility, that it has no intrinsic quality, but is merely the means of happiness. All actions and dispositions are indifferent but benevolence, and even that is good, not intrinsically, but as a means to happiness, as will yet more fully appear! On such a subject argument is out of place; there is no doubt what the primary intuitions of every unperverted mind reveal on this subject. Let him who undertakes to speculate them away, find anything out of the Bible more certain with which to begin or end his reasoning if he can. Dr Taylor does not hesitate to impress these intuitions into his service where it suits his purpose, and to make them oracles for determining what Scripture may or may not teach. He says, in reference to imputation as misconceived by himself, "that a morally perfect being, even Jesus Christ, cannot be ill-deserving, is an *intuition*." Vol. ii. p. 158. Indeed, we accept as the conclusive refutation of the above ethical theory the very language which Dr Taylor hurls with prodigious force at his own imagination of the doctrine of imputation.

"Indeed, if we are to rely on the necessary decisions and judgments of the human intellect—without which we can rely on nothing as true—then in this scheme these necessary decisions concerning law, justice, truth, equity, veracity, moral government, everything which lies at the basis of faith, of confidence and repose in God, are changed into their opposites; law ceases to be even respectable advice; for the lawgiver abandons its claims by sovereign prerogative, justice is converted into injustice."—*Ib.* p. 159. Suppose all this were so—what then, if Dr Taylor's ethical theory be true, and if our intuitive "necessary decisions respecting justice, truth, equity, veracity, moral government, everything which lies at the basis of faith, of confidence and repose in God," do not bury this scheme for ever out of sight? So true is it that men who speculate away their own moral instincts, are compelled after all to recognise them, and to use them as both shield and sword in defensive and offensive warfare. They can no more eliminate them from their practical faith, than an idealist can act as if there were no external world.

But we have not yet reached the lowest deep of this ethical theory, to which logical necessity precipitates, and our author follows it "down Niagara." Why is benevolence singled out to be made the comprehensive generic virtue, rather than justice, veracity, &c.? And why is selfishness made the only sin? "Inasmuch as one is perfectly, or in the highest degree fitted to prevent the highest misery, and to produce the highest well-being of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself, and the other is perfectly, or in the highest degree fitted to prevent the highest well-being, and to produce the highest misery of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself."—Vol. i., p. 19. But is there no good, and no well-being but happiness? No evil but misery, &c.? Let the author answer. "Nothing is good but happiness and the means of happiness, including the absence of misery, and the means of its absence."—*Ib.* p. 31. "Nothing is *evil*, but misery or suffering and the means of it, including the absence of happiness and the means of his happiness."—P. 35. The *goodness*, or the *worth*, or the *value*, or the *excellence* of a thing, is not the *absolute* nature, but the *relative* nature of that of which it is the predicate; or more particularly, it is the real nature of that of which it is predicated, *as related to sentient being*."—P. 31. "All the evil which pertains to action on the part of a moral being, is its fitness or adaptation to produce misery or suffering to other beings and to himself."—P. 35.

According to this, moral acts and qualities, even benevolence itself, have no intrinsic moral quality whatever. Their excellence is wholly "relative," and consists simply and exclusively in their being means of happiness. It is the happiness of beings too, considered simply as "sentient"—whether their sensibility be corporeal or spiritual, animal, esthetic, or moral—the *quantum* rather than the *quale*. Says Dr Taylor, in vindication of the doctrine that the love to God primarily required by the divine law is the love of benevolence, not of complacency—

"The love of benevolence is the love of the well-being, or of the highest happiness of the sentient universe. As God comprises in himself, immeasurably, the 'greatest portion of being,' and of course, compared with the universe besides, the greatest capacity of blessedness, his perfect happiness has more worth than any that can come into competition with it. If, then, the mind does not *primarily* love the highest blessedness of God, and his perfect character, as the means of this end, and this on account of its perfect fitness or adaptation as *the means* of producing this end, it does not love his character on account of its *intrinsic loveliness or excellence*—does not love it at all."—Vol. ii., p. 196.

How exclusively this founds all on quantity, rather than quality of being and happiness, and derives all quality from quantity? See the application of this utilitarian arithmetic to calculate the decrease of love to God in proportion to the temptation it surmounts. Says our author, "Perfect holiness in a moral creature consists in loving God as much as he can love him, while he is under a necessity of loving an inferior good in some degree. At the same time he has but a limited power or capacity of loving all objects of affection. Suppose this capacity in a perfectly holy being to be the capacity of loving fifty degrees, and that being under a necessity of loving the inferior good ten degrees, he loves God with forty degrees, or with perfect love. Let us now suppose the temptation increased; in other words, the value of the inferior good increased, so that it becomes necessary to love the inferior object fifteen degrees. The consequence is, that he must love God so much the less, as he loves the inferior object more," &c.—Vol. ii., p. 365. By this calculus perfect love will soon be differentiated down to zero. Is not the statement of such a system its refutation? As well might we measure fragrance by squares and triangles, as moral quality in this way. Who does not shudder at the bare suggestion of merging the holiness, righteousness, and truth of God, in mere boundless "sentient capacity," or sinking them into mere instruments for gratifying it? Does it terminate in anything short of absorbing his moral perfections—all that can be a ground of love and trust to his rational creatures—in mere physical or metaphysical infinitude? We stop here. We will not hurl back those epithets which we might justly employ, and which Dr Taylor applies so freely and gratuitously to the God exhibited, as he maintains, in the scheme of his adversaries. But really, is bare amount of sentient capacity, irrespective of its quality, the measure of worth and claim to regard, as this scheme requires? And who would not slaughter thousands of rams, if he had them and it were necessary, to soothe the anguish of a suffering babe? And are not all bodily sufferings, however intense and protracted, less to be deplored, reprobated, and shunned, than one pang of remorse, however faint or transient? And is the agony of the Son of God no more momentous than an equal amount of agony in a sentient being of any species?

But if benevolence be the only virtue, because it is a means of happiness as the only good, should not each one seek for himself this only good? and can he be under obligation to be benevolent or anything else, on any other ground, or in any greater degree, than as it is seen to be conducive to his own happiness. Says Dr Taylor:

"Were the agent wholly unsusceptible to happiness from the happiness of others, and as therefore he must be wholly indifferent to their happiness, he must be wholly indifferent to benevolence on his own part, as the means of their happiness. Benevolence in such a case could possess no worth or value *to him*, either directly or indirectly. . . . The worth *to him* of the highest happiness of all other beings, is its fitness to give him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action; and the worth to him of benevolent action is its perfect and exclusive fitness to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, and *herein* its perfect fitness to secure to him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action."—Vol. i., p. 32. In the same manner he proceeds to argue that, "selfishness would be no evil to the moral agent, were he entirely unsusceptible to misery from the misery of others; that the *evil* of this kind of action to the agent, is equal either to the evil to *him* of the highest misery of all other beings, or to the evil *to him* of his own misery from their highest misery."—P. 35.

There can be no mistake as to what all this, and much more of the like, means. The only obligation to benevolence is the constraint we are under to pursue our own happiness; but does not the author maintain that men are bound to do right and avoid wrong? Assuredly. But then, what is right and what is wrong? Let us hear him. "The word *right* denotes the *fitness* of that to which it is applied, to produce or accomplish some given end; and the word *wrong* denotes the *fitness* of that to which it is applied to prevent the same given end. . . . Of course, the same general ideas of fitness to produce or prevent the end, or the great end of action on the part of moral beings (*i. e.*, happiness,) are denoted by the words right and wrong, when applied to such action. To deny this, is to deny a fixed and universal principle in the use of words. It is to deny in the language of logic that the genus is predicable of the species, or that the same word has one and the same general meaning as applied to different things, to which it can truly be applied in that meaning. It is the same as to deny that the word *black* or *white* has the same general meaning when applied to a bird and a horse of the same colour."—Pp. 63, 64. This must be the answer which, on page 135, he says he has already given to those who say that the "idea of moral rectitude or rightness is a simple idea, an idea incapable of analysis and definition." And what an answer! If this is all that Dr Taylor's astuteness could devise, we may safely say they are unanswerable. Right as commonly understood means conformity to a standard as fitness to an end, of which Dr Goodrich shews himself well aware in his edition of Webster's Dictionary. It means not only conformity to a standard, but, as often, the very standard idea, or law to which we ought to conform, or the characteristic element of that to which we ought to conform,

i. e., moral goodness. Thus used, it denotes a simple idea. As such it may be indicated by synonyms. But it cannot be logically defined. For it is incapable of analysis into genus and differentia. It is itself the differentia of morally right action. But its own genus and differentia cannot be found, any more than those of black and white. Says Dr Taylor, usage is "that only which gives to words what may be called their *proper* meaning, and their only fixed and permanent meaning so far as they have any. It is, of course, the only criterion of deciding what that proper meaning is."—Vol. ii., p. 213. This is just. How absurd then to attempt to settle one of the greatest questions in psychology, ethics, and divinity, by erecting a partial and secondary meaning of the word *right* in some of its applications into a generic sense which must pervade all its applications, and settle all questions depending on its meaning, as a moral term! Does any thing but usage decide this meaning? When, then, men use the word right in reference to a moral act or state, do they, or do they not mean something else than is implied in the phrase, "a choice of the highest happiness of the sentient universe as a means of my own happiness?" This is a psychological question which each one must answer for himself, looking to it that his answer does not contradict the consciousness of the human race, as shewn by their words and their deeds. What that answer must be, is not a matter of doubt. And it directly contradicts the assumption which runs not only through the above argument, but through these two volumes, that there is no good but happiness or the means of happiness.

We have seen it recently stated by an apologist of Dr Taylor's ethical theory, that he was accustomed to say in his lectures somewhat as follows: "We hold that virtue and vice are respectively good and evil in themselves. We do not allow our opponents exclusively to appropriate this language. We attach great importance to it." The following quotation shews in what sense he adopted this phrase. "There are, generally speaking, two things and only two, each of which may properly be said to be *evil in itself*. The one is *suffering*, including unhappiness or misery, and the other is the *direct means* of suffering. Each is truly and properly said to be *evil in itself*, in distinction from being evil as *the indirect means* of suffering."—P. 132, vol. ii. What is this but a dexterous word-play? After all, the evil of sin is not intrinsic, but lies solely in its being the means of suffering—precisely what his adversaries charge—and what the above language is not even an attempt to parry, and only a very poor attempt to disguise. In this sense destitution of food and raiment, foul air, close confinement, are evils in themselves. They are the direct means of

suffering. Have they, therefore, the intrinsic evil of blasphemy, perjury, and malice, *i. e.*, intrinsic moral turpitude?

One other evasion, which is put forward in defence of this scheme by its abettors, with all the pomp and circumstance of demonstration, whenever they find themselves *in extremis*, we must notice. It is shadowed forth in the passage already quoted from pages 32-35. It is there maintained, that if a moral agent were unsusceptible to happiness from the happiness of others, and to misery from the misery of others, he would be indifferent to them, would not choose or refuse them, and they could be neither good nor evil to him. In short, the familiar axiom of moral liberty, that in all free choice we choose as we please, is the virtual premise for proving that if we choose at all, we must choose our own pleasure or happiness. To which we reply,

1. This confounds the subjective impulse which impels or determines choice with the object chosen. Because I choose as I please, it by no means follows that I may not be pleased to choose goodness, truth, beauty, as such, on account of their perceived intrinsic excellency, and irrespective of any perceived relations to my own happiness. Nay, does not the possibility of delight in the highest objects to a noble mind, depend on their perceived objective intrinsic excellency? How does it appear that a man may not be pleased with other objects as well as his own happiness, or things considered as the means thereof? Does not every man's consciousness attest that he may be pleased with the noble, the beautiful, the true, irrespective of their perceived relations to his own happiness?

2. This destroys all differences in voluntary action. The argument is, that virtue must consist exclusively in the pursuit of happiness, because men cannot choose objects in which they feel no interest, or which they are not pleased to choose. In this sense, and to the fullest extent, vicious and virtuous choices are alike. They are so, simply because they are choices, and it is the nature of choice to choose as we please. It is the nature of the *objects* chosen, and in which we find pleasure, not the mere subjective choosing as we please, that determines the moral character of the choice and of the man choosing. And he alone who loves the good *as good*, is a good man. Indeed, the argument now under consideration, obliterates not only all moral, but all other distinction between choices.

Another source of plausibility in many of the statements of Dr Taylor, and the whole Epicurean and Utilitarian school, is found in the intuitive conviction of the whole human race, that there is, under the government of a holy God, an inviolable nexus between holiness and happiness, sin and misery; and,

moreover, that aside from positive rewards and punishments, in their own nature, the one gives peace, no matter what present suffering it may involve; the other gives torment, no matter what transient pleasures it may procure. But though in moral beings, sin and misery, holiness and happiness, always mutually suppose each other, it does not follow that they are identical, or are so regarded, in the universal judgments of the race. Solidity supposes figure, colour, extension. These are not, therefore, identical. The rational and animal natures coexist in man. They are not, therefore, the same. The practice of holiness is the sure road to happiness. Wisdom's ways are ways of pleasantness. It does not, therefore, follow that pleasantness, or the pursuit of it, involves all that is implied in wisdom. Nay, the pursuit of happiness, except in subordination to holiness as a good to be sought in some measure for its own sake, is the inevitable forfeiture of it. He that seeks his life shall lose it; he that loseth his life for Christ's sake shall find it. But those who make happiness the only good, often employ the same language as those who make holiness the supreme good, and all the more readily, since happiness follows moral goodness, as the shadow the substance. In aid of this comes the *petitio principii*, which runs through these volumes, that nothing is good but happiness or the means of happiness. This is the very thing to be proved. It is simply assumed without proof. But when Dr Taylor asks, in innumerable forms, as if concluding all debate on these subjects, whether that action can be virtuous which does not seek some good, he asks a self-answering question. The answer is conclusive for his purpose, if we grant his postulate, that there is no good but happiness or the means thereof. But it is wholly in a circle and irrelevant for the purpose of proving this, the spinal principle of the happiness scheme, without which it falls helplessly and irremediably.

The exhibition of this theory which we have thus given at great length in the words of its author, is its refutation. On its own shewing it subverts the first principles of morals, the intrinsic difference between virtue and vice; and enthrones a shifting expediency in place of eternal and immutable morality. All but seeking the highest happiness of the sentient universe, is classed among things indifferent; good or evil not in themselves, but according to circumstances. In support of this view, Dr Taylor refers to our Saviour's doctrine in regard to the Sabbath, Matt. xii. 1-13, to prove "that the greatest good is to be done in all cases, notwithstanding the unqualified language of particular precepts."—Vol. i., p. 58. The Sabbath is a positive institute as regards the time and form of its observance. Like all positive institutes, the manner of its obser-

vance is a thing in itself indifferent, and becomes good or evil according as it promotes or hinders the higher moral and immutable interests to which it is auxiliary. All this is determined and varied, and made binding by the express command of God, according to his infinite wisdom. But does all this serve to shew that there is nothing intrinsically good or evil, but a benevolent or selfish purpose—that there are exceptions at the behest of expediency to the intrinsic obligation of veracity, justice, &c.? Believe this who will.

We cannot forbear adding, that if the quality of moral action lies not in its nature, but its perceived tendencies, or consequences to the highest happiness or misery of sentient being, then it must be for ever impossible for men to know the moral quality of their actions further than as they are taught it by the authority of revelation. Says Dr Taylor: "In respect to the most momentous agency in the universe of causes, *moral action*, he (the agent) knows what is true, what is false, what is good, what is evil, according to the eternal and immutable nature of things. Act as he may, he acts with a just and adequate view and comprehension of all that need be known, that the great end of all being, of all existence, may be accomplished or defeated."—Vol. i., pp. 36, 37. Now this is true, if the moral quality of actions be intrinsic and seen to be so. This quality may be as surely seen by the moral faculty in actions, as beauty or colours in objects by the eye, at the first dawn of intelligence or moral agency. But on the supposition that the right or wrong of actions depends upon their consequences to the happiness or misery of the sentient universe, who of men can calculate the consequences near and remote of his conduct? Or, if it were possible for any man, at what age does the intellect become sufficiently developed and comprehensive for this purpose? When, if ever, can moral agency begin on this supposition? What did Joseph's brethren or Christ's crucifiers know about the bearings of their nefarious deeds on the happiness or misery of the "sentient universe?" They meant it for evil, but God meant it for good. Gen. l. 20. Does the child, when committing the most common sin of childhood, and conscience-smitten for it, know or think of its bearings on the happiness of the sentient universe? If he did not know that it was wrong in itself, could he ever know that it was wrong at all! And what is the testimony of the universal consciousness of men on this subject! Do they undertake to compute, if this were possible, the consequences of most actions to the happiness or misery of the sentient universe, in order to adjudge, approve or condemn them as worthy or unworthy, noble or mean, right or wrong? Are veracity, fidelity, magnanimity, self-sacrifice, piety, falsehood, treachery,

sordidness, selfishness, estimated by this arithmetic? Would it ever be possible to know right or wrong, whether they were doing good or evil that good might come, on such a theory. So far as we can see, it puts moral action beyond the range of possibility.

We omit other comments which this scheme invites, except so far as they may rise collaterally in our observations upon those modifications of Christian doctrine, urged by Dr Taylor, with which they are implicated.

Deists and Universalists, however, are not silenced, if this whole scheme be conceded; if it be granted that the Divine goodness consists exclusively in benevolence, and that benevolence requires the utmost possible punishment of the wicked, both as regards intensity and duration. The question still arises, if the one exclusive desire of the Almighty be the highest or the perfect happiness of the sentient universe, why does he not effect it? Dr Taylor is not at a loss for an answer. He says, "Can human ingenuity devise an answer, or even be authorised to say there can be any other reason, except that a perfect God cannot prevent all sin, even under the best conceivable system, or in other words, cannot prevent all sin for ever without destroying moral agency?"—Vol. ii., p. 366. He more than intimates that the denial of this inability in God leads logically to "Atheism, Infidelity, and Universalism." Vol. i., p. 324. It might be rejoined, Why does not God make a delighted sentient universe, without this intractable element of free-agency to destroy or impair it? Or if it be said, that free-agency is an indispensable requisite to high and rapturous enjoyment, how does it appear that God cannot control without destroying it? Says Dr Taylor, "Moral agency implies free-agency—the power of choice—the power to choose morally wrong as well as morally right, under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action."—Vol. i., p. 307. "Moral beings, under this best moral system, must have power to sin, in despite of all that God can do under this system to prevent them; and to suppose that they should do what they can under this system, viz., sin, and that God should prevent their sinning, is a contradiction and an impossibility. It *may be true* that such beings in this respect, will do what they can do—that is, will sin—when of course it would be impossible that God, other things remaining the same, should prevent their sinning without destroying their moral agency."—Vol. i., pp. 321, 322. This, Dr Taylor argues, does not limit the power of God, because the accomplishment of contradictions has no relation to power. It is not within the province of power to make two and two equal to five. "No more does it imply any deficiency in power on his part, that he cannot prevent in supposable

cases, beings who can sin in despite of his power, *i.e.* moral beings, from sinning under the best moral system.”—P. 322.

Probably this dogma of Taylorism has contributed to its discredit quite as much as the ethical theory we have examined. To solve the mystery of evil by investing man with a power of contrary choice, superior to divine omnipotence, is hardly more consonant with the feelings of devout Christians, than to restrict his power of choice to happiness as its object, and self-love as its inward motive. However demonstrative Dr Taylor’s argument may be, to shew that we cannot maintain God’s benevolence and sincerity, unless we admit his inability to prevent sin in a moral system; Christians will yet believe that there is some flaw in the argument, whether they can detect it or not. The consequences of such a principle are too radical and subversive of the first principles of religion, to allow of its being entertained at all. These consequences are—

1. The annihilation of God’s providential government. The highest class of creature agents are above his control. No power that God can exert can prevent their acting in opposition to his decrees. There can be no certainty or stability in his administration of the government of the universe. A single uncontrollable free agent may turn all his counsels to confusion, and frustrate the plans of infinite wisdom in the realms of providence and grace. The greatest events may often be traced to the will, or even caprice of single persons, insignificant as well as great. No one knows how vast a network of providential events may be complicated with his most trivial acts. Every one can call to mind insignificant circumstances which have apparently shaped his sphere and his destiny. One of the decisive battles of the Revolution was turned in favour of the American arms, because the British commander chose to finish a game in which he was engaged before reading some despatches sent to him. Says Dr Taylor, “The annihilation of a single particle of matter would *instantly* cause some change throughout the material system; nor can it easily be told how long before the world would rush to chaos.” And is not any act of a free agent more in itself and its relations than a material atom?”

2. On this system prayer must be, to a great extent, “empty breath.” All spiritual blessings, and nearly all temporal blessings require some action of free moral agents, either in their bestowment or realization. But these are endued with a power to frustrate God’s will and purpose. He is dependent upon their permission, which he has no power to ensure, for the privilege of executing or conferring any good which involves their agency.

3. On this system, it is not God who makes Christians to differ from other men. They make themselves to differ. The theory is, that God is doing all he can to make men good and happy, but is defeated with regard to a portion, by the exercise of a power to sin, which is an over-match for all the power he can exercise to subdue it. Others do not so frustrate the effort of God to draw them to himself. To whom, then, are they indebted for the difference between themselves and the ungodly? Surely, if this theory be true, to themselves; and there is an end of the sovereignty of grace.

4. It is impossible on this scheme for God to work or implant holiness in the soul. It is for a power to act despite all God's power—to decide whether and on what conditions omnipotence itself shall induce it to be holy. There is no room nor possibility for the creation of a new heart and right spirit by the immediate exercise of a divine power upon the soul. The work of the Spirit must be essentially like that of the preacher, *suasory*, by the objective presentation of truth and motives. Says Dr Taylor, discussing this subject, "The direct prevention of sin, or, which is the same thing, the direct production of holiness in moral agents by dint of omnipotence, is an absurdity."—Vol. i., p. 308. This is a great deal for a Christian theologian to say, but no more than this theory requires him to say. But how does such a view quadrate with those scriptural representations which exhibit God as creating a new heart, quickening those dead in trespasses and sins, as exerting the exceeding greatness of his power upon those who believe, even according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead?—Eph. i. ii.

5. It is obvious that this scheme involves plenary ability to obey God perfectly without divine grace. This is not disguised, but earnestly maintained by Dr Taylor, against what the church has understood to be the plain averments of the Bible, and every historical creed of Christendom.

6. No man's salvation is sure on this theory. Whatever may be his present strength of faith, who will dare ensure himself against apostasy, by virtue of any goodness within himself? And while he cannot ensure himself, he has a power within him which is liable to fall, despite all that men, angels, or God can do to prevent it.

7. For the same reason, there is no security against the fall and revolt of holy angels and redeemed men in heaven.*

* Dr Taylor argues on the supposition that the only alternative to his theory is, that "sin is the necessary means of the greatest good." This is the alternative adopted by Emmons and some New England theologians. It is the logical alternative, if we take for our "point of departure" the utilitarian scheme, or Dr Taylor's form of that scheme of ethics. That "sin is the neces-

For these and other like reasons, this theory can never command the faith of God's people. No apparent conclusiveness of metaphysical demonstration can establish it in the face of those elementary Christian truths which it subverts. The judgment of the church will still be that there must be some flaw in the supposed demonstration, whether it can be detected or not. Even Universalists cannot be brought to believe that God cannot control the acts of moral agents. If eternal punishment can only be vindicated by such a theory, they will regard it as incapable of vindication. They will be confirmed in their soul-destroying delusion. We doubt whether a solitary instance can be found of an Atheist, Deist, or Universalist, reclaimed by means of this scheme.

We do not, however, for a moment admit that there is even a respectable show of even a seeming demonstration that God cannot prevent, or that it may be that he cannot prevent sin, without the destruction of moral agency. The alleged demonstration, as we have seen, is that since moral agents must have power to sin, to suppose them prevented from sinning, supposes them dispossessed of the power which makes them moral agents—which is to suppose that moral agents are not moral agents—a contradiction, the accomplishment of which is beyond the range of power.

This could not assume even the look of a demonstration in the view of one who did not overlook distinctions which Dr Taylor elsewhere and abundantly makes. It is one thing to have the power to sin in every sense requisite to moral agency—that is, the power to commit sin, if the agent is pleased to do it. It is quite another, that it should not be made certain

sary means of good," is for them to maintain who avow it. This is no part of our theology, or of church theology, whatever individual polemics may have promulged. In regard to the permission of evil, we are glad to take refuge in "mystery," notwithstanding Dr Taylor's protest that such a course will not satisfy atheists.

It is proper, however, that we should recognise what God has been pleased to reveal on this subject. It is quite certain that redemption is the grandest outshining of the perfections and glories of God; and that it was his eternal purpose, that by the redeemed church should be made known unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places the manifold wisdom of God.—Eph. iii. 10. It is equally certain that redemption, and God's declarative glory therein, are impossible without sin. Redemption from sin without sin is indeed a contradiction. The preservation of moral agents from sinning is not a contradiction. This may throw some light upon the divine permission of sin; not enough, however, to clear it of all mystery. However this may be, it is no proper use of language to call "sin the necessary means of the greatest good." That cannot be good, or the means of good, which is itself evil, and evil only, and requires to be counteracted and frustrated in order to any good whatever. The pollution of our great cities is the occasion of much Christian and philanthropic self-sacrifice for its abatement. This is a great good, which would not otherwise exist. Is this pollution, therefore, properly the means of good, because it is the occasion of noble efforts to neutralise it, which otherwise would be impossible?

that he will not exercise this power in sinning. The former by no means involves the latter. But unless it supposes the latter, it is unavailing to support the conclusion built upon it. Has not the Most High consummate powers of moral agency? Yet does not the holiness of his nature make it so certain that he will never do evil, that it is declared without hyperbole that he cannot deny himself, and that it is impossible for him to lie? Are not the holy angels and glorified saints free moral agents? And is it not made certain that they will never sin without infringement of their moral agency? Will not the saints on earth be kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation without infringement of their moral agency. There is no contradiction, then, in supposing that it may be made certain that a being who has the power to sin will not sin—*i. e.*, should be prevented from sinning without prejudice to his freedom.* What freedom can be conceived of but that of doing or choosing as he pleases? Would it lend any new finish or grace to moral agency, to suppose him endowed with a mysterious uncontrollable property of doing or choosing the contrary of what he pleases, or would he be in any manner responsible for the actings of such a power—a whit more so than for the beatings of his pulse? And is it a contradiction that it should be made certain what it will please a moral agent freely to choose and do? Cannot God do his pleasure among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of earth without impairing their moral agency? At all events, what has been done, it can be no contradiction in the nature of things to do. The contradictions which are no objects of power, are, in the expressive phrase of Dr Taylor, “mere thought-things,” whose actual existence is neither possible nor conceivable. The making it certain that free agents will use their freedom in a given way is alike conceivable, possible, and actual.

2. The ground we have taken is fully sanctioned by Dr Taylor himself. In arguing the universality of God’s purposes (which must inevitably be subverted by the hypothesis we have been refuting), he says, “who can doubt that physical propensities may be so strong toward a given action or

* This whole conception of freedom, as involving in its very nature a state of equilibration between good and evil, and so a liability to contrary and sinful choices, is a superficial, empirical induction from the phenomena of our fallen state. It is contradictory to the normal and rational idea of freedom, as it is realized in the most perfect moral agents. For God, for holy angels, for man restored to heavenly perfection, evil has no attractions. There is in them no oscillation or equipoise between sin and holiness. Perfect freedom, even up to the point of perfect spontaneity on the one hand, and immovable continuance in good on the other, are different phases of the same moral perfection. The very fact of a propensity to wrong, having power to act upon the will so as to produce any hesitancy in it between good and evil, or to render an evil choice practicable, is itself a symptom of an inward lapse from perfect rectitude. This view was one of the strong points made by Augustine against Pelagius.

course of action, and the motives or temptations so powerful, that such action will be certain? But if this may be so in one case, it may be in all . . . None will deny that the voluntary acts of the Divine Being are certain, nor that the divine nature is the ground of such certainty. Is it not equally undeniable, that there is in the nature of things a ground or reason why a being of such a nature as God chooses and acts in every instance as he does choose and act? If so, then the real ground or reason of the certainty of his acts is substantially the same with what we affirm to be the ground or reason of the certainty of human action . . . God in this respect made man in his own image.”—Vol. ii., p. 313. “Every one who acts voluntarily or as a free agent, knows why he acts as he does. But whatever be the reason why one acts in a given manner, is the reason of the certainty of such action. Now that this is a matter of human consciousness, supersedes the necessity of further argument.”—Pp. 314, 315. “If it be asked what gives this certainty of the wrong moral action, we may, or may not be able to assign some one antecedent as the cause. ground, or reason of this certainty in all cases. It may be the nearness of the inferior good, or it may be the peculiar vividness of the mind’s view of it, or it may be any one of many other possible circumstances.”—Vol. i., p. 195. But is it not clear that all these antecedents which fix the certainty of moral action, right or wrong, are within the control of the Most High? And so far as we can see, might they not have been so shaped as to prevent all sin? Is it then asked why he did not prevent it? We do not know. We can only say, “Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight!” Dr Taylor says, “It is vain, and worse than in vain, to cry out ‘*mystery*,’ in answer to Atheists who plead the existence of evil against the being of God.” Be it so. We yet deem it safer, more reverent, and more likely to benefit even Atheists, than to deny God’s sovereign power over moral agents.

3. Dr Taylor’s ethical scheme is utterly inconsistent with this alleged power to act, despite all opposing power. As has been abundantly shewn, it is part of this scheme that nothing can be an object of choice but happiness or the means of happiness. Nothing can be an inward spring or source of volition but self-love, or the desire of happiness. If this be so, how plain is it that those objects must be chosen which are deemed most conducive to happiness in preference to all others. Suppose two objects offered to the mind’s election. One is deemed more, the other less, conducive to happiness. That by which the former differs from the latter, therefore, is its tendency to happiness. According to this scheme, therefore, it must be chosen, or else choice is made without a motive. What be-

comes, then, of this stupendous power of contrary choice, with power to act despite all opposing power? *

Our readers have, of course, already seen that the plenary ability of sinners to perfectly keep the whole law, is implied and expressed in the parts of the treatise we have already considered. But as this is a chief feature of his scheme, to which in various ways other parts are subsidiary; as the author deemed it indispensable to the due power of the gospel for parrying the cavils of sceptics and unconverted men; as he avows himself most unmistakeably in the statement of his own dogma of ability, and in denunciation of the theology of the whole church on this subject, his deliverances upon it deserve more special attention. The following passage reveals his mind with emphasis:—

“And here I am constrained to ask, whether in all this theology, both Catholic and Protestant, theologians, in maintaining the doctrines of grace, have not extensively maintained opinions—philosophical dogmas, unscriptural principles—and held them as essential doctrines of the word of God, which are palpably inconsistent with, and utterly subversive of, God’s authority as a lawgiver? Without referring to more remote incongruities on this subject, may it not be said to be a prevalent doctrine of the Christian church from the time of Augustine, and emphatically in the two great divisions of the Reformed church, known as the Calvinistic and Arminian, that ‘God commands what man *cannot* perform;’ ‘that man by the fall lost all ability of will to anything spiritually good;’ ‘that God did not lose his right to command, though man lost his power to obey?’ ‘The error of Pelagius is, not that he maintained man’s ability to obey God without grace, but that man does *actually* obey God without grace.’—Vol. ii., p. 112.†

* We find at the end of a recent volume, entitled “*Evil not from God*,” by John Young, LL.D., of Edinburgh, and republished in this country by Mason Brothers of New York, the following note:—“While these sheets were going through the press, the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, for last January, was shewn to me by a friend. Amongst others, there is an article on sin, containing a review of a recent work by Dr Squiers of America. That work it is my misfortune never to have seen. But it delights me to learn from the review that in one point, the impreventability of sin, Dr Squiers maintains the view which is put forth in this volume.” This is a book of vastly higher ability than that which it refers to as authority. The theory in question has often appeared in past ages, and has as often been repudiated by the church. It is amusing to see these sepulchred heresies unearthed from time to time, and given forth, in all simplicity, as new discoveries. Especially is it amusing to see Transatlantic writers referring to obscure authors in this country, who feebly reflect the opinions which have been alternately broached and refuted by our ablest divines for thirty years, as if they had been equally fortunate with themselves in discovering a new principle in theology, and were lending to it the weight of their authority.

† We suspect that Pelagius would hardly have troubled himself to combat such a doctrine as this. Let any one study Neander’s analysis and exposition of the Pelagian controversy, in its doctrinal issues, and the inner spirit and aim of Pelagius and Augustin, and he will find himself in little doubt as to the respective sides with which our American New and Old Schools respectively class. See *Neander’s Church History*, Torrey’s translation, vol. ii., pp. 5, 64, 626.

Before proceeding farther, we remark just here,

1. The foregoing is an explicit admission, nay, charge, that the doctrine of man's inability without grace to obey God, is and has been the settled and universal faith of the Christian church. It is, therefore, one of the fixed cardinal doctrines of Christianity, which, if anything can, may be regarded and treated as past dispute among Christians, and not fairly to be called in question, except among outsiders.

2. Is it not absurd to assert that a doctrine is utterly subversive of God's authority as a lawgiver, which confessedly has been embraced by the whole Christian church, all the good and holy of earth, all who have recognised and obeyed his authority as a lawgiver? Ought not this decisive fact to suggest to a considerate inquirer that he probably misconceives the doctrine in its import and influence, before he ventures such unmitigated denunciation of it? Is not this proof that it is not so evidently monstrous and repugnant to the intuitive convictions of men, as he maintains?

3. In view of the foregoing, and other statements, we not only regret with his eulogist, Dr Dutton, that Dr Taylor should have spent so much of his "precious time" in trying to shew his orthodoxy according to the symbols of the church. We are astounded at the courage which could have attempted it.

Dr Taylor founds much on the statement of the divine law as given by Christ, as "measuring man's duty by his ability," when it says, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself."—Vol. ii. p. 7. This argument is put in a variety of forms elsewhere. His plausible exegesis of this is that it requires man "to love God as much as he can love him."—P. 137. That it means all our capacity of love absolutely considered is one thing. Our ability to direct this entire absolute capacity of love upon a particular object for which we have a dislike, is another matter. Suppose that one should command another to love a neighbour whom he abhors with all his heart, mind, and strength. If he "loves him as much as he can love him," *i. e.*, not at all, or slightly, does he come up to the meaning of the precept? Does he love him with all his heart? As we have already intimated, this command makes ability the measure of obligation, only so far as the absolute capacity of loving at all is concerned. It does not require men to love with angelic faculties. It requires that amount of love which he would be capable of, were he not disabled by his sin. But it does not recognise as the love of all the heart, mind, and strength, such affection as a sinful unrenewed heart can render to God. Can the carnal mind, which is not subject to the law of God, *neither indeed*

can be, love God with all the heart, mind, soul, and strength? But wherein lies its disability? Simply in its condition of enmity against God, *i. e.*, its sin. The inability of the unrenewed soul is its sin. God requires nothing which we could not perform, if our sin did not disable us. Our sinful lusts enslave us. Are they their own excuse? or do they excuse the non-performance of duties to which we should be adequate without them, or do they annul God's right to command the discharge of such duties?

This inability which all Christendom asserts in its creeds, its literature, and still more strongly in its devotions, is simply the inability of sin to conquer and extirpate itself. Of this inability every awakened man is intimately conscious. And he is no less conscious that he is culpable just in proportion to the rooted, invincible strength of his sinful lusts. Dr Taylor is good authority for the principle that speculation weighs nothing against consciousness. But it is claimed that man is conscious of power to will either way as he pleases. This is not denied. But sin lies deeper in the soul than these merely phenomenal acts of what is here called will, even in the covetings, the lusts, desires of the flesh and the mind—the HEART. Who does not know that he cannot expel or mortify the deceitful lusts of his soul, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, covetousness, ambition, worldliness, ungodliness, by merely willing to do it? that when he *would* do good evil is present with him? Who does not know that he cannot, by a mere act of will, or by any power within himself, or by any resource short of supernatural grace, fill his soul with faith, love, hope, and joy in God? But what Christian is insensible that he ought to have these feelings and affections, and that it is his sin to be partially or wholly destitute of them? That the affections and desires are not immediately under the control of the will, is indeed admitted by Dr Taylor himself. Speaking of other objects besides God, he says, "man cannot extinguish all affection in his heart for each and all of them."—Vol. ii. p. 192. Indeed, his whole theory of the will implies its inability to overcome and extinguish that "self-love or desire of happiness," which, he maintains, prompts and determines all voluntary action. But it may be said that these affections, which it cannot suppress, are innocent. That is another matter. Still it proves none the less the impotence of the will to control the affections, and the certainty that the affections—the deeper seat of moral character, as we maintain—control the will. Let one whose soul cleaveth to the dust, will that his affections shall be set on things above. Does this volition set them there, *propriis viribus*?

Dr Taylor, however, represents all the appetencies of the

soul which are not acts or products of will in the narrow sense of a power of choosing between two objects, as "constitutional susceptibilities" to good from different objects, in themselves void of moral character. Accordingly he says, "If it be said that God in regeneration gives man *the power* to will morally right, or to obey, or produces some other constitutional change in the mind, called a *new taste* or *relish*, diverse from right moral action, I answer, that to create any new mental power or property, is not to produce a new moral character, nor that which necessarily ensures such a character; that such a change in man is never taught in the Scriptures; and further, the Scriptures have not only never taught that man is unable to do his duty perfectly—*i. e.*, to act morally right, but the contrary, in the express terms of the divine law," &c.—Vol. ii., p. 21. We regret that this, and all else that we have quoted from the first thirty pages of the second volume, is from a lecture, written, as the editor informs us, only six months before his death. The words taste and relish were used by Dr Dwight and some others to denote what has been commonly indicated by disposition, principle, habit, or by affection and inclination. But they are in no sense "constitutional." It is, no doubt, a property of the human constitution to have some tastes or dispositions. But their being towards good or evil, holiness or sin, God or the world, is not "constitutional." Human nature—the human constitution—remains in its essential properties and faculties, whether any given dispositions, which are accidents of it, be present or absent. And is it to be seriously maintained by a Christian theologian, that no such relish, taste, or disposition is wrought in the soul by the Holy Ghost in regeneration, disposing and empowering it to holy exercises, of affection and of choice? On what pretext can it be denied, in the face of those manifold declarations of Scripture, which speak of God's giving, creating a new heart, shedding abroad his love in the heart by the Holy Ghost, of his quickening those dead in trespasses and sins; of our being his workmanship, created anew in Christ Jesus unto good works; of our being born of God, born of the Spirit, &c.? Do not these, and innumerable other passages, assert a work of God's Spirit in the soul, disposing and enabling it to obey the gospel? It is to no purpose to say, as our author does, that regeneration is a moral change, and therefore must be an act of the will of the subject of it; that the love of God shed abroad in the heart is an act of the person loving, that if God works in us to will and to do, we will and do.—Pp. 20, 21. That there cannot be a change in our moral state which is not an act of our own will is the very thing to be proved, not taken for granted. That we love, is true; but this is in consequence of

God's putting in us the disposition or heart to love. And we will and do what is pleasing to him, when he works in us that disposition which inclines and enables us thereunto. The truth is, Dr Taylor and his adherents persistently confound regeneration and conversion—the work of God renewing the soul with the act of man, flowing from this renovated state, in which he believes, repents, turns to God, and does works meet for repentance. Surely when men are turned they repent. When God gives faith, they believe. When he begets them unto a lively hope, they rejoice in hope. This is something far higher than Dr Taylor represents it—"no other than a change by a sinful moral being of his own moral character."—P. 22. Nor is it, as he would have us understand, "to transform the trees of the forest, or the stones of the street, into moral agents; or to change the physical properties, or physical laws of things created—things, including man himself, pronounced by their Creator to be very good."—P. 23. Such language exposes nothing but its author's ignorance of orthodox doctrine. It is not trees or stones upon which God puts forth this "working of his mighty power," but rational, voluntary, sinful, immortal men. Nor does he make them herein moral agents. They are such already, although "corrupt according to deceitful lusts." Nor are the physical, or other laws of man's being, changed. This change, though supernatural, is not a miracle contravening the laws of nature; it is wrought in harmony with the laws of our corporeal and spiritual, our rational and voluntary nature. Much less does it change aught that God pronounced very good. It simply eliminates the corruption and blight with which man's sin has degraded and deformed that which God pronounced very good. It does not create new "constitutional" faculties which did not before exist—faculties of intellect, sensibility, or will, in which sense Dr Taylor often uses the word "power"—but it removes the moral vitiosity which disorders and depraves the action of these faculties, whereby they are "indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good."

Truth is very apt to assert itself even in the thought and speech of those who impugn it. The doctrine of the church has been that sin is self-perpetuating. "He that committeth sin is the servant of sin," and can only be liberated from his bondage, even though it be a willing bondage, by Divine grace. Dr Taylor describes the "selfish preference," as "alike ceaseless in its activity and duration."—Vol. i., p. 28. He maintains that the moral agent is called upon "to choose God or an inferior good as his portion *once for all*. The transgressor does in his first act of sin become, *ipso facto*, an eternal rebel against God."—Vol. ii., pp. 230, 231. Again: "It is true

indeed that the natural man, the man enthralled by grovelling appetite and passion, discerneth not the things of the Spirit, neither can he know them. Such a man, under such a mental tyranny, must be a miserable interpreter of the lively oracles of God. His very intellect, by the bad dominion of this state of mind, is not only unfurnished with the first principles, the very elements of successful interpretation, but is stupefied and cramped as to all vigorous action on such subjects. The soul's constitutional discernment is peculiarly blunted in respect to the beauty, and weight, and excellence of Divine realities, and disqualified for that perception which is necessary to give them their practical influence. In this state of sinful enthrallment, the man cannot appreciate, nor apprehend, nor successfully judge of the things of God's revelation."—*Ib.*, p. 216. To our view, there is more of vital truth in this simple statement than in all the rest of his toilsome reasonings about ability. We only wonder at his life-long efforts to rear a fabric which he so unceremoniously strikes down at a single blow.

Of course, the denial of native sinfulness and of all sin, until the age of developed moral agency, when the moral agent can see the consequences of his act to the happiness or misery of sentient being, is implied in the theories we have been considering. But as this topic is not emphasised or elaborated in these volumes, we omit specific comment upon it.

On no subject is Dr Taylor more earnest or denunciatory of standard theologians, than atonement, justification, and connected topics. We have already seen features of his ethical system, which must of themselves undermine the doctrine of the church on this subject. If there is no good but happiness and the means thereof, no evil but misery and the means thereof; if holiness has no intrinsic desert of approbation and favour, and sin no intrinsic demerit; if God's moral government is administered solely for the purpose of accomplishing the highest happiness of the universe, requiring obedience and prohibiting disobedience, solely as a means to this end; if the innocent, without their own consent, and the guilty might rightly be made to change places as to reward and punishment, provided this would enhance the happiness of the sentient universe; if justice is only a specific form of benevolence,—of course the very fundamental ideas on which the received doctrine in regard to Christ's atonement rest, and by which alone it can be explained, are utterly subverted.

We have no space for a minute examination of Dr Taylor's positions on this subject. His theory, with some modifications, is the governmental scheme introduced by the younger Edwards. The distinctive characteristic of this scheme is, that it treats the atonement exclusively as a device of state, to render the

pardon of penitent believers consistent with the authority of law, and the highest happiness of the universe, and not at all as a provision required by the inherent turpitude and ill-desert of sin in discharge of the demand of justice, and the threatening of the law. The scheme is reasoned out mostly on the principles which underlie human governments, between which and the government of the infinite God there is a partial analogy. and, at the same time, an immense difference. The very idea of satisfaction for sin seems abhorrent to Dr Taylor, and he devotes pages to the denunciation of it, or rather to a figment of his own imagination, than to any recognised idea which this term is employed to indicate. He reasons that the claim of the law is obedience, and that this can never be satisfied in case of disobedience. "It is inconceivable and impossible that a perfectly benevolent lawgiver should be *satisfied* with sin, and with the infliction of the legal penalty on transgressors, as a substitute for their perfect obedience and consequent perfect blessedness."—Vol. ii., p. 141. Is it really necessary to say, that it is no part of the doctrine of satisfaction that God is satisfied with sin? It is because he abhors it, that when it is committed the very rectitude of his nature impels him to manifest that abhorrence by visiting upon it its proper deserts of indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish. If it go unpunished, if it be treated like innocence and virtue, our intuitive judgment is that injustice is done, that there is a lesion in the moral system, a derangement of moral relations. The criminality of sin, of course, cannot be obliterated. The only possible compensation or reparation of the evil of it is punishment. This justice demands. Without it, it is unsatisfied. So the law—the articulate expression of eternal justice—is not satisfied with sin; but if sin be committed, it is unsatisfied without the infliction of the penalty it denounces. This punishment the sinner owes to the law and justice of God—to him and his kingdom, wronged by his sin. So it is due *from* him. He deserves it. So it is *to* him. The claim of justice is satisfied with its infliction, and with nothing else; certainly not with the sin which deserves it. So it is styled a debt—*i. e.*, a thing due. Satisfaction in this sense is rendered when this penalty is discharged, either by the offender or a satisfactory substitute. These conceptions harmonise with the representations of Scripture. It tells us of every transgression receiving its just *recompense* of reward, Heb. ii. 2; that it is a righteous thing in God to *recompense* tribulation to them that trouble his people, 2 Thess. i. 6; that he will recompense—that he will repay fury to his enemies, Isa. lix. 18; vengeance is mine, I will *repay*, saith the Lord, Rom. xii. 19. If such language does not import the intrinsic ill-desert of sin,

and that God will visit upon it the penal recompense which is its due, then it seems to us impossible for language to express these ideas.

Consonant with this is the constant representation in the scriptures of the intent and effect of Christ's death. They tell us that he suffered the just for the unjust; that for the transgression of God's people he was stricken; that he bare our sins, and became sin and a curse for us; that he purchased, redeemed, ransomed us with his own blood. If these phrases do not import that he bore the punishment, and discharged the obligation to, or debt of suffering, which our sin had incurred, then how can language do it? And why did he this? "That God might be JUST, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Dr Taylor allows himself to say, more than once, that the punishment of sin on account of its intrinsic demerit, or for any purpose except the promotion of happiness, is "beyond the capacity of infernal malice."—Vol. ii., p. 278. And is it "more than infernal malice" to render to sin its just recompense of reward? If it be wicked to punish sin for its intrinsic demerit, can it be right to punish it for the public good—to do that which is in itself evil, that good may come.

But not only does Dr Taylor say that God cannot be satisfied with sin, which, in the sense of approving it, we know to be impossible; he indicates that God cannot be "satisfied with such results of a moral government," as are finally developed under the present administration; that sin "impairs his blessedness;" that he has been "crossed and thwarted in this highest, greatest design, by sin."—*Ib.* pp. 142, 146, 147. We shrink from this limitation of the power and blessedness of God. Our God hath done whatsoever he pleased—his counsel shall stand and he will do all his pleasure. Even the Eternal Son, after all the crying and tears of his earthly agony, shall see of the travail of his soul and be SATISFIED. He is blessed over all, for ever. Even to dwell at his right hand, is to receive the fulness of joy evermore. What! are the grasshoppers of earth, the nations that are less than nothing and vanity, to thwart the designs and impair the blessedness of their Maker? Is this the God of the Bible, and our God?

Dr Taylor thus portrays the orthodox scheme of atonement and justification:

"It maintains that God, in his sovereign supremacy and right, constitutes a mystical union between Christ and the elect, whereby they are *one moral person*! That in consequence of this constituted union, God imputes the sins of the elect to Christ, and in his sufferings and death inflicts the legal penalty of their sins on him; that he also imputes the righteousness of Christ to them; that by these

acts of imputation and mystical union, the sins of the elect become as really the sins of Christ as if he had committed them, and the righteousness and obedience of Christ become as really the righteousness and obedience of the elect as had they rendered it; that thus every justified sinner is regarded, and considered and treated, not merely *as if he had*, but as having really and truly—in *re ipsa*—in his own person never sinned, but perfectly obeyed the divine law; and thus every justified sinner having in actual verity fully met and satisfied and sustained every claim of law and justice, can *meritoriously* claim, before God, justification and eternal life.”—Vol. ii., pp. 155, 156.

Dr Taylor is unsparing in his invectives against the scheme above misstated. He speaks of “sovereign acts of necromancy, called constituting a mystical union, imputation,” p. 173; of “the mystical absurdity of imputing and thereby making the righteousness or obedience of one subject of law, which could only satisfy the claim of law on himself, the righteousness or obedience of others,” p. 144; of its making “known phantasms realities, and known realities phantasms.” “Can an all-perfect lawgiver by sovereign prerogative make eternal truth falsehood, and eternal falsehood truth? Can he by sheer despotic authority set at defiance, transmute, abolish every principle of eternal immutable rectitude, and substitute its opposite in the actual administration of his government? Can he by his mere *sic volo* make myriads of beings one being, and yet each to retain his personal individuality—make one perfectly holy being to *deserve* the legal penalty only due to these sinful myriads, and make these sinful myriads perfectly righteous by the perfect righteousness of one, regard such an exploit and its effects as a reality, proceed to adjudicate the retributions of eternity on the basis of such transmutations, and yet reign in the glory of his justice and in the majesty of his authority?”

“Some may think that to ascribe such views and opinions to wise and good men requires an apology. . . . I have no apology to make for these representations, except my own full conviction of their truth.”—Pp. 160, 161. By these weapons, and the stereotyped cavil that if the penalty of sin be discharged by Christ, there is no grace in the forgiveness of the sinner, twisted into manifold forms, and hurled with remorseless violence at the explicitly enounced doctrine of the symbols of the church, and as we think may be easily shewn, of Scripture—the mystical union of believers with Christ, the imputation of his righteousness to them and of their sins to him are assailed. Our principal object is to shew Dr Taylor’s attitude and animus unmistakeably. While an entire article or volume might easily be written in reply to his extended arguments, our limits constrain us to the briefest possible refu-

tation. This will be for the most part accomplished by correcting his misrepresentations of the scheme on which he heaps such unmeasured obloquy.

1. He says that the mystical union he opposes makes Christ and believers "one moral person." If this phrase is used literally, the word *moral* is a pleonasm. A person *ex vi termini* is a moral being; but what is charged is that "mystical union" involves the contradiction that a plurality of persons are made numerically one person. What author or authors may have represented Christ and his people to be one person we know not—although we recollect some phrases quite analogous in Crisp and other Antinomian extremists—but we do not now remember such phraseology in standard divines or confessions. If used at all by standard theologians, it is used in a metaphorical, not a literal, sense—a use for which we have the authority of Dr Taylor himself, in an analogous but much weaker case of mutual relationship. He says, "as a matter of convenience in the use of language, we may conceive of the public or a community as a moral person."—Vol. ii., p. 266. Surely no Christian will deny that the union between Christ and his people is more intimate and profound than that between the members of a civil community. And suppose that the advocates of mystical union had been unfortunate in their illustrations, is this more than what often happens with regard to important truths, or does it in any manner impair the overwhelming proofs of such union? There is not merely the natural union in that he took part of our nature of flesh and blood, and is our brother; not merely the federal union whereby he stipulates for us as our surety, and with us that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish, but have everlasting life; there is the mystical union constituted by the Holy Spirit, which dwelt in him without measure, dwelling in and vitalising his people with a spiritual life, common to him and them, so that he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit: Christ is our life; he liveth in us; we are quickened together with him; he is the vine, we are the branches; he the head and we his body, yea, members of his body, his flesh, and his bones. One form in which it is shadowed forth, is the marvellous union of husband and wife, whereby "they two become one flesh." Let those who will stigmatise this mystical union between Christ and his church as a "mystical absurdity," it is the well-spring of our salvation and the life of our life: to us it is a great mystery. We speak concerning Christ and his church. Eph. v. 32.

2. Dr Taylor sets forth that imputation implies that the "sins of the elect become the sins of Christ as really as had he committed them," and in like manner the righteousness and obedience of Christ become those of the elect. This lan-

guage may mean more or less ; but it is fitted and probably designed to convey the impression that imputation implies the contradiction that the moral acts and dispositions, whether good or evil, of one person become those of another person ; or are regarded and considered as those of another person inherently. Now is it necessary to iterate for the thousandth time, that imputation means to reckon to the account, as a ground of judgment and treatment, not the transfer or infusion of personal qualities ? Let any one examine his Bible from beginning to end, and he will find that the word *impute* always has and must have this meaning, and the words translated *impute*, are sometimes translated by the equivalent terms, "count," "reckon to the account of." "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." Does not "impute" here speak its own meaning, which is not to transfer or infuse, but reckon to the account of ? "The blessedness of the man unto whom the Lord imputeth righteousness without works." Does this mean the communication of inherent righteousness ? Or does it not mean, most indubitably, reckon righteousness to his account as a basis of judicial treatment ? Whose or what righteousness ? The man's own ? How then can it be without works ? Is it no righteousness at all ? This is the contrary of what is affirmed. What is it then but the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all, and upon all them that believe—that obedience of one by which many are made righteous ? That righteousness of one which is to all men (who believe) for justification of life ? This does not make his righteousness ours, morally or inherently ; but ours only in its title to reward, or as a ground of justification. As well might it be said, when a surety pays the debt of his principal, either that the money with which it is discharged is the money of the principal, or that it is not counted to him as a discharge of his debt ; or that when a father pays a fine which his son has incurred by crime, and procures his discharge, the son really paid it, because it is reckoned to his account as if he had paid it ; that thus "known phantasms are made realities, and known realities are made phantasms." Imputation in the above sense is plainly and undeniably taught in the Scriptures, word and thing. In this sense and no other, it is taught in our Protestant confessions, and by standard theologians. In this sense *the thing* enters into the faith, the spiritual life of the church, and is the foundation of her hope, whatever may become of the word. With a grief which we cannot express do we find the teachers of the teachers in Israel tasking powers worthy of a nobler service, to impugn and defame it.

And the demonstration from Scripture in regard to the imputation of the sins of believers to Christ is no less cogent.

It is certain that he bare the sins of many ; that knowing no sin he became sin for us ; that on him was laid the iniquity of us all. How ? By becoming morally sinful, or having our sins transfused into him, so that he partook of their moral taint and pollution ? This will not be said. How then, unless they were reckoned to his account as a ground of his bearing their penalty in our place ? Is it said this is unjust ? So it would be, unless done with his full and free consent. Is it said, as Dr Taylor maintains, that it is even then unjust to punish him as ill-deserving ? So it would be, if he were punished as morally ill-deserving. But if he assumes to himself voluntarily another's just obligation to punishment, out of love to him, what then ? Or if this be assailed as unjust, what shall be said of the scheme substituted in its place, wherein all this fearful anguish, at which earth shuddered and the heavens darkened, was inflicted without regard to any sin inherent or imputed ? If that is injustice, is not this the climax of injustice ? But we cannot follow these tortuous cavils. The controversy is not with us, but with the word of God. Thither we remand the adversaries of imputed righteousness. Besides, whoever else may offer the old Socinian objection, that in this scheme innocence and sin change places, it is not for those who maintain the doctrine of expediency, who ask, as we have already seen, and in a way which implies the absence of doubt, if "absolute and universal misery would follow, unless the innocent were to be punished, would it not be right to make innocence, now become the true and necessary cause of such results, the ground of punishment ?" And are such theologians to charge the doctrine that Christ suffered penally, as voluntarily standing in the law-place of his people, and for their sins as having taken them upon himself, with confounding moral distinctions ?

It will be said by some, that this explanation of imputation assimilates it essentially with the views of those who deny it, since they hold that sinners are treated as if they were righteous for Christ's sake. But the ground of the treatment is very different in the two cases. Imputed righteousness is quite different from mere putative or imaginary righteousness. It is a real righteousness reckoned to us, of which we have the eternal benefit. Trusting in this, we build on a sure foundation. On this our salvation rests secure, without infringement of the law, justice, or holiness of God, but supported by these as well as by his love and mercy. In the other case, it is founded neither on our own righteousness, nor the righteousness of another imputed to us. It is in conflict with the law and justice of God, which are both unsatisfied. In the one, mercy and truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other. In the other

we have the mercy and the peace, but where is the truth and the righteousness? But can there be a doubt, which sets the strongest foundations of mercy and peace, or to which a trembling sinner will most joyfully commit his perishing soul?

As to the objection, that if justice is satisfied, there is no grace in the sinner's pardon, put in endless forms, it has been answered a thousand times. It was mercy that provided a ransom for him, so that he could be saved without infringement of justice. Is it any the less mercy, because at a stupendous sacrifice it saves its object, without compromising the perfections, the law, the glory of God? Although it becomes righteous and just in God, to exercise forgiving mercy towards those for whom Christ has purchased it, and to whose faith he has stipulated it; is God any the less gracious because he is just, while he justifieth him that believeth in Jesus? Is grace any the less grace because it "reigns through righteousness?" On this subject it is enough to quote from a document once, if not now required to be subscribed by the Professor of Theology in Yale College, a passage, nearly every sentence of which expresses what is vigorously impugned in these volumes:—"Christ by his obedience and death did fully discharge the debt of all those that are justified, and did by the sacrifice of himself in the blood of his cross, undergoing in their stead the penalty due unto them, make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to God's justice in their behalf; yet, inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace, that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners."—*Confession of Faith of the Churches of Connecticut, adopted at Saybrook, A.D. 1708, chap. xi., 3.*

Here the whole Deity is known,
Nor dares a creature guess,
Which of the glories brightest shone,
The justice or the grace.

Dr Taylor objects to this scheme, that according to it "the sinner can *meritoriously* claim before God, justification and eternal life." On the strength of whose merits? His own? Never. It is the merits of Christ then. Can any but a Socinian fairly complain of this? Or will any evangelical theologian venture to do it? But it is "a claim." How, and in what sense? Is it anything else than a claim founded on the merits of Christ, and in view thereof warranted to every believer by the infallible promise of God? And may not we poor sinners "lay this humble claim" for the salvation of

Christ? If we may not, then woe is us—we are for ever without hope!

And what does Dr Taylor give us as a refuge from sin and the curse, in place of the strong tower which he would demolish? In order to escape the judicial relations of Christ's atonement, and consequent imputation, much of the second volume is devoted to proving that the law of God is a "rule of action but not of judgment." What sort of a law is that which is not a rule of judgment? Is it any law at all, or mere advice? Says Dr Taylor, "any view of God's sovereignty, of mystical union, of imputation or atonement, which separates from God's perfect law, its penal sanction in respect to a transgressor, annihilates that law for the transgressor's benefit."—Vol. ii., p. 172. What hope then remains for the transgressor, unless that penalty can be discharged by an Almighty substitute and surety? This and all other merely governmental schemes say that Christ's sufferings serve the same purpose in the support of law and government, which would be answered by the eternal punishment of penitent believers; and that hence the sin of the latter can be remitted. But does not this separate "God's perfect law from its penal sanction in respect to the transgressor?" And how do Christ's sufferings sustain the violated law, unless they vicariously discharge the justified sinner's obligations to the law? The "absurdities and contradictions" of every kind, which Dr Taylor so lavishly charges upon the church theology, find their true home and birthplace in his own.

There are various other eccentric theories advanced by Dr Taylor, which appear to be maintained chiefly for the purpose of giving consistency to his cardinal doctrine, that benevolence as the means of promoting happiness is the only virtue; and that the penalty of endless punishment for sin is defensible, because benevolence requires the visitation of the highest possible misery upon sin as the antagonist of the greatest happiness. Nothing less would prove God's benevolence; hence his fitness to reign; hence prove his authority and establish his government. Punishment, we are taught, consists exclusively in natural evil or suffering, and the utmost possible degree of it.—Vol. i., p. 160, *et seq.* Therefore spiritual death is not penal. Neither is temporal death, even under a legal dispensation, except as it is a beginning and constituent part of eternal woe.—Vol. ii., p. 225, *et seq.* A long disquisition is written to shew that no civil punishment except death is a legal sanction.—P. 367, *et seq.* The robber who is punished, but not capitally, "is considered and treated as essentially an obedient subject. He is not considered as actuated by a principle hostile to the welfare and existence of the state, nor as

disobedient to the supreme law of the state.—P. 377. The only degrees of punishment which this system admits, result from the varying capacity of the subject, not from variations in the positive infliction of penalty proportioned to varying demerit.—Vol. i., p. 163.

These and other like crudities, ground out by subtle logic from one-sided premises, we must leave to dispose of themselves. It is this process of twisting familiar words and phrases, which bear an established and recognised meaning, to be the vehicles of his peculiar philosophy, which has caused much of the difficulty and embarrassment felt by so many in understanding Dr Taylor's system. The words justice, due, right, wrong, penalty, legal sanction, good, &c., are illustrations of this, some of them being subjected to an elaborate process of this kind. The difficulty did not arise from any studied reticency, or politic reserve, or from his having an esoteric as distinguished from his exoteric system. Our quotations shew, what was so evident to all who knew him, that he was perfectly frank and outspoken in his opinions. There is no difficulty in understanding his system, for those who are capable of apprehending tenuous distinctions and abstract trains of thought.

We think the foregoing analysis of his system makes it sufficiently evident why, since it first flowered out in a sudden promise of triumph, it has been steadily withering and dying out of the theological life of our country. As an antidote to the rationalistic revolt of Universalists, Unitarians, and unbelievers generally, against the gospel of God, it is itself too rationalistic. It concedes too much, and endorses too many of their objections to the evangelical system. Instead of disarming them, it puts weapons into their armoury. Rationalism will not yield to a lower potency of itself. It rather feels itself endorsed and largely invigorated by the new theology, and, instead of conceding to it, boasts of it as a substantial victory.*

Apologetics constitute an important side of theology. Still, they are only its outworks. Their proper function is to shew that the Bible is the word of God, and, as such, entitled to implicit faith and obedience. It may also very properly be shewn, that what is thus revealed is worthy of God, and suited to man. But when we proceed as if we were bound to dispose of all philosophic and sceptical cavils, the rationalistic mind of unbelief is satisfied, and to rationalise the gospel till this result is achieved, we attempt what is a sheer impossibility, unless we explain away the Gospel itself. We let ourselves down from the high vantage-ground of speaking, by divine

* See Ellis's Half-century of the Unitarian Controversy.

authority, truth which commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God, to the level of mere disputants, with the sceptical understanding which will never want the sagacity to put questions a great deal faster than anybody can answer them. Instead of conquering opposition by the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, piercing the heart and conscience of adversaries, we lay aside our divine armour, and go to making terms with them in their own way. The dilutions and modifications of the clear teachings of Scripture, for the purpose of conciliating sceptics, have often emasculated it and invigorated them. When divines sink the authoritative in the apologetic aspect of Christianity, nothing is gained—much is lost. We may well ask in regard to some of these attempts, that “Christianity be defended from its defenders.”

This system has been steadily losing ground among evangelical Christians, because it rationalises some of the first moral truths and Christian doctrines into forms that antagonise with the moral and Christian consciousness. This has been all the more so, as the precise points of collision between this system and the older theology have come to be more fully developed, defined, and apprehended in this consciousness. The resolving all good, all right, into happiness and the means thereof, and all our inward impulses to action ultimately into self-love, contradicts, and even nauseates, not merely the Christian, but the moral consciousness. The assertion of plenary ability, the denial of any inability which is not innocent, conflicts with the most constant and intimate experience of the Christian, and with manifold representations of the word of God, which are written, sealed, witnessed on the heart, in that experience. The notion that creatures, by virtue of moral agency, are, or are liable to be, an overmatch for the Almighty, shocks every reverent feeling, and unsettles the very foundations of confidence in the stability of his throne, and the security of his people and kingdom. The pillars of heaven tremble. The Christian knows that the roots of his sin and of his spiritual life strike deeper than the mere choices of the will—into the desires, covetings, affections, and latent dispositions of his soul; and that all achievements of his mere power of choice are perfunctory and unreliable. And he knows that it is in a Saviour who has borne our sins, and taken their curse upon him, in whose righteousness he can stand, and in whose life, by mysterious union to him, he lives, he has peace, hope, holiness, and strength—the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting. Ingenious tirades and hair-splitting cavils against mystical union and imputation are constantly losing the respect of Christian people. We anticipate, therefore, that the publication of these lectures will accelerate and consummate

the downfall of the peculiar system they advocate. We say this in no disparagement of their power, acuteness, and even eloquence. They shew all these in a degree even unexpected. It is not because they lack ability fully commensurate with the author's fame, but because they reveal clearly and beyond a peradventure what his system is. That system, clearly apprehended, the church never has accepted, and never will accept. These volumes will justify, confirm, and invigorate the immovable opposition which has so long and decisively arrayed itself against Taylorism.

Much more it is in our hearts to say on this subject, but stern necessity forbids. We will only add, that there are many passages in these lectures in the line of practical application, which are not only highly eloquent, but just. Some of these are majestic and alluring representations of the love of God, fitted to soften hearts of stone. Even in these we miss that fulness of Christ, which wells up from the theology he rejects. They are mostly, however, passages directed to Deists, Universalists, and godless philanthropists, who feign for themselves a God too tenderly benevolent to punish sin, and who ignore or repudiate judgment and eternal retributions. Much sentimentalism and "rose-water philanthropy" are expressed with graphic power, and rebuked with indignant eloquence. The terrors of the Lord, with other lines of moving appeal, are arrayed with power before the ungodly and thoughtless. It would give us pleasure, if we had room, to transfer some of these passages to our pages; but they are passages having no special relation to his philosophic or theological peculiarities. They would at least be quite as fully developed from the system he impugns. They are not the new things, which are not true; but the true things, which are not new. To these we could wish he had devoted himself, instead of developing a new philosophy of moral government by which to explain them. Here lies the fountal source of his errors. And so must it ever be with our human excellency of speech or wisdom. One word which the Holy Ghost speaketh—one ray of divine light shot by him into our sin-darkened souls—is worth more than all that wisdom by which the world never knew God.

We have believed, therefore have we spoken; plainly indeed, but with all that respect for the dead which is consistent with fidelity to the living, and to that, in our view, inestimably precious truth, which is attacked in these pages, as our readers have seen, in no soft or honeyed phrase. Dr Taylor has passed beyond these conflicts, and is not under our review. His works are now given to the public for the purpose of moulding its opinions. They are of course on the same footing as other publications, amenable to the bar of impartial and faithful criticism. They compel the defence of what they assail.

ART. II.—*The Atonement in its relations to Law and Moral Government*; by the Rev. ALBERT BARNES. Parry and McMillan: Philadelphia, 1858.

THIS book, as the author states, is the result of his best efforts to meet difficulties on the great doctrine of the Atonement—difficulties which have occurred to himself, and much perplexed him; and it has been published with the laudable desire of relieving other minds beset with like embarrassments. It is a book on law, written by one who had, in early life, intended to enter the legal profession, and is dedicated to a lawyer of high repute.

The class of persons who are supposed to encounter the difficulties which it is the design of the book to remove, are presumed to be conversant with law, and of a philosophic or sceptical turn of mind. The claims of this class to the standing of philosophers may be more readily estimated, after a consideration of their reputed difficulties.

It seems strange that the author should have felt himself under any obligation to apologise for dealing so much in law, as if he were travelling beyond his profession in attempting the discussion of legal principles. His special object demanded the examination of legal principles, and his theme, if rightly apprehended, is a matter of law from beginning to end. Of such importance is the apprehension of this truth, that the man who has failed to discover it, has failed to discover the Gospel. That this book is chargeable with this tremendous oversight, notwithstanding its title-page, will appear in the sequel.

The plan of the book is, for the author's purpose, a very judicious one. In the first place, we are presented with certain difficulties which are said to embarrass philosophic minds in the investigation of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. These difficulties are followed by a statement of the objects which an atonement is intended to secure. Then, in as many consecutive chapters, the author argues the probability, necessity, and nature of the Atonement. Having thus determined what the Atonement ought to be, he proceeds to confirm his own independent conclusions from the Bible. This, with a chapter on the extent of the Atonement, comprising an argument conducted on the same principle (of first determining what the Scriptures ought to teach, *if they are to be received by men*, and then citing a few apparently confirmatory passages in support of the sentence of Reason), concludes the whole.

As the principle stated in the last sentence is a fundamental one with the author—one which has given direction to all his investigations in connection with the great theme of this book, and has manifestly ruled and determined his mind in all the conclusions herein recorded, it must be a matter of primary interest to ascertain whether this principle be valid. The question to be determined is simply this—Are we able, independently of Revelation, to determine what a revelation must reveal and teach? This brings up the well-known and very important question—What is the province of Reason in matters of faith? It would prevent a great deal of confusion in the consideration of this question, if those who discuss it were to observe the distinction between a judge and the law which guides and governs him in his decisions. The *potentia cognoscens* must be distinguished from the *norma judicandi*. The confounding of these two things usually leads to the exaltation of the lamp of human reason—the light of nature, into a standard whereby the word of God is to be tested, and approved or condemned. It is one thing to approach the sacred volume with an apprehending power in order to learn; another, and a very different thing, to draw near with an independent revelation of our own, in order to judge of the matter that volume contains. It is one thing to ascertain the sense of a given proposition as laid down in the Holy Scriptures, another to judge of the truth of that proposition, and to pass sentence upon it, in accordance with an outside and independent standard. He who approaches the word of life for the latter purpose must be sadly lacking in that grace of humility which is one of the leading traits in the character of those who have received Christ as their prophet.

It is true that right reason hath, even in matters of faith, a *judicium contradictionis*; and if any deliverance purporting to be a message from God, were found to contain a contradiction of an already authenticated communication, whether that communication have come through the medium of nature, or of revelation, the reputed message were to be rejected. But this is a different doctrine from that which would have us receive the word of God upon the ground of its agreement with our own views. What is this latter, but an attempt to establish our faith, not in the power of God, but in the wisdom of man?

The principle, therefore, is wrong. It is wrong first to determine what God is, and then to come to the Bible to confirm our doctrine. What are we—creatures who have opened our eyes upon the teeming wonders of a wondrous universe, some thirty or threescore years ago, and have spent the greater part of this period in correcting errors into which we have

been continually falling—what are we, that we should attempt to solve, on principles of law, as received by men, the central mystery of redemption, only drawing on the Bible in support of our foregone conclusions? It may be right and wise to speak to them that know law in legal phrase, and to discuss with such the principles of law may be eminently judicious; but if in the doing of this right and laudable thing, we introduce principles determining the very nature of the Atonement, and draw upon Scripture merely for confirmation, we assume an attitude towards the word of God, which must be exceedingly offensive to its Author.

As already charged, this principle has controlled the author of this book from the beginning to the end of his work. This is no mere inference, though it were a most warrantable one, from the spirit and method of the entire discussion. It is an avowed principle. (See pages 320, 321, &c., and the author's work on Slavery and the Church, pages 37, 186.) Indeed, the proof may be found in almost any page of the present volume. Whether he is reasoning with lawyers, or discussing with theologians, the most important points connected with this subject, he invariably settles the whole matter by an appeal to reason—as a *judge and rule*—confirming only occasionally by a reference to Scripture.

From the fundamental and determining principle of the book, we proceed to notice some of the reputed difficulties which philosophic minds are said to encounter in the investigation of the Scripture doctrine of the Atonement. The first of these is given in the form of a presumptive objection, against the doctrine of pardon through the substituted sufferings of the innocent for the guilty. In human governments, it is alleged, no such arrangements are adopted—none such would be allowed. Pardon is extended only where there is danger of severity—where the trial may not have been fair—where there are some mitigating considerations, either in the character of the individual, or in some circumstance connected with the commission of the offence. Where such reasons are not found, pardon is never granted among men—where such reasons do not exist, the offender languishes in prison, or dies.

Thus it is with men; and therefore—Therefore what? What, we ask, must be the conclusion of a philosophic mind as to the Divine administration? Why, simply this, that God would never pardon one whom he had found guilty. The very circumstances under which, as stated by this philosopher, human governments never extend mercy, are, without an exception and in perfection, found wherever God judges and condemns. As a philosopher, then, such ought to be his conclusion. But such it is not. When he comes to speak of the

Divine Government, he introduces a new principle, viz., that God can extend pardon where it ought to be extended, without bias, or danger either of error or of evil. This may pass with some men for philosophy; but it appears to us, that from the analogy in question the conclusion of a truly philosophic mind would have been exactly the reverse of the dictum here so quietly and complacently assumed. Human governments, we are told, never pardon except "where the law in its operations is too severe," "where there are mitigating circumstances in the case, of which the law in its regular operations cannot take cognisance," or "where the offender manifests such a spirit of penitence, that the interests of justice will not suffer by his release." Now as there can be no error in judging where God is judge, and no severity in the operation of a righteous law administered by a righteous Sovereign, and consequently no mitigating circumstances in any case where that law has been broken and that Sovereign offended, and as tears of penitence (if such could be found) are not the balm for injured justice, how could a philosopher come to any other conclusion than that God would never pardon sin? How, in view of these unquestionable truths, could he ever glide into the persuasion that there are cases where pardon should and ought to be extended? The idea is an unphilosophic assumption, unwarranted by the premises. A fair comparison of the two administrations, the human and the divine, would have shut up this reputed philosopher to the dreadful alternative of eternal wrath. Had he not been kindly furnished with a new principle in the second member of the comparison, he might have seen that where an omniscient and righteous Judge, administering a law which is holy, and just, and good, pronounces a man guilty, pardon, *so far as human reason can discover*, is for ever impossible. Blessed be God, there is pardon—pardon for the chief of sinners; but the scheme by which it is secured, and in which it hath been disclosed, is one which human wisdom in its highest efforts has never conceived—one which exhibits the manifold wisdom of God. The glad tidings that God can be just, and yet the justifier of the ungodly, have come to our ears, not from the lips of earth's philosophers, but from the lips of men inspired by the Holy Ghost.

The principle which forms the very kernel of the second chapter, viz., that there has everywhere been a deep-seated conviction that pardon should in certain cases be extended to the guilty—a principle which the author of this book adopts, and applies to the case of the sinner and the divine administration—is a most dangerous one. It will be seen that it is but the echo of the first presumptive objection, as it is, indeed,

the all-pervading idea of the book. The impression produced on the mind of any careful reader must be this—that if the divine government would avoid the appearance of harshness and severity, sin must be pardoned, and the Atonement is the expedient by which, with a due regard to the interests of the universe, this can be done. This is the sum and substance, the beginning, middle, and end of the whole matter.

Now if this principle be true—if it be true that pardon ought in certain cases to be extended to the guilty, we would like to know how in such cases salvation can be ascribed to the good pleasure of God, or to the exceeding riches of his grace. Such cases would certainly seem not to be included in those specified by the apostle, Ephes. i. and ii., for he refers the predestination, election, and actual redemption of all concerned, to the good pleasure of the will of God, and assigns, as the ultimate end, the manifestation of His own glorious grace. But if justice could not be exercised against the guilty, without reflecting upon the divine administration, representing it as “harsh, tyrannical, severe,” where was there any room for good pleasure or choice? How, we ask, could a scheme to which the divine government was compelled, in order to avoid the appearance of cruelty, ever be to the praise of the glory of God’s grace? Such a scheme might reflect honour upon those high intelligences whose moral sentiments, expressed or entertained, compelled the adoption of it; but one hymn of praise it could never evoke, either from the subjects of redemption, or the angel hosts who rejoice before the throne. In fact, the doctrine is so subversive of the whole economy of grace, and so derogatory to the divine character, that it is painful either to read or review it.

On all these preliminary objections of reputed philosophers, we would remark once for all, that the fundamental assumption of them is false. They assume that the Atonement is a perfectly plain common-sense transaction, that there is no mystery about it, nothing that has not its parallel in the principles of human jurisprudence and the administration of human law. Hence we have a chapter on the embarrassment felt among men through lack of an atonement, and a correlative one on the probabilities of some such arrangement being made. These chapters warrant the conclusion that, among other things, the design of the book is to smooth down the gospel, and make it so plain and philosophical, that there shall remain nothing of mystery about it, nothing too high for reason, nothing requiring faith; and thus to commend, on the ground of its entire comprehensibility, an economy before whose impenetrable mysteries the great apostle of the Gentiles stood in reverent awe, and cried, “O the depth of the riches,

both of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out !” And what is this but to degrade the mystery of all mysteries—the mystery of the obedience, and sufferings, and death of the incarnate God, to the level of the everyday transactions of the erring administrators of human affairs ? If men can see that the principles of the whole economy are embodied in the science of human jurisprudence, where, we ask, is the marvel of redemption ? If this be true, what reason is there for representing a ransomed church, as the great mirror in which angels and principalities shall see reflected the manifold wisdom of God ? If the nature and bearings of the central work of the whole economy may be determined *a priori*, from principles of human law, what need was there that angels should stoop down from their own habitations to look into these things ?

To satisfy our readers that this is no unfair representation of the spirit and tendency of the book, one quotation, we are persuaded, will be more than sufficient. In the chapter on the embarrassments experienced for lack of some such arrangement as an atonement, a case of forgery, which occurred in England in the last century, is cited as an illustration. Dr Dodd, a subject of high standing and excellent name, had, in an evil hour, used without authority the name of the Earl of Chesterfield on a bill. The fraud was detected ; there was no question of his guilt. Such, however, was the sympathy of the public toward the man, and such his conduct, both before and after the commission of the offence, that every possible effort was made to save him. The paper itself, which was indispensable to his conviction, was purposely put within his reach, but through some strange infatuation he neglected to destroy it. “ A petition for his pardon, drawn up by Dr Johnson, and with his name at the head, received at once no less than thirty thousand signatures, and all the warm feelings of the sovereign himself prompted him to clemency. The benevolent feelings of a large part of the British nation would have been gratified with his pardon. But on the other hand, there was the explicit judgment of the law. There was the aggravated character of the offence—an offence tending to destroy all confidence in a commercial community.” “ The law was suffered, therefore, to take its course. The offender died, and the world approved the stern decision of the sovereign.” And this is the case that is to illustrate the necessity of an atonement, or some such device ! What are we to think of the philosophy or the theology of an author who could cite this case to illustrate the necessity of the Atonement ? According to our author’s philosophy, an atonement was the

very thing required to relieve both the government and the nation in this embarrassing juncture. But is this a philosophic or reasonable view of the case? Why, it must be manifest, almost to a child, that the whole embarrassment arose from the injustice of the penalty then attached to the crime of forgery. And it must be equally manifest that the thing required was not an atonement, but an adjustment of the penalty. If Dr Dodd had been sentenced to imprisonment instead of death, there had been no such manifestation of sympathy. It was the glaring disproportion between the offence committed and the penalty to be endured, that thrilled the national heart and stirred up the merciful to the rescue. But where this disproportion is not found, where the penalty is the righteous award of the transgression, whether the case occur on the footstool, and under the magistracy of man, or in heaven among the first-born subjects of the Sovereign Jehovah, the judgment and punishment of the transgressor can never be regarded by any right-minded intelligence as "harsh, tyrannical, or severe." Where a sentence is just, it cannot be unjust to inflict it.

But there is something worse than bad philosophy in this case of forgery; it is brim-full of the worst ingredients of a corrupt theology. What! the case of a forger, overburdened with an unrighteous penalty, set in comparison with that of a transgressor of God's law, visited with the sentence of a law which is holy, and just, and good, and that by the Judge of all the earth! Are we to infer from the harshness of the government of George III. in putting Dr Dodd to death for forgery, a similar harshness on the part of the righteous Jehovah, in putting the sons of Adam to death for rebellion against his own august Majesty? Ah! no; let God be just, though all the sons of men be tyrants. We believe that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit such things; and that judgment is, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die."

And what is true of this case, is true of all others that are or can be cited on this behalf. There can be no case found among the sons of men, or in the history of law and government, to furnish a true parallel to the case of the sinner, as he stands related to an offended God, administering a broken law. What would be wrong, or harsh, or cruel, in a finite, erring man, sitting in judgment on a fellow-man, can never, with the sanction of sound reason, much less of Scripture, be set up as a standard whereby to measure the righteousness or severity of God. If it could be shewn that human law is infallible in the wisdom of its enactments, that the penalty annexed is always the righteous measure of the offence, that

those who administer it are omniscient and unswerving in their moral rectitude, and that the sentence is ever in accordance with the law and facts of the case, and then that, after all, the government felt embarrassed for lack of an atonement, there might be some ground for such analogical reasonings as those which make up this book. On such a firm basis a man might found, with all the independence of Scripture which characterises our author, and with some show of plausibility, a system of theology emerging from an Atonement, measured and determined in all its essentials, and in all its relations and objects, by the great principles of human law. From such premises on the human side, a man of a philosophic mind might argue out the necessity and probability of an Atonement on the divine. But what are we to say either of the philosophy or the theology which draws such an inference from the imagined wants of a government, where law is fallible and penalty often unjust? Why, the fact is, when we come to run these principles to their legitimate and avowed conclusions, we begin to tremble before the blaze of that wisdom and justice they would so irreverently tarnish, and so presumptuously impugn.

We pass now to the theology of the fourth chapter; a chapter on the objects to be secured by an atonement. These objects as enumerated by our author are as follows:—The maintenance of the authority of law; the securing of the object contemplated by the penalty; the ensuring of the reformation of the offenders in whose behalf it is made; the protection of the interests of the community against evils which might arise from the pardon of the guilty; and the guarding of the government from disparagement in the eyes of the world.

On this enumeration, we would remark that it is singularly defective, and defective on the great essential point of all. If carried out and applied, as it is, to *the* Atonement, it represents God as determined, in the providing of Redemption, by considerations drawn exclusively from without, and from the finite. There is not in the whole enumeration, nor is there in the whole compass of the book, a single intimation of the satisfaction of divine justice being included among the objects of the Atonement! The only thing that wears the least semblance of an acknowledgment of this all-important truth, is the reference which the Atonement is said to have to law and penalty. But even this semblance vanishes when the author comes to state the relation between the divine law and the divine nature. On page 80, after raising the question why the thing that is commanded is right, and why the thing that

is prohibited is wrong, he lays down three theories,—viz., that which refers it to the will of the lawgiver; that which refers it to the nature of things; and that which refers it to the bearing of the thing commanded or prohibited upon the happiness of the creature. Which of these theories exhibits the true foundation of the distinction between right and wrong, our author does not undertake to determine, but merely adds, with characteristic unsatisfactoriness, that “it is a question which has never been so determined as to demand the assent of all men!” What a reason for declining a candid avowal of his own doctrine, on a question which lies at the very foundation of virtue! Is there, after all, nothing fixed and certain, even in morals, but those principles and maxims which have commanded the assent of all men? If this be true, the sooner the Bible is laid aside, and a congress of the kindreds and tribes of this world assembled to determine upon a universal creed the better.

Our author, however, might as well have stated in plain terms what his views on this question are; for in saying that “a difference of opinion on these points does not affect his position,” he has disclaimed the doctrine that the law of God is a transcript of the divine nature, as forming any part of his system, and thus has indirectly denied that there is anything in the nature of God requiring the punishment of sin. That this is his doctrine on this subject, will be still more manifest as his theory of the Atonement unrolls.

We are, therefore, justified in affirming that this book does not include, among the objects to be secured by the Atonement, the satisfaction of divine justice, and in representing it as a scheme which exhibits God as determined throughout by the interests of the universe. That such a system can never be reconciled with the word of God, ought to be patent to every reader of the Bible. That word uniformly represents God as acting with reference to himself, and for his own glory; nor can there be a single passage pointed out, in which he is said to have been determined by the interests or sentiments, or “finer feelings” of his creatures. And what is this but to make the glory of God the chief end for which all things were created? and what is this would-be philosophy but an attempt to subordinate God himself to the universe which his own power and wisdom have brought into existence, and continues to sustain? It is true that the best interests of his creatures are secured by that administration, which hath for its final end his own glory; but to elevate these interests into the determinate cause of all that God has done, or will do, yea, or can do, in the economy of redemption, is to reduce the I AM, the Alpha and the Omega—of whom, and through

whom, and to whom are all things—to a state of vassalage to the universe !

The fact is, the doctrine which underlies this whole theory of the Atonement is subversive of theism altogether. A being determined by considerations outside of himself cannot be God. It is essential to the very nature of God that he be independent and omniscient ; but with these attributes a determination *ab extra* is utterly and for ever irreconcilable. What an amount of bad philosophy and worse theology would the church be saved, were men to get their minds thoroughly imbued with the answer given in our Shorter Catechism to the question, "What is God?" "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Were theologians to learn this first truth, and couple with it that noble utterance with which the Catechism opens—viz., "Man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy him for ever"—they would never be found framing theories which would strip God of his justice, and set the universe above the throne of their Creator. What is true of man's end and man's happiness, is true of the end and blessedness of all the moral intelligences which God has created ; and it is true of man, that it is only in the advancement of the glory of God that he can have any true enjoyment. Nor is this to humble either man or angel. God is himself the highest end for which even He could act. As he could swear by no greater, so he can work for no greater. Can we conceive of God as stooping to a lower than the highest end ? And if his own glory be an end becoming the forth-putting of the might and wisdom of God himself, surely he may well claim, for the advancement of that glory, the highest service of the highest seraph ! Ah ! there are none of the enraptured hosts who stand with veiled vision before the blaze of that glory in the temple above, who would regard it a bondage to be employed in advancing it. What child of God is there upon the footstool, who does not look upon that service as the source of the sweetest enjoyment, and look forward to the beholding of that glory as the richest reward ? What, then, are we to think of a theory of the Atonement—a theory of the redemption work accomplished by the Son of God, which leaves all this out of view—a theory which makes all the objects of the Atonement terminate upon something outside of, and therefore beneath God ! It cannot be the theory of the Bible, for the Bible expressly teaches that the glory of God was the end of the whole emprise. Such, however, is the doctrine of this book ; and this fact is sufficient to stamp it as another gospel.

But besides this defect in the objective reference of the

Atonement, the book is defective on another point, which we must regard as a vital one. Is it not a singular fact, that a work on the Atonement should leave out of view the obedience of Christ? Is it not still more glaringly singular, that a work professing to exhibit the Atonement in its relations to law, should be chargeable with such an omission? This charge we do prefer against this book. It ignores, both by its silence and by its principles, the part which the obedience of Christ has achieved in the great work of Atonement!

Now law, as all men who know law teach, embraces two elements, precept and penalty. Indeed, our author has gone further than this, and exhibited the penalty as the mere adjunct. In conformity with these elements of law, there are two things required from those who will satisfy it,—viz., obedience and suffering—the latter, of course, only where the law has been broken. If, then, the precept or rule, as our author teaches, be the main thing in law, one would expect that obedience ought to be the main thing in an Atonement. How comes it, then, that the Atonement described in this book is destitute of this essential element? How comes it that the thing required by that which, in our author's estimation, is the sum and substance of law, is not to be found in his system? Here is evidently a departure from what his own premises would have driven a logician to, as it is a departure from the faith of Christendom. Let any man take up the Confessions and Catechisms of the Churches of the Reformation, or the works of such men as Turretine, Calvin, or Owen, and mark the prominence given to the obedience of Christ in the work of redemption, and we are fully persuaded he will conclude that the theology of this book is not the theology of the Reformation. The key to this exclusion of Christ's obedience from any share in the Atonement is to be found in the author's aversion to the doctrine of imputation. If it had been admitted that Christ was made under the law, that he might redeem them that were under the law, and that his obedience had anything to do with making the many righteous, it might have become too manifest that, whilst living under the law, there was a righteousness wrought out, available as the judicial ground of the justification of his people, and which might therefore be imputed. But as our author denies the existence of any such righteousness, and the possibility of imputing it, even if it did exist, it behoved him to keep it in abeyance, or merge it in the notion of a service done to the universe.

And as there is nothing in this Atonement to meet the claims of the precept, so there is nothing to meet the demands of the penalty. As there is no legal obedience, so there is no

penal suffering. Having stripped the poor sinner of the only robe that could cover his nakedness, the author proceeds to remove from the lintel and door-posts of the house in which he has taken refuge the sacrificial blood which alone can avert the sword of the destroying angel. He speaks, it is true, of sufferings—yea, of sufferings unto death—but of what avail are these if not inflicted in satisfaction of law and by the hand of justice? The reasonings employed against the doctrine, that Christ bore the penalty due to our sins in his own body on the tree, are enough to produce the most painful impression on the mind of any one who has trusted in those very sufferings as his shield against the wrath of a righteous Judge. They are, in the main, the very arguments of Socinus, and would, if carried out, lead to the adoption of the entire Socinian system with regard both to Christ's work and person.

His first objection, for it is no argument, against the doctrine that the sufferings of Christ were penal, is that it would imply on Christ's part the experience of remorse—an objection which has been echoing from Socinian to Remonstrant, and from Remonstrant back to Socinian, from the days of Socinus up to the hour in which it received a fresh repetition in this book. And after all, what is it worth? Why, it obviously rests on two false assumptions—1. That remorse is a necessary part of the penalty; 2. That imputation implies a transfer of moral character. If the former be true, how comes it that children are visited with penal suffering? Here is surely penal suffering, but where is the remorse? It is not remorse, but death, that is the penalty denounced against sin. "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." "The wages of sin is death." "They which commit such things are worthy of death." Remorse may be a part of the woe of the lost, but what has this to do with the doctrine that Christ's sufferings were penal? Is it logical to argue from the mental emotions connected with the infliction of the penalty on one who has actually transgressed, and is morally corrupt, to what must be the experiences of a substitute who has never sinned, and who is holy, harmless, and undefiled? As already stated, this reasoning must be propped up with the assumption that imputation implies a transfer of moral character; and without this prop it is utterly insupportable. That such an assumption is false, is so obvious that there is no need of refuting it. Would the imputation of the debt of Onesimus to Paul have been attended with an experience of the regrets of Onesimus for contracting it? Did the sons and daughters of Achan, who were put to death for Achan's sin, undergo the same mental anguish as their father, who had coveted and

hidden the silver, and the wedge of gold, and the Babylonish garment? These cases settle the whole controversy. Those who hold that imputation implies a transfer of moral character, must prove that these are not cases in point, or they must acknowledge that their boasted principle is false. But to prove that these are not cases in point is simply impossible, for they embrace the fundamental principle of imputation. That principle is, *that what personally, and in law, belongs to one, is made the judicial ground of dealing with another.* Paul recognised this principle, when by his letter he bound himself, and that in law if Philemon had chosen, for the debts of Onesimus. Joshua and Israel, or rather Jehovah (for the whole transaction was by the order and counsel of the Lord) recognised it, when Achan's family were stoned to death and burned with fire, for Achan's sin. And if this was not the principle on which the Amalek of Saul's day suffered for the sin committed by the Amalek who lay in wait for Israel when he came up out of Egypt, four hundred years before, we would like to be told what interpretation we are to put upon the following language—"Thus saith the Lord of hosts, I remember that which Amalek did to Israel, how he laid wait for him in the way, when he came up out of Egypt. Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." No righteous exegesis can ever eliminate from this passage the fundamental principle of imputation. There it is as manifest as language can make it. He who proclaimed himself from Sinai, "a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate him," here illustrates the principle of that righteous law, by commissioning Saul to execute upon the fourth generation the sin of a buried ancestry. And did space not forbid, it were easy to shew that there is no principle more uniformly recognised, or more frequently illustrated, either in the Scriptures, or in profane history, than the one which we have been defending, and which it is a primary object with our author to ignore. It is uttered from Sinai with the voice of thunder, and is endorsed and reiterated by our Saviour in the days of his flesh. Yes, it mingles with that voice of lamentation which a rejected Redeemer lifts up over the devoted Jerusalem—"That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar. Verily, I say unto you, All these things shall come upon this generation." Before these utterances it becomes us to bow, and exclaim, with one who was favoured with the

sight of things within the veil, "Oh the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"

The next objection urged against the doctrine of penal suffering, viz., that it would have involved, on the part of the sufferer, subjection to eternal death, is from the same source as the former, and confounds the design of the sufferings with the period of their duration. The attribute *eternal* belongs to the latter, and not to the former. It simply expresses the duration of the suffering, if man is to be the sufferer. That the sufferings of Christ, as our legal substitute, were not eternal, arose from the infinite dignity of his ever-adorable person. For the objector whom this glorious truth will not silence, or satisfy, the word of God has no further answer.

We cannot, however, take leave of this portion of the book without noticing one other argument, which our author has advanced against the doctrine that Christ's sufferings were penal. "If such were the nature of the Atonement," he argues, "there could be no mercy in the case. When a debt is paid, there is no forgiveness; when a penalty is endured, there is no mercy. In the case of one who should be willing to pay the debt, or to endure the suffering, there may be the highest benevolence, but there is no mercy exhibited by him to whom the debt is paid, or the penalty of whose law has been borne." This argument he illustrates as follows:—"It would have been kindness, indeed, in an Egyptian to have come in voluntarily, and aided the oppressed and burdened Hebrew to furnish the tale of bricks; but there would have been no kindness or compassion evinced by the task-master who had appointed the task, for the whole demand would have been complied with. So far as he who performed the work was concerned, and so far as the burdened Hebrew was concerned, it would have been a transaction of mere law and justice; so far as the task-master was concerned, there would have been in the case neither mercy nor compassion."

This passage is a specimen of what we must regard as a deplorable feature of the theology of this book. It is an attempt, on the one hand, to furnish a palliation, if not an apology for sin, and on the other, to disparage the character, law, and government of God, by representing them as harsh, tyrannical, and severe. The animus of the foregoing illustration must be palpable to any candid mind. Why not put the case fairly? Inadequate as it is to illustrate the relation of a rebel sinner to an offended God, yet, had it been fairly stated, it would have sustained the very doctrine it was designed to overthrow. The case fairly stated would stand thus:—A law of Egypt, which the king is as unable to change as he is to

change his own nature, demands at the hands of a Hebrew very heavy toils and great suffering. The king, however, so loves the Hebrew that he spares not his own well-beloved son, the heir of Egypt's crown, but sends him into the brick-fields as a slave, to furnish for the Hebrew the "tale of brick" demanded by the law. The son enters with all his heart into the gracious purpose of his father, delighting to do his father's will, and loving the Hebrew with the same intensity of love. He takes the place of the Hebrew in the field of toil, and when the term of service closes, he gives into the hand of Egypt's law the full tale of brick, and claims the emancipation of those for whose deliverance that service was rendered, and those sufferings endured. This is the case fairly put; and so far as such a case can illustrate the work of redemption, it is, from beginning to end, an illustration of the very doctrine our author has been labouring to destroy. It exhibits a king girt about with justice, and moved with a love that will hesitate at no sacrifice. Who, with his eye upon such an act of kingly condescension and compassion, could have the heartlessness and injustice to conclude that there was nothing of mercy manifested by him who originated the whole scheme of deliverance. And when we substitute for the unrighteous enactment of Egypt's tyrant that law under which man is held amenable to penal suffering—a law which is holy, and just, and good; and in the place of Pharaoh, Him who so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son; and instead of an heir to the crown and kingdom of Egypt, the Heir of all things; and for the poor slave in the brick-field, suffering under an unrighteous bondage, the rebel sinner filled with enmity against his rightful Lord and Sovereign, who embraces in his character all moral excellence in infinite perfection, and then finish the comparison with what the Scriptures reveal of the free and sovereign grace wherewith the Eternal King stooped to extend his sceptre to his enemy, what but astonishment at the magnitude of the grace, and what but tenfold astonishment at the insensibility that has failed to discover and admire it, can possess the soul of any right-minded moral intelligence? Yes, penal suffering on the part of the substitute is not inconsistent with the manifestation of mercy to those in whose place he stood. It is justice that awakes the sword against the Shepherd, but it is mercy that spreads her wings over the sheep. Justice has her vindication in the infliction of the penalty, mercy unveils her face in the transfer of the penalty from the transgressor to the substitute. Here is mercy, not on the tremendous terms of this book, not mercy obtained by the sacrifice of God's truth, and law, and justice; but mercy sustained throughout by every prin-

ciple of law, and truth, and righteousness; the mercy of Him who is "just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus."

We do not deem it necessary to dwell long upon what our author says on the extent of the Atonement. We find in his chapter on this subject nothing more than the common-place misconceptions and objections. He limits the discussion to the relation of the Atonement to the human race, not because, from his view of its nature, it has any special suitableness to men more than to angels, but simply because there is no intimation that it "was designed to secure the salvation of any other fallen being than man." According to Mr Barnes, therefore, the Atonement is limited to the human race, and its limitation is determined, not by its nature, its sufficiency, or its suitableness, but simply by its design. Suppose we apply this to its relation to the human family. Unless Mr Barnes holds that the Atonement was designed to *secure the salvation* of all men, he cannot maintain that it was designed for all men. If its limitation is determined by its design, and if its design is determined by its actual or revealed effect, then, if the fact that it was not designed to secure the salvation of angels shews that it was limited to the human race, the fact that it was not designed to secure the salvation of all men, proves that it was limited to those whose salvation it does secure. Mr Barnes has stumbled at the very threshold of his argument. He begins by teaching the very doctrine which he labours through the whole chapter to refute. That doctrine is, that the extent of the Atonement is determined, not by its nature, its sufficiency, or its suitableness, but by the effect it was designed to *secure*. Yet he argues from its suitableness and sufficiency that it was designed for all men, while he admits that it was not designed to secure the salvation of all. He therefore refutes himself. He says the sources of evidence on this subject must be—1, analogy; 2, probabilities from the nature of the Atonement; 3, the testimony of Scripture. Under the first head, he argues from the abundance and suitableness of the *materia medica*, to a like sufficiency and suitableness of the provisions of grace. But he forgets that, by his own shewing, the question does not relate to the sufficiency or suitableness of the Atonement, but to its design. The argument from analogy, if it is worth anything, is simply this—God has made abundant provision for the physical wants and maladies of men, therefore it is probable that he has made similar abundant provision for their spiritual necessities. This no one denies. The argument from analogy, therefore, proves nothing to the point. God has made the earth productive, and stored it with inexhaustible treasures of

silver and gold : does this prove that he designed that all men should be rich ? Does it prove that this provision of the sources of wealth was designed for those who never enjoy them ? If so, the purpose of God has failed. Because God has given healing virtue to plants and minerals, does that prove that he designed that all men should be healed of their diseases ? Things were designed for the ends which they actually accomplish. If, therefore, the *materia medica*, notwithstanding its abundance and its efficacy, does not heal all men, it was not designed to heal them : it was designed to heal those whom it does heal, and no others. In like manner the Atonement of Christ, however abundant and suitable for all men, was designed for those who are thereby actually redeemed.

His argument from the nature of the Atonement is equally inconclusive. He argues that there is nothing in the nature of the Atonement to limit it to a particular class of men ; and, from the dignity of Christ's person, that there is no necessity for such limitation. " If," he says, " the sufferer had been a mere man, then it would seem necessarily to follow that the Atonement must have been limited. It would be impossible to conceive how a mere man, however pure in character, elevated in rank, or lofty in virtue, could have such merit that his sufferings could avail to the redemption of the entire human race," &c. According to this, the necessity for the divinity of Christ as a Redeemer arises from the *number* to be redeemed. Had fewer souls been the objects of redemption, then the merit of a creature, of an angel or a man, would have sufficed. Such is the legitimate consequence of the principle involved in this argument. According to the Bible, the necessity of the Atonement arises from the nature of sin and the justice of God ; and therefore the same merit in the Redeemer would be demanded if one soul or millions were to be redeemed. All that Mr Barnes's arguments under this head can possibly prove, and all, we presume, they were intended to prove, is that the Atonement is, from its nature, suitable for all men, and, from the dignity of the Redeemer's person, sufficient for all. This we cheerfully admit. This is the doctrine of our church, and of the church universal. But what has this to do with the question ? So far as *the extent* of the Atonement is concerned, the point in debate is not its nature or its value, but its design. Mr Barnes admits that we cannot infer the design of the Atonement from its suitableness and sufficiency. According to him, it is sufficient and suitable for angels as well as for men, yet he says it is limited to the human race. After admitting this, he turns round and argues that it is designed for all men, because it is sufficient and suitable for all. This, as every one sees, is a *non-sequitur*.

It is palpable that the only source of knowledge as to the design of what God does is his own declarations on the subject. The testimony of Scripture, therefore, instead of coming last, as it does in Mr Barnes's argument, as though its only office were to confirm the deductions of our own reason, should come first and determine the question beyond dispute or appeal. Our author refers to the passages usually quoted to prove that the Atonement has equal reference to all men. One of these passages is John iii. 16—"God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have eternal life." The argument here is that as the word *κόσμος*, *world*, means men, mankind, the human race, therefore the design of God in sending his Son as a Saviour had equal reference to all men. If this proves anything, then it proves that when we call our Lord *Salvator hominum*, as all Christians do, we mean to say that he is the Saviour of all men; that when Paul says that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners, he means all sinners. It is true that the design of Christ's work was to save sinners, but it is not true that he designed to save all sinners. In all such cases the words *men*, *world*, *sinners*, designate the class of persons whom Christ came to save. In John iii. 16, for example, our Lord teaches that the design of God in sending his Son was the Salvation of men, not of angels; of men generally, and not of Jews exclusively. The declaration that men and not angels, men generally and not the Jews only, are embraced in the design of God, does not teach that he designs to save all men. Our church has adopted the Westminster Catechism, which teaches that "God having out of his mere good pleasure from all eternity, elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace to deliver them out of the estate of sin and misery, and to bring them into an estate of salvation by a Redeemer." According to this, election precedes redemption. God elects some to everlasting life, and sends his Son to redeem them. The work of Christ, therefore, has a special reference to the elect. Such is the doctrine of our church. Now, suppose some one should turn to our hymn book, and endeavour to prove that the church which sanctions that book teaches that Christ died equally for all men—because in the hymn book it is said in substance, over and over, perhaps a hundred times, that "God pitied dying men, and sent his Son to give them life again;" or that the Lamb of God "sustains the dreadful load of man's iniquities;" or, "Lord, what is man, that he should prove the object of thy boundless love?" or, "to save a guilty world he dies;" would such an argument amount to anything? Does the hymn book contradict the catechism? Is saying that Christ came to save

sinners, to save men, inconsistent with saying that his death had a special reference to his own people? If not, then the argument for an indefinite atonement, founded on such passages as that quoted above, amounts to nothing. The illustration which our Lord himself uses, is derived from Moses lifting up the serpent in the wilderness. The design of God in this transaction was twofold; first, to illustrate the method of salvation, as we learn from the use made of the incident in the New Testament; and, secondly, actually to heal a certain portion of the people. Now there is no question: 1st. That the method of cure proposed to the Israelites was adapted to all; it was as well suited to one case as to another. 2. That it made no matter whether one or ten thousand was healed by the appointed means. One man's looking at the serpent did not hinder another man's looking. There was no possibility of exhausting the healing power of the means of cure. There could be no tendency to such exhaustion. 3. That the cure was offered freely and sincerely to all the afflicted. 4. That in fact some were healed and others perished, and so far as the design of God was concerned, the lifting up of the serpent was intended as a means of cure to those whom it was rendered effectual, and not for those who perished. Many, doubtless, never heard the proclamation; many who heard it were too stupid to avail themselves of the means of restoration; some, no doubt, preferred trusting to some other remedy. 5. Notwithstanding this limitation in the design of God in providing this method of cure, it would be perfectly proper to say, in general terms, that God so pitied the dying Israelites, that he ordained that whosoever looked on the brazen serpent should not perish, but be restored to health. No one would be authorised to infer from this language that God intended the provision as much for those whom he had determined to save, as for those whom he had determined to allow to perish. The application of all this to the work of Christ is too obvious to need any remark. That work is adapted to the salvation of all men. It is sufficient for all. It is freely offered to all. It was designed for God's own people, and in perfect consistency with his limitation as to design. It may be said, as in the case of the Israelites, that God so pitied dying men, or he so loved mankind, or the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believed in him should not perish, but have eternal life. Such declarations afford, therefore, no argument to disprove the plain doctrine of the Bible, that Christ laid down his life for his sheep, that their salvation was the end intended to be secured by his death, and that he died for them in a sense in which he did not die for those that perish.

Another passage quoted is Heb. ii. 9, "He tasted death for every man." Of course Mr Barnes knows that the word for *man* is not in the Greek. It is simply *ὑπὲρ πάντας*, *for every one*. Does this mean for every sensitive creature? Mr Barnes says, No, for irrational creatures are not the objects of redemption. Does it mean every rational creature? He again says, No, for unfallen angels do not need redemption. Does it mean every fallen rational creature? Again the answer is, No, for the Atonement was not designed for fallen angels. What, then, does it mean? It means that Christ tasted death for every one of the objects of redemption. It is, and must be, thus limited. Christ tasted death for every one of those whom God designed to redeem by his blood. It is on this principle that Mr Barnes limits the text, and says, it does not mean every creature, nor every intelligent creature, nor every intelligent fallen creature, but every one of those embraced in the design of God. Whether that design includes all men, or all the people of God, depends, not on this passage, but on the general doctrine of the Bible. If the Scriptures teach that God designed to save all fallen beings by the death of Christ, then the passage means that Christ tasted death for every intelligent fallen creature. If they teach that he designed the salvation of all men, then it means that Christ tasted death for all men. But if the Bible teaches that God designed to save his own people, then it means that the Redeemer tasted death for every one of the elect. The question is not as to the meaning of the words—about which there can be no dispute—but simply as to the point, who are the redeemed. Christ died for every one of the objects of redemption. In this exposition both parties must agree, and therefore the passage does not decide anything.

Mr Barnes, of course, makes the common objection from the universal offer of the gospel. If salvation is offered to all men on the ground of the death of Christ, he must have died for all. He uses the familiar illustration of captives in a foreign land. Such captives do not wish to be informed merely of the ability of some one to redeem them; they wish to know "whether it is the intention of such an one thus to appropriate his wealth;" whether the offer of deliverance is founded merely on the fact that he in whose name the offer is made is a man of wealth, or on the ground that the ransom is actually paid or provided; whether the offer is made "to mock their misery by the exhibition of wealth, which cannot in any event be theirs;" or whether it is made in good faith, &c. &c. This is intended to prove that the offer of the gospel to all men must be insincere, and a mockery, unless Christ died for all men. As soon, however, as the case is fairly stated, the weak-

ness of this argument, and the grossness of the misrepresentation which it involves, become apparent. Suppose a man hears that his own family, together with many other persons, are held in captivity; suppose the ransom demanded for his own family is the same in value as that demanded for the ransom of the whole body of captives. He determines to pay the ransom, with the design and purpose to deliver his own children, whom he can constrain to accept deliverance at his hands. When the ransom is paid, although designed for the deliverance of a part, yet being sufficient for the deliverance of the whole, he offers redemption not only to his own, but to all who choose to accept it. Is there any mockery in this? Does the fact that the ransom was paid with a special reference to some prevent its being freely offered to all. If those to whom it is offered prefer their bondage; if they refuse to be indebted to him who has paid the ransom for their deliverance; if they think they can deliver themselves; if on these, or any other grounds, they refuse the offer of deliverance, the guilt and folly are their own. If a king makes a feast for his friends, does this prevent his sincerely inviting all who choose to come and partake of his bounty; If God, in giving his Son for the redemption of his own people, has paid a ransom sufficient for the deliverance of all men, does the purpose for which that ransom was paid present any barrier to the general offer of salvation? It is a weary business to have to answer the same objections, and correct the same misrepresentations, day after day and year after year.

The impression made upon our minds by this book is a very painful one. We have great respect for its author. He has been a laborious and successful pastor and writer. He stands deservedly high in the estimation of the community. That such a man should put forth a book so thoroughly rationalistic in its principles and spirit as the one before us, is deeply to be lamented. We can hardly believe that it contains truth enough to save the soul. A man might as well attempt to live on the husk of a cocoa-nut. We have no idea that Mr Barnes, as a Christian, lives on the doctrine of the Atonement as here presented. There is a sense in which we are full believers in the difference between the theology of the intellect and the theology of the heart. A man in the retirement of his study may, by a perverted train of thought, satisfy himself that matter has no existence; but he is an idealist only so long as that train of thought is present to his mind. The moment he goes out into the world he resumes his normal state, and is as much a believer in the existence of things external as other men. Thus really good and devout men may spin out a theory which to their understanding seems true and

consistent, but which they believe only so long as the pen is in their hand. Their inward practical faith is determined by the direct assertions of the Bible, and by their own religious experience. We rejoice to believe that Mr Barnes is a thousand times better than the theology of his book.

*ART. III.—*History of the Institution of the Sabbath Day, its Uses and Abuses ; with Notices of the Puritans, Quakers, &c.*
By WILLIAM LOGAN FISHER. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Philadelphia: T. B. Pugh, No. 615 Chestnut Street. 1859. Pp. 248.

IN a population embracing so many elements as go to make up the American people, it is to be expected that there should be great diversity of opinion on all religious subjects, and more or less opposition to laws which recognise the obligation of any form of religious truth. This opposition is directed specially against the laws for the proper observance of the Sabbath. It is in our cities that the most conspicuous demonstrations have been made, which, in some cases, threaten to give rise to serious difficulties. In some instances our magistrates, influenced by public sentiment, or rather by popular clamour, have allowed the public desecration of the Lord's day to pass with impunity. But in other instances, both magistrates and courts, recognising their obligation to act, not according to their private judgment or outside demands, but according to the laws of the land, have interfered to suppress such desecration. The consequence has been that the public papers teem with remonstrances and denunciations; conventions have been held; exciting addresses delivered, and strings of formidable resolutions passed. It is important to notice the sources whence this opposition to our Sunday laws proceeds. It is admitted that there are men among these opponents highly respectable, both for intelligence and character. Some of our own church, and even ministers of high standing, who not only believe in the divine authority of the Scriptures, but in the perpetual obligation of the Sabbath, are so infected with the radical and infidel theory of civil government, as to throw all their weight against the laws for the proper observance of the Lord's day. There are others, who, in their own minds, have no objections to such laws, and who would be glad to see the community quietly submit to them; who, nevertheless, join in the opposition because they think that such laws are out of keeping with the spirit of the age. Others again are men of the world, whose

* This article is, we have no doubt, from the pen of Dr Charles Hodge. It is exciting no small sensation in the United States, and, we are persuaded, will be read with much interest in this country.—*Edit. B. & F. E. Review.*

convictions and conduct are not governed by religious principle, and whose interests are more or less enlisted in the abrogation of all restrictions placed on Sunday travelling and amusements. But with all these concessions it remains true that the opposition is, as a whole, an anti-Christian and irreligious movement. It is an outbreak of hostility to Christianity, and to all its institutions. We have just said that we do not pronounce every opponent of the Sunday laws, simply on the ground of that opposition, to be an infidel or an irreligious man. We cannot, however, resist the conviction that the movement itself is anti-Christian in its character and purpose. This is made manifest by the reasons commonly assigned for opposition to the Sunday laws—reasons which avowedly apply to all the institutions of Christianity; by the character of those who have rendered themselves most prominent in this movement, among whom the German emigrants are the most vociferous and violent; and by the character of the addresses made in anti-Sabbath conventions, and of the resolutions adopted in those assemblies.

In the *New York Spectator* for September 13. we find a partial report of such a meeting, at which one of the speakers declared, that the purpose of himself and of his associates was, that "the free thoughts which they had brought with them from Germany should be established here." That is, that the laws and usages of this Christian and Protestant country, the convictions and principles of the great mass of its inhabitants, are to be disregarded and revolutionized, to make way for the "free thoughts" of Germany. A Dr Gillot is represented as exclaiming: "Free Germans and citizens of America, let us join hand in hand with all other free citizens around us, to oppose a law which is unjust, and an infringement on our sacred liberty. The Sunday laws are only the tools used by cliques of politicians to further their own ambitious ends, in opposition to the interests of mankind. They are upheld in the sacred name of religion. We all have our own views about religion, and we mean to keep them without infringement, or being forced to adopt those of other men. We honour all days, and consider what is right to be done on one day is right to be done on another. Men should be left to the exercise of their own judgment in regard to the way they spend their time. If they wish pleasure, let them have it; if they wish social enjoyment and enlivening music, let them have it. This is freedom." At this meeting, it was "*Resolved*, That the liberty to worship what we please, implies the liberty to worship nothing we please: and that those professing what are called infidel and atheistic sentiments, have a right to the same recognition and protection from the civil powers, as those professing Jewish, Christian, or any other doctrine; and that any attempt, direct

or indirect, to exact a virtual confession of faith in the inspiration of the Old or New Testament writings as a qualification for a legal oath, or the keeping of some holy day enjoined, or supposed to be enjoined, by the Jewish or Christian Scriptures as the first or seventh day of the week, is alike defiant of natural right and constitutional law." Another resolution declares, that the attempt to enforce the observance of the first day of the week as a Sabbath, is "actuated by the same sectarian and proselytising spirit which has at the same time inspired the effort to enforce the reading of the Protestant Scriptures in our public schools." "This effort to proselytise the youth of our public schools to Protestant Christianity," is looked upon "as no less flagrant a violation of natural right and constitutional law, than if, instead of King James's, the Douay or Roman Catholic version were required to be used; or, instead of the Christian Bible, the Mormon Bible, the Koran of Mahomet, or the Vedas and Shastras of the Hindoos." We make these quotations, not for the purpose of exposing the shallowness and confusion of thought by which they are characterized, but simply to exhibit the *animus* of the opposition to our Sunday laws. For the same purpose we translate a few sentences from the *New Yorker Demokrat*, vom. 30, mai d. j. Under the caption "The Day of the Lord," the editor of that representative journal says:—

"As frogs in the swamp from time to time raise their heads, and fill the air with their melodious croaking, and then sink back into their slimy element, so the Sunday-saints raise their heads up and down out of the swamp of their church-creeds, and croak, 'Sanctify the Sabbath! Desecrate not the day of the Lord!' Such a frog-concert was held on Friday afternoon before the commissioners of police, to whom a delegation of frog-heads presented a memorandum, in which an earnest protest was made against the sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday, and the faithful execution of the Sunday laws was demanded."

It is well for people to understand each other. It is well, on the one hand, that those Christians and Christian ministers, and other respectable men, who lend their influence to this anti-Sabbath movement, should know their associates, and understand the real spirit and design of the enterprise in which they co-operate. It is well, on the other hand, that the friends of the Sabbath, and of the laws of the land enacted for its due observance, and that magistrates and judges charged with the exposition and execution of those laws, should understand the origin and aim of the opposition which they have to encounter. We pass no judgment on individuals, but we are fully convinced that if the anti-Christian, irreligious, and foreign element, were abstracted from this anti-Sabbath cru-

sade, it would lose all its significance and power. It is but another outbreak of the spirit of evil; and one may almost hear Lucifer, as in Longfellow's Golden Legend, crying out to these assailants,—

" Aim your lightnings
At the oaken
Massive, iron-studded portals !
Sack the house of God, and scatter
Wide the ashes of the dead ! "

Quite as distinctly, however, comes back the answer,—

" O we cannot !
The apostles,
And the martyrs, wrapped in mantles,
Stand as warders at the entrance,
Stand as sentinels o'erhead ! "

We do not want such a leader, or such associates. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, when the religious men of a community are on one side, and the irreligious, as a class, upon the other, the contest between them is a contest between light and darkness, between God and Satan, and, therefore, the stake at issue is the best interests of man. Good men, indeed, neither individually nor collectively, are infallible; and, therefore, we do not set up their judgment in any given case, as the ultimate standard of decision. But it is nevertheless true as a matter of history, that the intelligence and religion of a country go for what is true and good, ignorance and irreligion for what is false and evil. We know that there are cases in which the mariner cannot trust the needle, but must look for guidance to the unchanging star in the heavens; and there are cases in which even the mass of religious men swerve from the right course, and we have to look away from earth to heaven for direction. Nevertheless, the sailor who throws his compass overboard is sure to be shipwrecked; and the man, whether minister or magistrate, who sets himself against the religious convictions of the mass of good men, is sure to be ruined. This reference to the irreligious character of this movement against the Sunday laws is not made *ad invidiam*. It is intended as an appeal to a rational and well-established principle of action. It is wise and right (except in extraordinary cases), for public men to follow the enlightened religious sentiment of the community; it is unwise, disastrous, and wrong for them to go counter to that sentiment, or to take side with the irreligious and the vicious. All history is filled with illustrations and proofs of this truth. It is, therefore, a presumptive argument against this anti-Sabbath movement, that the religious sentiment of the country is against it, and the irreligious in its favour. No right-minded man can hesitate which side to take in such a controversy, unless his own convictions

are singularly clear and strong, so that his allegiance to God forces him to array himself against God's people.

We propose briefly to examine the leading arguments of the anti-Sabbatarians, and see whether they are of such cogency as to constrain a conscientious man to take part with the anti-Christian and irreligious portion of the community against the great body of enlightened and religious men. It is plain that this is a very serious question. There is far more at stake than simply the laws for the due observance of the Lord's day. The principle on which those laws are assailed, would, as its advocates avow, exclude the Bible from our public schools, banish chaplains from all our legislative halls, and from the army and navy, from hospitals and almshouses, from our penitentiaries and State institutions of every kind. It would, as we shall see, do far more than this. It would forbid the exaction of an oath of office, or for confirmation of testimony. It would obliterate from our statute-books all laws for preserving the sanctity of marriage, for punishment of polygamy or adultery, and, in short, of all enactments which assume that we are a Christian people, bound by the revealed will of God. We should, therefore, approach this subject with a due impression of the magnitude of the interests at stake, and of the radical character of the revolution which it is now sought to introduce into our laws and customs.

The first argument urged, by many at least, in opposition to Sunday laws, is that the Bible is not the word of God; it is not a revelation of his truth and will, to which we owe faith and obedience. This is substantially the ground taken by the author of the work at the head of this article. On page 18, he says, "In this account of creation nature speaks one language, the Bible another; shall we put aside those unchangeable marks of a creation long anterior to that recorded, in order to be guided by records written when, or by whom, no one knows. The account in the book of Genesis can only be considered an allegory calculated to please children and ignorant men." We happen to have heard one of the first scientific men of the age, the friend and peer of Agassiz, lecture on the Mosaic account of the creation, and saw him overawed by the stupendous exhibition of divine wisdom therein contained. To his mind and to his auditors, as unfolded by a true philosopher, it was shewn to be a summation of all the results to which modern science had arrived. We can imagine how such a man would regard the flippant ignorance displayed in the sentence just quoted. Speaking of the Bible, the author asks on page 176, "Can any believe that this book, ambiguous in its language, uncertain in its conjectures, is designed by the Almighty to be the rule of life for man?" On page 180, after stating

what he calls certain philosophical truths, he adds, "They put an end to the popular delusion that the Scriptures are the rule of life, and establish in its place that sublime idea of the constant omnipresence of God, comforting us in our affliction, and guiding us according to his own purposes through all the intricate scenes of our existence." It is the special design of one of his chapters, and apparently of the whole work, to overthrow the idea of a "book religion," and to shew that the doctrine of "the authority of the Scriptures," is of incalculable evil to the morals and welfare of society." His substitute for the Scriptures is "every man's own perceptions of truth and justice," which, in accordance with the language, but not with the doctrine, of Friends, he calls "the inner light." The only use we propose to make of Mr Fisher's book, is to select the heads of the common objections against the Sabbath, and the laws enacted in regard to its observance. The first in the order of importance is the one above stated, viz., that the Bible is not authoritative, is not derived from God, and ought not to be regarded as the rule of our faith or practice. This objection is not peculiar to Mr Fisher, nor to the very inconsiderable class to which he belongs. It is the objection either openly avowed or tacitly admitted by a very large portion of those most active in their opposition to the Sunday laws. These men are not atheists, but deists. They admit the existence of a personal God, but deny that he has made a supernatural revelation recorded in the Christian Scriptures. They say that the only guide for the individual or for governments, is reason, the light of nature, as some express it; or, as Mr Fisher would say, "a divine principle in the mind of man;" which he tells us is sufficient for "the governing principle of the individual man," and "for the governing principle of nations."

The first remark it occurs to us to make on this objection is, that it proves too much. If we must not make laws in obedience to the commands of God recorded in the Bible, because some men say the Bible is not true; neither can we make laws in obedience to the divine principle or voice of God within us, because some men say there is no God. Mr Fisher says to the Christian, "Your Scriptures are not divine as to their origin or authority. The assumption that they are a rule of life is the source of incalculable evils. Any laws founded on their commands are both unjust and injurious." The atheist says to Mr Fisher, "Your doctrine of a God has been and is the greatest of all curses to the human race. It is the fountain-head of all superstition, and of the countless crimes perpetrated in the name of religion. It degrades man from his true position, converts him from a freeman into a slave; brings his

inward life under the lash of a perverted conscience, and makes his soul a nest of scorpions." Let Mr Fisher call an anti-Sabbath convention, and although the atheists may not outnumber the combined elements on the other side, we answer for it, they will be immensely superior in knowledge and power. Should our author fall into the hands of some of these "Free Germans," he would soon find himself crumpled into very small dimensions, and trodden under foot. If, then, he will not admit Christianity as the governing principle for the nation, he will have to submit to atheism, and then we shall soon have a strumpet for a goddess, and the guillotine for the chief source of public amusement. Mr Fisher admits that we must have some "governing principle" not only for the "individual man," but for nations. He says the Scriptures must not be that principle, because they are not the word of God. We must, he says, substitute for them natural religion, "the inner light," "the omnipresence of God," every man's "perceptions of truth and justice." But with the same right that he tells us to put out the sun, and follow the farthing candle of his "inner light," the atheist says to him, "Put out your smoking taper, it has ever led man into swamps and quicksands." If, therefore, we must give up our Christianity, he must give up his Theism.

Our second remark is, that this objection is unreasonable, not only because it is unfounded, but also because it is entertained only by an insignificant minority of the people. The objection that the Scriptures are not an authoritative rule of life is an unreasonable objection, because their divine origin is a well authenticated fact. It is unreasonable to deny what by sufficient, and even superabundant evidence is proved to be true.

The Christian Scriptures, the Old and New Testaments, have been subjected to the scrutiny of men for thousands of years. They have been exposed to all kinds of assault. The greatest and the worst of men have united to overthrow their authority. Philosophy, science, and history, have been marshalled against them; yet at this day the conviction of their divine authority, is more deeply rooted in the minds of men than at any former period. At this moment a larger portion of the enlightened and virtuous of the human race believe the Scriptures to be the word of God, than ever before bowed to their authority. They are luminous with divine knowledge; knowledge of the past and of the future, of the visible and of the invisible, of God and of man; knowledge such as God only could reveal. They are resplendent with holiness. They are instinct with power over the heart, the reason, and the conscience. They meet our necessities, explain the mystery of our origin, of our

nature, and of our destiny. We believe in them for the same reason that we believe in the sun, or in the moral law, or that the Madonna of Raphael is a miracle of beauty. We believe in the Bible for the same reason that Mr Fisher believes in God. And if he would know how his denial of its authority affects us, he has only to ask himself how the denial of the being of God affects him. Such denial would not in the least degree weaken his own convictions. He would only feel indignant that a truth so evident, which addresses itself with such controlling power to his higher nature, should be called in question on grounds which to him must appear trivial. He would regard the demand that he should not make his Theism a rule of life, an outrage on his humanity. He could not fail to answer that it was impossible for him not to regulate his conduct, whether as a citizen or magistrate, by his "own perceptions of truth and justice;" that to throw away his sense of moral obligation and responsibility to God, would be to brutalize himself. The assertion of the atheist, that truth and justice are bugbears to frighten "children and ignorant men;" that moral distinctions are merely subjective; that there is no sin and no virtue; that might makes right; that the actual is the only possible; that all who succeed, whether robber or murderer, ought to succeed, would doubtless appear to him very absurd and very shocking. Well, Mr Fisher, if you cannot give up God, we cannot give up Christ, who is God in his clearest manifestation. If the will of God, as revealed in your own soul, takes such hold of your conscience, that you cannot disregard the demands of truth and justice, we must tell you that the will of God, as revealed in his word, takes such hold of our inward nature, that we cannot disregard its authority. Nay, as God is greater than man, if your own "perceptions of truth and justice" have such authority and power over you, you may believe that what God declares to be truth and justice has a proportionately greater power over us. If you must follow your farthing candle, we must follow the blazing sun, let owls and bats do what they may. If, then, you would regard the demand of the atheist, that you should give up your sense of truth and justice, as the rule of individual and national life as unreasonable, you must permit Christians to regard as still more unreasonable, your demand that they should give up the more distinct revelation of the divine will in his word, as the rule of their conduct, whether as individuals or as a nation.

— The unreasonableness of this demand is the more glaring, because it is made by a very small minority of the community. It is conceded, for the present, at least as between us and Mr Fisher, that nations as well as individuals must have some rule

or principle to regulate their conduct. Christians say that principle should be the will of God as revealed in the Bible. Deists, such as our author, say, it should be the will of God as revealed in the soul; or, in other words, the inward sense of truth and justice. The atheist says, as there is no God, there is no right or wrong, there are only force and happiness; therefore, the only rule of action for the individual is power and a regard to his own happiness, and for the nation, the greatest happiness for the greatest number. If murdering all the Indians would promote the happiness of the nation, then let them be murdered; if poisoning the wells in Canada would promote the enjoyment of Americans, let the wells be poisoned; if taking the wealth of the rich and giving it to the poor would make the people happy, let the rich be despoiled. Leaving out of view the truth or falsehood of these different theories, and assuming for the moment that questions of duty and of allegiance to God can be settled by the ballot-box, it is certainly preposterous for the atheists, who in this country number only a few thousands, to say to the deists, who probably amount to some millions, "you must give up your principle and adopt ours; there is no such thing as truth and justice, and therefore you shall not act in a national capacity on the assumption that there is." Mr Fisher could not stand this. With what face then can a million or two of deists say to twenty millions of Christians, "You must give up your principle, and follow ours." Let it be remembered we are speaking on the concession of Mr Fisher, that there must be some principle to regulate a nation's acts. If this be so, then as the vast majority of the people of this country profess to be Christians, it follows that the Bible, which they believe to be the word of God, must be the rule of their conduct; and it must, even on the low principle of relative numbers, be unreasonable that the few should control the many.

There is still another remark to be made on this objection. To argue that Sunday laws should be abolished, because the Bible is not a rule of life, is altogether irrelevant. It matters not, as to this point, whether the Bible is the word of God or not. It is enough that the people believe it to be his word. It is perfectly competent to Mr Fisher or any body else, to endeavour to convince them that they are labouring under a delusion, and should emancipate themselves from an illegitimate authority. But it is preposterous to require them to abolish laws which the Bible enjoins, so long as their faith in the Bible is unchanged. Mr Fisher must act according to his "inner light," so long as he believes it to be divine. Our telling him that it is an *ignis fatuus*, may be a reason for his re-examining the matter, but it is no reason why he should

alter his conduct before he alters his opinion. The constitution is the supreme law of the land. Any man has the right to endeavour to persuade the people to alter its provisions ; but so long as it is in force it must be obeyed. If a Christian goes to a Mohammedan country, it would be very absurd for him to call for the abrogation of a particular law enjoined in the Koran, on the ground that Mohammed was an impostor, and his book a tissue of absurdities : so long as the people regard Mohammed as a prophet, and the Koran a revelation, it is most unreasonable to require them to disregard their authority. So in a Christian country it is absurd to require that the people should act as if the Bible was not the word of God. It is one thing to try and change their conviction of its divine authority, but another thing to persuade those who believe it to be divine to disregard its injunctions.

The second great objection urged in the book before us, and often elsewhere, is, that admitting the Bible to be the word of God, and the fourth commandment of the Decalogue to be yet in force, the Bible itself does not require such an observance of the Sabbath as our Sunday laws assume. On this objection little need be said. We may repeat the remark just made. The real question is, not what the Bible as interpreted by the objectors means, but how do the mass of Christian people in this country understand it. Mr Fisher says that the Sabbath, even as enjoined in the Old Testament, was a day of recreation ; the people were commanded to rest from their ordinary labours, and to amuse themselves. The mass of Christians say that the Sabbath was a day separated from worldly avocations, and set apart for the service of God ; a day to be devoted to learning his will, and worshipping in his presence. It matters not, so far as the question about our Sunday laws is concerned, which of these views of the design of the day is correct. If the law-making power is in the hands of Christians, and the responsibility for the laws enacted rests on them, they must act according to their convictions. If that power and responsibility rest on Mr Fisher and those who agree with him, they must act according to their views. So long, therefore, as Christians believe that the Sabbath as instituted by God was to be a day of rest from ordinary labour, and of devotion to religious duty, anything inconsistent with that design they are bound, within the limits of their legitimate authority, to prohibit.

In another point of view, however, the question as to the design of the institution of the Sabbath is a matter of vital importance. Its hold on the religious feelings will of course be destroyed, if it could be shewn that it was intended by God himself to be a day of recreation. It is impossible, in an ar-

ticle like this, that we should enter on all these disputed points. Mr Fisher denies the divine origin and authority of the Bible. Must we write a new book on the evidences of revealed religion? So he denies that the Jewish Sabbath had a religious design; he denies that the institution, such as it was, was designed to be perpetual; that the early Christian church recognised the divine authority of the institution, &c. These are points which have been discussed and settled to the satisfaction of the church generations before Mr Fisher or ourselves were born. It would require more space than his work occupies, and more time than its composition cost him, for us to go over the ground which has already been so often traversed. This cannot be expected, and is altogether unnecessary, as works in abundance can be had discussing all these subjects. Our object in this review is simply to point out the inconclusiveness of the arguments presented in this work, and so often repeated elsewhere, in favour of the abrogation of our Sunday laws. We might therefore properly content ourselves with the remark, that so long as the Christian people of this Christian country believe that the Sabbath, as instituted by God, was a day, not for amusement, but for religious service, the Sunday laws cannot be dispensed with without a violation of the public conscience. That Christians are right in their view of this subject might indeed be easily demonstrated to the satisfaction of all who believe the Scriptures. The avowed and often-repeated purpose of its original institution was to keep in mind the creation of the world. If the world was created, then there is a personal God, to whom, as to the author of their being, all rational creatures owe allegiance and worship. If the world was not created, then there is no God, and men are left to choose between Atheism and Pantheism—a distinction without a difference. So far, therefore, from the Sabbath being designed primarily as a day of relaxation from the ordinary labours of life, this was a very subordinate object of its institution. It was designed to be a periodical and often-recurring arrest of the course of worldly life, to make men aware that there is a God to whom they are responsible, and on whom they are dependent, from whom come all their mercies, and to whom they must answer for all their sins. It was designed to prevent men sinking into the material and present, by keeping God in remembrance, and letting in upon the darkness of this outward and fleeting state the light of the spiritual and eternal world. The Sabbath was, therefore, the corner-stone of religion. Its neglect was sure to lead to forgetfulness of the true God, and then to idolatry, and the dominion of all evil. True religion—that is, what even a Deist would call true religion, the knowledge and worship of the true God—has never, since the

apostasy of man, been preserved where the Sabbath was unknown, or its religious character denied or neglected. It is to reduce the Old Testament from the sublimity of a revelation of God, and of the mode by which he is to be worshipped, and of the means by which the knowledge of him is to be preserved and promoted, to make its most characteristic institution a mere day for worldly amusement. If the Old Testament be viewed as simply a collection of historical records and human compositions, having no higher reference than the temporal affairs of the Jews, then the Sabbath, in keeping with such view, may be regarded as a day of recreation. But if the Bible be a religious book—if its design be to reveal God, his works and will, and to prepare man for a higher state of being—then the Sabbath is a religious institution, having for its object to wean man from the seen and temporal, and prepare him for the unseen and eternal. It is therefore called a holy day; that is, a day set apart to the service of God, just as the temple and its appurtenances, the priests and the people, were holy as consecrated to God. The command to sanctify or hallow the Sabbath is a command to devote it to a religious use. The word to *sanctify* always means, in such connections, to separate from a common to a sacred use. In Lev. xxiii. 3, it is said, “Six days shall work be done; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of rest, a holy convocation: ye shall do no work therein; it is the Sabbath of the Lord (or, the Sabbath to Jehovah, *i. e.*, devoted to his service) in all your dwellings.” It was the day on which the people were to be convoked for holy purposes. The sacrifices in the temple were multiplied—the people resorted thither to worship, they rejoiced, as the Psalmist said, in the courts of the Lord. He preferred to be a door-keeper in the house of God, rather than to dwell in the tents of wickedness. He was glad when they said to him, “Let us go unto the house of the Lord.” The book of Psalms is a collection of devotional exercises for the worship of God, specially on the Sabbath. That day was, therefore, a day set apart for religious services, according to the command, “Ye shall keep my Sabbaths, and reverence my sanctuary: I am Jehovah.” Lev. xix. 30. And the prophet said, “The people of the land shall worship at the door of this gate before the Lord in the Sabbaths.” Ezek. xlvi. 3. Isaiah said, “From one Sabbath to another shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord.” lxvi. 23. In chapter lviii. 13, he says, the blessing of God shall rest on those who shall abstain from doing their pleasure, or seeking mere amusement on God’s holy day; and shall call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord (or the day holy to the Lord), honourable; and shall honour him, not doing their own pleasure, nor speaking their own words. The Jews ever under-

stood the Sabbath to be a day consecrated to religious worship. Philo, as quoted by Eusebius, says, Moses commanded the people "on the seventh day to assemble together, and to listen to the recital of the law." Josephus says (*Contra Apion*. Lib. i. § 22), the Jews were accustomed on every seventh day not only to abstain from the ordinary affairs of life, "but spread out their hands in their holy places, and pray till the evening." We have, however, higher authority than this. It is said in Acts xv. 21, "Moses of old times [literally, *from ancient generations*] hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every Sabbath day." Such was the usage of the Jews in the time of Christ, as we learn from many passages in the New Testament. Mark vi. 2, "When the Sabbath was come, he [Christ] began to teach in the synagogue." Luke iv. 16, "He came to Nazareth—and, as his custom was, he went into the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and stood up to read;" xiii. 10, "He was teaching in one of the synagogues on the Sabbath." The apostles everywhere went into the synagogues on the Sabbath to preach; see Acts xiii. 14, xvii. 2. In this latter passage it is said, "Paul, as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures;" and xviii. 4, Paul "reasoned in the synagogue every Sabbath, and persuaded the Jews and the Greeks." It is plain, therefore, that the Hebrew Sabbath was not a day for worldly amusement, but a day set apart for religious duties. The people, indeed, were commanded to rejoice on that day. And well they might, for it was the constant memorial of the being and goodness of God, not only as their Creator and benefactor, but as their deliverer from bondage. There is nothing ascetic or gloomy in the religion of the Bible. Men are commanded to rejoice always, to praise God with a cheerful voice. There is no doubt that the Pharisees perverted this sacred day, and burdened its observance with many uncommanded austerities; and there is no doubt that some Christians have erred in the same direction. But this is not to be laid to the charge of the Bible; and it is not the tendency of our age. All that God requires is, that the day should be set apart from worldly avocations, and consecrated to religion. The more cheerfully it is observed, the more, that is, of joyful gratitude for the blessings which it commemorates attends its celebration, the better.

The third objection to our Sunday Laws is, that admitting the divine origin of the Old Testament, and conceding that the observance of one day in seven as a holy Sabbath to God is therein enjoined, it was a purely Jewish institution, and is not binding upon Christians.

It is on all hands admitted that the Mosaic laws include two

elements, the one designed especially for the Jews, the other designed for all men. Some of the laws of Moses bound the Jews as Jews, and therefore only Jews; others bound them as men, and therefore all men. The abrogation of the Old Testament economy, with all that was ceremonial, typical, and national, left what was moral and universal untouched. The commands, Thou shalt have no other gods before me; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not covet, are not swept away because the law of Moses is abolished. The only question is, what part of the Mosaic institutions was temporary and national, and what part is permanent and universal? In some cases, as in those just cited, the answer to this question is easy. In others it is more or less difficult. And it is to be admitted that very great evils have arisen from transferring temporary rules and principles from the national economy of the Old Testament, to the catholic economy of the New. Christianity has thus, in different forms, been corrupted by a Judaizing spirit. Whether the Sabbath belongs to the class of temporary Jewish institutions, or was designed to be permanent and universal, is therefore the question. We must here, however, repeat the remark already twice made. It is not so much the truth in this matter, as the faith of the general body of Christians we are to inquire after. Even if Mr Fisher were right in his confident assertion that the Sabbath was a purely Jewish ordinance, still if the Christians of this country are of a contrary conviction, it is unreasonable to expect them to violate their sense of duty because some men think them mistaken. That the Christian world does consider the Sabbatical law of perpetual obligation is obvious from two notorious facts. The whole Christian world observe that law. All classes of Christians (with exceptions too inconsiderable to be taken into account) do observe every seventh day, as a day for religious worship. This is done, indeed, by different churches and persons with different degrees of strictness. But the same may be said with regard to everything else which belongs to Christians as such. It is undeniably true that the whole Christian world, whether Greek, Latin, or Protestant, comprising ninety-nine hundredths of all who bear the Christian name, do observe one day in seven for Divine worship, and have done so from the beginning. This has not been done by accident, or from motives of convenience or expediency. That precisely one day in seven, and not one in six, eight, or ten, has been thus universally observed, is proof positive of its being regarded as a divine institution. If in any case the rule, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, can be applied with certainty, it is to this. But there is another proof of this point. The Decalogue is incorporated into the liturgical or

catechetical formulas of all the great divisions of the Christian church. The Greeks, the Latins, and all Protestants, who have a liturgy, repeat the ten commandments from Sabbath to Sabbath. In their worship the minister says, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy;" and the people answer, "Lord, have mercy upon us, and incline our hearts to keep this law;" and at the end of the repetition of the Decalogue, they say, "Lord, have mercy upon us, and write these thy laws in our hearts, we beseech thee." Here then is the testimony, uttered in the ears of God, and before all men, of the whole Christian world to their faith in the continued obligation of the fourth commandment. This being so, what Mr Fisher, or those who agree with him, have to say to the contrary, is of very little account. If Christians are to be allowed to act according to their faith, they must be allowed to keep the Sabbath, which with one voice they pray God to incline their hearts to do. And if, as even Mr Fisher admits, there must be a principle to determine national as well as individual conduct, then Christian states must obey the law which Christian men believe binds them with the authority of God.

But it is important to inquire into the grounds on which Christians proceed in separating the permanent from the temporary in the Jewish institutions. If we observe the Sabbath, why do we not observe other festivals and rites enjoined in the Old Testament? There are three principles or criteria of discrimination. First: when any command was given before the time of Moses, and not addressed to the chosen people as such, but to all mankind, then it is certain that such command forms no part of the peculiar institutions of the Jews. Whether it was intended to be of permanent as well as universal obligation, is to be otherwise determined. The offering of sacrifices was anterior to the Mosaic period, and was no doubt a divine institution designed for all men; but being typical, it ceased to be obligatory when the great antitypical Sacrifice had been presented on the cross. Second: when the reason assigned for any command is permanent and universal, then the command itself is permanently and universally obligatory. The ground of the commands, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not covet, is nothing in the relation of one Jew to another, but the permanent relations of men. Those commands, therefore, do not bind Jews as Jews, but men as men. The command to worship God and not to worship idols, was not founded on any peculiar relation which the Hebrews bore to God, but on the relation which all rational creatures bear to their Creator. Therefore those laws can never be abrogated. Thirdly: when any command in the Old Testament is recognized by Christ and his apostles as obligatory on their disciples,

it becomes a part of the law which binds all Christians. Thus the original law of marriage was adopted by our Lord, and is permanently obligatory upon all who recognise his authority.

It is the application of these criteria which has convinced the Christian world that the command to consecrate every seventh day to the worship of God and the duties of religion, is of permanent and universal obligation. From the beginning of the world, long before the time of Moses, and therefore for all mankind, God sanctified the seventh day, that is, separated it from an ordinary to a sacred use. This is the plain meaning of the sacred text. "God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work." Gen. ii. 3. This occurs in the account of the creation. It asserts the fact that God blessed or sanctified the seventh day from the beginning. To make this passage mean that the fact that God rested on the seventh day was the reason why, thousands of years afterwards, it was set apart as a day of rest, is to do obvious violence to the text. The language used in Exod. xx. 11, plainly teaches that the Sabbath was instituted from the beginning. "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day, and hallowed it." The reason assigned for blessing the day was a reason which existed from the creation. This view of these passages is confirmed by the consideration that the necessity for the Sabbath was a common necessity. Whether considered as a day of rest from labour, or as a day set apart for the worship of God, it was as important before, as after the time of Moses. Besides this, we have the clearest evidence, in the history of the deluge, that time was then divided into periods of seven days. For this, no satisfactory reason can be given other than the original institution of the Sabbath. Seven is not an equal part either of the period of one revolution of the moon around the earth, or of the earth round the sun. There is nothing in nature to indicate this division of time, or to account for its early introduction. This, too, accounts for the wide prevalence of septenary observances, and for the sacredness so widely attached to the number seven. To account for these facts from the worship of the seven planets, is not only arbitrary, but unsatisfactory. There is no evidence that the knowledge of the seven planets existed at that early period, much less that the worship of them prevailed before the deluge. The hypothesis of the institution of the Sabbath at the beginning, which is demanded by the simple meaning of the sacred text, and confirmed by the considerations just stated, is consistent with all the facts of the case. It is indeed objected that we find no mention of the institution in the subsequent

chapters of the book of Genesis. This, however, is not surprising, considering the brevity and the object of that sketch of the early history of the world. There is no mention of the Sabbath in Joshua, Judges, First or Second Samuel, although so solemnly enjoined by Moses. No special instance of the practice of circumcision is recorded as having occurred from the settlement of the Hebrews in Canaan to the time of Christ. The mere silence of the brief scriptural narratives therefore proves nothing. Neither is the fact that the Sabbath is said to have been commemorative of the deliverance of the people from Egypt, and a sign of the covenant between them and Jehovah, inconsistent with its institution in paradise. It was designed to answer many purposes; to keep in mind the creation of the world; to commemorate the deliverance from Egypt; and to typify the rest which remains for the people of God. An institution originally of divine appointment, which the nations had neglected, and therefore sunk into idolatry, was, as Nehemiah says, ix. 14, "made known" by the hand of Moses; and being thus reinstituted and enforced by additional considerations, became a distinguishing mark between the Jews and the other nations of the earth. Although thus communicated anew to the people, it would appear from Exod. xvi. 23, that it was not unknown to the chosen people. Other nations had neglected it, but the knowledge of such a day, although they have been remiss in its observance, lingered among the Hebrews. This appears from the fact that Moses, in giving directions in regard to gathering the manna, before any new command on the subject, enjoined on the people to collect a double quantity on the sixth day, for "the seventh, which is the Sabbath, in it there shall be none."

Of all classes of Protestant Christians, those who stand at the greatest remove from Brownists or Puritans, to whom Mr Fisher refers the doctrine of the perpetuity of the law of the Sabbath, are the High Church, or Anglican, party in England, and the Lutheran element of the United Church of Prussia. The celebrated Dr Hook, vicar of Leeds, a representative of the former, in his *Church Dictionary*, labours at length to shew that "one day in seven was in the beginning dedicated to the service of the Almighty." He says that Gen. ii. 3 proves that one day in seven was sanctified, or "set apart for a religious purpose." He teaches that this rule was given to Adam, and was "binding not on a chosen few, but upon all his descendants." As a representative of the latter class, we refer to Huebner, Professor in Wittenberg. In his edition of Büchner's *Exegetisch-homiletisches Lexicon*, he maintains that the Sabbath was instituted in Paradise, and says the observance of such a day "is plainly no local or temporary

command, but an original necessity of the spiritual nature of man ; he must suppress all aspiration after the heavenly and invisible, and sink into the earthly, and even the brutal, without the Sabbath." These are men of our day, not of the age in which witches were hung and Quakers persecuted. It will not do, therefore, to attribute to any such age or spirit the doctrine of the primitive institution and permanent obligation of this holy day.

The second criterion leads to the same conclusion. The reason for the Sabbath is permanent, and therefore the institution is permanent. That reason, as given in Genesis, in the Decalogue, and most frequently through the Bible, is nothing in the peculiar or national relation of the Hebrews to God, but the relation which men as rational creatures bear to their Creator. On the same ground, therefore, that the other precepts of the Decalogue, founded on the permanent relations of men, either to God or to each other, are of necessity regarded as binding all men in all times, the Sabbath, which is placed on a similar foundation, must be considered as permanently and universally obligatory. Men are bound to worship God. They are bound to do this socially as well as privately. This worship is a necessity of their spiritual nature. It is essential to the healthful development of their powers, to the formation of character, to their well-being in this world, and their salvation in the next. Without the stated public worship of God, men lose the knowledge of his existence, and all sense of obligation. Enlightened piety gives place to superstition, fanaticism, or irreligion. Men become debased, and society utterly demoralised. The institution of the Sabbath was designed to preserve the knowledge of God and the power of religion among men.* It is God's means to that end, and wherever it has been unknown or neglected, idolatry or false religion has always prevailed. The ground on which the Sabbath rests being, therefore, an abiding necessity of our nature, common to all men, the institution itself cannot be regarded as a temporary Jewish ordinance.

The third criterion by which to determine whether any institution of the Old Testament was intended to be permanent, is the manner in which it is treated in the New Testament. If it is there represented as belonging to the old economy, it is no longer in force ; but, if it is recognised as still binding, it becomes a permanent law of the Christian church. On this principle, all the precepts of the Old Testament founded in the

* Mr Fisher quotes, and afterwards refers to, with evident approbation, the suggestion that the Sabbath was instituted to relieve the sore feet of the Jews during their toilsome journey through the wilderness. So low as that may men get in this nineteenth century !

essential and necessary relations of man to God, or on the permanent relations of society, are in the New Testament either expressly enjoined, or clearly recognised as of permanent obligation. Thus, while the Mosaic law itself, with all its peculiar enactments and penalties, all its rites and its ceremonies, its temple-service and ritual, is declared to be abolished; the prohibition of the worship of false gods, and of all forms of idolatry, is reiterated; all precepts relating to the relative duties of men as fellow-creatures, as husbands and wives, as parents and children, as magistrates and citizens, are recognised as still in force. Now, with regard to the Sabbath, we find, in the first place, not the slightest intimation that it was regarded as a temporary institution. The various festivals of the Jews, *their* Sabbaths, their new moons, their great days of convocation and atonement, are declared to have passed away, as shadows of good things which had already come. But the original command anterior to the law of Moses, to separate one day in the week from worldly avocations, and to set it apart to the worship of God, is never in any way set aside. In like manner, the Jewish law of marriage, with its death penalty, its permission of polygamy and arbitrary divorce, is abrogated. But the original law of marriage is re-enacted and declared to be of perpetual obligation. The abrogation, therefore, of the Jewish Sabbath, with its death penalty, its peculiar services and regulations, leaves the original law of the Sabbath untouched.

In the second place, besides this negative argument, we have abundant evidence that the original law was regarded as permanently obligatory. Our Lord on various occasions, by word and act, taught that the view of the Sabbath entertained by the Jews of his day was erroneous, but he never taught that the Sabbath itself was to be set aside. He taught that it was right to do good, to supply the cravings of hunger, and the like, on the Sabbath; but he never taught that it was right to make the day one of labour or recreation. His doctrine was that the "Sabbath was made for man (not for the Jews), and not man for the Sabbath." It was designed to promote the physical and spiritual interests of men, and was not to be observed in any way which would sacrifice the end to the means. With regard to sacrifices, it was not merely the spirit and manner in which they were offered, but the sacrifices themselves which were set aside or condemned; whereas it was not the Sabbath itself, but the mode of its observance, that our Lord objected to. He sanctioned the religious observance of the day by attending the synagogue services; just as he sanctioned marriage by his attendance on the wedding at Cana. Christ and his apostles also on various occasions gave their sanction to the

Decalogue as a permanent rule of duty. They quote it as a whole, and command that it should be obeyed. That was the law which could not be broken. The decisive fact, however, is, that the whole Christian church, under the guidance of Christ and his apostles, have from the beginning acted on the assumption that the original law requiring one day in seven to be consecrated to God is permanently and universally binding. All Christians, as before remarked, have incorporated the Decalogue, including the fourth commandment, into their standards of faith and practice. The law of the Sabbath, therefore, is written as by the finger of God on the heart and conscience of the Christian world.

The change of the day is merely circumstantial. Any day may be the seventh, according to the mode of ordering the succession. There was a reason why the seventh in the Jewish mode of numbering the days, should be observed by them, because the creation was the thing to be specially commemorated. There is a reason why the first day of the week should be the sacred day of Christians, because the new creation, the work of restoring a ruined world, is the thing we are most interested in bearing in mind. This change of the day was not made arbitrarily, or by human authority. It was made by inspired men, as is proved by the designation of the first day of the week, in the New Testament itself, as the Lord's day, and by the observance of that day by the apostles and early Christians. This circumstantial change in no way interferes with the original command. All the permanent and salutary designs of the institution are answered by the observance of the first, as well as by the observance of the seventh day of the week. It is still one day in seven ; and this is the substance of the original law.

The fourth, and by far the most effective objection, so far as the popular mind is concerned, against the Sunday laws, is, that they are, as the "Free Germans" express it, a violation of the constitutional rights and religious liberty of the people. It is assumed that the separation between the Church and State which prevails universally in this country, and the provision, found in most of our State Constitutions, that no man shall be molested for his religious principles, and no religious profession shall be required as a qualification for office, forbid the enactment of such laws. Those who do not believe in the Sabbath, or even in Christianity, Jews and Infidels of every grade, say they have precisely the same rights under the Constitution as any Protestant Christian. If a man chooses to labour or to dance on the Lord's day, no one has a right to interfere with him. And if any set of men choose to run their cars or steamboats on that day, it is declared to be an act of injustice for the government to prevent it.

In reference to this plausible objection we would say, 1. That this is a Christian and Protestant country. 2. That the people have not only the right, but are bound in conscience, to act on the principle of Protestant Christianity, not only in their capacity of individuals, but as a government, in all cases in which such Christianity affords a rule for individual or governmental action. 3. That in so acting, no violence is offered to any man's constitutional rights or natural liberty.

These are not new principles for this Journal to maintain. They have been repeatedly asserted in their application to the introduction of religious teaching into our public schools. They are developed in a masterly manner (as we may be permitted to say) in a communication to the pages of this number of our Review.* With the principles contained in the article referred to, we heartily concur, although we may differ from our able contributor, as to the extent to which our national and state governments have in point of fact denuded themselves of their rights as Christian organizations. We propose to explain and vindicate, as briefly as possible, each of the principles just stated.

First: This is a Protestant and Christian country. This does not mean merely that the great majority of the people are Protestant Christians. This is indeed a most important, as it is an undeniable fact. Take out of the country all who profess Protestant Christianity, and you take out of it its heart, soul, life, and essence. Still this is not a question of numbers. Turkey is a Mohammedan country, although the Christians may outnumber the Moslems. Nor does the proposition above stated mean simply that the controlling legislative and executive power in this country is in the hands of Protestant Christians. Ireland is a Celtic Roman Catholic country in spite of the domination of Saxon and Protestant England. But it means that the organic life of the country is that form of social, political, and religious life, which is peculiar to Protestant Christianity. As every tree or plant, every race of animals, so every nation has its own organic life. If you plant an acorn it develops into an oak; and as it grows it assimilates or eliminates all that comes within the sphere of its activity. So if you take a number of Chinese as a nucleus of a nation, as they multiply and form themselves into a self-governing community, not only their physical organization, but their whole individual, social, religious, municipal, and political life, is of necessity, or by a divine law, conformed to that peculiar type. Of course the same would be true of any number of English or Frenchmen. The greater the distinction of races

* The article here referred to, entitled, "A Nation's Right to Worship God," we intend to publish in our next Number.—*Ed. B. & F. E. Review.*

the more marked the difference in the manifestations of the organic life of different communities. An African or Asiatic nation differs more from an European one, than one European nation from another. Every nation, however, has its peculiar character and usages, the product and manifestation of its organic life. This country is no exception to this law. It was originally constituted by Protestant Christians. They were not only the first settlers, but they constituted almost the only element of our population for the first hundred years of our history, which was the forming period of our national existence. These progenitors of our country being Protestant Christians, not only each for himself worshipped God, and his Son Jesus Christ as the Saviour of the world, and acknowledged the Scriptures to be the rule of his faith and practice; but he introduced his religion into his family. He associated with others for the public service of God. The people abstained from all ordinary business on the Lord's day, and devoted it to religion. They built churches, erected schools, taught the children to read and obey the Bible as the word of God. They formed themselves as Christians into municipal and state organisations. They acknowledged God in their legislative assemblies; they prescribed oaths in his name; they closed their courts, their places of business, their legislatures, and all places under public control on the Lord's day. They declared the common law of England, of which Christianity is the basis, to be the law of the land. In this way we grew to be a Protestant Christian nation, by the same general law that an acorn becomes an oak. When emigrants who were neither Protestants nor Christians come to the country, they were either perfectly assimilated and absorbed, as the rivulets which flow into the Mississippi are lost in its mighty waters; or, from want of congeniality, they mingle with us, but are not completely of us; as a branch of one kind of tree may be engrafted upon a tree of a different kind, without altering the nature of the sustaining stem. Sometimes the difference is so great as to forbid even this partial assimilation; and these uncongenial elements become warts and excrescences on the body politic. This is the case with the Indians, the Mormons, and the Chinese in California. It is with our religions as it is with our ethnical development. The great majority of the settlers in this country were from Great Britain. They brought with them the English language, English literature, laws, ideas, feelings, and domestic and social usages. They grew up, therefore, essentially an English people, and they so remain to this day. The accession to our population from other sources, does not change our ethnical character. Our language, laws, and institutions are as much English as they were a hundred years ago. Ger-

mans, French, Irish, Norwegians, and Danes, in the course of a generation or two, are merged indistinguishably into the mass of the English-speaking and English-feeling population. Not less palpable is the Protestant Christian character of our nation. It is what it is because it is the development of a germ of Protestant Christianity. This is an outstanding historical fact. It cannot be changed by denying it, by pooh-poohing it, or by cursing it. There stands an oak, because an acorn was planted. And we stand a Protestant Christian nation, because God planted Protestant Christians as the national germ on this western continent. The sense, therefore, in which we understand this to be a Protestant Christian country is, that its organic life, that which gives it being and character, and determines its acts and destiny, is Protestant Christianity. By Protestant Christianity is meant that form of religion which acknowledges Jesus Christ, as God manifest in the flesh, to be the absolute, sovereign, and only Saviour of men, and which takes the Bible, as his word, to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and protests against all human authority in matters of religion.

The second proposition stated above, is, that the people of this country have the right, and are in conscience bound, to act on the principles of Protestant Christianity, not only in their capacity as individuals, but as a government, in all cases in which Christianity affords a rule for individual or governmental action.

This seems almost a self-evident truth. Christianity is a law of life ; a law of Divine authority ; it binds the conscience, it must therefore be obeyed by those who profess to be Christians. They must obey it as men, as heads of families, as magistrates, as citizens, as legislators and executive officers. They cannot deliberately violate any of its injunctions without doing violence to their own conscience, and forfeiting their allegiance to God. If they believe that Christianity forbids war, they cannot, as a government, declare war, or permit it to be prosecuted by those under their control. A nation of Quakers could not maintain a navy, or organise an army. By so doing, they would forfeit their character as Quakers, and all the benefits and blessings therewith connected. If a set of men believe in God and the moral law, it is self-evident that they must obey that law, not only as individuals, but in all the associations into which they may enter. If they form themselves into a manufacturing, or banking, or railroad company, they cannot, in that capacity, do what they believe the moral law forbids. If they cannot deceive or defraud as individuals, neither can they do it as a society. If they are bound to keep the Sabbath in their families, they are bound to keep it in their

workshops and banking-houses. It would help them very little at the bar of conscience, or at the bar of God, to say that a railroad company was organised for secular purposes, and had nothing to do with questions of morals; that those are matters to be left to every man's own conscience and to God. The man who was at once a prince and a bishop, could not get drunk as a prince, and be sober as a bishop. The principle here asserted is so clear that men who occupy the low platform presented in Mr Fisher's book cannot deny it. Even he admits, as we have seen, that there must be a principle not only for the control of individual, but also governmental action. He and many others say "the inner light," or every man's sense of truth and justice, is such a principle. This is giving up the whole controversy, for it admits that men must act in matters of government in obedience to what they believe to be the will of God; and therefore as the people of this country believe the Bible to be a revelation of the will of God, they must, in their governmental capacity, act in obedience to the Bible. If the Bible forbids polygamy, they cannot sanction it. If the Bible prohibits arbitrary divorce, they cannot allow a man to put away his wife whenever he pleases. If the Scriptures enjoin the religious observance of one day in seven, they cannot, as a government, profane that day and be guiltless.

No one denies that men are bound to recognise the authority of the moral law in their governmental acts, that for a nation to authorise or to permit, within its jurisdiction, theft, rapine, or murder, is as atrocious as for an individual man to be guilty of these crimes. No one would dare to rise in a legislative body and propose that such offences should be sanctioned or overlooked. No one, therefore, can reasonably deny that Christians are bound to recognise the authority of Christianity in their governmental acts. They must do it. It may be said that these cases are not parallel, because the precepts of the moral law are obeyed by governments, not as moral duties, but out of regard to the public good. This is not true. It is impossible that men with a moral nature should not act under a sense of moral obligation. All public men are loud in their declarations that they favour or oppose certain measures because they are right or wrong, just or unjust. But even if it were possible for men to deny their moral nature, and to act always and only from selfish motives of expediency, this would not alter the case. It is expedient to obey God. If he has enjoined the observance of the Sabbath, all who recognise his authority will feel that it is expedient, best for the interests of society, that the day should be observed. What, however, we now desire to insist upon, is the absolute impossibility of

Christians ignoring their Christianity in their governmental acts. They can no more do it than they can ignore their reason or their moral nature.

But suppose they could do it, what would be the consequence? What would be the effect of carrying out the principle that religion has nothing to do with human governments, that it has no right to control their acts? Or, to state the question in a different form, what would be the consequence of adopting the principle that human governments have nothing to do with religion, and need not concern themselves whether their enactments violate the principles of Christianity or not? The first consequence of adopting this principle would be that all the Christians of the country would be disfranchised. Suppose our governments, municipal, state, and national, were to act as though there were no such thing as Christianity, or as if it had no right to determine their action. Then, as in Mohammedan or Pagan countries, all public business would go on on Sundays as on other days—all courts would continue in session, all public offices would be open, all town-councils, state legislatures, and both houses of Congress would sit without interruption on the Lord's day. It is plain, therefore, that no Christian could be a lawyer or judge, nor an office-holder of any kind, nor a member of town-council, or of a state legislature, or of Congress. The whole legislative, executive, and judicial power in city, state, and nation, would be thrown into the hands of Jews, infidels, and atheists. We should have a test act of a novel character. Not religion, but irreligion would be demanded as a necessary qualification for every post of trust or power. This is the kind of liberty and equality which our "Free Germans" and Fisherites would establish in the land. This is inevitable. He that will not bow to God, must bow to Satan. There is no help for it. If we banish religion as a controlling power, we thereby establish atheism. If we extinguish light we introduce darkness. And for a man to profess that his object is simply to banish the light, and not at all to bring in darkness, will deceive nobody who has sense enough to understand the meaning of words.

A second consequence of divorcing Christianity from government, no less inevitable than the one just mentioned, would be that all laws which have their foundation in the Christian religion must be abrogated. Take, for illustration, the laws relating to marriage. The doctrine that marriage is a contract for life between one man and one woman, is peculiarly a Christian doctrine. It is not a Jewish, a Mohammedan, or Pagan doctrine. It cannot be said to have its foundation in natural religion, nor in the nature of man, nor in expediency. It is, indeed, the original law given before the introduction of Chris-

tianity It is, no doubt, consonant to the higher nature of man, and necessary to the best interests of society. But these are not the foundations on which it rests. It is founded on the authority of Christ. It is received and obeyed because he has enacted it. It is the doctrine of the Christian Church ; and is observed and held sacred only by those who recognise Christ's authority. In other words, it is peculiar to Christian lands, and is purely a Christian institution. If, then, the government has nothing to do with religion ; if Christians in their governmental capacity are not to be controlled by Christianity, then they have no right to enforce the Christian law of marriage. Any man who may choose to have more than one wife, or to put away one, and take another, may plead his natural right, and put in the plea, that government has no religion, and cannot enact laws to favour any one religious doctrine to the disadvantage of another. To this plea no answer can be made, according to the doctrine against which we are contending. If one man's religion justifies polygamy, and another condemns it, the government, according to that doctrine, has no right to interfere. If it cannot enforce the Christian law concerning the Sabbath, it cannot enforce the Christian law concerning marriage. The advocates of "free-love" have, therefore, the anti-Sabbatarians on their side, so far as the principle is concerned.

A third consequence of the theory in question would be that government can make no law to punish vice. We have before remarked that if deists may drive Christians to the wall, and insist that the Bible shall not be taken as a rule of life to control the action of the government, the atheists may turn their own weapons against the deists, and say that the government must not recognise the authority of natural religion, or of the moral law. It must not exact an oath, because an oath implies not only the existence, but the providential government of God, and a future state of retribution. Thus this great safeguard of life, reputation, and property, must be swept away. What right has a government divorced from religion to exact an oath, which is an act of worship, as a condition of holding office, or receiving testimony ? This principle, however, would carry us much further ; not only must oaths be abolished, but the moral law must be set aside. If it is unconstitutional to act in obedience to the Bible, it is unconstitutional to act in obedience to the moral law. If one man has a right to say, I am an infidel, and you cannot require me to regard the Sabbath ; another may say, I am an atheist, and you have no right to make me obey the Decalogue. You say that the interests of society require that the moral law should be obeyed ; I say, replies the atheist, that what you call the moral law is a bugbear, set up

by priests to answer their own ends. So far from promoting the interests of society, it is the prolific source of all the evils under which society has groaned for ages. Necessity is the plea of tyrants. The church in the darkest ages never ceased to say she burned heretics for the good of society. No man, or set of men, has the right to set up their "inner light," or sense of "truth and justice," as a rule of life for others. This is only carrying out to its legitimate conclusions the principle on which the Sunday laws are now so vigorously assailed. So far, therefore, from admitting that Christianity must be divorced from the government, we maintain that such divorce is impossible. If Christianity is a rule of life, it must go with us into our families, into our schools, our prisons and hospitals; into our workshops and banking houses, into railroad and canal companies, into our municipal councils, and state and national legislatures. We maintain that if this principle be denied, all Christians must be disfranchised; infidelity or atheism must be a condition of office and power; not only our Sunday laws must be given up, but all religion must be banished from our public institutions of every kind. No man can enter the navy or army but on the condition that he renounces all claim to the public worship of God. We must send forth our ships and troops without chaplains, and let our fellow-citizens live and die as heathen. In short, the demand that the government shall not be administered on Christian principles, is a demand that it shall be administered on atheistic principles. The absolute negation of religion is atheism.

The third proposition laid down above, is, that there is no violation of any man's constitutional rights, or of his civil and religious liberty involved, in making the Bible the rule of individual and governmental action in this country.

Our readers will not overlook the limitation attached to our second proposition. We said that Christians have the right, and are bound in conscience to act on the principles of Protestant Christianity in administering the affairs of government, so far as Christianity affords a rule of governmental action. Christianity enjoins on us certain truths to be believed, and certain laws to be obeyed, as men. It does not prescribe any particular form of civil government, nor any definite principles of political economy. It does not invest civil government with authority over the faith of its subjects, nor over the performance of their religious duties. It simply requires that Christians, in all their relations and associations, should have reference to the law of God as revealed in his word, as their rule of action. Carrying out this principle is perfectly consistent with the widest liberty consistent with the existence of human society.

If a number of Christians should associate to carry on any

mercantile or manufacturing business, requiring the outlay of large capital, and the employment of many assistants and subordinates, they would, of course, conduct their business on Christian principles. That is, they would feel bound not only to be just and faithful in all their transactions, but they would suspend all their operations on the Lord's day, afford their employées the opportunity to attend public worship, provide for the education of minors and dependents, and act towards them in all respects as Christ would require at their hands. If a man not a Christian, whether Jew or deist, or an utter sceptic, should propose to join their company, they might receive him into partnership on terms of perfect equality; give him a full share in the profits of the business, and equal right in its management. If this new partner should become infected with the modern ideas of liberty, and say to his associates, I have as much right to control the business of the company as you have, the property is as much mine as yours, you have no right to bring your religion into a business concern. I insist upon it, that our operations shall not be suspended on the first day of the week, that no part of the property shall be used for religious purposes; let the parents of the children whom we employ, see to their religious training. I maintain that we must conduct our business without regard to the Bible, or anything which it enjoins. His associates would doubtless say to him, Then we must dissolve partnership. You knew we were Christians when you joined us. You knew that we could neither work ourselves on the Sabbath, nor allow our mills to run, or our workshops to be open. If you choose to work on that day, that is your own concern. But you have no right to require that our property shall be employed on the Lord's day; that our clerks, porters, or mechanics, should labour for your accommodation. You have no right to demand that a man must be willing to disregard the Sabbath as the condition of being taken into our employ. God, moreover, holds us responsible, not only for the physical comfort, but for the proper Christian education of the children dependent upon us. If you cannot remain with us, unless we conduct our business on infidel principles, you must transfer your capital and talents elsewhere. On the same ground that you require that we should disregard our Christianity, another man may come in and require you to disregard the moral law.

The same answer the Christians of this country give to all classes of men, who demand that Christianity should be divorced from our governments, municipal, state, and national. This country was settled by Protestant Christians. They possessed the land. They established its institutions. They formed themselves into towns, states, and nation. From the nature of the case, regarding the Bible as the word of God binding

the conscience of every man with divine authority, they were governed by it in all their organizations, whether for business or civil polity. Others have since come into the country by thousands; some Papists, some Jews, some infidels, some atheists. All were welcomed; all are admitted to equal rights and privileges. All are allowed to acquire property, to vote in all elections, made eligible to all offices, and invested with an equal influence in all public concerns. All are allowed to worship as they please, or not at all if they please. No man is molested for his religion or for his want of religion. No man is required to profess any particular form of faith, or to join any religious association. Is not this liberty enough? It seems not. Our "Free Germans" and other anti-Sabbatarians insist upon it, that we must turn infidels, give up our God, our Saviour, and our Bibles, so far as all public or governmental action is concerned. They require that the joint stock into which they have been received as partners, and in which they constitute even numerically a very small minority, should be conducted according to their principles, and not according to ours. They demand, not merely that they may be allowed to disregard the Sabbath, but that the public business must go on on that day; that all public servants must be employed; all public property, highways, and railroads, should be used. They say we must not pray in our legislative bodies, or have chaplains in our hospitals, prisons, navy, or army; that we must not introduce the Bible into our public schools, or do anything in a public capacity which implies that we are Protestant Christians. Those men do not know what Protestant Christians are. It is their characteristic, as they humbly hope and believe, to respect the rights of other men, and stand up for their own. And, therefore, they say to all—infidels and atheists—to all who demand that the Bible shall not be the rule of action for us as individuals, and as a government, You ask what it is impossible can be granted. We must obey God. We must carry our religion into our families, our workshops, our banking-houses, our municipal and other governments; and if you cannot live with Christians, you must go elsewhere.

ART. IV.—*Revised Book of Discipline.**

THE Revised Book of Discipline, by having been reported to the last General Assembly, has become, in some sort, the property of the Church; and as its fate will, in all likelihood, be

* This article is by Dr Thornwell, Professor of Theology in the Old School Theological Seminary, Columbia. He was Convener of the Committee appointed by the General Assembly to revise their Book of Discipline. Most of the topics here discussed are interesting to all Presbyterian Churches.—*Ed. B. & F. E. Review.*

settled by the next Assembly, it is a matter of grave importance that the principles it embodies should be rightly understood, and the grounds and tendencies of the changes introduced in it set in their true light. It has already been subjected to a severe criticism—a criticism extremely kind in its spirit and temper to the authors of the book, but without the slightest mercy or favour to the peculiarities of the book itself. The contrast between the courtesy with which the members of the Committee, personally considered, have been treated, and the freedom with which their production has been handled, may be taken as an apt illustration of the genius of Presbyterianism, which teaches charity to the man without concessions to his errors, and which, while it repudiates all human authority, endeavours to observe the maxim: Prove all things; hold fast that which is good. We thank our brethren for the good opinion they have expressed of us. Indeed our modesty might have been shocked at the laudatory terms which they have permitted themselves to use, had we not felt that the praise was materially qualified by the estimate they have put upon our work. It is very flattering, no doubt, to be called able and wise, even in the positive degree; but the edge is somewhat taken from the compliment, when in the next breath it is added, that these able and wise men have done nothing but blunder. It is a sublime thing to be a mountain, but a mountain labouring to bring forth a mouse has no great cause of self-congratulation. The brother to whom Robert Hall so warmly expressed his thanks for the benefit he had received from his sermon, was highly elated at the moment; but his self-complacency was not likely to be dangerous, when he came to learn that the real secret of the eminent usefulness of his discourse was its transcendent meanness. Our brethren, too, have been very considerate in tempering their praises of us, so as not to make them snares to our vanity. They have left us nothing whereof to glory. They have so dexterously mixed the antidote with the poison that we can take their physic without the risk of any serious inconvenience. On one occasion we heard it gravely maintained that the book was bound to be a bad one, because its authors were very able men. The idea seemed to be that they had a reputation to maintain, and as the burning is an easier road to fame, than the building of a temple, they were under a very strong temptation to immortalize their names by the cheap expedient of doing mischief, when they found the prospect very remote of doing any good. To meet and break up and have it said that such men had done nothing, was what they were not likely, for a moment, to brook. We think that we can relieve the minds of our brethren who are troubled on this

score. The Committee expected just about the glory they have received. They have erected about as big a monument as they ever expected to raise, and the inscription which their friends have put upon it, though not precisely the one they would like, is precisely the one that they looked for. They had a crazy kettle to mend, and they never aspired to any higher distinction on account of their labours in this line, than that of respectable tinkers. They thought that they knew where the crack was, and they, perhaps, persuaded themselves that they had succeeded in stopping it. But they were, at the same time, so fully aware of the perverseness of human nature, that they made up their minds, in advance, to hear it gravely alleged, that the vessel went into their hands in a perfectly sound state, and left them as leaky as a sieve. Accordingly the book is said to be a failure. It has been condemned, without benefit of clergy, as setting at naught the rules of logic, trampling under foot the most cherished principles of the Church, exposing her to the jeers of enemies, the triumph of rivals, and the pity of her friends; and to crown all, making it absolutely certain by its bungling provisions for securing the ends of justice, that in almost every trial, prejudice shall rule the hour. The marvel is, how any men, with an ordinary share of common sense, and common integrity, let alone wise and able men, could have been betrayed into such self-evident folly. The truth is, we think our critics have made a mistake. The praises which they have bestowed upon the Committee, they ought to have given to the book, and the censures which they have so freely dealt out to the book, we are afraid would not be misplaced if applied to the persons of the Committee, though we confess that we should be very sorry to believe, whatever we may think of ourselves, that our brethren were so fully in possession of the truth. We have hardly yet reached that stage in humility in which we are content that all the world should know how weak and foolish we know ourselves to be. But whatever may be our capacities (we speak as a member of the Committee), whether we belong to the weak and foolish things of the world, and things which are not, or to the strong, and wise, and noble, we insist upon it that the book is, upon the whole, a good one—that the old cracks in the vessel have been honestly stopped, and that no new ones have been made. We ask our brethren to give us a hearing in behalf of our poor, persecuted bantling.

We propose to indicate and classify the nature of the changes which have been introduced into the new book, and, as we go along, to discuss the principles which pervade them, and which have rendered some of them so obnoxious to some of our brethren.

I. The first class of changes to which we shall refer, consists in the lopping off of redundancies. Short as the old book is, it is rendered unnecessarily diffuse by a style of composition altogether unsuited to the nature of the work. Presbyterians are proverbially fond of the sermon, and the old book bears very decisive marks of this denominational peculiarity. Instead of being simply a book of definitions, of forms, and of rules, which a manual of discipline, as contradistinguished from a confession of faith, or a manual of devotion, ought to be, it mixes up with its legal technicalities moral harangues on the importance of the subject, or the necessity of cultivating a right spirit and temper. It stops to preach when it should only prescribe a form of process. What it says is all very good ; only we insist that it is not said in the right place. It would have been just as reasonable to have interspersed an occasional prayer, or to have introduced one or two hymns, by way of encouraging a devotional frame. The doctrine upon which discipline is founded, and the motives with which it should be enforced, must all be presupposed, and the only effect of introducing these matters into a book of forms is to swell its dimensions, and to increase the difficulty of finding what one wants. If, as the *Edinburgh Review* once suggested to Mrs Sherwood, the moral had been printed in a different type, the inconvenience would not be so great as one would then know at a glance what to skip ; but it certainly is provoking, when you are in search of a rule, to have to wade through a homily before you can get at it. The new book has omitted many of these sermons. It has retained enough to authenticate its Presbyterian parentage, and endeavoured to retain them where they were likely to be least annoying. We humbly suggest that this change is a real improvement ; and we cannot but think, that he who has mastered the Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, and the Form of Government, will stand in need of no further preaching when he comes to the Compend of Discipline.

The old book was sometimes very tedious in coming to a point. The new book has attempted to shorten the process. The whole chapter of New Testimony, which, in the old book, occupies nearly two pages, and is spread over seven sections, is, in the new book, condensed into a single paragraph, without the sacrifice of a single idea. The chapter of Actual Process has likewise been materially reduced, with all the advantages of definite and precise statements over wearisome circumlocutions. We mention these as specimens of the changes under this head ; and if it is desirable that a manual of discipline should be brief, pregnant, and pointed, we do not see on what ground these changes can be consistently condemned. They

might have been carried much further. If the committee had been preparing, out and out, a new book, instead of trying to amend an old one, well known and familiar, they would not only have omitted all the sermons and moral harangues, but they would have consulted a still greater brevity and point in the rules and definitions which they retained. But something was due to the familiarity of the church with old forms of expression, and to the associations of reverence which naturally cleave to a legacy from the past.

II. Another class of changes respects the supply of omissions. The old book is a curious illustration of the maxim that extremes meet. It often speaks where it ought to be silent, and is silent where it ought to speak. It is even profuse of words where there was no occasion for a single syllable, and as silent as the grave where the occasion demanded an articulate utterance. These omissions the committee have endeavoured to supply, and no one who has not compared their work, chapter by chapter, and section by section, with the old book, can form any idea of the contributions which, in this respect, they have made to the logical completeness of the Discipline. These additions may be referred to several heads, which we shall proceed to signalise.

1. The first embraces those cases in which the new book explicitly enunciates what was contained in the old book only by implication. For example: the old book defines offences, and proceeds to distribute them, according to their greater or less notoriety, into two classes, public and private. Subsequently another class is introduced—personal offences—and yet not a word is said in explanation of their nature, or of the grounds of distinction betwixt them and private offences. A two-fold principle of classification is implied, but only one is expressed. The committee have supplied the omission, and if they have done nothing more, have at least rendered the book consistent with itself. So in relation to prosecutions on the ground of common fame, the old book implies that the first step shall be to ascertain that a common fame really exists, but it has nowhere made this a law. Yet it is one of those things which ought to have been clearly stated. There have been instances in which rash and malicious men, under the pretext of common fame, have subjected their brethren to vexatious and annoying prosecutions, when the only common fame that existed was the scandal of wicked and suspicious enemies.

But the most important implication of the old book to which the new has given a distinct and articulate utterance, is in reference to the great principle of ecclesiastical inquest; that every church court has the inherent right to demand and

receive satisfactory explanations from any of its members concerning any matter of evil report. Nothing has surprised us more than the manner in which this doctrine has been received. It has been branded as "a new principle," "as unjust, hazardous, and extra-judicial;" "no good," we are told, "can result from this exacting, star-chamber mode of inquiry." Nothing but "mischief" is anticipated "from the revised suggestion." "It has been hitherto unknown to the Presbyterian church; and no court of law, in a free country, has ever ventured to practise upon it."* Now the simple question is, what is the principle in which the right recognised in "the revised suggestion" is grounded? Nothing more nor less than that the church courts are the spiritual guardians of the people. Their right to institute process, and to inflict censures, is founded in the same relation. The Lord has made them overseers of the flock. They must keep their eye upon their charge, and the very nature of their trust implies that they have all the power which is necessary to execute it. The Christian people are, in some sort, their children, and as a father has the inherent right to interrogate his children in reference to their conduct, so a church court has the right to institute inquiries, as well as to sit in judgment upon issues actually joined. It is not an inquisitorial, vexatious, star-chamber power. It is to be exercised in the spirit of love, for the glory of God, and for the honour and good repute of the church. Every man whose good name has suffered unjustly ought to rejoice in the exercise of it, as it gives him the opportunity of vindicating his character without subjecting him to the shame of being arraigned for crime. The guilty ought to rejoice in it, as it is a means of bringing them to a sense of their sin, and of leading their minds to repentance. We were greatly astonished to find it made an objection to this power, that it might require men to criminate themselves. If they have done wrong, this is precisely what a church court ought to try to do, and it never will succeed in doing them any good until it reduces them to this point. In spiritual jurisdiction, self-crimination is no evil. In civil courts, it may be the parent of tyranny and injustice; but a spiritual court is for edification—a civil court for justice. A spiritual court aims at producing and fostering a given state of heart; a civil court is for the protection of rights. Spiritual courts are for the religious education and culture of the people—a species of moral schoolmaster; civil courts for the safety and order of the commonwealth. Spiritual courts can censure, but not punish; civil courts punish without censuring. The spiritual court is entrusted with the keys—the symbol of the power of

* Dr Van Renselaer's Remarks, pp. 14, 15.

search and investigation; the civil court is armed with the sword. To reason from the rights of one to the rights of the other is therefore absurd. Cæsar is no model for Christ.

That the principle is no new one, but imbedded in the very nature of spiritual jurisdiction, will be obvious to any one who will reflect but a moment upon the right of a church court to cite offenders before it. Whence came that right, and for what purpose does it exist? Is it not obviously one manifestation of the common life of the Church, and one form in which the interest of each in all is signalised? What is the Church but a company of brothers, and are we not our brothers' keepers? But it is replied, that, while this common relation is admitted, the only safe mode in which the inherent right of supervision can be exercised is by regular judicial process. That remains to be proved. Indeed, a species of inquest must be resorted to before a court can be put in possession of the facts which justify process. Rumour may charge a man with crime; this rumour must be investigated. Now, is it the doctrine of our brethren, that a court may question, if it chooses, every other man in the community touching the rumour except the only man who is most deeply concerned in it? Has it no right to ask and receive his explanations? Has it no right to exact of him that he shall deal honourably and frankly with it, and that if he has done wrong he shall confess it and repent; and that if he has been injured, his brethren may be placed in a condition to vindicate his name? If this is tyranny, we only wish that there was more of it in the Church; and we shall rejoice to see the day when every Session and every Presbytery shall be a star-chamber after this fashion. The notion that this inquest makes an invidious distinction between the suspected man and his brethren, when they are all, in truth, on a footing of equality, overlooks the fact that the equality has been disturbed by the existence of grounds of suspicion. The parties are no longer on the same moral level, and one design of the inquest is to rectify the change.

Whether new or old, "the revised suggestion" is found almost *totidem verbis* in the Form of Government. In chapter IX. of the Church Session, it is said: "The Church Session is charged with maintaining the spiritual government of the congregation; *for which purpose they have power to inquire into the knowledge and Christian conduct of the members of the church.*" As all our courts are radically one, they all possess inherently the same powers. What the session can do in reference to its subjects, every other court can do in reference to those immediately responsible to it. If the right of inquiry

is essential to spiritual government, it must inhere wherever a spiritual government is to be maintained.

If now this power is odious and tyrannical, the framers of our constitution have been guilty of a grievous injustice to the people; and our brethren who denounce the principle chime in with the ancient enemies of Calvin in representing his discipline at Geneva as a shocking and monstrous inquisition into the privacies of individual or domestic life. The terms in which he and his system were reproached, for maintaining the very doctrine which is said to be new, are strikingly similar to those in which the revised book has been assailed—a clear proof that genuine Presbyterianism has the same difficulties to encounter in every age.

2. Another class of omissions, not very unfrequent in the old book, is that of details which experience has shewn to be necessary in the execution of its general provisions. We shall mention a few instances. The old book makes no allusion to the case in which a party accused evades a citation by removal or concealment; yet this is a case from which gross scandal may result, and which ought to be provided for in every sound system of discipline. The new book supplies the defect. The old book nowhere requires an issue to be joined—a capital omission in a judicial trial; the new book insists that the accused shall plead. It makes a case before it invokes the judgment of the court. The old book leaves indeterminate what constitutes an appearance in cases of appeal. The new book gives a precise rule. We think there can be little doubt that these amendments are all for the better. The first must commend itself at once to the common sense of every member of the Church. Scandalous offenders are not to be permitted to outrage the Christian name, and then screen themselves from all testimony against themselves and their crimes by dodging an officer of the court. The case of a deliberate and open refusal to obey a citation, which the old book provides for, is not so aggravated as the mean and skulking cowardice which seeks to sin behind a shelter. That an issue ought to be joined is plain to all who are familiar with the history of trials. To say nothing of other advantages, the saving of time is an immense gain. When there is a series of specifications, it may be that all but one shall be admitted—it may be that some are admitted as to the facts, but justified as to the offence—it may be that none are denied, and the issue is joined on the question of crime. Is it nothing to save a court the time and trouble and vexation of proving what the party has not denied, or of entering into matters of fact, when the sole question is a matter of Christian morality? Then, as to an appearance in cases of appeal, what a saving of time, trouble,

and expense, when the appellant is allowed to appear in writing; and how just is this arrangement to many who can ill afford the means of attending the sessions of the General Assembly? These additions may seem to be minute and trivial, but they are like the pins which hold together the beams of a building—they are the details of justice.

3. To this general head may be referred the omission to provide for the case in which a party confesses his guilt. The idea of hearing argument, examining witnesses, and proceeding through all the formality of a trial, when the very point to be proved is admitted, is simply absurd. There are men who are so impregnated with the maxims of the common law, that they can scent nothing but tyranny in the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, that men should confess their sins, and that Christian men should confess them to one another. Proof is necessary only when the facts are denied; and the new book has recognised a man as a competent witness in his own case when his testimony is against himself. If he says that he has been drunk, or has lied, or cheated, or committed fornication, the new book says that you may deal with him as guilty of these crimes. This strikes us as the verdict of common sense, though we heard it gravely maintained in the last Assembly, that a man's confession of a crime was no satisfactory evidence of his guilt, unless two or three persons had seen him commit it, or circumstances strongly corroborated his assertion.

4. To the same class belongs the case in which an offence is committed in the presence of the court. Trial is unnecessary, when the judges are already in possession of the facts. If the formalities of process should be resorted to, these very judges are the men that must appear as witnesses; and we should be brought back by a circuit to the very point from which we set out. There is certainly no need of trial—there may be need of delay. That is a matter to be determined by the wisdom of the judicatory. The new book does not require that the judgment shall be instantly rendered; all that it dispenses with is the idle ceremony of appearing to investigate what is perfectly notorious. If the court finds itself in a condition not to pass an impartial and deliberate judgment, it may postpone the matter until its passions have subsided and reason resumes her supremacy. Some cases may be imagined in which the judgment ought to be rendered on the spot—in which the language of indignation is the language of justice, and the only language in which a fitting testimony is uttered against the sin. Other cases might require delay. There is a defect in the provision of the new book, as it was originally adopted, in not giving to the offender the opportunity, if he desires it, of

being heard in his defence. This defect was remedied in the late meeting of the Committee at Indianapolis; and the section, as reported to the General Assembly, gives, both to those who confess and those whose sin is in the presence of the court, the privilege of a fair hearing in explanation or extenuation of their conduct. They are at liberty to speak for themselves.*

5. Another omission of the old book, which the new one supplies, is in reference to the charge of a suspended minister. In the case of a deposed minister, the old book provides that his congregation shall be declared vacant, but the important practical question, whether the suspension of a minister dissolves his pastoral relation to his flock, is left unanswered.

III. A third category to which changes in the new book may be referred, pertains to what may be called an extension of privileges. For example, parties are permitted to testify; in trials before a session the accused may employ any communicating member of the Church as counsel, instead of being restricted to members of the court, and gross irregularities in an inferior judicatory may be brought to the notice of the superior by memorial, as well as by common rumour. These changes seem to have received the general approbation of the Church. One of them is so obviously a matter of frequent necessity, and all of them so intrinsically reasonable, that we shall not occupy the time of our readers with any further discussion of their merits.

IV. A fourth class of changes in the new book consists in the removal of anomalies and incongruities which disfigured the old. The Committee have endeavoured to adjust the system so that the parts shall not only be consistent with one another, but with the Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, and the Form of Government. They have sought, in other words, to make the frame of our Discipline not only coherent and homogeneous with itself, but coherent and homogeneous with the whole scheme of our doctrine and order. The old book does not hang well together.

1. The first of these changes occurs in the definition of an offence. The old book either goes beyond the Scriptures, and makes that to be a ground of prosecution and judicial censure, which the word of God neither directly nor indirectly condemns, or is guilty of gross tautology. It either makes human opinion co-ordinate with divine authority, or it is a play of words. The whole section in the old book is: "An offence is anything in the principles or practice of a church member, which is contrary to the word of God; *or which, if it be not*

* The Committee also altered sec. 1, chap. iv., of the new book, so that a failure to plead should not, as first proposed, be considered as a confession, but should cause the trial to take place according to the provision in section 4.

in its own nature sinful, may tempt others to sin, or mar their spiritual edification." The clause in italics is omitted in the new book. In the first place, it is directly contradictory to the Confession of Faith, if it means to teach that there is any other standard of duty than the word of God. "The whole counsel of God," is the emphatic language of the Confession, "concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture; unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men." Again: "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are, in anything, contrary to His word, or beside it in matters of faith and worship." Now the rejected clause either means that the word of God, directly or indirectly, condemns those things which, though not inherently wrong, become accidentally sinful, or it does not. If it means this, it is unnecessary. It begins a classification of crimes, and abruptly terminates with a single order. If this is not its meaning, it is wholly unpresbyterian and unprotestant. It sets up a new and independent rule of life. In either case, it ought to be rejected. In the next place, as a rule, it is altogether too vague and too susceptible of perversion and abuse. It makes the consciences of others, and not our own, the guide of our actions, and brings us under bondage to others precisely where God has left us at liberty to pursue, according to our own judgment, the law of charity. Who was competent to say, that Paul ought to have circumcised Timothy, and not have circumcised Titus, but Paul himself? One man is offended if a brother happens to take a glass of wine; and we have known serious scruples about the lawfulness of holding communion with those who played upon a flute. Must the Church censure all who chance to be associated with brethren so deplorably weak, without recognizing the duty of humouring their follies. The whole case is one outside of discipline—it is a case of liberty—and of liberty to be used for the glory of God and for the real interests of his people—and as a case of liberty, must be determined by the individual in dependence upon grace. The more complicated the condition of society becomes, and the more diversified the forms which superstition, weakness, or will-worship may assume, the more stringently should the church feel the obligation to keep exclusively to the word of God. We have no right to make terms of communion which the Master never made, or to enforce laws which he never knew. Jesus Christ is the only king in Zion—the Bible, the only statute book He has given to his people and

whatever is beside, or contrary to it, is no part of the faith or duty of the Church.

2. It strikes us as an incongruity in the old book, that it makes no illusion to the Westminster Standards in determining what constitutes a matter of offence, whether in reference to faith or practice. It refers us at once and exclusively to the Bible, as if we had not already settled as a Church what the Bible teaches on these points, and solemnly agreed to walk together according to this interpretation. The constitution of the Church is its own sense of the terms of communion prescribed by our Lord—its own sense of what we are alike bound to believe and bound to do. It is under that Constitution that we become a separate and distinct denomination. Obviously, therefore, the standards of a church ought to be its immediate appeal, when a member is charged with walking disorderly. Has he transgressed the law, as that church understands it? This question can only be answered by shewing how the church understands it, and that only by an appeal to its standards.

A writer in the April number of this Review has objected to this feature of the new book—1st, on the ground that the provision is ambiguously expressed, leaving it doubtful whether two standards are meant, the Bible and the Westminster Formularies, to either of which the appeal may be made in determining an offence, or whether only one is meant—the Westminster Formularies; and 2d, on the ground that no human expositions of the ethical teachings of the Bible can contain an adequate rule of life.

As to the first of these objections it is enough to reply, that even if the clause were ambiguous, no possible confusion could arise. If a thing is proved to be wrong directly from the Bible, our Confession of Faith requires us to condemn it. That accepts the whole word of God as the absolute, authoritative rule of faith and practice. If a thing is shewn to be wrong from our standards, we, as Presbyterians, have declared, that it is so taught in the sacred Scriptures. To us the propositions are identical: Whatever the Bible condemns, our Confession of Faith condemns, and whatever the Confession of Faith condemns, the Bible condemns. They are the same authority; the Confession is nothing except as the Bible speaks in it, and through it; and in adopting it, we have averred it to be an honest and faithful interpretation of God's teachings. If the Bible and the Confession were independent of each other, or were inconsistent with each other, then difficulty might arise. But as long as their relation is that of original and translation, of cipher and interpretation, it is a matter of no moment to which a man immediately appeals. But it certainly is a

convenience to have the teachings of the Bible reduced to a short compass, and announced in propositions which are, at once, accepted without any farther trouble of comparing texts.

But, in the next place, we deny that the clause is ambiguous. It admits grammatically of but one possible interpretation. It means, and was intended to mean, that, to us Presbyterians, nothing is heresy which is not repugnant to our standards of doctrine; and nothing is unlawful which is not repugnant to our standards of practice. We have given to the world a creed in which we undertake to condense what God requires us to believe, and what God requires us to do. We have expounded the Law and the Gospel, Faith and Duty, and we have solemnly agreed to accept this exposition as the constitution of our Church. This creed, in its whole compass, covers all that we believe to be necessary to the salvation and spiritual prosperity of the soul. It is, therefore, the standard by which we are to try and to judge one another.

As to the second objection, we have only to say, that it applies as fatally to the Bible as to the Westminster Formularies. "These standards," it is said, "do not profess to be exhaustive in their enumeration of disciplinable offences. The circumstances of mankind vary so infinitely, that if a statute-book were to enumerate, specifically, all the offences which will arise in all time, the world would not hold the books which should be written.* All this is very true, and, therefore, one would think we are not to look in the Bible for any such chimerical attempt. This is precisely the ground on which Paley has constructed his argument, to shew the insufficiency of the Scriptures as a complete rule of practice, and the necessity of supplementing them with philosophical speculations. Paley is certainly wrong, but it is as certainly true, that the Westminster standards are no more at fault, upon this particular point of a complete enumeration of all possible offences, than the Scriptures themselves. How, then, do the Scriptures become a perfect rule? The brother tells us, and tells us very correctly. It fixes general principles, illustrates them by appropriate examples, and gives us the key to the discovery of duty in the complicated relations of life. To do this, it is said, "requires infinite wisdom." Granted. But after infinite wisdom has done it, what is to hinder man from repeating it? If the general principles of the Bible, as found in it, are exhaustive, what prevents the same principles from being exhaustive when they are transferred to the Larger Catechism? If complete in one place, why not in the other? It is precisely these principles of the Bible, as illustrated by concrete cases, that are embodied in the ethical teachings of our standards.

* South. Pr. Rev., April 1859, p. 42.

We have added nothing to them—we have taken nothing from them. We have only collected them from the divers parts of the sacred volume in which they are scattered, and reduced them to method and system. But it seems that we are at liberty to deduce necessary inferences from Scripture, but not from the Confession of Faith? Why not? Has the brother to learn that a necessary inference is no addition? That it is part and parcel of the premises from which it is drawn? Does he not remember that all analytical judgments are essentially identical; and that in necessary inference we only explicitly enunciate what was previously implicitly affirmed. This law of inference, therefore, applies to all general propositions wherever they are found, divine or human, inspired or uninspired. We cannot see, therefore, the force of the objection. If the general rules of the Bible are complete and exhaustive in themselves, they are as complete, when collected and arranged by human skill, as when they lie scattered through a multitude of volumes.

3. Another anomaly, which the new book has abolished, is that of making the inferior courts, in appellate jurisdiction, parties to a new issue. The incongruous nature of our present judicial system is not generally apprehended. In every appeal there are two issues, two sets of parties, and may be two judgments. The secret of this complication is, that every appeal not only transfers the case to a higher tribunal, which ought to be its sole legitimate effect, but is construed into an impeachment of the court below, raising an issue in relation to its integrity and judicial fairness. The appellant appears, not only to represent the merits of the case to which he was an original party, but to expose the demerits of the court that refused him justice. He is at once a suitor and a prosecutor. Both issues are tried at the same time, and so blended that they constitute but one apparent case. Hence the appellant is heard in a double capacity, and the lower court in its own defence; and when the final sentence is rendered, the book distinctly contemplates, that both issues shall be fairly considered, and that the lower court shall be censured if found guilty of mal-administration. Now the complication of two such issues is simply monstrous. To try at the same time, and in the same breath, the question of individual right, and the question concerning the official integrity of a judge, is an outrage upon common sense. And yet this is what the old book does. The inferior courts are arraigned at the bar of the higher to defend themselves; and it is mercifully provided, that “if they appear to have acted according to the best of their judgment, and with good intention;” that is, if they succeed in shewing that they have not been knaves, they may escape with their

necks—"they incur no censure." "Yet, if they appear to have acted irregularly or corruptly, they shall be censured as the case may require." What can shew more clearly than this passage, that the lower court is on trial for its character? The writer in the April number of this Review insists that this must be the case from the very nature of an appeal.* "When the individual who was cast, appeals or complains, *against whom*, we pray, does he appeal or complain? Not surely against the accuser (where there is a personal accuser). The complaint is *against the judicatory which cast him*; as he conceives, unjustly. And when his appeal or complaint is entertained by the higher court, what is the thing which is investigated? Is it not *the sentence passed below*? The body appealed from, or complained against, the body whose that sentence was, is surely then a party to the question." In all this there seems to us a singular misconception. The design of the appeal is to transfer the case to a higher court. It removes it from one tribunal to another. The appellant, no doubt, thinks injustice has been done him, but all that he transfers, or ought to be allowed to transfer, is the identical case upon which the lower court sat. The higher tribunal must have before it precisely what the lower had—the same issue—the same testimony—the same circumstances. The operation of the appeal is nothing more nor less than to introduce the question to another court—it is the removal of the cause. The issue before the higher court is not the sentence of the lower, absolutely considered, but relatively to the merits of the case. It is through a full and patient consideration of the case, that the final conclusion is reached, either sustaining or reversing that sentence. The principle upon which the law of appeals rests is, that truth and righteousness are likely to be elicited by the care, deliberation, and exemption from passion implied in submitting a cause to successive tribunals. One court is a check upon the other, as in representative assemblies one chamber checks another. The thing to be secured is the contemplation of the subject from different points, and aloof from the influences of prejudice and passion. A bill passes the House of Commons, and is sent to the Lords. The Lords may adopt or reject it—but their vote is no censure upon the Commons—it is only a part of the process by which rash and hasty legislation is prevented. So when a case is decided in a lower court, it may be carried to a higher, and reversed. This reversal implies no censure upon the lower, but is the result of the system by which the fullest and most impartial consideration is secured to the complaints of every suitor. Appellate jurisdiction is a contrivance of political wisdom for approximating

* Page 69.

as nearly as possible to the unbiassed verdict of truth and reason. What passes through the successive courts is *the case* that the parties at first made out, and it passes, like a bill, from one chamber to another, and then from both to the supreme executive. Our brother seems to think that the motives of the appellant give us a clue to the real nature of an appeal. No doubt his end is to gain his case; but the end of the system is to do justice. If his views were to control the matter, there would be no necessity of any court.

If the views which we have given of appellate jurisdiction are correct—if the successive courts are only judges of one and the same case—if it is the case which passes from one to the other—it is clearly preposterous to make the courts pass with the case, and to originate a new case at every step of the transfer. There is a way for trying the lower courts—the old book provides for it, and the new book still more completely—but when they are tried, no other issues are mixed up with the process.

As a logical consequence of expunging the features of the old book which made the lower courts parties, the new book has also abolished the rule which deprives those members of the upper court that were also members of the lower court, of their right to deliberate and vote on questions transferred from the lower to the upper. The denial of this right was grounded in a false assumption, touching their relations to these questions. When they are restored to their true position they are restored to all their privileges. That they cannot be ejected from the court consistently with the laws of Presbyterian government, will be evident from a brief review of the fundamental principles of our system. In some States, appellate courts are composed entirely of new judges, in others they are constituted by a council composed of all the judges in the court below. The end in both cases is to secure the deliberation of different minds. There must be a different body. It is immaterial whether the difference depends upon an absolute difference in the persons of the judges, or upon modifying elements which are likely to introduce new views, to suggest new considerations, and to repress the influence of prejudice and partiality. So fulness and impartiality of consideration are gained, it is of little moment how it is done. Now, in the Presbyterian system, the courts run into one another—all the higher are combinations of the lower. The Presbytery is an union of sessions—the Synod is an union of Presbyteries—and the General Assembly is, or ought to be, an union of Synods. It is not possible, therefore, to constitute an appellate court of new and independent materials; the members of the lower, from the very nature of the system, must enter into the higher. The only thing that we can do, is to mar the integrity of the

system by excluding the members of the lower court, as the old book has done, in cases of appeal and complaint and general review. To the extent that we do this, we depart from the theory of our polity. Now the question is: Does justice require such departure? Is impartiality more likely to be secured by making the court consist wholly and exclusively of different persons, or by a mingling of the same persons with such a number of others as to make the body really though not absolutely different? To our minds, though the question is not without difficulty, and has embarrassed the wisest legislators, the full working of our own system is, in relation to spiritual causes, a divine answer. It is well to have the lower court represented, because in that case the views which prevailed in it are likely to be brought out, and when presented in the spirit of judicial deliberation, are likely to receive their full measure of consideration. The new members will have their views, and when both sets of opinions are canvassed and discussed, in the love of truth and with a single desire to do justice, the probability is, that a righteous sentence will be rendered.

Should it be objected that the judges from the lower court are under strong temptations to forget their duties as judges, and to set themselves as partizans to vindicate their first decision, the answer is threefold. 1. If their opinions, at first, were honestly and dispassionately formed, they are very possibly correct, and no harm will be done, even if they should urge them with some degree of vehemence. If they were not deliberately formed, then these men are not fit to sit in any court, and the argument is as cogent for expelling them from the court below as from the court above. 2. In the next place, the best way to make them partizans, is to treat them as partizans; and the best way to preserve in them the spirit and temper of judges, is to treat them as judges. Presume them to be honest and you hold out a motive for being honest. Let them know that the church trusts them, that it has confidence in their integrity, prudence and impartiality, and they must be desperately corrupt if they do not strive to justify this good opinion. 3. In the third place, to exclude them from the court is not to exclude them from an influence upon its decision. All that you accomplish is to exempt that influence from all responsibility. They have tongues, and their brethren have ears, and who is to hinder them from whispering in the lobby of the Court? The real question, therefore, is between a responsible and an irresponsible influence. One or the other, from the very nature of our system, we must have. It is not enough to eject the members of the lower tribunals from the house. We must send them home, or rather prevent them from coming to the appellate court.

But, after all, this dread of prejudice and partizanship is not justified by the experience of the Church. It is a rare thing that any man, under the solemn sanctions of judicial responsibility, perverts judgment; and surely in religious assemblies corrupt judges must be the exception and not the rule.

Our brother, in the April number of the Review, contends that the court should be composed exclusively of new judges, because, if we understand his argument, that is what the appellant expects. If the wishes of the appellant, as we have already intimated, are to determine the organisation of the court, the problem would very soon be solved. We apprehend, too, that he would care very little of what judges it was composed, provided they were favourable to him. At any rate, we doubt very seriously whether, if it should so happen that none of the judges of the lower court were present, but those who voted on his side, he would enter his protest against their sitting, as a mockery of justice. His feelings and his wishes should have no influence in the matter. He might prefer entirely different judges, but if that arrangement should not seem to be most conducive to the ends of justice, his preferences must be disregarded.

It has been further objected to the rule of the new book that, under it, cases may happen in which the lower court really determines the decision of the upper. In the first place, these are extreme cases, and must be very rare. And even were this an evil, it must be remembered that no system can provide against all inconveniences. Under the present book, the highest court of the church has been on the eve of making itself supremely ridiculous by contradictory decisions upon the gravest matter, involving the very essence of the gospel, and that at the very same sessions. The same court, almost in the same breath, was almost made to say that white was black and black was white. In the case of Dr Beecher, when the New School Synod of Cincinnati was out of the house, and the great orthodox Synod of Philadelphia in the house, the Assembly was prepared to be true to its doctrines. In the case of Mr Barnes, when the Synod of Philadelphia was out of the house, it betrayed the cause of its Master. Here the decision of the Court was a greater evil than all the inconveniences likely to result from the new book. But we are not prepared to admit that the extreme case which our brethren have put is an evil. If the lower court was a large one, and its decision nearly unanimous, or by a large majority, the presumption is that the decision was right. A numerous Presbytery, covering an extensive range of country, is not likely to be misled by prejudice or passion in a case in which very few of them can feel a personal interest, or be seduced by local considerations.

They took it up in the spirit of judges of a Court of Jesus Christ—they knew nothing of it until issue was joined before them. Why should their verdict be suspected? If it is a case of general interest, and one likely to enlist the passions of the Presbytery, it is incredible that the other Presbyteries of the Synod should fail to be present, if they were persuaded that the original judgment was wrong. But take the extremest supposition. This large Presbytery rules the Synod—the remedy is at hand. No single Synod has a preponderating influence in the General Assembly. We do not see, therefore, that any mischief can result from the new rule. It preserves the symmetry of our system—diminishes the motives to partiality and prejudice, and represses the exercise of an irresponsible influence, and secures the fullest consideration and the widest comparison of views. It treats our ministers and elders as honest men, and does not allow a brand to be put upon their characters because an appellant is not content with their decision. It supposes that they were upright judges in the court below, and presumes that they will be equally upright in the court above.

These two changes in relation to the posture of the lower courts have greatly simplified our process of appellate jurisdiction. They have settled the everlasting controversy about original parties—they have abolished the long speeches of the lower courts, and they have rendered clear as noonday the whole order of proceedings. Those who have witnessed the confusion, embarrassment, and waste of time, occasioned by the anomalies of the old book, can appreciate the value and importance of the changes. Three judicial cases were tried before the last Assembly, and there was not a difficulty in which the house was involved, and it was often involved in difficulty that could possibly have arisen, if the new book had been in force. A prominent member of the Assembly, and one by no means favourable to the revision, candidly acknowledged to us that, in the matter of judicial proceedings, the new book was almost absolutely perfect.

V. There yet remains to be considered three provisions of the new book, two of which are confessedly innovations, while the other belongs to the category of omissions. We shall begin with it. We allude to the rule in relation to an application to withdraw from the communion of the Church. That this is a case not provided for in the old book will be manifest to every one who calls to mind, that the only instance in which it makes confession a ground of conviction is the case of a minister of the Gospel, and there the confession is supposed to take place after the charges have been tabled—it is a part of the pleading. Here the offender is not a minister, but a private individual—

here there is nothing in the life to be the basis of a charge—the offence is known only to the guilty person and his God, and without his own confession, his name might stand as fair as that of any other man in the Church. The unbelief of the heart must be manifested by overt acts, or, in the sense of the old book, it is not an offence susceptible of discipline. It cannot be reached. There are no witnesses to prove it, and confession is not admissible. The guilty individual may, indeed, abstain, as while he is in an unconverted state, he ought to abstain from the sacrament of the Supper. He may be arraigned and suspended for *this* irregularity—but the charge of abstaining from the Lord's Supper is a very different thing from the charge of not being converted. We aver, then, that the old book makes no provision for the case. And yet the experience of the Church has shewn that some provision is needed. The Committee, therefore, assumed no superogatory task, when they undertook, according to their best judgment, to supply the omission. Is their remedy a wise one? We have examined carefully all the objections that have been raised against it, and we do not recollect to have seen one which was not founded in radical misconception. The rule has been represented as giving men a right to withdraw from the church at pleasure—as releasing them from their solemn covenant obligations—as reducing the church to the condition of a voluntary society into which men go, and from which they depart, when they choose—as putting an end to all discipline by affording a convenient shelter of retreat from it, and, worst of all, as sanctioning the notion that unbelief is no sin, but that a frank and manly confession of it entitles the reprobate to special indulgence.

Whether men, under any circumstances, have a right to withdraw from the church, is a grave question, and a question which cannot be answered without a precise definition of terms. If the meaning be whether they can apostatize without sin, whether God holds men guiltless for abjuring his authority and his Son, the answer is plain as day. As before him, they have no right, and to concede it to them is to confound the eternal distinctions of guilt and righteousness. But if the question be, whether men have a right to prevent them from announcing their apostasy, and that is the true aspect of the question in relation to the church, the answer may be different. If a man has renounced his God and Saviour in his heart, whether the church has a right to interpose and say you shall not renounce the profession of your faith, is a very different thing from legitimating either act. The right of a man to do a thing and the right of others to hinder him, are entirely distinct, and yet, from the poverty of language, we

are often compelled to represent the non-right of others to hinder as his right to do. It is a right only in relation to them—only in the sense that they are bound not to interfere. But important as this question of withdrawal is, the Committee have not touched it; the rule, on the contrary, is directly against the possession of any such absolute right. In the first place, the unconverted offender is distinctly treated as guilty of an offence. It is a case without process—the process is superseded by confession—the man is convicted upon his own shewing. This surely does not represent him as unblamable and unprovable in the eye of the court. The offence, moreover, is just as distinctly unbelief—not being converted. Now, the rule prescribes a penalty to be inflicted by the court. The man does not withdraw, but the session is required to deal with him according to his guilt. What is the penalty? It is exclusion, judicial exclusion from the communion of the church for an indefinite time. This is the plain import of striking his name from the roll of communicating members. A definite suspension would be absurd, because he can never be restored to the communion, until he gives evidence of a change of heart; excommunication would be too harsh, as it might repel him from all those influences under which his continued connection with the church would probably still keep him. The only thing to be done was to say, that he could no longer be a communicating member—he must take his place with the other baptized persons who are not yet prepared to redeem their vows to God. It is presumed, of course, that the pastor and session will deal with him frankly and honestly, that they will endeavour to impress him with a sense of his grievous guilt and of his awful danger, and that they will earnestly exhort him to seek at once the reconciliation of his heart with God. But, as the new book was not commissioned to preach, it contented itself with prescribing the manner in which such cases, alas! too common, should be dealt with. Before this simple exposition every objection vanishes into air. No leave is given to withdraw from the church, for the man does not withdraw—there is no release from covenant obligations, for the man is treated as an offender for not fulfilling them—no evasion of discipline, because discipline is actually exercised—the guilty party is solemnly, and by the sentence of a court of Jesus Christ, excluded from the fellowship of the saints, because the love of God is not in him. The sentence, too, is an awful one, the most awful that can be pronounced on earth, save that of excommunication.

2. The change which has provoked most opposition is that in relation to the baptised non-communicating members of the church. A hue and cry have been raised against us as

though we had ruthlessly turned the lambs of the flock head and heels out of the fold, and sent them to wander on the mountains, and left them a prey in the wilderness. We are denounced as having struck a blow at the root of infant baptism more terrible and fatal than any which our Ana-baptist brethren have been able to administer. We are amazed at the mischief we have done; and we should have no comfort, did we not believe that the ghosts which have frightened our brethren are the spectres of their own troubled fancies. We think it can be shewn that the new rule has put the children in a better condition than it found them—has put infant baptism upon a higher ground than it occupied before, and has solved a question in relation to which the perplexity of Pædobaptist churches has been a standing scandal. We think that the tables can be turned, and that it can be conclusively shewn that the mischief is all on the side sustained by our brethren, and the good on our own. The core of the question is, whether church membership necessarily involves subjection to judicial prosecution. It is admitted on all hands, that these baptised persons are members, *bona fide* members of the church. The new rule asserts this as positively as the old. It is alleged by our brethren that, if members, they must be liable to process. It is not a question whether they are under the government, guardianship, and training of the church, or whether they are under its discipline, in the wide and comprehensive sense of that term, as including the whole process of moral and spiritual education—this also the new rule positively asserts. It omits the word *discipline*, because that term, in a manual of forms and processes, would convey the narrow idea of judicial investigation, but it retains the thing as completely as equivalents can express it. The sole point, therefore, is whether the class of members in question can be cited, tried, and condemned for offences, or, in the words of the book, are the proper subjects of judicial prosecution. It is said that they must be, or their church membership is purely nominal. Now, subjection to discipline (we use the word in its narrow sense) is either a privilege, or it is not. If it is a privilege, the argument of our brethren assumes either that church membership carries with it a right to all privileges, or that there is something peculiar in this privilege which makes it universal. Upon the first assumption they are clearly at fault, as these same persons are excluded from the privilege of the Lord's Table. If all church members are entitled to all privileges, then all church members have a right to communicate. If exclusion, on the contrary, from the Lord's Table does not contradict church membership, why should exclusion from discipline contradict it? The argument in this form

proves too much, and therefore proves nothing. The universal proposition on which it rests is clearly false. If, on the other hand, there is something in the nature of judicial prosecution which requires it to be an universal privilege, the peculiarity ought to be pointed out; and that has not been attempted. All that our brethren have achieved in the way of argument, has been to repeat the syllogism—All church members are entitled to all church privileges. The persons in question are church members, therefore they are entitled to all privileges. But let us suppose that discipline is not a privilege, but a disability. What is there in the nature of church membership which makes it inconsistent to exempt a certain class from a specific disability? Must all be subject to precisely the same conditions—to the same pains and penalties? If some members of the church can be excluded from a privilege to which others are entitled, without prejudice to their church membership, why may they not be exempted from a penalty to which others are exposed, without jeopardy to their relations to the church? Surely the argument is suicidal, which reasons from the naked fact of church membership to the other fact of subjection to discipline, as it would equally conclude in favour of a right to the Lord's Table.

The truth is, in every commonwealth there may be peculiar privileges and peculiar disabilities. Rights and privations may alike be conditioned by the qualifications and characters of the subjects. It is so in the church. All are not entitled to be made ministers, ruling elders, or deacons—these are privileges which belong to special qualifications—all are not entitled to the privilege of the Lord's Supper, that also depends upon a special qualification, the ability to discern the Lord's body. Now, if it should appear that subjection to judicial process involves also a special condition, then it would follow that this also, call it disability or privilege, cannot be universal. Now we contend that it does imply just such a condition—that to those who profess no faith in Christ it is as unmeaning and absurd to dispense the spiritual censures of the church, as it would be to tie a dead man to the whipping post and chastise him with rods. The possession or non-possession of faith divides the church into two classes so widely apart, that it is simply ridiculous to think of treating them in the same way. The great end which the church is to aim at, in reference to the first, is their edification, their growth in grace, their continued progress in the divine life. What it primarily seeks, in relation to the first, is their conversion to God. One class is already alive, and are to be dealt with as living men—the other is dead, and the whole scope of spiritual

effort is to bring them to Him who can quicken the dead. Discipline is for the living, and not for the dead. It is not an ordinance for conversion, but an ordinance for repentance. Its design is to recover the fallen—to arrest the backslider—it is the rod with which the shepherd gathers the scattered sheep who have strayed from the fold. It is the solemn caveat against their sins which God has directed his church to utter in the ears of his erring people. Our brethren have perpetrated two mistakes in reference to the nature and ends of discipline. In the first place they regard it as a punishment of the offender. This is a serious error. There are no punishments in the church of God, it is founded upon a dispensation of grace and not of law—and discipline is a merciful provision, a kind and fatherly chastisement, by which a son, not a slave, is made sensible of his follies. It is not the act of a judge pronouncing on the intrinsic demerit of the crime, and giving the award of justice; but the voice of a parent, employing just such tones of rebuke as are likely to arrest attention. When men shew by their contumacy that they were not sons, they are then cut off from the church, on the very ground that they are incapable of discipline. Excommunication is, in its last analysis, a solemn declaration that the professions of the party which brought him under discipline are false, and that he who was mistaken for a sheep has turned out to be a wolf. It is the act of separating from discipline him who is not qualified to profit by it.

The other error is that judicial process is a means of conversion. That God might bless it to that end, as he can overrule any providence we are not disposed to deny, but that he has appointed it for that end in His word is more than has yet been proved. Not a case can be found in the New Testament in which the subjects of censure were not regarded as professing brethren.

There is, therefore no logical inconsistency in exempting non-communicating members from judicial prosecution. On the contrary, if faith is an indispensable condition of the benefit of discipline, the paralogism would be in making them subject to it.

What, then, it may be asked, is the real relation of these persons to the church? what the significance, or what the value of their membership? We answer, in the terms of the new rule, they are under its government and training. We answer in the terms of our Directory, "they are under the inspection and government of the church, and are to be taught to read and repeat the Catechism, the Apostle's Creed and the Lord's Prayer. They are to be taught to pray, to abhor sin, to fear God, and to obey the Lord Jesus Christ. And when they come

to years of discretion, if they be free from scandal, appear sober and steady and to have sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body, they ought to be informed, it is their duty and their privilege to come to the Lord's Supper." But if they are not free from scandal, nor sober, nor competent to discern the Lord's body, what then? The silence of the book evidently implies that they are to stay where they are—they are still to be pressed with the motives and claims of the Gospel, but no government is to be exercised over them, but that which looks to their conversion. This, as we understand it, is the doctrine of the Directory, and it is the clear common sense view of the case. They are brought into the church as a school in which they are to be trained for Christ; and they are kept as pupils until they have learned the lesson they were set to acquire. And as their relation to the church is through their parents, the church exercises its watchful care over them in their infant years through the family. It expects of their parents that they shall bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, and maintain a Christian inspection over their deportment and habits. When they are released from parental government, the pastor and elders and all the faithful followers in Christ are to bring to bear every proper influence in bringing them to recognize their solemn obligations to the Saviour. The thing to be aimed at is, as we have said, their conversion, and whatever power is exerted must be exerted with reference to that end. From the circumstance that they are not professors of religion, their irregularities bring no scandal upon the Church. They do not claim to be in Christ, and their excesses are consequently no reproach to his name.

But it may be said that the church owes these duties to all sinners, and that these baptized persons have no advantage over the rest of the world. This, however, is a grievous error. Their baptism has brought them as contradistinguished from others, in the same relation to the promises of the covenant in which circumcision brought the Jew as contradistinguished from the Gentile. To them belong, in a special sense, the oracles of God, and "to them pertain the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises." They can plead the promises as an unbaptised sinner cannot plead them. God is nigh to them for all that they call upon him for. The Scriptures evidently distinguish unbelievers into two great classes—those who are nigh, and those who are afar off. These terms do not express so much differences of moral character as different relations to the covenant. In the time of the Saviour the Jew was nigh—the Gentile was afar off, though the Gentile might have been, and often was, a better man than the Jew. But

the Jew was nearer to God—he was consecrated by covenant adoption. In the present age, the baptised unbelievers are nigh, and the unbaptised afar off. The Gospel must be preached to all ; but, as in the beginning, it was *first* to the Jew and *then* to the Gentile, first to the nigh and then to those afar off ; so now it must first be preached to the baptised and then to the unbaptised. The bread must first be given to the children and then to the dogs. The covenant is the birthright of the seed of believers. If, then, it be asked, what profit is there of baptism ? we answer, much every way. And, in point of fact, the whole history of the church is a glorious illustration that baptism is not an idle ceremony—that the privileges to which it entitles are, in innumerable cases, sealed to its subjects. Then, too, what an argument does it put into the mouths of God's servants in pressing upon baptised unbelievers the Saviour's claims ! The vows of God are upon them—they have been consecrated to the Lord—and when they pervert their faculties and strength to the service of themselves or the world, they are guilty of a more aggravated profaneness than could have been imputed to the Jew, if he had gone into the temple and taken the vessels of the sanctuary and perverted them to his private use. What an appeal lies in this consideration ! Then the value of their privileges, the nearness of God to them, the significance of their baptism, what motives are here ? To this must be added the enormity of guilt which they contract by unbelief. They cannot sin like other sinners. They cannot be exalted to heaven, and then expect a gentle fall. Is it nothing to be in a situation to be addressed by arguments and motives and considerations like these ? Beyond controversy it is a great privilege to be a member of the visible church ; and, beyond controversy, the despising of such a birthright is no common crime.

Let us contrast with this view of the case that taken by our brethren. They would have these persons when they arrive at years of maturity, if they resisted all private and personal efforts for their conversion, duly cited and arraigned to shew cause, why they had not given their hearts to God. If, after repeated admonitions, and counsels, and prayers, they persisted in impenitence, they are to be solemnly excommunicated, and their relation to the church as absolutely abolished as if they had been born heathens and publicans. Now what will be the effect, the inevitable effect of such proceedings ! Some it would make hypocrites ; they would come to the Lord's table and put on a show of religion to avoid the annoyance of this species of discipline. Some would treat the whole thing with contempt, and others would be exasperated against the very name of the church. The thing is so revolting that no living, spiritual

church has ever attempted to carry it out. The theory suits only that condition of things when there is no real faith, and when formal observances are all that distinguish the professor of religion from other men. The tendency would be to bring about just this state of things. The church would be made up of decent professors without grace. We should soon have the reign of moderatism. The effect, too, in bringing infant baptism into disrepute, by making it the badge of what many would consider a disgraceful bondage, deserves to be seriously weighed by those who appreciate the importance of the ordinance.

Others, to avoid the difficulties connected with discipline, maintain that these persons are self-excommunicated—that their continued impenitence is an actual renunciation of their church membership. And yet the very persons who teach this doctrine are loudest in the clamour against the right of a poor, self-deceived sinner to withdraw. Excommunication can only be pronounced by a court, and that is a sufficient answer to the theory.

The doctrine of the committee is encumbered with none of these difficulties. It is consistent with itself, consistent with the nature of infant baptism, and defines intelligibly and scripturally the status of these people. The Church of God, as a visible external institute, is made up of two classes of members. This results from the very nature of its organisation through families. One class consists of true believers, or those who profess to be such—the other of their children who are to be trained for God, and for that purpose are blessed with pre-eminent advantages. They are to be retained as pupils until they are converted. If they should continue impenitent, the church does not revoke their privileges, but bears with them as patiently as her Master. They are beloved for the fathers' sake. This host of baptized children is, however, the source from which her strength is constantly recruited. The church contains a sanctuary and an outer court. True believers are in the sanctuary, others in the outer court, and the sanctuary is constantly filled from the court. Our brother, in this review, is grievously mistaken when he says that the idea which lies at the basis of the new rule is, "that it is unreasonable to exercise a church government over a man to which he has not given his own voluntary assent." The idea is, that it is unreasonable to exercise a kind of government wholly unadapted to his condition and circumstances; it is unreasonable to treat a child like a man—a sinner like a saint—an unbeliever like a professed follower of Christ. The reviewer has more than once used language which implies that the rule abolishes *all* exercise of government in relation

to the persons in question. For example: "If we roundly assert, as even the revised discipline does, that all baptized persons are members of the church, we see little consistency in then exempting a large class of them from its government." But who has done that? Not the new book, for that expressly asserts that they "are under its government and training." The only thing from which it exempts them is a particular species of government, for which they are not yet prepared. But we have said enough upon this point to put the reader in possession of the ground and spirit of the change. We believe that it exactly represents the feeling of the Church, and that it has only to be understood to be generally and cordially adopted.

The only other change which we might be expected to notice—the change in relation to the competency of witnesses—as it has elicited no censure, and seems to be in keeping with the progress of civil jurisprudence, we shall pass without comment.

Upon the whole, we are prepared to commend the new book as a real improvement upon the old. It has pruned away redundancies and supplied many important omissions—removed incongruities and contradictions to the general tenor of our system—extended privileges which experience has shewn to be important—cleared up ambiguities, and reduced our Discipline to a logical completeness and coherence which it did not profess before. It has simplified the process of appellate jurisdiction, and cleared a highway for our upper courts where all before was rocks and thorns. We do not say that the book is perfect—but we do say that it is a better book than the old one, and, therefore, worthy of adoption by the church. Candour, however, compels us to acknowledge that, in our judgment, it is marred by one remarkable incongruity. The section on appeals is out of harmony with the principle on which the specific difference of the various modes in which a cause may be removed from a lower to a higher court depends. We have four methods of removal. The distinction between these does not depend upon the nature of the cause, or the effect of the transfer, but upon the *parties* who bring the matter to the attention of the higher court. When the higher court itself, by virtue of its own inherent power of inquest, brings the matter before it, we have then a case of review and control. Here it is evidently the party originating the inquiry which determines the nature of the remedy. When a lower court transfers a matter, either for advice or decision, we have a case of reference—the party presenting the cause to the higher court being still the differential idea. The complaint is the remedy of any man whose zeal for the glory of God and the

prosperity of His kingdom prompts him to seek the redress of errors and irregularities in any of the subordinate tribunals—the party is still the differential idea. In consistency with this idea, the appeal ought to have been exclusively a remedy for personal grievances, and confined to an injured party. Had this restriction been made, the system would have been logically complete.

The effect of an appeal in arresting all further proceedings is not a part of its specific difference, but the natural consequence of the relation of the parties. They are presumed to be *injured*. Their rights have been invaded, and until this point is settled, it is manifestly fit that no further steps should be taken. A man may be trusted with the care of his own personal immunities, and his judgment on that point should be respected until it is proved to be wrong. The case is different with questions of general interest—one man there is as competent a judge as another, and it is highly inexpedient to leave it in the power of a few to clog the wheels of the Church upon mere abstract differences of opinion. Thus much we have felt bound to say. But the abatement is a trifle compared with the advantages which the new book offers. Even with this defect, our system is well nigh perfect. Every member of the Church has free access to our higher courts, and if wrong is done, the whole Church is to blame if redress is not sought and obtained.

ART. V.—*The Theology of Edwards, as shewn in his Treatise concerning Religious Affections.*

THE Treatise of Edwards “concerning Religious Affections” is, by general acknowledgment, the standard work on that subject, discriminating correctly between the affections of the regenerate and the unregenerate. In this respect its praise is in all the churches, so that it needs no words of commendation from us; and yet, perhaps, the churches would do well to study it more than they do. False conversions, such as it exposes, sometimes occur at the present day. There are even preachers so ignorant as to strive to produce them, and hearers who strive after them, and attain to them, and then think themselves regenerate, and offer themselves to the churches; and if tests, substantially the same as these set forth in this work, are not applied to them, they may be received as members, to the unspeakable injury of themselves and others.

Such spurious conversions attend every great revival of religion. Their frequency and pernicious influence in the great

awakening about the year 1740, in the judgment of Edwards, brought that revival to an end. "And so," he says in his preface, "it is likely ever to be in the church whenever religion revives remarkably, till we have learned well to distinguish between true and false religion ; between saving affections and experiences, and those manifold fair shows and glistening appearances by which they are counterfeited ; the consequences of which, when they are not distinguished, are often inexpressibly dreadful." "Therefore it greatly concerns us to use our utmost endeavours clearly to discern, and have it well settled and established, wherein true religion does consist. Till this be done, it may be expected that great revivings of religion will be of short continuance." And if so, the present is a time when this work ought to receive special attention.

But highly and generally as this treatise has been esteemed, it has usually been thought of merely as a practical work ; and it has probably seldom been consulted as an authority or a help in the study of scientific theology. American divines, differing widely from each other on important points, commonly claim to hold the theology of Edwards ; and they quote from his treatises on Original Sin, on the Will, on the Nature of Virtue, or on God's End in Creation, in support of their claims. But if we have ever seen a reference to his Treatise on the Affections for such a purpose, it has escaped our recollection. And yet, so far as the whole doctrine of regeneration is concerned, where should we look for his theology rather than here ? The work was written for the express purpose of teaching what regeneration is, and distinguishing it from all counterfeits. It goes fully and minutely into the theoretic consideration of the subject, and thus establishes the principles from which all its practical conclusions are scientifically deduced. He says in his preface : "The consideration of these things has long engaged me to attend to this matter with the utmost diligence and care, and exactness of search and inquiry that I have been capable of. It is a subject on which my mind has been peculiarly intent ever since I first entered on the study of divinity." If we would learn what the "Theology of Edwards" actually was, no work from his pen is more worthy of study, or of higher authority, than this.

The question may be raised, and perhaps will be raised by some, whether the doctrines of this treatise are all perfectly consistent with those of his more purely speculative essays.

Probably he never troubled himself with that question. He seems to have investigated each subject to which he turned his attention, on its own merits, knowing that truth on one subject is always consistent with truth on another. And so it is apt to be with minds of his order. They do not usually

construct systems. Columbus wrote no geography for the use of schools. Such men "see the distant tops of thoughts" far beyond the circle of those things which are well enough understood to be capable of systematic arrangement. It is not strange if apparent inconsistencies are sometimes found in their conclusions. Indeed, a system of theology, a system of doctrines concerning the infinite, so comprehended by a finite mind that the consistency of every part with every other part is clearly seen, must be a system the parts of which, symmetrically, fall far short of the truth. A discovery in one department of science creates a necessity for equal discoveries in all the other parts, in order that the harmony which we know exists in truth may be manifest to our understandings. Even, then, if all that Edwards has written be correct, it is no wonder if the consistency of some parts with others should still need to be shewn.

If, therefore, everything in this treatise should not be seen to be consistent with something which he is thought to have said elsewhere, it should not for that reason be cast aside as no part of his theology. The doctrines may be reconcilable, though some one may fail to see the mode of reconciliation, and there is no part of his writings which, with greater certainty, presents his permanent convictions. The central, governing thought of this treatise appears in his sermon on true grace. It is clearly developed in his sermon on spiritual light, preached and published in 1734. Indeed, its workings shew themselves in his own account of his early religious experience. It exerted a controlling influence on his conduct in the great trial of his life, the controversy that ended in his dismissal from Northampton. For it, and views inseparably connected with it in his mind and in their logical relations, he suffered that ecclesiastical martyrdom. No doctrine more certainly than this belongs to his theology.

What, then, is his doctrine of regeneration? And first, what, in his view, constitutes the essential difference between a regenerate and an unregenerate man? This is the point especially discussed in the *Treatise on the Affections*.

Having shewn, in the First Part, that "true religion, in great part, consists in holy affections," he proceeds, in Part Second, to shew "what are no certain signs that religious affections are truly gracious, or that they are not." "It is no sign, one way or the other, that religious affections are very great, or raised very high;" "that they have great effects on the body;" that they cause those who have them to be fluent, fervent, and abundant in talking of the things of religion;" "that persons did not make them themselves, or excite them of their own contrivance, or by their own strength;" "that they come with texts of Scrip-

ture, remarkably brought to the mind ;" "that there is an appearance of love in them;" "having religious affections of many kinds accompanying one another;" "that comforts and joys seem to follow awakenings and convictions of conscience in a certain order;" "that they dispose persons to spend much time in religion, and to be zealously engaged in the external duties of worship;" "that they much dispose persons with their mouths to praise and glorify God;" "that they make persons that have them exceeding confident that what they experience is divine, and that they are in a good estate;" or "that the outward manifestations of them, and the relation persons give of them, are very affecting and pleasing to the truly godly, and such as greatly gain their charity, and win their hearts." All these points are argued at length, and established conclusively; and yet, if a candidate for membership appears right in all these respects, how many churches would insist on farther evidence of regeneration?

The Third Part shews "what are distinguishing signs of truly gracious affections"—signs which, but for our liability to mistake as to their existence, would enable us always to discriminate between the regenerate and others.

And to begin with that which, though not directly observable, is the foundation of all, he asserts, first, that "affections that are truly spiritual and gracious do arise from those influences and operations on the heart which are spiritual, supernatural, and divine." Regenerate persons are called spiritual, "because of the indwelling and holy influences of the Spirit of God in them." "The Spirit of God is given to the true saints—to dwell in them as his proper, lasting abode—and to influence their hearts as a principle of new nature, or as a divine, supernatural spring of life and action." "He is represented as being there so united to the faculties of the soul, that he becomes there a principle or spring of new nature and life." "The Spirit of God, dwelling as a vital principle in their souls, there produces those effects wherein he exerts and communicates himself in his own proper nature," which is holiness; and that holiness "is of the same nature with the divine holiness, as much as it is possible for that holiness to be, which is infinitely less in degree."

He makes his meaning plainer by a distinction, or rather a contrast. "The Spirit of God never influences the minds of of natural men after this manner. Though he may influence them many ways, yet he never, in any of his influences, communicates himself to them in his own proper nature. Indeed, he never acts disagreeably to his nature, either on the minds of saints or sinners. But the Spirit of God may act on men agreeably to his own nature, and not exert his proper nature

in the acts and exercises of their minds"—as he "moved on the face of the waters"—without imparting his holiness to them. We must observe the necessary implication, that he does "exert his proper nature in the acts and exercises" of regenerate minds. He is so "united to the faculties of the" regenerate "soul," as to be active, to "exert his proper nature," in its acts. He acts *in* them. He is active in their activity. But not so with respect to natural men. He does not act *in* their minds. He acts *on* their minds as an agent external to themselves, presenting to their contemplation ideas of duty, of guilt, of danger, and thus producing in them conviction, alarm, and anxiety, of which the natural man is capable on natural principles. But he does not act *in* the activity of their minds, so as to communicate his own moral attribute of holiness to the action.

This distinction between "on" and "in" is of fundamental importance, underlying a difference in kind between the exercises of natural and spiritual men. "The true saints only have that which is spiritual. Others have nothing which is divine, in the sense that has been spoken of. They not only have not these communications of the Spirit of God in so high a degree as the saints, but have nothing of that nature or kind." "From these things it is evident that those gracious influences which the saints are subjects of, and the effects of God's Spirit which they experience, are entirely above nature, altogether of a different kind from anything that men find within themselves by nature, or only in the exercises of natural principles; and are things which no improvement of those qualifications or principles that are natural, no advancing or exalting them to higher degrees, and no kind of composition of them, will ever bring men to; because they not only differ from what is natural, and from everything that natural men experience, in degree and circumstances, but also in kind, and are of a nature vastly more excellent. And this is what I mean when I say that gracious affections are from those influences that are supernatural.

We shall soon see how this bears on Locke's theory of the origin of ideas, deriving them all from sensation and reflection on the products of sensation. Edwards proceeds:

"From hence it follows, that in those gracious exercises and affections which are wrought in the minds of the saints, through the saving influences of the Spirit of God, there is a new inward perception or sensation of their minds, entirely different in its nature and kind from anything that ever their minds were the subjects of before they were sanctified." "There is some new sensation or perception of the mind, which is entirely of a new sort, and which could be produced by no ex-

alting, varying, or compounding of that kind of perceptions or sensations which the mind had before ; or there is what some metaphysicians call a new simple idea." "And here is, as it were, a new spiritual sense that the mind has, or a principle of a new kind of perception or spiritual sensation, which is in its whole nature different from any former kinds of sensation of the mind, as tasting is diverse from any of the other senses." "So that the spiritual perceptions which a sanctified and spiritual person has, are not only diverse from all that natural men have, after the manner that the ideas or perceptions of the same sense may differ one from another, but rather as the ideas and sensations of different senses do differ."

Evidently, according to this doctrine, the spiritual man has such a "new simple idea," as is neither furnished by the bodily senses, nor by reflection on any of the products of sense. And even the natural man has the faculties necessary for such "spiritual perceptions." "This new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding."

The perception of "a new simple idea," not received through the senses, nor formed from the products of sense by any "exalting, varying, or compounding" of them, "or by adding anything of the like kind," or "by any improvement, composition, or management" of them, but differing "in kind" from all ideas of such origin, as the ideas of one bodily sense differ from those of another, must be an intuition. And as the natural man has all the faculties that the spiritual man has, he must have, in addition to all the faculties that Locke ascribes to him, a faculty of direct intuition of spiritual truth.

This is made still plainer, as, through nearly forty pages, this "new simple idea" and its results, are distinguished from various effects of the Spirit of God, working "on" the mind of the natural man. Thus acting, the Spirit "only moves, impresses, assists, improves, or in some way acts upon, natural principles ; but gives no new spiritual principle." When he gives a man visions, as to Balaam, or dreams, "it is only exciting ideas of the same kind that he has by natural principles and senses." If he reveals anything that shall hereafter be seen or heard, it is only impressing, in an extraordinary manner, ideas that shall hereafter be received in the ordinary manner. "So in the more ordinary influences of the Spirit of God on the hearts of sinners, he only assists natural principles to do the same work to a greater degree which they do of themselves by nature." "In those awakenings and convictions that natural men have, God only assists conscience, which is a natural principle, to do that work in a further degree, which it naturally

does. Conscience naturally gives men an apprehension of right and wrong, and suggests the relation there is between right and wrong and a retribution. The Spirit of God assists men's consciences to do this in a greater degree; helps conscience against the stupefying influence of worldly objects and their lusts. And so, many other ways might be mentioned wherein the Spirit acts upon, assists, and moves, natural principles; but, after all, it is no more than nature moved, acted, and improved." Hence, there is nothing spiritual, no evidence of regeneration, in having an idea of Christ on the cross, or smiling from his throne or judgment-seat; or seeming to hear any text of Scripture, or words of Scripture coming into the mind, even if it could be known that the Holy Spirit suggested them; or in comfort from some gracious promise, coming suddenly into the mind after terror; or even in the revelation, were it actually made, of the fact that one shall be saved. Indeed, what some call "the witness of the Spirit," by which they mean, the knowledge of the fact that they are converted, has not necessarily anything truly spiritual in it, any more than the knowledge of the fact that some other person is converted, or that a certain person, Saul of Tarsus, for instance, was converted long ago.

The second positive criterion of gracious affections is stated as follows:

"The first objective ground of gracious affections is the transcendently excellent and amiable nature of divine things, as they are in themselves, and not any conceived relation they bear to self or self-interest."

Under this head, he dwells mainly on the last clause; shewing that though self-love may exist and act in saints, even in relation to divine things, it is not "the first, or primary and original foundation" of their spiritual affections, as it is of the religious affections of hypocrites. Having settled this point, he gives his third positive criterion thus:

"Those affections that are truly holy, are primarily founded on the loveliness of the moral excellency of divine things; or, to express it otherwise, a love to divine things for the beauty and sweetness of their moral excellency is the first beginning and spring of all holy affections."

"The moral excellency of an intelligent being, when it is true and real, and not only external, or merely seeming and counterfeit, is holiness." "That kind of excellency of the nature of divine things which is the first objective ground of all holy affections, is their moral excellency or their holiness. Holy persons, in the exercise of holy affections, do love divine things primarily for their holiness. They love God, in the first place, for the beauty of his holiness, or moral perfection

as being supremely amiable in itself." They love him, indeed, for all his attributes; but "a true love to God must begin with a delight in his holiness, and not with a delight in every other attribute; for no other attribute is truly lovely without this, and no otherwise than as (according to our way of conceiving of God) it derives its loveliness from this, and therefore it is impossible that other attributes should appear lovely, in their true loveliness, until this is seen; and it is impossible that any perfection of the divine nature should be loved with true love, until this is loved." "They that do not see the glory of God's holiness, cannot see anything of the true glory of his mercy and grace. They see nothing of the glory of these attributes as any excellency of God's nature, as it is in itself; though they may be affected with them and love them, as they concern their interest." "As the beauty of the divine nature does primarily consist in God's holiness, so does the beauty of all divine things" consist in their holiness.

We are about to learn what that "new simple idea" is. "Now, this that I have been speaking, viz., the beauty of holiness, is that thing in spiritual and divine things, which is perceived by this spiritual sense, that is so diverse from all that natural men perceive in them. This kind of beauty is the quality that is the immediate object of this spiritual sense. This is the sweetness that is the proper object of this spiritual taste." In other words, the saints have an intuitive perception of the beauty of holiness, but natural men have not. The idea of that beauty is the "new simple idea" which is given by the Spirit of God, dwelling and acting "in" the mind.

And yet natural men may know much of God. "Wicked men and devils will see, and have a great sense of, everything that appertains to the glory of God, but only the beauty of his moral perfection. They will see his infinite greatness and majesty, his infinite power, and will be fully convinced of his omniscience, and his eternity, and his immutability; and they will see and know everything appertaining to his moral attributes themselves, but only the beauty and amiableness of them. They will see and know that he is perfectly just, and righteous, and true, and that he is a holy God of purer eyes than to behold evil, who cannot look on iniquity; and they will see the wonderful manifestations of his infinite goodness and free grace to the saints; and there is nothing will be hid from their eyes, but only the beauty of these moral attributes, and the beauty of the other attributes which arises from it. And so, natural men in this world are capable of having a very affecting sense of everything else that apper-

tains to God, but this only." "The sense that natural men have of the awful greatness of God may affect them in various ways. It may not only terrify them, but it may elevate them, and raise their joy and praise as their circumstances may be," and hence a variety of false and delusive experiences.

Edwards is careful to make us understand that this "new simple idea" is really a new idea, and not merely a new feeling in view of an old idea. His fourth criterion is this:—

"Gracious affections do arise from the mind's being enlightened, richly and spiritually, to understand or apprehend divine things."

"Holy affections are not heat without light but evermore arise from the information of the understanding, some spiritual instruction that the mind receives, some light, or actual knowledge. The child of God is graciously affected, because he sees and understands something more of divine things than he did before." "Now there are many affections which do not arise from any light in the understanding," and which, therefore, "are not spiritual, let them be ever so high." "And if men's religious affections do truly arise from some instruction or light in the understanding, yet the affection is not gracious, unless the light which is the ground of it be spiritual."

But though this "new simple idea" of "the supreme beauty and excellency of the nature of divine things as they are in themselves" is really an idea, an addition to the knowledge of him that has it, yet it is not the product or object of "the mere notional understanding, wherein the mind only beholds things in the exercise of a speculative faculty." "That sort of knowledge by which a man has a sensible perception of amiableness and loathsomeness, or of sweetness and nauseousness, is not just the same sort of knowledge with that by which he knows what a triangle is, or what a square is. The one is mere speculative knowledge; the other, sensible knowledge, in which more than the mere intellect is concerned. The heart is the proper subject of it; or the soul, as a being that not only beholds, but has inclination, and is pleased or displeased. And yet there is the nature of instruction in it; as he that has perceived the sweet taste of honey knows much more about it than he who has only looked upon it and felt it."

There is, then, in the departments of morals and æsthetics, not merely one idea, but a whole class of ideas, the possession of which can be attained only by direct intuition. They can neither come into the mind through the bodily senses, nor be formed in the mind by any "exalting," or "varying," or "compounding," or "any management" whatever, of materials which those senses furnish.

In respect to the spiritual man, this is expressly taught. "When the true beauty and amiableness of holiness, or true moral good that is in divine things, is discovered to the soul, it, as it were, opens a new world to its views. This shews the glory of all the perfections of God, and of everything appertaining to the Divine Being." "This shews the glory of all God's works, both of creation and providence." "By this sense of the moral beauty of divine things, is understood the sufficiency of Christ as a mediator." "By this sight of the moral beauty of divine things, is seen the beauty of the way of salvation by Christ." "By this is seen the true foundation of our duty," "and the amiableness of the duties themselves that are required of us." "And by this is seen the true evil of sin; for he who sees the beauty of holiness, must necessarily see the hatefulness of sin, its contrary." "And well may regeneration, in which this new sense is given to the soul by its Creator, be represented as opening the blind eyes, and raising the dead, and bringing a person into a new world." "And besides all the things that have already been mentioned, there arises from this sense of spiritual beauty all true experimental knowledge of religion, which is of itself, as it were, a new world of knowledge. He that sees not the beauty of holiness, knows not what one of the graces of God's Spirit is. He is destitute of every idea or conception of all the gracious exercises of the soul, and all holy comforts and delights, and all effects of the saving influences of the Spirit of God on the heart;" "and in effect is ignorant of the whole spiritual world." "This sort of understanding or knowledge is that knowledge of divine things from whence all truly gracious affections do proceed; by which, therefore, all affections are to be tried. Those affections that arise wholly from any other kind of knowledge, or do result from any other kind of apprehensions of mind, are vain."

And here we see with what propriety that which is given in regeneration is called a "principle," that is, a beginning, a something to start from. It is not a new faculty, but a new idea, leading on to a world of new ideas, of a nature like its own, and even transforming into its own nature all the soul's former knowledge about divine things.

And this system of new spiritual ideas is a system of knowledge and not of mere opinions; for his fifth criterion is, "Truly gracious affections are attended with a reasonable and spiritual conviction of the judgment—of the reality and certainty of divine things."

Certainly, he who sees a truth intuitively must know it to be true, and must know all its logical consequences and applications to be true. This is no exclusive prerogative of

geometry, but must equally hold good in all departments of knowledge. Edwards does not shrink from this view of the matter: "He that has his judgment thus directly convinced and assured of the divinity of the things of the gospel, by a clear view of their divine glory, has a reasonable conviction; his belief and assurance is altogether agreeable to reason; because the divine glory and beauty of divine things is in itself real evidence of their divinity, and the most direct and strong evidence. He that truly sees the divine, transcendent, supreme glory of those things which are divine, does as it were know their divinity intuitively. He not only argues that they are divine, but he sees that they are divine. He sees that in them wherein their divinity chiefly consists." And the possibility of this, and the reasonableness of supposing that there is an excellence in divine things which may be seen, and by which they may be known, he argues carefully and fully: "Unless men may come to a reasonable, solid persuasion and conviction of the truth of the gospel by the internal evidence of it, in the way that has been spoken—viz., by a sight of its glory—it is impossible that those who are illiterate and unacquainted with history should have any thorough and effectual conviction of it at all." "But the gospel was not given only for learned men. There are at least nineteen in twenty, if not ninety-nine in a hundred, of those for whom the Scriptures were written, that are not capable of any certain or effectual conviction of the divine authority of the Scriptures, by such arguments as learned men make use of." "Miserable is the condition of the Housatonnuck Indians," if they must wait till they understand such arguments. The proof from history, from its very nature, can never rise above probability. But it is unreasonable to suppose that God has provided for his people no more than probable evidence of the truth of the gospel. And if we come to fact and experience, there is not the least reason to suppose that one in a hundred of those who have been sincere Christians, and have had a heart to sell all for Christ, have come by their conviction of the truth of the gospel in this way. "The true martyrs of Jesus Christ are not those who have only been strong in the opinion that the gospel of Christ is true, but those that have seen the truth of it; as the very name martyrs or witnesses (as they are called in Scripture) implies." This idea he so elaborates that there can be no mistake as to his maintaining it.

After shewing, as a sixth criterion, that "gracious affections are attended with evangelical humility," he shews, as the seventh, that

"Another thing wherein gracious affections are distin-

guished from others is, that they are attended with a change of nature."

On this point the philosophical explanation and proof are not so fully and systematically elaborated as on some of the preceding; yet its scientific connection with the principles already established is clearly indicated. "All gracious affections do arise from a spiritual understanding, in which the soul has the excellency and glory of divine things discovered to it, as was shewn before. But all spiritual discoveries are transforming, and not only make an alteration of the present exercise, sensation, and frame of the soul, but such power and efficacy have they, that they make an alteration in the very nature of the soul." "Such power as this is properly divine power, and is peculiar to the Spirit of the Lord. Other power may make a great alteration in men's present frames and feelings, but it is the power of a Creator only that can change the nature, or give a new nature; and no discoveries or illuminatives but those that are divine and supernatural will have this supernatural effect."

Instead of following him in his quotations from Scripture and practical applications, let us look at the philosophical accuracy of the term "a change of nature." What is a nature? The definition may not be perfect, but will be enough for our present purpose, if we say that the laws of any creature's being, the laws which determine its existence and its action, are its nature. It is a law of an alkali that it shall, in certain circumstances, combine with oils and acids in certain proportions; and therefore we say with perfect propriety, it is the nature of an alkali so to combine. So it is the nature of the unregenerated man to think, to feel, to govern himself according to those ideas which are not above nature. Even when he reads God's word, with no questioning of its authority, he receives from it no ideas of a higher kind than the natural man, in the use of his natural faculties, is capable of; and no feelings are excited except such as naturally flow from such ideas. In regeneration he is made, by the power of the Holy Spirit, acting supernaturally "in" his mind, intuitively to see truths that he never before saw; to see them with delight, with love for them; to see and know of a certainty that they are really true, really excellent, really divine. These "discoveries," commencing with one "new simple idea," shed a new light on all moral and religious subjects; on all his conceptions of duty and of sin. His former ideas on all these subjects, so far as they are not false, are taken up and transformed into new ideas, and these new ideas, seen with love and known to be real truth, transform his feelings and his life. And as these ideas do henceforth control his thinking, his feeling, and his acting on moral

subjects, they are the laws of his moral being. They are his moral nature. His moral nature has been changed. He is a new creature. He is living a new life, which is different in its nature from his former life; and its commencement may well be called a birth.

The remainder of this Treatise, as well as much of the parts already considered, is occupied with the practical application of these principles, so as to distinguish genuine religious affections from the spurious. An examination of it would be both interesting and seasonable; but time and space confine us to a few remarks on this doctrine of regeneration. In these remarks, as in those which have preceded, our object will be, not to prove the truth of the doctrine of Edwards, but to shew what doctrine he actually taught.

In the first place, then, according to Edwards, the act in the performance of which regenerate life commences, is not a volition, but an intuition. All holy affections, and of course all holy volitions, are the results of the "new simple idea;" the reception of which is the absolute beginning of spiritual life. And this new idea is not something which precedes regeneration, and from which regeneration may be made to follow by an act of the will, but, on the contrary, is itself the distinguishing characteristic of the regenerate man, so that he who has it is already regenerate. So widely do they differ from him, who make regeneration to consist in an act of the will.

The presence of that idea in the mind is not brought to pass by an act of the will of the natural man. Indeed, how can the natural man will to have that idea in his mind, when he does not know what that idea is? He is not hindered from seeing "the excellency of divine things as they are in themselves" by any want of power, for he has all the power with which he will see it when he becomes regenerate; but he is hindered by the logical impossibility of thinking on a subject before that subject is present to his mind; of forming an idea which cannot be formed out of or derived from any or all the ideas he has, or ever had, or any other ideas of the same kind; of *forming* a "simple idea" at all.

Even the awakening and convicting influences of the Holy Spirit, or any other work of the Spirit "on" the mind of the natural man, fail to impart that idea. Its presence is not the result of any effort which the natural man puts forth when thus excited and directed by the Spirit, acting "on" the mind as an external force. "The Spirit of God, acting upon the soul, only without communicating itself to be an active principle in it, cannot denominate it spiritual." It is only when he "communicates himself in his own proper nature" to the minds of

men, so as to "*exert* his proper nature *in* the acts and exercises of *their* minds," that they ever perceive the excellency of true holiness. That intuition is not the act of a mere human mind in the use of its natural powers, but the act of a mind to which the Holy Spirit has so "*communicated himself*" as to "*exert his own proper nature*" in its acts. It is a work of a higher kind than any to which the natural powers of the human soul, acting separately from the Holy Spirit, are applicable.

Nor, according to Edwards, is the Holy Spirit first given to the natural man, and then used by him, if he will, as a power by which that act may be performed. To the natural man, the Spirit is only an external force, acting "*on*" the mind from without, awakening, urging, impelling, and even revealing such things as the natural man can comprehend, as he did to Balaam. "*Though he may influence them many ways, yet he never, in any of his influences, communicates himself to them in his own proper nature.*" Of course, the actings of their minds are theirs, and not his; and there is nothing supernatural, nothing above nature, in them. They are still "*sensual, not having the Spirit.*"

Let none, then, preach to sinners, "*Regenerate yourselves,*" and call their theology "*Edwardean.*" According to Edwards, the regenerating act of the Holy Spirit, is the giving of an idea, and not the causing of a volition. This is sufficiently manifest from what has been already said. We mention it distinctly for the sake of calling attention to the fact, that in regeneration no constraint is put upon the will. A "*discovery*" is made to the mind, and the man acts voluntarily in the light of the truths discovered to him. Thus the difficulties are avoided, which attend the theory, that the Holy Spirit acts directly on the will, either compelling it to do what it would not if allowed to act freely, or strengthening it to do what it could not for want of sufficient power.

But it is said by some, that though the sinner cannot regenerate himself, yet he can do things that imply regeneration. He can repent; he can believe; he can love God; and by doing these things he can become a regenerate man. This is not the theology of Edwards. Repentance is a "*religious affection*" in view of one's own sins; and "*the true evil of sin*" is seen only by him "*who sees the beauty of holiness.*" Faith is, or at least implies, that "*reasonable and spiritual conviction of the judgment of the reality and certainty of divine things*" by which the saints "*know their divinity intuitively.*" And "*a true love to God must begin with a delight in his holiness,*" and, therefore, presupposes that idea of his moral excellence as supremely lovely in itself, which the natural man never

has. In short, "a love to divine things for the beauty and sweetness of their moral excellency," which is peculiar to the regenerate, "is the first beginning and spring of all holy affections." There is, therefore, no getting round regeneration, by doing other things which imply it. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit, communicating himself to the mind in his own proper nature, and thus discovering to it the excellence of divine things, is as indispensable to repentance and all other holy affections as to regeneration itself.

But it is thought, the doctrine of the sinner's entire dependence on the good pleasure of God for regeneration has a tendency to discourage him; and he must in some way be relieved from that discouragement that he may make efforts, and thus attain salvation. How does Edwards relieve him from that discouragement?

In no way whatever. He does not desire to relieve him; does not think that he ought to be relieved, or that relief would promote his conversion. He would have sinners feel, as he preached at Enfield, that they are "in the hands of an angry God," whose "mere pleasure" alone "keeps them at any one moment out of hell." "God glorified in man's dependence" is one of his favourite themes. In his "Narrative of Surprising Conversions," he says: "I think I have found that no discourses have been more remarkably blessed than those in which the doctrine of God's absolute sovereignty with regard to the salvation of sinners, and His just liberty with regard to answering the prayers or succeeding the pains of mere natural men, continuing such, have been insisted on." Some, in these days take directly the contrary course. They seek to prevent, or remove, or diminish the sinner's discouraging sense of absolute dependence on God, and to encourage and stimulate his efforts by convincing him that his own "natural ability" is adequate to the work of his conversion. Their practical theology on this point is precisely opposite to that of Edwards, and they ought to acknowledge it.

It is time to close, but we must first shew how beautifully the doctrine of Edwards is illustrated by his own religious experience.

In the account written by himself, he mentions two points in his experience, with some appearance of hesitation, whether his conversion should be dated from the first or second, though he evidently rests with much more confidence on the second. The first is described thus:

"From my childhood up my mind had been full of objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty, in choosing whom he would to eternal life, and rejecting whom he pleased, leaving them eternally to perish, and be everlastingly tormented in hell. It used to appear

like a horrible doctrine to me. But I remember the time very well when I seemed to be convinced and fully satisfied as to this sovereignty of God, and his justice in thus eternally disposing of men according to his sovereign pleasure. But I never could give an account how, or by what means, I was thus convinced, not imagining at the time, nor a long time after, that there was any extraordinary influence of God's Spirit in it, but only that I now saw further, and my reason apprehended the justice and reasonableness of it. However, my mind rested in it, and it put an end to all those cavils and objections. And there has been a wonderful alteration in my mind with respect to the doctrine of God's sovereignty from that day to this, so that I scarce ever have found so much as the rising of an objection against it, in the most absolute sense, in God's shewing mercy to whom he will shew mercy, and hardening whom he will. God's absolute sovereignty and justice, with respect to salvation and damnation, is what my mind seems to rest assured of, as much as anything that I see with my eyes. At least, it is so at times. But I have often, since that first conviction, had quite another kind of sense of God's sovereignty than I then had. I have often since had not only a conviction, but a delightful conviction. The doctrine has very often appeared exceedingly pleasant, bright and sweet. Absolute sovereignty is what I love to ascribe to God. But my first conviction was not so."

This conviction, coming he knew not how, was in the nature of a "discovery," which he afterwards imagined was from some "extraordinary influence of God's Spirit;" but as it produced only acquiescence in the doctrine, and not such sensible delight in it as he afterwards had, he passes immediately to a more satisfactory experience:—

"The first instance that I remember of that sort of inward, sweet delight in God and divine things, that I have lived much in since, was on reading those words, 1 Tim. i. 17: 'Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory for ever and ever. Amen.' As I read the words there came into my soul, and was as it were diffused through it, a sense of the glory of the Divine Being; a new sense, quite different from anything I ever experienced before. Never any words of Scripture seemed to me as these words did. I thought with myself, how excellent a Being that was, and how happy I should be if I might enjoy that God, and be rapt up to him in heaven, and be as it were swallowed up in him for ever! I kept saying, and as it were singing over these words of Scripture to myself, and went to pray to God that I might enjoy him, and prayed in a manner quite different from what I used to do, with a new sort of affection. But it never came into my thought that there was anything spiritual, or of a saving nature, in this." "From about that time I began to have a new kind of apprehensions and ideas of Christ, and the work of redemption, and the glorious way of salvation by him. An inward, sweet sense of these things at times came into my heart, and my soul was led away in pleasant

views and contemplations of them. "After this my sense of divine things gradually increased, and became more and more lively, and had more of that inward sweetness. The appearance of everything was altered. There seemed to be, as it were, a calm, sweet cast, or appearance of divine glory, in almost everything. God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to appear in everything."

And so on, more and more, for years, so beautiful that it is an act of self-denial not to quote it.

Now, it is perfectly evident from this account that Edwards did not first form or receive an idea of this change, and of the state into which it would bring him; then balance the motives in favour of it and against it; finding the former to predominate; and then, by an act or successive acts of his will, put forth for that purpose, bring it to pass. Instead of all this, he had no idea of such a state of mind till he found himself in it. It *came*; and after it had come, but not before, he knew what it was. And the foundation, "the first objective ground" of these new thoughts and affections, was "the transcendently excellent and amiable nature of divine things, as they are in themselves."

Every successful pastor must have noticed that many experiences are distinctly of this type. Few minds, indeed, are capable of an experience in all respects like that of Edwards. Very few have that poetic power which appears in his meditations on the beauty of holiness; but very many, like him, are conscious of a change which they did not preconceive, labour after and achieve, but which *came*. How it came they "could never give any account." They could only say that at, or gradually after, a certain time, God, his character, his government, his way of salvation, all appeared to them in a new light, and became objects of their adoring love. At the very first, this new view may have related only to some one point; to God's holiness, his justice, his goodness, his mercy; to the mediation of Christ, or some part of it, or, perhaps, to some one Christian duty; but it gradually spread itself over all, and invested all with the same kind of loveliness. Even when the new view at first is seen in connection with some one duty, which the convert now is willing to perform, the same fundamental character often appears in it distinctly. The duty, before repulsive, is now attractive; the decision to perform it is now easy. He cannot choose otherwise than to perform it. But this willingness was not made by his own effort—it *came* to him. He found himself willing.

And every successful pastor who has considered the subject has observed that such conversions are apt to "wear well." They result, oftener than other conversions, in a solid and

enduring Christian character—a character which can stand the test of Edwards's twelfth and last criterion:—

“Gracious and holy affections have their exercise and fruit in Christian practice. I mean, they have that influence and power upon him who is the subject of them, that they cause that a practice which is universally conformed to and directed by Christian rules, should be the practice and business of his life.”

ART. VI.—*Christianity Contrasted with Hindu Philosophy: An Essay, in Five Books, Sanskrit and English. With Practical Suggestions to the Missionary among the Hindus.* By JAMES R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, and Principal of the Government College at Benares. London: 1859.

PERHAPS no product of the human intellect is more interesting to the Psychological and Ethical student than is the Hindu Philosophy. Ranging over a vast extent of surface, and ever ready to plunge into the profoundest depths of thought, it seems now to play with subjects the most awful and sublime, and now to busy itself with matters that we have been accustomed to regard as trivial and commonplace. While this renders it singularly unattractive, and even repulsive, to the ordinary western intellect, it at the same time invests it with a powerful charm for those whose peculiarity of mental structure, or habit, which is second nature, invites to the study of it; and as is commonly the case with acquired and apparently unnatural tastes, these few probably derive intenser enjoyment from it than ordinary men derive from ordinary studies. One thing ought to be said of the Hindu philosophy, to its praise or to its censure;—it never turns aside in order to avoid a difficulty. The old gymnosophists, who pondered so deeply on all things knowable and unknowable, took real delight in encountering and grappling with difficulties. They might crush them, or they might be crushed by them; but to avoid them was none of their tactics. To attain a conclusion was indispensable to them. To us it appears that this was the grand radical defect in their *Organon*. The one grand lesson that they could not, or would not, learn, was to doubt. Although the essence of their philosophy, in its matter and its tendency, is absolute scepticism, yet the chief characteristic of its method is the most boundless dogmatism. Nor is this so utterly inconsistent as it might appear. One of the fundamental tenets of their system is, that the whole material and spiritual system that is cognisable by man, the cog-

nisan man of course included, is unreal and illusive. A system which embraces such a tenet must of necessity be essentially sceptical. But this being once admitted, and it being agreed to reason upon illusions as if they were realities, it is no difficult step by which the conclusion is arrived at, that one set of illusions are as real as any other; and, consequently, that every man's illusions are, granting always the initial hypothesis, absolute truth to him. And thus there is a reasonable justification of unswerving dogmatism. *Cogito, ergo sum*, said the European sage. No, said others, that is not putting the matter rightly; *Sum, ergo cogito*, would be more logical. But the Oriental sage cuts the Gordian knot. *Nec sum*, says he in substance, *nec cogito; sed si essem et cogitarem, et si quid esset cogitabile aut scibile, sic cogitarem, et sic scirem*.

Until very lately, the philosophy of India was very little known to the students of the west. Locked up in a sacred language, which bade defiance to British power, and yielded but very partially to the more potent charm of British gold, speculations which, had they been written in the language of Plato, might have influenced the current of human thought and opinion almost as materially as have those of the great Grecian, were scarcely known beyond the limits of the Brahmanic circle. Sir William Jones set a noble example; and he, and Wilford, and Wilkins, did something towards the divulging of the secrets which have for ages been hoarded in Sanskrit repositories. But it is to Colebrooke that we are indebted for most of what has been hitherto known of the Hindu philosophy. This man deserves, in this connection, to be mentioned with profound respect. He did something—indeed much—when it was extremely difficult to do anything. But it is no disparagement to him to say, that he left far more undone than he accomplished, far more than he, or any man, or any number of men, could possibly have accomplished in his day. He was, to a great extent, dependent on the caprice of Pandits, the most capricious of men, both for the selection of the books that he was permitted to read, and for the explanation of the mysteries which these books contained. Yet he was a hardy and energetic pioneer; and what he did, he did well.

Of late years, the Sanskrit language has been profoundly studied on the Continent, especially in Germany and Russia, but mainly with a view to philological researches. Not a little has been done by an Englishman, Dr Horace Hayman Wilson, and an Anglicised German, Dr Max Muller, to lessen the difficulty of the attainment of the Sanskrit language, and to popularise the knowledge of the literature and the philosophy which it contains; and a few of our countrymen have

displayed much of the national energy in the study of both. Without prejudice to others, we may mention three gentlemen who have laboured successfully in this difficult field;—Mr John Muir of Edinburgh, formerly of the Bengal Civil Service; Mr Monier Williams of Haileybury; and Dr Ballantyne of Benares, author of the treatise before us. These three men are all enthusiasts (in the best sense) in Sanskrit studies. Besides these, there are some missionaries in India who have prosecuted Sanskrit studies with much zeal and success. Some civilians, too, comparatively young men, have caught the flame from Wilson and Williams. Of the former class, we may name the late Messrs Morton and Yates, the latter of whom had a worthy colleague, and has left a worthy successor, in Mr Wenger. Of the latter class are Mr Seton Karr and Mr R. N. Cust, whom we happen personally to know; and there are probably others, devoting a scanty and hard-earned leisure to the cultivation of this field.

Before Dr Ballantyne left this country, he was known to many as an Oriental scholar of high promise, and of attainments which were truly wonderful, the disadvantages being considered under which they were made. What these disadvantages were, must be evident to every one who considers that even now there exists not in our Scottish metropolis a single facility for the acquisition of any Oriental language, with the exception of Hebrew. It is needless to say, that twenty years ago there were as few. Yet in Edinburgh about that time, Mr Ballantyne acquired so much knowledge of the most difficult of these languages, as to justify his aspiring, while still a very young man, to the high office of Principal of the Sanskrit College of Benares. To that office he was appointed by the Court of Directors of the East India Company. In this position he has enjoyed the most favourable opportunities for perfecting his knowledge of the Sanskrit language, and extending his acquaintance with Oriental lore; and those opportunities he has turned to good account. But he has not, as so many mere scholars do, lived and studied for himself alone. He has been ever on the watch for opportunities of extending an interest in Oriental studies among Europeans, and still more for correcting the views and improving the knowledge of the Brahmin Pandits, and other learned natives of India, over a large number of whom he has acquired an influence which has no parallel since the days of Sir William Jones.

In India, Dr Ballantyne has been generally regarded as the leader of that section of the well-wishers of the people, who regard the Sanskrit as the most important medium for the communication of sound knowledge to those who are to become the teachers of the people. It seems to be admitted by

all who know much about India, that the vernacular dialects, in their present state, are not sufficient as a medium for the instruction of this class. While it is admitted on all hands, and cannot be doubted, that the great body of the people can be educated only through the medium of their own vernacular dialects, it seems to be equally certain that there must be a body of men who are to receive from Europeans, or at least under European superintendence, a superior education to any that it is possible to give in the vernaculars, and that this body are to be the instructors of the masses of their countrymen. But it is not so easy to come to a conclusion as to the language that should be employed in the teaching of these professional and non-professional, yet not less real, teachers. The claims of English and of Sanskrit have been warmly advocated. As in most such cases, much may be said on both sides ; and as in many cases, much that is sound and true. The advocates of English say, and say truly, that in that language we have all the matter that is to be taught ready to our hands, that we have but to teach our students a language which they are eager to acquire, and which they acquire with remarkable ease and accuracy, and the whole domain of knowledge, religious, scientific and historical, is at once open to them. They say, moreover, and not without evident truth, that the political condition of the country has created, and is fostering, a strong and wide-spread desire for English education, which will in all probability be continuous and increasing; whereas the desire for Sanskrit education has never been widely diffused, is gradually being restricted within narrower limits, and will in all likelihood cease altogether ere long. Still further, they say that this desire exists only among a portion of the Brahmanic caste, whose influence is on the wane, and who besides would feel it a degradation, as according to their creed it were a sin, to share their knowledge with the profane and low-caste vulgar ; whereas the desire for English prevails amongst all classes, and especially amongst those who are undoubtedly destined to occupy the most important and influential positions among their countrymen. The Sanskritarians, on their part, argue with equal truth, that as the ultimate object is the conveyance of sound instruction to the people, through the medium of the vernaculars, we ought to avoid in the education of their destined instructors aught that would denationalize them, and would place a barrier between them and those whom we wish them to influence. Moreover, in order to the education of the people, the vernacular dialects themselves must be cultivated and improved ; and this confessedly can be best effected, indeed can only be effected, by those who are conversant with the Sanskrit. Further, they say, and

truly, that although the desire for the study of Sanskrit is not so general as that for the study of English, yet we have a sufficient body of men ready to engage in the study of this learned tongue, to whom study, and especially the study of this language and the knowledge stored in it, is a hereditary profession, and who will study, from the mere love of study, with far more earnestness than the English students, who generally seek only a smattering of knowledge, and such familiarity with the language as may fit them for various employments in Government or other European service. And still further, they say that the influence of the Pandit class over the people is immense, and the respect in which they are held is boundless; whereas, for the present at least, the English-educated natives are kept at a distance by the great body of their countrymen, who naturally regard them all as tainted with the same faults that are admitted to distinguish a section of them, well known to all residents in India under the designation of "Young Bengal;" and that consequently the former class *could* do far more for popularizing knowledge than the latter class could ever effect, while they *would* bend their endeavours to this end if they were set free, as we may hope they will gradually be, from the baneful influences of caste, and their minds expanded by sound knowledge, and especially by the genial and humanizing influences of the gospel.

Some years ago, these controversies were carried on with great earnestness; but now we think the advocates of both opinions are quite willing to wish all success to those who follow the opposite course to that which they themselves prefer. In India there is room for all instrumentalities, and there is need of all. Indeed, we cannot but think that the strongest advocate for English education must admit that a body of enlightened and Christianized Pandits, retaining their simple habits, and devoting their lives to the instruction and evangelization of their countrymen, would be an agency of great power, and might be expected, with God's blessing, to effect a great amount of good. On the other hand, we cannot see how the most strenuous advocate of Sanskrit can deny that the large class who are from year to year going out from the Government colleges and missionary institutions, well grounded in the English language and in sound knowledge, and who are occupying, and are more and more to occupy, the most influential positions in the country, are fitted also to exert an influence for good, if less intense, yet far more extensive than is likely to be exerted by the other class.

For many years Dr Ballantyne has laboured with an intensity that has few parallels, even in India,—where we venture to think that the standard of diligence amongst diligent men is

higher than anywhere else—for the training of Pandits in sound knowledge and correct habits of thought, without doing violence to the cherished forms of Oriental lore. The books that he has written with this view are a library of themselves; and those of them that we have seen are admirable specimens of the way in which a vigorous *will*, which is an important element of genius, can find a *way* of accomplishing what might seem too difficult to be attempted. As an instance, we may refer to his translation of Bacon's "*Novum Organum*." This noble work, from which Dugald Stewart quoted in the original Latin, on the ground that he despaired of being able to translate his quotations adequately into English, Dr Ballantyne has rendered into Sanskrit, and accompanied the text with an extensive commentary, which is admirably fitted to beguile the Pandits into the acquisition of a great amount of sound knowledge, and the formation of Baconian habits of thought, while they suppose that they are meditating on the lucubration of one of their own most venerated sages.

The work before us is composed with the design of introducing amongst the Pandits of India a knowledge of the Christian system. Its publication is due to the offer of a prize by a Bengal civilian, "for the best statement and refutation, in English, of the fundamental errors (opposed to Christian Theism) of the Vedanta, Nyaya, and Sankhya Philosophies, as set forth in the standard native authorities, in the Sanskrit language, treating of those systems; together with a demonstration (supported by such arguments, and conveyed in such a form and manner as may be most likely to prove convincing to learned Hindus imbued with those errors) of the following fundamental principles of Christian Theism—viz. :—

"*First*, Of the real, not merely apparent or illusory, distinctness of God from all other spirits, and from matter; and of the creation (in the proper sense) of all other spirits, and of matter, by God, in opposition to the Vedanta.

"*Second*, "Of the non-eternity of separate souls, and their creation by God, in opposition to the Nyaya and Sankhya.

"*Third*, Of the creation of matter, in opposition to the tenet of its eternity in the shape of atoms (as maintained in the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools), or in the shape of Prakriti, (as maintained by the Sankhya).

"*Fourth*, Of the moral character and moral government of God; and of the reality and perpetuity of the difference between moral good and moral evil, with reference to such dogmas of the above systems as are opposed to these doctrines."

Although the essay was submitted in competition for this prize, we doubt whether it was composed with a view to the

competition. We suspect rather that its author selected from his unpublished writings such chapters as bore most nearly on the subject prescribed. This supposition will account for the Sanskrit version accompanying the essay, while the advertisement just quoted distinctly states that the essay required was to be in English. It will account also for the somewhat fragmentary character of the work. And, further, it will account for the work's being free from the general defects of prize essays, in which the writers are constrained to make their thoughts flow in channels that have been dug for them by others, and to state and enforce their views in a different order and in different lights from those that their own minds would spontaneously have chosen.

"Man will not follow where a rule is shewn,
But loves to take a method of his own."

As it will not be necessary to refer further to the purpose for which the treatise may have been composed, or to the circumstances under which it is now published, we shall say, once for all, that it appears to us admirably adapted to excite the interest of the Pandits, and not less to afford to the European student at once a considerable amount of accurate knowledge respecting the tenets of the Hindu philosophy, and a model of the way in which discussions should be conducted with the philosophical Hindu. This last object is of more importance in the conduct of missionary operations in India than may perhaps be generally supposed. It seems to be generally believed that the missionary in India will not ordinarily come into contact with the philosophical systems of the country, that he may deal with the minds and the hearts of the great body of the people, and leave the learned few to be dealt with by one or two of his brethren, whose tastes and talents may specially qualify them for this department of the work. But this is not so. In almost every village in India there is some man thoroughly versed in the philosophical dogmata; and with this village oracle, rather than with the mass of the people directly, the missionary must discuss the claims and characteristics of the gospel. It is all very well for him to lay down a rule to himself, or for directors of societies or committees at home to lay down rules to him, that he is not to discuss metaphysical questions with the learned, but to preach the simple gospel to the simple men. It is not in his power to choose the mode of his operations. Discussion will be forced upon him, and he can only purchase immunity from the necessity of discussion, by qualifying himself for discussing in such a way as to deter assailants from seeking a second encounter; just as we are told that every improvement in weapons of destruction tends to the preservation of peace.

But even if there be no Pandit among the missionary's audience, he is not on that account the less likely to be drawn into discussion respecting the Hindu Philosophy. It is a singular fact, but a fact nevertheless, that the whole Hindu nation is leavened with metaphysical lore. In Europe philosophers may speculate for ever on abstract questions, and come to what conclusions they may, and the great body of the people, notwithstanding all our boasts as to the universal diffusion of knowledge and the march of intellect, will be none the wiser—perhaps, we should rather say, none the foolisher. But in India it is not so. The whole current of thought of the whole people runs in the channel of the philosophy of the country. Ask a man at the plough, who never learned to read, and who has never been two miles from his native village, how he is to-day, and very likely his answer will be, "I am not at all; God alone is, and has no second!" Or ask him the news of the neighbourhood, and he will perhaps tell you that God had employed Ramgopul to restore Krishna Lal to being; his meaning being that Ramgopul has murdered Krishna Lal, and so released him from this unreal and illusory life, and admitted him into that true life which he may enjoy when absorbed into the essence of God! Charge him with sin, and he will certainly tell you that, as there is none in the universe but God, there can be no responsibility, and, consequently, no guiltiness. Tell him of a Saviour, and he will tell you that salvation consists only in deliverance from what is the sole evil, namely, consciousness, or the want of a conviction of the great fact of his identity with God. Be the cause what it may, we are confident that no creed ever pervaded the minds and influenced the habits of thought and action of a whole people, so thoroughly as the creed, which of all others seems least fitted to be popular, pervades the minds of the Hindu population.

There are commonly considered to be six schools of Hindu philosophy, corresponding with the six *Darsans* or expositions of the Vedas; but as some of them do not materially differ from others, our author, as well as several other authorities, regards them as three, the *Nyaya*, the *Sankhya*, and the *Vedanta*. Although these differ widely from each other, yet as they all proceed on the same inspired authority, the native Professors are anxious to shew that they are not contradictory, but rather supplementary to each other, differing "mainly in regarding the universe from different points of view, viz., as it stands in relation severally to *sensation*, *emotion*, and *intellection*." Our author's account of the distinction is very clear:

"The *Naiyāyika*, founding on the fact that we have various *sensations*, inquires what and how many are the channels through which

such varied knowledge flows in. Finding that there are five very different channels, he imagines five different externals adapted to these. Hence his theory of the five elements, the aggregate of what the *Nyāya* regards as the causes of affliction.

"The *Sāṅkhya*, struck with the fact that we have *emotions*,—with an eye to the question *whence* our impressions come,—inquires their *quality*. Are they pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent? These three qualities constitute, for him, the external; and to their aggregate he gives the name of Nature. With the *Naiyāyika* he agrees in wishing that he were well rid of all three; holding that things pleasing, and things indifferent, are not less incompatible with man's chief end than things positively displeasing.

"Thus while the *Nyāya* allows to the external a substantial existence, the *Sāṅkhya* admits its existence only as an aggregate of qualities; while both allow that it really (eternally and necessarily) exists.

"The *Vedāntin*, rising above the question as to what is pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent, asks simply, what *is*, and what *is not*. The categories are here reduced to two—the Real, and the Unreal. The categories of the *Nyāya* and *Sāṅkhya* were merely scaffolding for reaching this pinnacle of philosophy. The implied foundation was everywhere the same,—viz., the *Veda*; and this, therefore, we shall find is the field on which the battle with Hindu philosophy must ultimately be fought.

"The *Nyāya*, it may be gathered from what has been said, is conveniently introductory to the *Sāṅkhya*, and the *Sāṅkhya* to the *Vedānta*. Accordingly, in Hindu schools, where all three are taught, it is in this order that the learner, who learns all three, takes them up. The *Nyāya* is the exoteric doctrine, the *Sāṅkhya* a step nearer what is held as the truth, and the *Vedānta* the esoteric doctrine, or the naked truth."

The Vedantic system, then, being the culminating point of Hindu philosophy, it is with its doctrines that the Christian advocate comes mainly into collision; and it becomes of great consequence on this ground, as it is of great interest intrinsically, to ascertain, with all possible precision, what the distinctive tenets of this school are. This we shall endeavour to state as clearly as we can in a limited space; and for the sake of distinctness, we shall inquire into the Vedantic doctrine respecting *God*, the *creation*, and *sin*. This will comprehend a pretty full view of what is contained in the Vedantic system, "apart from trifles."

The grand fundamental principle of the Vedantic system is Monotheism. "There is One, and he has no second," is its simple creed. Of this doctrine the Vedantic writings are full. Perhaps it is from the prevalence of Polytheism around them that the modern Vedantists feel themselves constrained to contend with double earnestness for this "*present truth*." At all events, unity is the grand theme of their discourses, the attri-

bute which is mainly celebrated in their invocations and their hymns of praise. So far, then, the Vedantist seems to be in accord with the Christian and the Mohammedan; for the Christian believes that "there is one God, and one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus;" and the Mohammedan, many times in a day, repeats it as the essence of his creed, "God is God, Mohammed is the prophet of God." It is upon their earnest maintenance of the doctrine of the Divine Unity, that many Europeans, disliking the exclusive claims of the Christian system, have founded many arguments, the object of which has been to prove that the Vedantic system is just as good as the Christian, that it is equally fitted to set free its votaries from the debasing influence of Polytheism and idolatry, and to elevate them to a fitness for communion and fellowship with "the King eternal, immortal, and invisible." But before we can agree with this opinion, we must inquire a little more particularly as to the character and attributes that the Vedantists ascribe to the God of their creed. A man is not necessarily a loyal subject of our queen, if he hold, however strenuously, that there is but one rightful sovereign of these realms; he must hold further that Victoria is that sovereign. Though the Philistines might worship no god but Dagon, and the Moabites no god but Chemosh, they did not on that account worship the God of Israel. Yea, we can even conceive a system of polytheism, in which men should worship the personified attributes of God, and which should yield a result far less opposed to the worship of God, than might be the worship of one God, represented as possessing attributes contrary to those of the living and true God. Therefore, after the question *Quot Dei?* is satisfactorily answered, there remains the question not less important, *Quis Deus?* or *Qualis Deus?*

Now the epithet that the Vedantic writers constantly apply to God is *Nirguna*, and upon the meaning of this word depends the answer to the question just stated. Our author—who in this instance acts the part of an apologist for Vedantism to a far greater extent than we can agree with him—gives an interpretation of this term, which we shall first state in his own words, and then examine.

"Confining ourselves, for the present, to the consideration of ontological theories and terminology, we proceed to inquire what is the Vedantic conception of the relation of the phenomenal to the real. The Vedantists are sometimes charged with holding that the phenomenal *is* the real,—in other words, with material Pantheism. At the same time they are charged with the wildest extravagance, of an opposite description, in declaring that the Supreme is *devoid of qualities*, or, in Sanskrit, *nir-guna*. With regard to the relation of the real and the phenomenal, no point appears to have occasioned more

perplexity to the European assailants of Vedāntism than the employment of this term *nir-guna*, so frequently connected in the Vedāntic writings with the name of the Supreme (*Brahm*). We find, for example, a zealous writer against Vedāntism declaring that, 'In any sense, within the reach of human understanding, he (*Brahm*) is *nothing*. For the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes.' And the same writer calls upon his readers to admire the extravagant notion that *Brahm* exists 'without intellect, without intelligence, without even the consciousness of his own existence!' Now, the reply to all this is, that the word *nir-guna* is a technical term, and must be understood in its technical acceptance. It means 'devoid of whatever is meant by the term *guna*,' and the term *guna* is employed (as already explained at pp. xxxiv. xxxvi.) to denote whatever is phenomenal. In denying that anything phenomenal belongs constitutively to the Supreme Being, the Vedāntin speaks very much like Bishop Berkeley, and like other good Christians whom Milton's epic has not educated into a semi-conscious Anthropomorphism. Berkeley expresses himself as follows:—'We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing; it is evident such a being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected by any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body; that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities,' and so on. The Vedāntin, in like manner, denying that such 'qualities' belong to the Supreme, declares, 'We ought not to ascribe to Almighty God properties, attributes or modes of being, which are the peculiar characteristics of humanity, such as the faculty of vision,' &c. In short, the Vedāntin denies that the Supreme either has or requires either senses or bodily organs; and, holding that organs of sense or motion are made up of what he calls *guna*, as we Europeans in general say they are made up of what we prefer to call *matter*, he asserts that the Supreme is *nir-guna*, in very much the sense that we Europeans assert that God is *immaterial*. We say, guardedly, 'in very much the sense,' and not simply 'in the sense,' because the term *guna* denotes strictly, not the *imperceptible* quiddity 'matter,' but what Berkeley calls *the sensible*, or the sum of the objects of sense. Theologically, the Vedāntin, asserting that the Deity is *nir-guna*, and the Christian, asserting that God is *immaterial*, are asserting the very same fact in terms of separate theories,—just as two chemists might make each the same assertion in regard to some individual specimen, while the one spoke of it as destitute of chlorine, and the other spoke of it as destitute of oxymuriatic acid.

"To say that 'the mind of man can form no notion of matter or

spirit apart from its properties or attributes,' is therefore no *reductio ad absurdum* of the Vedāntic dogma that nothing of what is technically called *guna* enters into the essence of God. Take away everything of what is comprised under the name *guna*,—that is to say, take away everything that is perceived through the organs of sense, and take away every sense-organ, and take away all human feelings or mental processes, such as alarm, delighted surprise, recollection, computation, deduction,—take away all this, and there remains to the Vedāntin, not a mere empty substratum, but the One Reality, consisting of existence, thought, and joy, in their identity, as an ever-existing joy-thought. This, whatever else we may think of it, is something very different from a substratum evacuated to nonentity.

We are accustomed to regard eternal existence, wisdom, and blessedness, as *attributes* of God. The Vedāntin, on the other hand, instead of regarding these as attributes of God, regards them, in their eternal identity, as God himself. Instead of holding, as they have been so often accused of holding, that God has no attributes in *our* sense of the term, they hold, in fact, that He is *all* attribute,—sheer existence, sheer thought, sheer joy, 'as a lump of salt is wholly of uniform taste within and without.' So far is the conception of *Brahm* from being reduced to that of a nonentity by the Vedāntic tenet of his being *nir-guna*, that, according to one of Vyāsa's aphorisms, as rendered by Mr Colebrooke (*Essays*, p. 352), 'Every attribute of a first cause (omniscience, omnipotence, &c.), exists in *Brahme*, who is devoid of qualities." It is rather strange that the occurrence of this passage in Mr Colebrooke's well-known essay should not have sufficed to awaken a suspicion that the term 'devoid of qualities' must be employed in a sense other than that of an empty substratum—a non-entity. The Vedāntin, seeing no occasion for any such vehicle of the joy-thought, never postulated any such. The empty substratum, the 'nothing,' which they are fancied to place in the room of the Supreme, is precisely what, as a nothing, does not enter into their conception of the Supreme at all. It will readily occur to the reader that the Hindu conception of *thought*, as the ultimate ground of all, independently of any substratum beyond it, anticipates, in its own way, Hume's extreme development of Locke."

We are not conscious of any desire to speak evil of Vedantism, but we do think that this is too favourable a representation of it. It strikes us that our author is unconsciously guilty of a fallacy respecting the use of the term *guna*. He says that the term denotes, "not the imperceptible quiddity, 'matter,'" but what Berkeley calls *the sensible*, or the sum of the objects of sense. Now it is quite true that when the *gunas* of a material object are spoken of, this is precisely what is meant by the term, the whole of those sensible qualities, which, according to the ideal school, constitute matter, and according to others, belong to, and are inseparable from matter. But when the *gunas* of an intellect are spoken of, these correspond as exactly with what we should describe in English as the

qualities or characteristics of that intellect ; and so in respect of moral qualities. Probably indeed no word in any language answers more strictly to any word in any other language, than does the Sanskrit term *guna* to the English term *quality*. To say, then, that the Deity is *nir-guna*, is to say that he is destitute (not of material qualities merely, as our author would have it, but) of all qualities whatsoever.

But, says Dr Ballantyne, the word *nir-guna* is a technical term, and must be understood in its technical application. Granted. Now let us ask what is this application, and let Dr Ballantyne supply the answer. He tells us distinctly that the three *gunas*, or qualities, are *Sattwa*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*. "According to the commentators, the first of the qualities, whilst endlessly subdivisible into calmness, complacency, patience, rejoicing, &c., consists summarily of *happiness*. The second, on the other hand, consists summarily of *pain*. . . . *Indifference*—the third of the qualities—is exemplified in its highest potency in such things as sticks and stones, where soul, the substratum of these as of all else, is altogether immersed in matter, or obfuscated by the quality of *darkness* ; as the word *tamas*, the name of the quality, literally signifies." In other words, *Sattwa* denotes all positive qualities ; *Rajas* all negative qualities ; and *Tamas* all such as may be regarded as neither positive nor negative. From this it appears that the *gunas* are all that by which the common soul can be manifested—not to the senses merely, but to the understanding, the feelings, or any faculties or powers of a sentient being. And it is by the abstraction of all these that the Vedantist attempts to explain what God is. Soul, or rather *the* soul, when united to the *guna tamas*, may be a stone or any other merely material object ; the same soul, when united to the *guna rajas*, may be a tiger or a jackal ; the same soul, when associated with the *guna sattwa*, may be a Brahman or a sage. When associated with various combinations of these *gunas*, it constitutes all that is, material or immaterial. The *gunas* alone give to the common soul its distinctive qualities. Now the same soul, when *nir-guna*, or absolutely without any qualities at all, positive, negative, or indifferent, is God. Dr Ballantyne's statement that the Vedantist asserts that the supreme is *nirguna* in very much the same sense that we Europeans assert that God is *immaterial*, is so far from being correct, that the opposite is much nearer the truth. If you conceive all the qualities abstracted which distinguish one kind of matter from another, then the residue, according to European ideas, is that "imperceptible quiddity" to which is given the name matter ; but according to Vedantic notions, the residue is God. According to European ideas, the term matter is employed to denote

the substratum on which perceptible material qualities, as extension, impenetrability, and inertia, are manifested, and the term spirit is employed to indicate the substance in which spiritual qualities, as judgment, memory and reason, are exhibited. But with the Vedantist the substratum of all material and of all spiritual qualities is soul; and this soul, when disjoined from all qualities whatsoever, is God. We cannot, therefore, see that the charge brought against Vedantism by the "zealous writer," whom our author quotes, is not perfectly well founded. If you deprive a triangle of the quality of being right-angled, without communicating to it the quality of being obtuse or acute-angled, and take away the quality of its being made of brass, without communicating to it the quality of being made of copper, or iron, or wood, or paper, or any other substance, and take away from it its quality of having three sides and three angles, without giving to it any other boundaries;—will Dr Ballantyne, or any other man, say that he "can form any notion" of what would remain? Yet this residue, conceived as resulting from the abstraction of all qualities from any material or spiritual substance, is what the Vedantists call God. The subject is infinitely too solemn for ridicule or irony, yet no one can fail to perceive that it is virtually the same subject which is treated with such exquisite ridicule in the pages of Martinus Scriblerus.

It appears, then, that the Vedantic Theology is most purely Pantheistic. In the universe there is but one *entity*, and that is God. Invested with certain qualities he is all material and all immaterial things, and separated from all qualities, he is simply God. Yet these qualities are not entities, but only modes or relations.

We are not unwilling, however, to admit that the Pantheism of the Vedanta is free from a portion of that grossness which we sometimes find to attach to doctrines essentially Pantheistic. But is not this in great measure due to its nearer approach to atheism? When the bloody Mary, grieving over the loss of the last of the possessions that her predecessors had held in France, declared that after her death CALAIS would be found written upon her heart; and when an enthusiastic soldier at Waterloo said to the surgeons who were searching for a bullet lodged in his breast, "a litte deeper and you'll find the emperor;" they expressed a sentiment which is either very gross or very refined, according as they meant literally or figuratively that the object of their affection was engraven upon their hearts. If they meant literally that their material hearts bore a material impress of the objects of their love, then the sentiment was undoubtedly a gross one; but if they meant merely to express figuratively that they did love these objects the

idea was not unpoetical, but just in proportion as it meant nothing. In like manner we admit that the Vedantic idea of God is less gross than the materialistic, sensuous, and sensual Pantheism, but just in proportion as it is less real.

The doctrine of the Vedanta respecting creation follows as a consequence from that respecting God. There is and can be nothing in the universe but God. The idea that there is arises from *ajnana*, or ignorance, which seems sometimes to be represented as an essence apart from God, but which is more strictly regarded as a negative. God having formed the design to create, could not baffle the impossibility of creating *from nothing*, and therefore he diffused himself, and superinduced upon himself this quality or non-quality of ignorance, in virtue of which he imagines that there are separate substances and existences from himself. This is the pure doctrine of the Vedanta, though of course there are various, and scarcely consistent, ways of stating it.

Our author strenuously maintains that the idea of creation, in the ordinary sense of the term, is unattainable on philosophical principles, and that a Pantheistic system is the ultimate conclusion of unaided reason. The following passage is somewhat startling:—

“That to which I refer especially is the great tenet that only One exists, and that nothing but One ever really existed or will exist or could exist. To this *conception*, if not to this belief, every one, we think, must come, who, studying the mystery of being—by the bare light of his own reason—determinedly analyses and takes account of every thought and every term in the chain of his speculation. I can articulate the term *creation*, and I may appear to attach a distinct idea to the term when I say that it means ‘making out of nothing,’ which I do hold it to mean; but is it possible for me to conceive that what is so made has in it a principle of existence which would sustain it for an instant if the creative force were withdrawn? I am *not* able to conceive this. I believe that, by a confusion of mind—or confusion of words—people may persuade themselves that they have a conception of it (as a child may imagine that it has a clear conception of a *round square*); but I find in my inmost thoughts that I have *not*. Were there a withdrawal of the support of the One, I cannot conceive otherwise than that all *that appears* must collapse—as the electro-magnet drops the load that it sustained the instant that it is disconnected from the source of its magnetic power. Can we call such a thing a *magnet*—a *real magnet*? No; it only appears to be one through the influx of an adventitious power. The illustration is an imperfect one;—as what illustration, of the conception here spoken of, but must be?”

We are not, of course, able to account for Dr Ballantyne's idiosyncrasy, nor are we entitled to doubt the absolute accuracy of his account of his own conceptions. But we venture

to say that there is not in the human mind generally, any aversion to the idea of a beginning of existence, of something being created in the most absolute sense of the term. On the contrary, we believe that the natural tendency of ordinary minds is to suppose creation in cases where it has not taken place, to suppose, for example, that the results of chemical processes are creations. But supposing our author's statement of his own inability to conceive creation to be correct, he certainly goes too far when he represents the conceptions of others on the subject to be the same in kind with that which a person might have of a round square. This involves a contradiction in terms, and no power of authority or revelation could ever make us admit such a thing as possible. But surely there is no contradiction in the idea of creation, which should make it impossible for any one to believe that creation has taken place, if he see evidence sufficient to prove that it has. To us it appears that a fallacy lurks under the definition of creation, when it is explained as meaning the making of something *out of nothing*. Dr Ballantyne's statement as to the impossibility of conceiving this is true only if the meaning be that *nothing* is the material out of which the something is made, in the same way as a piece of iron is the material out of which a nail is made. In this sense certainly the old maxim is true, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. But when creation is defined as the making of something out of nothing, the *out of nothing* is employed simply as the *differentia* of making, to distinguish creation from any process of manufacturing. No one imagines that to create is to make use of nothing as the material out of which to manufacture something, but rather that it is to make something without any pre-existing materials from which to make it.

Equally different from the ordinary conceptions of men is our author's as to the permanence of created things, apart from the sustaining power of the Creator. It is both in accordance with popular thought and with the axioms of physical science, that all things will remain for ever in the state in which they are, unless an adequate cause be brought to bear upon them to produce a change. It may be quite true that created things have a constant tendency towards annihilation, which is constantly counteracted by the sustaining energy of the Deity; but certainly no such tendency is evidenced to us either by reasoning or observation. Altogether, it appears to us, that the ordinary idea of creation, that an Almighty Being called the universe into substantial existence, is most strictly in accordance, physically and metaphysically, with truth;—and this conviction we cannot relinquish, although our author supports a contrary assertion by the authority of Sir William Hamilton.

Practically, the grand defect of the Vedantic system is, its denial of all distinction between moral good and evil. If God alone existed in the universe, there could be no morality. But according to this system God alone does exist, and therefore there is no such thing as morality or immorality. The belief of separate existence is an illusion, the effect of ignorance; and this, in point of fact, is the only evil thing, actual or possible, in the universe. To get rid of this illusion, and to know that we are good, is the only salvation that the system admits of. It is this that makes the Hindu mind so inaccessible to the gospel of salvation. Dr Arnold, we think, has somewhere said, that the knowledge of God is the knowledge of moral evil. But, in the Hindu system, there is no admission of the existence or possibility of moral good or evil. And this is the grand reason why we cannot go along with our author in his well-meant attempts to bridge over the errors of the system. Its evils are fundamental and essential, and admit of no remedy other than the utter eradication of the system itself. Were the question one simply of metaphysics, however important we might consider the right solution of it to be, we should still be willing to make all reasonable allowance for differences of national character, and habits of thought modified by peculiarities of education, both personal and hereditary. But the case is very different, when the foundations of all morality are undermined, and all difference denied between good and evil. There must be no compromise with such a system; and by whatever means it be assailed, there must be no hesitancy about the vigour or the thoroughness of the assault.

In general, we are pleased with the way in which Dr Ballantyne presents and defends and illustrates Christian truth. And in this respect we can heartily commend his work to the careful study of those who look forward to labour in the great Indian mission-field. No man knows the peculiarities of the Pandit mind better than Dr Ballantyne. The modes of its logic, and the phases of its feelings, are all familiar to him; and most valuable are his suggestions as to the ways in which these may be best directed towards Christianity.

We are very glad to find Dr Ballantyne, in his preface, expressing his intention of devoting himself still further to the great work of facilitating the introduction of Christianity among the learned natives in the East. We know his ability for such a task; and we know the indefatigable perseverance and energy which he will bring to bear upon its execution; and we heartily bid him God-speed!

ART. VII.—*The Geography of Palestine in relation to the Historical Truth of the Bible.*

1. *Sinai and Palestine in connection with their History.* By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, M.A. London : Murray.
2. *The Land and the Book; or, Biblical Illustrations drawn from the Manners and Customs, the Scenes and Scenery of the Holy Land.* By W. M. Thomson, D.D., twenty-five years a missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. in Syria and Palestine. London : Sampson, Low, & Co.
3. *The same.* London & Edinburgh : Nelson & Sons.
4. *A Hand-book for Travellers in Syria and Palestine; including an account of the Geography, History, Antiquities, and Inhabitants of these Countries, the Peninsula of Sinai, Edom, and the Syrian Desert; with detailed descriptions of Jerusalem, Petra, Damascus, and Palmyra.* London : Murray.

IF some assembly of good men had been appointed to deliberate on the *best outward form* in which the revelation of God's will for the salvation of men of all nations, tribes and tongues, could be conveyed, it can hardly be doubted that their decision would have been wide as the poles asunder from that which infinite Wisdom has been pleased to sanction. They would have been almost sure to lay it down as a first principle, that designed as the revelation was for the whole world, it must, in its language, imagery, and allusions to external objects, be quite general, so as to be equally intelligible in all parts of the earth, and at all periods of its history. It would have been held quite improper to connect the great charter of salvation with any particular locality, and especially with a country or people every way singular, isolated in a great measure from the rest of the world, and so insignificant as to be scarcely heard of in the general history of its affairs. If any one had proposed to weave into the great book of all nations numberless allusions to every feature of such a little territory as Palestine,—to make the volume team with the names of its mountains and rivers, its trees and flowers, its plains and valleys, its very fountains and pools, or glance in every page at the occupations, habits and institutions of its people, we may well fancy the difficulty the eccentric member would have had in getting a patient hearing for his opinions, and the impossibility of finding any one to second his proposal. Human wisdom would have been almost sure to construct the Bible as it has constructed catechisms, creeds, and confessions of faith,—to make it a book of abstract, general propositions, carefully eliminating every local allusion, and every mention of passing events.

It is but one of many proofs of "the foolishness of God being wiser than men," that the Bible has been constructed after the very fashion which men *a priori* would have been almost sure to condemn. "It is a law of the dispensation," as Isaac Taylor has remarked, "that while Christianity propounds itself as a universal code, and as a universal motive, and a universal hope; yet in the mode of its conveyance to the human family. instead of its assuming an abstract form, and instead of its floating down from heaven, disjoined from all things earthly, it was born just as any merely national and temporary scheme has been born; and this is true both of the persons of its first preachers, and in every circumstance of their style and behaviour; it came into the very closest contact with the things, and with the persons, and with the places and with the positions, and the climate of the country and age where and when it appeared. The light of the gospel was not the universal blaze of the upper heavens,—a light, shadowless, colourless, unchanging; but it was as the shining of the sun in his strength upon the familiar objects of earth; its beams brightening the things near us, and giving light and colour to what we are used to,—sparkling among the flowers beneath our feet. and shedding an equal glory upon things mean and upon things high. . . . Christianity is indeed the religion of the world, but it is also the religion of Palestine. . . . Its innumerable alliances with places and circumstances furnish proofs that are palpable and irrefragable and inexhaustible of its HISTORIC REALITY. . . . When we thus speak of Christianity, we intend, of course, Revelation entire, of which the gospel is the centre and the substance. The inspired volume scarcely includes a page. and in a strict sense, not even a line, which does not historically connect itself with Palestine. Of these innumerable and inter-related connections, a large proportion is of that sort which, supposing the country to be laid open to a course of undisturbed and unrestricted exploration, would be susceptible of an identification, more or less obvious and certain, and which, when so traced, would constitute a vast body, as well of critical *illustrations* as of argumentative *evidence*, serving on the one hand to establish and to bring forcibly home to all minds the historic reality of the Jewish and Christian systems; and on the other, to shed light upon a multitude of single passages, the precise import of which, no sagacity, no erudition, could otherwise have divined."

There are two great objects in connection with the sacred Scriptures, as Mr Taylor has well pointed out in this passage, that will be served by a thorough acquaintance with the external features of Palestine,—namely, first, the brighter *illumination* of numberless passages, the general purport of which may be otherwise pretty obvious, but whose finer shades of meaning

and more delicate tints are lost to the uninitiated ; and second, the construction of what may almost be called a new *evidence* for the literal truth of the Bible, especially in its historical portions,—an evidence resembling in kind that which Paley has so skilfully constructed in his *Horæ Paulinæ*, hardly sufficient in itself to establish the authenticity of the Scriptures, but a singularly satisfying and interesting addition to the more purely demonstrative evidences.* In the one case, our minute knowledge of Palestine, especially its manners and customs, will have the effect of an opera-glass or a stereoscope—bringing out in clear and sharp relief what is otherwise seen but vaguely in the distance. In the other case, the exact correspondence discovered to exist between events and the alleged scenes of their occurrence, will confirm in every unprejudiced mind the belief that the historical Scriptures are not a set of myths ingeniously dressed up, but an honest, simple, transparent narrative of real historical events.

The more clearly the external features of Palestine are brought to light, the more complete and remarkable will the correspondence appear between its *physical geography* and its *history*, and the more clear and satisfactory will the light appear which the one throws on the other. The effect of this correspondence is the more striking, that the geography and the history of Palestine each claims, as Mr Stanley has remarked, to be singular of its kind ; “ the history, by its own records, unconscious, if one may so say, of the physical peculiarity ; the geography, by the discoveries of modern science, wholly without regard, perhaps even indifferent or hostile, to the claims of the history.” There is not, for example, the slightest reason to suppose that Moses, or any other Jew, was familiar with that most remarkable feature of the Jordan valley, and the basin of the Dead Sea—their deep depression below the level of the Mediterranean, reaching at its maximum to 1300 feet. It is all but certain that neither Moses, nor any other Jew, was acquainted with this fact, for it is but recently that it has been brought to light. Yet how well does it agree with the narrative in Genesis, of the awful catastrophe that first burnt up the cities of the plain, and then brought over them the gloomy waters of the Dead Sea ! The ordinary manner of the sacred historians is that of writers unconscious of the existence of any physical peculiarities in their country ; usually they write with a simplicity like that of little children who have never been from home, and never sup-

* We do not take into consideration here the subject of *literal prophecy*, whose fulfilment must become more and more clear and satisfying as we become better acquainted with Palestine and other Bible lands. Our present subject is—what may be called the *undesigned* coincidences between the History and the Home ; or as Ritter has called it, between the Physics and the Politics of Palestine.

pose that other places are different from home, or that people need to be told what home is like. Matthew and Mark write of "the sea," as if every reader would recognise under that provincial expression, the sheet of fresh water which Luke, who was not a native of the district, calls more properly "the lake." This transparent artlessness in ordinary allusions to places, gives rise to something like the surprise and pleasure of a discovery, when any remarkable adaptation of places to events is now brought to light. It is obvious and undeniable that the writers did not adapt the narrative to the places; whenever, therefore, such adaptations are found, the conclusion is irresistible, that the narrative is true.

Since the commencement of the Christian era, there have been three several periods at which the attention of the Christian world has been very earnestly directed to Palestine; but it is only during the last of the three that any progress has been made in the illumination of the sacred Scriptures by such means as we have referred to. The first time when Palestine became a centre of deep interest to the Christian world, was in the beginning of the fourth century, when the Empress Helena exerted herself so strenuously to discover the sites of the holy places, and built churches on remarkable spots to commemorate the great events, chiefly of the Gospel history. The second period of deep interest in Palestine was the memorable era of the Crusades. The third period is that in which we ourselves are living. Churches formed the monuments or memorials of the first period, battles of the second, books of the third. The Empress Helena and her coadjutors had a very different object in view from the illustration of the Scriptures. Superstitious reverence for holy places was the force that stimulated their researches. The feeling had begun to prevail, that an actual sanctity belonged to these places, that that sanctity was communicated to those who were much about them, and that the worship rendered at them was especially acceptable to God. The same impressions prevailed in the time of the Crusades. By that period, moreover, the Bible had become to a large extent a sealed book, and when few or none were making a study of the Bible, little or no interest would be taken in researches designed to throw light on its meaning. But in our own day, Palestine has begun to be visited and explored for higher and worthier objects. It is true, the Empress Helena is still represented by a section of travellers and writers. It could not have been that a great revival of interest in Palestine would occur, without a resurrection, on some scale, of the spirit that predominated during the two former periods. We may not, perhaps, have pilgrims quite so far gone, as those whom Chrysostom ridicules, that travelled to the Haurân to see the dung-

hill on which the patriarch of Uz sat and scraped himself. The author of *Eothen*, too, may be pointing^{*} his sarcasm rather too sharply, when, with respect to the certainty of the spot where the cock crew, he professes himself "far from being convinced." But there are men in our day who firmly credit the ridiculous story of the finding of the true cross by the Empress Helena, and who would not for the world abandon the belief that the crucifixion occurred at the spot where the precious relic is said to have been discovered. There are Protestant clergymen not a few, at least clergymen of the Protestant church, who would be hardly less scandalised at hearing it denied that the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, standing, though it does, in the heart of Jerusalem, is built over the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea, than at a denial of the inspiration of the Scriptures themselves. Superstitious reverence for "holy places" is very far from extinct, nor would it be at all safe to despise the feeling, or think lightly of the mischief which it may yet work. It is indeed most strange that such a feeling should find support and nourishment in the minds of intelligent men, amid the shrines of Jerusalem. The shocking scenes often witnessed in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre—the revolting orgies of Passion-week—the creation of the Holy Fire—or the service of the Crucifixion—scenes which, for unchristian horrors and unholy passions, all Hindu superstition hardly rivals, might surely, by this time, have dissipated in any honest mind the last trace of the belief, that the holiness of a place (as it is called), must consecrate and elevate the worship performed at it! But no. It is the property of superstition to blind and fascinate, not to reason and enlighten. It is of little use to argue with such men. When Molière was asked whether he expected the publication of "*Le Tartuffe*" to put down hypocrisy, he is said to have replied that there might be as many Tartuffes as ever, but, he hoped, their dupes would be fewer. So with regard to the determined upholders of "holy places," in theory and in practice. Facts and arguments may prevent their views from spreading, but will seldom dislodge them where they have once established themselves.

But apart from the race of superstitious sentimentalists, there has risen up in our day a noble band of Biblical travellers, whose great object has been to explain, elucidate, and (if the word may be used), confirm the Scripture narrative. These travellers have not by any means shewn themselves indifferent to the legitimate influence of the scenes where the great facts of the Bible were transacted, and the wonders of redemption were achieved. Avoiding altogether the unscriptural error, that the *places* have acquired a holiness which entitles them to reverence, and consecrates worship, they have regarded their claim

to respect and interest to lie in this, that they serve to *vivify* the events recorded in the Bible—they enable one to see more clearly with his mind's eye what is there set forth; especially they help one to realise a more life-like conception of the life and death of the adorable Redeemer, and thus lay the foundation for a more active faith—more clear in itself, and more powerful in its practical effects. And in telling to others what they have seen and heard, these travellers enable them in some degree to share their advantages—a thing that can in no degree be done by those who connect all the benefit with the holiness of the places themselves.

It is interesting to mark the progress that has been made within the last few years in exploring Palestine. The harvest already gathered is far from insignificant, yet only a tithe, probably less, of what may be expected under more favourable circumstances. The Israelites, in the days of Gideon, snatching up their grain by handfuls, through terror of the desert hordes of Midian and Amalek, were a picture of the greater part of Biblical travellers, gathering their Biblical harvest in scraps and fragments, and often in terror of their very lives through the descendants of those very sons of the desert. In many cases, men from the west, with little Hebrew and less Arabic, have spent a few weeks in Palestine, accompanied by "Ibrahim," or "Mehemet," as dragoman; have gathered from his lips the Arabic names of the several places, and depended on him (probably a knave) for all their information respecting them. The wretched Turkish government, the unsettled state of the country, the fear of Bedouins, the hardships of travel, and the scarcity of time, have prevented most travellers from visiting hundreds of places they would have desired to see, and have made their accounts necessarily very imperfect. When these difficulties are taken into account, the wonder is that we know anything of Palestine at all; and the most magnificent expectations present themselves, when we anticipate the removal of all difficulties, and Palestine laid open, from Dan to Beersheba, to the unrestricted scrutiny of the sons of the West. We should make special a very grateful mention, however, of a most valuable source of information which the last few years have made available. We refer to the researches of British and American missionaries, whom long residence in the East has familiarised with the language, the manners, the scenery, and all the other peculiarities of the country. The contributions from this source are already quite invaluable, and they are but the earnest of what may be expected in future years.

At the head of this article we have placed the titles of three of the most important works on Palestine that have appeared

during the last few years. We might easily have increased the list, but many other works have been noticed in former articles in this journal, and those which we have specified are amply sufficient to introduce our subject. We will first notice briefly the works themselves, and then present our readers with some of the general views, and some of the detailed information which they contain, throwing light on the connection between the country and its history.

Professor Stanley's *Sinai and Palestine in Connection with their History*, is a work of singular ability and value, but marred, unfortunately, by some considerable blemishes. The author surveys the whole land with the eye of a general, and having first laid it off in districts, according to the great natural lines of division, he seizes firm hold of the outstanding physical peculiarities of each, and marshals the facts of Bible history around them in a way that awakens the admiration and astonishment of his readers. It is very remarkable that a writer who has no very unusual powers of description—who has little of that faculty of daguerreotyping nature which we admire so much in a Sir Walter Scott, yet enables intelligent readers, who have never been in Palestine, to see the country more vividly than any other traveller. Lamartine, with all his sentiment and poetry, does not, in this respect, come within a hundred miles of him. The explanation we conceive to be this. Mr Stanley, by seizing the grand physical peculiarities of Palestine, creates a great piece of framework, within whose compartments he teaches us how to set for ourselves, in their natural places, the numberless and matchless pictures of the Bible. The living scenes are already in our minds before we open Mr Stanley's volume; but usually they float about, in our conceptions, unmoored, unanchored,—as if they belonged to the universe in general, but to no spot in particular, or as if they had been transacted in “the empty, vast, and wandering air.” Mr Stanley, by the prominence which he gives to the broad natural features of Palestine, enables us to unite, as it were, the soul and body to each other,—to wed the living scenes that have been familiar to us from childhood to their appropriate localities, and lay them down, we may almost say in heaps, in the sort of places, if not in the very places, where they occurred. Generalisation is the great feature of his book; but, like most men who are fond of generalisation, he sometimes errs by carrying it too far. Evidently, he has such faith in general views and principles, as to make him somewhat careless about particulars. He is too ready to marshal facts around a captivating theory, or to assume things as facts because they suit the theory. For example, because the east side of Jordan was a great pastoral district, he makes out that the two and a-half tribes, Reuben, Gad,

and Manasseh, were simply Bedouins, living in tents, not cities, and pursuing the wild life of the present sons of the desert. Jephthah was a wild Bedouin sheikh. Elijah, too, who was of the inhabitants of Gilead, was a Bedouin, trained to run with extraordinary speed, and thus able to keep ahead of the chariot of King Ahab, in its course from Carmel to Jezreel. All this is little else than a fanciful exaggeration of the admitted fact, that the east side of Jordan was an isolated pastoral district; but the assertion that the people were Bedouins, and had no cities, is contrary to fact; and the running powers of Elijah, on the occasion referred to, are accounted for in the Bible narrative by the explanation that "the hand of the Lord was upon him." A somewhat amusing instance of his proneness to adapt facts to theories occurs in a note, where, in proof that from their snowy tops the highest mountains in all countries are almost uniformly named from the word for *snow*, he gives, among other instances, Ben Nevis in Scotland, apparently forgetting that that respectable Gaelic name is not synonymous with the Latin *nix*, *nivis*. A theory that Mount Gerizim was in very ancient times a sanctuary or sacred mount, leads him to maintain, and try to prove, that it was the Mount Moriah on which Abraham was commanded to offer Isaac. Another theory of the same kind makes him identify Kadesh-Barnea with Petra, the rocky capital of Edom. A more dangerous theory, founded upon the frequent occurrence (as he deems) of names of places derived from words that have the meaning of *ruined* or *deserted*, leads him to affirm that Palestine was from time immemorial a land of ruins. By this means he would knock on the head the argument from the literal fulfilment of those prophecies that foretell the existence of the ruins of the present day. Without here entering upon the questions in dispute between Mr Stanley and Dr Keith, we may say that the most painful feature of Mr Stanley's book is the disposition shewn, on a few occasions, to lessen the *supernatural element* in the Bible, not only in this matter of prophecy, but in reference to such facts as the passage of the Red Sea, and the miraculous subsistence of the Israelites in the desert. Yet, while pointing out these defects, we are bound to say, in justice to Mr Stanley, that the main drift of his book goes to increase our reverence for the Bible, and especially for Him who is the Alpha and Omega of all revelation. It would be impossible to doubt his own profound reverence, both for the sacred word and for the person of the Lord Jesus Christ; but it is matter for serious regret that a work, otherwise so valuable, should contain anything that must be regarded as wrong in itself, and injurious in its tendency, by many of the best friends of the truth.

The Land and the Book of Dr W. M. Thomson, who has

been for five-and-twenty years a missionary in Syria and Palestine, in connection with the American Presbyterian Church, is a work, the very opposite, in one respect, of that of Mr Stanley. We have said that the leading feature of Mr Stanley's is generalisation; that of Dr Thomson's is detail. Mr Stanley's is a framework for other materials; Dr Thomson's is materials without any framework. "The Land and the Book," as its title indicates, has for its object to connect the Land with the Book, to throw light from the one upon the other. Twenty-five years residence in the very scenes of Bible history, gives the author of this book a wonderful advantage in executing the object for which he has taken up his pen. His mode of operations is peculiar. He starts from Beirout in January with a companion, to whom he acts as cicerone, whose imaginary questions he answers, and to whom he lays off, in the form of easy conversation, the vast mass of information that fills upwards of a thousand closely printed pages. The free and easy style of Dr Thomson has, undoubtedly, many advantages; but occasionally it becomes decidedly too free and easy: allusions to sacred things are sometimes made in a spirit far from reverential, and the English reader is reminded of the American more frequently than is desirable. After traversing Phœnicia, Dr Thomson comes to Northern Palestine, which he intersects in various directions; he then passes southwards by the plain of the sea-shore, strikes up by the mountains of Judea to Hebron, thence to the Dead Sea, Jericho, and the Jordan; and he reaches Jerusalem, the terminus of the journey, about the end of April. The illustrations of Scripture with which the book abounds are suggested, almost at random, by the objects that present themselves in the journey. When the shadow of an olive is cast over the road, the writer tells all that he knows about olives, and illuminates a vast number of Scripture passages; when a sparrow chirps upon the house top, the whole natural history of Syrian sparrows is spread out, with the like most interesting effect; or when an inn is reached, and refreshments served, the social habits of the East are described, and new light thrown on all the allusions to them that lie scattered over the Bible. It is in the department of manners and customs, and the smaller details of natural history, that the chief value of Dr Thomson's work lies. Not but that in geography, too, he has made some very important and valuable contributions; in the geography of the Lake of Galilee, for example, we are disposed to place a very high value on the conclusions at which he has arrived. But his *forte* lies in accumulating information on the habits of the people, and on the appearances and changes of the vegetable and animal world, and in bringing his knowledge in this department to

bear on the illustration of Scripture. This he does to a degree that altogether eclipses the eminent services even of Dr Kitto, or any other writer in the same field. The chief defect of Dr Thomson's work is the want of method. There is no attempt even at system or classification. The only rule of this sort which he seems to have laid down for himself is, not to speak of harvest in winter, nor of the vintage in spring, nor of rains and storms in summer, but of all in the seasons when they actually occur. But even this arrangement is of less value than might have been supposed, because the reader of a book of travels can hardly be expected to remember, if indeed he even observe, the date prefixed to the several chapters. We observe that in the English edition of Dr Thomson's work, published by the Messrs Nelson of Edinburgh, considerable pains have been taken to remedy the defects of Dr Thomson's book, by prefixing to each chapter copious contents, supplying a marginal title for each paragraph, indicating beforehand the course of the journey, and supplying omitted information respecting several of the places. Those who may wish to use the work as a book of reference will find these additions of great service for this end. Most of the passages bordering on the irreverent, to which we have referred, have been omitted in this edition.

A work entirely different in plan and structure from both of those which we have noticed, is the "*Handbook for Travellers in Syria and Palestine*," of which it is no breach of etiquette to name as the author the Rev. J. R. Porter, missionary from the Irish Presbyterian Church to the Jews at Damascus. No one can even see or hear of an elaborate work of this sort, in two well-filled volumes, without exclaiming irresistibly, What a remarkable sign of the times! It is at once a proof of the extraordinary interest which the land of Palestine already creates, a powerful aid for gratifying and augmenting that interest, and a token and pledge of a vast increase of English and American travellers in years to come. "Whereas thou hast been forsaken and hated, so that no man passed through thee, I will make thee an eternal excellency, a joy of many generations." The plan of the work resembles that of the manifold handbooks of "*Murray*," whose red boards are almost as invariably the badge of the Englishman abroad, as the union-jack is the badge of her Majesty's vessels at sea. First, the peninsula of Sinai, then Edom, then Palestine itself, and adjacent parts of Syria, are laid out for the traveller in convenient "*routes*," the distances carefully noted, all needful information for the journey communicated, and the traveller's attention directed to all the more prominent objects of interest, whether in natural scenery or historical associations. Though marking an extraordinary progress, in respect of the facilities of travelling, from the days of Burck-

hardt, Irby and Mangles, and other pioneers of Eastern travel, the day may come, perhaps may not be far off, when this first handbook for Palestine will be regarded very much as Dr Johnson's Tour through the Hebrides is regarded now—a photograph of times half barbarous, when the Jordan Valley Railway, and the Plain of Sharon line, and the Grand Mediterranean and Lake of Galilee Junction, were not even heard of in the share market, when no Trois Rois Hotel greeted the traveller at Bethlehem, and when ladies had to be left outside, and pass the night under canvass, beneath the inhospitable walls of Santa Saba. From the plan of Mr Porter's work, it is necessarily a book of topographical detail. It may be said to abridge the famous "Biblical Researches" of Robinson, and to supplement the broad general views of Stanley. The obligations of the writer to Robinson and others are apparent in every page, and are, for the most part, frankly acknowledged. The occurrence of not a few typographical errors in Greek and Latin quotations, would seem to indicate that Mr Porter is less at home in the dead languages of the West than he is in the spoken tongues of the East. It would be a mistake to regard this work as entirely one of compilation, although, from the admirable method, concentration, and clearness, which characterize it, its merit would be of no mean order were it nothing more. The author has used his own eyes and his own judgment on what he describes. His previous work on Damascus and the Haurân shewed his fitness for the duties of an independent explorer, and was a pledge that a book so important as the present would be executed with all the care, patience, and loving industry, that were needed to make it what it is. The handbook contains some interesting contributions to the science of scriptural geography, and throws light upon several passages of Scripture that have not been noticed by other writers.

We will now endeavour to present to our readers some of those great natural features of Palestine which have exercised an important influence on the history of the country, pointing out generally here the nature of the connection between the two, and reserving a few points for special and detailed illustration.

The first great natural feature of Palestine that we notice is, its remarkable isolation from the rest of the world. This isolation was precisely of the kind fitted to keep the Israelites apart from the busy world during the early part of their history, when they were to be trained for their duties as God's peculiar people; but not during the latter part, when they were to have entered, had they been faithful, on their missionary career. On the south and east, Palestine was girdled by deserts; on the north,

the bold ranges of Lebanon and Antilebanon excluded the very idea of easy communication ; and along the west lay the Mediterranean Sea. To the enterprising children of Japhet a sea-board of about a hundred miles, instead of proving a wall of separation, would have formed a highway of communication with the most distant parts of the world. But with the single and remarkable exception of the Phœnicians, dislike of the sea was a characteristic of Oriental nations, and the Jews were no exception to the rule. They were no lovers of the sea. Not one of the many cities that at different times held the rank of capitals was situated on the sea, until at last, a few years before Christ, Herod, who was as much a Roman as a Jew, built Cæsarea on the sea, afterwards the Roman capital of the country. Throughout the whole Scriptures, the sea is the element of danger and strife ; its proud waves are the emblems of the rebellious " lifting up their voice ; " its endless surging denotes the eternal unrest of the wicked ; and, in the Apocalypse, it is a feature of the new earth, that in it there is " no more sea." The only nations with whom the Israelites, thus isolated, could for a long time come into contact, were the remnants of the dispossessed tribes, and the Arab hordes that established themselves on the skirts of the deserts, delighting, on the one side, in the freedom of the wilderness, but requiring on the other, for their subsistence, the products of arable land. The history of the Israelites in Palestine, for the first four or five hundred years, is quite in accordance with this state of things. During the troubled period of the Judges, their enemies were almost exclusively the remnants of the old inhabitants, the Canaanites and Philistines, or tribes of the desert—Moabites, Midianites, Edomites, and Amalekites. By-and-bye, however, in the far distance, more powerful empires arose, capable of sending armies to much greater distances, and forming schemes of far more extended conquest. In particular, the two great rival empires of the south and north, Egypt and Mesopotamia (the latter including Assyria and Babylon), began to look each other in the face ; and in their mutual efforts to tear each other in pieces, found frequent occasion to pass through Palestine, which lay between. This gave rise to quite a new phase of Hebrew history. Neither the southern nor the eastern desert, neither the chain of Lebanon nor the barrier of the Mediterranean, could repress the energy of such mighty warriors, or secure to Palestine the comparative tranquillity of former days. The small desert tribes now disappear from the history ; the great empires of the north and south become in turn the objects of fear and hope, or the sources of sorrow and joy, to the Israelites ; and the entire external history of the country is moulded by the geographical fact, that

it lay in the direct route from Egypt to Assyria, and from the Euphrates to the Nile.

The *internal* configuration of Palestine is very striking, and had a very great influence on the history of the people. In the north, two great mountain chains, Lebanon and Antilebanon, run parallel to each other, in a direction pretty nearly north and south, enclosing the celebrated province of Cœle-Syria, or Hollow Syria, now called El Bükkâ. Both ranges lose the character of mountains about the northern boundary of what was the land of Palestine in actual possession, but send right along the country elevated ridges or plateaus, forming on the one side the hills of Galilee, Samaria, and Judea, and on the other those of Gilead and Moab. Between these two ridges, or hilly ranges, lies the valley of the Jordan. The river rises in the Cœle-Syrian plain, and at successive stages of its course, creates the three lakes of Palestine—Merom or Huleh, the lake of Galilee or Gennesareth, and the Dead Sea. Between the two hilly ranges, there would naturally be a hollow; but in addition to this, the valley of the Jordan and its lakes has undergone an extraordinary depression, to which the globe itself furnishes no parallel. In its more northerly parts, the river is pretty nearly on a level with the Mediterranean; but as it advances, it sinks further and further below that level, the surface of the lake of Galilee being about 650 feet,* and that of the Dead Sea 1300 feet, below the surface of the Mediterranean. This fact, however it may be accounted for, exercised a very great influence on the history of the country. In ordinary circumstances, a river seldom so wide as 50 yards, and provided with easy fords, would have formed no very serious obstacle to the intercourse of friendly inhabitants on both sides. But as the case stood, it was widely different. The valley of the Jordan proved an almost complete barrier of separation between east and west, more especially at its southern portion, where it is widest and deepest. In going from Jerusalem to the Jordan, a distance of but 20 miles, a descent in all of 3500 feet† had to be performed, the ascent on the opposite side being similar, or equal to the height of Ben Lomond or Snowdon! Besides this, the deep hollow, acting like a great reflector, absorbed an immense amount of heat, forming a climate like that of the tropics, excluding the breezes that played round the mountains, so as at once to exhaust the traveller and burn up the vegetation of the plain. Then further, the peculiarity

* The several estimates of the depression of the Dead Sea pretty nearly coincide, but those of the Sea of Galilee differ. The United States expedition under Lieut. Lynch, estimated it at 653·3 feet. Lieut. Symonds, of the British Navy, made it less.

† The American expedition made the descent even greater. The elevation of Jerusalem above the Dead Sea is given at 3927·24 feet, and above the Mediterranean, 2610·5.

of the Jordan channel,—a sort of groove in the rock, sunk in another groove—prevented the river from ever overflowing, like the Nile, *into the adjacent plain*; the immediate margin was a jungle of tropical vegetation, but the plain itself was a dried-up wilderness; consequently scarcely a town or village was situated on either bank of the Jordan, except at such spots as Jericho, which happened to be watered independently by local fountains. Owing to these circumstances, the separation caused by the Jordan was very complete. And the whole history corresponds with this. The two and a-half tribes got only a sort of reluctant permission to settle east of the Jordan, their heavenly Guide knowing well that there they would be greatly isolated from their brethren, that they would be too much in contact with the tribes of the desert, and sadly liable, as the result proved, to be brought into subjection, now to their idols, and now to their arms. These two and a-half tribes had but taken possession of their territory, when they were seized with a misgiving as to the continuance of a feeling of oneness between them and their brethren on the west; the erection of the altar Ed was expressly stated to be in answer to the probable objection of their children, that they had no part in the Lord, for “the Lord had made Jordan a boundary” between them and the tribes beyond, (Josh. xxii. 25). It was an amazing proof of the energy of Saul, soon after his coronation, that, within a week, he transported an army of relief across the Jordan to Jabesh in Gilead. In times of contest and danger, the east of Jordan was usually resorted to for shelter and safety; Ishbosheth, Saul’s son, fixed his head-quarters at Mahanaim in Gilead, deeming himself most secure there from the hostile tribes of Judah; and there, too, David fled during Absalom’s insurrection, gaining a most important point, as far as personal safety was concerned, when once the Jordan and its valley separated him from the usurper. In the earlier part of his life, during his persecution by Saul, David would doubtless have hid himself among the hills of Gilead or Bashan, had he not been guided, with a view to his future career, to take advantage of the friendly feeling towards him of his own tribe—that of Judah. Our Lord himself, when desirous of rest and quiet, used to cross the Jordan, and in the district of Perea, as it was called in Roman times, where Scribes and Pharisees did not care to follow him, he found the seclusion and calm for which he longed. Often the tribes east of the Jordan were harassed by border foes, when on the west tranquillity prevailed. When at last days of captivity began, the first to taste the bitter bondage were those beyond the Jordan; and many of the children of Gilead were the badge of slavery, while their more favoured brethren on the west were yet sitting every man under his vine and under his fig-tree.

On the west side of the Jordan, the physical peculiarities of the land had a marked influence on the history. The most prominent fact here was the existence of that elevated central ridge which we have already noticed. This high table-land stretched from north to south, with a few interruptions, like a great backbone, sending down lateral ridges like ribs, that ran on one side to the Mediterranean, and on the other to the Jordan. Many of the chief towns were situated on the highest part of the ridge, near the water-shed, including Hebron, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Bethel, Shechem and Samaria. Jerusalem was situated at a height of 2200 [2600 ?] feet above the level of the Mediterranean, and 3500 [3900 ?] feet above that of the Dead Sea. It was probably this elevation that led Moses, so early as in his song at the Red Sea, to speak of the promised land as "the mountain of thine inheritance." Hence, too, the constant occurrence in Bible history of the expressions "to go up," or "to go down," according as the journey was towards the summit of the plateau, or in the opposite direction. Thus in the first chapter of Judges, when the exploits of Judah immediately after his settlement in his lot are recounted, he first "goes up" against the Canaanites to battle; next, from Jerusalem, or near it, he "goes down" to fight against the Canaanites that dwelt "in the mountain, and in the south, and in the valley;" and then he goes, neither up nor down, against Hebron and Debir, these having been on nearly the same level with Jerusalem. In the same chapter, the Kenites "go up" from Jericho into the wilderness of Judah; and the children of Joseph "go up" against Bethel. The remnant of the defeated and dispersed Canaanites had established themselves in two different kinds of strongholds—the heights of the mountains and the level plains. The men of Judah first tried to drive them from the former, they "went up" against them and succeeded; then to dislodge them from the lower regions, they "went down" from the heights now secured, but were not equally successful—"they could not drive out the inhabitants of the valley, because they had chariots of iron." These chariots of iron, against which the Israelites had no means of prevailing, reversed the usual geographical relations of conquerors and conquered. The conquerors occupied the high ground, the conquered dwelt in the plains, which they rendered inaccessible by their chariots. Once and again we find the enemies of the Israelites in possession of some of the largest plains; the Canaanites, for example, in the time of Deborah and Barah, held possession of the plain of Esdraelon. But the people that remained in most stubborn possession of their plains were the Philistines. The whole territory of the Philistines was a plain. Probably it was owing to this that, for so long a period, the Israelites were quite unable to make head against the Phi-

listines, and seemed, indeed, at one time as if they were to be completely vanquished by that vigorous and warlike people. Accustomed to plains, the Philistines were commonly victorious when they fought on level ground; but when they got among the hills, as in the days of Jonathan at Michmash and Geba, they sustained overwhelming defeats. It is evident that when the nations of Canaan were able to construct hundreds of chariots of iron, they must have had an almost unlimited supply of that useful metal. The question where they got their supply is attended with some difficulty, for iron is not very common in Palestine; yet there are monuments at the present day that shew that it must have been somehow procured in abundance. Mr Cyril Graham, who has lately made some interesting explorations in the ancient kingdom of Bashan, in referring to the iron-bedstead of king Og, remarks, that the vast slabs of hard basalt found in what he considers the ancient cities of Og, chiselled and polished so perfectly as they often are, shew that the inhabitants must have had an abundance of iron implements. Moses had spoken of Canaan as "a land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills thou mayest dig brass," or copper; and though there is no evidence that the Jews ever wrought mines either of iron or copper, yet it has been ascertained that there is iron among the mountains of Lebanon, and a copper mine is said to have existed in ancient times near Aleppo.*

When we examine more in detail the plateau of Western Palestine, we discover certain great natural divisions, chiefly running across the country, and forming the three districts, Judea, Samaria, Galilee, that afterwards became so famous in the history. Leaving out of view, in the meantime, the level plain that extended along the margin of the Mediterranean (embracing the land of the Philistines and the plain of Sharon), we find the remainder of Palestine proper divisible, as has been said, into three great sections, the southern, the central, and the northern. The southern district comprehended in chief the tribe of Judah, along with the smaller sections of Simeon and Dan on the west and south, and Benjamin on the north. It is, for the most part, a rocky, mountainous tract, where the bare limestone hills throw up everywhere those gray crags and blocks that give to the country, neglected as it is now, its peculiar aspect of desolation. It is, and has always been, the head-quarters of the vine in Palestine; and if we mark the connexion in which allusions to the vine occur in Scripture, we shall find that for the most part they are connected with this district. It was in connexion with it that Jacob foretold of Judah,—“binding his foal unto the vine, and his ass’s colt unto the choice vine; he washed his garments in wine, and his clothes in the blood

* Kitto's Pictorial Commentary.

of grapes." It was from this district that the spies cut down the branch of grapes which they took to the camp at Kadesh-barnea as a sample of the produce of the land. It was to the "inhabitant of Jerusalem and man of Judah," that Isaiah's parable of the vineyard in the very fruitful hill was spoken. Of the parables and discourses of our Lord, it was within the same district that most of those were spoken in which vines and vineyards are introduced. "The parable of the labourers in the vineyard; that of the father and his two sons whom he sent to work in his vineyard; that of the husbandman and wicked workmen to whom he let his vineyard; and that of the true vine, were all spoken either at Jerusalem or in its neighbourhood." "The vineyard of Engedi," celebrated in the Song of Solomon, lay within this district; a fertile oasis on the shore of the Dead Sea, watered by a beautiful spring, enjoying a tropical climate, and still bearing the name of Ainjidy, identifies the spot where David found refreshment amid his weary wanderings, and Solomon "the cluster of camphire" that represented the fragrance of his beloved.

Some readers will be startled when we add, that as the southern district was the head-quarter of the vine, so also it was the head-quarter of the lion and other savage beasts. We associate so much of quiet life and culture with the vine, that we are not prepared to learn that the king of wild beasts had his lair in the same district where "the fig tree put forth her green figs, and the vines with the tender grape gave a good smell." Yet so it was, and the history has many indirect allusions to the fact. The limestone hills, whose sides and soil afforded admirable terraces and nourishment for the vine, often lodged in their deep dark caverns the lion and the bear. The dry desert tract called "the wilderness of Judah," afforded these wild creatures room and solitude adapted to their habits of life. The same short prophecy in which Jacob alludes to the vine in connection with the tribe of Judah, alludes also to the lion—"Judah is a lion's whelp: from the prey, my son, thou art gone up: he stooped down, he couched as a lion, and as an old lion; who shall rouse him up?" Moses, also, in addressing Dan, whose territory was adjacent to Judah's, used the same figure—"Dan is a lion's whelp." It was within this district that David slew the lion and the bear; here, also, Samson slew the lion that roared against him as he "went down to Timnath;" and on the northern frontier of this district, near Bethel, a lion slew the disobedient prophet. There were indeed other habitats of the lion in Palestine. The tropical jungle on the banks of Jordan afforded him a nest, from which, however, he was dislodged when the river was flooded; hence the figure of Jeremiah—"he shall come up like a lion from the swelling of Jordan, against the

habitation of the strong." There were lions' dens, too, and mountains named from the leopard, among the cliffs of Lebanon; "from the top of Amana, from the top of Shenir and Hermon," one looked round upon their haunts; they seem to have been met with also in the forests of Bashan; but in the central district they had no natural habitat. Hence, when the King of Assyria's eastern colonists took possession of Samaria and her cities, we read that "the Lord *sent* lions among them, which slew some of them," (2 Kings xvii. 25). The expression implies that there was something supernatural, or at least non-natural, in the fact of lions being found in that district. Can we suppose that such minute accuracy of expression would have occurred in the history if the events had not really happened, if the narrative were not a plain unvarnished record of real events?

We have said that the tribe of Judah predominated in this southern district. But Judah did not occupy the northern frontier of this district, and it was a very great blessing that he did not. Had Judah been in immediate contact with Ephraim, scenes of contest and bloodshed, far more numerous than actually occurred, would have been sure to take place between them. From the earliest period of the history, a jealousy prevailed between Judah and Ephraim. Both tribes had received a pre-eminence over the rest. Judah had received the spiritual birthright; Joseph, in his sons Ephraim and Manasseh, the temporal. The "double portion of the Spirit" had fallen to the one; the double portion of the inheritance of the land to the other. The spirit between them was never cordial; often it was intensely hostile. Probably it was with the design of restraining their hostile spirit that God had caused, at the beginning, a remarkable natural barrier to separate the territory of Judah from that of Ephraim, and, when the land was divided, placed a neutral tribe, the tribe of Benjamin, as occupant of that district. "The heights and passes of Benjamin," as Mr Stanley has called them, formed a very remarkable barrier between the northern and the central district, or between the territories of Judah and Ephraim. Until a scientific trigonometrical survey of this district shall have been made, we shall not be in a position to appreciate perfectly all the minute references to localities in the many important transactions that occurred in this district. The general character of the situation, however, may be easily gathered from an examination of Dobbs' relieve or embossed map of Palestine. From the summit of the central ridge, at Ramah, it will be observed that deep gullies or ravines go off on both sides. On the east side they run down towards the Jordan valley by Michmah and Jeba, and by Ai and Bethel; and on the west, to the valley of Ajalon, by the passes of Upper and Nether Bethhoron. The

existence of these ravines throws light on two things. In the first place it enables us to understand, especially in connexion with the known jealousy of Judah and Ephraim, how it happened that the two districts drew off so completely from each other; how they became the seats of kingdoms that were almost as hostile in spirit, and as unlike in religion, as if they had been of entirely separate origin. Further, we are enabled to understand the importance, in a military point of view, of the possession of these passes, and the reason why so many sanguinary battles were fought upon them. It was on this ground that Joshua fought two of his battles—that of Ai, and that of Gibeon with the confederate kings of the south; it was here, at Michmash, that Jonathan routed the Philistines; it was here, “by the pool of Gibeon,” that the troops of David and those of Abner met, while David and Ishbosheth were contesting the sovereignty; and it was at Ramah, on the neck between the eastern and western passes, that Baasha, king of Israel, built a fortress, “that he might not suffer any to go out or to come in to Asa, king of Judah.” In later times, Judas Maccabeus routed the Syrian troops in the same neighbourhood, and drove them into the western plain, down the passes of Bethhoron; when the Romans entered Palestine, under Cestius, they too were attacked at their camp at Gibeon by the insurgent Jews, and driven down and scattered in the plain below; and “ages afterwards, the Crusading armies, in the vain hope of reaching Jerusalem, advanced up the same valley from their quarters at Ascalon and Jaffa; and the last eastern point at which Richard encamped was at Beit-Nuba, in the wide vale of Ajalon.” In all authentic history, when the possession of some district or country has been frequently contested, it is remarkable how often the same spots have witnessed a repetition of the struggles. Crossed swords stud the map of Lombardy, bearing the dates of all the great struggles for the possession of Central Italy, down to the days of Magenta and Solferino. The same may be said of the Carse of Stirling, the great field on which the mastery of Scotland has been disputed. It holds true also of Palestine; the ravines of Benjamin, and the plain of Esdraelon, have been from time immemorial the great theatres of contest. The fact is an important corroboration of the minute historical accuracy of a large part of the history of the Bible.

To the north of Benjamin lay, as has been said, the powerful and princely tribe of Ephraim, and still further north, his brother Manasseh, to all practical purposes the same as himself. The district occupied by these two tribes became the seat of royalty when the kingdom of the ten tribes was set up, and in the New Testament times had the name of Samaria. It is not very wonderful that the tribe of Ephraim made pretensions to

sovereign dignity. Their lot was in the very centre of the land. Shechem, consecrated centuries before by the residence of the patriarchs, lay in it ; so also did Shiloh, the appointed resting-place of the ark, and the scene of the gatherings of the tribes at the three annual festivals. Many of the leading men of the nation were connected either by birth or residence with this tribe. Joshua himself was a man of Ephraim ; Gideon was of the adjacent tribe of Manasseh ; Deborah, the prophetess, Tola, of Issachar, and Samuel, the greatest of the judges, were either born in "the Mount of Ephraim," or had their residence there. It is remarkable, however, that scarcely any great battle was fought within the district of Ephraim and Manasseh.* Apart from the sea coast, there seems to have been no part of the district adapted for that purpose. It would require a military eye to survey the country and explain the reason of this—to shew how the physical structure of this district has caused it to be avoided by the generals of contending armies. The fact, however, is undoubted. The victory gained by Joshua at Ai seems to have at once opened the way for him to Shechem, without further contest, for we find him and the people there, immediately after, reading the blessings and curses of the law between Mounts Ebal and Gerizim. Yet there is not a syllable in any of the Old Testament books to indicate that the writers so much as knew that one district was more favourable for battles than another. They seem quite unconscious of any necessary connection between battles and battle-fields. Had they been writing fiction, would they not have spread the battles more equally over all parts of the land ? Would not a place so memorable as Shechem have been sure to have its share ? Would they have grouped them all round one or two spots ? Is not the fact that in the history the great contests are thus concentrated, a strong presumption that the history is literally true ?

But if the district of Ephraim and Manasseh afforded no spot suitable for great military operations, the case was widely different with the great plain immediately to the north—the plain of Esdraelon. This plain, running slantways across the country, from the Bay of Acre to Bethshan in the Jordan valley, could not have been better adapted for warfare if it had been formed for the very purpose. Whether the enemy made his advance from the south by the sea-coast plain, as did the Philistines in the days of Saul, and the Egyptians in those of Josiah ; or whether he descended from the Lebanon ranges, as did the Canaanites in the days of Barak ; or whether he entered from the east, as did the Midianites and Amalekites in the times of Gideon ;—

* That is, within the district actually possessed by them, for part of the plain of Esdraelon was given to Manasseh, but does not seem to have been possessed by him. Judges i. 27.

the plain of Esdraelon was the very place for him to draw up his forces, or find awaiting him the hosts of the enemy. Hence, as Dr Clarke remarks—"Esdraelon has been the chosen place of encampment in every great contest carried on in the country, until the disastrous march of Napoleon Buonaparte from Egypt to Syria. Jews, Gentiles, Saracens, Crusaders, Egyptians, Persians, Druses, Turks, Arabs, and French—warriors out of every nation which is under heaven, have pitched their tents upon the plain of Esdraelon, and have beheld their banners with the dews of Tabor and Hermon." This is true; yet there is one remarkable exception which Dr Clarke does not seem to have noticed. When Joshua conquered Palestine, he fought no battle in the plain of Esdraelon. Of his three great campaigns, the first, including the capture of Jericho and the battle of Ai, gave him possession of the central district; the second, including the battle of Gibeon, gave him Judah and the south; while of the third, which gave him the north, the decisive battle was fought so far away as the Lake of Merom or Huleh. Yet in the very fact that Joshua fought no battle in Esdraelon, we seem to have a more convincing proof of the minute truthfulness of the history than we should have had, if it had been represented that he did fight there. After the terrible defeat and slaughter of the allied kings of the south at Gibeon, and in the valley of Ajalon, and in their several cities, ordinary chieftains in other parts of the country would naturally be appalled, and would shrink from facing so terrible a foe. But one bold-hearted man was yet to be found, with courage enough to call his neighbours to arms, and marshal a great confederacy, whose troops were drawn from the plain of Esdraelon and all places to the north. This intrepid chief was Jabin, King of Hazor, near the waters of Merom. It was natural for Jabin to desire to protect his own territory, and he might easily persuade his southern coadjutors that if Joshua could be defeated in the Thermopylæ of the north, their dominions in Esdraelon might afterwards be recovered. The battle-field was accordingly chosen by him near the sources of the Jordan. There he, too, was surprised and utterly defeated by Joshua; and the policy which had avoided the plain of Esdraelon, and concentrated resistance on the banks of Merom, had just the effect of saving a battle to the leader of Israel, and enabling him to accomplish by one blow what he could never have expected to achieve by less than two.

It was not to be expected that the parts of Palestine in the extreme north should exercise much influence on the general history of the country. But the district of Galilee, though little noticed in the Old Testament, was pre-eminently memorable in the New. For nearly thirty years, the Word made flesh dwelt amid the hills that encircle Nazareth, and during his public

ministry, the shores of the lake of Galilee were his usual home. There is one coincidence between the history and the geography of Galilee connected with the life of Jesus, that deserves to be noticed. From the position of Galilee, as the frontier district of Palestine, its population became more mixed than that of the more southern districts,—it embraced a much larger proportion of other nations. Galilee was adjacent to Tyre and Sidon on the north-west, to the valley of Cœle-Syria on the north, and to Damascus on the east. From these, and other sources, a foreign element mingled largely in its population. Phœnicians, Syrians, and Greeks, as well as descendants of the colonists brought by the king of Assyria from his dominions in the east, were mixed with the inhabitants of Israelitish extraction. "Galilee of the Gentiles" became its familiar designation. The consequences of this mixture of foreign ingredients were, first, that the Galileans were greatly despised by the Jews of purer blood—such as could use Paul's language when he described himself as "an Hebrew of the Hebrews;" but second, that they were less bigoted,—less disposed to reject untried any opinions that did not coincide with the recognised creed of the orthodox,—less disposed to worship "the tradition of the elders." In most parts of Galilee, our blessed Lord could walk about in comparative safety, and draw large audiences of at least attentive hearers. In Jewry or Judea, on the contrary, "the Jews sought to kill him," and his presence there was always viewed by his disciples with the greatest solicitude. His apostles were all from Galilee. Five hundred brethren there witnessed him in his risen body at one time, whereas the whole church at Jerusalem, even though recruited by the apostles and others, was but a hundred and twenty souls. Again and again our Lord perambulated Galilee, but not once, as far as we know, Judea. It is remarkable that we never read of him having visited Bethlehem, the place of his birth, or Hebron, the first metropolis of David, and the burial place of the patriarchs, or Beersheba, where Abraham dwelt, and Isaac used to meditate at even-tide. The reason must have been, that in that district, ecclesiastical influence was far too strong for him to visit it with safety. Jerusalem, and the surrounding country, was thoroughly priest-ridden. Galilee was comparatively free. The fierce fanaticism that prevailed in and around Jerusalem, can be understood only when we bear in mind the former religious history of the district. Fanaticism is commonly the frightfully mis-shapen and degenerate successor—we dare not say offspring—of earnest living religion. It is the body without the soul, or rather the body possessed by a fierce spirit from hell, in place of the blessed Spirit of God. Now, for many centuries, the district of country near Jerusalem had been remarkable for pure religious fervour. In the times of Samuel, with his fervent

"schools of the prophets," this character seems to have been first impressed on it. In the revivals under David, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, and Josiah, the spirit of godliness awoke to new life in the district, while the rest of the land continued, for the most part, to be sunk either in idolatry or indifference. In the days of our Lord, we still find Jerusalem and its environs characterised by great religious zeal, but of a fearfully degenerate kind. According to the proverb, it is the sweetest wine that turns to sourest vinegar. Church history can produce many instances of the operation of this law. Districts of country once characterised by great evangelical fervour, when forsaken by the spirit that gave beauty and power to their religious life, have presented in its room a proud Pharisaism, fierce, intolerant, hateful, hating. Thus it was in our Lord's day in Judea; and thus it happened, that while his life was never safe for a moment in the metropolis of Judaism, his person was comparatively secure and his movements unimpeded among the wilder and less religious inhabitants of Galilee.

Having now stated, generally, the nature of the connection between the geography and the history of Palestine, we proceed to add a few detailed illustrations, which we shall give, for the most part, in the words of the writers whose books we have before us.

First, in illustration of the history connected with the passes of Benjamin, we take the following from Mr Porter's Handbook, under the head of Jeb'a or Geba, and the Pass of Michmash.

"Jeb'a, the ancient Geba of Benjamin, is a small village, amid whose half-ruined houses we observe some hewn stones which point to other and more prosperous days. . . . The situation is very commanding. . . . From this spot, too, we can study to advantage one or two of the most interesting passages in the Bible. Before us, on the N., is the scene of Jonathan's adventure against the Philistine host. 'Saul, and Jonathan his son, and the people that were present with them, abode in Geba of Benjamin,' (incorrectly rendered *Gibeah* in the English version); 'but the Philistines encamped in Michmash—that village amid the rocks on the other side of the ravine, little more than a mile distant. The 'spoilers' went out from the Philistines' camp in three companies. One band 'turned into the way that leadeth to Ophrah'—situated on yon lofty tell on the northern horizon, now called Taiyibeh. Another band 'turned the way to Bethhoron,' passing up that rocky ascent toward the West. The third struck eastward down the path to the "valley of Zeboim," or plain of Jordan. All were in full view of the Israelites; and now, as one reads the graphic story on the spot, he almost imagines that he sees the predatory bands starting from Mukhmâs, and radiating along the heights to their several destinations. (1 Sam. xiii. 25-18.)

"But the enemy are soon after seen to remove their camp from the

village to the '*Pass of Michmash*' (id. xiii. 23), that is, half a mile or so S.E. to the brow of the cliff overhanging the ravine which separates Michmash from Geba. Saul's head-quarters are also removed from Geba to the pomegranate-tree at Migron, 'in the uttermost part of Gibeah' (id. xiv. 2); thus at once retreating from the Philistines, who seemed determined to force the 'pass,' and getting nearer the high-priest who was in Gibeah, (id. xiv. 3). The position of *Migron*, 'the Precipice,' is not known, but it was probably somewhere on the bank of Wady Fârah. The two armies were only separated, as it seems, by the ravine then called the '*Passage of Michmash*,' and now Wady Suweinît. Jonathan and his armour-bearer resolve to make a secret expedition against the enemy; they descend into the valley; they clamber up the northern bank 'on their hands and on their feet;' they suddenly appear to the Philistines over the brow of the cliff, as if they came forth out of the holes where they had hid themselves; they boldly advance and attack the camp, and, aided by a sudden panic, and by the simultaneous terror of the shock of an earthquake, they succeed in dispersing the whole host. Saul's watchmen at once observe the confusion. While the king consults the high-priest, the tumult increases. The Israelites take courage and rush upon the spoilers of their land. The Philistines are completely routed, and driven westward through the mountains to Ajalon. (1 Sam. xiv.) From that day till the fatal battle of Gilboa, in which Saul and Jonathan fell, Israel was freed from the inroads of the Philistines.

"Another passage of God's Word ought to be read on this spot. In the description of Sennacherib's advance upon Jerusalem, contained in the 10th chap. of Isaiah, every step of his approach is so graphically portrayed, that we can from this point follow him with our eyes. It is probably not given by the prophet as a narrative of a real event, but rather as an allegorical warning, yet it is not on this account the less graphic. The army is supposed to leave the great northern road near Bethel, and to turn off eastward to Ai. Advancing to Michmash, the baggage is left there; and the troops thus disencumbered cross the ravine and pass the night at Geba. Ramah, situated only half an hour westward, though hid by an intervening ridge, 'is afraid.' Gibeah of Saul, placed on the top of 'yon conspicuous hill, 'is fled,' for the dreaded foe is in sight. In the morning the army continues its march southward. The sites of Gallim and Laish are now unknown; but Anathoth is in the direct line of march—'O poor Anathoth!' The evening finds them at Nob, within sight of the Holy City; and from thence the foe 'shakes his hand against the daughter of Zion.'

"It is thus that modern research proves the minute accuracy of Old Testament topography; and it is thus, also, that while we wander through Bible lands, Bible history is enacted over again before the mind's eye."

The western pass of Benjamin—that which led down by the Upper and Nether Bethhoron into the valley of Ajalon and the

plain of Sharon—was also memorable in the history of the Israelites. Mr Stanley thus describes the pass:—

“Straight from the plain of Sharon a wide valley of corn-fields runs up into the hills, which here assume something of a bolder and higher form than usual. This is the valley of ‘Ajalon,’ or ‘of Stags,’ of which the name is still preserved in a little village on its northern side, and of which the signification is said to be still justified by the gazelles which the peasants hunt on its mountain slopes. The valley is slightly broken by a low ridge, on which stands the village of Beit-Nuba. Passing by two more hamlets, Beit-Sireh and Beit-Likhi, another ridge is crossed, and another village; and from thence begins a gradual ascent, through a narrower valley, almost approximating to the character of a ravine, at the foot of which, though on an eminence, marked by a few palms, stands the village of Beit-ur El-Tathi, whilst at the summit and eastern extremity of the pass stands the village of Beit-ur El Foka. This is the pass of the Nether and Upper Beth-horon, ‘the House of Caves,’ of which there are still traces, though, perhaps, not enough to account for so emphatic a name. From the Upper Beth-horon another descent and ascent leads to a ridge which commands the heights above El-Jib, the modern village which thus retains the name of Gibeon; and then once more a slight descent reaches that village, and from the village is mounted the high point, called Nebi-Samuel, from which is obtained the first view of Jerusalem and its wide table-land.”

We must abridge, from the copious pages of Stanley and Porter (who borrows here somewhat freely from Stanley), the account of the famous battle fought by Joshua at Gibeon, and the pursuit of the confederate kings of the Amorites down the pass of Bethhoron, and along the valley below.

The kings of Jerusalem, Hebron, Jarmuth, Lachish, and Eglon, had mustered their forces and encamped against Gibeon, in order to chastise the Gibeonites for having made a league with Joshua. Joshua was with his army at Gilgal, nearly twenty miles distant, in the deep Jordan valley, when he received a most urgent summons to come to the help of the Gibeonites. With amazing promptness, he marched his army by night up the eastern pass, guided by the pale light of an old moon; and ere the sun rose over the mountains of Moab, the Israelites defiled into the open ground round the hill of Gibeon. Their sudden appearance, immediately followed by their fierce attack, overwhelmed the Amorites. They were driven in confusion across the plain. This was the first stage of the flight—up the gentle slope that leads out of the plain of Gibeon to the rocky heights east of Bethhoron the Upper. Here the fugitives had outstripped their pursuers; but when they were “in the *going down* of Bethhoron,” when they were rushing down the

declivity between the upper and the lower town, one of the fearful tempests that from time to time sweep over the hills of Palestine burst upon the disordered army, "and they were more which died with hailstones than they whom the children of Israel slew with the sword." Joshua would, of course, halt his troops till the storm below should have spent itself. It was yet early in the day; the sun was in the midst of heaven; but the Hebrew chief began to fear that the enemy might be able to retreat so far as to get under the protection of night, before he and his troops could overtake them. Standing on the summit of the pass, looking far down the deep descent of all the westward valleys, with the broad green vale of Ajalon unfolding in the distance into the open plain, with the yet wider expanse of the Mediterranean Sea beyond, spake Joshua to the Lord—"Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and thou, Moon, in the valley of Ajalon. And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies." The five kings ran along the valley, trying to reach their cities. The nearest was Jarmuth, about twenty-five miles from Bethhoron, situated in the Wady es Sumt, or valley of Elah, where David afterwards fought with Goliath. Unable to reach the fortified city, the five kings took refuge in a cave at Makkedah, believed to be about two miles from Jarmuth. Joshua shut up the door of the cave with great stones, pursued the fugitives to the very gates of their fortified cities, then returned to Makeddah, and having hanged the five kings, committed himself and his weary troops to the repose of which they stood in such need, after the unparalleled exertions and achievements of that most memorable day.

Let us pass now to the other great battle-field of Palestine—the plain of Esdraelon. Let us examine the account in Judges of the great battle between the northern tribes of the Israelites roused by Deborah, and led by Barak, and the hosts of the Canaanites, the subjects of Jabin, king of Hazor, a successor of Joshua's opponent, commanded in the battle by his lieutenant Sisera. Stanley's account of this contest is very good, but far surpassed by that of Dr Thomson, in "The Land and the Book." Ample though our extract is from the latter, it will well repay perusal:—

"On the border of the plain to the south-west you can distinguish the bold artificial Tell el Mutsellim, near Lejjûn, the Megiddo of the Bible. South-east of it is a village called Te'ennûkh, the Taannach of Judges. Below these two, on the plain, the host of Sisera was encamped. Barak, accompanied by the heroic Deborah, was where we now are (on Mount Tabor), with their ten thousand courageous Naphtalites from Kadesh. On the morning of that eventful day, probably long before it was light, Deborah set the

little army in motion with the energetic command and animating promise, Up, for this is the day in which the Lord has delivered Sisera into thine hand. Is not the Lord gone out before thee? (Judges iv. 14.) Rapidly they descend the mountain, cross over by Nain into the valley of Jezreel, then incline to the left to avoid the low and marshy ground, and by the first faint light of the morning they are upon the sleeping host of the Canaanites. This assault, wholly unexpected, threw them into instant and irrecoverable confusion. But half awake, the whole army fled in dismay down the plain, hotly pursued by the victorious Barak. No time was allowed to recover from their panic. God also fought against them: "The earth trembled, the heavens dropped, the clouds also dropped water." Josephus adds that a storm from the east beat furiously in the *faces* of the Canaanites, but only on the *backs* of the Jews. The storm is required by both the narrative of the action and the song of victory. It was to this, I suppose, that Deborah alluded, "Is not the Lord gone out before thee?" and this it certainly was which swelled the Kishon, so that it swept away and drowned the flying host, for it never could do that except during a great rain. The army of Sisera naturally sought to regain the strongly fortified Harosheth of the Gentiles, from which they had marched up to their camping-ground a short time before. This place is at the lower end of the narrow vale through which the Kishon passes out of Esdraelon into the plain of Acre, and this was their only practicable line of retreat. The victorious enemy was behind them; on their left were the hills of Samaria, in the hand of their enemies; on their right was the swollen river and the marshes of Thora; they had no alternative but to make for the narrow pass which led to Harosheth. The space, however, becomes more and more narrow until within the *pass* it is only a few rods wide. There horses, chariots, and men become mixed in horrible confusion, jostling and treading down one another; and the river, here swifter and deeper than above, runs zigzag from side to side of the vale, until, just before it reaches the castle of Harosheth, it dashes sheer up against the perpendicular base of Carmel. There is no longer any possibility of avoiding it. Rank upon rank of the flying host plunge madly in, those behind crushing those before deeper and deeper in the tenacious mud. They stick fast, are overwhelmed, are swept away by thousands. Such are the conditions of this battle and battle-field that we can follow it out to the dire catastrophe. We only need to know where Harosheth is, and that is now easily found and identified. The narrative of the battle leads us to seek it somewhere down the Kishon, for only in that direction would they fly from an attack coming from the north-east. Again, it cannot be very far from the camp, for the Hebrews pursued them to it. They had before the battle marched some ten or twelve miles, and we cannot suppose that they could pursue an enemy more than eight or ten miles farther. Now, exactly in the line of their necessary retreat, and about eight miles from Megiddo, at the entrance of the pass to Esdraelon from the plain of Acre, is

an enormous double mound, called Harothîeh, which is the Arabic form of the Hebrew Harosheth, the signification of the word being the same in both languages. This *Tell* is situated just below the point where the Kishon in one of its turns beats against the rocky base of Carmel, leaving no room even for a footpath. A castle there effectually commands the pass up the vale of the Kishon into Esdraelon, and such a castle there was on this immense double tell of Harothîeh. It is still covered with the remains of old walls and buildings. The village of the same name is now on the other side of the river, a short distance higher up, and, of course, nearer the battle-field. I have not the slightest doubt of this identification. It was probably called Harosheth of the *gentiles*, or *nations*, because it belonged to those gentiles of Acre and the neighbouring plains, which we know from Judges i. 31 the Hebrews could not subdue; and, by the way, I believe that Sisera pitched between Taannach and Megiddo, because, as is stated in the passage from Judges, those towns were still in the hands of the Canaanites.

"It may be objected that our supposition makes the authority of Jabin extend very far. It does; but, instead of weakening, this fact is rather confirmatory. Hazor, situated in the centre of the mountains of the present Belad Beshara, we are distinctly informed by Joshua, was the *head of all those nations* who assembled at the waters of Merom. Among them were the kings of Dor, of Taannach, and Megiddo, and very likely of Acre itself. As Hazor was rebuilt, and another King Jabin of the same dynasty now reigned in it, the probabilities are great that he would still be the acknowledged '*head*' of all these Canaanitish cities. Moreover, Jabin could only use his nine hundred chariots of iron on the plains, such as those of Acre and Esdraelon, and no better position for his horse and chariots could be found than just this site of Harosheth, nor a more commanding position taken by his chief captain Sisera.

"But if Harosheth is this Harothîeh, how comes it to pass that Jael, the wife of Heber the Kenite, is found so near the battle-field that Sisera could light down from his chariot and flee to her tent? We are told in this very narrative that their home was near Kadesh, which is two days' travel to the north-east of the battle-field.

"Even this, when carefully examined, confirms our identification. It is mentioned in the eleventh verse that Heber the Kenite, which was of the children of Hobab, had severed himself from the Kenites, and pitched his tent unto the plain of Zaanaim which is by Kadesh; and I suppose the object of this brief notice thus thrown into the narrative is, in reality, to account for the appearance of Jael on this scene of action. The other Kenites were settled in the hill country of Judah, not far from Hebron. If you ask, Why state that Heber had settled near Kadesh when you want to know how he came to have his tent down at the bottom of Esdraelon? my answer is, that such was the fact. Heber did settle there. And it is because he did that there came to 'be peace between Jabin and the Kenites,' for Hazor was only a few miles from Kadesh. An incident which happened to myself will explain why Heber was found at the bottom

of the plain at the time of the battle. With a guide from Nazareth, I once crossed the lower part of Esdraelon in the winter. It was then full of Arab tents, and at first I felt a little nervous, but my guide assured me there was no danger, for he was well acquainted with these Arabs. Their home was in the mountains north of Nazareth, toward Safet, and they only came down here to pass the cold months of winter. This was the very thing that Heber did, and who knows but that these Arabs are lineal descendants of that heroic Jael. I peered curiously into the faces of the women, but they were all tawny brass or dirty bronze; and I could find none that looked at all heroic, though some of them seemed as if they could drive a nail into the temple of a sleeping enemy. To all this some one might object, that if Heber lived near Kadesh, why not descend to the Hûley immediately below for the winter, rather than migrate to this distant place? For the simple reason, I answer, that this place was under the government of his ally Jabin, and the other was not. It is interesting to notice how all parts of this narrative, even to its remote and incidental implications, correspond and corroborate each other. In addition to the above, the habits of these tent-dwellers require that the battle should have occurred in the winter, or very early spring, for only then would Heber's tent be found here. Now this is nowhere stated in just so many words, but the song of victory says that the clouds dropped down rain, and it only rains on Esdraelon in the winter. The same thing is necessarily implied by the fact that 'the river of Kishon swept them away, that ancient river, the River Kishon,' and this it could not do except in winter."

The story of another great battle fought between Gideon and the Midianites on the plain of Esdraelon, we take from the pages of Mr Stanley:—

"The next battle was of a very different kind, and one of which the present aspect of the plain can give a clearer image. No one in present days has passed this plain without seeing or hearing of the assaults of the Bedouin Arabs, as they stream in from the adjacent Desert. Here and there, by the well-side, or amongst the bushes of the mountains, their tents or their wild figures may always be seen—the terror alike of the peaceful villager and the defenceless traveller. What we now see on a small scale constantly, is but a miniature representation of the one great visitation which lived for ages afterwards in the memory of the Jewish people—the invasion, not of the civilised nations of Assyria or Egypt, or of the Canaanite cities, but of the wild population of the Desert itself, 'the Midianites, the Amalekites, and the Children of the East.' They came up with all the accompaniments of Bedouin life, 'with their cattle, their tents, and their camels;' they came up and 'encamped' against the Israelites, after 'Israel had sown,' and 'destroyed the increase of the earth,' and all the cattle [in the maritime plain] 'till thou come unto Gaza; as 'locusts' for multitude both they and their camels without number.' The very aspect and bearing of their sheykhs is preserved to us. The two lesser chiefs ("princes

as they are called in our version), in their names of Oreb and Zeeb, 'the Raven' and 'the Wolf,' present curious counterparts of the title of 'the Leopard,' now given to their modern successor, Abd-el-Aziz, chief of the Bedouins beyond the Jordan. The two higher sheykhs or 'kings,' Zebah and Zalmunna, are mounted on dromedaries, themselves gay with scarlet mantles, and crescent-ornaments and golden earrings, their dromedaries with ornaments and chains like themselves; and, as in outward appearance, so in the high spirit and lofty bearing which they shewed at their last hour, they truly represented the Arabs who scour the same regions at the present day.

"Such an incursion produced on the Israelites amongst their ordinary wars a similar impression to that of the invasion of the Huns amongst the comparatively civilised invasions of the Teutonic tribes. They fled into their mountain fastnesses and caves as the only refuge; the wheat even of the upland valleys of Manasseh had to be concealed from the rapacious plunderers. The whole country was thus for the first time in the hands of the Arabs. But it was in the plain of Esdraelon that then, as now, the Children of the Desert fixed their head-quarters. 'In the valley of Jezreel,' that is, in the central eastern branch of the plain, commanding the long descent to the Jordan, and thus to their own eastern deserts, 'they lay all along the valley like 'locusts' for multitude,' and 'their camels'—unwonted sight in the pastures of Palestine—'were without number, as the sand by the sea-side' on the wide margin of the Bay of Acre, 'for multitude.' As in the invasion of Sisera, so now, the nearest tribes were those which first were moved by a sense of their common danger. To the noblest of the tribe of Manasseh—to one whose appearance was 'as the son of a king,' and whose brothers, already ruthlessly slain by the wild invaders on the adjacent heights of Tabor, were 'each one like the children of kings'—was entrusted the charge of gathering together the forces of his countrymen. All Manasseh was with him; and from the other side of the plain there came Zebulun and Naphtali, and even the reluctant Asher, to join him. On the slope of Mount Gilboa the Israelites were encamped by a spring, possibly the same as that elsewhere called 'the spring of Jezreel,' but here, from the well-known trial by which Gideon tested the energy of his army, called 'the spring of trembling.' On the northern side of the valley, but apparently deeper down in the descent towards the Jordan, by one of those slight eminences which have been before described as characteristic of the whole plain, was spread the host of the Midianites. It was night, when from the mountain side Gideon and his servant descended to the vast encampment. All along the valley, within and around the tents, the thousands of Arabs lay wrapt in sleep, or resting from their day's plunder, and their innumerable camels couched for the night in deep repose round about them. One of the sleepers, startled from his slumbers, was telling his dream to his fellow—a characteristic and expressive dream for a Bedouin, even without its terrible interpretation; that

a cake of barley bread, from those rich corn-fields, those numerous threshing-floors of the peaceful inhabitants whom they had conquered rolled into the camp of Midian and struck a tent, and overturned it, so that it lay along on the ground. Reassured by this good omen, Gideon returned for his three hundred trusty followers, the trumpets were blown, the torches blazed forth, the shout of Israel, always terrible, always like 'the shout of a king,' broke through the stillness of the midnight air; and the sleepers sprang from their rest, and ran hither and thither with the dissonant 'cries,' so peculiar to the Arab race. 'And the Lord set every man's sword against his fellow, even through all the host;' and the host fled headlong down the descent to the Jordan, to the spots known as the 'house of the Acacia' (Bethshittah), and the 'border' of the 'meadow of the dance' (Abelmeholah). These spots were in the Jordan-valley, as their names indicate, under the mountains of Ephraim. To the Ephraimites, therefore, messengers were sent to intercept the northern fords of the Jordan at Bethbarah. There the second conflict took place, and Oreb and Zeeb were seized and put to the sword, the one on a rock, the other at a winepress, on the spot where they were taken. The two higher sheykhs, Zebah and Zalmunna, had already passed before the Ephraimites appeared; Gideon, therefore, who had now reached the fords from the scene of his former victory, pursued them into the eastern territory of his own tribe Manasseh. The first village which he reached in the Jordan-valley was that which from the 'booths' of Jacob's ancient encampment bore the name of Succoth: the next higher up in the hills was that which from the vision of the same patriarch bore the name of Peniel, 'the Face of God,' with its lofty watch-tower. Far up in the eastern Desert—amongst their own Bedouin countrymen 'dwelling in tents'—'the host' of Zebah and Zalmunna 'was secure' when Gideon burst upon them. Here a third victory completed the conquest. The two chiefs were caught and slain; the tower of Peniel was razed; and the princes of Succoth were scourged with the thorny branches of the acacia groves of their own valley."

Passing from the Old Testament to the New, there is much in Mr Stanley's account of the localities of the gospel history that we could have wished to extract. But we must limit ourselves to a single passage—that which refers to "the parables of Galilee:"—

"Of these the greater part are grouped in the discourse from the fishing-vessel off the beach of the Plain of Gennesareth. Is there anything on the spot to suggest the images thus conveyed? So (if I may speak for a moment of myself), I asked, as I rode along the track under the hillside, by which the Plain of Gennesareth is approached. So I asked, at the moment seeing nothing but the steep sides of the hill alternately of rock and grass. And when I thought of the parables of the sower, I answered, that here at least was nothing on which the Divine Teaching could fasten: it must have been the distant corn-fields of Samaria or Esdraelon on which

His mind was dwelling. The thought had hardly occurred to me, when a slight recess in the hillside, close upon the plain, disclosed at once, in detail, and with a conjunction which I remember nowhere else in Palestine, every feature of the great parable. There was the undulating corn-field descending to the water's edge. There was the trodden pathway running through the midst of it, with no fence or edge to prevent the seed from falling here and there on either side of it, or upon it; itself hard with the constant tramp of horse and mule, and human feet. There was the 'good' rich soil, which distinguishes the whole of that plain and its neighbourhood from the bare hills elsewhere descending into the lake, and which, where there is no interruption, produces one vast mass of corn. There was the rocky ground of the hillside protruding here and there through the corn-fields, as elsewhere through the grassy slopes. There were the large bushes of thorn—the 'Nabk,' that kind of which tradition says that the Crown of Thorns was woven—springing up, like the fruit-trees of the more inland parts, in the very midst of the waving wheat.

"This is the most detailed illustration of any of the Galilean parables. But the image of corn-fields generally must have been always present to the eye of the multitudes on shore—of the Master and disciples in the boat—as constantly as the vineyards at Jerusalem. 'The earth bringing forth fruit of itself;' 'the blade, the ear, the full corn in the ear;' 'the reapers coming with their sickles for the harvest,' could never be out of place in the Plain of Gennesareth. And it is probable that these corn-fields would always have exhibited the sight which has been observed in the plains of the Upper Jordan beyond the Lake of Merom, and in the great corn-fields of Samaria—women and children employed in picking out from the wheat the tall green stalks, still called by the Arabs 'Zuwân.' This is apparently the same word as the Greek 'Zizania,' in the Vulgate rendered 'Lollia,' in our version 'tares.' These stalks, it can easily be imagined, if sowed designedly throughout the fields, would be inseparable from the wheat, from which, even when growing naturally and by chance, they are at first sight hardly distinguishable."

We have already spoken of the value which we attach to Dr Thomson's opinions on the geography of the Lake of Galilee. His identifications of Capernaum, Chorazin, and Bethsaida, seem to us preferable to those of Dr Robinson. But we cannot go into these much-disputed questions.

We cannot conclude this very fragmentary paper without requesting the earnest attention of our clerical readers, and others directly engaged in the religious training of the young, to the very great importance of Scripture geography, as a branch of instruction in Bible classes as well in the school-room and in the domestic circle. Chronology and geography—as the old saying has it—are the two great lights of history, and there is no field where their illuminating properties are more

beneficially exercised than Bible history. Geography is a subject that will be either the driest or the most fascinating, according to the manner in which it is taught. Scripture geography, if judiciously managed, may be rendered most interesting, for the kind of information which it brings up is exceedingly congenial to the inquiring minds of the young. We hope, the day is not far distant when, in boarding schools, parish schools, and similar institutions, it will not only be one of the ordinary branches of instruction—as indeed it often is now—but taught in the attractive manner of which it is capable. We may remark, in passing, that we know nothing more susceptible of improvement than the ordinary school maps of Palestine. Most of those published in this country are exceedingly slovenly, and some of them shamefully inaccurate. Germany is far ahead of us in this respect. A great service would be done in this country by a really good school map of Palestine, bringing out the physical features as well as the political divisions of the country. Our education committees and religious societies should interest themselves in these matters. The whole subject of school books and school studies demands far more attention than the religious school societies have yet given to them. The subject-matter, so to speak, of school instruction, in its religious bearings, is susceptible of very great improvement, and those churches which have educational institutions ought to direct much attention to it. When they do so, we are persuaded there is no study which they will be more desirous to see prosecuted in schools than that which forms the subject of this article. There may be subjects bearing more directly on the vital spiritual interests of man; but there is none more likely, with God's blessing, to foster what lies at the foundation of all spiritual religion—an intelligent and cordial persuasion that the Bible is historically true—that it is throughout the word of God—and “that the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.”

ART. VIII.—*The Christian Life, Social and Individual, in the Present Time.* By PETER BAYNE, A.M. New Edition. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. 1859.

A NEW edition of this very able and thoughtful work has just appeared; and we gladly take advantage of the opportunity to bring it prominently under the notice of our readers. This we shall do most effectually, not by indulging in the language

of empty panegyric, but by giving some account of what the volume professes to teach, and of the style or manner in which the argument in it is conducted.

At the very outset we meet a new thing in this present edition, a *Prefatory Note*, containing a brief but remarkably clear and satisfactory estimate of the influence for good and evil of the writings of Carlyle. It had been said, and perhaps there was some ground for saying it, that Mr Bayne had spoken of that author in a style which, on the whole, was too complimentary; and to obviate any evil consequences that might conceivably flow from this, he now places in the foreground of this work a distinct statement of his actual opinion of him. With all the positions in that statement we entirely concur. For any one to assert that Carlyle has done no good in his day and generation, and that his books ought to be shunned as purely and simply evil, is nearly as absurd as for a believer in revelation to say that his writings contain nothing which is directly hostile to Christianity. Both extremes must be avoided, if we would form a fair and faithful estimate of this extraordinary man. And, on the one hand, few will refuse to him the credit claimed on his behalf in the following sentences. At the root of much of his false teaching is, as is well known, his favourite theory of Hero-Worship. Mr Bayne sees the folly of this theory as clearly, and points out the dangerous issues of it as strongly as any man could do. But he is not blind to the fact that incidentally the pursuit of it has been advantageous in some respects; and, for example, in this respect. "It has led him to study *men* more earnestly, and to know them more correctly, than any former biographer; *it has led him to rescue from undue depreciation the element of individual human force in history*; it has led him to extol and inculcate human qualities which, however named, ought to be esteemed and emulated." "Well understood," he goes on to say, "this doctrine of respect for great men, upon which (Mr Carlyle) has been for twenty years expatiating, is of high importance. *Upon a just and loyal appreciation of eminently gifted men does the prosperity of mankind—the beneficent and harmonious working of all social and political institutions—in any age of potent and advancing democracy depend.*" "Further, Hume and Gibbon were men of distinguished faculty, superior, in certain qualities of the historian, to Mr Carlyle. *But we cannot realise the characters with whom they bring us into verbal acquaintance as living men.* . . . In a manner totally different from that of Hume and Gibbon, (Mr Carlyle) writes history for, as he declares it to have been made by his heroes. Every action is rendered exponent of the personal character and life." The pertinence of these remarks will be admitted

at once; and no one who reflects upon them for an instant can fail to admit that even if Carlyle had done nothing more than what is attributed to him in these sentences, he has rendered important services at once to literature and society. But he has also other redeeming points. Other good is mixed up with his much evil; and as the one is separable from the other, Mr Bayne well asks, "Is it not to be desired that the good should be acknowledged and accepted by the Christian world? It is not well when religion has relaxed its grasp of the leading intellectual phenomena of the day. It least of all becomes the professors of that religion which is not more purely divine than profoundly and comprehensively human, . . . to stand aside in blank intolerance or ignorant alarm when some original and potent influence in philosophy or morals is being exerted. *The most effectual, and surely the most rational and dignified, manner in which to counteract errors, is to assimilate that truth with which, as with an element of binding iron, it has contrived to stubborn its ropes of sand*" In other words, we must deal with men of powerful intellect and erroneous religious views, just as we do with infidel men of science. Both may conceivably make discoveries in their respective fields; and just as the facts of nature remain in reality the same, whether submitted to us by a believer or an unbeliever, so the phenomena of mind do not vary in their essential character though brought to light and presented to us by one of whose relations to Christianity we may most reasonably stand in doubt. This most defensible position Mr Bayne maintains not only in his Prefatory Note, but throughout the theoretic part of his book. He has felt that Carlyle has sounded life-depths which other writers have but dipped into; and to assimilate the truth in his works, and eliminate the errors, seems to be one, at least, the ends which he has here expressly set to himself.

While thus appreciating to its full extent the better element in Carlyle's writings, and well disposed to make the most of it, Mr Bayne is not in the least blind to the less satisfactory side of his character and works. Even as a historian—as a narrator of facts (although, as has been said, he is in one respect, that of being able to vivify the past, very much superior to Hume and Gibbon), Mr Carlyle is shewn to be entirely unreliable. "His genius is of the imaginative, as distinguished from the scientific order." "Whatever he beholds takes character and colour from an imaginative medium. He sees a 'flame image' of the thing, not the thing itself." Hence, a sober and unpretending circumstance, which an ordinary writer might record without exciting our especial wonder, becomes often so transformed and transfigured in his hand, as

to seem a perfectly different thing; and Mr Carlyle himself becomes not a true but a false witness for the antiquity which he professes to revive. Two extraordinary illustrations of his utter untrustworthiness in this respect are given in the preface—one of which (which we select for its shortness) we may quote here. The old Marquis Mirabeau, father of Carlyle's French Revolution hero, had said of his son, of whose capacities, apparently, he had no very high opinion—"And then, his talent for dazzling by superlatives, for he has swallowed all formulas, and cannot substantiate anything." The meaning of this would seem to be sufficiently obvious. The word "formula" was used by the Marquis "as indicating the result of a train of reasoning severed from its demonstration, expressed in algebraic characters, and set apart for practical purposes;" and certainly its application to the conventional usages of society was never for a moment thought of by him. Yet here is the remark as interpreted by the professed historian—"Consider," says he, "how, as the old Marquis still snarls, he (Mirabeau) has 'made away with (*humé* swallowed) all *Formulas*,' a fact which, if we meditate it, will in these days mean much. This is no man of system, then; he is only a man of instincts and insights. A man, nevertheless, who will glare fiercely on an object, and see through it, and conquer it; for he has intellect, he has will, force, beyond other men. A man not with *logic spectacles*, but with an *eye*!" Now we may acquit the writer of this of intentional misrepresentation. Looking at the Marquis's statement through the luminous mist of his imagination, he doubtless felt himself entitled to interpret it as above; but the fact that he could in one instance make such a use of the material whereof history is composed, proves how incapable he is of seeing and describing things just as they are. On this ground, among others, Mr Bayne holds that Carlyle is essentially a poet, and argues that if his Visions of the Past, &c., had been given to the world in a metrical form, it would have been greatly better at once for himself and for his readers. For himself, because in that case his histories could have been legitimately judged by a rule less rigid than is actually applied to them; and for his readers, because there would then have been far less likelihood of any of them being seriously led astray. Whatever be the truth in regard to that particular point, it is manifest that the opinion of any one so much under the influence of his imagination as Carlyle is, can have, or at least ought to have, comparatively little weight. We may admit the fascination of his language, the originality of his thoughts, the power and eloquence of his descriptions; but when a great practical difficulty is raised, say in the department of social

science, we cannot fail to see that he is not exactly the sort of person one would look to for its solution. And in fact Mr Bayne says truly,—“There is but one opinion among practical men touching his works in that department—that their value is almost inappreciably small.”

The disproportionate power of his imagination, however, has had another effect on Carlyle besides that of disqualifying him for being a sober theorist or a trustworthy historian. To it doubtless is to be attributed that “affinity for mysticism,” which so soon attracted him to the transcendental speculations of Germany, and under the action of which his mind became so diseased as to be incapable of forming a rational estimate of evangelical Christianity and its evidences. “From his youth up,” says Mr Bayne, “Mr Carlyle has required better bread than is baked with wheat. He has not had the rare gift of perceiving how far the simply true is greater than the singularly and magnificently false. He could not stay at home. This was revealed in his critical preferences as well as in more important instances. . . . Was it, considering these circumstances, so surprising that at the time for calmly and judicially weighing the facts of Christian evidence, he should have been thinking of something ‘infinitely deeper than miracles?’” We are accustomed to think of Carlyle chiefly as a seducer—we can never forget the cases of Sterling and others who, coming under his spell, were turned aside out of the right way. But we ought to remember that, as is here indicated, the Seducer was once the *Victim*. The ingenuous youth who, with Edward Irving as his colleague, once taught the boys of Kirkcaldy to spell and cipher, was perhaps at the outset of his life as innocent of doubt as Cowper's cottager. And if his mind had been better regulated, and the society he frequented better toned, he might have grown indefinitely in mental wealth and influence, without falling away from the simplicity of the truth. But what could be expected of one in whom the imagination was the predominating faculty, when he chose to seek intellectual pabulum only amid the visionary and unhealthy speculations of modern Germany? He may fancy he has mastered them all, that he has extracted the good out of them without having been affected by the evil; and that now, standing at the centre of things, he can point out with a clear and unjaundiced eye what is shallow and amiss in the opinions of other people. But “his neighbour cometh,” in turn, “and searcheth him;” and the general opinion among those who study his history will be, that in Thomas Carlyle we have not a man who went royally astray of his own free, unconstrained, and sovereign will, but merely one, like poor Sterling himself, who succumbed to unwholesome influences. What wonder

that he has become so morbid and diseased, as to be incapable of relishing anything but what is unnatural and extravagant. A mind which has fed for months on exciting fiction, is not in a condition to appreciate highly the sweetness and simplicity of nature. And Carlyle's antecedents have been such that we can attach little or no weight to his rejection of Christianity.

At the close of his preface, Mr Bayne makes some very noteworthy remarks on the *evil* results which have followed from the excessive importance attached by Carlyle to his pet theory of hero-worship. What *good* had issued out of the exposition and illustration of it, he had shewn before. Of course, the theory itself has its root, obviously, in pure Pantheism. *Genius, and force, and capacity in men, are outcomings of Deity. A great man is a manifestation of God in the flesh.* It is not, however, of the radical error in the theory that Mr Bayne is called to speak, but of the practical effect which the maintenance of the theory has had upon his views of men and human life. And in this connection, the following statements appear to us to be exceedingly deserving of attention. "Unduly exalting the force and value of individual men, he has overlooked to an extent sufficient of itself to invalidate his claims as a philosophic thinker, *the associative capacities of the race.*" "Through the same intense and exclusive appreciation of men of pre-eminent or peculiar capacity, Mr Carlyle has in another way wronged the mass of men, and, in wronging them, has entailed severe retributive injury on himself. He has failed to estimate rightly *the value of common human testimony.*" "Mr Carlyle's exaggerated estimate of the heroic in man has prevented him from doing substantial justice even to those whom he has most eloquently eulogised. While according them a worship as heroes with which they would have dispensed, *he has denied them that respect as men which they would modestly have claimed.* His Luther, his Cromwell, his Knox, believed what to him are incredible delusions." "Looked fairly in the face, and in its best form, admiration for men is a thing to be cautiously commended and guardedly applied. . . . Men have, in all ages, been ready enough to cower under Roman Catholicism, Renaissances, Napoleonism, and other forms of hero-worship, or scoundrel-worship. To separate principles from men, to prize the former without permitting their exaggeration or perversion through association with human passions and fallibility, is among the most momentous problems for men and nations, and one which, in religion, in politics, in art, they have been by no means successful in solving. . . . The present seems, after all, to be a strange time for bidding men trust to the light within, or to seek for its clear shining

in men of genius. Napoleon was a man of genius; yet much a villain. Goethe was a man of genius; and he wrote the *Roman Elegies*, the most deliberately and malignantly immoral compositions known to me. Edgar Poe was a man of genius—the greatest poetical genius, probably, that America has produced; and what a melancholy despicability of sin and misery was his history? . . . These are not exceptional names in the annals of recent genius. The association of brilliant genius with some intellectual extravagance, or some desolating vice, has rather been the rule of these days. It is well to know how men justify their actions to themselves; it is well to widen our horizon of sympathy and tolerance. But has Mr Carlyle exercised sufficient caution in bringing sympathy and pity into proximity with crime? Is it not well to see virtue in its objective reality, and vice in its unveiled deformity? Is it safe to be weighing inducements to cruelty and calculating palliations of debauchery, to yield to admiring impulses in presence of a blood-stained Danton, or to find a heroic annihilator of shams in a thorough-going blackguard like Mirabeau? ‘If the light in you is darkness, how great is that darkness?’”

We have dwelt thus long on the preface, not only because it is one of the new features in the present edition, but because it is our honest belief that a better account of the good and evil of Carlyle is (within so brief a compass) not to be found in the language. What may be the actual influence of that writer now-a-days on the students in our colleges we do not know. Since our day, those absurd and incoherent “Latter Day Pamphlets” of his have appeared, which shewed so conclusively that, like other seducers, he was “waxing worse and worse,” and perhaps they have helped to satisfy some that a considerably safer and more sensible guide might be found. But if the author of “Sartor Resartus” is worshipped still as he was some fifteen years ago, we could conceive of no better antidote to that idolatry than the circulation, in a separate form, of this admirable introductory Essay. Leaving this, however, let us turn to notice what is *the great purpose of the book itself*.

Every thoughtful reader of general literature must have observed in how many forms and places the exclusive claims and authority of Christianity are sneered at or ignored. Through the departments of Poetry, Fiction, Philosophy, and History alike, there breathes too often a spirit which is half contemptuous and wholly sceptical. The significance of our religion as a great fact may be admitted, and the beauty and purity of its code of morals may be condescendingly admired; but when the question is as to the acceptance of its peculiar doctrines, or as to the outcoming of a sincere faith in these doctrines

in the life, the case is altered. It is not too strong to say that the man who honestly believes *all* that the Bible teaches (including what it says about the human heart, the atonement of Christ, the necessity of regeneration, and life in the Spirit), and who ingenuously endeavours to walk, not as a kindly, good-natured man, but as a *Christian*, is regarded by many of our most popular writers as belonging to one or other of two classes, the *narrow-minded*, or the *hypocritical*. Read, for instance, the works of the two men who perhaps can at any time command a larger circle of readers in this country than any other author—Dickens and Thackeray. Their influence is not to be estimated at a light rate because they are novelists. They do not write to please merely. They treat of *life*, life not as it really is, but as it appears to them and as they wish it to be. And their books, “to be had at all the circulating libraries,” and carried often into the most remote and sequestered villages, are giving almost universal currency to their views and prejudices. Their influence, whether for good or evil, is unquestionably very great. And what is the character of it? We say without hesitation, that the whole tendency of their teaching is to propagate and confirm the impression that Christianity, as evangelically interpreted, is at the best but a form of fanaticism, and that there is a higher style of life not only different from that commended to us in the New Testament, but even in direct contrast to it. Yet both Dickens and Thackeray would repudiate the idea of their being anti-Christian writers. For the national religion they would probably profess to have a real respect. They are only wide-minded and liberal, in place of being narrow-viewed and bigoted. And the life they hold up for the admiration of their readers is, they would say, only genuine and rational, instead of being unreasonable and hypocritical. It is evident, then, their notions in regard at once to the claims and to the character of Christianity must be of a peculiar kind. On the one hand they assume the right to sit in judgment upon it, even after having admitted its divine original; and in the exercise of that assumed right, they on the other declare in so many words or by implication that there is something which, as a system and as a practical power, is decidedly better. This infidel attitude (for it is an attitude which to all intents and purposes is infidel) is taken up more or less formally by a very large number of those who, in one department or another, have the ear of the public; and it must have struck not a few earnest minds as supremely desirable, that some man of extensive reading, literary power, and Christian culture should take up the point, and shew, if possible, that the religion of the Bible is infinitely more rational than any of the *isms* which

are preferred to it, and that there is no higher style of life in any sense, than that in which it tends to issue. Now this is in substance the very end which Mr Bayne sets to himself in the work before us; and if he has succeeded, as we believe he has done, in establishing his main positions, there can be but one opinion among intelligent Christian men about him, and that is, that he has rendered important service to the cause of evangelical religion. But it may be well to give his own statement:—

“The gospel of Jesus is everything or it is nothing; if true at all, every god and oracle must vanish before it. To the insidious homage paid in many a cultivated circle to Christianity at present, our answer can be none other than that which was given of old, [referring to the reply which is said to have been given by the early Christians, when it was proposed to place a statue of Christ in the Pantheon at Rome], Christianity lives a divine life, or dies. Until the concession is made that it is divine, in no qualified sense, but to the express intent that it came down from heaven, no approximation is made to what it demands. It cannot, however, be unattended with important results to prove, that, viewed whether from the side of theory, or of life, this contemptuous assumption of the obsolescence of Christianity is gratuitous and indefensible. *On the side of theory there has no moral or spiritual truth emerged in the world of culture, which it does not either embrace in its own scheme, or transcend by a truth nobler and deeper. In actual existence it is still the basis of moral and practical life to men of unquestioned integrity and of robust, advanced, and liberal intellect, and it is the animating principle in social combinations of a vigorous and natural kind.*”

These are the propositions of which proof is offered in the pages of the *Christian Life*. The idea is a noble one—one for which a Christian soldier may well put forth all his resources of skill and learning. Even had Mr Bayne failed in his attempt satisfactorily to expound and illustrate it, not a little credit would have been due to him; for would he not even in that case have led the way into a field wherein Christianity cannot but in the long run gather fresh laurels? But since he has not failed, we can scarcely wonder that the writing of this single book should at once have made for him a high apologetic reputation on both sides of the Atlantic.

In carrying out the purpose thus announced, Mr Bayne adopts the following method.—*First*: he reviews “in connection both with the individual and social life, as embraced in the Christian scheme, two of the most conspicuous phases of recent intellectual activity antagonistic to Christianity;” and *secondly*, “he exhibits the living power of Christianity in the individual and society by means of a series of illustrative biographies.”

The two phases of intellectual activity which Mr Bayne discusses in the first part of his book are the *Atheistic* and the *Pantheistic*—as represented, the one by Comte, the other by Carlyle and Fichte. On hearing that these are the only theories of existence with which that of the Christian Life is contrasted, our first feeling is one of disappointment. Is it, we are disposed to ask, only by the Atheist and the Pantheist that Christianity is scorned in these days? Is it by them alone that the life of a believer in Jesus is reckoned a poor thing—which can have no attractions for large and liberal minds? Every one knows that the enemies of the cross cannot be so simply classified, and that, in point of fact, as we have already hinted, the spirit of virtual contempt to which Mr Bayne has himself referred, breathes to a perilous extent through a great proportion even of our light literature. We shall not venture to say that it was superfluous for Mr Bayne to have vindicated our position against the Atheist. The opinion of Isaac Taylor, “that Atheism and Christianity are preparing to divide the world,” would of itself make us hesitate to say anything of the kind. Atheism may undoubtedly yet prevail for a time. The influence of the Positive Philosophy in “an era of Physical Science,” may be such as to drive many minds wearied of the indefiniteness of Pantheism into the abyss of blank unbelief. It is not, as Mr Bayne sadly hints, at all impossible that Carlyle himself, unsettled, changeful as he has ever shewn himself to be, and growing yearly worse, as it should seem, than better—it is not impossible that even he should be found at last by the side of Comte, wildly and as emphatically as ever giving forth his last *discovery*, “that there is no God.” On these grounds, there certainly ought to have been, in such a book, a defence, on philosophical grounds, of our faith in this connection—a contrast drawn between the life of the Christian and the life of the man for whom the “immaterial world is a mere fiction of thought,” and who looks at religion as “the first great human delusion.” And, of course we may with added emphasis say the same thing of Pantheism. While the other evil has slain its thousands, this has slain its tens of thousands. For one Atheist among thinking men, there are twenty Pantheists, and any work like that before us would have been fatally defective, if it had failed to recognise this material fact. But when you have settled and set it aside as manifest, that these two phases of unbelief must be dealt with, the question arises, “Is it from them alone that the fiery darts are discharged which threaten the integrity of the Christian life? or is it in them at the present day that Christianity, as a life, encounters her most formidable antagonists?” We are inclined to answer *No*, to both queries. When you have shewn how

unsatisfactory, in every respect, is the condition of the man who has no belief in the existence of a God, or who denies that He is a Person—when, in other words, you have swept utterly out of your way both Atheism and Pantheism, there remains behind an immense mass of contempt for the Christian life, and of enmity to it, which all your reasonings have never touched; and it is this mass, and not that which you have removed, that offers perhaps the most serious obstacles to the advance of spiritual religion—of that religion which it is Mr Bayne's object to describe in his noble series of illustrative biographies.

We must not, however, in adopting Mr Bayne's own statement of what he has done, be guilty of inflicting a piece of practical injustice on him. *Formally* he has contrasted the Christian life only with Atheism and Pantheism, but *really* he has done a great deal more than that. He has contrasted it with CARLYLEISM—a very much wider and more comprehensive thing. True, Carlyle is (or was, for who can tell his present stand-point?) a Pantheist,—or rather, “the spirit of Pantheism” runs through all his writings. But it seems to us a little absurd to father all his special views about the individual and society, upon the system of religion of which he appears to be a disciple. Many of them, we readily grant, may be conclusively shewn to spring naturally out of the Pantheistic theory. But some, we certainly think, cannot; and at any rate it will be allowed that there are not a few men who, while in many points they sympathise with Carlyle, would claim to be as pure Theists as either Mr Bayne or the writer of this article. In plain terms, then, Mr Bayne accomplishes more than he promises to undertake. He shews the superiority of the Christian life not only over Atheism and Pantheism, but also over other kinds of life which are considered less objectionable.

But while admitting this, we must continue to repeat, that the practical utility of the book would have been greatly enhanced if the plan of it had been more comprehensive. We don't depreciate the influence of Carlyle, when we say that there are other men writing about LIFE in these days, whose teaching is just as contrary to that of the New Testament, and is doing quite as much mischief as his ever did in the very heyday of his reputation. There are, for example, popular novelists, like Dickens—sentimental moralists, like Martineau—trenchant redressers of wrongs, like Parker—philosophical historians, like Buckle—heretical trinitarians, like Kingsley, and Maurice. It is the simple truth to say that every one of these men is, heart and soul, opposed to that scheme of life which Mr Bayne, rightly calling it Christian, describes so minutely in

his essay. Is it safe to pass over them without a very formal notice? Would it be altogether useless to do with their works what is here done so effectively with those of Carlyle? That is not our opinion. We believe that the least suspected among them—Dickens and Kingsley—are doing an incalculable amount of evil wherever their books are read; and it would give us very sincere pleasure if Mr Bayne—whose competency to deal with this whole subject is now, we may say, a settled point—would address himself to complete the service he has been rendering to the cause of evangelical religion, by extending his Theoretic Statement so as to review *all* the erroneous views of life which have special currency at the present time. Such a subject, indeed, is, in our judgment, important enough to merit exclusive discussion in a separate volume.

Let us not be misunderstood, however. While we have no hesitation in expressing our opinion that the Theoretic Statement is too limited in its range, we would emphatically add, *that the remark applies only to the negative side of it. The positive part of the Statement is exceedingly full and satisfactory.* The relations of Christianity to the Individual Life on the one hand, and to Society on the other, are shewn in a way which at once evinces the thoughtfulness and intelligence of the writer, and hardly leaves anything more in that department to be desired. The blessed doctrine of *the Incarnation*, which to Arnold and so many others has afforded such rest for the mind and heart, is first set forth with powerful effect, as giving a shape and colour to human life which it never could have derived either from the “No God” of Atheism or the “All God” of the Pantheist. “*Duty*” is a word which figures often enough in the pages of Mr Carlyle; but to him the idea has no higher basis than obedience to the light within. The Christian scheme sets before us something more definite and less uncertain. Life has attained its highest possible development when we have become *like Christ*. To reach this end, the Bible declares that a great spiritual change must be undergone by each of us. That change is *conversion*. And here, while bringing out the force and meaning of the Scripture view of this crisis, Mr Bayne points out the significant fact, that the idea itself is by no means confined to the Christian system, but is embraced in their Schemes of Life by both Carlyle and Fichte! “According to the writers named,” says he, “it is seemly and right, if not in all cases necessary, that at a certain stage of the personal history the mind awaken and bestir itself, and struggle as in throes of birth, or tumult, or departure; that for a time it wrestle with doubt, or cower trembling under the wings of mystery, searching earth and heaven for answers to its questions and satisfaction for its

wants; that there be a turning, in baffled and indignant loathing, from the pleasures of sense, as all inadequate either to still or satisfy new and irrepressible longings after the Good, the True, the Beautiful—after God, freedom, and immortality.” And in his “Sartor Resartus” Carlyle “shews us how a soul may *emerge* from this confusion and distress to noble and perfect manhood; how it may evermore feel around it the fresh breath of the open sky, and over it the clear smile of heaven; . . . and *how all fear and torment are to give place to blessedness.*” The fatal defects in the theory of “conversion,” as these writers understand it, are shewn with admirable clearness in the essay before us. Its utter inconsistency even with Pantheism—its insufficiency to account for the phenomena the existence of which it assumes—and its manifest inadequacy to explain the causes and effects which produce and proceed from the radical changes which we see often accomplished in individual men—these and other points are brought out with great distinctness; and if the record of them served no other purpose, it would be useful in this way, that by forming a broad contrast, the Christian doctrine on the subject is rendered more prominent, and is felt to be the more satisfactory. In this connection, Mr Bayne well shews that Philosophy has never supplied a key to the phenomena of human life like that which the Bible puts into our hand when it declares, that the “sense of imperfection” which we all feel is due to the fact of a *Fall*—that the dread which often comes on the spirit arises from the consciousness of *Guilt*—that Peace comes to the soul when it has been made to believe and feel that its sin has been *Atoned for*—and that that transformation of the nature which makes any individual a new man, is the result of the direct operation of *the Spirit of God*. A glance at the nature of the Christian’s *Work*, and at the character of the Christian’s *Heaven*, finishes the Essay on the Individual Life, concerning which we have just one further remark to make before we pass from it. It is this: that it would have been rendered very much more readable, and therefore very much more useful, if it had been formally broken up into sections and chapters. It discusses a considerable number of distinct topics, all certainly related to one another, but all (or most of them) capable of being viewed apart. And Mr Bayne is very well aware of the fact, that the “reading public,” as it is by courtesy called, is not such an intelligent creature that, in reading such a book as his, it can afford to dispense with any of the helps that may be supplied by simplicity and arrangement. Many we can fancy, in addressing themselves to Mr Mansel’s “Limits of Religious Thought,” have devoutly thanked him in their hearts for the very full, and clear, and useful abstract.

which he has so wisely prefixed to his learned lectures. And we are very sure of this, that if Mr Bayne had assisted his readers in some such way, few (in comparison with the number of those who actually do so) would skip the Theoretic Statement to reach the more popular and attractive region of the Illustrative Biographies.

We have not the same objection to make in reference to the second essay—that on “The Social Life.” It, after a brief preface, is divided, very properly as we think, into two distinct chapters—one entitled “The Social Problem of the Age;” the other, “Associative Action and Christian Philanthropy.”

What is *the Social Problem of the Age*? Without offering any opinion of our own, we give Mr Bayne's answer to the question:—“The Age” dates its commencement, as he thinks, from the time of the French Revolution. That event “awoke a power that had long slumbered—“THE PEOPLE.” “Leaving Encyclopædism behind, and lifting its voice in other nations besides France, this great new element in social affairs—in its awakening, its attempt to make itself heard, its slow gravitation toward its own place in the system of things—has given its distinctive features to our epoch.” And the great question of the time, in this connection, is—“*Can we combine modern freedom, thought, and enlightenment, with the strength and activity of despotism?*” Can that awakened power, the People, be kept awake, nay, roused by an ever-broadening enlightenment, to a plenitude and potency of political function even yet unexampled, while every benefit and every energy of government are preserved?”

Carrying out the idea which he had developed in his essay on the Individual Life—that of comparing the Bible views with those of two specific schools of unbelief—Mr Bayne in this place also adopts the plan of first reviewing, in connection with the problem which he proposes, the theories of government which Atheism on the one hand, and Pantheism on the other, have offered for the acceptance of the world! The one he shews was actually put to the test half a century ago in France:—

“The sun looked down on strange sights in that revolution tumult; on sights whose significance can never be exhausted, and in which the eyes of nations will in all time have deep lessons to read. It looked down on a people that turned its gaze on the past, and saw generation after generation trooping dimly down the vista of years from the cavern of vacant chance, which had the heart to cast its eye on the future, and see all men sinking from the verge of the world into the blank abyss of annihilation; and which, even in the ghastly loneliness of such a universe as this, standing for one cheerless moment between two vast and eternal graves, could contrive to be

riotous and gay." "Never in this world was there a revolution so profoundly infidel, and never did revolution more completely fail." "If we accept even from it the imperishable truth that freedom is the inalienable inheritance and ultimate goal of man, let us read in it this other lesson, *that without religion a nation can never be free.*"

From "atheistic liberalism," therefore, which, as is well added, "must end either in folly or in anarchy," Mr Bayne turns to what we may call the theory of the Pantheist:—

"Mr Carlyle, looking forward into the distance, appears to contemplate a time characterised somewhat as follows:—The rubbish of extinct customs has been swept aside; the dust of shattered systems has fallen from the air, and sunk harmless into the soil; the discords of quackery and disputation have gone silent; and, alas! the world-tree of the nations, planted of old in Judea, the Igdrasil of modern civilisation, that bloomed into its chivalries, and yielded fair flowerage of literatures and philosophies, and bore its final fruit in the Lutheran Reformation, has fallen utterly, and mouldered as into moorland moss; the deep eternal skies of nature, the great laws of duty, of industry, and of hero-worship, have again emerged and roofed the world. . . More and more the development of Mr Carlyle's system has tended to the pouring contempt upon all the modes and agencies of our present social life; he has scouted upon popular assemblies, upon free election, upon what is partly the voice and partly the guide of public opinion, the free press; more and more clearly his all-embracing word—of command, of denunciation, of prophecy—has been hero-worship; and, with more and more distinctness and decision, he has pointed at the severance of all men into two great classes—the foolish and the wise, the silently and blindly governed, and the silently and irresponsibly governed. . . In a word, no one can question the fact, that Mr Carlyle has drawn off altogether from the side of what is meant by radicalism; that his political philosophy has disjoined itself from the popular enlightenment, the popular science, the popular election, which cluster around that standard. . . The sum total and ultimate goal of all his political thinking has turned out to be what was naturally and philosophically to be expected—**Despotism.**" "And has the path of humanity," Mr Bayne goes on to ask, "over sandy deserts, and up flinty mountains, through burning heats and bitter storms, been to such a promised land as this? A promised land! No true man would accept it, though its vines were richer than those of Eshcol, and it flowed with milk and honey. Decided was the error of the radicals of the French Revolution; still more deadly is that of Mr Carlyle."

But, having disposed of these two questions, and that with all the burning eloquence of one who feels that to deny the fact of a reign of God, and the inalienable right of individual men to freedom, were to take the sun out of the heavens, and leave us in outer darkness, Mr Bayne next takes up the positive side of his argument, and in a manner most telling and conclusive, shews that in Christianity alone is to be found a

satisfactory solution of the difficult and important question which he had propounded:—

“Taking from irreligious radicalism the truth groped after by it, and accepting at the hands of Mr Carlyle the vitally important lessons he has so powerfully proclaimed—avoiding anarchy on the one hand, and despotism on the other—Christianity sets the race on a path of unlimited advancement. *It pronounces men in essentials equal.* . . declares all nations of the earth to be of one blood; pronounces all men equally the subjects of one king; and makes the value of the soul infinite, and shews no difference between the worth of that of a beggar and that of a prince.” “But Christianity does not make the truth of essential human brotherhood powerless by leaving it alone. Mr Carlyle saw the weakness of the anarchy to which modern freedom was tending; government he knew to be absolutely necessary. And this government, in some way or other, must be vested in able men. . . Christianity meets this want also. *It writes down civil government as an ordinance of God.* . . And how are we in every case to find out our rulers? *By finding those who are fitted to rule.* . . A nation would be perfectly free and perfectly governed if the allied truths of equality and subordination were both in full force; if not only the ablest governed, but the channels to government were absolutely unobstructed, and every man had the assurance that, if he were the ablest, he would be governor.”

Mr Bayne proceeds to go further into detail, to consider especially these two important questions in which, at present especially, this nation has a deep concern—“How is the ruling body to be got together? and to the discharge of what duties is it competent when assembled?” But we must be content to commend his thoughtful and well-weighed remarks on these topics to the best consideration of our readers.

The purport of the second chapter in this Essay will be seen at once, when we have quoted the opening sentence of it. “In the preceding chapter, we had before us the Social Life mainly in that broader aspect in which it pertains *to the nation as such.* But *voluntary association among the citizens of a free state,* independently of the central power, is a natural and inevitable growth of freedom. It is a phenomenon, also, of so great prominence in the most recent civilization of free countries, and has an agency so powerful in political reform, in social amelioration, and in the missionary movement, that it demands careful consideration.”

The chief argumentative assailant at once of association for active purposes, and of philanthropy, is Mr Carlyle. Against the former he has flung one of those contemptuous aphorisms of his, which appear at first sight often to be so axiomatic, but which so often on a second examination turn out to be utterly destitute of truth or power. He divides the forces which act in human life into two classes—the Dynamical and the Mechanical; and places all unions and organizations among the

latter. Any one who is in the slightest degree acquainted with his writings, will at once see that this classification is the reverse of complimentary to the associative principle. He habitually worships free nature-born individual force. For dynamical power he has literally an infinite respect. But for everything which is merely mechanical, he cannot find words too strong to express his contempt. Mr Bayne's answer to him here is, we think, particularly good. "One man conceives an idea or perceives a truth, many men must unite to carry out or to diffuse it. But has he (Mr Carlyle) fully realised how the machinery of association and the dynamics of individual power are related? The connection is that of simple, proportional, indissoluble sequence. *The machinery arises from the dynamics, the organised and united force results from the individual, by a necessity which cannot be exhibited because its negation cannot even be conceived.*" "An individual or dynamic force acts in an individual bosom, it is communicated to another bosom, to a third, to a fourth; these all now have a common bond, and constitute a common force; a society, an organisation if you will, a machine is formed. The machinery must always be in a precise ratio to the dynamics." While that classification of Carlyle, then, which makes individual force dynamical, and the force of an association mechanical, may be admitted to be, in a sense, *formally* correct, it is not *really* so. For a body of men, by the fact of their combination, do not become a *tertium quid*—a something which works with an essentially new nature, and according to an essentially new law. The individuals organised retain their individual characteristics. Supposing, therefore, the question to be raised: "In seeking to effect great ends, the removal of social evils, or the propagation of saving truth, should we rely on the isolated efforts of single minds, or on the combined action of leagues and associations?" What shall we answer? Shall we side with Carlyle against the world, or against Carlyle with the world? For ourselves we elect to be in the majority.

Does "Christian Philanthropy" require to be defended? Is unbelief of any name so base and heartless as to sneer at the efforts made by good men to relieve the miseries of their fellows? Yes! Not in the pages of Carlyle alone, who, in regard to social matters, is so extravagant often as to seem absolutely insane; but even in the works of such apparently kind-hearted people as Mr Dickens and Miss Brontë, reason and ridicule are plied to bring into contempt the schemes and labours of those whose only crime is that they are walking closely in the footsteps of Jesus Christ. One of the two popular novelists we have named appears to have made up his mind that all who professes any anxiety to relieve those who are perishing

for lack of knowledge in heathen lands, proclaim themselves, *ipso facto*, to be hypocrites. To the other it seems clear that the man who is willing to leave home to carry the blessings of salvation to the dark places of the earth, must be both eminently heartless and animated by unhallowed ambition. As to Mr Carlyle, he openly and emphatically denounces all philanthropy—declares it “a phosphorescence, and unclean,”—and peremptorily “rejects it from among the agencies to be regarded with hope by those who desire the common weal.” The root of these extraordinary views, is shewn by Mr Bayne to be his fatal mistake in regard to the real end and function of *Law*. His theory of it is, that it proceeds from and gratifies revenge. “Example, effects upon the public mind, effects upon this and upon that—all this,” he asserts, “is mere appendage and accident.” “Revenge! my friends. Revenge, and the natural hatred of scoundrels, and the uneradica- ble tendency to *revancher* one’s self upon them, and pay what they have merited, this is for evermore a correct and even a divine feeling, in the mind of every man.” These sentiments scarcely deserved or required the elaborate answer which Mr Bayne has given to them. Most men will feel that they are at once weak and atrocious; but as it is, they are most ably and satisfactorily dealt with here; and being for ever cleared out of the way, the reasonableness and beauty of Christian philanthropy are exhibited with a power which ought to make all future vindication unnecessary.

And now we have reached what is in every sense of the word the principal part of the book—the *Illustrative Biographies*. Principal because of its extent, principal also because of its interest and value. This section of the work neither needs nor admits of such an analytic review as we have devoted to the Theoretic Statement. All we require to say is this, that here are six life sketches, from the perusal of which every reader will derive great profit and great enjoyment. The men whose biographies are given are *John Howard*, *William Wilberforce*, and *Samuel Budgett*, *John Foster*, *Thomas Arnold*, and *Thomas Chalmers*—all men whom we cannot know too intimately. The sketches themselves (it is, we believe, the testimony of all who have read them) are admirably rendered. In the selection of his facts, the grouping of his figures, the clearness and simplicity of his arrangement, the beauty of his style, the originality of his observations, and the healthiness of spirit which breathes through the whole, Mr Bayne has evinced his possession of capacities of the highest order and of the best kind. It is matter of thankfulness that a mind so rich and cultured, and a pen so strong and graceful, should have been devoted to the service of God,

and the illustration and defence of Christian truth. We greatly need such men as the author of "The Christian Life,"—men who have thoroughly examined the position of the enemy, and know all that he can say and do, and who are able to meet him on what we may call the neutral ground of the press. It would, in one sense, be almost absurd to speak of the work before us as a book of greatest *promise*, for it is, in point of fact, very much more than that—it is a mature *performance*. Yet the fact that it was substantially the fruit of Mr Bayne's labours while he had scarcely entered on the period of his manhood, is, we cannot but think, an eminently hopeful one. Already, in comparing the old with the new edition of the work, we have marked most decided indications of progress in many ways. There is an easy power in the prefatory note which does not appear to the same extent in the original statement. The style, too, is in certain parts altered for the better, and that in such a manner as to shew that Mr Bayne has less faith than he once had in rolling sentences, and more in simplicity, and directness, and strength. Besides, there is such a manifest improvement in the disposition of the materials as a whole, as to make it plain that the author now occupies a higher elevation at once as an observer and as a thinker. The relations of the various parts to one another, and of the whole to the end he has in view, are evidently better understood; and, as a fact, the momentum of the book as a power in society will now be felt to be greatly increased. Progress so conspicuous promises much for a future day. We would in the strongest manner commend "The Christian Life" (especially the new edition of it) to the attention of our readers; and in doing so we would express, at the same time, an earnest hope that its accomplished author may yet be spared to explore still further the important field on which he has entered, and vindicate "against *all* comers" the Bible view of a noble and blessed life.

ART. IX.—*The Life and Times of Carey, Marshman and Ward; embracing the History of the Serampore Mission.*
By JOHN CLARK MARSHMAN. 2 Vols. 8vo. London, 1859.

AMONGST the civil and military grandees assembled on a certain occasion in the brilliant saloon of the vice-regal residence at Barrackpore, in the days of the Marquis of Hastings, the most brilliant of all viceroys,—was a gentleman in a plain clerical garb, of simple unaffected manner, yet evidently conscious that he was not out of his proper sphere when he was among

the wisest of India's statesmen, and the bravest of India's warriors. Overhearing an old general ask an aide-de-camp whether it were true, as he had heard, that that gentleman was once a shoemaker, he himself vouchsafed the answer that report had done him too much honour, as he had never attained a higher grade in the profession than the cobbler's! It was William Carey, who, thirty years before, had been, in every sense of the term, a poor cobbler in an English village.

In the hall of the Agricultural and Horticultural Society of Calcutta there stands a marble bust of exquisite execution; and at the annual dinner of the Society, after "the usual loyal toasts" have been duly proposed, the assembly is called to do honour, in solemn silence, to the memory of the founder of the Society, whose bust adorns the hall. The man whose name is thus held in so distinguished and grateful remembrance, and whose features are thus commemorated in classic marble, is William Carey, who, with no advantages of position or education, in spite of obstacles that must have been deemed insurmountable had he not actually surmounted them, both furnished out from his own resources a noble botanic garden at Serampore, and gave the first impulse to a great movement for improving the cultivation and developing the resources of a mighty empire; and—let not this be thought a matter wholly unimportant—for beautifying the dwellings and cheering the exile of thousands of sojourners in that land, by putting it in their power to cultivate the humble and simple flowers of their native land, along with the more gorgeous products of tropical vegetation.

But half a score of years before Lord Hastings landed on the shores of India, and sixteen years before the formation of the Agricultural Society, there was a grand gala-day in Calcutta. The occasion was a public exhibition of the College of Fort-William. "These annual exhibitions were got up in that spirit of magnificence which characterised all Lord Wellesley's proceedings. They were held in the splendid edifice which he had erected in Calcutta for the residence of the Viceroy of India. . . . The Governor-General took his seat on the dais at the upper end of the noble throne-room; and the principal officers of Government, the judges of the Supreme Court, and the most distinguished members of European society, were seated around him. The assembly was graced by the beauty and fashion of Calcutta. The most eminent men in the native community; the learned Brahmans from all parts of the empire, in their simple attire; the opulent rajas and babus, and the representatives of the native princes of India, in their plumed and jewelled turbans, were assembled to do honour to the majesty of British power. In this brilliant assemblage

three of the most proficient students of the year in each language appeared as disputants, and the professor stood at their side as moderator. The scene was the most splendid which the metropolis presented throughout the year, and the day was one of high and honourable excitement to the civil service." On the occasion alluded to, the Professor of Sanskrit delivered an address, composed by himself in that language, to Lord Wellesley. A translation of it had been previously submitted to his Lordship, who returned it with a note in which was the following sentence:—"I esteem such a testimony from such a man a greater honour than the applauses of Courts and Parliaments." This man, whose profound scholarship entitled him to occupy the moderator's place in that august and brilliant assemblage, and enabled him to declaim in the audience of Pandits in their own most difficult language,—that man whose high character rendered his commendation an object of fond desire and of proud satisfaction to England's proudest nobles, was that same William Carey, whose education was limited to the merest elements of reading and writing, whose time from his fourteenth year was completely engrossed with a laborious avocation, and who probably never set his foot within the walls of a college, until, in his fortieth year, he entered within those of the college of Fort-William, as Professor of a language, which even now, with vastly increased facilities and helps, it is reckoned a great achievement to master when it is made the principal labour of the best twenty years of a man's life!

On the right bank of the Hooghly, opposite that Barrackpore which has been already mentioned, there stands a ruined pagoda. Externally it differs in no material respect from hundreds and thousands of others that are to be seen everywhere throughout Bengal. Upwards of fifty years ago this temple had been abandoned as a place of heathen worship, and having been purchased by a clergyman of the English Church, had been by him fitted up as an oratory or chapel; and under that roof, which had so often reverberated the wild sounds of that revelry which constitutes the staple of Hindu worship, was frequently to be heard the voice of Christian psalmody, breaking the stillness of an evening in Bengal, when the short twilight had given way to night, and the myriads of flashing fire-flies seemed the reflection of the myriads of stars in the still heavens. The voices that were most frequently heard mingling in the notes of that evening hymn were those of David Brown, Henry Martyn, Claudius Buchanan, William Carey, Joshua Marshman, and William Ward. This William Carey was the same who had concerted mainly with men who deemed apparently that there could be no salvation beyond the boundaries of a small

sect, and that grace could scarcely exist in a heart that did not reject infant baptism and an established church ; yet here we find him taking sweet counsel with men conscientiously holding views and sentiments very different from his own, and glorifying the grace of God in men from whom he conscientiously differed.

Similar contrasts, though not quite so vivid, occur in the histories of Dr Marshman and Mr Ward. They had never to struggle so laboriously under the burden of poverty ; and although they both excelled their senior colleague in many things, yet they did not stand out so prominently as *facile princeps* in any one thing of great importance, as he did as a scriptural translator, a lexicographer, and a florist.* It is, however, the providential union of the three, with their different gifts and graces, all consecrated by the same Spirit, and devoted with rare singleness of heart and unity of aim to the promotion of one great cause, that makes the foundation of the Serampore mission so remarkable an incident in the history of the Christian church. The three were a threefold cord not easily broken ; and as they were united in their lives, so Mr Marshman does well to join them in their biography. And very skilfully does he delineate the separate workings of each, and exhibit the contributions they severally made to the common working of all. We may notice that lives of Carey and of Ward have been long before the public, but their execution was not worthy of the subjects of them. It is only now that the history of the men and the mission is made accessible to the student of church history, and to the general reader. Those who go to the perusal of Mr Marshman's book with the expectation of receiving from it gratification or edification of the same kind which so many readers have sought and found in the lives of Martyn and Macdonald, and many other missionaries, will be disappointed. But those who wish to study an important epoch in the Christian church history, and to form a correct estimate of the way in which very remarkable men and very remarkable times acted and reacted on each other, will find the volumes before us well worthy not only of perusal but of careful study.

A word as to biographies of the class to which we have just referred, as distinguished from those of which that now before us is an admirable specimen. The former class are composed mainly of extracts from the private journals or diaries of their subjects, and the authors modestly state that they permit their subjects to be their own biographers. This, doubtless, appears

* Mr Marshman speaks of Dr Carey as if he had been a botanist. We question if he ever was so in the technical sense of the term. In fact botany, as it was then, a mere system of artificial classification and crabbed nomenclature, could have few attractions for an intelligent man. It is otherwise now.

very plausible, but we suspect that a very important fallacy lurks under it. Assuming, as in the specimen cases to which we have referred, we may safely assume, that the journals were written in perfectly good faith, they yet give no more idea of the real life of the journalist, than the brick of the classic simpleton gave of the tenement from which it was extracted to serve as a sample. Yea, far less. For that brick was of the same sort with those of which the tenement was built ; but the quarter of an hour that is taken as a sample of the day, is necessarily of a different complexion and character from the twenty-three and three-quarters from which it is detached. A man goes into his closet for a few minutes before retiring to rest, and solemnly reviews the proceedings of the day, and records in his journal his reflections on these proceedings. It is simply a matter of necessity that he is in a different mood and "frame" of mind from the various moods and frames in which he has been while he has been enacting these proceedings, and coming into contact and collision with his fellow-men. The real life is the text—the journal is but the commentary ; and however important it may be for many purposes to have the commentary, it cannot supply the place of the text. We are in a position to illustrate this statement by reference to the two so-called lives that we have mentioned—two of the best of their kind—those of Henry Martyn and John Macdonald. The latter of these great and good men we knew intimately ; and of the former we have heard numberless reminiscences from many of his surviving friends. On the strength of the knowledge thus derived, we venture to assert that scarcely any two men could be more different from one another than was the actual Henry Martyn from the Henry Martyn of Mr Sargeant, or the actual John Macdonald from the John Macdonald of Dr Tweedie. Probably in neither of the biographies is there a single false statement, and yet the effect of both of them is utterly to falsify the character of the subject, and to mislead the judgment of the reader. Every reader of Martyn's life conceives the idea that he was a sad, melancholy, heart-broken man ; while every reader of Macdonald's life pictures to himself a stern, austere Ishmaelite ; whereas the truth is, that in both the men cheerfulness and hilarity, and even mirthfulness, were the most conspicuous characteristics. We do not think that the real men were inferior to the men of the biographies ; to our own thinking, they were greatly superior. Certainly they were *toto cœlo* different ; and our knowledge of this difference nearly destroyed our faith in biography altogether, until it was restored by the perusal of the life of Dr Chalmers.

It is quite possible, as we have intimated, that good may be derived from such partial and one-sided views of life and cha-

racter as those to which we have referred ; but we suspect that the evil greatly exceeds the good. One very evident evil is, that they tend to make us misjudge of ourselves and people with whom we are conversant. The men and women with whom we are brought into intercourse in such books are made to shew us precisely that small portion of their lives which we never see in the lives of our daily associates, and which we know to be but an insignificant fraction of our own lives ; and thus, for all purposes of comparison, they are either useless, or they are misleading.

The founders of the Serampore Mission are well entitled to be had in remembrance of the church, and of all well-wishers of India. Their doings form an important chapter in the church-history of their native land, and in that of the land of their adoption. It is, therefore, a matter of congratulation that we have at last their history detailed in a continuous narrative, of great clearness and of unquestionable authenticity. A mere life of Dr Marshman, as supplementary of the lives previously published of Carey and Ward, would have been a poor substitute for the work before us.

Long before the end of last century, the glory of the church in England, both in its Established and Dissenting departments, had suffered a sad eclipse, and had gradually approached that condition in which the only alternative was revival or extinction. The summons which the poet represents as having in old times sounded over the expanse of hell was uttered from heaven in the ears of the church—

“Awake, arise, or be for ever fallen !”

And the warning voice was heard by the few to whom God gave ears to hear. One of the most distinguished among these was Thomas Scott, who was led from Socinianism to orthodoxy by the “force of truth,” and from indifference to fervent piety by the power of the Spirit. One of the first fruits of Mr Scott’s revived ministry was William Carey, then a shoemaker’s (or cobbler’s) apprentice at Ravenstone. His early struggles with poverty ; his energetic efforts to cultivate his intellectual powers, and to store his mind with useful, and especially with biblical knowledge ; his secession from the church, and adoption, first of Congregational, and afterwards of Anti-pædo-Baptist views ; his varied experiences as pastor of a very small church, teacher of a very small school, and maker or mender, on a very small scale, of shoes and clogs—are probably well known to all our readers. It was while prosecuting the pedagogic department of his multifarious vocation, and giving lessons in geography to his few scholars at Moulton, that the condition of the heathen nations arrested his

mind, and he conceived the great idea of claiming for the risen Son of God the heritage promised to him in the eternal covenant. From this time Carey was a new man ; a man now with a great soul-filling, soul-controlling, soul-strengthening idea ; a man with a divine call ; a man to whom difficulties and trials, though they are to come upon him thick as rain-drops in a thunder-storm, are to be henceforth but so many fresh calls to increased and more sustained exertion. We have often thought that one of the greatest differences between man and man—between the men who accomplish most and the men who accomplish nothing at all—is not so much the difference of their intellectual powers as the strength or weakness of their wills. Newton believed that this alone constituted the difference between him and ordinary men ; and certainly the idea receives confirmation from the case of Carey.

It was not long before his determination and firmness of purpose were put to the test. He had, of course, no right to expect sympathy from an ungodly world ; but probably he had not calculated upon antipathy from what he regarded as the godliest of all churches, and from really godly members and ministers of that church.* Yet so it was. The idea of missions to the heathen had been well nigh obliterated from the mind of the church. In almost all its branches it was in the state of hybernation, not dead, but with the powers of life so languid that it could not grow. In his own body there was perhaps fully as much life as in any other ; but it was woefully cramped and distorted by a misunderstood and misapplied system of theology. We do very sincerely believe that that system of doctrine commonly called Calvinism is so essentially true, that those who do not admit it are saved from Atheism only by a happy inconsistency. But *optimi corruptio semper pessima* ; and this system, misunderstood and perverted by a large section of the Baptist body in those days, became a doctrine not according to godliness, but a doctrine subversive of all the divine precepts.

The following scene requires no comment. It would be highly ludicrous were it not deeply melancholy :—

“ At a meeting of ministers held about this time at Northampton, Mr Ryland senior called on the young men around him to propose some topic for discussion, on which Mr Carey rose and proposed for consideration, ‘ The duty of Christians to attempt the spread of the

* We are quite aware that it is not technically correct to speak of the Baptist body as “ a church,” rather than as a number of churches, more or less associated with each other. We use the expression merely for the sake of its brevity, without the slightest reference to the questions that are involved in its propriety or impropriety.

Gospel among heathen nations.' The venerable divine received the proposal with astonishment, and, springing on his feet, denounced the proposition with a frown, and thundered out, 'Young man, sit down. When God pleases to convert the heathen, He will do it without your aid or mine.' Mr Fuller himself, who, in after years, built up the Mission at home, while Mr Carey was employed in establishing it in India, was startled by the boldness and novelty of the proposal, and described his feelings as resembling those of the unbelieving courtier in Israel: 'If the Lord should make windows in heaven, might such a thing be!'

Very interesting and instructive it is to trace the gradual working of the leaven which Carey succeeded, in spite of such opposition, in conveying into the body to which he belonged. Only those who have had to fight an almost hopeless battle can fully sympathise with his feelings of triumph and humble gratitude, when at last, at the end of 1792,* he succeeded in getting a Society organised, and £13:2:6 subscribed, and when he offered to embark at once as the first missionary of the Society for any country that they might select. And now, although the difficulties were far from being removed, and although they were continually presenting themselves in forms that would have discouraged aught but firm faith and Christian fortitude, yet there was regular and steady progress, until, on the 13th of June 1793, Mr Carey embarked in the *Cron-Princessa Maria*, a Danish vessel, manned with Danish and Norwegian sailors, but commanded by an Englishman. This is the voyage on which so much ridicule has been cast by the late Sydney Smith, by a process which we do not think it would be particularly difficult to imitate. To our thinking, the whole bearing of Carey, throughout scenes of almost unexampled trial, was nobly sublime. It was the working of a great, strong soul, sustained by an Almighty arm, daring all and doing all in the simple confidence of a child-like faith.

Mr Carey was accompanied by Mr Thomas, a strange character, of whom Mr Marshman enables us for the first time to form a consistent and intelligible idea. With rare mental powers and endowments, with warm feelings and ardent aspirations, Christianity did for him what it is competent for Christianity to do for a man of his class. It gave him zeal and devotedness, but it did not give him common sense. He would have delighted in sharing with Simeon Stylites his lofty accommodations, yet he could not deny himself the pleasure of spending money obtained by very questionable means. Most devoted to the great work of saving souls, he had a very inadequate idea of the main element of that salvation. Most unselfish and self-denying in respect of great

* Erroneously printed 1793.

things, he was self-indulgent to excess with respect to silly conceits and vanities. He would willingly have been a martyr for the faith of Christ, yet that faith had not power to purify his heart from that miserable vanity which led him recklessly to squander, with a prodigality that cannot be distinguished from dishonesty, the money that was not his own. The last act of the strange drama of his life casts light on much that was inexplicable in those that went before. He died a madman. Let us in charity hope that he lived one.

On the 11th of November 1793, Carey and his party landed in Calcutta. An honester, braver heart was never landed on the shores of that strange land. Hundreds had gone before, and thousands have followed him, actuated by various motives, and animated by different principles. Many warm hearts have long been cold, and many as warm are beating now, in that land, fighting the great life-battle with the weapons which God has given them severally. Right gladly might the bravest of them call Carey their brother. When Carey went to India, he doubtless braced himself for arduous labour and for severe trials and sufferings. But it is not likely that he had any adequate idea of the amount of either that lay before him. During his three months' residence in Calcutta, it was from dire poverty he was called to suffer. In that city of palaces, where so much is constantly squandered, and where so much is constantly given most cheerfully for the relief of wretchedness, even when that wretchedness is caused by folly and vice, there was no helping hand extended to the associate of Thomas, for it was known that what was given to Carey was virtually given to him, and that even the mass of Indian liberality could not fill the maelstrom of his insatiable extravagance. But if the darkest hour be that before the dawn, the depth of the darkness is a presage of the dawn that is to follow; and Carey did experience comfort and even joy in the period of his residence in the Soonderbunds and at Malda. It is gratifying to know that it was through the influence of Mr Thomas that he received an appointment at the latter place, as superintendent of an indigo factory, belonging to Mr Udny. In this good act he must have had more satisfaction than in any other of his wayward and eccentric life.

"The letter reached Mr Carey on the 1st of March. His thoughts had always turned to a residence in the Malda district, and he was not long, therefore, in determining to accept a proposal which rescued him from the jaws of starvation, and opened to him the prospect of extensive usefulness, more especially as the large establishment of native servants and labourers connected with the factory would afford shelter and subsistence to any who might embrace Christianity. No sooner had he accepted Mr Udny's offer, than he considered it his

duty to write to the Society in England, and state that he was no longer in circumstances to need any personal support; he likewise requested that the sum which might be considered as his salary, should be devoted to the printing of the Bengalee translation of the New Testament. 'At the same time,' he adds, 'it will be my glory and joy to stand in the same relation to the Society as if I needed support from them, and to maintain the same correspondence with them.'

The Committee of the Baptist Missionary Society were alarmed for the safety of their missionary, lest secularity and the love of riches should corrupt his heart! We doubt not that their fears were honest; but they were groundless. Nevertheless the five years of Carey's residence in Malda, were probably among the happiest of his life. With his very moderate wants supplied, his secular work affording him moderate but sufficient physical exercise, while his time was mainly occupied with the study of the language, which was to him emphatically a labour of love, with ministrations in English and Bengali, with the superintendence of a small but promising school, and with efforts to render the word of God into the language of the country; he was living a life of quiet usefulness, little dreaming of the more stirring career that he was soon to enter upon.

The failure of the factory of which he had charge compelled his employer to relinquish it, and Mr Carey was once more thrown destitute upon the world. He had long had an idea of forming a Moravian establishment; and with a view to this he now purchased a small factory in the Malda district, and removed to it with his family. Mr Marshman, who knew Dr Carey as intimately as any man can know any other, and who knows the capabilities of Bengal as well as any man living, has no doubt that this speculation must have utterly failed. With only second-hand knowledge of Carey, and with much less extensive knowledge of Indian cultivation, our perfect agreement with him is of but little value for the confirmation of his opinion. But indeed it needs no confirmation. On other grounds altogether than those on which he puts it, we think it very evident that not only would a Moravian establishment have been unsuccessful under Carey's management, but that the Moravian principle altogether is inapplicable to a country where Europeans cannot labour in the open air, nor live without many expensive comforts, which are elsewhere deemed luxuries, but there are absolute necessities; where, in all ordinary handicraft employments, they must be prepared to compete with men who are amply remunerated by fourpence a day.

Before leaving Mr Udny's factory, Mr Carey had made to

the society an urgent appeal for additional missionaries, who might be reported to the government as his assistants in the factory, and in that character permitted to remain in the country ; and within nine months of the receipt of this application, four missionaries were on their way to India. Amongst these were Messrs Marshman and Ward. The latter had received a good common-school education, and had been in a favourable position, in connection with the provincial periodical press, for improving his advantages. The former, like Mr Carey, was mainly self-educated. An equally hard student with Carey, he seems to have studied more with a view to the acquisition of knowledge, while Carey seems to have been prompted mainly by the love of study itself. Perhaps no man ever actually possessed a greater amount of knowledge stored up in his mind than Joshua Marshman. An insatiable reader from his childhood till the last year of his long life, he was continually making fresh acquisitions, and he was gifted with a memory of almost preternatural power. He never forgot either fact, or date, or word. It is told of him in India, and we happen to know that it is true, that he was once pitted for a mnemonical tournament with Mr (now Lord) Macaulay. "Repeat," said the historian, "any line from Shakspeare, and I undertake to tell you from what play, what act, what scene it is taken, and to carry on the quotation fifty lines without a mistake." "Repeat," said the missionary, "a line from the Paradise Lost, and I undertake to tell you not only in which book it occurs, but also which line it is in that book, and to carry on the quotation in like manner, as far as you like." Each made good his profession, and the victory was undecided. Both Marshman and Ward were much less unworldly men than Carey, in the sense that they knew the world better, and were far more fitted to take part in its affairs, and without being subject to it, rather to render it subject to them, and to make it available to the promotion of their great object. Carey could scarcely have constrained "the earth to help the woman," or known how to render her help useful. His colleagues were men of larger minds. All were devoted in spirit to a degree rarely witnessed in these days of a decent world and a cold church. Separately each would have been incompletely furnished for the great work of laying the foundation of the native church in Bengal, but each found in the others a helpmeet for himself, and the providential union of them formed a three-fold cord, not easily broken. It were an interesting exercise to study the history of the Serampore mission, with especial reference to this blending of dissimilar elements, and to trace the operation of each mind, acting on and acted upon by each of the others. It is thus that in

all the great crises of the history of the church, the imperfection of individual instruments has been compensated by their union.

There are three subjects brought prominently before us in these volumes, viz., the relation in which the mission stood toward the Government; the operations and procedure of the missionaries in the carrying out of their great object; and the relation in which they stood toward the church at home, and the society under whose auspices they went to India. A brief notice of these three topics will fully occupy the space at our disposal.

In the earlier days of the Company's rule in India, their watchword was *monopoly*. No good or evil must be done but by the Government. Now, whatever we may now think of this principle, we ought to remember that it was the principle on which all the governments of the earth were then conducted. We ought to remember another thing, that while the principle was submitted to with a better or a worse grace by the nations of the west, it was most thoroughly in accordance with all the feelings and habits of the Asiatic races, and perhaps most of all with those of the Indian race; and perhaps, at the time when we succeeded to the Mohammedan powers, it was a necessary evil, to be endured for a season, until the people should be trained for a better order of things. But it was not so that it was accepted by the East India Company. It was sedulously interwoven with all their institutions, and formed an integral and unseverable part of them. Entirely in accordance with the spirit of this policy, was the exclusion of all foreigners from their territory, with the exception of such as were employed in their own service. The subjects of European states could go nowhere without carrying certain rights and privileges along with them; but no rights or privileges must exist within the Indian territory, except the right and privilege of implicit, unquestioning, unthinking obedience. There does not appear to have been any attempt to relax the absolute exclusion of independent Europeans from the territories of the East India Company during the first half-century of their rule. But, previous to the renewal of the Charter in 1793, a vigorous attempt was made by Mr Grant to induce the Government themselves to undertake the instruction of their subjects; and Mr Wilberforce had the high satisfaction, to his own surprise and that of his friends, of carrying the resolution in Parliament—"That it is the opinion of this House, that it is the peculiar and bounden duty of the legislature to promote, by all just and prudent means, the interests and happiness of the inhabitants of the British dominions in the East; and that for these ends such measures ought to be adopted as may gra-

dually tend to their advancement in useful knowledge, and to their religious and moral improvement." Mr Wilberforce recorded in his journal:—"The hand of Providence was never more visible than in this Indian affair." But there was a fatal slip betwixt the cup and the lip. The Attorney and Solicitor-General were instructed to frame a clause to be inserted in the Charter, in order to give practical effect to the resolution. The clause bore that encouragement should be given to missionaries and schoolmasters. "The India House was seized with a panic, which led to an unexpected and violent explosion. The clauses were quashed, and the improvement of India, as far as the public authorities were concerned, was thrown back twenty years."

It was at this very time, when Mr Dundas positively dared not, although he was well-inclined, to support Mr Wilberforce's clauses; when Mr Fox objected to the whole measure, because he considered all schemes of proselytism as wrong in themselves, and as productive, in most cases, of mischief; when the Bishop of St David's, in his place in the House of Lords, questioned the right of any people to send their religion to any other nation; and when the bishops, as a body, gave no support to the opposite view—that Carey conceived the grand idea of introducing the gospel into India, not only without the aid, but in the face of the most violent opposition on the part of the authorities. Thus hath God chosen the weak things of the earth to confound the mighty, and things that are not to bring to nought things that are.

It does not clearly appear how it happened that Carey and Thomas were allowed to land and take up their abode in India without molestation. Their doing so made them liable "to be declared guilty of a high crime and misdemeanour, and to fine and imprisonment;" and the civil authorities were well-disposed to exercise the power placed in their hands. However it was, it is certain that Mr Carey's first trials in India did not arise from any molestation on the part of the Government, but from dire poverty, and his unfortunate connection with his eccentric colleague. When, in 1799, Messrs Brunson, Grant, Ward, and Marshman were to proceed to India, it was well known that not only would they be refused permission to sail in the Company's fleet, but that an application for permission to do so would probably lead to instructions being sent to India to prevent their landing, if they contrived to find their way thither by any other means. All the Danish vessels of the season had sailed; but an opportunity offered itself of their proceeding in the American ship *Criterion*, whose good commander, Captain Wickes, had long cherished the hope of being privileged to convey the messengers of the gospel to the heathen.

When the vessel reached Calcutta, the missionaries had the alternative of reporting themselves as assistants in Mr Udny's indigo factory, or as missionaries proceeding to the foreign settlement of Serampore. They adopted the latter course. They do not appear to have landed at Calcutta. Captain Wilkes "procured boats for their luggage, in which they embarked under the guidance of his sirkar, who spoke a little English ; and on Sunday morning, the 13th of October, they found themselves opposite the neat little hotel at Serampore. Mr Marshman immediately went on shore, and falling on his knees, blessed God for having brought them in safety across the ocean, and landed them on the soil of India." No bad subject for the artist's pencil were this landing of the missionary on the scene with which his name will be connected as long as that of Columbus with America, or that of Watt with the steam-engine, or that of Wellington with Waterloo.

Although the missionaries had reported themselves as proceeding to Serampore, yet it was not their intention to remain there, but to embrace the first opportunity of joining Mr Carey. The movements of a few eventful days we must give in the words of our author.

"On Monday, the 14th of October, the missionaries waited on the Governor, Colonel Bie, with the letter from the Danish consul in London, and were received with the most cordial affability. He offered them all the assistance in his power, but expressed great doubts whether they would be permitted by the British Government to proceed up the country to Malda. They were not, however, deterred by his remarks, but began to engage boats, and prepare for their immediate departure. But a grievous disappointment awaited them. The captain's report of having brought out four missionaries reached Calcutta on Thursday, and was submitted by the police to the Governor-General in Council, without the loss of a day. This was the first instance in which the arrival of missionaries, without the permission of the Court of Directors, had been officially brought before Government, and it was resolved that the missionaries should be forthwith required to leave the country. Orders to this effect were sent to the town authorities the next day ; and when Captain Wickes applied on Monday to enter his vessel, he was informed that instructions had been issued by Government to refuse it, unless the four missionaries appeared at the police office, and entered into engagements to return immediately to England. This intelligence, which Captain Wickes brought up to Serampore in person the same evening, disarranged all their plans, and filled their minds with dismay. They determined, however, to remain at Serampore, and quietly await the development of circumstances, unless the governor of the settlement declined to protect them. They waited on him the next morning, and explained the difficulties of their position. Colonel Bie had enjoyed the ministry and instructions of Schwartz, while an officer at the Danish settle-

ment of Tranquebar, on the coast, and entertained great regard for the cause of missions. He had been nearly forty years in the service of the Danish Company, the greater portion of which period was passed in the government of Serampore. He was a man of small stature, but undaunted resolution, and though the contrast was so palpable between his little commercial settlement, with a small saluting battery, and the Empire of British India, in which it appeared a mere speck, he had maintained a tone of lofty independence towards the British Government twenty years before this time, and had given no little umbrage to Warren Hastings. Subsequently to that period he had uniformly resisted the demand of successive Governors-General for the surrender of those to whom he had given the protection of his flag. He was now prepared anew to brave the indignation of the British Government by offering the missionaries an asylum, but at the same time advised them to present an explanatory memorial to Lord Wellesley. They lost no time in writing to Mr Carey to come down with all expedition, and aid them at this crisis with his advice. Mr Ward and Mr Brunsdon also went down to Calcutta to make interest for permission to remain in the country; but they found that a paragraph had appeared in a newspaper of the preceding day, stating that four Papist missionaries had arrived in a foreign vessel and proceeded to Serampore. The editor had never heard of the existence of the Baptist denomination, and concluded that the missionaries must be Popish priests, more especially as the emissaries of Bonaparte were known to be traversing the country under that guise. But the Governor-General was soon assured of the Protestant character and pacific designs of the missionaries. He found, moreover, that they were now beyond his reach, and he felt that he had no legal right to refuse an entry to a foreign vessel, simply on the ground that she had brought out four passengers who had proceeded to a foreign settlement. He yielded to circumstances with a grace that did credit to his good sense, and removed the interdict he had laid on the 'Criterion.' At the same time Captain Wickes informed the police that the missionaries did not intend to present themselves at the office, but would for the present continue at Serampore."

Shortly after the missionaries learned, through Mr David Brown, that Lord Wellesley would really be glad that they should remain at Serampore. He conceived that he had no alternative but to prevent their residence in the British territories; but he had personally no wish to persecute them, and was rather pleased than otherwise that Serampore afforded a means of reconciling what he considered his official duty with his personal feelings. "Lord Wellesley," says our author, "was a despot, but an enlightened despot. The uncontrolled power vested in him he valued, because it enabled him to secure the safety and promote the prosperity of the British empire in the East. But he had no sympathy with the little contracted views which then prevailed in the corporation in Leadenhall Street, where the dread of interlopers

was an heirloom, and it was almost treasonable to name missionaries and schoolmasters. He did not consider either of these classes dangerous, and he had therefore no reason for persecuting them." Mr Carey could not relinquish his new station at Kidderpore, in the Malda district, without sacrificing the greater part of the £300 that he had paid for it, and the whole of what he had expended in the erection of huts for himself and his expected colleagues. But he had set his heart upon printing, and, through the kindness of Mr Udny, had procured a printing-press; and it was very evident that the government would not permit printing operations to be carried on, even on the smallest scale, within their territories, at a distance from Calcutta, where all the apparatus of a rigid censorship had been erected. This seems to have been the consideration that prevailed with Carey to join his brethren at Serampore.

Scarcely six months elapsed ere the government took alarm at the vicinity of the press and the mission. A notice was inserted by the missionaries in the Calcutta newspapers, to the effect that they were about to print the New Testament in Bengali, and soliciting subscriptions to aid them in carrying out this design. Lord Wellesley at once perceived that he had gained nothing by prohibiting the press in Malda, some 300 miles off, where it would have been completely under his own control, and permitted its establishment at Serampore, thirteen miles from Calcutta, where he could not directly exercise any authority over it. His first impulse was to request the Danish authorities to forbid the printing operations; but fortunately he first consulted with Mr David Brown, and was assured by him that the Serampore missionaries would never print anything which could in any way endanger the British empire. This was the last occasion on which he manifested any feeling of alarm at their proceedings; and next year he appointed Mr Carey to the office of teacher of Bengali in his new College of Fort William. It was well for the missions that good counsels now prevailed in Lord Wellesley's mind, for in the following year the protection of Denmark was rendered unavailable. On the 8th of May 1801, the town of Serampore was taken possession of by a party of British troops. The missionaries were required to attend on the English commissioner, who expressed his regret at the trouble he had given them, and assured them that they were at liberty to pursue their avocations as usual; and during the eighteen months that the place remained in the hands of the English, they were permitted to prosecute their labours without any interruption. The work went on in peace. The New Testament was printed; several tracts also were extensively circulated,

and several natives were baptised. This success, of course, roused the indignation of some of the influential natives. One of them shewed the tracts to a judge of the Sudder Court at Calcutta, who was known to be unfriendly to missions, and inquired whether the Government had authorised these remarks on the popular faith. This judge determined to bring the matter before Mr Barlow, who was then acting as President of the Council, Lord Wellesley being absent in the upper provinces. Mr Claudius Buchanan overheard the conversation between the judge and Mr Barlow, and urged the judge to read the tracts himself before he committed himself to any steps in the matter. Whether he were convinced that he had no grounds for instituting proceedings, or whether the Governor-General gave him a hint to forbear, we are not informed; but the matter was allowed to drop.

Mr Carey's position in the College of Fort William not only secured toleration for himself and his colleagues, but enabled him to exert a favourable influence on the proceedings of Government with reference to the superstitions of the natives; an influence which his strong "voluntary" sentiments were a safeguard against his abusing. To Lord Wellesley belongs the high honour of having been the first Governor-General who broke through the rule of permitting the Hindus to perpetrate the most enormous crimes under the sanction of religion. His first onslaught was on the practice of sacrificing children at the mouth of the Ganges. This practice had been carried on to a fearful extent, and was an institution which none of his predecessors had dared meddle with. But "not-to-dare" was an expression whose meaning the Wellesley family could never very distinctly comprehend. When the enormities of the practice were brought to Lord Wellesley's notice, he immediately resolved that it should be suppressed. His first step was to request Mr Carey to examine the authorities which were adduced in support of the practice, and report to Government. The work was one altogether to Carey's taste. His report was soon given in, and upon it was founded a regulation, which was put forth in August 1802, and which interdicted the drowning of children at Saugor under severe penalties.

In this instance, Mr Carey had only acted as a linguist at the request of the Government. But soon after we find the Serampore missionaries organising means for obtaining correct statistics respecting a still more appalling practice, the rite of Suttee. The results of careful inquiries as to the frequency of the rite, and of diligent study of the various texts in the sacred books on which the practice was based, were put into the hands of Mr Udny, now a member of the Supreme Council. By him they were embodied in a memorial, which he submit-

ted to the Governor-General in Council. And it is worthy of remark, that this is the first notice of the subject which appears in the records of Government. A quarter of a century passed away, and one Governor-General after another occupied the vice-regal throne, and tens of thousands of women fell victims to this murderous rite, ere Carey and Marshman saw the abolition accomplished. During all that time, they were strenuously exerting themselves for the promotion of the good cause, and proportionate was their joy when the glorious work of the abolition was accomplished. When the act for the abolition of Suttee was at last passed by Lord William Bentinck in 1829, Dr Carey was Bengali translator to the Government. The act was passed on a Saturday afternoon, and was immediately despatched to Serampore for translation. It reached Dr Carey on Sabbath morning, when he was about to go into the pulpit. A day's delay in the issue of the act would have caused the death of at least two additional victims.* He therefore handed over his clerical duty to one of his colleagues, and sending for his Pandit, proceeded at once to the work of translating this gospel of glad tidings, and finished it before night,—the only occasion on which he was ever known to do secular work on the Lord's day. But was it secular work?

So far as it went, it was a great blessing, for which the Serampore missionaries were unfeignedly thankful, that Lord Wellesley threw no obstacles in the way of their operations. But his administration came to an end. He was succeeded by Lord Cornwallis, whose former administration had been distinguished by military conquests, but mainly by a settlement of the Land-Revenue in Bengal, which was doubtless well-meant, but which has proved a mighty blunder, and has been the great obstruction to improvement ever since. He was sent out a second time, professedly for the purpose of counteracting Lord Wellesley's policy, which was too liberal for the ideas of his honourable masters in Leadenhall Street. But Lord Cornwallis died a few weeks after he landed,—the only Governor-General that has hitherto died in India. After his death Sir George Barlow acted as Governor-General,—a man who had made a profession of religion, but who was far too little-minded and too timid to be valiant for the truth. During his administration, the persecuting spirit which had been dormant for a while, revived with increased strength, and for the eight years that intervened between the death of Lord Cornwallis and the amendment of the Company's Charter in 1813, not a step was taken by the missionaries but at the risk of being banished from the country. The attitude

* So says Mr Marshman; but the average number of victims was more nearly ten than two daily.

which the two parties assumed was simply this. The missionaries asked permission to establish stations at suitable places in the British territory. Sir George Barlow "stated that he was personally favourable to missionary exertions, but that he had not the power to authorise missionary establishments in the country, and could not act in opposition to the known sentiments of the Court of Directors." Mr Carey stated in reply, that "however great might be the respect of the missionaries for the wishes of Government, they *must* form stations, and that without the consent of Government, if they were unable to obtain it, and that they were prepared to take the risk of the consequences on themselves." The risk that they undertook was simply this: if in any district where they commenced operations, the officials were all either Christian men, (which in those days was a coincidence not to be expected) or good-natured, quiet gentlemen, they might be permitted to carry on their operations without molestation. But whenever a collector, or judge, or magistrate, came into the district who had a dislike to Christianity, or who wished to gain a little favour with the natives, or who had a desire to attract the attention of Head-quarters to his own zeal, he had only to ask for the licence of the missionaries, and as they had none, he would pass them from police-station to police-station, until they arrived at Calcutta, where they would probably have been sentenced to deportation. As it was, however, particularly undesirable that there should be an open collision with Government, the missionaries, in every case where they were questioned, preferred to leave the district quietly. Thus Mr Moore and Mr William Carey junior were expelled from Dacca, and Mr Biss and Mr Moore from Dinagapore. It thus became evident that European labour could not be available for the propagation of the gospel beyond the very narrow limits of the Danish territory. But let it be clearly understood what was the crime of which the law could take cognizance. It was not the preaching of the gospel; for that had never been declared to be a penal offence. It was that unlicensed Europeans should be in the country for any purpose. It is true that there were many, traders and cultivators, who were unmolested; but they were equally liable to be interfered with, although they never were. But there was no law or regulation which could prevent native preachers from going where they would, and doing what they could, for the diffusion of the gospel; and this seems to have led, at an earlier period than it would otherwise have been resorted to, to the employment of native preachers, of whom there were now several connected with the mission. This had all along been the object of the missionaries, as it must necessarily be of all mis-

sionaries; but probably the peculiar relation in which the European missionaries stood towards the Government, caused it to be brought into operation sooner than it otherwise would.

"The plan which had been for some time under consideration at Serampore, of sending native itinerants into various parts of the country, was now reduced to a distinct form. In the beginning of August, a meeting of all the missionaries and converts was held at the Mission House, when the following proposal was discussed and adopted:—That it is the indispensable duty of the native brethren, both individually and collectively, to strive, by all the means in their power, to communicate divine truth to their fellow-countrymen; that those who are thus employed ought to be supported, and that it is as much the province of the Church to provide for their maintenance while thus engaged, as for the support of its own poor. It was proposed, in every case, to send two itinerants together, one a man of years, steadiness, and ability; the other a younger convert, who should 'carry papers, and cook for both,' and be gradually initiated into the work by occasionally addressing the heathen. The missionaries were anxious on this, and on all occasions, that the itinerants should retain the simplicity of their national character and habits. A committee was formed at Serampore to superintend and direct the labours of the itinerants, and the three senior missionaries were requested to preside over it. They nominated twelve of the most active and intelligent of the converts to the work, of whom some were already engaged in the field in different parts of the country."

But even this limited amount of toleration was soon withdrawn. The opening of a chapel in Calcutta, the arrival of two new missionaries from England, and the panic occasioned by the Vellore mutiny, induced Sir George Barlow to send to Mr Carey, through one of the magistrates of Calcutta, a message to the effect that "as the Governor-General did not interfere with the prejudices of the natives, he required Mr Carey and his associates to abstain likewise from any interference with them. Mr Carey requested an explanation of this rather enigmatical prohibition, and the magistrate explained it to signify that the missionaries were not to preach to the natives, or allow their converts to preach; they were not to distribute pamphlets themselves, or permit others to circulate them; they were not to send forth converted natives as teachers, or indeed to take any step, by conversation or otherwise, to induce the natives to embrace Christianity." This was a declaration of war *à l'outrance*; and Sir George soon shewed that what he said he fully meant. The two newly-arrived missionaries were ordered to quit the country, although they had come in an American ship, and had been received under the protection of the Danish flag at Serampore.

The native preachers, however, continued to itinerate in defiance of Sir George's orders.

Lord Minto arrived in India as Governor-General on the last day of July 1807. The first tidings that he heard on his arrival were of the mutiny at Vellore; and before he was a month in the country the anti-missionary party had gained complete possession of his mind. After various consultations, and the not very dignified course of employing spies, under the character of inquirers, to procure from the missionaries copies of their publications, the Supreme Council came (apparently unanimously) to the conclusion "that they were bound by every consideration of general safety, and national faith and honour, to suppress, within the limits of the Company's authority in India, treatises and public preachings offensive to the religious persuasions of the people." The proceedings and negotiations that followed upon this resolution, and the consequent demands of the Government, are among the most interesting that we remember to have read. Mr Marshman's narrative of these does not admit of abridgment, and is too long for transference to our pages. "The irresistible might of Christian meekness carried the missionaries safely through this crisis." If any of our clerical readers think of preaching from the text, "If a man's ways please the Lord, he causeth even his enemies to be at peace with him," let us venture to recommend to them to study this incident in the history of the Serampore mission as illustrative of the truth. It was well that this change in the views of Government had taken place, as at the beginning of 1808 Serampore was again taken possession of by the English, and remained in their hands till the peace in 1815.

The battle which had been fought in India had to be fought again in England; and it was at this time that the question of missions to the heathen was examined in all its aspects, and decided for ever. The publications on either side are nearly forgotten now, but they are well worthy the attention of the curious.

A notice of the restrictions that still remained, taken in connection with the intense thankfulness of the missionaries and their friends, for the "great and almost miraculous deliverance" they had experienced, shews us more clearly than aught else how great was the evil before its alleviation.

"The Armenian and Portuguese attendants at the little chapel in the Chitpore Road, which had been closed on receiving the deposition of the magistrate's spy, petitioned Government to grant the Serampore missionaries liberty to preach to them in the Bengalee language, in which alone they were able to receive instruction. But the request, however reasonable and innocuous, was refused. The missionaries

were thus excluded from all preaching in the vernacular tongue in the metropolis, except at their own house. Under the general regulations of Government they could not send missionaries into the interior of the country without permission, and this permission had been denied them. 'But this difficulty,' writes Dr Carey, 'we shall endeavour to evade, that is, we shall run the risk of the missionaries being sent back to Serampore by the magistrate. On this principle we are hoping to send my son William to Chittagong, and brother Robinson to Orissa.' They hoped by patient and quiet perseverance gradually to wear out the opposition of Government. It was in reference to the issue of religious tracts and treatises that the restrictions imposed on them were at first most keenly felt. They were required to submit the manuscript of every publication to the inspection of the Secretary, and could not print a single page without his imprimatur. Unfortunately, Government had affirmed that it was pledged to protect the natives from molestation in the exercise of their religion; and any animadversion on their creed or practice was considered an act of molestation, within the scope of the pledge. The governor of Serampore had, however, inquired whether the Bible in the native language was included in the prohibition, and had been informed that 'the British Government was not aware of any objection to the circulation of the Holy Scriptures in the vernacular tongues, if unaccompanied by any comments on the religions of the country.' The missionaries were thus at liberty to print and circulate the Scriptures in the language of inspiration, and they freely availed themselves of the privilege."

Scarcely anything can be more affecting than the intense gratitude of these good men for being permitted to carry on their work, even on what seem to us so unfavourable terms, and being admitted to a position which can only be described as,

"For happy though but ill, for ill not worst."

Of the improved state of feeling on the part of Government, an instance occurred in 1810, when the missionaries presented an official application to the Governor-General for permission to send two of their number to Saharanpore, on the Punjaub frontier. The request was indeed refused, but the Government, in intimating their decision, were careful to explain that they had been influenced in this determination only by those considerations which rendered it imprudent for any Europeans, not sustaining a public character, to settle in the frontier districts in the present circumstances of the country. This certainly implied, and was intended to imply, that there was no objection to their carrying on their operations in the more settled districts. And this was a mighty step in advance. The sincerity of this return to sounder views of toleration was evinced soon after, when an application was made for permission to establish a mission in Agra or Delhi. Mr Marshman had an interview with Lord Minto on the subject, and was advised to

apply merely for permission to proceed thither, *saying nothing of anything else*. In this form the application was made, and granted. But this gleam of sunshine did not last long. The period of the revival of the company's charter was approaching. It was known that great exertions would be made for the legalisation of missionary operations; and the anti-missionary party, as if they knew that their days of power were numbered, resolved to put forth a last effort. The sky had been lowering for some time, and the cloud at last burst on the arrival of Dr Judson and his colleagues from America. The history of the transactions with reference to that event, which, under the hand of God, led to the establishment of the mission in Burmah, and the blessed results that have ensued from it, is generally well known. A similar course was adopted with reference to Messrs Johns and Lawson, two missionaries who had arrived to join the Serampore body. The proceedings of 1807 were repeated and improved upon in 1812, Mr Lawson having been actually put in prison, and Mr Johns deported, though he was a physician, and had in that capacity received an acting appointment in the service of Government. This was one of the last acts of the Indian Government under the old charter. The day-star was already touching the horizon, and from this time missionaries have had a *right* to prosecute their labours in India, subject only to the ordinary conditions of good citizenship. All honour be to the memory of those who stood in the fore-ground of the great battle by which this freedom was achieved, and so gloriously fought a good fight, of which the fruits are to be perpetual.

Having thus sketched the circumstances under which the earlier operations of the Serampore mission were carried on, we have now to notice more specifically these operations themselves. These were very various in their kinds, and very extensive in their amount. It may be that they lose a portion of their value as an example to the church, on the ground that we do not know that they were precisely what the missionaries would have chosen under more favourable circumstances. As Solon said of his laws, that they were not the best that he could have made, but the best that his countrymen would receive, so we doubt not that the Serampore brethren would have modified their course of action had they been less subject to interference from without. But as it was, their labours are a noble exemplification of the might and power of faithful men, acting under the influence of high principle in a good and noble cause.

The labours of the Serampore missionaries were of two kinds, those that they undertook for the support of the mission, and those that they carried on directly in promotion of their great

object. Of the former class were Dr Carey's work as an indigo-planter in Malda, and subsequently as teacher of Bengali and Sanskrit, in the College of Fort William, and Dr Marshman's boarding-school at Serampore. These were the two main sources of support to the mission, and most freely were the hard-earned gains devoted to the cause of God. Of the latter class were the teachings, the preachings, and the translations in which these good men abounded ; and we may be permitted to say also, the literary labours and researches, by which they conferred an invaluable boon on all who have come after them, by facilitating their studies in those subjects that are essential to their equipment as missionaries.

The first work that Mr Carey undertook, after his arrival in India, was the revisal of a translation of the New Testament that had been made by his colleague, Mr Thomas, during his previous residence in the country. We believe that the repeated revisals of Dr Carey completely displaced the original translation, and that the version that was long in use was substantially, as it was always called, Carey's own. It served a most valuable purpose, until it was superseded by that of Dr Yates, which to our thinking was not, upon the whole, an improvement upon it. The language of Dr Yates's version was positively beautiful, but it was the language of the Pandits rather than that of the people. Dr Carey's language was comparatively inelegant, and the whole composition bore the marks of being a translation ; whereas Dr Yates's might have been supposed to be an original work. We venture to think that the time has not yet come for an authorised and permanent version of the Scriptures in the Bengali language, and that we must wait for this until the indigenous church of India can supply a body of translators learned in the original languages. It is no disparagement to Dr Carey to say that he did not do what no foreigner could do, or can do, or ever will be able to do, and that he did well, under great difficulties, what was competent for a foreigner to accomplish. The work of translation seemed, indeed, to be the department of the work to which the missionaries were for a time shut up, from the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed ; and the amount of work that they accomplished in this way was truly remarkable. We believe we may safely assert, that greater industry and greater talent were never united in any Christian work. Like him of old who is said to have wept because he had no more worlds to conquer, they were not even content with the study of the numerous languages and dialects of India ; but Dr Marshman actually undertook the study of Chinese, and made good progress in it. His son questions the wisdom of this, forgetting apparently that with these men

study was a necessity, that they could as little live without encountering and surmounting difficulties as they could live without breathing.

When we say that translation was the peculiar work of the Serampore missionaries, we only mean that they did more of this work than any other missionaries; not that they did more of it than they did of other work. In fact, there is nothing more admirable in the history of these remarkable men than the readiness with which they accommodated themselves to every department of labour. They translated as if they had been only translators; they preached as if they had devoted their whole time and thought to preaching; they taught as if they had been nought but teachers; they studied as if they had not been men of action; they laboured as if they had not been men of thought. Altogether, they were great men raised up and qualified by God for a great work, and sustained in that work by a large measure of divine grace.

There is perhaps no part of their work in which they succeeded so well as in raising up an indigenous ministry, suited to the wants and the circumstances of the native churches. This is a problem of difficult solution. Of course an unlearned ministry is always undesirable, and it is not difficult to impart a good measure of learning to men so acute and receptive as the Bengalis are. But it is very difficult to avoid imparting, along with the learning, ideas and habits which spoil those who receive it for the work for which they are intended. We are not aware that any subsequent missionaries have succeeded so well as they did in training a class of men just suited for the peculiar work of ministering to native churches. Doubtless it was not so difficult then as it is now, when there is so much demand for well-educated natives in secular employment. The ministry is too apt to become the profession only of those who are not fit for such employment, and of those who have such a burning zeal for their Master's service, that they will prefer the work of the ministry with poverty to any other work with wealth. Of this latter class there are some noble specimens in the native Bengali church; but probably no church in Christendom could furnish a large number of such. In the beginning of the century there was little demand for native talent and intelligence, and for native Christian talent and intelligence none at all. This, doubtless, gave the earlier missionaries a larger choice than is open to their successors; and they knew how to take advantage of the facility—almost the only one that they enjoyed. The Serampore preachers, both natives and those of mixed blood, were simple men, well but not showily educated; rather trained than taught; distinguished rather by quiet patience than by *dash*; accounting

it no strange thing if they were despised and held in slight esteem by their worldly countrymen ; ready to toil on noiselessly, in the hope of ultimately effecting some good. We suspect they have all passed away now ; and although the race that has succeeded them be superior to them in some things, it can scarcely be doubted that, with a few exceptions, they are inferior to them in others.

The Serampore College has been generally spoken of as a splendid failure. This is a mistake. It was just such an institution as was required *somewhere*. Serampore was not the best place for it, but Serampore was the only place available for it. Notwithstanding the disadvantage of its locality, it rendered good service as long as it was wrought by its founders. That for a long time after their removal it lay dormant, was no fault of its or of theirs. A few years ago it was revived, and has now a fair prospect of a career of important usefulness. It is with this as with other departments of their work. Great injustice is done to the memory of the Serampore heroes by travellers and others, who sigh or rejoice over the comparative smallness of Serampore as a mission station. Is this all that has been effected after sixty years of missionary labour ? No, it is not all. When the banyan-tree has sent out its buttresses, and these have become a forest, the original trunk frequently decays, while the derived forest flourishes. Now, it is forgotten that Serampore was not an eligible place for a mission. No one ever thought so. Its only recommendation was that it was beyond the limits of the British territory, and under the protection of the Danish flag. The missionaries did not select it as their station—they were driven to it. But when missionaries were no longer excluded from British territory, Serampore had no advantage over multitudes of other places, and was less eligible than many. But, in fact, all the Baptist missions in Bengal and the north-west provinces are the off-shoots and legitimate representatives of Serampore. That quiet little town was not suited to be the home of the mission. It was the ark in which it was kept in safety while the storm was raging, and from it the mission patriarchs sent out their children to overspread the earth, as soon as the rainbow appeared in the heavens. The ark of Noah has long ago rotted on the top of Ararat ; and Serampore has lost its glory, till it was described by a late Governor-General, as he looked across to it from Barrackpore, as “ a city of the dead.” But they both served a great purpose in the good providence of God ; and as the pilgrim would gladly visit the spot consecrated by the contact of the ark, so does every spot at Serampore possess an interest for the Christian’s heart.

The literary labours of the Serampore missionaries were

very various and very extensive. The Grammar and Dictionaries of Dr Carey are admirable specimens of philological works, and splendid monuments of their author's talents and industry. They have been of the greatest service to many, and will be to many more, in leading them to the study of the language of the country. Mr Ward's great work on the Hindus, is to this day the classical authority on a vast multitude of subjects. Although it is not equally good on all the multifarious subjects of which it treats, yet there is no work as yet that can take its place. As a description of the popular mythology and the popular worship it is invaluable, so far as Bengal is concerned. If there be errors in it, they arise from the author's having occasionally mistaken local legends and local superstitions for general articles of faith over the whole country. It is remarkable that Dr Marshman, with more taste for general literature than Dr Carey, and with more logical and argumentative power than Mr Ward, has left us no enduring monument as those that perpetuate his colleagues' names. He wielded the pen of a ready writer, and was ever ready to do battle for the mission against whatsoever assailants. Some of his papers in the old *Friend of India*,* shew how great a sacrifice he made in thus foregoing his claims to posthumous fame as a writer.

Our readers are probably aware that the latter days of the Serampore missionaries were clouded by a miserable misunderstanding betwixt them and the Baptist Missionary Society, respecting property and the pecuniary affairs of the mission. A great part of the second volume of the work now before us is occupied with the details of this controversy, which have for the first time been laid before the general public in an intelligible form. We have studied the whole question with great care; and while we are convinced that Mr Marshman owed it to his father and his devoted friends, to vindicate their characters from the aspersions that were so freely and so eagerly cast upon them; and while we have risen from the perusal of his volumes with the feeling that no vindication was ever more complete, we have no heart to enter upon the question here. The controversy arose out of the peculiar circumstances in which the missionaries were placed, and the necessity that was laid upon them to labour for their own support. While they freely gave up to the cause of God and the service of the mission the large incomes that came to them without their seeking, they naturally wished to have a certain measure of control, during their own lifetimes, of the property that was acquired by their labours. This claim would have been freely allowed by the generation

* As distinguished from the *Friend of India*, a weekly newspaper which Mr John Marshman established at Serampore, calling it after his father's periodical, and which has long been, and still is, at the head of Indian journals, confessedly the highest authority on all Indian subjects.

of good men that knew them ; but they outlived that generation ; and those who came after certainly treated them as such men ought not to have been treated. Mr Marshman's vindication of them is not a pleading, but a simple detail of the whole facts of the case. We congratulate the son on the unqualified verdict which we are sure that he has secured from the church and the world, in favour of his father and his noble associates. It was a pious work that he undertook, and he has fully succeeded in its achievement. This part of the book may suggest salutary reflections to committees of societies and churches, with reference to the spirit by which they should be actuated in the treatment of missionaries.

And now we have to thank Mr Marshman for this long-promised contribution to missionary biography and church history. We have to thank also the electors of Ipswich, to whom we suspect that we are in no small measure indebted for the conclusion and issue of this work, which has been long in preparation. If ten more of them had voted for Mr Marshman, he would probably have been devoting his fine talents mainly to their local and ephemeral interests in Parliament, and the book which he owed to the church and the world might never have been published. If the electors of Edinburgh led to the continuation of Macaulay's History of England, those of Ipswich may claim the credit of having caused the publication of "The Life and Times of Carey, Marshman, and Ward."

X.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Ancient Church : Its History, Doctrine, Worship, and Constitution, traced for the first three hundred years. By W. D. KILLEN, D.D.
London : James Nisbet & Co. 1859. Pp. 656. 8vo.

THIS is a work of great value and importance, and will, we have no doubt, take a high and permanent place in the department of theological literature to which it belongs. Its author occupies an honourable and influential position as Professor of Church History to the Irish Presbyterian Church, and has gained a high reputation by his contribution to the "Plea for Presbytery," and by his continuation and completion of Dr Reid's History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. Dr Killen is evidently possessed of very high and thoroughly cultivated powers, and of a very complete mastery of the subjects of which he treats. He has brought very fine talents and extensive erudition to bear upon an investigation of all the most interesting and important questions suggested by a survey of the

church of the first three centuries, especially those connected with its constitution and government. It is mainly in connection with its bearing upon the subject of the different theories of church government, Popish, Prelatic, Presbyterian, and Congregational, that the condition of the early church has been made matter of controversial discussion. It is of course impossible to unfold the history and aspects of the early church, without coming into contact with the controversial discussions which have been carried on in modern times, at such length and with so much ability and learning, as to its government and worship. Dr Killen does not conceal his convictions as a Presbyterian; on the contrary, he states them plainly, and defends them with a talent, an erudition, and a skill, which fully entitle him to a place among the most distinguished men of different ecclesiastical denominations who have taken part in the investigation of these subjects. But while Dr Killen's Presbyterian views are openly avowed, and very ably and ingeniously defended, they are never obtruded in an unseasonable or offensive way; and the discussion of these topics, even when it assumes something of a controversial form, is uniformly conducted in a style and spirit which indicate the cultivated scholar and the Christian gentleman. New materials have recently cast up, bearing upon some of the arguments usually employed in the discussion of the government of the early church. All these new materials have a decidedly anti-prelatic tendency, and Dr Killen has not failed to turn them to good account. We know of no one at present among the clergy of the Church of England who would demean himself by breaking a lance with Dr Killen; and if a controversy should ensue, we are certain that the defenders of Prelacy would meet with nothing on his part, but what was fully accordant with Christian courtesy, and on every ground entitled to respect.

Reason and Revelation. By the REV. R. S. CANDLISH, D.D. London, Edinburgh & New York: T. Nelson & Sons. 1859. Pp. 186.

WE rejoice that Dr Candlish has been induced to collect together and to publish in a volume, the different pieces of which this book is composed, viz., Lectures or Essays on the Authority and Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, on the Infallibility of Holy Scripture, on Conscience and the Bible, on Paul preaching at Athens, and on the Duty of Free Inquiry and Private Judgment. In the Lectures and Essays upon these topics, published at different times, Dr Candlish had brought out many important views, peculiarly valuable and seasonable in the present day, had expounded them with great ability and ingenuity, and enforced them with great eloquence and power. They are peculiarly fitted to tell upon the minds of intelligent and ingenuous young men, and to guard them against the superficial, conceited latitudinarianism, and the semi-infidel liberalism, which abound in the present day, and which are countenanced by some from whom

better things might have been expected. It is well that productions of so high an order as these Lectures and Essays of Dr Candlish, so valuable in themselves and so seasonable at present, should be put into a more accessible and permanent form. They seem to have been carefully revised, and they now form a handsome volume, which we trust will be extensively read.

A Grammar of the New Testament Diction, intended as an introduction to the critical study of the Greek New Testament. By Dr GEORGE BENEDICT WINER. Translated from the 6th enlarged and improved edition of the original, by EDWARD MASSON, M.A., formerly Professor in the University of Athens. Vol. II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1859.

THIS great work is now completed, and forms in all a handsome volume of above 700 pages. We can only repeat what we said in noticing the first part of it, that it is the standard work upon this important subject, and indispensable to every one who would prosecute successfully the critical study of the New Testament, a description which ought to comprehend all who in civilized countries are allowed to be put in trust with the gospel.

The Complete Works of Edward Payson, D.D., Pastor of the Second Church in Portland, including Memoir, Select Thoughts, and Sermons. Compiled by the Rev. ASA CUMMINGS. 3 large vols. 8vo. Philadelphia, 1859: W. & A. Martien. London: James Nisbet & Co.

THIS is the first collected edition of the works of Dr Payson, whose name is so well known as that of an eminent Christian, a great preacher, and a most faithful and successful pastor. The whole of the second volume consists of sermons never before published; while there is also some new matter in each of the other two. A considerable part of the first volume is occupied with a very full and interesting memoir of this eminently gifted and honoured servant of Christ. There are very few books better fitted to be useful in regard to the highest of all objects, especially to ministers. We heartily commend it to all who desire to live and labour for the honour of Christ and the spiritual welfare of their fellowmen.

Die Unionverhandlungen Zwischen d. Orient. u. d. Rom. Kirche s. d. Anf. l. 15, Jahrh. Con. v. Ferrara. Von Dr J. ZLISHMAN. Wien. Gerold, Pp. 257.

SOME years ago, a very unfavourable picture of the Church of

Greece was given to the French public by the lively pen of M. About. Since then the Eastern political complications have given fresh interest in Western Europe to the condition of the Oriental Churches. In France especially graver pens than that of the author of "Tolla," have occupied themselves with the probable future of Eastern Christendom. While bigoted Romanists like Jager, Pitzifois and Gagarin, have summoned both the past and the present to testify against the Eastern Churches; more liberal writers, such as St. Marc Girardin, have endeavoured to win the attention of the French public to the desirableness of seizing for political influence the fluctuating condition of those Churches in the decaying Ottoman Empire. France has been strenuously exhorted to assume the position of Protector of the Oriental Christians. We in this country, have taken comparatively little interest in such questions. But no comprehensively religious mind surely can feel indifferent to the future of Churches still so widely spread, and formerly so influential. To estimate the probability of Rome succeeding in her ambitious efforts in the East, it is of importance to study her former attempts. The volume before us contains within a moderate compass, and from carefully studied original sources, an account of the last great effort to reconcile the Greek Church to Rome. The success of the councils of Pisa and Constance in terminating the great Latin schisms naturally led men's minds to the renewal of negotiations tending to bring about the union of the Eastern to the Western Church. The declining condition of the Eastern Empire seemed to give a fairer promise than ever of success. The arrival of John Palaeologus in Italy, his presence at a council presided over by Eugenius IV., and his acquiescence, with that of most of his bishops and attendants in the claims of Rome, were a temporary triumph for the Papacy. But events soon shewed how little, even amid political danger, and on the eve of national ruin, the Greeks were prepared to surrender their ecclesiastical independence. To this tradition we must rejoice that they have continued true, and are likely to remain so. While the operating with success from a Protestant stand-point upon the Eastern Churches, may be difficult and for a time disappointing, it is at all events pleasing to know that their (now certain to increase) connexion with Western Europe will not have the effect of throwing them into the hands or under the yoke of Rome.

Leben u. Schriften Heinrichs v. Largenstein. Von Dr Otto Hartwig. Marburg, 1859. Pp. 143.

HENRY of Largenstein, whom Dr Hartwig denominates "the most learned German theologian of the 14th century," has hitherto, even in his native land, come short of the fame which seems his due. As a proof of this, the article devoted to him in Herzog's Cyclopædia only occupies half a page, while much less distinguished men are treated in it at greater length. From original investigation, Dr

Hartwig, whose connection with Hesse Cassel has given him a local interest in the question, shews that Largenstein was the originator of those views on the superiority of Councils to the Pope, which were, after his death, brought into such prominence, and so perseveringly acted on, by Gerson and others. This view is supported by an analysis of, and extracts from, his "*Consilium Pacis*," written in 1381. For this, and for other efforts in the cause of Church Reform, Dr Hartwig claims Largenstein as "worthy of being admitted into the number of Reformers before the Reformation." The contrast is not drawn by the writer of this *brochure*, but it strikes us very forcibly, between the posthumous fate of Largenstein, and his predecessor by only one generation, John Tauler. It has been the more popular gifts of the latter that have given him his prominence in the estimate of modern Germans, and indeed almost made him with them what Bernard is among the French, the representative of mediæval churchism. We can recommend Dr Hartwig's little book to all who take an interest in the less explored parts of Church History. It possesses not a little interest as an account of German Church matters in the period it embraces, from 1342 to 1397.

L'Eglise et l'Empire Romain au IVme. Siecle (Constance et Julien.)
 Par M. ALBERT DE BROGLIE. 1859. Paris: Didier et C^{ie}.

THE two former volumes of this work excited much attention, and those before us are equally worthy of regard. In more than one of the foremost of French periodicals, M. de Broglie had tested the literary power, which is so manifest in this, his first work on a large scale. These two volumes contain the civil and ecclesiastical history of the period from the accession of the sons of Constantine to the death of Jovian. The struggles of Arianism for ascendancy, the sufferings of Athanasius and other confessors of orthodoxy, the attempt of Julian to re-establish Paganism in the position it had lost, forms the main subject of an ecclesiastical character in these volumes. M. de Broglie has made a good use of the ancient works relating to his theme, but while familiar with the French literature upon it, he has neglected to avail himself of the help which such German books as "Neander's Julian," and "Ullmann's Gregory Nazianzen," would have afforded. Comparison of the passages he quotes from ancient writers is sometimes made needlessly difficult by his giving references, not to books and chapters, but to pages, which, of course, vary in different editions. A nobleman, M. de Broglie is the very opposite of a courtier, and his book, though not liable to a prosecution, like that of his friend Montalembert, will be no favourite at the Tuileries. But the love of liberty which it breathes ought to make it a favourite on this side the Channel. Had we space, we would have extracted his character of Julian. He has not ignored that Emperor's talents; the "*fortissimus armis, celebrissimus ore manique*" of Prudentius is given to us as he was; but he

has shewn how far from true is the estimate which an ancient living man of letters has made, that "Julian had the virtues of a Christian." We should have liked if M. de Broglie had adverted to the fact that the abbreviators, Eutropius and Aurelius Victor, give a somewhat higher idea of Constantine as a ruler than the ecclesiastical writers do.

Sketches of Religion, and Revivals of Religion in the North Highlands during last Century. By Rev. A. M. M'GILLIVRAY, Dairsie. Edinburgh: John Maclaren.

THIS is an excellent little book; full of information, well written, and interesting. In these days, when awakenings have been occurring in almost every part of the world, the desire to learn something of what the Lord has done for his church in the past has naturally become very general, and such a book as that before us is almost sure to meet with attention and respect; and we can confidently assure our readers that it will well repay perusal. It describes extraordinary manifestation of spiritual life in four northern parishes—Nigg, Golspie, Strathnaver, and Tongue; and the sketches are all remarkably well rendered. Mr M'Gillivray gives also a very thoughtful and satisfactory account of THE MEN of the Highlands; and, altogether, much may be learned from this book regarding the peculiar conditions under which the Christian church has worked, and still continues to work, among our Celtic fellow-countrymen. We have here, in fact, a small contribution to the illustration of a subject which we should like to see taken up by some competent mind—the History of Religion in the Highlands of Scotland.

Sermons by the late James Henderson, D. D., United Presbyterian Church, Galashiels. With Memoir, by JOHN CAIRNS, D.D., Berwick. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. 1859. Pp. 346.

WE had scarcely ever heard of Dr Henderson of Galashiels till his death about a year ago. The high commendations bestowed upon him on that occasion impressed us, while we made allowance for the partialities of friendship and affection, with the conviction that he must have been no ordinary man; and this conviction has been confirmed by what we have read of this volume of his posthumous sermons. He was evidently a man of very superior talents, of a well balanced and highly accomplished mind, and, in all other respects, well furnished as a preacher of the gospel and an instructor in divine things. The Memoir by Dr Cairns is very interesting, and not unworthy of the high name and position of its author. The Memoir and the Sermons bring Dr Henderson before us as an excellent specimen of a class of men, not very uncommon in the

evangelical churches of this country—men who, though unknown to fame, are conferring the most important benefits upon their fellow-men, with reference both to time and to eternity, by discharging the varied and arduous duties of the Christian ministry in such a way as is fitted to secure the respect and esteem of all around them.

The Unseen : a Series of Discourses. By WILLIAM LANDELS, Minister of Regent's Park Chapel. Second Edition. London : James Nisbet & Co. 1859. Pp. 274.

WE have been much interested in this series of Discourses upon the Unseen, as an able and vigorous, a full and impressive, setting forth of the leading features of a department of divine truth too much overlooked. Some great preachers have acted upon the principle, that every sermon should contain as much about Christ as would be a virtual proclamation of the good news of the kingdom to those who heard it. Mr Landels has not acted upon this principle, and we do not say that it is one of universal imperative obligation ; but we would have liked this volume better if it had been more fully pervaded by a savour of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity.

Earthly and Heavenly Things ; or, The Truths Unfolded by our Lord in His Interview with Nicodemus. By the Rev. JAMES GRIERSON, D.D., Errol. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark. 1859. Pp. 352.

THIS work is virtually a full and elaborate commentary or exposition upon the third chapter of John's Gospel. It expounds and applies the many important subjects brought before us in that chapter in a very superior and satisfactory way. The connection of the whole section is very successfully unfolded, and many of the particular topics contained in it are very distinctly, accurately, and judiciously handled.

The Life of the Rev. Richard Knill, of St Petersburg : being selections from his Reminiscences, Journals, and Correspondence, with a Review of his Character, by the late Rev. JOHN ANGELL JAMES. By CHARLES M. BIRRELL. Second Edition. London : James Nisbet & Co. 1859. Pp. 268.

SEVERAL things combine to make this a singularly interesting and useful volume. It brings fully before us a very remarkable man, whom the Head of the church honoured with an unusually large measure of usefulness, in various departments of His work, both at home and abroad. The accomplished editor, Mr Birrell, has dis-

charged his duty with excellent taste and judgment. And the review of Mr Knill's character by Mr James of Birmingham was the last production of that eminently-honoured servant of Christ, and was revised by him for the press only a few hours before he was called to join the select society of those who have turned many to righteousness. We are glad that we have room to lay before our readers a considerable portion of this very interesting paper.

"Mr Knill was no ordinary man. His usefulness in the way of conversion of souls to God was perhaps greater, all things taken into account, than that of any other man of his day in this kingdom. Wherever he laboured, whether in the villages of Devon, in India, in Russia, or in the various parts of England, he was instrumental in awakening the impenitent and careless to a deep concern for their eternal welfare. He entered every place with that object in view, and in very few instances left without having in some measure accomplished it. His usefulness lay not exclusively among the poor: many persons of education, intelligence, and station were brought, through him, under the influence of evangelical religion. How seldom has the individual been found, since Whitfield's and Wesley's time, of whom it could be said that there was reason to believe he had been the *instrument of converting a hundred persons who, in one way or another, became preachers of the gospel!* This, added to the multitude of other persons who by his instrumentality were brought to the Saviour of the world, is an amount of usefulness which rarely falls to the lot of any minister of Christ. It proves that he, above most, was 'wise to win souls,' and that 'God was with him.'

"Surely it should become with all, and especially with the ministers of religion, an inquiry by what means this amount of usefulness was accomplished. Such a man's life should be a study; yet, it is to be feared that, in this age of "intellectualism," many will deem it beneath their notice. True, he had no splendid talents, no brilliant genius, no lofty imagination; he possessed neither scholarship nor philosophy; he was neither an acute metaphysician, nor an accurate logician, no, nor even a profound theologian. But he was something greater, higher, and holier than all this,—he was a devoted servant of Christ, a hero of the cross, an eminently successful preacher of the gospel. He made no pretence to greatness; yet, if saving souls be a great work, he was great. He made no attempt at display; he coveted not, he attempted not to be philosophical or intellectual, yet he was master and preacher of the profoundest of all philosophies, and the deepest of all intellectualisms—the gospel of salvation. He was no orator, in the conventional meaning of that term, yet had he the power of rousing, fixing, and holding the attention of an audience, far above what most elaborate and intellectual preachers possess. He was no rhetorician, nor, if eloquence consist of great and original conceptions clothed with glowing imagery and splendid diction, could he pretend to this: his eloquence was that of the heart, gushing out in streams of impassioned feeling, which carried away his hearers on the tide of his own emotion—the eloquence of a man on fire with zeal for God, and melted into compassion for souls hovering on the verge of the bottomless pit—the eloquence of faith and love. Like Paul, he was a man of tears, and often drew forth the tears of others by the magic power of his own full eyes and faltering voice; or, like Paul's Master weeping over Jerusalem, Knill would often weep over the audience before him. The minister who would turn from the delineation of such a man because he had no claim to be a genius, or a subtle reasoner, or an original thinker, or a poetic sentimentalist, or a dreamy mystic, and was nothing but an earnest preacher of the gospel, has reason to doubt whether he knows that the salvation of souls is the great object of the Christian ministry, and is above all scholarship and all philosophy. It is much to be desired, then, that this work should be read by our whole ministry, to see what may be done even by a man of moderate abilities, whose heart is set in him to be useful, and who is inspired and moved by the purpose of saving souls.

"We now take up the inquiry after the means by which he attained to so great a measure of usefulness. It is evident that it was, in a great degree, to be attributed to *his intense desire after it*. He set out in life with the adoption of that

mighty, impulsive, and glorious word, *USEFULNESS*; and usefulness, with him, meant converting sinners. He yearned for the salvation of souls. It was, with him, not merely a principle, or a privilege, but a passion. For this he longed and prayed in the closet, wrote in the study, laboured in the pulpit, conversed in the parlour, and admonished, counselled, and warned wherever he went. It was his conviction, that his talent and temperament were more especially adapted for the work of conversion, and thence his sermons contained invariably a large portion of the truths which conduct to it. They were to a considerable extent made up of first principles, and were not so much calculated for leading on a congregation to perfection. As regards the pastoral style of preaching, it is by no means necessary or proper that this should be its character, to the exclusion of more instructive and profound teaching. Few of our congregations are mere nurseries for babes who are to be fed with milk; in most of them there are Christians of full age, young men and fathers, who require strong meat; and, therefore, Mr Knill, though valued as a preacher, cannot be held up for indiscriminating imitation. What we desiderate is more of his simple, direct, earnest, heart-affecting method of address, grafted, as much as possible, upon a more enlarged and enlightened course of pulpit ministration."

"The usefulness of Mr Knill, however, was not exclusively the result of his preaching. The passion for the conversion of souls which he manifested in the pulpit, and which led him to seek it with such earnestness there, he brought with him out of the sanctuary, and carried into more private spheres, as the great object of life and principle of action. Like the enthusiastic botanist, geologist, or entomologist, he was ever in pursuit of his object, and looking out for fresh means of gaining it. It was his felicity to have rarely to say, '*I have lost an opportunity.*' How few, how very few of us have attained to this watchfulness for occasions of usefulness! Our friend, no doubt, had a peculiar tact for this way of doing good—a talent which exists in various degrees in different persons, but which ought to be, and may be, cultivated by all. Whether it was the servant girl that waited upon him in the house of a friend, or the host and hostess themselves, or the fellow-traveller in the railway carriage, or the porter at an inn, or a person he casually met on the road, or a sailor on the sea-beach, he had a tract or a word—generally an *apt* word—for each. In every one, he saw an immortal being on his passage to eternity, and he longed to be the instrument of his conversion. Oh, what multitudes would be converted to God, and how changed would be the face of society if all ministers and all Christians were thus set upon the work of saving souls! And why should they not be? True, they may not have Mr Knill's tact for the work; but they may do much if they have the heart to do it.

"What kept Mr Knill thus active and ardent in his career of usefulness was his fervent piety. If he had a tongue of fire, it was because the flame of devotion was bright and ever burning in his soul. Few men in modern times entered more deeply into the apostle's words, '*The love of Christ constraineth us.*' By this, as a torrent, which he was as little able as he was willing to resist, he was borne energetically and successfully along in his course. He lived within sight of the cross, and felt the '*powers of the world to come.*' His diary exhibits the springs of his action, the source of his energies, and the secret of his success. He was eminently a man of prayer, and did everything in the *spirit* of prayer. His communion with God was close and constant. He came from the closet strengthened for his work in the pulpit and in the city, and went back to his closet, not only for repose and refreshment, but to be strengthened and prepared for further labour. This made him '*strong in the Lord and in the power of His might.*' And why are any of God's servants feeble in action, but because they are weak in devotion? We live in days when Christians are far less in the closet than they should be. The study and the counting-house encroach upon the closet. We are preaching men and business men, but not so much as we should be praying men. What mighty men in prayer were our great ancestors, the Howes, the Owens, the Baxters, and the Henrys! How they must have wrestled in the closet to send forth such words as they did from the study! Where is their mantle? Doddridge and Watts found it, and dropped it again for such men as Payson, McCheyne, and Knill. They, in their turn, let it fall. Would God we could find it! What is wanted among us is a deeper-toned piety, a more devotional spirit. Oh for a fresh baptism of the Holy Spirit—a revived ministry,

and a revived Church—a race of preachers and of people whose whole character and conduct shall bear, in letters which every one that sees must read, the inscription on the mitre of the High Priest, ‘*Holiness to the Lord!*’ We complain of a want of usefulness. Have we any reason to wonder that we should have cause to complain? Is our piety such as to make us burning as well as shining lights? Are we as intense in devotion as we are earnest in business and in study. We should all be more useful if we were more holy.

“In the retrospect of a long life, now drawing to a close, during which I have watched, of course, the career, and observed the mode of action, of many of my brethren, I have noticed great diversity in the results of their ministry; and I have most assuredly seen, that where they have been intensely earnest for the salvation of souls, and have sought this by a style of preaching adapted to accomplish it, God has honoured their endeavours by giving them success. If, without impropriety, I may refer here, as I believe I have done elsewhere, to the service which, during fifty-four years, I have been allowed to render to our great Master, I may declare my thankfulness in being able, in some small degree, to rejoice that the conversion of sinners has been my aim. I have made, next to the Bible, Baxter’s “Reformed Pastor” my rule as regards the object of my ministry. It were well if that volume were often read by all our pastors, —a study which I now earnestly recommend to them. I sometimes venture to hope that it has kindled in me a spark—but oh, how dim!—of that spirit which actuated Mr Knill. In regard to all that constitutes earnestness. I blush before his statue, as it rises before me in this volume, and confess my shortcomings in the work of the Lord. Standing, as I now do, in the prospect of the close of my ministry, of the eternal world, and of my summons to the presence of the great Lord of all, the salvation of souls, as the object of the ministry, appears to me, more than ever before, in all its awful sublimity. Everything else, as compared with this, seems but as the small dust of the balance; and though perhaps, not altogether an idler in the vineyard of the Lord, it is now my grief and my surprise that I have not been more devoted and more laborious. Defects, omissions, and errors, come out before our view in the evening of life, and especially when it is spent, as mine now must be, in retirement, solitude, and suffering, which we did not perceive during the burden and bustle of the day. To my younger brethren I say, You are engaged in the greatest work in the universe; for in preaching for the salvation of souls, you are brought into fellowship with God in his eternal purposes of mercy to the children of men; with our Lord Jesus Christ in his redeeming work upon the cross; with the Holy Spirit in his mission to our world; and with prophets, apostles, and martyrs. Heaven, through eternity, will resound with the praises of your diligence, or hell with lamentations and execrations upon your neglect. Happy will it be for you, and happy for your flocks, if the perusal of this volume should help you to find and to wear the mantle of Richard Knill.”

J. A. J.

“POSTSCRIPT BY THE EDITOR.

“WHILE the proofs of these concluding pages, accompanied by the Preface, are yet returning to the press, the public telegrams announce to all parts of England that their venerated writer is no more. The intelligence will travel to the utmost limits of our language, and be told, at length, in all the tongues in which his heart-stirring thoughts have ever been read,—filling thousands with such sorrow as springs only from the loss of a father. With what solemnity does this event stamp these his last utterances! A life completely filled with labours for the highest welfare of mankind could not surely have been more fitly closed. It seems as if his Lord, with touching kindness, had given him this latest opportunity of bearing testimony to the importance and blessedness of His service.

“A bound set of the sheets of this Memoir were sent to him about a month ago, with little hope that he would be able to add to them. But, after glancing over the volume, he was so warmed by the kindred spirit of Knill that he resolved to throw his generous impressions into writing. His continual sufferings greatly increased the difficulty of composition, and, after doing his uttermost, he wrote to say that the result was so unsatisfactory to himself that he could send nothing. But immediately after the despatch of that decision he happily changed his mind, and sent the manuscript, accompanied by an expression of the hope that it would

be found so unsuitable as to be returned. It was, however, too much prized to be so treated; and, with a very few alterations, it reached him in print on the day prior to his departure. He at once proceeded to its revision, in the course of which he detected several inaccuracies in the printing, which had escaped other eyes, and inserted two or three qualifying words. This was his last work on earth. He felt that it was; for as soon as it was finished, he wrote to the Editor, with unusual distinctness of penmanship, as if every word had been deliberately weighed, a letter—it is presumed his last—of which the following passage is the chief part:—

“‘EDGBASTON, 30th Sept. 1859.

“‘. . . I think it probable that with these few notes on dear Knill's life and labours I shall lay down my pen, which has written much: would God it had written better! But while I say this, I am not without hope, yea, I may add, conviction, that it has, in some measure, written usefully. In some humble degree, I have aimed at *usefulness*, both in my preaching and writing, and God has, to an amount which utterly astonishes and almost overwhelms me, given me what I have sought. It seems a daring and almost presumptuous expression, but with a proper qualification it is a true one—that usefulness is within the reach of us all. The man who intensely desires to be useful, and takes the proper means, *will* be useful. God will not withhold His grace from such desires and such labours. Oh, my brother, how delightful is it, notwithstanding the humbling and sorrowful consciousness of defects and sins, to look back upon a life spent for Christ! I thank a sovereign God I am not without some degree of this.’

“In an hour or two after this letter was sealed, the summons came from his Divine Master, and when next morning dawned upon us he was with Him in glory. May *his* mantle be found and worn by thousands!”

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

APRIL 1860.

ART. I.—Recent Syriac Literature.

1. *Remains of a very Ancient Recension of the Four Gospels in Syriac, hitherto unknown in Europe.* Discovered, Edited, and Translated by WILLIAM CURETON, D.D., F.R.S. London: 1858.
2. *S. Cyrilli Alexandriæ Archiep. Commentarii in Lucæ Evangelium quæ supersunt Syriace.* Edidit ROBERTUS PAYNE SMITH. Oxonii: 1858.
3. *P. Lagardii Analecta Syriaca*, (Book of Collections of the Holy Fathers and Heathen Philosophers). Lipsiæ: 1858.

SEMITISM is a unity with a threefold development. It is a stem which has blossomed thrice, and each of its three flowers has taken a thousand years to bloom and die. It may too have enjoyed a fourth period of luxuriant growth on the plains of Assyria; should the conjectures of scholars turn out true, that one of the three orders of cuneiform character imprisons a captive and dumb Semitic speech. But this is only conjecture, and the civilization of Assyria with its apotheosis of brute power, its bloodshed, and its huge materialism, bears traces rather of the degeneracy, the curse, and godless defiance of Hamite blood, than of the spiritualism of the Shemite. Semitism, too, may have lived a term of rank and sturdy life on the fertile soil of Italy. Stickel develops a Semitic dialect from the Etrurian monuments, and though his labours have yet to undergo the test of a trying scrutiny, he has, at least, achieved what before was considered impossible, he has referred these extraordinary remains to a recognised family of

tongues. The Etruscan dialect, as deciphered in his work, is a strange medley of Aramean and Hebrew forms, including much possessed by neither. And till the African tongues are more accurately investigated, we must rest contented with the demonstration of a Semitic element in some, and the suspicion of its presence in many of the countless dialects of that little known continent.

But generically, Semitic speech appears in three forms, and each of these forms has attained historic predominance in turn. All the various dialects of this family of human language may be classed under three great categories:—

Hebrew,	{	Phoenician, Punic, &c.	Aramean,	{	Chaldee, Syriac, Samaritan, &c.	Arabic—Ethiopic, &c.
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The above classification also represents the order in which these dialects have become historical. Hebrew flourished as a literary language from fourteen to four hundred years before Christ; Aramean from four before to six hundred after his birth, and Arabic from the seventh century on to our own time. It would perhaps be rash to say, that the same order represents the degree of fidelity with which the dialects have respectively preserved the primitive mechanism and primitive features of this peculiar class of languages. This might be true of Hebrew, it could scarcely be affirmed of Aramean. Though really the primitive Semitic speech, the Aramean now betrays marks of degeneracy. Analysis has begun to disintegrate it. Auxiliary verbs which scarcely shew themselves even in rudiment in Hebrew, are here the usage. It has also lost, to a great extent, that most peculiar characteristic of Semitic, inflection, by internal vowel changes, its passives have no trace of the famous *u*, which uniformly marks the passive notion in Arabic and partly in Hebrew. Like the Western tongues and the Ethiopic, its passives are only middles. It has never reached, or it has lost the idea of a pure passive, so fully developed in Arabic, and to a less degree in Hebrew, and has pressed into its service the reflexive forms, forming thus a conjugation system very simple and nearly as regular as the Ethiopic. How the farthest north and the farthest south should thus agree is difficult to divine. The use, however, of the reflexive for the passive is common in all tongues. And the *ed*, or *et*, which marks the form in Low and High German, may not be very different from the *ith* which distinguishes it in Aramean.

The Aramean floats still in the memory of its Hebrew sister. The one makes continual reference to the other. The popular Hebrew dialects are akin to the Aramean. The primitive forms which linger longest in the mouths of the populace, who

are uninfluenced by the language of literature, are strongly marked by Aramean affinities. We know little of the popular language of the Jews, but a word of people's dialect occasionally occurs. A single expression dropped in the wilderness regarding the manna, recalls the Aramean origin of the race. The renowned shibboleth was degenerated into sibboleth, after the Aramean fashion. Writers of the people, such as Amos—whom Jerome ventures to style *imperitus sermone*—are Aramean in their language. But so too is the poetical and elevated style, and also what might be called the scientific language, leans to the Aramean. Job is full of Arameisms, which are no proof of lateness of composition, but the contrary. The Song of Solomon is also very Aramean in its texture. It has been said, that this class of idioms are demonstrative either of a very late or a very early date of the works where they appear. This is only partly true. It is a test only reliable when other tests agree. It may demonstrate the antiquity of Job, which we know otherwise, or the lateness of Esther, which is also well known from other sources; but applied to such works as Solomon's, the test fails. They are very Aramean in their style, and neither very early nor very late in their composition. Ecclesiastes is perhaps as near the Rabbinic style as any work not purely Chaldean in the Bible. This is not to be explained by lateness of date, or all Solomon's works must be equally late. It is to be explained by the turn of Solomon's mind, by his scientific bent and his syncretism, by his foreign tendencies and his striving after greater accuracy of terms than the Hebrew language affords. The Aramean is more of an analytic tongue than the Hebrew. The latter is chiefly fitted for poetry, and to be the language of feeling and passion; to express philosophic definitions, more particles are necessary, more auxiliaries, a language, in short, more analysed and broken down is necessary. This advantage the Aramean possesses over the Hebrew. This advantage the Greek possesses over the Latin. This advantage all well-worn speeches possesses over those that have remained true to their primitive mould, and their original more or less synthetic mechanism. The Aramean is less fine than the Hebrew, which again is less fine than the Arabic, it is more rugged, as became a mountainous speech; its consonants are harsher, its vowels scantier. It is, however, a mistake on the part of Fürst to imagine, that all this is due to a greater faithfulness on the part of the Aramean to the primitive Semitic idiosyncrasy. Something may be due to this, but Aramean, as we now have it, is a corrupted language. Its ruggedness and bareness, its nakedness and skeleton spareness and sharpness of outline, are not to be looked upon as an antique protest against accomplish-

ment and luxury, as a sort of puritanical stiffness that refuses to accommodate itself to progress of ease and refinement around it, they are to be regarded rather as the consequence of the want of proper nourishment and proper exercise. To change our comparison, the Aramean is not a huge Cyclopean structure, whose rugged walls are formed of masses that have never been connected together, but a ruined building out of which the mortar has crumbled, leaving the walls rent and bare and broken down.

When we compare several kindred tongues together, interesting questions arise concerning them. We cannot help speculating on those sisters, whence they come, which is the first-born, and which the youngest, what have been their several histories, where their cradle, and what their parent? Are they orphans, like the wide-spread Aryan or Indo-Germanic family, whose parent has long since expired, and lies buried somewhere in the far-off plains of Iranistan; which have themselves been so long separated, and are of so diverse complexions, that all relationship was long forgotten or denied, some of which, like high-matched daughters, moving in polished circles, with lofty intelligence in their eye, look down upon the humbler drudges of the family which have never risen above the cares and the duties of domestic life, and, were it not for the perverse attempts of genealogists, would willingly cut the connection, and ignore the affinity? It is not long since the Englishman would have acknowledged that the blood that flowed in his own veins was the same blood that ran beneath the dark skin of the Hindu, and that that feeble and cunning foe once slept with him in the same cradle, and even now spoke the same language as himself; that both were exiles from a common country, and both, after long years of separation, were like Jacob and Esau (would it were like them in peace!) meeting again, almost over a parent's grave. And where may lie the tomb of the mother of the Semitic family—so soft and artless in her expressions, so unsophisticated in her ways, who utters no word but burns with poetry, and thinks no thought but breathes with life, who is too earnest to smile, too impassioned to argue, too confiding to reason, whose passions seem exhaustless and her intellect scarcely appreciable—the woman *par excellence* of human languages? Like the grave of her greatest prophet, it lies concealed from human eyes by the marge of some brook on some Armenian hill, by some Mesopotamian watercourse.

After all, our speculations may have but little foundation. Dialects may not necessarily destroy their mother in their birth, may not necessarily have a parent at all. To be sure, all that we know of such things leads us to believe in one

primitive Semitic speech. The vulgar dialects of India are the daughters of the Sanskrit. The vulgar Romance dialects are the daughters of the Latin. The Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, Celtic, &c., are themselves daughters of some long-forgotten parent, whose very name has never passed her children's lips. And all analogy leads us to think that the Aramean, the Hebrew, the Arabic, &c., have some common forgotten parent also. But, perhaps, the rise of dialects could be explained otherwise. It is noticed that in the youth and freshness of human nature its linguistic capacities are almost infinite. Uncultivated nations and uncultivated men have the faculty of coining language onomatopœetically. An educated man is fettered by his logical and grammatical rules, by his principles of etymology. A clown is fettered by no such restrictions, he expresses his thoughts in new forms without hesitation when an old form is not at hand or not sufficient. The most superficial glance at any language shews us that the longer it lived the sparer it became in roots, the fuller in forms. In Latin, for instance, the one verb to *bear* is manifestly composed of fragments of *three* verbs all signifying to bear—*fero, tuli, latum*. In the freshness of the Latin tongue all these roots were doubtless living, and in use. And if we consider our own verb *to be*, and compare it with kindred speeches, we shall find that we have there also fragments of three stems. The richness of human speech in its early ages must have been unimaginable. Its very riches was an inconvenience. Every man making his own terms was a hindrance to easy intelligence. Mutual consent was requisite to stamp certain roots with certain significations. If any one would speculate on those unsurpassed abstractions, the words representing the numerals, the problem of speech will rise before him in all its difficulty, and the absolute necessity of agreement on certain signs for these will be most apparent. Let us imagine such a time of fresh exuberance and overflowing fulness in the Semitic stem. Numberless roots existed for the same idea. The faculty of coinage lay in every man's mouth. The words, though many, were chiefly nature pictures, and while the family was small, no difficulty was felt in apprehension. One man took a daguerrotype of an object from one side, another from another side, and these sun images were bandied from mouth to mouth; but so long as the object was there no difficulty was experienced. Only when the family dispersed, and when the object was not distinctly seen, or only in part, or when it was forgotten, one-sided words would be alone intelligible and come into use. The state of the language was like a chemical mixture, seething and boiling with a thousand ingredients. It could not long exist in such a condition. Some object was

introduced that caused a precipitate. Some authority arose, distance, taste, pursuit, all tended to eliminate certain ingredients and preserve the rest. So many roots for one idea were inconvenient. Several were dropped, and one district dropped one word and a separate district another. And thus speedily dialect arose, and what is wonderful is not their number but their scarceness.

Another problem, which in lack of express history on the subject, philologists have busied themselves with solving, is the connection of dialects with each other. How do they stand related in point of time, which has retained the primitive stamp with the clearest visibility, and in what order did these tribes of the weary foot leave their primitive seat? The comparative philologist will tell us that he can almost with certainty read the unwritten history of many thousand years ago; he can tell us in what order the several tribes of the great Aryan family left their grand old family home in Iran; and as clearly as the geologist can trace the deposits of rock, he can trace the successive waves of population that swept over Asia and Europe. First, there came a Turanian horde, unconnected with the noble Aryans, which has left scattered traces of itself in many lands, in indecipherable names, in strange inexplicable monuments, in ways and usages that were familiar to man only in his early youth, but of whom all memory has long been gone, except in the frosty regions of Finland. These were swept away without a trace of their memory by the first Aryan horde, the Celts and Cimmerians, the sons of Gomer, who have themselves, after centuries of warfare, been constantly retreating before more powerful assailants, and now occupy the extreme west corners of Europe. The second wave of population consisted of the sons of Magog, Sarmatians and Slavonians, who are the constant companions of the Celts. And finally, the mighty Teutonic wave, consisting of the Low and High Germans, and among them the Latins and the Greeks. Philologists are able to inform us to what a height of civilization and domestic comfort the Aryans had attained before a teeming population compelled the younger members to quit the paternal home. Then, as now, the father was the supporter of his children till they attained maturity. The root *Pa*, from which comes *Pitar*, father in Sanscrit, and in Greek and Latin means to support. The word *daughter*, traced to its Sanskrit etymology, opens up to us an exquisite picture of the early pastoral life of the Aryans. That word comes from *duh* (dug), to milk, and *duhitar*, tochter, daughter, was the milkmaid in the old Aryan homestead. But more, the early life of these revered ancestors of ours was chaste and simple. Those relations that arise by marriage, and which

only civilized communities value, were there already known and cherished. The old Aryan had his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, no less than his descendant in the nineteenth century.

Can anything like the same law of diffusion be traced among the Semitic tribes? The Semitic languages are much nearer each other than the Aryan tongues, and most domestic words are common to them all. Before any separation, the words for father, mother, brother, father-in-law, &c., were all agreed upon. They all lived in *houses*, all but the Ethiopians worshipped *God*. These last have not the divine name common to the other families, their God is only a *king*. The Ethiopians, too, seem to have left before the Semites lived in *cities*, although the mere fact of wanting these words is perhaps too slender foundation for building such conclusions upon. It is another result of the extraordinary scrutiny to which the Indo-Germanic languages have been subjected, that philologists are able to predict what changes a word will undergo when passing from one dialect to another. This most extraordinary discovery is known as Grimm's law. We are not aware that any such principle has been sought among the Semitic languages. We have been looking with some impatience for the second volume of Renan's *Histoire et Système Comparé*, to see whether he has sought to discover any such law among the Semitic consonants, and whether, if he has made the search, he has been rewarded with a discovery. That changes pretty regular at least occur is certain. Should Mr Renan have found any general law of change, it will be a new fact in Semitic grammar, and we shall willingly hail it as *Renan's law*. Such wide generalizations are of immense importance to the student who goes to his task, not by mere force of memory, but with philosophic appliances.

Almost all the literature of the Aramean, which is known before the Christian era, is confined to the fragments in the Bible. The first notice of the tongue we meet is in the history of Jacob and Laban; the latter is introduced to us as using an Aramean speech of the same kind as we find it twelve hundred years afterwards in the mouth of the magi at Babylon. This need not surprise us. The Semitic tongues are noted for their stationary habits. The language of the Pentateuch is scarcely to be distinguished from the language of Ezra. The language of the Moallakat does not differ materially from the literal Arabic of the present day. The Talmudists are of opinion that the Aramean was the primitive speech, and that Adam and Eve conversed in that tongue in Paradise.

Besides the Chaldee portions of the Bible coming from the pens of native Jews, there are undoubted extracts from the archives of the Persian kings, which were kept in one form in

that language, and letters from their pashas of the era of the captivity. The language, from passing through Jewish hands, savours somewhat of Hebrew, is slightly less pure than we find it five or six hundred years afterwards in the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan Ben Uzziel, but has the same *copia verborum* and the forms scarcely perceptibly different. It is strange, if true, that during the whole history of this race, down to the rise of the Targums and the Syriac Christian literature, no remains of literary labour should have come to us from the Aramean-speaking races of Mesopotamia and Syria. That there should have been there no results of literary effort is incredible. That like many other monuments of human skill and human insignificance it should have perished, we can readily believe. Some modern writers have fancied they could discover definite remains of literary activity among the Nabateans or Mesopotamian Syrians long before the time of Christ. Quatremère, in his interesting *Mémoire sur les Nabathéens*, has largely described a work called *Agriculture of the Nabatheans** translated about the year 900 of our era into Arabic, from the Syriac. This singular work, which has yet found few readers and no editors, is purely heathen. It contains no reference to Greek authors, no mention of Greek towns, such as Sileucia or Ctesiphon, and no allusion to Christianity; on the contrary, numerous references to Babylon as still existing, and also to Nineveh as a well-known city, and repeated allusions to the most ancient religions of the East, are to be met with in it. And it is known that these Nabatheans possessed works in medicine, physics, botany, astrology, works on the mysteries, works on the adventures of Thammuz or Adonis, works on magic, on star worship, on monotheism, many *brochures* as old as to be attributed to the patriarchs Abraham and Noah, and even works of fancy and poetry. On this curious field of inquiry a new writer has lately entered. Chwolsohn contributes many interesting facts in his singular work, *Ssabier und Ssabismus* (Sabeans and Sabism), and we believe he has lately published a monograph on the pre-Christian literature of the Syrians. Chwolsohn is, we believe, a Russian, but he writes a fine simple German style, and we are indebted to him for casting the first light on the much vexed question of who and what the Sabeans were. All writers before his time have been on this question in the grossest error. He gathers his materials from Oriental writers exclusively, and goes to his task with no preconceptions. And his conclusions are sufficiently simple and intelligible. The Koran mentions Sabeans. These were the sectaries called Christians of St John; they were called *Sabeans*† from the repeated ablutions which they per-

* P. 112 and following.

† From a verb צָרַע, or טָבַע, to dip.

formed. But neither had they any connection with John the Baptist nor with Christianity. These, however, are not the Sabeans known as star or fire-worshippers, and supposed to derive their name from *Tsaba*—the Hebrew word for the host of heaven, as some think. This name which they gave themselves is an imposition, and arose in the following way:—The Chalifs tolerated no religion but those mentioned in the Koran. The Koran expressly tolerates Sabeism, that is, the religion of those Baptists usually called John Christians, but who cannot be proved to have been Christians at all. About the year 830 the Chalif El-māmūn, making a journey in Mesopotamia, came upon a colony in Harran and its vicinity, of whom their neighbours had many suspicious things to relate, he demanded of them what religion they were of. That was a question difficult to answer. They were of no particular religion, being pure heathens, and devoted to the Greek philosophy. They could not call themselves any branch of the *ahlu lkitab*, people of the book, that is, those employing a written revelation, Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans. A cunning lawyer, to whom in their trouble they applied, advised them to call themselves Sabians. The name was somewhat vague, and the Koran threw its protection over it. And Sabians these heathens named themselves, and escaped the exterminating sword of the Khalif. Chwolsohn devotes two enormous volumes to the history and opinions of this singular people, and not the least interesting portion of his work is the history of opinions entertained by the learned before his time on the meaning of the name, and a sketch of the grotesque and contradictory interpretations given of it.

In favour of the existence of a pre-Christian Syriac literature, it is well known that Moses of Khorene, in his history of Armenia, mentions a writer of the name of Mar Abbas Catina, who, about the year 150 before Christ, composed annals of Armenia in Greek and Syriac. This is doubtless somewhat apocryphal, but the sudden rise of the Syriac literature in the first ages of Christianity in such extraordinary luxuriance, is a singular phenomenon, if unconnected with any previous literary activity. The first Syriac writer of whom anything has come down to us is Bardesanes (for the letters of Abgarus are contemptible forgeries, though found in the archives of Edessa as early as the time of Eusebius), and it is well known that this writer was intimately connected with Chaldea, and deeply versed in the Chaldean wisdom, which he did not altogether despise, even after he had learned to know a higher; and it is possible that Bardesanes may form the link of connection between the two countries.

To the Christian scholar the Syriac is, next to Hebrew, the

most interesting Semitic speech. Its development is entirely Christian. Its infancy was contemporaneous with the infancy of our religion. They grew together and waxed strong together, and in that region died together. The first Christian monarch was Abgarus, King of Edessa. A Syrian was one of the leading Gnostics. Perhaps a Syrian was the author of Manicheism—certainly a Syrian was one of its sternest opponents. The early state of the Church is curious. If represented by Bardesanes, its orthodoxy seems to have been fluctuating. He is both a heretic and a persecutor of heretics—both a Gnostic and an apologist for the Christian faith; in his own age he is looked upon as a saint—two ages after reproached as an unbeliever, and written and preached and poeticised to death. He is the first poet and the first prose writer of the Syrian Church, skilled in Greek as well as in his native tongue—together the most notable and least known man of his time in that quarter of the world. The schools of Edessa and Nisibis were famous all over the East. Men of Asiatic reputation taught Greek and Syriac, and prelected on the Scriptures. The weary battles between Nestorians and Jacobites almost extinguished the College at Edessa. The Nestorian teachers were banished, and transferred their learning to Nisibis, seeking and obtaining the protection of the Persian Court. The ecclesiastical history of part of this time—so full of treaties and ruptures of treaties, vain efforts in favour of peace which always ended in embittered war—is perhaps best recorded by a Jacobite historian, John of Ephesus. It is a pity that we have not more original works from Syrian pens. It is too often the voluminous chaff of garrulous triflers that remains, while the golden grain of men of real thought has perished. What have we but a few fragments of the great Theodore, named by the Syrians themselves the “Commentator”—of Lucian and of Diodorus—those founders of the exegetico-grammatical school of Syria, in opposition to the allegorical, to which Ephraem unfortunately attached himself? These men, though the ban of excommunication be on several, and the stigma of heresy on most of them, were all men of thought and insight. But the cry of heresy is easily raised and eagerly believed, even in the nineteenth century, and in the fourth it was not less omnipotently destructive. Ephraem, again, is too often an orthodox twaddler—a fablemonger and legend collector—whose works are certainly little known, and therein lies their value*—whose cleverness lies in spouting sermons in poetry and confuting heretics in rhyme. There are, however, many original works

* An exception might be made in behalf of the hymns, and his works might all be turned to account in criticism, and for the purpose of restoring the Biblical text.

which have never yet been published, great part of which have found their way to the British Museum. There are sermons of Jacob of Sarug—works of Isaac, a presbyter of Antioch—of Philoxenus of Mabug—the patron and projector of Polycarp's version of the New Testament, known as the Philoxenian—which in its original state has never been found, and as published is the revised edition of "poor Thomas" of Haclea. This revision is probably much superior to the original, as the MSS. collated at Alexandria by poor Thomas were of the highest character. The original Philoxenian was supposed by Adler to be found in the Codex Florentinus, but Bernstein, the greatest authority on any Syriac question on the Continent, writes that there is no foundation for Adler's conjecture. Bernstein, however, is of opinion that Polycarp's unrevised handiwork is still to be discovered in a MS. at Rome, which he names the Cod. Angelicus, from belonging to the Bibliotheca Angelica of the Augustinian Monastery. He was unfortunately able to collate but five chapters of John's Gospel—the results of which collation are given in his edition of the Hacleensian revision of that Gospel—and it is sufficiently apparent that the work of poor Thomas is greatly better than that of his predecessor, Polycarp.

It is, however, in the character of an interpreter that the Syrian Church has acquired most fame. She stands as the mediator between East and West. This has always been the function of Syria. She handed over the great Aramean discovery of letters to the Greeks; she hands over to the East the great speculations of these same Greeks. Living on the confines of Asia and the shores of the great sea, she has been the great emporium both of trade and thought. Through her, Oriental influences and ideas became so much modified as to be acceptable to the West, and through her, Western thought was so modified as to be comprehensible to the East. She is thus the interpreter between the Semite and the descendant of Japhet. The British Museum is now filled with the results of her diligence in this vocation. Hardly were works issued in Greek when they were rendered into Syriac. We owe to these Syrian monks productions long lost and long lamented of the Greek Fathers. The works at the head of this paper are specimens of what the assiduity of these humble men has transmitted to our hands.

The first Englishman who made any important contribution to Syriac literature in the present century was Cardinal Wiseman. When employed in the Vatican, Wiseman was a diligent student of the Syriac treasures there; and, after Adler, deserves commendation for the facts he has contributed to our scanty knowledge of the Syrian Bible translations. His

Horæ Syriacæ was published in 1827. Only one part has appeared, ecclesiastical ambition having called the Cardinal away from the more peaceful pursuits of literature. His work, though originating in a polemic and dogmatic interest, contributes a good deal of general information. Horne most singularly allowed himself to say that the words, "This is my body," were the only words the Syriac language afforded to express "This *represents* my body." Horne doubtless knew no Syriac; but no man of common sense would advertently say of any cultivated tongue that it has no word to express *represent*. The passage is a good specimen of the carelessness with which really sensible and scholarly men sometimes permit themselves to write. So far from having *no* word to express *represent*, Wiseman shewed that the Aramean could express that idea in thirty or forty different ways. And having carried off this victory over Horne, his party doubtless believed the weightier matter of transubstantiation victoriously asserted also. But the man who of all others deserves the gratitude of his country and of learned Europe, in this department, is William Cureton, the present rector of St Margaret's, and canon of Westminster. That the British Museum is not the poorest but the richest depository in the world of Oriental literature, is due to the representations and even remonstrances of this scholar. The Lords of the Treasury, who will expend thousands on some wretched antiquarian project, could scarcely be induced to grant funds to purchase these venerable remains of an extinct Christian literature. It was due to the representations of Cureton that great part of the Nitrian treasures did not find their way to Paris; it was even due to him, in great measure, that these treasures ever found their way to Europe at all, and that any of them, beyond some merely private bargains, ever came the way of England; and having seen them landed safely on English ground, his labour but began. The drudgery of reading leaf after leaf, in order to collect the scattered members of some valuable volume, the weariness to the eye and the brain, the tedious scrutiny of bundle after bundle of scattered scraps, the difficult hand, the faded ink, the sickening disappointment when baulked in some cherished expectation—all render this kind of work most grievous to be borne. How long time Cureton spent on this work we cannot tell. We have never been privileged to see the results of his patient toil in the now regularly classified Syriac works in the Museum; but we know something of his own publications, and they alone are sufficient to place him in the foremost rank among Oriental scholars of any country. His work on the Ignatian epistles entitles him (he may think it no great praise) to the gratitude and respect of all Presby-

terians. And, so far as we know, he is the only man in our country of whom Ewald never permits himself to speak with disrespect.

The story of the Nitrian monasteries and their treasures is known to all. From the first time that Europeans visited the East, they have attracted the attention of book collectors. At the era of the famous Ignatian feud, they were looked to as likely to yield some weapons which would be deadly to one or other of the combatants. Usher predicted that a Syrian translation of these epistles would yet be found which would settle the dispute. His prediction has been verified in the first, if not the second particular. At the time this prophecy was uttered there were in the Nitrian monastery two copies of a Syriac translation of three Ignatian epistles, and a third copy of a translation of the Epistle to Polycarp. In the opinion of all candid scholars these are the only reliable representations of what the bishop and martyr really wrote. In later times many are the visits that have been paid to this monastery of Mary the Mother of God. The monks have been coaxed, and wheedled, and intimidated, and even hounded out of their treasures, which indeed they could not read or little cared for, but feared to alienate lest they should inherit the curse of Judas the betrayer, or Esau, the profane person, who sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. It was not pottage, but *rosoglio*, a delicious but potent liquor, that opened the hearts and the cellars of these holy cenobites. We all know how they lied, how they denied the possession of books, and over *rosoglio* confessed it; how they said they had very few, but at the sight of money produced loads, and at the sight of more money, heavier loads; how they sold all their library for a heavy ransom, and like Ananias and Sapphira, kept back part, with the consent of their superior; and how this holy man, commissioned by his brethren to receive the whole price, appropriated the half to his own uses, and lectured the querulous devotees on the unreasonableness of expecting more than half the money when they gave up but half the books.

Perhaps since Cureton's fortunate discovery of the genuine Epistles of Ignatius, no discovery so important has been made as that of the *Syriac Gospels*, first mentioned at the head of our paper. Cureton concludes that they are exceedingly ancient, that the copy is of the fifth century—probably transcribed about the middle of it.

"When it first came into my hands," says he, "I laid it aside among the other earliest MSS. of the gospel, without further examination at that time, concluding from its external marks of antiquity that it must have been written at a period

even more remote than the time of Philoxenus, and that it could not therefore be other than an early copy of the Peshito. The next time I took it up I was struck by observing that several erasures had been made, in the fifth and seventh chapters of the gospel of St Matthew, and other words supplied. This led me to examine the matter more closely, when I ascertained that this had been done with regard to words and passages which had differed from the text of the Peshito; they had been erased, and the others from the Peshito had been supplied. A little further examination shewed that the text before me was very different from that of the Peshito, and indeed belonged to a revision of the gospels in Syriac hitherto altogether unknown in Europe."

Any question about Matthew's gospel is liable to give rise to endless complexities. So soon as we approach this work, a host of questions start up before us. What was the current language of Palestine in the days of Christ and his apostles? Was it Greek or Hebrew, that is, Hebraizing Aramean? If Hebrew, what was the peculiar character in which it was written? Was it the ancient Samaritan letter, or the present square character, called by the Jews the Assyrian, and said to have been introduced by Ezra? What was the language in which our first Gospel was composed? Was it Hebrew, that is, Aramean, as all antiquity, the universal church down to the Reformation, and Syrian writers declare? or was it Greek as Erasmus first maintained, and as many scholars have since maintained? or did the Evangelist first give out an Aramean copy for the use of his countrymen, and afterwards freely translate his work into Greek for the use of the general believing world? Cureton assumes that the language of Palestine at this period was Aramean, that Matthew wrote his gospel in that tongue, and that this gospel was written, as Jerome says it was, in the square character now usually employed in writing Hebrew, and not in the Samaritan nor the Estrangelo anciently employed by Syriac penmen. We are not inclined to think it worth while contesting any of these questions with Cureton. Common sense and common belief are pretty unanimous in supposing the Aramean, that is, the Palestinian Jewish Aramean, to have been the generally prevalent and understood language of the time; though there is good reason to believe that many Jews understood and spoke Greek, that in some towns, such as Cæsarea and the capital, perhaps, that language would be understood and spoken by considerable numbers, and that, consequently, there would be little more remarkable in an evangelist writing a gospel in Greek to Jews, than in an apostle addressing an epistle in Greek to Romans.

On the question of the kind of character employed by the

Jews at this time, there cannot be two opinions amongst scholars. After the investigations of Kopp, which we have not seen, of Hupfeld in the *Studien und Kritiken* (1830), and in his Grammar, of Hävernicks in his Introduction, and finally of Ewald in his Hebrew Grammar, it cannot be any longer doubted that the present square character, though by no means exclusively, was in use before the time of Christ. And, indeed, an intelligent reader of the New Testament, who knows both forms of letters, must come to the same conclusion.

On the question as to the original language of Matthew's gospel, much fierce warfare has been waged. We cannot discuss the question here, nor even say how it is to be discussed. It does not seem to us one of that importance which it is occasionally represented to be. We should rejoice to see it settled beyond controversy, but we despair of living so long; and we are inclined to think it would be advantageous for the interests of religion to let it, for a time at least, repose. It is not one of the questions decided by argument, but by feeling. Of course there can be no objection to men maintaining their own opinions with all the arguments, both of persuasion and scholarship that they can command, but we have observed on such questions a tendency to resort to concussion, to coerce an opponent by the argument *in terrorem*. We have seldom looked into any work on one side of this question, where we did not encounter some such argument as this:—If our present gospel be a translation, it is impossible to regard it as of divine authority, and its presence in the Canon (being of such doubtful character itself) tends to cast a shade of suspicion over the whole Canon. This is a most unworthy argument. What is the meaning of it? It may read two ways. If our present gospel be a translation, it is impossible to regard it as of divine authority; but this result we shudder at; therefore it can be no translation. If this be the meaning of the argument, we congratulate its authors on its discovery. It is a short and easy method. Let them stick to it, and evidence will be superfluous. But the argument may have a different sting. If our present gospel be a translation, it is impossible to regard it of divine authority; whoever is led, by whatever means or evidence, to embrace (with many pious Christian scholars) the view of an Aramean original, must be prepared to face the loss of Matthew, and the deterioration of the whole Canon. Were such consequences to follow we cannot help it. We must follow our convictions on the evidence before us. It is not a question of dogmatism, but one of testimony. Happily, however, no such consequences follow as are alleged. The above argument is not more illogical than it is unchristian,

equally confused and dangerous. It is in the direct teeth of fact to argue that it is impossible to believe our present Greek to be a translation, and yet apostolic and divine. Early church writers did both. To a man they assert it to be a translation, and to a man they assert it to be apostolic and canonical. They assert it to be a translation, and by whom they knew not; and asserting both, they yet assert it to be apostolic and divine. And multitudes of modern scholars make the same twofold assertion. There is, therefore, no impossibility in the double belief. And it is a calumny upon our fellow-Christians, to insinuate that with their peculiar views of Matthew's original, they cannot have the same reverence for our first gospel as they entertain for the others when they tell us, that in spite of their peculiar views they have the same reverence, and do regard our first gospel as inspired and canonical. We believe it will never be proved to the satisfaction of more than one-half the critical world, that Matthew wrote in Greek, nor to the satisfaction of more than the other half that he wrote in Hebrew. The question is likely to be disputed till all disputes are at an end. But it can be proved to the satisfaction of most Christians, that our present Greek gospel belongs to the apostolic age, and comes to us with apostolic authority; that it is canonical, and that all the benefits which accompany or flow from canonicity adhere to it; and that whatever sanctity and authority belong to other portions of the canon belong also to it. And, surely, this is enough to know and enough to believe.* Let it be understood that the belief in an Aramean original interferes with none of the evidence for our present Greek. Every argument which is valid in behalf of the Greek without this belief is valid with this belief. All testimony by citations is testimony in behalf of the Greek. Clemens, Romanus, Polycarp, pseudo-Ignatius, all the names in Jones and Lardner, record their votes for the Greek. The early existence of our Gospel in its present form is thus set beyond question. Even Papias, the great witness for an Ara-

* It is a *dogma*, that our gospel in its present state is the immediate product of some apostolic hand; less than this cannot be held without compromising its inspiration, for we do not understand what is meant by "virtual" inspiration. But within this there is liberty for difference of mind. 1. It may be held that our present Greek came immediately from Matthew's hand, and is the only gospel that came from his hand. 2. That our present gospel came immediately from his hand, but is a reproduction in Greek of what he had already given forth in Aramean. 3. That our present Greek is not the immediate product of Matthew's hand, but is a reproduction in Greek of his immediate Aramean by some apostolic man, but what apostolic man cannot now be conclusively ascertained. Not one of these three aspects of the dogma is itself a dogma, and the attempt to elevate any of them to that height, is to be resisted might and main, as a confounding of things distinct, and an overbearing of the right which every individual believer possesses, to construe indifferent history for himself.

mean original, writes of a time in his days long gone by, when every one "translated" that Aramean as he best could. But still the co-ordinate fact remains, that all antiquity delivers itself in favour of a Hebrew original. And it must be candidly admitted, that only recourse to the most violent supposition, and a treatment of history most unscientific and sophistical, can impose silence on this stubborn witness.

Cureton having made this assumption of an Aramean original, further thinks it highly probable (as Stuart argued, on the opposite behalf, however), that this original would naturally make its way beyond the confines of Palestine, meet with favour among the kindred-tongued Christians in Syria, and be adopted by them with a few dialectic alterations to render it generally and easily intelligible. The present Syriac translation, the Peshito, bears unmistakeable traces of being after the Greek. But the Syrian churches knew as late as the twelfth century of a Syriac translation of Matthew made out of the Hebrew, and a writer of that time specifies certain of its peculiarities. This version, which Dr Cureton has discovered, contains these very peculiarities, has besides, in Dr Cureton's estimation, a general appearance of a Hebrew origin, and is unquestionably much older than the Peshito in its present form. On these grounds Cureton thinks himself justified in concluding that this version he has discovered is Matthew's original as it was slightly modified in the Syrian churches, and in use among Syrian believers till it was revised after the Greek, constituting the translation known as the Peshito, and that we have thus a means of coming nearer the *very words* which Matthew wrote and Christ spoke than we were privileged to have before. In short that we have now, to a *great extent*, the very words which Christ himself uttered. Cureton says to a *great extent*, because he does not believe, as no man can who reads it, even this text free from changes and alterations occasioned by collation with the Greek.

Now this does seem to us a most harmless speculation on Cureton's part. We cannot see what occasion there is for the clamour that some journals have raised over this work. Why, *any* Syriac, made or not made off the Greek, comes much nearer the *very words* of the Saviour than the Greek does. Any Syriac version will unquestionably contain many of the very words made use of by Christ, and the Greek hardly one. It is well known that Boyle in advanced life learned Syriac, in order to have the happiness of reading in the Syriac translation words almost identical with those he knew the Saviour must have spoken. We think, however, there is reason to complain of Cureton, if he intimates that his Syriac is of superior *authority* to our Greek. We grant at

once, for we cannot deny, that his Syriac, whatever be the source of it, represents the gospel in use in the Syriac church in the second century, that it was anterior to the Peshito, and assisted at the formation of the Peshito, or if he pleases, that the Peshito is nothing but the Curetonian revised after Greek manuscripts, and grammatically adapted to the language of the time. But whatever be its source, and whatever be the date of its modification or translation off that source, we deny that this Syriac has any apostolic authority, which all antiquity and the universal Church declare our present Greek to possess. And were it proved even to demonstration, which it cannot be, that Matthew did write in Aramean, and to demonstration, which it cannot be either, that this Syriac is a translation or modification of that Aramean, and at any date however early, we could have no hesitation in repudiating all claim which it might put forward to predominant authority over our present Greek. We are apt to be troubled with vain fears here. We cannot bear any rival to our present canonical gospel. We forget that there *can* be no rival; and the terrors that haunt us lest it should be displaced or depreciated—which we forget is impossible—are apt to stand in our estimation as arguments against this Syriac Gospel. We must consider that *our* fears will not debar others from prosecuting the inquiry with a determination to reach the truth; and they may, indeed we begin to suspect they will, in the opinion of considerable numbers, prove this Syriac Matthew to be translated from an Aramean source; and we must not deny such an Aramean source, or that this is a translation from it, lest we should be found opponents of the truth; but neither dare we concede to those who uphold these things that this Syriac is therefore more authoritative than our Greek, lest we be found surrendering another and infinitely more important truth. We, through the church, know of only one authoritative Gospel of Matthew. We have not the means of clearing up all the statements and opinions of early fathers upon the question. The early church has not explained its conduct. We know what it did, we know what it said, we know not why it said one thing and apparently did another. But we are entitled to suppose that it acted wisely and under the divine guidance, and did not without the best of reasons—viz., certainty of the fact—consider our present Greek as possessing apostolic authority. And this consideration lightens all our fears. The question of an Aramean original is merely interesting as a historical question, of no importance as a matter of faith; the question whether this Syriac be immediately rendered from an Aramean source is also interesting

especially as a matter of criticism, but it has no bearing on the canon of Scripture or the creed of the church regarding it.

This question, then, being not a question of creed, but only of criticism, we can approach it without any undue excitement and give the argument on both sides a fair sifting. Come to what conclusion on the *source* we may, the value of these Gospels, and the obligation scholarship is under to Dr Cureton, are things incontestable.

First, we do not think much respect is due to Cureton's supposition, that the Syrian Christians would more readily accept an Aramean gospel than a Greek one. The Oriental Christians certainly valued too highly Greek over their own tongue. They, like all ancient Christians, were inclined to place the Septuagint above the Hebrew. Their old testament was, doubtless, made from the Hebrew, but its present condition is inexplicable, except on the supposition either that the translators had beside them the Septuagint, or that subsequent manipulation has adapted their translation to the Septuagint. Indeed, one bishop confesses that he corrupted his own "blessed" Scriptures after the Alexandrian version, and claims our gratitude for the deed! Still the testimony of Papias must mean something, that every man "translated" Matthew's original as he best could. This "translation" must have some reference to the use of the (in his estimation) Aramean original beyond the bounds of Palestine. It would, therefore, be vain to deny that this Aramean, whatever it was, had made its way outside Palestine.

More important is the fact on the face of these Syriac gospels compared with each other. The first gospel is widely more correct than the others. It contains nothing that can fairly be called a mistake, which the others can hardly with any candour be denied to do. It is much more literal, less paraphrastic, and does not so often *slump* sentences and words together as if catching the general sense, but at a loss to render the individual words. This is presumptive evidence that the translator found the task of rendering the first gospel an easier task than he found the rendering of the others, in other words, that he rendered from a cognate dialect. This might be answered by urging that the translators in both cases may not have been the same. We cannot doubt, however, either that the same translator performed the whole task, or that the translator of the other gospels kept the Matthew sedulously before him, because many passages are verbatim in Matthew and Luke, and to all appearance the Matthew, though largely interpreted from Luke, bears marks of priority. The translator of John has on one occasion mistaken entirely the construction of a sentence, making the

nominative what is really the accusative. The translator of Luke, in addition to several curious words which he uses, falls into a singular usage, we might also say error, for we know of no such expression (nor does Cureton, a much higher authority) in Syriac, viz., the rendering of *υιος του ανθρωπου*, the Son of Man by *ברךנברא* *son of the man*, for which the usual Syriac is *ברךאנשא*. Still *נבר*, though usually *a man*, does mean also *man*, and we would not willingly convict the translator of an error. Whether error or not, the *usage* in Matthew and Luke is different. Matthew never uses this expression, Luke on several occasions. We have not noticed it in John, but so small a fragment of that gospel is preserved that no conclusion can be drawn. Taken by itself, the fact of greater correctness does not go a great way to prove the Matthew from an Aramean original, but taken in connection with other and stronger arguments, it cannot be fairly denied to afford some presumption.

By far the strongest argument that the editor can urge is the testimony of Barsalibi, bishop of Amida in the 12th century. His testimony is direct. In his time a certain gospel was known in the Syriac church as the gospel made out of the Hebrew. There can be no doubt that this Matthew which Cureton publishes *is* that gospel. The peculiarity alluded to by Barsalibi is so singular and apparently self-contradictory that with no feasibility can it be supposed to be found in two Syriac gospels. That bishop, enumerating explanations given of the omission of the *three* kings in Matthew's genealogy, writes thus :

“Others say that the Christians of the Hebrews removed these three in order to accommodate the generations from David to the captivity to the number fourteen, because the number was cherished by them ; for there is found occasionally *a Syriac copy made out of the Hebrew*, which inserts the three kings in the genealogy, but that it afterwards speaks of fourteen and not seventeen generations, is because fourteen generations has been substituted for seventeen by the Hebrews on account of their holding to the septenary number, which is much cherished by them, because on the fourteenth they were delivered from the bondage of Egypt.”

Here we must not confound the explanation with the fact. The explanation we believe to be worthless ; the fact cannot be doubted. Barsalibi tells us that, in his time, there was occasionally found a Syriac copy of the first gospel, which gave all the seventeen names, but counted fourteen generations, and these Syriac copies were made out of the Hebrew. It would be worse than irrational to deny that this Curetonian Syriac is the Syriac alluded to by Barsalibi, and which was

believed by him and his contemporaries to be made out of the Hebrew, for it gives seventeen names and counts fourteen generations. It was evidently no uncommon thing to insert these three names in the genealogy. This was natural enough from the Old Testament; especially this practice seems to have prevailed in the East. Mar Jacob the Persian cites them as early as the middle of the fourth century; George of the Gentiles in the middle of the seventh. This George thinks Matthew wrote seventeen names and counted seventeen generations; but that for some reason, accidental or intentional, three names fell out, and the change from seventeen to fourteen naturally followed. This, of course, is a mere explanation on his part of a difficult phenomenon—viz., the omission by the Evangelist of the three names, and proves nothing more than that it was not an uncommon thing very early to find Syrian MSS. with these three names inserted. It cannot be denied that this testimony of Barsalibi's is very strong. Take into account his character, his scholarship, his position, and altogether his testimony, were there nothing more, would be sufficient to exonerate Cureton, or any other man, from the charge of rashness or folly in believing, without more ado, that this Syriac was made out of the Hebrew, which circulated pretty largely in the East, and from a very early time, down at least to the fifth century, under the name of "Matthew's Authentic." We believe we are not wrong in saying that Dr Tregelles agrees with Cureton that this Syriac is from that Hebrew, and the evidence on which he grounds his belief is this testimony of Barsalibi.

We have now stated what we think the strongest grounds for Cureton's theory. He has several more, chiefly from the internal appearance of his gospels, and from their agreement with citations from the gospel usually known as Matthew's Original Aramean. We do not think these arguments strengthen Cureton's position materially. We cannot help feeling that this Syriac is made from the Greek when we peruse it; and, at least, the internal arguments on opposite sides may be said to neutralise each other. The editor relied formerly on the peculiar title of the Matthew—*Evangelion d'ampharsho (d) Mathai*—which he renders, *the distinct Gospel of Matthew*. It must be remembered, however, that the particle *d* (of), is not at least visibly written in the Syriac. There is merely a small lacuna, which the editor thinks must have been once filled by that letter, though it is now damaged and illegible. It has been said that Cureton's rendering is inconsistent with Syriac syntax. That we cannot admit. It may be doubtful, however, if he is entitled to supply *d*, if a fair interpretation can be made of the superscription without that particle. Bern-

stein, Ewald, and many more have tried their hand at the explanation of this heading. Bernstein's conjecture is inadmissible from the nature of the gospels. Ewald's will scarcely command general acceptance. Perhaps a solution lately proposed by Dr Gildemeister, in the third part of the German Oriental Society's Journal for 1859, is more likely to meet the necessities of the case. According to him, *mpharsho* qualifies *Mathai*, not gospel; and he renders, "The gospel of the chosen, elected Matthew." How should such a name apply to this apostle particularly? Professor Gildemeister does not solve that difficulty; but, nevertheless, in the East, it seems the name was applied. He appears with that designation in some Arabic MSS. in the Bodleian. Such names were not unknown among the apostles. There is an old tradition that Mark had his thumbs cut off, and was known as the "Stump-fingered." This tradition is generally rebuked with disgust by later writers; but it is, nevertheless, occasionally met with in ancient writers and MSS.; and Hippolytus (Pseudo-Origenes), without ceremony, calls the apostle *ὁ κολοβοδάκτυλος*.^{*} Whether this explanation be the correct one or not, the argument on Cureton's behalf is too precarious to be of much importance.

Equally precarious we deem his arguments from the citations of the Hebrew gospel in ancient authors, such as Jerome and Epiphanius. It is well known how well acquainted these authors were with a document generally supposed to be Matthew's original. This gospel existed under various names—Nazarene Gospels, Ebionite Gospels, Hebrew Gospel, Gospel of the Hebrews, &c. There can be no reasonable doubt that these are all names for the same document in the hands of various parties, and in various stages of preservation. We do not think that the attempts of Alford and others to shew that Jerome at one time believed the Nazarene Gospel to be Matthew's original, and afterwards doubted this, have been successful. Jerome never believed that the Nazarene Gospel was the apostle's as it came from his hand, and he seems always to have believed that it was his considerably corrupted by interpolations. It introduces extraordinary complication into this question to suppose that the Nazarene and Ebionite documents rested on bases entirely different. They both seem to have been corruptions—the Ebionite to a much greater and more dangerous extent—of one original. It is also unreason-

^{*} Page 252. The passage alluded to by Gildemeister is curious. "When therefore Marcion, or any of his curs, yelps about a Demiurge, producing arguments from the comparison of *good and evil*, we must tell them that neither Paul the Apostle οὐτε Μαρκός ο κολοβοδάκτυλος, declares these things, for not one of them is written in the Gospel according to Mark."

able and arbitrary to imagine that these gospels of the Jewish Christians were pure fabrications. Such an opinion is incompatible with the name and character attributed to these documents, and it inflicts a gratuitous injury upon the Nazarene Christians. It is most certain that these Nazarenes were the remnants of the primitive Jewish church. They were the party who adhered to the decision of the Apostolic Assembly regarding the relation of the law to Gentile Christians. They were not in fellowship with the church in the time of Jerome; but there is no proof that, beyond their own legal scruples, they entertained any heretical opinions. Before the destruction of the temple and the complete dispersal of the Jewish church, two rival sections seem to have existed in that community, one a laxer and another a sterner class. The latter maintained the inviolable sanctity and endless permanency of the law, and refused communion with Gentiles and those who declined to submit to its requirements. These were the men against whose opinions Paul directed so many of his assaults. That they formed one community with the milder class at Jerusalem is most probable; that this community had, even before dispersion, a gospel in their own tongue, is likewise probable. This might be a translation of Matthew, whose gospel, in whatever tongue composed, is by all acknowledged to have been the first in circulation, and addressed to Jews of Palestine. It is difficult to account for this Hebrew gospel being common to the two sects, who, after the destruction of the temple, had no good feeling to each other, except on the supposition that, before their separation, they had together employed it. This causes the Hebrew document, whether original or translation, to ascend very far back, and a translation of it into Syriac at an early period would put into our hands a document much more reliable and interesting than that which Jerome took the trouble to copy and translate. This Curetonian Syriac is not a translation of either the Nazarene or Ebionite document, as expanded by silly and sometimes dangerous interpolations, and largely described by Jerome and Epiphanius. It is a pity that their quotations are chiefly from the interpolated parts. They of course had occasion chiefly to quote what differed from the common reading, and what was peculiar. These peculiarities would be the gradual accretions of three centuries, and our Curetonian, adapted from the gospel at a very early period, would not naturally contain many of them. It is likely, however, that if it really was the representative in Syriac of the Hebrew gospel, it would agree in *some* particulars with citation from that gospel. This Cureton thinks it does, and this agreement he uses as an argument to establish its Hebrew origin. This

proceeding is quite legitimate; only we must see that the argument is fairly conducted. We must lay down one or two restrictions to its use. *First*, Any passage from this Syriac agreeing with such quotation, if the Peshito also agrees with the quotation, can hardly be admitted as an argument. The Peshito is certainly based on the Greek, and though with the assistance of the Curetonian, it is too much to assume that all readings common to it with the Curetonian, and deviating from the Greek, have been borrowed from the Curetonian. All Oriental translations are in common liable to give certain turns to the Greek. And, *second*, Any passage from this Syriac, agreeing with a quotation from the Hebrew gospel, if any Greek MS., or version, such as the Old Latin avowedly made from the Greek, also agrees, cannot be admitted as an argument. These two most fair principles, which Cureton himself could not object to, will, we believe, neutralise almost all his arguments from quotations. For instance, Jerome writes that *Juda* was the reading of the Hebrew gospel in Matt. ii. 1, where the Greek read της ιουδαϊας. This father believed that the apostle wrote *Juda*. Well, the Cureton reads *Juda*, which reading Cureton thinks proves it connected with the Hebrew. But the Peshito does so to. Are we entitled to say that the Peshito made off or with the Curetonian, borrowed this reading from it, or may it merely be one of the liberties of the translator of both? Both Jerome and Origen quote the curious passage:—"My mother, the *Holy Spirit*, took me by one of my hairs, and carried me to the great mountain, Tabor," from the Hebrew gospel. In the history of the temptation, the Curetonian also says the *Holy Spirit*; but so does the Peshito. And such insertions are quite in the manner of the Syriac versions. What are we to say? That the Curetonian borrowed from the Hebrew, and the Peshito from the Curetonian, or that the insertion is due to some exegetical whim of the translator? We confess we like to give him as little place as possible among rational Christians; but knowing that such whims did possess the Syriac translator, we are at a loss which side to take.

We may give an instance where our other canon or caveat will apply. It may be taken as a type of a considerable class of the editor's arguments. In Matt. xiii. 16 we read, Happy are your eyes that see, and happy your ears that hear. The Syriac is ܚܕܝܢܝܢ, this may be rendered either "that see," or *because* they see. Our Greek gives the second sense, *because* they see. Hegesippus, however, citing this passage, gives οἱ βλέποντες, *which* see; and we know from Eusebius, that Hegesippus used the Hebrew gospel. It is therefore likely, that that language which explains both readings—viz., the Aramean—was the

original. But this, though one of Cureton's favourite arguments, is really very weak. For in the first place we are not informed that Hegesippus took this quotation from the Hebrew, he was well acquainted with Greek, having lived some time both in Corinth and Rome. Eusebius merely states in general terms that Hegesippus brought forward things from the Hebrew gospel, the Syriac, and particularly the Hebrew language, thereby shewing himself to have been a Hebrew convert. In the second place, the reading of Hegesippus is also that of Irenæus and Hilary, and the three best MSS. of the old Latin. And the reading is to be explained, not from the Hebrew gospel, but from the parallel passage of Luke, *μακαριοι οι οφθαλμοι οι βλέποντες α βλέπετε*. And this Syriac Matthew has a wonderful affinity for Luke.

The internal argument in favour of the Greek original of this Matthew seems to us stronger than that in behalf of the Aramean original. When we compare the gospels among themselves we see at once that there is a considerable difference, but that difference is only in point of correctness. There is no dialectic difference that we can discover, no difference of style, or idiom, or language, nor anything (excepting always the correctness) indicating a different source or time of translation. And as the Luke and John necessarily came from a Greek basis, this similarity affords a presumption that the first gospel did so likewise. The relation of all the gospels to the Peshito is very much the same, and those places in the Greek, where two evangelists agree together verbatim, are also found verbatim in this Syriac, just as they are in the Peshito. We admit, however, that little can be made of this. For there is every reason to think that, according to the custom too prevalent in early times, these gospels have frequently been collated with each other, and differences smoothed away, and fuller details inserted in the one from the other. For instance, the parallel passages Matt. viii. 19, Luke ix. 58, are verbatim in this Syriac, as in the Greek, and an addition to verse 21 of the words *and I will come*, is common to the two gospels, though found, so far as we know, in no Greek manuscript. In many passages, the Luke and Matthew are verbatim, and verbatim with the Peshito; and did we not know the constant tendency to compare and assimilate, we could draw some conclusion in favour of a Greek original from this fact.

We believe that any one reading over this first gospel with the Greek, will conclude at once by mere feeling, that Greek has been the basis of the gospel. We are not sure that this will be the reader's feeling on a second perusal, and after some reflection. The mere occurrence of Greek words is little argument. For many Greek words occur in all Syriac writings,

and even in Rabbinical writings. And a reader who is startled by these, and deems them proof of a Greek source, must remember that they did not convey any such impression to a native Syrian six hundred years ago; and that the Greek words in his copy could not be fewer than in ours; for our copy was in all likelihood transcribed for the last time more than six hundred years before Barsalibi's day. But in spite of this, the Greek expressions in our gospel are a curious phenomenon. When they occur, they are as a rule the Greek words found also in the Greek gospel in the same passage. This cannot be accidental. Neither can all the Greek words in this Syriac, which are generally the Greek words also in the Peshito, have belonged to any Aramean gospel supposing Matthew to have written such, nor to any translation of it, true to its original form. Either this Syriac of ours is a translation from a Greek source, or, like the Peshito, it has itself been subjected to emendation and alteration after Greek manuscripts. Dr Cureton accepts the second hypothesis. But we cannot see that that hypothesis fully explains these Greek peculiarities. Let us adduce two instances. In Matt. v. we have the following verse 15, under a *bushel*, *μοδιος*; the Curetonian retains this word, which is Latin; the Peshito avoids it: verse 17, *law* and the prophets, *νομος*; the Curetonian retains the word: verse 22, *angry without a cause*, *εικη*; again retained by the Curetonian: verse 41, *compel thee to go a mile*, *μικρον*; also retained by the Curetonian. It would be a curious fact if a collator should take upon him to alter so many words. One more curious instance we shall bring forward, chap. xvi. ver. 9. Do ye not remember the five loaves among five thousand, and how many baskets (*Κοφινους*) ye took up? nor the seven loaves among four thousand, and how many baskets (*σπουριδας*) ye took up? Not only does this Syriac borrow both these Greek words, which can hardly have been current in Palestine (we are not aware that they are found in Rabbinical Hebrew), but never suffers them to be interchanged, uniformly employing the word in the Greek, and where it is in the Greek. We should not wonder if such an example as this would satisfy many that the Greek was the original which the Syriac translator closely followed. Further, there are certain readings in this Syriac which can hardly be accounted for, except as mistakes in rendering from a Greek original. For example, Matt. vi. 24, he will *hold to the one*, Gr. *ενος ανδεξεσται*. The Curetonian renders נִסְכֵּר, he will *sustain*, which is *ανεξεσται*. It is highly probable that the translator had a Greek MS. before him, and *mistook* one Greek word for another very similar to it. And this probability is considerably heightened by the fact, that some of the old Latin versions have made the same mis-

take, translating *patietur*, which is *awēṣerai*. Ewald is of opinion that this is conclusive for a Greek original. We believe a good deal more could be said in behalf of a Greek original, and we leave our readers to form their own opinions. We would not willingly stake very much on the arguments we have alleged against Dr Cureton. We candidly confess nothing can be urged of equal value to the testimony of Barsalibi, and that Bishop had all the internal probability against an Aramean source which we have, and he and his contemporaries found no difficulty, in spite of it, in believing this gospel "made out of the Hebrew." The question may be decided either way with perfect safety. From an Aramean source or from a Greek source this gospel has no authority in comparison with our Greek. The question of Matthew's original is a doubtful question; we would not willingly stake our faith on anything that can be reasonably disputed. The question of the original of this Syriac gospel is also very much a doubtful question; we would not willingly stake our faith on one side or other of the dispute. We know of only one canonical and authoritative Matthew, the ancient church recognised but one; the authority of the ancient church is all we can have, and it is sufficient; we know she acted wisely, and we are independent of any discovery that can be made, or any hypothesis that can be formed, we can afford to look upon them all with complacency, even indifference; accept what is good in them, and smile at what is worthless.

Of much more real importance than the question of origin is the question of age and critical value. And here, happily, there can be no dispute. This version is demonstrably old—older than the Peshito—and bears a close resemblance to our oldest transcripts of the gospels, especially the MSS. B.D,* and the old Latin. Indeed, the antiquity of the translation is apparent at the first glance. There are in it certain archaic forms which are found only in the oldest Syriac. The only work, so far as we are aware, containing some of the peculiar forms in question, is the Theophania of Eusebius, published by the late Dr S. Lee of Cambridge.† The MS. from which this work was printed, bears that it was transcribed about A.D. 411, only some seventy years after the historian's death. This is, so far as we are aware, the oldest Syriac MS. known, and those curious in the history of induction may read the story of the discovery of its hour of nativity in Cureton's preface to the Festal Letters of Athanasius. The form of the first

* Of course these signs are well known. A., Cod. Alexand; B., Vatican; C., Ephraim D., Bezae Cantab.

† Since this was written, the work of Titus of Bostra against the Manichean has come into our hands, and exhibits some of the same peculiarities.

personal pronoun in that work and in this Syriac is אַנְחֲנֵךְ, instead of the common הֲנֵךְ. There are in the Theophania some forms of the pronouns which we have not seen in these gospels, but on the other hand we have observed a most extraordinary *demonstrative* in Luke, viz., הוּלֹךְ, which we have not noticed elsewhere. There is no reason to suppose that these forms are indicative of any particular district or dialect. Lee presumed his translation of Eusebius must have owed its origin to Palestine. That is highly probable on other grounds, but these archaisms afford no reason for the suspicion. But what is evidence most convincing of the antiquity of this translation is its peculiar affinities to the Peshito. The comparison of even a few verses will convince any one that the two translations are not independent of each other. There are many parts verbatim, both in Matthew and Luke, and the general relationship is of such a kind that either the translators of the Curetonian must have employed the Peshito, or the translators of the Peshito the Curetonian. It seems improbable that such a translation as the Curetonian could have arisen after the existence of the Peshito. No end could be served by it, and its readings are not consistent with such a hypothesis. And, besides, it is observed that there is a law among the Syriac versions, as indeed among all versions, the earlier a version is the freer and more idiomatic it is; the Philoxenian or Harclensian is slavishly literal; the Peshito is pretty free and independent; the Curetonian the freest and most independent of all.* The readings, too, of the last are the known readings of the second century. Some of its peculiarities are preserved by writers of that time. It is well known that the Peshito, in many important cases, deserts the writers of the second and third centuries, and that this has been always one of the inexplicable things about the Peshito. Some Syriac must have existed in the second century. That Syriac version must have contained certain readings which were demonstrably the widespread readings of the time. The Peshito, which has usually been supposed the only Syriac version in common use, does not now contain these readings. But this Curetonian Syriac does; and if there be any force in reasoning at all, we conclude that this is the Syriac in use at that period. So far from the Peshito being the only Syriac version in use in the first centuries of our era, it is now evident that besides it, at least *three* others were current, and in all probability more than one of these were employed by Syriac scholars in moulding the Peshito with the assistance of Greek MSS., which differed considerably from the MSS. of the second century.

* Hence Griesbach's rule that amplifications imply lateness, applies only to MSS.: applied to translations the rule must be *reversed*.

There are certain vices in the Syriac versions. They are often very much of a paraphrase. They seek to lay hold of the sense more than to render the mere words. They omit; they add; they invert. Particles, substantive verbs, and such like small matters they supremely disregard. The translator stands far above the original, and thinks himself at liberty to use it with all freedom. These are the vices of the Peshito. These are the vices of the Curetonian in a strongly exaggerated form. Critics have been strongly tempted to regard the whims of the translator as peculiarities of the MSS. he employed. Nothing is more strange than to read the traditional criticism on the Peshito. Introduction after introduction takes up the wondrous tale and repeats it to the listening earth. The best account of the Peshito is that given by Dr Davidson in his *Biblical Criticism*, but that account is confessedly borrowed from a clever tract by Loehlein on the Ephesian Epistle in the Peshito. All introductions contain certain traditional accusations of mistake on the part of the Syriac translators, which mistakes were really never committed. It is astonishing to find, even in the last German edition of Hug, such an accusation as this:—"Wisdom is justified, *απο των τεχνων αυτης*—the Syriac translator renders by *her works*, he read *τεχνων* for *τεχνων*." Surely the learned man was not unaware that the Vatican MS., to which the Peshito bears a most close resemblance, reads here *εργων*, and such must have been the reading of the Jerusalem Syriac, the Philoxenian, and many ancient versions. But while injustice is thus often done the Peshito in particular instances, and especially by the wholly impossible conjectures of Hug,* it cannot be concealed that no version has given critics so much trouble to solve the problem of its readings. Griesbach unequivocally declared that it had been repeatedly subjected to emendation after inferior Greek copies. Bengel maintained that Latin MSS. had been used by the translator—Adler that it had been corrected after the Latin. Tischendorf has no doubt that the present text of the Peshito is widely different from its primitive text. Tregelles agrees, and places far more dependence on the Curetonian, as accurately representing what was read by the Syrian Church in the earliest ages. The difficulty is this. The Peshito agrees very often with certain ancient MSS., the ancient fathers, and certain old versions. But in some notorious instances it deserts these hoary witnesses, and upholds the readings of younger MSS. It is not unknown that attempts to classify MSS. into families or *recensions* have in general

* Hug's attempts to explain peculiar readings in the Peshito are recognised failures. Bernstein says of him in regard to the Philoxenian, that he asserts of it much that is erroneous, and some things even fabulous (und mitunter fabelhaftes), and with a confidence as if what he affirmed were established verity.

failed. Griesbach virtually retracted his classification. Hug's division into recensions of Hesychius, Lucian, and Origen, is a piece of imagination; and, perhaps, other classifications are equally unreliable. What, however, is evident is this, that there are certain MSS. and certain versions older than others, and that several of these oldest MSS. and these oldest versions, both eastern and western, agree on the whole together, and this general agreement is supported by the additional general agreement with it of some of the most ancient Fathers, as Clement and Origen in the east, Irenæus and Tertullian in the west. We give no opinion as to the value of these MSS. (though it seems to us the rational way, to ascertain first of all what the most ancient testimonies do affirm), nor do we decide whether they are the only competent authorities in ascertaining readings, or whether mere authority alone, or also conjecture and exegesis, ought to be taken into account in editing a text. These MSS. may be, as Matthæi named them, "dunghill MSS.," and of very slender authority; still two things can be affirmed of them:—they are the oldest that we possess, and they have undeniably a general agreement with each other and with the most ancient fathers; and with this class of MSS. the Curetonian Syriac agrees far oftener than the Peshito does, and this agreement is quite as marked in the other Evangelists as in the Matthew of Cureton's Recension. A case or two will demonstrate this:—

Matt. V. 4 and 5.—The order of these verses is inverted by Origen, by most copies of the old Latin, by the Vulgate, by MS. D. With these agrees the Curetonian Syriac: the Peshito agrees with the received, which, however, is supported by B.

Matt. XIX. 17.—*τι με λεγεις αγαδον; ουδεις αγαδος, ει μη εις.* The rival reading is, *τι με ερωτας περι του αγαδου; εις εστιν ο αγαδος.* The former is the received and the reading of the Peshito. The latter is that of the Curetonian, and with it agree B. D. L., &c., Vulgate, all the old Latin except one, the Jerusalem Syriac, &c. &c.

Of Mark the only part preserved is the much contested passage in the end of the last chapter, and Biblical critics should value this Syriac, if for nothing else, for adding another testimony in behalf of these verses.

From John, which stands before Luke in this Recension, we cite the following:—Chapter III.—*χωρις αυτου εγενετο ουδε εν ο γεγονεν. εν αυτω ζωη ην, &c.* This is the punctuation of the received and of the Peshito. Another punctuation is *χωρις αυτου εγενετο ουδε εν. ο γεγονεν εν αυτω ζωη ην.* This is the interpunction of the Curetonian, and with it agree Irenæus, Clem. Alex., Tertullian, Origen, &c., MSS. A., C., D., &c.—B. having no interpunction.

The well-known passage, John v. 4, regarding the troubling of the water by an angel, is omitted by the Curetonian, with B, C, D, the Peshito with the Rec. retains the whole.

From Luke we may just refer only to the shorter form of the Lord's Prayer, in which the Curetonian agrees with the express declaration of Origen, and with several ancient MSS. Scores of such cases could be adduced from all the gospels. Cureton has collected a vast amount of them in his notes, but not the half of them. In the first gospel nearly all the important readings are found, in the others his purpose did not lead him into so full an exhibition of the readings of his text. But he has conferred a great benefit on those who may not have leisure or inclination to consult the original. One caution may be given regarding his translation. It is very literal, and the peculiar distinctions in it are liable to create doubt in the mind. His object was to be as literal as possible, and always to render the same Syriac by the same English. An intelligent reader, after some perusal of his translation, will discover the peculiarities of it, and run no risk of being misled.

There can be no denying the fact of the general agreement of this version with the oldest MSS. All fair critics are agreed on this point, which is susceptible of demonstration; and all are agreed, even Ewald, who upholds its Greek origin, on its priority to the Peshito. It is, therefore, a valuable witness to the readings of the second century; but like any ancient translation which has been unrevised, it contains singular inaccuracies, and rather renders the sense than the words. It is chiefly valuable, therefore, when it agrees with the class of MSS. to which it belongs, it cannot be of much weight when it differs from all or a majority of these. The MSS. of the Peshito are, now at least, singularly uniform. Perhaps the oldest of them is not more ancient than the middle of the sixth century. The manipulations and prelections of the schools of Edessa and Nisibis had ere then effected for them what the Masoretes effected for the Hebrew Bible. There are hardly any deviations of these MSS. one from another. The more modern may contain forms slightly modified, but no important distinction occurs. Not much is to be gathered from a comparison of the MSS. of the Peshito. It was at one time supposed that the reading of the Jacobites differed considerably from those of the Nestorians, and that the latter had in various ways corrupted the Peshito to favour their own dogmas. This suspicion is quite unfounded. The first edition of the Peshito was printed from Jacobite MSS., but the labours of Wiseman and others have abundantly shewn that the Peshito remained unchanged in the hands of both the great Syrian church parties. And the only material addition to our knowledge of

Syrian readings will be from the comparison of such texts as the Curetonian, as the Jerusalem Syriac, and the MS. known to be at St Petersburg, which Tischendorf, no Syrian, we believe himself, beseeches some one to collate; and from a diligent perusal of the works of such native Syrians as Ephraem, and others, whose writings may yet be edited.

There is one part of Cureton's preface which seems to require some explanation. The object of it is not very clear. It is the part where he collects a variety of expressions found in his Syriac differing from those in the Peshito. His words would lead us to infer that he considers all these to be dialectic differences. He says:

"The language also of the four gospels in the Peshito has undergone some modification from this text. Other terms, and different modes of expression, which appear to be purely dialectical, have been substituted in the place of those which are found here."

Cureton then gives a very large number of words and expressions differing in the two recensions; giving first the Curetonian, then the Greek, and then the Peshito, for purposes of comparison. We have reason to think that, notwithstanding the words we have quoted, Cureton means only a small portion of these expressions to be understood as dialectical. The majority of them are not so. They are really to be found in other places of the Peshito. Thus the two common words for "ship." Cureton calls attention to one of these in the Curetonian in a particular passage, although both words are used indifferently, both in the Peshito and the Curetonian. So the two words for *law*. Cureton doubtless means to call attention to the fact, that the Peshito has substituted a different word from the one already used in the Curetonian. The fact of these differences, however, seems to us to shew, that this Curetonian Syriac was *never* in the Syriac canon, but only employed as an aid by the translators who formed the Peshito translation, the basis of which even in Matthew is certainly the Greek. We believe a rigid scrutiny would discover the great majority of the expressions and phrases which Cureton adduces here, even in the Peshito, and writings in that dialect. There are, however, both words and forms peculiar to this version of Cureton's, and while these do not demonstrate any strong dialectic difference, they sufficiently demonstrate, as does the whole grammatical texture of his version, its antiquity and priority to the Peshito.

In conclusion, it may appear that on the question of *Origin*, we have given a very uncertain sound. We have come to no conclusion on that question. When we peruse the Syriac, we are strongly led to suspect a Greek origin, when we re-

consider the testimony of Barsalibi, and remember that he and his contemporaries, and Cureton and Tregelles had all this internal evidence before them, and yet came to the conclusion of a Hebrew origin, we are led to doubt our own subjective feeling, and hung up again *in suspensio*. Cureton's hypothesis of an elaboration after the Greek effectually cuts the ground from under our arguments from internal Græcisms. But we cannot help thinking that his hypothesis really invalidates much of the gain to be presumably derived from Matthew's supposed original. It is not after all his original, but a Syriac modification of it, elaborated after Greek copies, that has been discovered. Such a thing seems hardly worth fighting in defence of. Who knows what these elaborators changed or left unchanged? They thrust in many Greek words and expressions, who knows that they did not alter whole clauses or paragraphs? This theory of the learned Canon really damages his discovery to a great extent. When did this elaboration take place? What was the character of the MSS. employed? To our mind, a very early translation into Syriac from a valuable Greek MS. unchanged and subjected to no interference, would be much more precious than a thing such as the editor describes, which has demonstrably suffered so much at the hands of reckless meddlers.

But whatever be the source of this gospel, and whatever unworthy treatment it may have undergone at the hands of menders, it still remains a most venerable and most precious monument of antiquity. And the agreement of much of it with the readings preserved from the earliest times is susceptible of proof. The question of its origin is of no moment. It is as a testimony to what the Syriac church read in the second century that these gospels are of real value. Sagacious critics *predicted* that the Nitrian MSS. would likely afford a copy of the gospels; and if so, they predicted that it would contain readings which the Peshito did not now contain. The Nitrian treasures have given forth a copy of the gospels, and this does contain the predicted appearances. This is a curious fact in criticism, as curious as the prediction of the anti-Ignatian champions that the Syriac Ignatius would *not* contain certain readings, which readings the Syriac Ignatius, when he came to light two centuries after the prediction, was found to want. People can draw their own conclusions from these facts.

With regard to the unauthorised readings in this Matthew and in the other gospels, many of them are supported by no authority, and it is hardly worth while speculating on the origin of them. It is easy to collect a host of such peculiarities from almost any version and almost any MS.; and such an

array, when paraded before the eyes of the unskilled, may seem at once to end the matter by a conclusive demonstration of the worthlessness of the document harbouring such things. But it must be remembered that such errors are the universal heritage of MSS., that they can be separated almost entirely from what is genuine, and that the peculiarities of this Syriac are no more conclusive against its value than the peculiarities of other MSS., such as the Cambridge document, are conclusive against the worth of them. They are both valuable in spite of these peculiarities.

We regret that we can do little more than allude to the other works we undertook to discuss. Cyril is well known, and not over creditably, from his share in the Nestorian controversy. After the rise of the Jacobite party in the Syrian church, relations with Alexandria were very close. Cyril was a great authority among the Jacobites, and translations of almost all his voluminous works are found in Syriac. The commentary on Luke is almost entirely lost in Greek, fragments of it only being preserved in the Catenas. Efforts have been made with considerable success, we believe, by Mai, in his *Bibli. Pat. Nova.*, to restore it. The present editor, however, Mr Smith, assures us that much of what Mai has admitted into his *Bibliotheca* is not commentary and not Cyril's. Great deal of it he asserts to be Theophylact's. The commentary on Luke is in the form of sermons. Of these there are 153 in all, but great part of many, especially the earlier ones, is lost. Gieseler pronounces Cyril's commentaries worthless. Perhaps the verdict is too strong, although we have not seen anything very valuable in this volume. It is, however, very carefully edited by Mr Smith, the type being small estrangelo of the same kind as that employed by Widmanstad in printing in 1555 the first copy of the Syriac Scriptures at Vienna. The Syriac learner can now have no reason to complain of want of materials. This commentary, which by the way is not the easiest Syriac we have seen, is a great quarto of nearly 500 closely printed pages.

The other work edited by Lagarde (Boetticher) is, perhaps, more interesting. Lagarde has done good service in giving out the treasures of the British Museum. He is the most indefatigable Syrian living, a work from his pen making its appearance every year. We owe to him the apostolic constitutions from a Parisian MS. These are greatly shorter than the Greek, wanting several books entirely, and much out of the books remaining. The conceit of the editor is laughable when he says in his preface that hardly five men in Europe will understand his work, and nobody read it. Lagarde is evidently one of the best scholars on the continent at this

moment. He has a project before him, which we could wish to see him speedily execute. It is to edit a Greek text of the New Testament very much after Oriental versions. This project is not altogether vain. Not enough has been made of these early Eastern versions, especially the Ethiopic and the Coptic have been neglected. The only really scholarly attempt to turn these to account has been made by Ellicott. The results of collation contributed by Tischendorf are very superficial, that scholar being dependent on others, or on translations for his information, and any one who will take the trouble to compare even a small portion of an Oriental version, such as the Curetonian Syriac, or the Ethiopic, with the readings from it exhibited in his testament, will discover that the latter are often both defective and erroneous.

Nothing could demonstrate more clearly the extreme value of Syriac studies for the church, or shew better the kind of spoil likely to be gathered from their prosecution than these "Analecta." Much that is most valuable in elucidating points of early church history, especially Oriental history, and much that will tend to fill up some deep abysses of ignorance, may be gathered from these Syriac remains. For example, the original of the Recognitions of Clement is altogether lost; the Latin translation by Rufinus is confessedly not literal, and is defaced by omissions of much that he misunderstood or considered suspicious. There is extant in the Museum a Syriac translation of the Recognitions, which would be interesting, if published or collated, as casting light both on the true text, and also on the kind of liberties which Rufinus allowed himself in translating. The Syriac is very ancient, in all probability anterior to the Latin, and the transcript of it which we possess seems to have been made less than a dozen of years after Rufinus completed his task.

The most curious fragment contained in these "Analecta" is the *γνῶμαι* of Xystus or Sixtus, bishop of Rome. This work, which the Syriac shews to have been originally in Greek, is altogether lost. The great translator Rufinus did it into Latin. It seems to have been pretty widely known at one time, for Origen cites it. Later, it came under the suspicions of some of the Fathers, such as Jerome, who questioned its claim to be a Christian production at all. It was thought to be the work of some Pythagorean, and in modern times even Neander speaks doubtfully of it. There are Pythagorean doctrines inculcated in it, but this arises not from its being the production of a Pythagorean philosopher, but because some forms of Christian asceticism coincide with Pythagoreanism. The work is largely coloured by Christian modes of thought. In a review in the *Göttingen Anzeigen*, Ewald

concluded that the only portions of Scripture known by the author were the First Epistle of John and the Epistle of James. This is a curious opinion to come from one who remembers even the first page of the tract, where is an undoubted verbatim quotation from the First Epistle to the Corinthians—"He that is spiritual judgeth all things," and the antithesis of "spiritual" and "carnal," of which the author makes so much, and which he carries through his whole work, is undoubtedly Pauline. Then on p. 11 there is a quotation, not quite literal, it is true, but recognisable from the gospels. We have not been fortunate enough to discover any quotation from the Gospel of John, to which, however, the Curetonian Syriac offers such irrefragable testimony. Who was this Xystus? The editor decides him to have been the first bishop of that name who presided at Rome. We should then have another valuable addition to our scanty collection of remains from the first half of the second century. A German of the name of Siber wrote a manual so early as 1725, with the design of shewing that this Xystus or Sixtus was the second of that name. This bishop lived about the middle of the third century. Origen, however, was already acquainted with our work, and cites it. It can hardly be the production of one living so late. There are seven MSS. containing the Syriac or fragments of it, and all of them attribute it to a bishop of Rome. We regret that we cannot give any detailed account of its contents. It is the first book of Christian proverbs, and if the work of a Christian and disciple of James, in the first quarter of the second century, is exceedingly interesting.

ART. II.—*A Nation's Right to Worship God.*

WE propose, in this article, to discuss some of the principles and laws of social progress, in the endeavour to elucidate the relations between civil government and religion, under American institutions. There are grave questions connected with this subject, which, we are persuaded, must soon be reopened in this country, and come to engage the most earnest thinking of our time.

To prevent misunderstanding, however, we would observe at the outset, that we are firm believers in human progress; the faith and hope of which are interwoven with the very fibres of parental affection. We find it easy to persuade ourselves that our children will reflect honour upon us; and that

we shall be comforted, with respect to our own errors and failures in life, by their successes and happiness. On a certain occasion, a good and wise father called his son into his presence, on the day he came of age, and said, "My son, you are no longer a child; you are now a man. From this time you have no master but God. God and your country now call you to liberty and to duty. I wish you to remember, my son, that it was ever the aim of your father to be a man, to act a man's part in life; and that his honour is now committed into your hands. You will not betray, nor tarnish it." That was all he said to the young man, but as he turned away, with a tear of parental hope and pride, he softly added, "It is an honest lad; the boy will not discredit his name; he will do *better* than his father has done."

A single generalisation from this fact gives us the faith and hope of the human heart in that physical, mental, and moral development of the race, which we call by the name of social or historical progress. This faith we hold to be indestructible. It is true, indeed, as every thinking man must be well aware, that much of what is called by the name of progress is mis-called. If the destinies of humanity were in the hands of many who vociferate this word, but who are only camp-followers to the army, intent on plunder, no victory could ever be gained, organised society would soon be dissolved, and the world engulfed in perdition. Notwithstanding, from the times of the Hebrew prophets, in whose glowing predictions it finds its most sublime utterances, this has ever been the faith and hope of all the great and good of mankind. It is, indeed, the light of human life, without which life itself would be intolerable. We cannot believe in a permanently retrograde movement. No; the deep and fervent aspirations of our hearts, and the faithful striving of our hands, are not doomed to end in disappointment. The succeeding do enter into the labours, and profit by the experience, of preceding generations. Human reason is a nobler endowment than the instinct of the beaver.

A little attention, however, to the phenomena of history reveals the striking fact, that this progress is never in a direct line, but in a zig-zag movement, like that of a ship beating to windward: which may well illustrate the actual condition of our fallen humanity. From the social evils of a given system of philosophy, or prevailing solution of the great problems of life, a reaction sets in, under the influence of which the course of human thought shoots far over into the opposite extreme. When the evils of this extreme begin to make themselves extensively felt, and others, more grievous, are threatening us, like "breakers ahead," a similar reaction takes place; again

the word is passed, "About ship! helm hard down!" when we come up into the wind, and if we do not miss stays, and fall off upon rocks or quicksands, we go about, and lie over on the other tack. But head as close to the wind as we possibly can, we soon find ourselves, not indeed in the same, but in a similar extreme to the first. In the mean time a certain progress has been achieved, yet by no means so great as he imagines, who watches only the motion of the vessel through the water, but does not lift his eyes to the guiding constellations of heaven.

Sometimes, where the wind is dead ahead, and the channel very narrow, as in France for the last hundred years, these courses are very short. There we have the apotheosis of despotism under Louis XIV., the experience of the evils of that extreme, the subsequent reaction, and the subversion of that ancient and renowned monarchy. Next the opposite extreme of Jacobinism, the Reign of Terror, the reaction, and the consequent overthrow of the first Republic. Following this we have the military throne of the first Napoleon, under whom the course of national thought ran on in the same direction, through the sorrows of France depopulated by incessant wars, and of Paris occupied by the allied armies, reaching at length the extreme point of the restoration of the ancient dynasty, with most of its obsolete traditions. Hence, again, a similar reaction towards republicanism, stretching through the second expulsion of the Bourbons, and the reign of the Citizen King, to the provisional government, and the second Republic. And yet, again, a reaction set in against this movement, not so much, as it would seem, because of any extremes which it had actually reached, nor from evils actually experienced, but from those which were apprehended as impending and inevitable. For during the brief continuance of the second Republic, the socialistic ideas had made such rapid advances as to threaten the rights of property, the integrity of the nation, and civilisation itself. This was well understood at the time by the first minds in France. Cavaignac himself, that staunch republican and most incorruptible of Frenchmen, is known to have declared, that although he would not forfeit his own consistency, yet, if Louis Napoleon, or any other capable man, chose to put himself at the head of a reactionary movement, he would not draw his sword in defence of republican ideas. This was the secret of that great man's virtual acquiescence in the *coup d'état* which established the present order of things. He could not disguise from himself that a change was indispensable to save society from dissolution. And now, if we compare the second Republic with the first, and the present condition of the French people with that under the first Napoleon

and still farther, with that under the legitimate despotism of the old monarchy, it becomes quite evident that the result of all these conflicts has been a true and living progress.

Thus it has always been in the history of the human race. For if, to the generalisation of this construction of particular facts, it be objected, as we sometimes hear it said, that French nature is not human nature, and such proceedings are never seen but in France, we are not to attribute the least force to this expression. Its wit is the chief element of its life and currency. Human nature everywhere is numerically one, and identically the same. We meet similar phenomena in Greek, Roman, and, as we shall see hereafter, even in Jewish history. In fact, throughout all past time, wherever any life and movement at all have been manifested, this progress by reaction from extremes has been going on, in more or less striking forms, through longer or shorter reaches of thought, according to the peculiarities of each several people.

The reason of this is obvious to reflection. For the life of humanity consists, in great part, of the development under logical forms, and of the realisation in action, of intellectual conceptions, principles, ideas. Facts, *res gestæ*, are the phenomena and the body of which thought is the law and the soul. History is crystallised thought. Not that principles in their abstract forms, are first apprehended by the mind; on the contrary, facts are first in the field. Some leader of human activities becomes conscious of a common want, and therefore immediately takes action. In order to justify such action, to induce others to unite with him in sharing its responsibility and its benefits, reflection is brought to bear upon it, and the principle which it contains is abstracted from it and defined. This principle now enters into a course of logical development; its contents are drawn out of it, and applied in various directions, according to their capabilities; and thus it passes into history. In so far as any such given principle or idea is both true and fruitful, the nation or people over whose history it presides for the time is animated with a vigorous and flourishing life. The time during which it supplies impulse and energy, norm and corrective, to the human activities, is marked as an historic period—which is of longer or shorter duration, and more or less rich in grave and important events, according to the fulness and truth of the ideas by which it is inspired and governed.

Thus it is that all great movements of mankind are movements of thought in course of evolution and application to the affairs of life. And wonderful it is, to see with what vigorous, logical procedure such developments march. For although each individual be capable of but little thought, and that little

may often wander, and load itself with inconsequent deductions, yet, as in orchestral music, the discords of the various instruments are assimilated and absorbed in the full tide of the harmony, so the errors in the reasoning of individual minds are either neutralised by each other, or taken up and borne along in the vast sweep and volume of national thought, so that the mass movement follows, in the main, a logical direction. Of this our own history, as we shall presently see, affords many striking illustrations.

In order now to comprehend why such movements cannot run on for ever in the same direction, we must here take into consideration the infinite nature of the truth, and the finite capacities of the human mind. Consequently these ideas which are developed in history, are never absolute. In so far as they are true, they are but glimpses into the infinite of truth, which are liable, in the course of time, to be exhausted of their contents, so that, torture them as we may, they will yield no more consequences capable of being realised in act; whence they cease to inspire the life and energies of the people, and give place to other ideas which turn the current of history. Human life, moreover, is manifold and many-sided. No one idea, however great and fruitful, can be adequate at any time to fill out its whole circumference. The life of each individual, much more that of a nation or race of mankind, consists in the development and realization of many different and often conflicting ideas, which have relation to each other, and will yield consequences which never can be foreseen or predicted. For it is only in life, through actual historical development, that the logical contents of any great principle can ever come to be fully known. Hence it follows that when such principles continue to be fruitful, they are liable to be pushed on to unforeseen results, which not only clash with each other, but are pernicious in themselves. For there is no principle which is capable of definition, development, and realisation—that is to say, there is no historical principle which will not yield, by perfectly legitimate processes, *extreme results*, which practical wisdom will stedfastly refuse to adopt and act upon. Every such principle is necessarily, to a certain extent, contingent upon circumstances, in some of which its legitimate consequences are true and valid, in others, false and pernicious. However incontrovertible it may be when abstractly stated, however beneficial its consequences when realised up to a certain point, others are sure to be evolved out of it in the course of time, with respect to which it will require to be severely limited in its application to the affairs of life.

Now where this is ill understood or neglected, where a people

do not stop to apply these necessary limitations, but push on the great ideas, which animate and inspire their energies, to the remotest results of which they are capable, these extreme consequences, as they are unfolded and realised, become productive of intolerable social evils. Then it is that reaction sets in; the ship goes about, and lies over on the other tack.

The most sharply defined and typical forms of this whole procedure we have found in French history. The reason of this lies in the obvious truth, that the most striking characteristic of the Gallic national mind is logic. The French are eminently a people of ideas, in this sense, that they carry out their social theories, as if they were absolute, to the most extreme logical results of which they are capable. Your true Gaul follows his logic "down Niagara." Hence the rapidity with which they run through their historic periods: hence the frequency, and strength, and violence of their reactionary movements. The English, on the contrary, are not a people of ideas, that is to say, of theories. The grand trait of their national mind is common sense. Above all men whom we know, whether of ancient or modern times, the English are clothed with the power of arresting extreme consequences, of limiting the development of one idea by that of another. They understand the necessity of checks and balances in every human arrangement. Hence those long reaches of thought through which their historic periods run, and the permanency of their social institutions.

In such views as these we may find ample justification of that maxim of the people's wisdom, which we take to be essentially of English origin, "It is very good in theory, but will not hold in practice"—a maxim, however ridiculed by sciolists, both sound in itself, and of extensive application. For here we see that the wisdom and safety of any act, or course of action, do not wholly rest upon its being a legitimate consequence of some received, and, in the main, sound principle. In order to demonstrate a safe practical judgment, each separate result of our guiding principles must be brought to the test of other ideas, as also of experience, and of common sense.

In the light of these principles and laws of social progress, we may now endeavour to understand ourselves, and to determine through what stage, whether of healthful action, or of extreme results, we, as a nation, are now moving in the development and realisation of the grand ideas which inspire and govern our history.

And here it is necessary to ascend to the fountain head of that which only, as we think, can properly be called modern history. The historic period through which we are now moving, begins—in so far as any part of what is necessarily an organic

whole, can be said to have a beginning—in Luther's first act of rebellion against the authority of the church of Rome. The principle which was contained in that act, we take to be this, that the mind and conscience of the individual are responsible to the truth and to God alone—the principle of INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY, AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY. The history of the Protestant nations, from the sixteenth century to the present time, chiefly consists of the progressive development, the further and more widely extended realisation, of this idea. This mighty truth, this vast and fruitful principle, according to the strength with which it actuated Martin Luther, and according to his agency and influence in opening to it a career of development in the world, is that which constituted him, truly and properly, an epoch-making man. With all our known reverence for the other great Reformers, especially for Calvin and Melancthon, it seems no way unjust to them to say, that the relation which they bear to Luther is like that of La Place to Newton.

Now this principle of individual liberty and responsibility, as all other ideas which have exerted a regenerating and transforming influence upon the world, had its birth in a fact of religion. Consequently, it was first applied to doctrinal and church reforms. Hence we have the Reformation, the Reformed Religion, with all that is signified by these words. But it was self-evident that this principle could not be limited to the sphere of the religious life. Immediately, therefore, it began to be applied to literature, science, and art, in all other directions, and to all other human affairs. Hence came Oliver Cromwell, Puritanism, the English, American, and even the French revolutions, together with all their fruits and consequences in modern history. Hence the freedom of the press, universal education, and all free institutions. Hence all freedom of scientific inquiry, experiment, and publication, and that riches and bloom of Protestant literature, science, and philosophy, especially that stupendous growth of the physical sciences, in their application to the industrial arts, in the midst of which it is our happiness to live. The immeasurable superiority, with respect to all these things, of the Protestant over the Papal nations—except France alone, emancipated, to a great extent, from Papal influence by the revolution—is proof that they belong to the germinal principle of the Protestant Reformation.

But it was on this continent, in this new and vast country, and by reason of the character, antecedents, and objects of our forefathers, that this great religious, political, and social principle found a wider and more favourable sphere, than it had ever before enjoyed—its true and proper home. Consequently

our history, as no other in the world, consists of its more and more extended development and realisation. This we now proceed to trace.

Taken as the right of private judgment, it is this principle of individual liberty and responsibility which has given us much of that intense individualism, self-reliance, directness of thought, abounding energy, restless activity, and daring enterprise, which in religion, politics, and business, are so strikingly characteristic of the American mind. Hence, also, we derive our prevailing mode, to question, examine, discuss, and criticise, rather than to believe. In all the departments of thought and life—in science, art, and philosophy; in theology, morals, and religion; in the church, the state, and the family—there is nothing too great or too small, too high or too low, too sacred or too profane, for individual criticism. This also places us in constant and powerful resistance to the authority of the past, the deliverances of tradition, prescriptive right. But since fashions always tend to extremes, and no less, as we have seen, in philosophy than in dress, it would not be surprising if those who come after us, should reject much that we have retained. It is certain, that if the habit of mind should continue to grow upon us, it must in time lead to the rejection of many just and true ideas; of many sound maxims and wholesome customs. The principle from which it springs, therefore, requires to be checked or limited, at least to some extent, by reverence for the past, the experience of the human race, and common sense.

The application of this idea to civil affairs, has given us the right of self-government, with all its priceless advantages over all other forms of government ever known to mankind. Hence we have our central, state, county, township, and municipal organisations; the whole country being divided and subdivided again and again, that the idea of self-government may be the more perfectly realised. But it is evident that the principle admits of a still further development, in the entire separation of the North from the South, of the East from the West, and of each state from all the others, into so many disconnected and absolute sovereignties. Nay, its remote consequences would displace the very idea of a state or sovereignty, and constitute each individual the supreme law, and sole arbiter of his own life and conduct. Here, therefore, the principle requires to be limited by that of national unity, of which we shall have more to say hereafter.

Nor is there anything in this idea to restrain any man from marrying as many women as he can persuade to become his wives. Hence we have lived to see United States officials exercising, in a perfectly valid and recognised form, all the

functions of territorial government, with harems of women around them, more numerous than that of the Grand Turk. This is a significant fact, and well worthy of being understood in connection with the principle from which it springs, and by which it is justified. Hence, also, our communities of free lovers, and the impunities they enjoy; together with the enormous multiplication of divorces among us. For where all parties freely consent to such arrangements, the idea of individual liberty is the more perfectly realised, without violation of the civil rights of any. Here again the principle requires to be limited by that of the Christian character of our nation, of which also we shall have more to say.

The right of self-government, moreover, admits of an easy and perfectly sound translation into the received formula. All the powers of government are derived from the consent or concessions of the governed. But it is evident that a man cannot alienate from himself a right which he does not possess; and no man is possessed of the right to take away his own life, for any purpose, or in any circumstances. Consequently no man can surrender to government this right to take away his life. Government, under this formula, has no right to inflict the death penalty; and capital punishment becomes murder. Here we find the true explanation of those popular agitations against the death penalty which we experience from time to time; which have already excluded it from the penal code of some of the States; and which must ultimately abolish it altogether, if the idea from which they spring be not limited by the Divine right of civil government, and of society to protect itself.

In fine, the principle of individual liberty, carried out to its utmost consequences in civil affairs, is, of course, simply anarchy. And such was the actual condition of the Jewish people at the close of that historic period which is covered by the Book of Judges; when *there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes*. For what state of social disorganization those words were intended to describe, is plain from that horrid affair of the Benjamite's wife, in which a whole tribe of Israel were almost exterminated by their brethren, and which closes in that stormy period. Hence the uncontrollable reaction that followed, and the establishment of the monarchy to save society. Nor is there any other way, as it would appear, to escape precisely similar results in our own history, but by the limitation of the idea of individual liberty by the correlative principles of national unity, and of the religious character of the nation.

The application of this principle to matters of religion, has given us all our individual religious liberties, with all their unspeakable blessings. From it also we derive that vast

multitude of different religious sects, with their advantages and disadvantages, by which Protestant Christianity is distinguished from the outward and formal unity of Romanism. And here it would seem that we have already reached extreme results in the development of the idea, which exert no little influence to undermine and weaken the faith of the people. The church, the body of Christ, appears to exist among us in a dismembered state, its mangled limbs violently torn from each other, and the life-blood, which is faith, pouring forth from its wounds in fatal streams. We cannot but think that the inward and spiritual unity of the church demands some outward and visible sign, in order, first, that it should be a living unity, and secondly, that it should be so manifested as to convince the world that Jesus Christ is the Sent of God. This seems to be included in that repeated prayer of our blessed Lord, interceding for his people, in the words: *That they all may be one ; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they all may be one in us ; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.* For how can the world, who cannot discern spiritual things, be aware that there is any spiritual unity in the church, so as to be convinced by it that Christ is sent of God, otherwise than by its going forth, and expressing itself, in some outward manifestation and visible sign ?

But not to insist upon this interpretation, it is evident that in the idea which has given birth to all these different denominations, there is nothing to restrain it from continuing to multiply them to an indefinite extent. Accordingly, we find it in full career of development and realisation up to the present time. Within the present generation it has given us Mormonism, the so-called Spiritualist Circles, and a number of new Christian sects ; and it has rent in twain the Methodist Episcopal Church, North and South, the Presbyterian Church, and twice again, the New-school branch of it. Still it threatens other communions. Where will it naturally stop ? Let it run on to the last extremes of which it is capable in logic, and it must subvert all creeds and confessions of faith, displace the very idea of church unity, and make each individual his own church, and thence, practically, his own Saviour and his own God. All that is needed to ensure this result, is that the very same mental processes and acts, which have broken up the Christian church among us into the existing number of different sects, should continue to repeat themselves without let or restraint. Here therefore the principle from which they spring requires, and it must find, limitation in catholic unity, experience and common sense. The last, and now the only hope of Romanism in the world, lies in the possibility that Protes-

tantism, in this country, may not have the wisdom to apply these limitations in time to save the faith of the people.

We come now to consider the influence of this idea, of individual religious liberty, in moulding our governmental institutions. For in order that every individual might be not only absolutely free, but wholly unbiassed by the influence of the government, in his religious opinions, the Constitution of the United States has rigorously abstained from all recognition of, and allusion to, Christianity, or to the being of a God; and all* our Constitutions prescribe and ordain "that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification for any office or public trust." Consequently they cannot require an oath in the name of God. What is called the oath of the President elect, which is the model of all others, whether of the general or state governments, is prescribed in these words: "I do solemnly swear or affirm," &c.; in which the officer elect is left free to swear by nothing at all, and thus to leave out not only all recognition of God, but therein also the very essence of an oath. Whenever the name of God is introduced in such cases, whether under the Constitution of the United States, or of any particular state, in any department of the government, executive, legislative, judicial, educational, or military, it is purely optional.† The practical effect, whether or not the original object, of all this, is the neutrality of the government with respect to all religions, so that no possible governmental influence can be constitutionally exerted for or against any form of religious belief.

This absolute neutrality in religion of the Constitution of the United States, is admitted and defended by the commentators. Says one of them: "It has been objected by some against the Constitution, that it makes no mention of religion, contains no recognition of the existence and providence of God. . . . But there were reasons why the introduction of religion would have been unseasonable if not improper. The Constitution was intended exclusively for civil purposes, and religion could not be regularly mentioned. The difference among the various sects of Christians is such that, in an instrument where all are entitled to equal consideration, it would be difficult to use words in which all could cordially join. . . . The purity of religion is best preserved by keeping it separate from government." For these and other reasons, he adds: "It was impossible to introduce into the Constitution even an expression

* The constitution of North Carolina, unchanged since its adoption in 1776, is an exception to this.

† In some of the States, the form of the oath is in some cases prescribed by law so as to make a direct appeal to God, but this can always be evaded by substituting the affirmation.

of gratitude to the Almighty for the formation of the present government."* Such are the views of the commentators upon the Constitution of the United States, in which they manifest a cordial zeal for the purity of religion, "by keeping it separate from government;" but unfortunately they do not inform us what is to preserve the purity of government after it has become sequestered from religion—has thus solemnly excommunicated itself. It were "devoutly to be wished" that some eminent statist of that school would speak to this point.

The same principle substantially rules in our state Constitutions. It is true that in some of the earlier of these there is still a faint recognition of God, and even of the Christian religion. In that of North Carolina there is even a Protestant clause. But from most of those which have come into existence under the further development of the idea of individual religious liberty, either all trace of religion has disappeared, or, as in those of Missouri and Texas, there are provisions of positive, though, no doubt, of unconscious hostility to Christianity. The Constitution of New Jersey is an honourable exception to this statement. As revised two years ago, under the influence of the eminent Christian statesmen of that Commonwealth, it exhibits a decided tendency to return to the idea of a Christian state. But the Constitution of New York is an admirable example of this perfect religious neutrality, the more significant in so far as the inhabitants of the Empire State are a typical people. For it guarantees the largest liberty to all mankind, with respect to all religions, in the words, "without discrimination or preference." That the true intent of that clause is to place all the religions, and all the infidelities of the world, upon exact level with Christianity before the government, we have the best possible evidence. For being well acquainted with the truly eminent and accomplished gentleman to whom chiefly that Constitution owes its present form, and happening to meet him soon after its adoption, we took occasion to say, "You, sir, have done what surely no other man in the state could have accomplished. Having yourself been born, and brought up, and moulded under the influence of the Christian church, you have given us a Constitution for the government of a great Christian people, which covers a vast extent and variety of topics, and yet which carries out one idea with such perfect logical rigour, that from no single word, or form of expression, could it ever be inferred that such a fact as the Christian religion ever existed." "Ah!" he replied, with manifest delight, "how well you have understood it! That was just what we intended to do." Yet was he anything but

* Bayard on the Constitution of the United States.

an irreligious person. He was a regular attendant, and liberal supporter of the Presbyterian Church, and, indeed, formerly a parishioner of the writer of this article. But this was his theory of civil government. A Christian person, even a Christian family he could understand ; but a Christian state was an idea totally inconsistent, in his mind, with that of the religious liberty of the individual.

Thus far we have actually realized this principle in our Constitutions. Its further development in the same direction, leads, by necessary sequence, to the abrogation of all our laws for the protection of the Sabbath, the punishment of blasphemy, and the like ; also to the banishment of all observance of the Sabbath, chaplaincies, and religious services, from our legislative bodies, our army, and navy ; and of all recognition of God, and of the Christian religion, from the messages of our presidents, and other executive officers, and from all other public documents, and governmental acts. Even the executive appointment of our thanksgiving days is contrary to the spirit, and many of the things mentioned, to the express letter of our Constitutions, because they are governmental acts with "discrimination and preference" in matters of religious belief, which is constitutionally repudiated. They exert a governmental influence to bias the minds of individuals in favour of Christianity against infidelity, and against all non-Christian religions ; consequently against every man's position and success in public life, who is an enemy to the national faith. They are, in fact, the lingering remains of an obsolete system of ideas, with respect to which our governmental institutions are, as yet, but imperfectly purified from religion. Hence the agitation which, from time to time, calls for their abolition. They have been allowed to remain—the laws for the protection of the Sabbath, and the punishment of blasphemy, being merely a dead letter, often violated by the government itself—only because their religious influence is so ill defined, and ineffectual.

The influence of this jealous neutrality, with respect to all religions, of our supreme and state government, upon our public men, political parties, and political life in general, is very striking. For no government can be administered and carried on, according to its true intents and aims, but by men who are personally in sympathy with its character. And since our Constitutions do thus exclude from themselves all influences which could bias the minds of individuals either for or against any religious belief, they cannot but act, in a most subtle and powerful manner, to repel from their offices of trust, and from the political organisations under them, all men who have any religious character, and to attract those who have as few reli-

gious and conscientious scruples as possible. Accordingly, we observe, that our chief magistrates have hardly ever been professed Christians. Even when favourably disposed towards the Christian religion, commonly they have held themselves aloof from formal church-membership until their retirement from office. The like is true, with noble exceptions, of our legislators, judges, aspirants to office, leaders of political parties, and public men in general. And here we find the true and all-sufficient explanation of that almost total banishment of religious ideas and restraints from politics, and of that portentous, ever-increasing political corruption, which already perplexes and appals the nation. For it is manifestly impossible thus to shut out all religious aims and objects from any sphere of human life, without weakening, and ultimately destroying, the power of religious principle within that sphere. The inevitable result, in time, of this rigorous exclusion of religion from politics, is the irretrievable demoralization of the whole sphere of public life. The idea is yet, indeed, but imperfectly realized. But it can hardly be denied that we have been of late, and are daily, making good progress. The principle is in full career of development up to the present hour. When it has reached its last terms, all appeal to religious motives in politics will be held to be as much out of place, and illegitimate, as is now the appeal to political motives in religion. This idea is a two-edged sword, which cuts with equal keenness both ways.

It were possible, however, to bear all this, if it were not for still another consequence of this governmental neutrality in religion, which seems to us of deeper, and farther reaching significance, than all others put together. This is its influence upon our whole educational system.

For inasmuch as our public schools are strictly governmental institutions, organized and maintained under Constitutions from which all religious objects have been sedulously excluded, from these schools must also be excluded all religious objects, worship, instruction, and influence. Accordingly, it is one of the fundamental laws of this department of the government, that "no religious test shall ever be required of the teachers of our public schools; and no teacher shall be deemed unqualified for giving instruction in them on account of his opinions in matters of religious belief." One of the most eminent of American jurists* has officially decided, that "it is no part of the object of our public school system to give religious instruction." How otherwise could he honestly interpret our Constitutions and laws? Even the reading of the Bible in these schools, although in some of the states the school laws do

* The late John C. Spencer.

specify that it shall not be prohibited, is in palpable conflict with this idea of government neutrality in religion: under which it is the constitutional right of the Romanist to object against the common version of the Scriptures, of the Jew against the New Testament, and of the heathen and infidel against the whole. Each and every religionist can rise up and say, You have no constitutional right to tax me for the instruction of my children in a religion which I do not believe. Nor at the point where we now stand in the development of the idea of individual religious liberty, is it possible to answer them. The logic of the case they have all their own way. And the carrying out, in good faith, of these provisions must ultimately banish the Bible, prayer, every vestige of religious worship and influence, and all teaching of morality which is peculiar to the Christian religion, from our vast and all-moulding systems of public education. This is the inevitable logical consequence of the principle, as it is already, to a great extent, the actual result. Who that has reflected upon the subject at all, can fail to see it?

What must be the effect of this extrusion of religion from the public schools, both upon education itself, and upon the national character, it is not difficult to foresee. For the three great ends of education are, to communicate the most important information, to train the mind, and to form the character; and these three are one. It is not possible to attain any one of them apart from both the others. Consequently all sound education, whatever is worthy of the name, must needs be an organic process. For the knowledge which is of paramount importance is, of course, just that which pertains to the moral and spiritual world; the communication of this by right methods is the most effectual way to discipline and impart strength and steadiness to the mind; whilst these two, right knowledge and right discipline, with respect to the facts and truths of the moral and spiritual world, are the fundamental elements of a right character. By the knowledge of the facts and truths of the moral and spiritual world, and of the relations which these bear to each other, the mind is fed, and nourished, and invigorated, as the body by its appropriate food, and by healthful exercise. Ignorance is the want of intellectual food, the famine and starvation of the mind. If that which is communicated in education be of trivial importance, the mind is dwarfed, as the body by insufficient nourishment. If the relations between the facts and truths communicated be not traced out, the mind is surfeited, as the body with an overloaded stomach, and without exercise. If in the tracing of these relations unsound processes be followed, the mind is warped, as the body by unnatural exercises and con-

tortions. If that be given for fact or truth, which is neither, the mind is poisoned, as the body by unwholesome food. It is only when the matter of instruction in education is of the deepest significance, *i. e.*, when it is just that which pertains to the moral and spiritual world, that which is revealed in the word of God, and when the relations of the things taught to each other are traced out by sound processes, that the mind is adequately fed, and nourished, and invigorated, is broadly developed, and attains to the full growth and maturity of all its faculties and powers. In other words, the intellect of man is grafted in, so to speak, upon a moral and spiritual, that is to say, upon an infinite, exhaustless root, by which supported and replenished, it is rendered capable, as distinguished from the brute mind, of culture, development, and growth, from generation to generation, and from age to age. And it is necessary that it should be trained with special reference to this idea, in order that it should uphold its highest and most plentiful blossoms, and should bear its golden fruit of true wisdom. This moral and religious training is indispensable from the beginning to the end of the whole educational process. To interest the minds and hearts of children at the dawning of their intellectual and moral life; to acquaint them with all things most necessary to be known, both for this world and that which is to come; to accomplish them in the most profound, abstruse, and infallibly correct processes and methods of reasoning; to imbue them with the knowledge of history, eloquence and poetry; to quicken their perceptions of the true, the beautiful, and the good; to inform them with sound principles of right and justice; to purify their affections, and fix them upon the most exalted objects; to make of our sons men, and of our daughters women, in the highest sense of these words; in fine, to ennoble, transfigure, and glorify their whole humanity—to accomplish these sublime objects the Holy Scripture alone is adequate, and indispensable, throughout the whole course, as matter of instruction and principle of education.

All this, of necessity, is lost to the education of the masses by excluding the Bible and religious instruction from the public schools. Nor is it possible to provide a sufficient remedy by placing our children in private or select academies. For this great public school system is an all-moulding power upon the ideas themselves which are entertained of education, among all classes of society. The views of education which prevail in the public schools soon come to prevail in the nation. Religious instruction and influence driven from these, soon cease to form any part of the idea of education in the community at large.

Accordingly we find that the loss of this idea is working a revolution in the whole department of education, as also in the character of the teachers and instructors themselves. For the system, being without aims and objects, naturally attracts to its service a class of men who are personally in sympathy with it; in other words, who have as little of the religious character as possible; consequently unconscientious, unscrupulous, whose chief end of life is a piece of bread. Such teachers, themselves intellectually incompetent, and in order to flatter both parents and children, are easily tempted to pass rapidly over elementary exercises, and to increase the number of studies beyond all rational limits, crowding one upon another, and hurrying on with such reckless speed, that learning, in any true sense of the word, becomes impossible. Hence it is already one of the most difficult things to find an instructor under whom a child can be placed, with any rational expectation that he will obtain such a knowledge of language as will enable him to read the classics, in after life, with any facility, pleasure, or profit. The same ineffectual methods, and abortive results, are equally apparent in other branches of education. In this way, children of the brightest intellect are soon discouraged. Thoroughly instructed in what they pass over, when it is light behind, they are easily interested in study, and learn to face, without shrinking, the darkness which lies before them. But when it becomes dark behind as well as before, they are utterly confused and disgusted; their minds are stupified and enfeebled, instead of being educated. This evil is already enormous, and no less, perhaps even greater, in private than in public education. It is one of the greatest calamities that can befall any people. Hence the almost universal outcry from parents and guardians, What shall we do with our children? Send them where we will, they do not learn. They seem to feel no interest in study; and we cannot persuade our boys to go to college. For this is one of the chief causes of that relative decline in the number of our youth who aspire to collegiate, and the higher forms of education—they have no genial interest awakened in study, they are discouraged and disgusted with its blind and fruitless toil, in the lower departments.

The further influence of this whole system of education divorced from religion, upon the character of the young, surely cannot be misunderstood. It is already but too evident in that early loss of the simplicity and innocence of childhood, in that precocious development of subtlety and forbidden knowledge, in that disgusting manishness, which dwarfs the stature, enfeebles the mind, and, like the worm in the first ripe fruits, causes the premature decay and death of so many of our

American youth. Some one has bitterly said, "There are no children in America; they are all pigmy men and women; and half of them never grow up to full size." For how is it possible that the humanity in them should continue to grow through the ordinary length of time, and attain to the full stature of men and women, when it is deprived of that religious instruction in education which is its most necessary food.

The influence of this change in education we have begun to feel in every department of life. It extends even to the fundamental relation between parents and children. Formerly, as is well known, a certain religious character and dignity belonged to the father of the family, a certain prophetic, priestly, and kingly authority, was vested in the head of the household, in virtue of which he felt obliged to assert for himself, and for the mother of his children, a divine right to their reverence and obedience; and to set apart some portion of the week to instruct them in their relations and duties, "as inferiors, superiors, and equals." How little of all this is found among us now! How indeed could it remain after it had ceased to be a self-evident truth, that education is essentially a religious training!

In a few generations this influence must extend to the whole population of our country, and recast in its own likeness, our national character, which already tends to the merging of its original Anglo-Saxon depth and seriousness in a certain French levity and frivolity. There is no less of truth than of wit in the saying that, "Good Americans, when they die, go to Paris." For it may be safely affirmed that all other influences which go to determine our national character and destiny, are scarcely superior to that of our all-comprehending, all-moulding systems of governmental education. As are the public schools of this land, such will be the great and governing masses of the people. If they are Christian, the nation will be Christian. If the Bible shall be driven from them, it can never maintain the place it has hitherto occupied in the nation.

These are some of the extreme consequences, logically derived, already extensively realised, and in full course of realisation up to the present hour, of the principle of individual liberty, taken in its widest sense. This is the course we are steering with full sails. Is it not plain to reason that if we pursue it long enough, we must find ourselves in perilous waters? And when the mast-head watch shall call out, "Breakers ahead—and close under the lee bow!" there will be no time to trim the vessel. Then a sudden and violent change in our course will be our only and doubtful possibility of escape from disastrous shipwreck. If the principle, by which we are now guided, be not limited, and its extreme consequences arrested

in time, by some other principle of historical development, of equal validity, fruitfulness, and power, a violent reaction against it is inevitable. And the longer this is delayed, the greater the lengths to which the now dominant idea shall yet go, the more sudden and violent that reaction must be, and the greater will be those evils of the opposite extreme, into which the American mind is as sure to run, as that it has not escaped from under the laws which have governed all preceding history. It seems plain that there is no other way to save and perpetuate the innumerable and priceless blessings which we owe to this great principle of individual liberty, but faithfully to apply these limitations in time.

And now what is that other principle of historical development, no less valid and true, no less fruitful, and no less evident, than this of individual liberty, by which it can and ought to be limited, and restrained from rushing on to these, and even greater, extremes. It is of this only that we have yet to speak ; and we answer, it is the principle of NATIONAL UNITY, NATIONAL LIBERTY, AND NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. It remains to develop this idea.

Let us observe, then, that what we call a nation, is not to be conceived of as a mere aggregate of individuals, a bare collection or collocation of men, women, and children, having no other than personal relations to each other, and to God. A nation is properly an organism, with a unity of existence and life, distinct from all others, and from the individuals of which it is composed. Such an organism is a tree which, though capable of being grafted with the buds and branches of other stocks, has yet a life of its own, distinct from others, and from all the different parts of which it is composed. In like manner ethnic life must needs be conceived of as a unity, else it could not be life at all ; for life is one. As the vital force in the human body is one, and not many, so that if you wound the feet it is felt in the head, and if you kill the head the feet also die, so every body politic has a distinct life of its own, which is not many, but numerically one and the same in all its members. Hence it is that nations follow, to a certain extent, the analogy of individuals in the phenomena of infancy, childhood, youth, growth, and maturity—of decline, old age, decay, and dissolution.

But it is worthy of observation, that this oneness of ethnic life does not wholly depend upon unity of race or tribal descent. *For God hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth, (i. e., one life : for the blood is the life).* So that in other combinations than those of tribal descent they are capable of forming new organisms or states, which soon become as conscious of their own separate unity

and identity as if they were all derived from one subordinate branch of the great family of man. There is no doubt, however, but that, even in such cases, there must be one predominant race, to which all the others are as grafts to the original stock of a tree, by whose life both the native and grafted branches are alike supported and nourished. Of this we, as a people, are now giving to the world a remarkable proof and illustration. For there is hardly any country in which the national life is more unique, or the national character more distinct and sharply defined, than in our own. The word *American* is altogether as precise in signification as the word French, or Spanish, or English, and far more distinct than the word German. Our nation, made up of all heterogeneous varieties of mankind, already, whilst yet in its infancy, manifests an organic life so different from all others, so full and strong, that, as a vast galvanic battery, it easily disintegrates, assimilates, and Americanises those dense masses of alien populations, which, like the ocean waves that bear them, are incessantly rolling in upon us, and losing all separate form and identity in breaking upon our shores.

This principle of ethnic unity is fully recognised by nations themselves, in all their dealings with each other, and in all their sovereign acts. For the national sovereignty resides in the nation as such. It is a pernicious fallacy to speak of each American citizen as a sovereign. Individual sovereignty is anarchy. The nation as such, and that alone, is vested with sovereign authority and power. And this national sovereignty manifests itself in constitutions, laws, the coining of money, in matters of peace and war, in governments, and in all governmental acts. In these the nation acts as a unit, and expresses its nationality, in distinction from the individuals of which it is composed. These are the acts of the nation as such, in which no distinction of individuals is, or can be made; by the wisdom and justice of which the bad, no less than the good, are benefited; for the sin and folly of which those who dissent and those who assent, the guilty and the innocent, suffer together; for which the people as a whole are responsible. Thus England and America, and all other nations, deal with each other. A declaration of war between any two of them affects alike those who approve and those who disapprove of it; a treaty of peace binds every individual of both nations. In all this the unity of national life is fully recognised by the nations themselves.

Nor is it less evident that God deals with nations as distinct moral entities, than that they so regard and treat each other. There is a national character and conduct of which He takes account in the moral government of the world. For he

is the God of nations no less than of families and of individuals. He creates them, *and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitations.* He governs them with supreme sovereignty. Hence he reveals himself as *the Governor among the nations, as the King of nations, the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings and Lord of lords.* All government, of whatever form, exists, and derives its essence and authority, from God alone. *For there is no power but of God. The powers that be are ordained of God.* The civil magistrate *is the minister of God; and he beareth not the sword in vain.* And here it is another great fallacy to say that all the powers of government are derived from the people. Not one of them is thence derived. All the powers of government, its authority and very essence, are from God alone. As to its form only, it is from the people. It belongs to the people simply to determine and prescribe, according to the light given them, what those powers are which God has vested in civil government. They have no more right either to take from, or add to, these, than they have to increase or diminish the powers of the Christian church. The church and the state are equally Divine institutions. God is no less the head of the one than of the other. Consequently, and as a matter of fact and observation, God deals with nations no less obviously than with individuals, by a system of rewards and punishments. With blessings and prosperity he seeks to quicken the national gratitude; with afflictions and chastisements he calls to national humiliation and repentance. In the distribution of these national rewards and punishments he makes no distinction of individuals, whether they as such be innocent or guilty, precisely as nations themselves, in dealing with each other, must ignore such personal distinctions. In times of peace, health, and plenty, these blessings are not confined to the good; nor are the wicked alone cut off by war, pestilence, and famine. In all this God himself fully recognises the distinct entity, and moral unity, of nations.

From these truths it follows of necessity that nations, as such, have a moral character, and are clothed with a moral responsibility, of their own. In other words, nations, in distinction from the individuals of which they are composed, have relations and duties to the God of nations and Supreme Ruler of the world, no less than individuals themselves. And it is evident of itself that these duties, and this moral responsibility, if they exist at all, cannot be conceived of as requiring anything less than some national acknowledgment of themselves. For as our individual responsibility requires recognition and acknowledgment from each individual, by his own act, so the valid acknowledgment of national responsibility must be the

act of the nation. In other words, our national responsibility requires, and cannot be conceived of as being satisfied without some national acknowledgment of the being, providence, and government of God, in those acts which are the most solemn and significant, the highest, not to say the only, acts of the nation itself—the acts of government. But moral responsibility implies moral freedom. Whatever a nation is morally obliged to do, that, as a nation, it is of right free to do. Consequently, it is an inalienable right of nations to acknowledge the being and government of God, to worship, honour, and obey him, in their national and governmental acts. Such is the idea of national unity, liberty, and responsibility.

In applying this general principle to our own case, we may assume what surely does not need proof, that, in our moral and religious character, we are not a heathen, nor a Mohammedan, nor an infidel, but a Christian nation. For the emigrants from the Old World, in whom our national existence was first constituted, were, as a body, eminently religious and Christian people. It was chiefly a religious and Christian movement which brought them to this continent. Driven from their country and wealth, from their kindred, homes, and churches, they brought with them hardly anything but their religion. They sought and found in these western wilds a refuge for their persecuted faith, where they might worship God in freedom, and freely educate their children in the saving truths of the gospel. And they were not only the founders of our nation, but also of the national character. Even so far as mere numbers can have any bearing on such a question as this, it is safe to say that a vast preponderance of our population has always been on the side of Christianity. The great mass of our people have always been, as they still are, at least speculative believers, carrying with them into all their new settlements, as a sacred palladium, or rather as the ark of their national covenant and safety, the word of God, the preaching of the gospel, and the Christian church.

Here we would gladly arrest this argument, without any discrimination among all those who call themselves Christians. But the plain truth of the case carries us further. For our national character is no less Protestant than it is Christian. Our civil and religious liberty, all our free institutions, even our civilization itself, are, as we have seen, an outbirth and growth of Protestant Christianity. We are eminently a Protestant nation. Nor is this truth even limited by the fact that Romanism is found among us. For this is nothing properly American. It is an exotic, a purely foreign growth, not yet assimilated or Americanized. The members of that communion, in a vast proportion, are foreign born. Its head, whom

both priest and people are sworn to obey in all things, both temporal and spiritual, as lord paramount, with full power to absolve them from their allegiance to the governments under which they live—a power which he has actually exercised again and again—is a foreign prince. Whilst they remain subjects to him, they cannot enter into our American and Protestant nationality. As they become Americanized they cease to be Romanists. And this is a process which is continually going on. For incredible numbers of their children, in spite of the perfection of their organization, and of all they can do to prevent it, cease to be Papists. They can no more escape from the all-transforming influence of our American institutions, the enormous assimilating power of our Protestant nationality, than from the effects of the American atmosphere and climate. Accordingly, as we learn from the statistics of the Propaganda, the Papists who have emigrated to this country have lost thereby full one-half of their numbers; that is to say, they would have been twice as numerous as they now are if all the emigrants, with their children, had remained in their own communion. But inasmuch as they are now grafted into the stock of a Protestant nationality, the life which nourishes them, and circulates in all their veins and thoughts, is a Protestant life; which ensures that they shall cease to be Romanists in becoming Americans.

If then we are indeed a Christian and a Protestant nation, in the name of the people, in the name of the truth, in the name of God, we have the right to say so in our constitutions and laws, in our national and governmental acts. It is the chief element of our national religious liberty, that we should be allowed, and we are bound by the most solemn of all moral obligations, to acknowledge, worship, and obey our God, not only as individuals, but also as a free Christian and Protestant nation. For no moral creature of God, no creature which is subject to his moral government, such as we have seen a nation is, can refuse or decline to honour its Creator by public and solemn worship with impunity. As the individual and the family, so the nation that neglects this must bring upon itself His sovereign displeasure, and a grievous punishment. And since all our national institutions and blessings, yea, our civilization itself, are the fruits of Protestant Christianity, in the name of the people, in the name of the truth, in the name of God, we have the right, and we are morally bound, to recognise and honour, in our national acts, the source from which, and the channel through which, they have been derived to us. For it is contrary to the constitution and order of nature, it is evidence of a base mind, and can never come to good, when the child, for any reason, or to gain any object,

refuses to own its parentage. And we are bound to vindicate this right at all hazards. To yield it up, is to renounce our national parentage, birthright, and character; it is to dishonour our national religion, and the God of our fathers; yea, it is to betray ourselves, blindfold and manacled, as our children will find to their sorrow, in the very citadel of our religious liberties.

But does not all this imply some form of Erastianism, or at least some modified union of church and state, which American institutions have repudiated bodily? We answer that it implies nothing of the kind. For Erastianism makes the church the creature of the state, which is abomination in the sight of God and man. The union of church and state, in any right acceptation of the words, either gives the state some sort of control over the church, and makes the church, to some extent, dependent upon the state, as in England; or reverses the relation, and gives the church some control over the state, making the state, in some degree, dependent upon the church, according to the Papist theory. Both of these ideas we cordially repudiate, not only for ourselves, but also in the name of every branch of the Protestant church in this country. We do not believe there are any Protestants among us who can tolerate either of them. The doctrine here advocated is, that as the different branches of our national government, the executive, legislative, and judicial, are co-ordinate, each supreme within its own sphere, and independent of the others, but all alike responsible directly to the people, so the church and the state are co-ordinate institutions, totally independent of each other, each, in its own sphere, supreme with respect to the other, but both alike of Divine appointment, having one and the same head and fountain of all their powers, which is God. Whence both alike are bound to acknowledge, worship, and obey him. It is as great a solecism for the state to neglect this as it would be for the church. Many seem to think that the complete separation of church and state implies that the state, as such, has no duties to God, and no religious character. As logically it could be inferred from the family's independence of the church, that the family has no religious character, and no duties to God. The family, the church, and the state, these are all co-ordinate institutions, severally independent of each other, yet all alike having one and the same Head, which they are equally bound in solemn form to acknowledge, worship, and obey. When the state, for any reason, declines to do this, it falls into a gross anomaly, and exemplifies that which is described in the second Psalm: *Why do the nations rage, and the peoples imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers*

take counsel together, against Jehovah, and against his Anointed, saying, Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; Jehovah shall have them in derision.

But even if this doctrine of church and state could be refuted, we ought not to forget that there are two extremes to this question, no less than to every other, both of which are equally removed from the only practical truth. For one of these extremes King Charles lost his throne and his head; and we lose what is dearer than life, our national religious liberty, while we rush to the other. *In medio tutissimus ibis*: the golden mean is ever the path of safety.

All that for which we here contend requires but the least possible change in the words of our Constitutions; which, moreover, would express nothing but an obvious truth: "We, avowing ourselves to be a Christian and a Protestant nation, do ordain and establish this Constitution." That change would leave all denominations calling themselves Protestant Christians, whatever liberty they now enjoy, to follow their natural developments, and to exert all the influence of which they are now capable; it would complicate no question between them severally; and it would give them all a great advantage in prosecuting that glorious work in which they are all co-labourers with the Fathers of the Reformation, and of all civil and religious liberty. That constitutional change would open its true channel to the current of our national life and history, and allow it to flow with perfect freedom in its natural course. And it would give us the constitutional right to worship the God of our fathers, in our legislative bodies, army and navy; to require an oath in the name of God in our courts of justice, and of our officers elect; to observe, as a nation, and to protect by law, our Christian Sabbath; to punish blasphemy, adultery, and polygamy, and to protect the unity of marriage; to inflict the death penalty for murder; and to make the word of God the matter of instruction, and the principle of education, in our all-moulding public school system.

Whatever in the idea of individual religious liberty is inconsistent with such an avowal of the Christian character of our nationality, and inconsistent with these its immediate logical results, is to be regarded as an extreme and baleful consequence of the principle from which it flows. Not long ago a California judge—and we happen to know this to be a fact—undertook to elicit the truth from a Chinaman by swearing him on a cock's head, instead of the Bible. The foolish magistrate had been instructed by some wag that this was the idolatrous sanction of witness-bearing among the Chinese, although the whole procedure must have been as incompre-

prehensible and absurd to the witness as it was to the spectators. But the idea of the court was, that the government having no religious character or preference of its own, could easily accommodate itself to those of the individual, whatever they might be*—a perfectly sound inference from the principle. Upon the same ground the Mormon denies our authority to punish him for his loathsome polygamy, and insists upon his constitutional right to sit in our legislative bodies, and to fill our highest judicial and military offices, in the very eye of the nation, with all his harem around him. Upon the same ground the Papist denies our right to the reading of the Bible, to religious instruction and worship, in our public schools; and the Jew, our right to observe as a nation, and to protect by law, our Christian Sabbath. Upon the same ground, and with equal reason, the infidels, of every name, deny our right to require an oath by the name of God, in our courts of justice, and of our officers elect; our right to the appointment of chaplains in our legislative bodies, army, and navy; and our right to worship or acknowledge the God of our fathers in any of our governmental or national acts. If we yield to this brazen cry of a very few in every thousand of our Christian population, we accept all those evil results to religion, morals, education, politics, and liberty itself, from which we now suffer, and which unchecked are certain, in the end, to overthrow all our free institutions, and even our national existence. If we admit these extreme consequences of the idea of individual religious liberty, we give the death-blow to national unity, liberty, and responsibility. The nation, as distinguished from the individuals of which it is composed,

* It is objected to this illustration, that it is an old English law maxim, and a plain dictate of common sense, that the witness must be sworn upon what he holds sacred. But the writer of this article is constrained to adhere to it. In a Christian state the principle of the objection must have its limitations. For example, the worshippers of Sheitan, or Satan, visited by Mr Layard, could take no other oath than one by appeal to the devil himself. Could a Christian court accept such an oath? And the Scriptural view of all idolatry is, that it partakes more or less of the nature of devil worship. Whilst the theory of a Christian state recognises God as the Supreme Judge, and invisibly present in all its courts of justice, it implies that justice is administered in his name and by his authority. It is his justice which is dispensed. In such a court none but those forms of witness-bearing which are agreeable to his mind are admissible; and nothing can be valid which does not acknowledge his authority. Surely, now it is not possible to conceive of Him, the Supreme Judge, administering an oath in which there is an appeal to the devil, or to any heathen god, or which is accompanied with any idolatrous rite. In such an oath the witness would insult and repudiate the authority of the court itself. The difficulties which would grow out of this theory of a Christian state, in such a government as that of the English in India, exhibit only one of the many anomalies which are inseparable from the subjection of a conquered people to the rule of foreign masters, and render more certain the ultimate triumph over the whole world of the great "cause of the nationalities."

is deprived of every vestige of religious liberty. Yea, the first principles of national existence itself are subverted.

The doctrine for which we here contend will give us an answer to these brazen demands. Children of the Papacy, do we not know you, in all your historical antecedents, as the sworn enemies of both civil and religious liberty? When did you ever concede, where you had the power to withhold, either the one or the other? Who can number the martyrs of both you have slain? Having fled from your own countries, where, ground to the earth by the despotism of your priests and princes, you had neither liberty, nor bread, nor hope, you have taken refuge in the protecting arms, and fostering bosom, of a free Protestant nation. We have received you to liberty, plenty, and a new life, the fruits to us of two centuries of a Christian and Protestant education in all our institutions of learning. And now you demand, in the name of religious freedom, as a right of your consciences, that we banish the word and the worship of God from all our public schools, which, as you yourselves avow, through your highest authorities, must inevitably result in making us a nation of infidels. If this, indeed, is the freedom of conscience which only will content you, once for all, you cannot be gratified. Set your hearts at rest. And if without this you cannot be contented, return to your own nationalities, to the Italian priest who is your temporal prince, and ask him for rights and liberties, and see what he will give you.

Enemies of Christianity, by whatsoever name, Jew, Pagan, Mormon, Mohammedan, or infidel, you are called, we did not receive our free institutions, nor any of the priceless blessings which distinguish us above all other nations, from you, but from our God, and through the channel of the Christian religion. We are a Christian nation. As such, we are one, free, and responsible to God. You dwell among us. Whatsoever rights, liberties, and blessings you can enjoy in consistency with this our Christian character as a nation, are freely yours. We will defend them with our blood, as promptly for you as for ourselves. But you demand in the name of religious freedom, as a right of your consciences, not only that we banish the word and the worship of God from our public schools, but also from our legislative bodies, army, and navy; that we abolish all legal protection of our Sabbaths, and of marriage; that we expunge all acknowledgment of our Christian nationality, and even the name of our God, from the sacred roll of our Constitutions and laws; and that we thus repudiate the source from which, and the channel through which, we have derived all our national institutions and blessings. This, as you are well aware, would soon bring us to your ground, and

make of us an infidel nation. Now, if this be the liberty of conscience which only will content you, it is time you were given to understand, that we also have a conscience, which binds us by the most sacred of all obligations, to worship our God in our most solemn and significant national acts, and to educate our children in our Christian faith. We will defend and maintain our sovereign right to do this against the world in arms. Beware how you touch it. You cannot be gratified in this thing. Set your hearts at rest. And if you cannot rest, go form a nation and a state where you can find a place, and see if infidelity will do for you what the Christian religion has done for us.

Such answer the great palpitating heart of our nation already feels to be most just and right; it needs only to be interpreted and justified to the intellect of the people. Even now it begins to make itself heard in no uncertain sounds. We hear it in the popular determination expressed from time to time, as of late in Boston, and later still in the city of New York itself, that no quack theories of government shall be permitted to drive the word and the worship of God from our public schools; and it speaks in that mighty reaction which has taken place all over this country, in the last fifteen years, in favour of religious education. We hear it in the throes of our great cities, whose governments are clutched and held by obscene harpies, that eat up the property of the citizen, whilst they afford no protection to life. We hear it in the muttering of national perplexity over corruption in political life, which is already prodigious. Inarticulate as yet, but full of a vast meaning, like the thundrous tramp of armed squadrons, like the ground-swell of the ocean, or the heavings of the earthquake—it is the indignation of a mighty people, awaking to the conviction that they have been deceived by political quackery, into the surrender of the most precious rights of a free, Christian, and Protestant nation.

The immediate practical duty which devolves from this great principle of national unity, liberty, and responsibility, upon all good men and true patriots, is plain. In whatever situation of life they may be—in the workshop, on the farm, in the counting-house, on the mart, in the walks of literature, science, and art, in the professor's chair, in the pulpit, at the bar, on the bench, in our state and national councils, as members of conventions to form and revise Constitutions, in our highest executive and military offices, and in all the places of trust and influence in this land—it is their duty to cherish this principle in their hearts, and to advocate such constitutional reforms as may be necessary to realise it in our national life.

The motives to faithfulness and energy in the fulfilment of

this sovereign obligation, are all-constaining. It opens the path of honour to the greatest abilities. For the time is not far distant, as we are persuaded, when some capable man, putting himself at the head of a movement which is already making itself felt, to vindicate our national religious liberty, our inalienable right to worship God as a nation, will become the most popular candidate for the presidential chair. A Christian and Protestant people, whose patience has become exhausted by intolerable political corruption, and indignant at the demoralisation of its educational interests, will stand by him. Raising his voice in behalf of a nation's right to worship God, his words will speak into clear consciousness their own struggling thoughts; and they will hasten to crown him with their highest honours. But if this motive were wanting, the worldliness and mockery of the age have not been able to quench the sacred flame of patriotism in the national heart. For this is the true Promethean fire which cannot be extinguished, whilst an honest and brave man, or a virtuous woman, continues to exist. My fatherland, let me honour thee with my life; my mother country, I will defend thee with my blood—there is no true heart which does not thrill with the power of this great mystery. And the Christian religion, the Protestant church, which has made us what we are for good—by this faith we live; for this faith we are ready to die. It is more to every one of us than husband or wife, father and mother, than kindred, home, and country. We will not betray our religion. In the strength of these all-powerful motives, we will defend and maintain, on all occasions, against all opponents, our inalienable right to avow ourselves, in our Constitutions and laws, in our national and governmental acts, a free, Christian, and Protestant nation. And the ages to come will bless us, the preservers, as we now bless the authors, of all civil and religious liberty.

ART. III.—*Lectures on Theology.* By REV. BENNET TYLER,*
D.D. With a Memoir by REV. NAHUM GALE, D.D. Boston:
J. E. Tilton & Co.

THE Christian life of every regenerate man is a new edition of the Christian doctrine. The conversion of three thousand at Jerusalem, in a single day, evinced the moral power of the Gospel, by an argument, certainly not less conclusive than that

* It having been thought advisable that some sketch of the late Dr Tyler should be inserted in the "New Englander," from the pen of one who sympa-

of the theopneustic logic in the epistle to the Romans. The epistolary statement is Christianity in *posse*, the new births are the same in *esse*, standing related to each other as proposition and proof, principle and practice. The vital and practical in Christian theology resolves itself, in this view, into a Christian Biology,—the science of that new life of faith and love, commenced in regeneration, and matured in sanctification. Hence the truthful delineation of a good man's life, his spiritual conflicts, his defeats and victories, has a two-fold value. It augments the ever-accumulating, demonstrative proof of the gospel doctrine, by shewing it to be the power of God unto salvation to them that believe. It also serves as a practical commentary upon the didactic Scriptures.

Thus church history, in the department of Christian Biology, makes important contributions to Biblical interpretation. There are many passages of the divine Word, which baffle the finest merely philological acumen, whose deep, rich meaning, rises to the very surface, in the light of this biological illustration, when the historic spirit, in the student, is combined with hermeneutic skill. The key to the inner sanctuary and significance of Biblical theology, is given into his hands who has traced in Christian biography, with quick sensibility and sound judgment, the life-history of the successive generations of good men, in its ebbs and flows, its striving after holiness, and its struggles against sin.

Hence we welcome as a new treasure to our hermeneutic and historical storehouse, the faithfully-written biography of every true man of God. In the variant forms of philosophy and of faith observed in such men, in the shadings of error and of evil, and in the idiosyncrasies and excrescences which we perceive falling away in the divine process, and which are replaced by the verities and vitalities of the Christian life,—its harmonies, and beauties, and charities,—in this we have the many-sided view of our doctrine, and its divine adaptation to the emergencies of man's condition.

Dr Gale was fortunate in the subject committed to his literary and filial guardianship. The biographer of Dr Tyler had no dark places to illumine by the light of an apologetic rhetoric, and no perilous chasms to bridge by the links of a factitious logic. The work is well done,—certainly not overdone.

thises with his views, Professor Lawrence, of the East Windsor Theological Seminary, has prepared, by request, this Article. It will be seen that he has found it necessary, in referring to the points of controversy between Dr Tyler and Dr Taylor, to state to some extent the theological opinions of the latter. We deem it important to say that the Editors of the *New Englander*, in publishing this statement, without comment, are not to be understood as vouching for its correctness, for which the Author alone is responsible.—*Ed. "New Englander."*

The first impression, on opening the volume, is that made by the engraving, which is in the best style of the art. No thoughtful mind can contemplate that picture,—its harmony of contrasts, intellect and sentiment, gentleness and force, divine principle and chastened human passion, without being attracted to examine further. The broad, high forehead, as an arched propylæum to the acropolis of thought, betokening, even to the casual observer, the mysterious machinery that worked behind it,—the large, but finely-turned Grecian nose, and the mild blue eyes, through which beam upon you love and wisdom—these are a whole table of contents. The slightly compressed lips, and gracefully moulded mouth, individualise the expression, and speak of a nobleness of soul, and a dignity strictly his own. The round, full chin, and the firm Lutheran neck, with the proportional shoulders, indicate, in the lower features, a sufficiency of realism, and what is emotional, to balance the intellectual and ideal that shine in the upper. The slight furrows ploughed by thought and care, the silvery locks, and the meditative, almost pensive air, awaken, in a stranger, the half-suspicion that the under-tone of his life was on the minor-key. But, beyond the general fact that all earnest life has its minor strains, this is only the ripening of the mental and moral character into the mellowness of maturity,—the hue of that inner, ever-waxing conflict with evil, which ended in a victory preassured to him in the warmth and steadfastness of his love-working faith.

Bennet Tyler was born July 10. 1783, in Middlebury, Connecticut,—then a part of Woodbury. He was the youngest son of James and Anne Hungerford Tyler, whose chief excellence consisted in their being intelligent and practical adherents of the Christian faith. Among the records of his early childhood, made by Dr Tyler, is the solicitous care of his parents for his religious instruction. He says, "My parents carefully watched over my morals, and laid me under useful restraints, and my mother,"—a name that makes a strong man weak in the tender reminiscences it excites,—“my mother used to instruct me, even while quite young, in the things which relate to my eternal welfare. I early committed to memory the Assembly's Catechism, and recited it every Sabbath evening.”

This excellent custom of our Puritan fathers, he held in high esteem in his mature years, and lamented the comparative disuse into which it had fallen. For, as it was not followed by any effective substitute in the form of family Bible-instruction, he regarded its partial relinquishment as a sign of relaxed parental solicitude, and of lower and less vital principles of Christian nurture. In the ideal of the Puritan family, the Sabbath evening catechetical exercise was an important ele-

ment. It did not displace the Bible, only superadded the Catechism to give to the Bible doctrine a sovereign power at this centre of influence. Of the pure social ethics, for which the families of New England were so long distinguished, and of our fathers' generous, though sometimes rough philanthropy, and their high, stern purpose of Christian endeavour, this Sabbath evening hour of parental religious training, was, in no mean measure, the moral genesis. It was not, as it has been caricatured, an isolated desert, set off from the verdure of child-life—an hour stolen from the genial and joyous of the social circle, and stiffened into slow-moving moments, by the repetition of dead, fossilised doctrine. The mild light of a mother's eye illumined the scene, and her loving omnipresence clasped young hearts, moulding them into new forms of truth and beauty, and diffusing itself as an unconscious influence, through all the fibres and cells and tissues of the whole family organism. And the father's sterner character came in, to fix these forms into a marble firmness, in the pliant group. By such faithful, moral culture, the Puritan family rose a moral unit,—a household church,—a type of heaven, whose salutary influence went forth into society as a moral disinfectant of the social atmosphere, from as many centres as there were family circles.

Mr Tyler's opportunities for education, till he was fifteen, were confined to the district school, and his whole stock of learning consisted, at that period, in the mastery of Webster's Spelling Book, in being able to read respectably well, and to cipher nearly through Daboll's Arithmetic. This constituted him among his youthful peers, master of the arts. But his sphere, according to the divine purpose, was not long to be thus limited. An injury, which disqualified him temporarily for physical labour, withdrew him from the trade which he had chosen, and led to a course of mental culture and a life of mental toil. Bennet Tyler could not be a *hatter*, for God had decreed for him a more important mission,—to make him "a minister and a witness of those things in the which he would appear unto him."

He pursued his preparatory studies with Rev. Ira Hart, the parish minister, and entered Yale College in the autumn of 1800. While studying with Mr Hart, a fellow-student, of infidel sentiments, unsettled his views respecting some of the principal points of Christianity. For two or three years he was in that place where two seas meet, so difficult of navigation, and in which so many make shipwreck. He could not rest in the assumption that the Bible is false and its plain teachings a delusion, though his sceptical tendencies were leading him to this. Nor, on the other hand, would these

tendencies allow him to trust implicitly in the Book and its doctrines as infallible and divine. At times he was inclined to resolve all religion into hypocrisy, or the result of education and circumstances. But the examples of parental piety which were ever before him, and his sober second thoughts, held this in check.

The workings of an honest, earnest mind, while thus abiding in "Doubting Castle," are impressively given in some passages from the struggles of Jacobi, in his gradual egress from the bogs of German Rationalism.

"With your complaints," he says, in a letter to a friend, "about the unsatisfactory nature of our speculations, I most heartily, though sorrowfully, agree. I know, however, no other counsel than to speculate and philosophize right on." At a more advanced age, he writes: "My mind now stands thus. I am fully satisfied that he who wants the piety of the fathers must want their belief also. But how I am to want that sound, solid, plain piety in such a manner as really to obtain it, I do not know. You see that I am still the same, a thorough heathen in my understanding, but with my whole heart a Christian. I am swimming between two oceans of heterogeneous elements. They will not unite to support me. As the one raises me up, the other carries me down again into the deep." In the issue of his speculations, the faith-principle triumphed, and through "the belief" of the fathers, which before he lacked, in the judgment of charity he obtained their "sound, solid piety," which he had also lacked. "Having," says one, "brought philosophy and religion nearer together than any other metaphysician of his time," he departed, humbly blessing God for the privilege of prayer as a solvent of the dark problems of philosophy, and declaring *grace* to be his refuge and his hope.

There are perils in such speculative processes, the carnal bias inclining men without the moral balance to harmonize their creed and their conduct by adjusting the former to the exigencies of the latter. The danger is, that cavilling will become chronic, that minor difficulties, for want of patient study, will generate major doubts, and that these doubts, so accordant with man's native repugnance to the evangelic doctrines, will darken into positive and permanent disbelief. The process, much less frequent in our educational institutions now than at the beginning of the century, when Mr Tyler was in college, always cramps the intellect. It presses out the most generous and genial scholarship. It dries up the lymph, and wastes the gastric juices of the soul, and stiffens it into a stubborn credulity of whatsoever is most incredible. Some, in every generation, by such an illogical process, gradu-

ally discredit to themselves, one after another, the ground truths of a living and triumphing Christianity, as the only relief which their moral status allows, from the doubts and doctrines which disturb them. Then they mistake this relief for solid peace, and the process for the emancipation of the reason from the thralls of superstition, the transition from a blind and stultifying *faith*, to a high spiritual and universal truth—evincing philosophy. This was the claim of the English deists of the last century, who held themselves as the only representatives of a pure and spiritual Christianity, although they resolved its prophecy and miracles into myths, and much of its history into allegory. The Pantheists and Theosophists of the present day present the same exclusive claim, and seek to sustain it by a similar antagonism to the evangelical doctrine. Thus radical and destructive has ever been the criticism upon the Word of God, which attempts to mediate between that Word and man's degenerate, speculative, and baleful bias.

Young Tyler's sceptical tendencies were checked and turned just where he found difficulties would fade away before patient study and prayer, or where it was evident that they remained only from human ignorance and the limits of the understanding. At this juncture in his religious history, his doubts led to greater diligence upon the legitimate sources of information, and by God's guidance they ended, as did Jacobi's, in a living, working faith, whose central object is Christ, and the chief element love. What he may have received in childhood from Christian nurture, after all these doubts and questionings, is retained by the adhesive force of the soul's most rational convictions. The foundations, which were for a time shaken, being carefully examined, are readjusted and settled, with a deliberation and a consent of all the mental and moral faculties, which make them ever after the mind's place of perfect rest, and the point of its loftiest, heaven-aspiring activities.

It was in the second year of his college course that this change occurred—a year marked by what is known as the great revival of 1802, in which about seventy of the students became subjects of the regenerating work. The disclosures of his own heart, and of his need of divine help, fully verified the representations of the Word of God, and shut out for ever all doubt on these points. "I think I was brought to see that the carnal mind is enmity against God, and that nothing short of the almighty energy of the Holy Spirit is sufficient to subdue it." * * * "I can recollect that a calmness came over my mind such as I never felt before, and that my views of divine things were different from what they had

been. I saw that God's requirements were reasonable, and that I was without excuse. Everything, indeed, appeared right but myself." P. 19.

The subjective evidence by which this experience was assured to his consciousness as genuinely Christian, is no less solid for the characteristic simplicity, almost timidity, with which it was recorded. "I think I do delight in the character of God as it is revealed in the Scriptures. I think I do rejoice in the government of God. I think the law of God appears to me excellent. I think I see a loveliness in Christ, and that he is precious to my soul. I think sin appears to me odious, and that I do sincerely long to be free from it, and to be made perfectly holy. I think I feel a peculiar affection for the people of God. I think I feel a deep interest in the cause of Christ, and a sincere desire to see it promoted." Pp. 20, 21.

These fruits of the Spirit made the nature of the tree that produced them as evident to others as to himself. The relation of speculation and faith, and their comparative value in solving the great practical problems of spiritual life, as disclosed in this part of Dr Tyler's history, are forcibly presented by a passage or two from Lessing's Letters. "When the paralytic experiences the beneficial effect of the electric spark, what does he care whether Nollet is right, or Franklin, or neither of the two? The *Christian* is the bold conqueror who leaves the frontier fortresses behind him, and takes possession of the country. The *speculative theologian* is the timid hireling, who dashes his head against their walls and never sees the land. Man is made for action, and not for empty speculations. But on that very account, he is fond of the latter and neglects the former. His wickedness will always prompt him to do what he ought not to do, and his daring lead him to that which he cannot. Infatuated mortals! That which is above your comprehension may exist, but not for you."

Mr Tyler united with the College Church in April 1803. The following year he completed his collegiate course, "with the comfort," says his biographer, "enjoyed by too few students, of being free from debt." There are advantages, undoubtedly, in exemption from pecuniary embarrassments at the close of the academical curriculum, and, so far as "rigid economy" can procure them, they are more than an equivalent for the sacrifice. But when "teaching school and other labours" trench on the regular course, which is none too long, and divert time and energies from the major purposes of solid acquirements and a high mental culture, as often occurs, to the minor one of avoiding a debt, the end is sacrificed to the

means,—the greater good to the less. A loss is incurred, and a mental deficit created at the outset of one's career, for which the slight pecuniary advantage which occasions them is but poor amends. Few students make a better use of every hour than did Bennet Tyler. And when we recall the clear, effective, right working of his mind on the material it possessed, as it is disclosed in his lectures and other productions of his pen, and in connection, these abridgments of his preparatory training, we are led to say, "What would he not have done—what length and breadth of mental furniture, and what height and depth of intellectual culture, would he not have acquired, had his preparatory study been curtailed or disturbed by no such necessity for devising ways and means?" As it is, he was a peer among the good and great men of his time; and of fields which he had explored, and treasures which he had laid up, he was a perfect master.

After studying theology some nine months under the instruction of the Rev. Asahel Hooker, of Goshen, with Drs Woodbridge and Humphrey, and Rev. Frederick Marsh, Mr Tyler was licensed by the North Association of Litchfield County, in 1806, and ordained in 1808, as pastor of the church in South Britain, a parish of Southbury, Conn. The church was small, divided, and disorderly. All the young pastor's time, patience, and skill, were at once brought into requisition in a thoroughly reconstructive work. Under his formative hand, by a favouring Providence, the chaotic elements, gradually becoming homogeneous, assumed organic relations, and fruitfulness and beauty soon smiled where before were barrenness and desolation.

In 1822, Mr Tyler was elected to the office of President of Dartmouth College. This raised a question of duty, which for a time perplexed him. He loved the pastoral office. His mind, in a ministry of fourteen years, had become adjusted to its cares, and worked freely under its burdens. Success had given him ease and a measure of confidence in his fitness for his work. The change proposed would introduce an experiment, in which success was far from certain, and the want of it would be unfortunate for himself and the College. He felt that his disposition and mental habits fitted him rather for pastoral duty than the presidency of a literary institution. His tastes and mental furniture were more theologic than classical. But he waited on the Lord till his way was made plain, and then entered it with a singleness of purpose and a decision which virtually settled the question of his success.

In his new field of labour he was greatly admired as a preacher, and the inquiry was made, "Why was he not heard

of before? To which his associate, the now venerable Professor Shurtleff, replied, "that the Lord had kept him concealed in an obscure place for a blessing to the College. The impression which his first appearance made was not lowered by further acquaintance. I do not recollect hearing a complaint of him from any member of the College. All his intercourse with them was tempered with the utmost kindness, while he was punctual and faithful in every official duty." P. 41.

Owing to the ill-health of the pastor of the College Church, the pulpit duties, for a considerable period, devolved on Dr Tyler. It was during these double labours of president and pastor that the great revival of 1826 occurred in the College and the village. One of the rich results of this was, that eighteen out of the thirty-six who then constituted the senior class, and twenty out of the forty-one in the sophomore class, entered the Christian ministry. They included the best scholars in College, several of whom became marked men of the age.

Dr Tyler originated and executed the plan of raising ten thousand dollars, as a permanent fund for the aid of needy students preparing for the ministry. Thus he perpetuated his influence in those classic halls, where he will continue to speak for Christ and the church to the generations to come.

After six years of useful and honourable connection with the College he received a call from the second church in Portland, Maine, to become its pastor. "When I received this call," he says, "I felt a new hankering after the duties and joys of the pastoral life; and believing I could resign my office without putting in jeopardy the interests of the College, I concluded to do so." P. 40.

The readiness with which Dr Tyler adapted himself to new and difficult positions, was the result of a kind of omnific element in his character, by which he did well whatsoever he attempted. No two men, in some particulars, were more unlike than Dr Tyler and that eminent preacher and pastor, Edward Payson, whom he succeeded. As to their conceptions of the fundamental Christian doctrines, and their adherence to the accredited symbols of doctrine, they were in harmony. They were accordant in their deep convictions that all theological errors are in moral antagonism to this doctrine, and, as they approximate its vital centre, first check the religious growth of the church, and then choke it out. In these fundamental points, the succession was apostolic and happy. But in their nervous organism, the two men were temperamental opposites. One was subject to the extremes of mental depression, sometimes to the depths of despair; the other knew

nothing of this, but was remarkably uniform both in his moods and tenses. Occasionally, when Dr Payson "attempted to read the Bible, every verse almost afforded ground of doubt and cavilling." When Dr Tyler read it, the effect was to confirm him more stedfastly in the faith. The former was sometimes carried up, on the mount of emotional elevation, to such displays of the divine goodness, as almost forced him to exclaim, "Lord, stay thine hand." The advance of the latter was so *even*, on the ascending plain of the Christian life, and his sense of the divine excellence, and his holy aspirations, were so increased by each step of upward movement, that he was evermore saying, "I beseech thee, shew me thy glory."

As preachers, they were in equal contrast. Dr Payson was impassioned, with no deficiency in method or logic. Dr Tyler was methodical, with no want of earnestness; and when aroused, he was sometimes vehement. The one was more imaginative and original; the other more logical and constructive. Dr Payson found the church in Portland without a written confession of faith, and after a twenty years' ministry, during which large accessions were made to it, he left it as he found it. Dr Tyler wrote a few comprehensive articles of belief, explained them and their use, "talked with the brethren," and "in the last year of his ministry, which was of only five years' duration, had the pleasure of seeing it adopted with entire unanimity." Says one, who enjoyed the advantages of his whole ministry there, "Dr Tyler came to Portland in the right time. While he remained, he was the right man in the right place. His clear and logical mind was needed to systematise the truth which had been so faithfully and pungently preached by his beloved and almost adored predecessor. No man that ever preached in this city, could set before his hearers more clearly the controverted and mysterious doctrines of the Gospel." P. 52.

Dr Tyler's sincere love of truth, and his skilful unfolding and defending the Christian system here referred to, led providentially to the part he took in what is sometimes called the Connecticut controversy. The time for a full and impartial history of those discussions has not come. When it does arrive, and the historic spirit shall reduce the materials, by analytic and constructive processes, to logical and lucid statements, this period will make no indifferent contribution to the history of doctrines. The Orthodox Congregational Churches were just coming out of the conflict with Unitarianism, a system holding little as positive, except its negations of the old historic doctrines, and the paternal, unpunishing character of God. The humane, æsthetic, and classically elegant Canning, and the philosophic, dialectic Ware, were the negating leaders.

Worcester, Woods, and Stuart stood forth as the defenders of a historical and Biblical Christianity. The results of that discussion, as given by the late Dr John Pierce, a Unitarian clergyman of Brookline, Mass., speak well for the temper, discretion, and executive ability of the Orthodox polemics. "You appeal to me as a matter-of-fact man. Take, then, one result of my investigations. In May 1812, there were 138 settled ministers in the State, liberal enough to be Arminians, and 179 Orthodox. In May 1846, there were but 124 of the former class, and of the latter 417, making a liberal or Unitarian loss of 14, and an Orthodox gain of 238."*

The germ of the Connecticut controversy sprang up in a different view of *original sin*, from that which had been generally received by the New England Churches. It was distinctly enunciated that no human being can become depraved but by *his own act*, and that the sinfulness of the race does not pertain to man's *nature*. Two other views, standing in logical alliance with these, were set forth in their dependent or defensive relations to them. One is that regeneration is the act of *man's own will* or heart;—the other that self-love, or a desire of the greatest happiness, is the *primary cause* of this specific, regenerative act, and of all acts that fix supremely on any object. These views were connected with the intimation that God's system of moral government is *not the best*; that the prevention of moral evil would have made it better; but, from the nature of things, this could not be effected. These principles were regarded by their promulgators as of vital importance in their bearing on the remedial system. Enunciated with the distinctness and confidence of earnest men, intent on contributing improvements to theology, they constituted the occasion of what, among evangelical Congregationalists, was *the* theological controversy of the age. It is with no eye to polemic adjudication, but simply in a historical light, that they are here referred to in the necessary evolution of our subject. We have aimed to represent them correctly, as they were given in the original documents, and were understood by those who dissented from them and made them the occasion of the controversy, though we are conscious of the liability to misconception. Should the statements, from this liability, make, in any respect, a wrong impression, it must be placed to the account of the writer, and the conductors of the Journal be held free from responsibility. It is also but just to say that some of them were modified by limiting statements and implications. The announcement of regeneration as the act of man's will, was accompanied by the statement, that whatever part of the process, in the popular use of the term, is produced by the

* Life and Labours of Dr Worcester, vol. ii. p. 379.

Divine Spirit, some part of it is preliminary to such interposition.

It is further, we believe, accordant with the results of the discussion, and due to candid, historical criticism, to state that the happiness theory, notwithstanding the logical skill and ability with which it was urged, failed here, as it ever has done, to attach itself permanently to the living and enduring body of theologic thought. This body grows in compactness and beauty, by incorporating what of homogeneous and vital substance is evolved in the passing epochs and ages. But this theory, if perchance, for a time, it adjoins itself, soon falls away as irregular and excrescent.

These theological positions, as taken in the *Concio ad Clerum* of Dr Taylor, in 1828, and elaborated in his Articles on the Means of Regeneration, in the *Christian Spectator* of 1829, drew the attention of many good men to the movement, both in New England and out of it. If close inspection discovered here and there saving limitations, it also disclosed what were regarded as perilous compromises. With or without reason, there was a fear for the foundations, and all the more from the fact that the reputed assailants were sapping and mining within the citadel. After consultation, the defence was opened. Earnest, acute, and strong-minded Christian men were on both sides.

Among the opponents of what thus came to be known as the New Haven Theology, Dr Tyler held a prominent place. This was not from any particular fondness for controversy, for he was a quiet and peace-loving man. And whenever he engaged in theological conflict, it was not that he loved peace, or his brethren less, but truth and Christ more. He did not make haste to

“Ope the purple testament of bleeding war”

at the first note of the bugle; but when he entered the field his armour was not put off till the war was ended.

He was a native of Connecticut, and had been fourteen years one of its prominent pastors. Dr Taylor was for a time a college classmate, and the two were personal friends. He had heard rumours of the New Haven movement, but gave little heed to them, for he knew that

—“Rumour is a pipe
Blown by surmises, jealousies, conjectures,
And of so easy and so plain a stop,
That the blunt monster with uncounted heads—
The stiff, discordant, weaving multitude
Can play upon it.”

In a visit to his native state in the summer of 1829, he collected the pamphlets which had been issued on the subject, and on his return sat down to a calm and careful examination.

The result was the impression that his New Haven brethren were inculcating opinions of a dangerous tendency. He opened a correspondence with Dr Taylor, in which, with great frankness and brotherly love, he expressed to him his fears. The explanations, given in a spirit of equal frankness and fraternal kindness, rather increased than removed his anxiety. At this stage he wrote to a friend, "I have been exceedingly distressed for a few weeks past in reflecting on this subject. What is to become of New England? Must we fight over the battles of former generations? And that, too, with brethren in whom we have had the highest confidence, and with whom we have acted in concert?"

After conference with cool and discriminating advisers, Dr Tyler published his "Strictures on Dr Taylor's Articles on the Means of Regeneration." In the preface, he says, "As the reasoning of the reviewer is metaphysical, and his style rather obscure, it is possible that his meaning has in some instances been misunderstood. The author has aimed to give a fair representation of the principles laid down in the Review. If he has in the last represented them, he has done it unintentionally." "The writer of the Review," he says, "he has ever regarded with the highest respect, and cherished towards him the warmest sentiments of personal friendship." Here is the animus of all Dr Tyler's polemical papers. He was above seeking any mean advantages which designed or negligent misrepresentation sometimes procures. He was no strategist, nor hair-splitting pugilist. He did not abound in the niceties and angularities of definitinal disputation. His plain common sense, his strongly compacted Anglo-Saxon mind, grappled fully and fairly with his old friend's acute, versatile, dialectic, and philosophic mind. The field was free. The goal was truth—dearer to both combatants than Alexandrian victories—truth on some of the greatest problems of theology. The struggle was resolute on both sides, and lasted, in its varying phases, four long years.

Dr Tyler's style was peculiarly favourable for such discussions. It had Doric simplicity and Saxon strength. Neither ornate nor repetitious, it was clear and comprehensive—a kind of daguerrotype of thought. A short sentence, a definition, sometimes a word illumined the whole of a dark subject. No one could mistake his drift, seldom the precise shape of his thoughts. His unmercurial temperament and his kindly disposition, as well as his Christian charity, contributed to his noble bearing through this and other similar "wars of truth."

There is no theological labour so difficult to perform *well* as controversy. It is not easy always to determine when it is called for; and to obtrude it out of time and place, especially

among those holding the fundamentals of Christian doctrine, is always a misfortune and sometimes a crime. In the heat of the conflict it is hard to bar out passion and personalities, which are always irrelevant and often hurtful—hard not to impute ill motives—hard to prevent a high-minded conflict from degenerating into logomachy and strife for victory. Dr Tyler surmounted these difficulties in no ordinary degree. He was self-possessed, and what an opponent said of John Cotton, a “tight writer.” Yet he made no use of asperities, and never descended to theological badinage. There was no gall in his ink, and his pages were not marred by the *odium theologicum*, or by one word in the *lex talionis*.

When the Theological Seminary at East Windsor was established, in 1833, the part taken in the Connecticut controversy by Dr Tyler inaugurated him as a competing teacher of theology in his native state, with his old friend Dr Taylor. Having commenced their career as college classmates, for twenty-five years they laboured together in the same common work, in relations, it is believed, of Christian kindness and friendship. They finished their work as teachers within a few months of each other, and, almost in company, closed their earthly life—Dr Taylor in March 1858, and Dr Tyler on the 14th of the following May. All imperfections and errors having faded away in the light and love of heaven, and all doctrinal divergencies ceased, they join together in the new song with Edwards, and Luther, and Augustine, and the host of the faithful who have loved the truth, and lived it, and been willing to die for it.

“See where they walk on yonder mount that lifts
Its summit high on the right hand of bliss,
Sublime in glory, talking with their peers
Of the incarnate Saviour’s love, and past
Affliction, lost in present joy.”

These distinguished theologians have bequeathed to the church militant their carefully elaborated writings, which now come forth simultaneously, challenging the lovers of philosophic and theological thought to a renewed and dispassionate examination.

The volume before us, besides the memoir, contains eighteen lectures. It was the original design to include in it also a selection from Dr Tyler’s sermons. This part of the plan, we are glad to learn, is to be executed in a second volume soon to be issued by the same enterprising publishers. What we should like to say of him as a sermonizer, must give place to what the character of this volume demands for him as a theologian, and for his theological system.

Of the eighteen lectures, five are on the character and condition of man before and after the fall, three on the decrees of God, four on moral agency, and six on regeneration. We regret that the plan did not include a few on what is the distinguishing topic of Christian theology—the atonement. This would have given completeness to the representation of his system, and made a valuable contribution to our theological literature, upon a subject on which the church cannot well afford to lose the sound scriptural teaching of such a master in Israel.

Dr Tyler makes no claim to originality, either in substantive doctrine or general method. In both these his aim was to be thoroughly Biblical. Whatever of essential doctrine had any other origin than God's Word, he held as alien, if not antagonistic, to the Christian system—as apostatic and not apostolic. No tradition had authority with him, except what inspired men had committed to the infallible records. Whatever was in conflict with this, he dismissed as abnormal and false. And whatever described the footsteps of successive generations of the redeemed in "the old paths," he held as illustrative and confirmatory of the substantive doctrine.

Dr Tyler was a follower of Edwards, and Calvin, and Augustine, as representatives of the Pauline theology, standing over against John Taylor of England, Arminius and Pelagius, whom he regarded as attenuators and corrupters of that doctrine. He would be considered as a conservator of the genuine New England Theology. He differed on one or two points from the stricter constructionists of the Old School Presbyterians, especially respecting the extent of the atonement; and in several particulars from what may be called the newest school among Congregationalists. In respect to these two extremes, he adopted the motto, "*In medio tutissimus ibis*," not from a timid expediency, but from convictions of truth and safety. When asked which was the safer side of the two, he was accustomed to answer, "It is not safe to err on either side."

A careful survey of Dr Tyler's theology discloses the following, as its distinctive features;—God a *sovereign*, man a *sinner*, and Christ a *Saviour*. Our space will allow of but a cursory view of the first.

All pure theology starts with the idea of God as an intelligent, personal sovereign. This distinguishes it from Pantheology, which, in its emanations and absorptions, loses the idea of *person* in that of one universal, self-evolving and self-involving substance, and logically necessitates the denial of divine sovereignty. This theistic Person with which theology starts, Himself without cause or beginning, has yet caused the

beginning of all other beings ; not, like the spider its web, out of his own substance, as the Pantheists affirm, making the Creator and the creature *homooousian* ; nor as the Atheists hold, out of an eternally existent matter. As revelation teaches, He freely originated other substances and beings *heteroousian*—neither specifically nor generically consubstantial, or coetaneous with him. Creation was, therefore, no mere *evolution* of an ever-fermenting divine substance, nor an eternal cardiac, or pulmonary activity and efflux of the Creator ; but the definite *act* of a free will—a voluntary agent. It was optional with God to create or not, and to create as he did, or otherwise if he pleased ; else he was not free. Of all conceivable modes of cosmical existence,—of all numbers, kinds, and ranks of creatures, and of all possible systems of government, he chose the existing ; not from any limiting imperfections in his own nature, or hindering obstructions in the nature of his creatures, to his choosing otherwise and better, if better had been possible ; but because the one chosen is absolutely the best, ensuring the highest results of the best workings of infinite power, wisdom, and love—an optimism of which these attributes of the Sovereign Ruler are the joint factors.

But here meets us the great problem of moral evil. How can we account for it in the government of such a Sovereign ? Dr Tyler's answer secures from impeachment the divine attributes, which are severally assailed by the old dilemma of Epicurus. "If He has the will to prevent evil, but not the power, he is impotent, which cannot be true of God. If He has the power, but not the will, he is malignant, which is equally foreign to the Deity." Atheism here offers to Theism a choice of horns, but Theism declines the option. God could have prevented the introduction of sin, if it had, on the whole, been best ; for his power is not like man's, a dualism, physical and moral, but a *qualitative*, moral *unit*, divine and infinite,—not less adequate sovereignly to *govern* free agents than to create them. He did not prevent sin, because its permission, that is its non-prevention, belonged to a system of moral government, which infinite wisdom had devised, and infinite love chosen, as, of all conceivable ones, the best, though including what, in itself considered, is not good, but evil. "If God is infinitely good, it must have been his choice from eternity that the best possible system of things should exist. If He is omniscient, He was able to see what would be the best system. If He is almighty, He is able to bring into being the system which He saw to be the best." P. 231. By this logical formula, Dr Tyler solved the great problem of moral government.

Hence he reasons that the affirmation of a moral system without moral evil, as better than the present with its permission, is, 1st, to deny "one or more of the essential attributes of God;" 2d, "to exhibit the Governor of the universe as a *disappointed* Being. He desired and planned the best, but his counsel does not stand;" 3d, "to represent the divine Being as *unhappy*. How can He be perfectly happy, if He is constantly crossed in his designs?"

Bellamy portrayed the logical sequences of this view with a master's hand. "And doubtless, if God is disappointed and grieved, all the inhabitants of heaven are very sorry too, so that the grief and sorrow are universal in the world above. And if it is universal there, it may well be universal here. And this disappointment, sorrow, and grief, are likely to be eternal. Thus hell will be full of the groans of the lost, and heaven full of disappointment and grief,—God and all holy beings heartily sorry that things have come to such an issue."*

From all these derogations of the divine glory, Dr Tyler found logical and moral relief in what he regarded as the theopneustic optimism of the Apostle, which has been "enforced by the scientific genius of Leibnitz, the rhetorical opulence of Chalmers, and the logical energies of Jonathan Edwards." God permitted sin, because, in his sovereign power and wisdom and love, He purposed to bring out of it a greater good than would otherwise have been gained. Between *such* a permission of sin, and *submission* to it as to a dire necessity, against which his administrative power and skill could bring no defence, there is the same difference as between God's universal sovereignty, and his subjection to a power that is *his* sovereign. And this sovereign power is just that, against which protection, in all good governments, is the grand desideratum—the power of evil.

But Dr Tyler applied to this hypothesis the historical, as well as the Biblical and moral argument, "God *has* preserved the holy angels from apostasy. He has, in innumerable ways, imposed restraints upon the conduct of wicked men," p. 230. He has not only kept a part of his moral subjects from defection, with no infringement of their freedom, but in perfect accordance with, and by *means* of that freedom. He has, in his loving sovereignty over their freedom, and *by* it, drawn from their debasement an innumerable multitude of the fallen,—a multitude to be augmented by countless other myriads. And to the consummation of this adnormal, redemptive process, sin always evil *per se*, by the wise sovereignty of the Supreme, is so ruled and check-mated as to bring a liberal contribution. This tributary relation of evil to good, is *contra*

* Preface to "The Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin."

naturam, as the beneficent results of the crucifixion were contrary to the *intent* of the crucifiers. We cannot well see how the blessings of redemption could have come to the world, except through the permitted agency of those evil men. But it is perfectly manifest that this fore-ordained, non-prevention of evil, and its prearranged subserviency to good, neither abridged the moral freedom of the actors, nor abated an iota from the enormity of their evil acts. Thus, God is not only held at an infinite remove from the authorship of sin, but is placed in such *antagonism* to it, as to make it subserve, contrary to its nature, the very purposes which, but for his sovereignty, it would have thwarted. The theory of divine impotency,—of an inability to do what God desires, in Dr Tyler's view, perplexes the problem it assumes to solve. It comes nearer to the truth to say that, with sin's ever, and everywhere purely *evil nature*, and with God's ever, and everywhere intense *hatred* of it, He was unable *not to have prevented it*. But, the divine mastery over sin, which everywhere appears; the clear stamp it bears, not as a superior, or even co-ordinate, competing power in the moral system, but as a dependent, servile, constantly defeated element, failing of its ends, and ever compelled to promote the designs of the Supreme,—a purely evil force, bent into the divine mechanics of wisdom and love for the production of the greatest good,—this sufficiently justifies the ways of God in the permission of sin.

In this view, we believe the last discussions and renderings of the subject have well nigh harmonised the earlier and later New England divines. Edwards says it is God's "pleasure so to order things, that, he *permitting*, sin will come to pass for the sake of the greater good, that, by his disposal, shall be the consequence." It was the view of Bellamy that God's wisdom in the permission of sin consists, "not in bringing good out of good, but in bringing infinite good out of infinite evil." Dr Tyler teaches that the present system is the very one "which God preferred to all others; and that, notwithstanding the sin and misery which it includes, it will result in a higher display of the divine glory, and in a greater amount of good, than any other system of which the divine mind could conceive," p. 222.

We regard the language of an able writer in this Journal, on "Dr Taylor and his System," as in felicitous agreement with this:—"There is no dishonourable reflection upon the will of God, since his moral will or preference is always for good and not for evil. His choice does not lie between not *creating* and *creating sin*; but between not creating and *creating a moral system*, into which sin may enter, but in which it

can be counteracted and overruled, and by which *system*, the highest possible good is achieved.”*

And if we look beneath the alluvia of error respecting God’s omnipotence as a mere *force*, and some other points of doctrine in Dr Bushnell’s eloquent and remarkable treatise on “Nature and the Supernatural,” we come to a strata of the same old theology. “We mean by omnipotence,” he says, “not power in the sense of influence or moral impression, but *mere executive force*.” This force “can overturn mountains,” but can no more control free agents—personal “powers”—than the force of an army can “compute an eclipse, or write an epic.” We have never, in the history of accredited doctrines, met with this mode of conceiving of God’s power as separated from his “influence and moral impression.” The omnipotence, or all-powerfulness of God, stands, we believe, in such history, not as a blind “army,” “earthquake,” or physical force, a corporeal, cyclopean, non-personal dynamic—the weight of a huge, Vulcanic hammer, falling fitly on malleable, material *things*, but beating the air when exerted in relation to moral and personal powers. It stands as the sum of all that potentiality which is *actualised* in the divine agency—the totality of God’s creative, sustaining, and governmental ability—the whole energy of a *free, moral* sovereign, over *free, moral subjects*, and unfree, material objects.

But, waving this, and the classing of man’s will as a co-ordinate power with God’s will, Dr Bushnell solidly teaches a practical optimism, on the basis of a real, divine sovereignty, and the subserviency of evil to good, in essential harmony with the earlier and later New England theology. “In selecting the best possible plan among the millions of possibles, open to his contemplation, and in deciding to set on foot, or actualise that particular universe, he also made certain, all the evils or mischiefs, seen to be connected with it. But they are not from him, because (although ?) they are in this indirect manner, made certain, or foreordained by him. It is hardly right to say they are permitted by him. They come in only as necessary evils that environ the best plan possible. And yet he is not disappointed or frustrated. Still he governs with a plan, a perfect and eternal plan, which comprehends in its exact date and place, everything which every wrong-doing, and revolting spirit will do, even to the end of the world.” P. 107. The powers may and do break loose ; but “the plan of God is made large enough to include such a breaking loose, and deep enough in council, from the beginning, to handle it in terms of sovereign order.” P. 98. “The system will be one that systematises the caprices and discords of innumerable wills, and works

* Vol. xvi. p. 402.

results of order, through endless complications of disorder, having in this fact, its real wisdom and magnificence." P. 97. Upon this broad, catholic view, attested by science and reason, by Christian consciousness and revelation, Dr Tyler based his doctrine of divine sovereignty.

It commended itself to him as not only rational, but as eminently practical and consolatory, for, it is the conclusion of common sense, and the best philosophy, that, if God be not the world's sovereign, it has none. And if it has no moral ruler, able to restrain evil and evolve good, its present conflicts are aimless and interminable—an unending repetition of meaningless dynasties, in which good and evil, and all moral distinctions are swallowed up in the vortex of an eternally rotating, revolving materialism. Against such discomfiting and gloomy apprehensions, just views of God as a sovereign are a sure defence.

This doctrine is sometimes counted as one of the unlovely, hard features of Calvinism, making God a reasonless and arbitrary tyrant. And uncaredful and clumsy modes of presenting the subject, mere dead, dogmatic statements, may have given occasion for such misconceptions. In Dr Tyler's inculcations, the doctrine stands as harmonious and homocentric with all the other doctrines of the Christian system. It is a sovereignty of wisdom and love, as well as of law and justice. God is equally a sovereign Father and Judge. But the most exact and life-presentations, will not secure from the carnal mind, delight in God's government. "From my childhood up," says Jonathan Edwards, "my mind had been full of objections against God's sovereignty. It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me. But I remember the time very well, when I seemed to be convinced and fully satisfied as to this sovereignty of God. But I could never give an account how, or by what means, I was thus convinced, not in the least imagining, *at the time*, that there was any extraordinary influence of God's Spirit in it. However, my mind *rested* in it, and it put an end to all those cavils and objections. But, I have often, since that first conviction, had quite another sense of God's sovereignty, not only a conviction, but a *delightful* conviction. Absolute sovereignty is what I *love* to ascribe to God." The doctrine ever after appeared to him exceedingly pleasant, bright, and sweet.

God's sovereignty an arbitrary tyranny! It can seem so only to those who misconceive it, or are in rebellion against it. What is it? Infinite *love* guided by infinite wisdom, seeking its ends of good by infinite power. It is genial, generous, and marvellously mellowing to the hard-hearted when it strikes inward. It nourishes in all devout minds those inexorable

restraints of justice and that filial confidence in the divine administration, best suited to the tender, but exalted state, in which men exclaim with Mills, "Glorious sovereignty! glorious sovereignty!"—and like him, too, fly to the outermost bounds of human sin and misery, on the wings of divine charity, in Christ-like missions of mitigating love.

Dr Tyler's reverence for the Scriptures is patent in all he wrote or did. Having settled its theopneustic character, the only remaining question with him was—What does it mean? This determined, there was no appeal. He did not derogate from the dignity of human reason, but he remembered that in man's fall, it fell; that its decisions, however plausible, can never discredit the written word of the Infinite Reason. If this word opened to him deep mysteries which he could not fathom, so did God's works of nature; and he learned herein that both have the same author—that He is infinite and man finite.

Yet his faith, though implicit and childlike, was not blind. His reason, taxed to its utmost, and his conscience, tutored by the most rigid discipline, both justified it. This is a legitimate effect of the old Bible theology. The most indisputable masters of reason and quickeners of conscience, who have employed both most successfully in combating ignorance, error, and sin, are just those who, by the tractors of study, prayer, and faith, have drawn this theology out of God's infallible Word, as the vital element of their life of love. Where the Bible, by such an influence, reigns over man most sovereignly, there reason is mightiest, conscience freest, and love purest;—man has most good of the life that now is, and best hopes for that which is to come.

In this fulness of justifying faith, and of a faith fully justified by the best reason, Dr Tyler in a moment of perplexity remarked, "I am past being greatly troubled. I have committed myself to God, and wait the guidance of his hand."

"I have not the ravishing views which some have had," he said, just as he was passing down into the valley of the shadow of death, "but I have no fear,—I enjoy perfect peace."

"Thou art gone up, victorious saint,
To find the joys for which we faint,
Away from sin and sin's complaint—
My father, O, my father!"

ART. IV.—*On the Power of Contrary Choice.*

THIS phrase, as a phrase, rather than any well-defined idea conveyed by it, serves as the corner-stone of that scheme that

has of late come in to displace the New England theology, while adopting its name. It is employed to relieve the difficulty which is felt by some, in contemplating the fact that fallen men begin their moral existence under decisive bias to sin. By saying that, though we are sure to choose that which is sinful, we have, at the time of this choice, the power of a contrary choice, the case seems to be relieved of some of its difficulties. The precise thing that is meant by this power of contrary choice, perhaps we, after all our endeavours, have failed to apprehend. Nor do we know much of the origin and history of this new conception. We see that it answers, in a scheme of doctrines, ends similar to those attempted to be answered by the old idea of a self-determining power of the will; and the nearer we come to a satisfactory definition of it, the nearer we bring it to an identity with that idea. If we could trace the history of its development, we might perhaps better understand what it is. But we have not been able to do this.

There is a pretence that the younger Edwards developed the idea, in his "Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity," in opposition to Dr West, who held to "a power to act or not to act" residing in the will. Perhaps it may be said that he developed its absurdity. That supposed power to act or not to act bore a close resemblance to this power of a contrary choice. And that, Edwards the younger said, was "the main point on which the hinge of the whole controversy turns;" that is, the controversy between West and Edwards. Of Dr West's views he says:—

"A power to act or not to act is his definition of that liberty for which he contends, and in support of which he has written two books. And if he is not able to give a single instance of such a power, it is high time for him to give it up, and the whole controversy, of which this is the hinge. No wonder Dr West's correspondent did not understand what the Doctor meant by this power, if the Doctor himself did not understand it so far as to be able to give an instance of it. A *power to act or not to act* must either mean a power to choose or refuse, or a power to act or cease from all action, either in choosing or refusing. If the former be the meaning, it is no more than we all grant, provided by *power* he meant *natural* power. But if in this case moral power be intended,—a power opposed to moral necessity, which is the previous certainty of a moral action,—this we utterly deny; because it implies that there is a previous perfect uncertainty in the nature of things, and in the divine mind, whether we shall choose or refuse the proposed object. If the last be the meaning of the *power to act or not to act*, as this is a power to sink ourselves into a state of unfeeling and blockish torpor, I appeal

to the reader whether Dr West, or Limborch, or any other man, has ever had or can have any idea of such a power."

Dr Edwards comes perhaps still nearer to a detection in Dr West of that idea which is the subject of our inquiry, in the following paragraph:—

"The Doctor [West] puts the case of his choosing coffee when that, tea, and chocolate were offered him, and all appeared equally eligible, and says, 'I believe that it will be impossible, in this and a multitude of instances, to assign any accident or circumstance which determines the mind to its choice among other things which appear equally fit and eligible. Consequently, here is an undeniable proof of the liberty for which we contend.' The liberty for which he here contends is the power to choose one of several equally eligible things. If by power he means *natural or physical* power, I grant that we have such a power, to choose not only one of several things equally eligible, if any such there be, but one of things ever so unequally eligible, and take the least eligible. A man may be under no involuntary restraint from taking an object ever so ineligible. But if, by power to choose one of several equally eligible things, he mean a power opposed to moral necessity, it is a previous uncertainty which he will choose. But there is in this case no more previous uncertainty in the nature of things, and in the divine mind, than in any case whatever."

These quotations will shew that Dr West was directing his endeavours after something like what is sought by those who speak of a power of contrary choice. He was evidently labouring to find an escape from the controlling influence of motives, and something like the will's acting in *equilibrio*, and free from any previous certainty as to what its acts would be, in his supposing the case of his choosing coffee when tea or chocolate was just as eligible. Dr Edwards, in answering this, took the same ground that we should take as to this new power supposed; admitting that if mere natural power of choosing, or the liberty of choosing, free from involuntary restraint, were meant, such a power exists. In his treatment of Dr West's power not to act, he shewed plainly that he made no departure from the views taken by his father, against both the self-determining power of the will and the supposed power of contrary choice. But the light of these quotations will serve us better as we advance.

Unless we find the first notice of what is now called the power of contrary choice in Dr West, set forth in his debates with the younger Edwards, we find it nowhere approved by any distinguished writer, till we find it in Dr Taylor, in whom it appears as a main constructive idea of what was called the New Haven theology. Since that, it has stood in similar re-

lations to the other forms of effort made to displace the true Edwardean system.

The truth is, the concession that Edwards effectually exploded the notion of a self-determining power of the will is concurred in by many who really, but unconsciously, hold to the substance of the exploded thing. They see the annihilation so thoroughly done, that they are aware of the folly of any attempt to reproduce the broken idol. Yet the exigencies of their theology demand it; their scheme has an aching void without it,—which void they seek to fill with what seems very like the ghost of the demolished fiction, though called by this other name, “the power of a contrary choice.” They fancy it to be, not the identical thing, but a sort of *tertium quid* between that and the necessitarian principle which they supposed to be maintained by Edwards. They have discovered that this will answer all the ends that were answered by that; as indeed it would, if it had a solid reality. So, consciously or unconsciously, they are labouring to build again what Edwards destroyed; while they are fain to use the name and prestige of Edwards, in order to secure popular favour to their work. Necessity presses them into a narrow corner. To say, or even to think, that Edwards taught the self-determining power of the will, would be difficult, while his work on the will is remembered. Yet something that will answer the same purpose they must have, and the prestige of Edwards they must have; and how shall they secure both? This problem they have attempted to solve, by taking up something which they conceive to be midway between Edwards and his opponents, but undiscovered by him; and which they have named “the power of a contrary choice.”

This phrase, first pronounced as far as we can ascertain, by Dr Taylor, has been gaining currency for about a third of a century, and has been so little challenged, that the gregarious class of theologues who receive their clothing of mind without toil or spinning, are widely assuming it, as an established principle. And some are so strong in their confidence of it, that they are venturing to put it forth under its own proper name,—the self-determining power of the will. An organ of this school has lately said:—

“In a most important sense of the term, we do hold, and earnestly hold and teach, that there is a self-determining power of the will. And we sincerely regret that so good a term for the statement of our doctrine has been so long associated with the advocacy of error. It is too valuable to be lost. It should be rescued from the hands that have so long misappropriated it, and put to a better use. But for its historical associations, there is no phrase which is a more

exact and condensed expression of the truth on the subject. And modern Calvinistic writers are beginning to adopt it, to denote the natural ability or power of men to choose, in any instance of choice, otherwise than they actually do choose."—" *Congregationalist* " of May 20.

This statement is so far true, that what these men mean by the power of contrary choice, is, as far as we understand it, better expressed by self-determining power,—the old term which has always been applied to it. But we were not aware before, of what we are glad to learn on so good authority, that modern Calvinistic writers, so calling themselves, are beginning to adopt it. We sympathise with the writer in his conviction, that the historical associations of this term give it a bad odour. But who has done a greater damage to its reputation than Edwards; and what stands so much in the way of its restoration, as his immortal work on the Will? That work must have a refutation as signal as that which it put upon its opponents, before it will be prudent to say much in favour of a self-determining power of the will, among really Calvinistic theologians. While we were not aware, that "Calvinistic writers" of the school from which the above extract proceeds, had begun to avow a belief in the self-determining power of the will, as it is avowed in that extract, we had heard much said by them about a self-determining power of the human *mind*, in a way that raised a suspicion, that the self-determination of the will was what was meant.

Between these two terms, however, there is a very important difference. Against the latter,—the self-determination of the human mind,—when properly understood, there is no valid objection. If we take into consideration the whole state and action of the mind, resulting in a given choice—all the intellectual perceptions, the inclinations, affections, and tendencies of the mind, which go to determine the choice—in all of which the mind is active, as well as passive in some of them,—if we take in the permanent inclination of will, as well as the transient act of it, it is proper to say, that the mind determines itself in view of motives, to the volition which it makes. The mind, in its whole agency and tendency towards that choice, determines itself,—is a cause of the act of choice, though not a cause acting independently of motives. The state of the understanding determines what class of objects shall stand before it as the greatest apparent good—which is a very important element in determining the choice. To those who have a spiritual discernment, those things appear desirable, which to one in the opposite state appear repulsive. The will's previous inclinations, which some call immanent acts of the will, may determine what class of motives shall stand before the mind

as the strongest. What we call the state of the heart, as to moral subjects, goes far to decide what the volition in any given case will be. In this view of the mind working as a whole, it is true, that *the mind* determines its volitions. And this is the proper view.

Much error has come of making distinctions of different operators or agencies in the mind, such as have no real existence. The mind discharges its separate functions, not by different committees or heads of department. It does its whole work in a committee of the whole. Every volition takes its character from the whole character of the mind; and the mind reveals what is the character of its moral judgment and affections, by the moral choices which it makes. Similar remarks would apply to the exercise of what we call the other faculties of the mind. When the mind is employed in reasoning, it is not one faculty or member of the mind that labours, while the others lie still; but it is the whole mind exerted in ratiocination. When it forms mental images, it is not imagination alone at work, leaving her several sister faculties meanwhile to slumber; but it is the whole mind employed in creating imaginary objects, or new combinations of materials previously existing in the mind. So, when volitions are put forth, it is the whole mind that is employed in willing. It is not a faculty of will, standing out separate from the convictions of the understanding, from the judgment of what is good and desirable, and from the affections of the heart or inclinations of the will. These immanent acts of the will, so called, are as much concerned in our choices, as is the immediate power of choice. So when we speak of the mind's determining its acts of choice, and speak of the whole mind going forth to them, according to what is pleasing to the taste, the judgment and the inclinations of the will,—when we speak in this comprehensive view of mental action, there is no error in saying, that the mind determines its own volitions.

Self-determination in this sense, however, is little to the purpose of those who look to it, or to a power of contrary choice, for the sake of finding for man a liberty of acting free from any moral necessity. Their occasions seem to demand, that man, opening into moral existence with a bias to evil, such as is found in man since the fall, shall have, located somewhere in a distinct faculty of will, a power of choice that shall work independently of that part of the mind in which depravity is seated; as if some power residing in the muscles of the arm should carry the motion athwart the design formed in the brain. By this supposed power of the will working independently of the judgment and inclination, and making a choice contrary to what judgment and inclination would dictate, the

endeavour is, to escape all necessity of acting under a bias to evil, even where that bias exists, and to get for depraved man a possibility of forming holy choices. A fit comparison for this we have seen in a person, whose brain was so affected by disease, that when he willed to raise his hand to his mouth, some contrary choice seemed to come into his arm, and carry his hand over the back of his head. If our friends could find in the faculty of the will a power of contrary choice like this, so that the power of choice should go forth in opposition to the inclinations and judgment and to the motives rationally addressed to them, then would they evade the force that lies in any bias to sin, and find out a way in which one might, perchance, put forth holy choices in spite of a preponderating bias towards what is sinful. But self-determination in the sense above defined, a self-determination that is formed by the judgment and inclinations going forth in view of motives, can serve no such purpose. If one's inclinations are so decidedly fixed to evil that he may be fitly called "dead in sin," he will still determine his own volitions; but he will be under an unfailing certainty of determining them to evil; so that self-determination, in this comprehensive sense, is consistent with the most absolute moral necessity.*

* There is a popular fallacy, with which thousands of superficial thinkers have been carried away, lurking under what passes as a self-evident proposition, that "*all sin is voluntary*." With those whom a cant phrase serves instead of clear and well-defined ideas, the enunciation of such an axiom is warrant enough for believing that there is no sin but that which is the product of a distinct volition; and this false conception has led to most important errors in theology. We grant that all sin is voluntary, in several senses of the term; but not in the narrow sense which would make all sin the product of some act of choice. We call that voluntary which inheres in the will, or depends upon it, or is produced by it, or concurs with it. No one denies that all sin is seated in the will, and has the will concurring with it. And no theologian that we ever read makes sin to be positively involuntary, as that which takes place in spite of the will willing the contrary. But no less a theologian than Paul makes that first motion of concupiscence, that first preponderance of evil propensity, which is the source of all bad volitions, and which is not voluntary in the narrow sense of the term—*i. e.*, which is not the product of volitions, to be sin. He says: "I had not known sin, but by the law. For I had not known lust [to be sin] except the law had said 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Here, in the light of the law, he discovers that the propensity to sin, which goes before the act of the will, is sin; and not only that, but in the 13th verse he makes this sin to be "*exceeding sinful*." These motions of lust, this energy from which sinful volitions spring, this propensity to sin, is no less sinful or blameworthy from the fact that it is not in our power to extinguish or repress them by a counter volition; or rather because we cannot raise a counter volition against them.

Lust, or sinful propensity, cannot be distinguished from sin generically; but from a particular species, or form of sin; that is, sin consummated in the conscious act of the will. Another apostle says—"Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lusts and enticed. Then, when lust has conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, it bringeth forth death." Here lust is made to be the mother, womb, *fomes* of sin. That which Paul had not known to be sin, or against the law, unless the law had spoken expressly against it, is made to be the hidden and secret cause of all sin, which, once discovered,

It also consists with the full power of the grace of God, in determining the character of the mind and its acts—a power as full and complete as the Scriptures allege. For God's grace exerts itself first in changing our views of divine things, so that we see the beauty of holiness, as the unrenewed cannot see it; therein changing our moral affections and inclinations, so that we are inclined to a holy choice.

But it would not be strange, if our friends should conceive a vein of misrepresentation in what we have said about the will's acting so as to overleap the bias to sin and all necessity. For they—how consistently we shall see—hold to an infallible *certainty*, where we find a *necessity*, of acting according to the bias of the mind. They insist that by power of contrary choice, they mean no more than a natural ability, to choose either of several eligible things. If this be really so, what we have quoted from Edwards in answer to West is in point. "If by power he mean natural power, or physical power, I grant that we have such a power;" so that man is under no *involuntary* restraint from choosing the opposite of what he chooses. What is meant, when it is said that only natural ability is involved in this power of contrary choice, we suppose to be just this,—that man's natural power of choosing, or his choosing apparatus, if we may so speak, is just as applicable to the opposite of what he actually chooses, as to what he does choose, and he is under no involuntary constraint to choose as he does. Now, if the words could be fixed to that sense, so as never to slip out of it and stealthily do service in another sense, they would be very harmless. But this notion of a contrary choice, as an element of theological reasoning, goes up and down a sliding scale, according to emergencies. When it has need to be defended, it is a simple natural ability; but when it becomes the mother of inferences favouring Pelagian conclusions, it is more than the choosing apparatus lying idle for want of the power of propulsion.

The word *power* usually includes the possibility of doing a thing. So when we speak of a power of contrary choice, unless we cautiously limit the term, we *of course* use it, and are understood to use it, in a sense which includes moral ability.

swallows up the thoughts of all other sins. It is both sin and the fountain of sin. In the light of this divine philosophy, that theory which narrows down the view of sin to mere acts or volitions, appears meagre indeed. But though sin is not always voluntary in the sense of an act of the will *put forth*, it is always voluntary in its root; because, in all cases and kinds of sin, the will is its proper seat. A sinful propensity is a sinful state of the will, or an energy of the will ready to go forth in sinful acts, and is blameworthy, because the man is wilfully wrong. The importance of this distinction is seen, when it is remembered that the overlooking of it has narrowed down the view of sin, so as entirely to exclude the doctrine of original sin, and the other doctrines of grace consequent upon that.

Both for the speaker and the hearer, it is easier than not, to change the meaning and understand the term of power in the full sense of a possibility of doing the thing. And the temptation for theorizers of that class, thus to slip the sense of the term in the utterance, is the more pressing, because the sense of moral ability is what their occasions demand. They ascribe to Calvinists the doctrine that the will acts under a necessity involving involuntary restraints; and to go clear of any such necessity, they suppose a contrary power, that shall involve a possibility of choosing the contrary of what is chosen. The power supposed, in order to be at all to the purpose, must involve a real possibility of making the contrary choice, and thus must involve a moral power. It is nothing to their purpose, to say that one has a natural power, the choosing organ or apparatus, but that not in working order; and more than this is always meant, when the idea of a power of contrary choice is brought in to sustain any conclusion in theology. When there is occasion to defend it, it appears only as a natural faculty; and none can deny, that the natural faculty of choosing is as applicable to one object as another, according as it is set to work by a positive inclination or motive. But when this defence is done, and the idea is called to its theological applications, then, forsooth, it is taken in the full sense of a faculty of the mind really at work, or at least in a condition in which it may work.

Let the sense of the term as defended be fixed in the mind—let it be remembered as we pass with it from point to point in theology, that this power of contrary choice is nothing more than a faculty of choosing, without any inclination of mind to move to a choice, and therefore sure never to be exerted, and see what service it will do, when applied as it is wont to be applied. For instance, it is applied to relieve the mind from the thought of acting under a necessity, in our first choice of sin. Because we begin life with all our inclinations towards sin, it strikes some minds that we are driven into sin, as by some imperious necessity. So they say—We do indeed choose that which is sin; but then we might have chosen the contrary, for we had a power of contrary choice. But the objector replies—That was not a working power. While the inclination is against it, it is wholly unserviceable. Without inclination concurring, a power of choice never avails as a power. And how does it mend the matter, to bring in an unavailable power as an offset against inclinations that are sure to prevail?

This sophistication of mind, playing fast and loose between the two senses of the phrase, power of contrary choice, is facilitated by the habit of locating the power *in the will*, as a separate faculty. The powers that stand behind the will, in

the inclination and judgment, and which impel to volition, in other words, those energies of the mind from which the volitions spring, are counted as one power, and then the will itself, or something in it, is conceived of as another power, which may swing over on the opposite side, when needful, to balance one's scheme of theology.

This sophistication is also facilitated by an ambiguity, to which we have already referred, in the very term, power of contrary choice. It has such an elasticity about it, that if taken up to express simply a natural ability, it, by a force residing in itself, overleaps the bound, and expresses a moral ability. For, strictly speaking, a power to choose, if we mean by it anything more than the abstract faculty of choosing, involves a moral power. A mere natural ability to choose is a solecism in language. An ability *to choose*, whether in a direct or contrary choice, is, by force of the terms, more than a natural, it is a moral ability. How do we distinguish a natural from a moral ability, except by saying that one has a natural ability, when he has an ability to do the thing, if he is inclined to do it; and that one has the moral ability, when he is inclined to do it—that is, when he has the inclination to choose to do it? So Edwards, in his work on the Will, says—"We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it *if we will*, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow it." But he says, "Moral inability consists either in a want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives." According to these definitions, a power of actually choosing is a moral ability. A natural ability to choose, is an ability to choose *if we will*, or an ability that becomes an ability to choose, as soon as we do choose, and not before; and as, in case of the power of contrary choice, we never do choose it, so it is no ability at all. Or in other words, a natural ability to choose, is an ability to choose *if we will*; and so the very conception of a mere natural ability to choose, separate both from the bare faculty of the will, and from a moral ability, involves the idea of our choosing to choose—the very gist of the old Arminian self-determining power of the will.

But what has led these theologians to this conceit of a power of a contrary choice? One empty conceit has begotten another. They have been endeavouring to avoid the conclusion, that fallen man is under a *necessity* of sinning, conceiving to themselves a kind of necessity that imposes involuntary restraints—a necessity that involves something more offensive than is involved in an infallible certainty. In tracing out the practical uses which they make of their assumed power of contrary choice, we find that one of them is, to make it appear that the

unbalanced appetites of the infant, when opening into moral agency, forming a bias to sin, do not impose a *necessity of sinning*. The infant, it is said, chooses that which is sinful; yet he has at the same time a power of contrary choice,—he was not necessitated to what he chose. In the precise language of formal teaching, their word is, that the infant's tendency to sin "*is infallible, but not inevitable*;" that is, it is such as cannot fail, but as may be avoided. It seems to us, that if it should be avoided, it would fail. But as those who use this language cannot mean to contradict themselves in five words, we must suppose that they use the word "infallible" somewhat inaccurately, meaning only that, as a matter of fact, it is unfailing—never does fail, never did fail, and never will. How even this can be absolutely certain, if it is known to be "not inevitable," is not plain to our apprehension, unless, indeed, they have the faculty of foreseeing contingent events. However, they seem to have convinced themselves, in some way, of the "infallible" certainty of the sinfulness of every infant's first responsible choice. Let us consider the bearing of this concession on the theory, that sin consists only in volitions, put forth by those who have, at the moment of putting them forth, the power of contrary choice.

Let it be admitted that there is an infallible certainty that the infant's first moral choice will be sinful, then all the advantages of assuming a power of contrary choice vanish. It can be of no value, practical or theoretical, if the constitution of things under which the infant is placed, and the inclinations of his mind, be such as to determine him infallibly to a sinful choice. If this supposed power of choosing the contrary cannot avail, even to raise a doubt whether he will choose the contrary, or to beget the least contingency as to what the choice will be, it is of no avail whatever.

Should any here reply by asking, to what end, in any case, serves the showing of a natural ability which the sinner has, to do things which he is disinclined to do; we answer, that it is never to make out any contingency about his future acts, but to shew that there is a *bona fide* basis of obligation. When we say that one has an ability to do a thing *if he will*,—that is, has natural ability to do it, though his inclinations are hopelessly set against it,—we say what is needful to shew that the obligation to do it is complete upon him, and the blame for not doing it is as complete. And if the same were said of a supposed mere natural ability to a contrary choice, it might go to the same purpose of shewing obligation and blame; were it not that the nonsense of the term, *ability to choose if he will choose*, or the liberty of choosing to choose, prevents its going to any purpose at all.

But the only purpose which this term can answer by being called in, is to give scope for contingency in the case of men's future acts. This contingency was the great thing sought by the old Arminians, in their pleas for the self-determining power of the will. And a shadow of a like contingency seems to float before the mental vision of the advocates of a power of contrary choice, as a thing required to fill a void in their scheme ; while other exigencies of their scheme require them to admit an infallible certainty. In order to make out their notion of liberty, as necessary to moral agency, and their notion of sin, as consisting only in self-determined volitions, they need to have the future volitions of men contingent. But in order to make out the universality and totality of man's depravity, which they feel bound to maintain, they need an infallible certainty that the first moral act of every soul will be sin. So they actually provide for a contingency, while they exclude it by admitting a certainty. They assume that moral agency consists in the exercise of a will that is capable of choosing, with the same bias of the affections, in the same circumstances, and in the same act, the opposite of what it does choose. This is assuming that it is possible for the infant's choice to be holy, in all the circumstances of his case. For if he be really and fully capable of such a choice, it is fully possible that he will make it. There is a power of contrary choice, only so far forth as there is an actual possibility that the choice may be the contrary. When it is said that the infant, opening into moral agency under a bias, through a disturbed balance of the sensibilities, is under no necessity of choosing sin, because he has the power of a contrary choice, to what purpose is it said, if it be not to shew that there is an actual possibility that the contrary choice may occur ? If we can see a cause, in the mind or out of it, which is sure to prevail against its occurrence, we can see a cause which is sure to prevent a contrary choice ; that is, which precludes in every case the power of a contrary choice. And even if we know that there is such a cause, though we cannot see what it is, the known existence of such a cause assures us that there is no such power of contrary choice. The power that is so effectually precluded by some cause, known or unknown, from ever being exerted, that of all the millions of those who are supposed to have it, it is infallibly certain that not one will ever exercise it, is at best no power at all.

The assumption, therefore, of a power of contrary choice, in order to avail to any purpose, must avail to make the future choices of men contingent ; and if, on the other hand, all contingency be excluded, and an infallible certainty be admitted,

all the advantages of a supposed power of a contrary choice amount to nothing.

But, whatever may be the value of this power of contrary choice, or its want of value, we are not called on to admit its existence without proof. Its existence, if it does exist, is a matter of fact, and should be proved, like other matters of fact, by the exhibition of the fact itself, in some instance of its manifestation. Where shall we find such an instance! The infant's mind opens into moral agency under such a constitution of things, and with such a bias to evil, as makes it certain that his first moral choice will be sinful. That which makes it infallibly certain that he will make a sinful choice, excludes the possibility, the *posse*, of his making a holy choice. Then how do you know that this power of a contrary choice exists, when you concede that in all the acts of will, in all intelligent beings in the universe, never an instance occurred, or could occur, wherein it came into exercise? We know that other powers exist, because, in some instances, we see them exerted; and from their exercise in some cases, we infer their existence in cases similar. But it is conceded that this power of contrary choice never was exerted, and never will be. How, then, do we know that it exists? Indeed, it is by supposition, a power never supposed to be exerted. It is called the power of contrary choice; that is, a power to choose the opposite of what, in all cases, actually is chosen. It is only a power to make the choice that one is sure never to make. This must be one of those latent powers, that are doomed, by their very nature, to sleep a sleep of practical non-existence,—like a supposed power of the lighter scale to descend, notwithstanding an “infallible” certainty that it will “kick the beam.”

If any should say that the saints in heaven, fixed there by a decree of Jehovah, to “go no more out,” but remain in a state of eternal holiness, have the natural power to plunge into sin and hell, what would he mean? Would he mean that they have the power of a contrary choice, involving a possibility of their actually preferring sin? If there be any such possibility, actual and real, then they are no more fixed in the heavenly state than were the angels that sinned; and it is really possible that they may yet become fiends of hell. Grant that they have a natural ability to plunge into hell. That would be granting that they have the power to do it *if they will*, that is, if they choose; but not that they have the power of choosing to do it, involving the whole state of mind without which such a choice cannot be made. Such a power of contrary choice they have not; and the assurance that they never can have it, is our assurance that they are fixed in holiness, and heaven is to be heaven for ever.

If there be, in all cases of choice by a moral agent, a power of contrary choice, then God has the power of choosing sin in preference to holiness; of choosing to turn all the resources of his creation and of himself into the service of malignity,—of becoming himself an infinite devil, and converting every world into a hell, and every soul into a fiend. Really, if he have the power of a contrary choice, what ground of certainty is there that he will not do it? The certainty that is, lies in the actual impossibility which, the Scriptures tell us, resides in his moral nature. They tell us that God “cannot lie;” that “it is impossible for God to lie;” that “he cannot deny himself.” In telling us this, they assure us that God will never choose sin, or become a devil, because he has not the power of a contrary choice, and that there is in his moral nature an impossibility of his doing it. So the saints in heaven are sure never to become devils, because they have not the power of contrary choice,—because their holy inclinations are so fixed and strong, as to put them beyond the possibility of that contrary choice.

So the infant, under an innate bias to sin, has a natural ability to do right, *if he should choose to do right*; but this is not saying that he has power to choose to do it. It is conceded that there is an infallible certainty that the infant’s first moral choice will be sinful, because he will make that choice under a decided bias, called a disturbance of the balance of the sensibilities. This bias so determines his choice, as to make it certain that he will choose that which is sinful. But, if this be the case, he has no power to choose the contrary. The inclination of the will in one direction, makes it impossible, that, in the same instant, it should be inclined in the opposite direction; as much as the actual inclination of the scales in one direction, makes it impossible that in the same instant they should be inclined in the opposite. So, where this previous certainty exists, there can be no power of a contrary choice.

Let us now consider the nature of that necessity which the advocates of the power of a contrary choice seek to provide against. We maintain that there can be no other necessity in the case than that which is involved in an infallible certainty, which certainty they also admit; so that the labour of getting round any necessity which goes beyond an infallible certainty, is a work of supererogation. No one holds to any necessity determining the first choices of moral agents towards sin, other than the strength of inclination, or the mind’s own tendency to a sinful choice. But the necessity which our friends are anxious to provide against, seems to be some force external to the will and controlling its action. They seem to fancy, that our choices, if made necessarily, are made under some involuntary restraint or constraint. But no such involuntary re-

straint, and of course no *such* necessity, can exist, when the strength of our inclination towards what we choose, is all the necessity which we are under for choosing as we do. But here we prefer to adopt the words of President Edwards (Part I. section 4) on the Will:—

“It must be observed, that in what has been explained as signified by the name of moral necessity, the word *necessity* is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word. For such terms, *necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c.*, in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition, or endeavour, that is insufficient. But no such opposition or contrary endeavour is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is a certainty of the inclination of the will itself; which does not admit the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in the present act, or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting the present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And, therefore, the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this necessity.”

This quotation from Edwards answers a double purpose. It shews that he did not, as our friends have supposed, overlook this conceit of a power of contrary choice. He here animadverts upon it, and pronounces it an absurdity; as absurd as two contrary motions of the same body in the same instant. But our main intent in the quotation was, to shew in what sense he uses the term *necessity*, when he makes our moral choices necessary. He uses it, not in the common sense of that which prevails against our mental endeavour, but in the sense of that which ensures the volition which the mind's inclination seeks. In Edwards's view, there is no necessity controlling moral choices, other than an absolute certainty; and this certainty our friends admit. This moral necessity, or certainty, differs from a natural necessity, as the necessity of acting according to our inclination differs from the necessity of feeling pain when we are wounded. In the latter case, we feel the pain independently of our willingness to feel it. But the moral necessity is as sure in results, when the inclination is such that, on the presentation of certain motives, the act of will follows by an infallible certainty. That such a moral necessity, that is, certainty, rules in all moral choices, need not be argued; for our friends admit it. They admit that the infant's tendency to sin is infallible, though they say it is not inevitable. And by making this distinction between the infallible and inevitable, they shew that they are labouring against a figment of their own fancy,—a necessity, such as no one supposes; a necessity prevailing against contrary endeavours of the will, which endeavours are not supposable.

We do not misunderstand them. The writer from whom we have already quoted, reasons against a kind of necessity that supposes a force of constraint put upon the will. He says:—

“If motives determine the movement of the will, in the same sense that the locomotive determines that of an attached train of cars, or that the weight determines the movement of the descending beam of the scales, then we could not ascribe to the will any self-determining power, nor indeed any power whatever. It would then be a mere passive thing, of which accountability could not be predicated. The will in no instance chooses as it does because it is overpowered by irresistible motives; but because it is a will, and as such can act only in the way of free elective preference.”

How closely this deliverance harmonizes with Edwards's opponents, may be noticed by the way. Yet this writer, with what consistency we will not say, holds that the act of the will is always as the greatest apparent good, or as the strongest motive. What, then, is he opposing? Simply an imaginary necessity—the conceit, that somebody pleads for a power that prevails against or without the will's endeavour. He agrees with us, as to the infallible certainty, that the infant's first moral choice will be sinful. Yet none of his opponents would ask him to concede more than this. None of them believe in any other necessity than this. None believe in a necessity that bears the will away in spite of its endeavours, like a steam-engine. So all this labour of theorizing only escapes a difficulty that never existed; that might be more easily escaped, by shewing it a simple absurdity.

Indeed, it arrays one absurdity against another. The conceit of a power of contrary choice is brought in, to exclude the conceit of a natural necessity. It supposes that, where the mind determines the will to a certain choice, the will is capable of a determination to a contrary choice in the same instant. But when the will actually makes its free choice in view of motives, it is absurd to suppose it capable of choosing the opposite. But this absurdity cannot be better exposed, than it has been in the above quotation from Edwards. When this absurdity is presented to the mind as he presents it, even the believer in the power of contrary choice repels it, and denies that he holds the idea in any such sense. So the writer above quoted remarks on this very passage from Edwards:—

“What is the power here denied? Certainly not what is usually meant by ‘power of contrary choice,’ but only the power of the will ‘to oppose its present act,’ or, in other words, to have opposite choices at one and the same time. The will can no more move in opposite directions at the same instant, than can the body. A man can as easily be walking north and south at the same time, as the

will be making contrary choices at the same time. This is a power of contrary choice, which neither sinner, saint, nor angel possesses, and which God could no more impart to a creature than he can make two and two equal five. But we, nevertheless, insist that there is in the will a power of contrary choice, and that without this, the will would have no power of choice whatever, and so would not be a will."

Doubtless he is sincere in the belief, that the idea, as he holds it, involves no such absurdity; but he fails to define it in such a way as to escape the absurdity. We want such a definition; but we have never seen it, and think we never shall.

They tell us, too, that they believe in "no such self-determining power of the will, as the old Arminian philosophy claimed." We doubt not, they sincerely think so. Yet to us it seems that they unconsciously involve the same principle, and that their power of contrary choice describes an imaginary attribute of the will, which is identical with the self-determining power of the old Arminians. See it in a single view. They tell us, that this power of a contrary choice is a mere natural power, or ability. But a natural ability is an ability to do *as we will*. A natural ability *to choose* is an ability to *choose as we will*, or an ability of the will, in its own exercise, to determine how it will choose; and wherein does this differ from the old Arminian self-determining power?

But, whether the two are identical or not, the phrase, we will not say the idea, of the power of a contrary choice, serves in the new scheme of doctrine the same ends which the self-determining power served in the scheme of Taylor and Turnbull, refuted by Edwards. They used it to exclude the proper doctrine of original sin; to shew that sin and holiness consist exclusively in choices, or volitions; to carry out the doctrine, that man could not be created holy, nor born in sin, and of course that regeneration cannot properly be a new creation in Christ, but a result of moral suasion under a divine influence that is common to the regenerate and unregenerate,—making the issue turn on man's self-determined choice. These, in the main, were the purposes to which the Old Arminians worked their self-determining power, and these are the purposes to which the same, under a new name, is now worked. Could we afford the space, we should be glad to take up first the reasons, one by one, by which Edwards so prevailed against the conceit in his day, and shew that they have equal force against it, as it stands in its new form and phrase. And then we should be glad to take up, one by one, the applications of each, and shew them to be the same,—that they are used as props to precisely the same corners of the frame of theology.

This subject is worthy of the reader's careful study ; for the conceit which we have laboured to expose, is the foundation and grand constructive error of a scheme in theology which is acquiring many adherents, especially of our young ministers. It may strike the cursory reader as a small question of metaphysics. But when Edwards employed the choicest energies of his mind and produced his world-renowned work against it, he did it, he tells us, because in this single error was entrenched the whole Arminian scheme ; and in his work on Original Sin (page 423, Worcester edition), he says—

“The fore-mentioned notion of the freedom of the will, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand favourite point with Pelagians and Arminians, and all divines of such characters, in their controversies with the Orthodox. There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of religion. On the determination of this one leading point depends the issue of almost all the controversies we have with such divines. . . . It is necessary that the modern prevailing doctrine concerning this point should be well understood, and therefore thoroughly considered and examined. For without it there is no hope of putting an end to the controversy about original sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist about the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern divines, if they can maintain their peculiar notion of freedom consisting in a self-determining power of the will, as necessary to moral agency, and can thoroughly establish it, in opposition to the arguments lying against it, then they have an impregnable castle, to which they may repair and remain invincible, in all controversies they have with reformed divines, concerning original sin, the sovereignty of grace, election, redemption, conversion, the efficacious operations of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving faith, perseverance of the saints, and other principles of the kind.”

The importance of a thorough examination of this notion is the greater, in that the whole scheme to which it belongs, stands or falls with it. A wider influence is now at work to turn away the minds of ministers and churches from the Calvinistic doctrines, than was ever before seen in the course of the history of New England. And we have the germ of the whole system here antagonizing with Calvinism, in the phrase which we have so imperfectly expounded. Let this germ be displaced from the common mind, and the rest will disappear. Yet, strange to tell, we have now in memory not a single instance, in which any thing like a full and formal refutation of this sophism has been attempted. And, indeed, we know of very little that has been written and published in argument *for it*. We would be glad to see such an argument ; for it strikes us, that one attempting to sustain it by arguments could hardly fail to dis-

cover for himself the narrow and crumbling ground beneath him. The assumption has obtained its wide currency, very little by argument, but mostly as a gratuitous assumption, and it is now time to bring it to the test.

ART. V.—*The Minister's Wooing.* By HARRIET BEECHER STOWE. New York : Derby, Jackson, & Co. Boston : Brown, Taggard, & Chase. 1859. Pp. 578, 12mo.

WE are among the many who began to read this latest fiction of Mrs Stowe, when first published in the *Atlantic Monthly* with a lively curiosity to see how the skill that created the admirable character of Uncle Tom would succeed in treating the solid, historical character of Dr Samuel Hopkins ; and we frankly confess that, in some parts of the book, not only has our curiosity been gratified, but our admiration has been excited to the highest degree. We admire the genius of the author, which dared to set her good-natured, chatty factotum, Miss Prissy, to the heroic work of storming the redoubtable doctor's study, while he was in the midst of a profound cogitation upon the distinction between natural and moral ability, and "swoop him up," goodly old bachelor as he was, into Mrs Scudder's best room, to help a "synod of matrons" from the parish to decide which of several brocades would best become his young sweetheart at her approaching nuptials ; and then could depict the modest composure and sweet becomingness with which that reverend and muscular divine submitted to an operation at once so sudden, so unusual, and so delicate. This surely is a rare and felicitous combination, even for fiction ; and we say at once that the grace that could undergo all this is worthy to be mentioned alongside the genius that created the scene ; and that a book which can afford such rich contrasts among its commonest incidents, is worthy of the popularity which it is sure to have.

Thus far, we doubt not, the great majority of our fellow-readers are at one with ourselves. But now, and more seriously, we confess to a feeling akin to a personal mortification, in having been made to see that august theologian and truly great man brought down to the level of common lovers in the plot of a common love-story—a Samson, as it were, bound and blinded, that he might furnish entertainment for the uncircumcised. We question the right of any medium, however talented or well-disposed, thus to summon up the spirits of the

great dead, merely to point a contrast or adorn a tale.* Further still: we must confess to a feeling stronger yet than mortification, at some intimations which chapters xxii. to xxiv. of this story give to the world, of the author's sentiments on some important religious truths, and the currency which this popular fiction will be likely to give to those sentiments. In order to place the matter at once and fully before the reader, we raise the question in order that we may answer it—"Does this part of the story tend to disparage some important Scriptural truths as they have been generally understood and held by the orthodox portion of New England?" In other words, has it a natural tendency to modify the anxiety which they have always felt in regard to the eternal state of friends who die impenitent.

In comparison with this question, it is of little consequence to those whose sentiments this Quarterly represents, what may be the character and success of this story as a feat of creative genius; what circulation it may attain to, or how soon be forgotten; whether the genius of the writer will succeed in cultivating the literary taste of New England so that it will continue to relish negro-talk† in all her books, or whether that taste will prove obstinate, and, asserting its dignity, require that such slang henceforth be omitted from books which they are expected to pay for; and whether the author is writing herself up still higher in the public admiration, or whether she may not be doing what the most malicious critics could not do as well. These points, on which the critics are already differing, and on which we have very positive opinions, we consent

* Dr Hopkins was born, September 17. 1721. He was married to Miss Joanna Ingersol, at Great Barrington, January 13. 1748—his age being a little more than 26 years. They had five sons and three daughters, the youngest of whom died September 22. 1792, in her twenty-seventh year. She must therefore have been born about 1766. Dr Hopkins's first sermon against the slave-trade was preached at Newport, about the year 1770. His first wife died, August 31. 1793. He was married, September 14. 1794, to Miss Elizabeth West, aged 55, who survived him. [See Dr Park's memoir of his life.] Is it quite fair to represent him, soon after the preaching of that sermon, when he must have been about fifty years old, the father of eight children, and the wife of his youth still living, as an old bachelor, "wooing" Mary Scudder? The sermon quotes the Declaration of Independence, of July 4. 1776, p. 243. Dr Stiles is represented as disapproving of it, p. 278. He and Hopkins had been known through New England, New York, New Jersey, England and Scotland, as the *leaders* of effort in behalf of the negroes, since the issue of their joint Circular, Aug. 31, 1773. Stiles left Newport in 1776. John Adams was Ambassador at the Court of St James, p. 199. This was from 1785 to 1787. Aaron Burr was a member of the United States Senate, which was first organised, April 30. 1789, when Dr Hopkins was in his sixty-eighth year, and his first wife was still living. Can we be quite sure that a book with such errors in it, describes his pastoral life, character, and influence, with perfect accuracy?

† We have been informed, on high southern authority, that much of her "negro talk" is no genuine negro talk at all, but only a mixture of vulgarisms current among ignorant Yankees and Low Dutch.

to leave, for the present, untouched save by this passing allusion, in order that we may shew that the practical theology of the book, on some fundamental points, is loose, and justly unsatisfactory to a large portion of her New England readers.

In the first place, in the discussion of religious questions, the advantage, in point of force, is given to the wrong side. Even where there may be a doubt, the benefit of that doubt is not given where it of right belongs. Genius raises strong, or at least specious objections, and nothing but unlearned simplicity is found to reply. The circumstances in this particular case are in brief as follows: James Marvyn, a bright, daring, generous young man, but without any pretensions to a religious character, is lost at sea. (Of course, he turns up again in due time, else the story would not be a good love-story according to the standards; but for the purposes of evincing and testing the religious sentiments of the *dramatis personæ*, it is all the same as if he were truly and for ever lost.) His mother, a religious woman of strong feelings,—we might say almost of passions,—whose heart does not fully accept the popular religious faith from which her understanding finds it impossible to break away, is thrown into the deepest agony by the news; is first paralysed, and then frantic, in which state she talks like a maddened fury, pressing, with a fearful eloquence, all the suggestions which a human heart in such a state can raise against the benevolence of God in permitting such an event. Mr Marvyn, a strong Puritan believer, silently submits to the awful stroke “in hopeless, heart-smitten dejection.” Mary Scudder, the angelic Christian maiden, whose guileless heart had been stolen unawares and carried off to sea, rises above all anxiety as to where his body sleeps, and pushes her tearful inquiries after his soul into the very depths of the future state. In her agony she still clings to her God,—she has nowhere else to go but unto him; but, oh, *what* a God does he now seem to her to be! “*My God, my God, oh where art thou?*” she exclaims; and then her grief retires within to prey upon itself. Had she not been the embodiment of every Christian grace, this dreadful load would have pressed some impiety from her lips; but there she stands in the midst of this fiery trial, faultless as an angel, and leaving us nothing further to desire in her regard, except that the writer had represented her as a proper result of Puritan training, rather than as a beautiful exception to it.

Thus the representation, direct and implied, which is given of the feelings of these religious people in regard to this providence, is tragic in the extreme. It is fearfully eloquent, and by far the most exciting part of the book. The whole force of the author's genius is laid out upon it, and with such success,

that the character of God for benevolence labours like a great ship in a terrible gale. Now, what is offered as a restorative in this extreme case, and who administers it? A negro, of course; and that a woman! In the whole circle of friendship, no other is found worthy of doing it. The white people have all been turned into ice or stone by the popular theology of the day; "stiffened and enchained by the glacial reasonings" of the Puritan ministry. A prayer is indeed offered in the afflicted circle, but by whom and with what effect, we are left to conjecture. Dr Hopkins is utterly silent until Mrs Marvyn and Mary leave the room, when he volunteers to Mr Marvyn one cold, theological proposition, a broad and solid religious generality, and then returns to his home and his study.

While Mrs Marvyn and Mary Scudder are by themselves, there transpires that tragic scene to which we have alluded, that fearful outpouring of a smitten but unreconciled heart, in language which we will not quote, for it cannot be read without a shudder. During this awful hour, "Ole Candace" has been listening at their door until her big tropical African heart could contain its generous warmth no longer, and she bursts into the room, administering mingled doctrine, consolation, and reproof thus liberally to the unimpassioned father, the unreconciled mother, and the disconsolate daughter-elect:

"Lor bress ye, Squire Marvyn, we won't hab her goin' on dis yer way," she said. "Do talk *gospel* to her, can't ye?—ef you can't I will."

"Come, ye poor little lamb," she said, walking straight up to Mrs Marvyn, "come to Ole Candace;" and with that she gathered the pale form to her bosom, and sat down and began rocking her, as if she had been a babe. "Honey, darlin', ye a'n't right,—dar's a drefful mistake somewhar," she said. "Why, de Lord a'n't like what ye tink,—he *loves* ye, honey! Why, jes feel how *I* loves ye, —poor ole black Candace,—an' I a'n't better'n Him as made me! Who was it wore de crown o' thorns, lamb?—who was it sweat great drops o' blood?—who was it said, 'Father, forgive dem?'—Say, honey!—wasn't it de Lord dat made ye? Dar, dar, now ye'r cryin'!—cry away, and ease yer poor little heart! He died for Mass'r Jim, —loved him and *died* for him,—jes' give up his sweet, precious body and soul for him on de cross? Laws, jes' *leave* him in Jesus' hands! Why, honey, dar's de very print o' de nails in his hands now!"

The floodgates were rent; and healing sobs and tears shook the frail form, as a faded lily shakes under the soft rains of summer. All in the room wept together.

"Now, honey," said Candace, after a pause of some minutes, "I knows our doctor's a mighty good man, an' larned,—an' in fair weather I ha'n't no 'bjection to yer hearin' all about dese yer great an' mighty tings he's got to say. But, honey, dey won't do for you now; sick folks mus'n't hab strong meat; an' times like dese, dar

jest a'n't but one ting to come to, an' dat ar's *Jesus*. Jes' come right down to whar poor ole black Candace has to stay allers,—it's a good place, darlin'! *Look right at Jesus*. Tell ye, honey, ye can't live no other way now. Don't ye 'member how he looked on his mother, when she stood faintin' and tremblin' under de cross, jes like you? He knows all about mothers' hearts; he won't break yours. It was jes' cause he know'd we'd come into straits like dis yer, dat he went through all dese tings,—him, de Lord o' Glory! Is dis him you was a talkin' about? him you can't love? Look at him, an' see ef you can't. Look an' see what he is? Don't ask no questions, and don't go to no reasonin's,—jes' look at *Him*, hangin' dar, so sweet and patient, on de cross! All dey could do couldn't stop his lovin' 'em; he prayed for 'em wid all de breath he had. Dar's a God you can love, a'n't dar? Candace loves him,—poor ole, foolish, black, wicked Candace; and she knows he loves her." And here Candace broke down into torrents of weeping.

They laid the mother, faint and weary, on her bed, and beneath the shadow of that suffering cross came down a healing sleep on those weary eyelids.

"Honey," said Candace, mysteriously, after she had drawn Mary out of the room, "don't ye go for to troublin' yer mind wid dis yer. I'm clar Mass'r James is one o' de 'lect; an' I'm clar dar's consid'r-able more o' de 'lect dan people tink. Why, Jesus didn't die for nothin',—all dat love a'n't gwine to be wasted. De 'lect is more'n you or I knows, honey! Dar's de *Spirit*,—he'll give it to em; and ef Mass'r James is called an' took, depend upon it de Lord has got him ready,—course he has. So don't ye go to layin' on yer poor heart what no mortal creetur can live under; 'cause as we's got to live in dis yer world, it's quite clar de Lord must ha' fixed it so we *can*; and ef things was as some folks suppose, why, we *couldn't* live, and dar wouldn't be no sense in any ting that goes on."

Doubtless "Ole Candace's" heart was all right in this matter. She talked good experience, and that right eloquently; but experience, heart-knowledge, piety, were no match for the fiery logic and almost Satanic eloquence of Mrs Marvyn. It did not strike and turn one point of the difficulty she had raised. It only hushed her up.

It was something as if a Mrs Siddons should come upon the stage, raving like a fallen angel against God and religion, carrying the sympathies of the whole pit with her as she turned and walked off with the haughty air of an injured queen; but should soon send back her simple waiting-maid to curtsy to the multitude, and say—"Missis did not mean as much as she said. She was only *acting*; so full of her assumed character was she, that she *had* to say that or die. But she feels better now."

Now, what inference will unbelievers be likely to draw from such a scene as Mrs Stowe has here pictured, but that, in proportion as a mind is excited to think intensely on re-

ligious subjects, it sees awful objections to evangelical doctrine ; and that there is no cure for these objections but the simple credulousness of ignorance ; in other words, that these objections cannot be looked down, they can only be looked away from. For here the current theology of that day, as represented in Hopkins and Edwards, and which the author pictures as being so admirable for the exercise of such giant intellects in the study, is set before the reader as perfectly nonplussed and dumb in one of the trying experiences of practical life ; as worthless in this dire emergency as a ponderous stationary engine of a thousand horse power would be to rescue a drowning man from the water. Nor does Mrs Stowe, who holds the most intimate social relations with those who glory in being called Edwardians and Hopkinsians, volunteer one word of her own in vindication of their sentiments, or utter one hearty disclaimer against the impious and broken conclusions of Mrs Marvyn. The intellectual strength of the party lies silent, while "Ole Candace," with her pious garrulity, bring out whatever of consolation there is for the poor sufferers. But supposing that "Ole Candace," or some coloured brother no less pious than herself, had been put to the work of raising the objections to this providence, and that Dr Hopkins, through Mrs Stowe, who is professing to interpret him, had been permitted to answer them by some of those strong logico-scriptural consolations which are by no means rare in his works, how would the case have then stood ? The practical effect of such a disposition of the forces in argument would have been quite as just to the truth, to say the least ; it might have been as useful to the general reader ; and this arrangement would, at the same time, have afforded all necessary scope for the creative genius of the author.

She has said some things highly complimentary to the intellects of Hopkins, Edwards, and their compeers ; but what is the *practical* estimate which she has here put upon their character and works ? What but this, that their system of belief, as an intellectual construction,—a system on which they suspended their own hopes of salvation, and in the illustration of which for the salvation of others they exercised their loftiest faculties for more than a quarter of a century, and which system of belief is generally considered by the theological world as one of the most remarkable products of the human mind acting upon the word of God,—that this, after all, is only a man of straw, which can easily be upset by the pious gibberish of an ignorant negress ; or only a scarecrow, which, however much good it may have frightened common New England people into in the days of their ignorance, has no terrors for "poor ole, foolish, black, wicked Candace ?"

Mrs Stowe has here repeated the inexcusable mistake, of Mr Dickens. Most of the religious characters he has drawn are purely vicious,—designed so to be; and the very few exceptions are, so far as we can now recollect, taken from low life,—their piety being carefully separated from all power of original, independent thought. One would suppose that Mr Dickens had never fallen in with, or read of, one genuine specimen from that glorious host of worthies that rises before the English historic mind responsive to the word “Christian.” As an author, he either wilfully ignores the existence of any such being as a Christian philosopher, Christian poet, or even Christian gentleman; or else he has no faculty to appreciate that lofty type of humanity; or, which is perhaps the more probable, he has no confidence in his power to delineate them, and so wisely chooses only such as he can manage,—that weak and earthly class, whose infirmities and hypocrisies lie upon the very surface.

Should we substitute, in the last paragraph, the words “preacher and lecturer” for “author,” it would describe the most popular speaker in America at the present time,—we mean, of course, the pastor of the Plymouth Church in Brooklyn. We rarely listen to him, or read the reports of his most popular discourses, without wondering what is that attribute, or that combination of attributes, in him, which has drawn within the sphere of his observation such an unusual proportion of such unfortunate specimens of the genus minister, as furnish him materials for what are generally considered the spiciest parts of his discourses. If these are, as they appear to be, his principal associations with the ministry, he shews the mettle of a true hero by remaining in it.

In like manner, Mrs Stowe's Christians are generally from humble, not to say low life; and, in her former novels, her ministers are, with rare exceptions, contemptible. They generally disgrace the profession they make, and weaken whatever system they attempt to advocate; and she is quite content to have it so, since, if these characters were dropped out, her stories would lose some of their raciest passages. With all the noble and beautiful things she here and there says of the Christian doctrines and of those who profess them,—as in these very chapters she has said some fine things in truly Macaulayan style of the New England Puritans,—she generally leaves the balance of the argument against them; an injury to substantive Christianity for which all her brilliant and lucrative labours for the poor slave will be a miserable compensation. The least that we can say upon this point is, that if the doctrines which Mrs Stowe, by her connection with an evangelical church, professes to believe, and to hang all her

hopes for the future life upon, command the respect and confidence of the reading world to-day, it is not from any direct and open service which her pen has rendered them in her most popular works. Her negative testimony on these points has a very positive effect upon a large class of readers,—an effect she may not have intended, and may even deplore, but which is none the less dangerous for that.

We admit that the first effect of the violent eloquence of Mrs Marvyn is considerably modified afterwards. She comes to herself, and appears somewhat penitent for her violent unsubmission; but the honour of this practical improvement accrues to the course of nature in the soul, rather than to positive Christianity, as it should have been made to do. Her wicked passion ere long calms down, as all violent human emotions must, soon or late, from exhaustion. She then tells Mary she must forget the naughty things she said on that fearful day; and still she cannot avoid adding, "it had to be said, or I should have died." She looks at the awful providence something as she would at the back side of a summer thunder-cloud that had laid waste her beautiful home and flower-garden,—a grand and impressive sight in the distance, but which, after all, had no business to come that way.

Sweet Mary is made still more heavenly and spiritual by the remembrance of this, her great sorrow, as it recedes. How could it be otherwise? She was already too unearthly to be endangered by a discipline of this sort; and so, when this great trial, like a Satan, came, it found nothing in her, and passed on. But this comforting result of the great trial in both is spoken of as the "reaction" of suffering nature, something as the cessation of acute pain becomes a positive pleasure; but it is not spoken of as the proper Christian effect of a sanctified affliction,—a result wrought by the Spirit of God through an unquestioning submission to a deep, dark providence. No distinct enunciation is made of the important truth, that such a blessed fruit of trial is due, not to nature, but to grace. The great evil is represented as at last overruled for good, or turning into good; but no clear, strong vindication of the providence as not being evil or unjust, but altogether wise and good, is attempted. There is given the reader a long and fine essay upon the uses of sorrow in human experiences, without any intimation that the quality of the effect of sorrow upon the heart depends upon the quality of that heart in its relation to Him who sends the sorrow. The reader is told that "sorrow is divine—sorrow is grand and great—sorrow is reigning on the throne of the universe—sorrow is wise and far-seeing—sorrow is the great birth-agony of immortal powers—sorrow is the great searcher and revealer

of hearts," and many more glittering generalities of this sort, to prove that it is disciplinary and good for every one, as crushing the rose is necessary to bring out its sweetness. But we look in vain for any quotation in the plain, terse Saxon of our Bible, or for any indirect intimation that all this sorrow, or indeed any part of it, is the proper result of sin,—a vindication of the righteousness of the great Sovereign,—a penalty for transgression, and a chastisement, looking back to our guilty past; which truth must be fully admitted, or there can be no solid consolation whatever for sorrow. The inference which might be drawn from this delicate and flattering exposition of the ways of God with man, is, that they could not be vindicated on their own merits as the penalty of sin, but only as considered in connection with certain useful results to the sufferer; and that, therefore, inversely, had Mrs Marvyn remained obstinate and impenitent to the last, this providence, as far as she was concerned, could not be defended.

Not to quote "*Ole Candace*" again on this point, take such a passage as this, in which Miss Prissy takes up the same strain with slight variations, adding the comforting thought, that some folks may perhaps repent while falling from mast-head:—

"I can't help feeling that Jim Marvyn is gone to heaven, poor fellow! His father is a deacon—and such a good man! and Jim, though he did make a great laugh wherever he went, and sometimes laughed where he hadn't ought to, was a noble-hearted fellow. Now, to be sure, as the doctor says, 'amiable instincts a'n't true holiness;' but then they are better than unamiable ones, like Simeon Brown's. . . . Now I know we can't do anything to recommend ourselves to the Lord; but then I can't help feeling some sorts of folks must be by nature more pleasing to him than others. David was a man after God's own heart, and he was a generous, whole-souled fellow, like Jim Marvyn, though he did get carried away by his spirits sometimes and do wrong things; and so I hope the Lord saw fit to make Jim one of the elect. We don't ever know what God's grace has done for folks. I think a great many are converted when we know nothing about it, as Miss Twitchel told poor old Miss Tyrel, who was mourning about her son, a dreadful wild boy, who was killed falling from mast-head. She says, that from the mast-head to the deck was time enough for divine grace to do the work." (P. 371.)

Are we beside ourselves, or uncharitable, in saying that this seems too like the ingenuity of a tender spirit, labouring to gloss over or modify the old, fearless doctrine of the fathers on this point; a doctrine which seems very strong, and was very strong, only because the unmistakeable word of God made it so?

Taken in its connection, this seems too much like a special plea, devised in order to get round the unpleasant fact, that an interesting sinner had died without giving that evidence of preparation for death which is commonly supposed to be necessary to authorise hope of his salvation. It likewise conveys a strong intimation of this unexpressed inference, that when acute sorrow at a sinner's loss shall have done its purifying work in the hearts of sufferers, fitting them for the intensest enjoyment of the surprises of heaven, that lost sinner shall somewhere be found safe. In other words, that God, in such trying providences, is playing with our sensibilities, as Mrs Stowe is in her fiction of Jim Marvyn's loss at sea, in order to intensify our delight, when, with affections quickened and purified by his supposed loss, we find him on *terra firma*.

The whole philosophy of this affliction, with the exception of two or three lines out of as many pages, is natural and Pagan, not Christian and scriptural. Now, we submit that all reasonings from the mere nature of the soul, like all fine analogies from the physical world, are "stiffening and glacial" —utterly inadequate to the cravings of the soul in its fiery trials; and, therefore, for a Christian writer who has brought a soul into such straits, then to make no effort to meet its wants by a clear and explicit offer of the Bible consolations as being sufficient, and the only consolations sufficient, for the emergency, giving in place thereof a fine disquisition on the natural uses of tears, is practically to dishonour the Word of God, and place Christianity at a disadvantage before the reader. A soul, under the pressure of a great affliction, will reason more forcibly from nature against the divine benevolence, than a Christian, in a calm, dispassionate mental state, can reason in behalf of that benevolence from the same dry source; and hence, to rest the defence of Christianity in such circumstances upon mere natural reasonings, is to do it an irreparable injury. Had Mrs Stowe's "mournful Cassandra" applied for consolation to Plato (whose wisdom in point she also quotes), that noble heathen would have discoursed to her in quite as comforting a strain as Mrs Stowe converses with her readers upon the moral uses of sorrow; and in that case, such discourse would have been admirable, and all that could have been expected. But for a Christian writer of this day to reduce her mournful characters to the same cold and meagre consolations, as if there had been on earth no such thing as the Christian scriptures working their wonders of divine healing now for eighteen hundred years, is an unfairness to Christianity not to be excused in any one, and least of all in one who professes allegiance to those scriptures as divinely inspired.

We hope not to be misunderstood on this point. We are

aware that it is a critical matter to discriminate between an author's own sentiments, and the sentiments which he represents only dramatically. Still there are certain general principles of judgment in such cases, in regard to which there can be but little difference of opinion. It is no uncharitableness or unfairness to say, that the most forcible and interesting characters in a story argue the quality of the ruling forces in its author's spirit; that more of his own soul, or self, will of necessity flow into those creations with which he sympathises, than into those from which he differs; and that, therefore, the reader is right in forming conclusions as to the author's characters and sentiments from the prevailing tone and atmosphere of the book.

Admitting, then, as we distinctly do, that Mrs Stowe is not to be held guilty of all the wrong things which any of her characters, in an unchristian mood, may have uttered—as inspiration is not to be charged with all that is said by the interlocutors in the Book of Job—we do say, quite as distinctly, that the religious public will hold her responsible for allowing such characters to carry off the convictions and sympathies of the reader beyond her power to recover them—as the author of the Book of Job would have been in fault had he given that book a final lurch towards Satan and infidelity. She is responsible for such a distribution of power among her characters as places New England theology, and the characters formed upon it, at a disadvantage and under a reproach in the mind of the average reader; or that, in the modern theological dialect, she has unfortunately “disturbed the balance of the sensibilities” in the reader's mind. In our judgment, she has done a great wrong in not having spoken more positively in her own name, to rebut, or at least to qualify, the very positive and forcible irreligious statements of Mrs Marvyn; but had she said ever so much in this way of calm after qualification, it would have been but a partial compensation for having first given Mrs Marvyn, while in a wicked state of mind, the power to steal and carry off the reader's freshest sympathies into the cheerless regions of unbelief, and there desert them.

Hence we have little doubt that Messrs Holmes, Lowell, Higginson, and their coadjutors in the *Atlantic Monthly* who scorn the peculiar New-England Theology as only such minds can scorn, are secretly bidding this book God-speed, on account of its silent theological tendencies; and that the whole mystic fraternity of liberalism will rejoice together, that this book will incidentally do some part of their work more effectually than they could have done it, because its author has the confidence of the religious public as they have not.

We remark in the next place, by way of objection, that Mrs Stowe's reasonings upon these deep and awful subjects in religion are chiefly from the human sensibilities. They spring from the heart without a Bible, rather than from the understanding with the Bible open before it ; from woman's heart, proverbially tender rather than logical ; and from woman's heart when riven by a great sorrow, when her "love lies bleeding," and when, in consequence, her sensibilities have more than their usual preponderance. It is poignant, tender grief at the untimely death of James that points the whole argument. This gives its whole force to Mrs Marvyn's passionate soliloquy ; it is to soften this agony of the bereaved mother that Miss Prissy, "who had very small proclivities towards the unseen and spiritual," chatters on so foolishly upon one of the most awful truths of Christianity ; and it is obvious that the great argument of the chief comforter on the occasion is only the unrestrained bubbling up of her benevolent heart. These outgushings of emotion may do well enough for those whose theology lies chiefly in the plane of the feelings, and happens to be right too ; but Mrs Stowe writes also for intellectual people, and many such will read her in cool, intellectual moods ; and not appreciating the force of her heart-method of reasoning, will spring at the conclusion that she could defend her positions in no other way.

Nor does Mrs Stowe, when she speaks in her own name, often descend below the stratum of the sensibilities. Her philosophizings on this subject are little more than a natural sentimentalism, borrowing some force and beauty from Christianity, but forgetting to give Christianity the credit for them. In wrestling with this awful theme, not one solid and radical Scripture truth is quoted by any of the speakers, save Dr Hopkins in the single sentence attributed to him, and he is made to say it in such a way as to chill the heart of the reader ; not one clear, calm, firm argument, such as a Christian heart in such a mood is so well fitted to appreciate, or at least to lay up and ponder upon afterwards, is used by the author herself in her own exposition of the momentous event, as the umpire in such a case ought to do ; but very little throughout, save appeals to the sensibilities, first to harrow them up by a partial and therefore unfair representation of the truth, and then to soothe them in the most superficial manner, without any attempt to enlighten and satisfy the understanding.

In the brief analysis which the author gives of Mrs Marvyn's character, there is dropped an apparently incidental remark, which is, in our apprehension, a key to the whole philosophy of the author concerning this subject. Having spoken of the mathematical and logical nature of Mrs Marvyn's mind as un-

fitting it to receive religious consolations readily, she adds : "The commerce with abstract certainties fitted her mind still more to be stiffened and enchained by glacial reasonings, *in regions where spiritual intuitions are as necessary as wings to birds.*" (The italics are ours.) The connection shews that the regions where these "spiritual intuitions" are so necessary, are such deep experiences as those through which this afflicted family are struggling ; and these spiritual intuitions were all the more necessary, because the stern theology of the day had no appropriate consolations to offer. So the needed spiritual intuitions must be the natural risings of a bruised spirit above the logic, and even the letter, of Scripture to those finer and more humane truths which the soul in such a state knows *must be*, somehow, true. They were, in short, the inspirations which that pious seer for this hour of darkness, "Ole Candace," had ; or as she herself expresses it in a subsequent chapter, and in her own inimitable dialect, "Now I feel tings *gin'ally* ; but some tings I feels *in my bones*, an' dem allers comes true."

The same sentiment is put into the mouth of the restored Mrs Marvyn, as she recounts to the gentle Mary her feelings while under the pressure of this dread affliction. And it is not made at all certain that these are not still her honest convictions, only she is not quite ready to assume the responsibility of making Mary a convert to them.

"Mary," she said, gently, "I hope you will forget all I said to you that dreadful day. It had to be said, or I should have died. Mary, I begin to think that it is not best to stretch our minds with reasonings where we are so limited, where we can know so little. I am quite sure there must be dreadful mistakes somewhere.

"It seems to me irreverent and shocking that a child should oppose a father, or a creature its Creator. I never should have done it, only that, where direct questions are presented to the judgment, one cannot help judging. If one is required to praise a being as just and good, one must judge of his actions by some standard of right, and we have no standard but such as our Creator has placed in us. I have been told it was my duty to attend to these subjects, and I have tried to ; and the result has been that the facts presented seem wholly irreconcilable with any notions of justice or mercy that I am able to form. If these be the facts, I can only say that my nature is made entirely opposed to them. If I followed the standard of right they present, and acted according to my small mortal powers on the same principles, I should be a very bad person. Any father, who should make such use of power over his children as they say the Deity does with regard to us, would be looked upon as a monster by our very imperfect moral sense. Yet I cannot say that the facts are not so. When I heard the doctor's sermons on 'Sin a Necessary Means of the Greatest Good,' I could not extricate myself from the reasoning," &c. (P. 354.)

Here is a broad avowal by Mrs Marvyn of one's own innate sense of right as being the highest, and indeed the only standard for judging of the character of God and of his ways with man. Of course there would be no objection to the Bible testimony on this point, so far as it does not clash with this higher law. And again, here is only such a sentimental use of "Christus Consolator" as the devout papist makes, when he passes from shedding scalding tears over the fresh grave of a lost friend, to shedding refreshing tears before a fine old painting of the crucifixion. Of this particular passage, we reaffirm what we have before said of her reasonings generally on one class of evangelical subjects, viz.,—she raises ghosts which she does not put down. She here states with great force the objections which a natural mind raises to the benevolence of God; but the counterpoise is of a different quality entirely,—hardly more than a fine evasion of the great difficulty. Mrs Marvyn's piety is, in its restored state, hardly more than a strong will so far softened by a sympathetic view of the suffering Saviour as to submit in silence to what it cannot help. Observe also how the lovely and Christian Mary is made to reason with herself about her lost lover and his probable condition in eternity:—

"Mary sat at her window in evening hours, and watched the slanting sunbeams through the green blades of grass, and thought one year ago he stood there, with his well-knit, manly form, his bright eye, his buoyant hope, his victorious mastery of life! And where was he now? Was his heart as sick, longing for her, as hers for him? Was he looking back to earth and its joys with pangs of unutterable regret? or had a divine power interpenetrated his soul, and lighted there the flame of a celestial love which bore him far above earth? If he were among the lost, in what age of eternity could she ever be blessed? Could Christ be happy, if those who were one with him were sinful and accursed! and could Christ's own loved ones be happy, when those with whom they have exchanged being, in whom they live and feel, are as wandering stars, for whom is reserved the mist of darkness for ever! She had been taught that the agonies of the lost would be for ever in sight of the saints, without abating in the least their eternal joys; nay, that they would find in it increasing motives to praise and adoration. Could it be so? Would the last act of the great Bridegroom of the Church be to strike from the heart of his purified Bride those yearnings of self-devoting love which his whole example had taught her, and in which she reflected, as in a glass, his own nature? If not, is there not some provision by which those roots of deathless love which Christ's betrothed ones strike into other hearts shall have a divine, redeeming power? Question vital as life-blood to ten thousand hearts,—fathers, mothers, wives, husbands,—to all who feel the infinite sacredness of love!" (P. 353.)

The precise value of such logic on such a theme will appear if we apply it to the other side, and ask, "Could she be perfectly happy in her Saviour's presence, if one who had treated him as James had done were there too? Would the last act of Christ's mercy for that persistent sinner against him be, to annihilate those propensities that repelled him from himself, and fill the void with the new creations of holy love, in order that she might be gratified by his society in heaven?"

By the whole argument in the last quotation is intended to be clenched by this closing paragraph: "If not, is there not some provision by which those roots of deathless love which Christ's betrothed ones strike into other hearts shall have a divine, redeeming power?" &c.

If this reasoning has any power, then a Christian woman's natural love for any one who rejects Christ will eventually reclaim him,—the penitent Magdalen's tears will wash clean the heart of her guilty lover; else how can she be blessed in heaven? And should he die first, without having repented and reformed, then she must pray for his soul while she keeps drawing it by her love, until he is ransomed from the pit; and all, for aught appears in this story, to spare the purely human and natural sensibilities of woman's heart!

We have read of the wily Indians defending themselves successfully within their wicker stockades, by placing the delicate women and children they had captured right before the muzzles of their assailants' guns, so that the bravery of husbands and fathers should be nullified by their humanity; for who could be a hero while his heart was palpitating? So this story places the interesting and beloved James in a position where either his soul or the standard New England theology on this point must be sacrificed. And as the one is a sensitive spirit, while the other seems only an abstraction, the result is inevitable.

The author, perhaps all unconsciously, but really refers the awful question to the reader's sensibilities, and with an imploring look that virtually necessitates the answer. She says to him, in substance, this: "Shall I, after the unflinching manner of Hopkins and Edwards, send the heavy shots of doctrinal truth right into the very heart of this fortress of error, thus imperilling the soul of this dear young man; or shall I sly round to the back side, and wait to see if some way may not open for an assault that shall allow him a chance to escape?" And this is the substance of much—shall we not say of most?—of the popular reasoning of the day against the doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked. It begins and ends with the testimony of mere human feeling on the subject. The reasoning, and the belief it would support, are

intensely and only humanitarian. The manly and Christian method of treating this subject in the days of Hopkins and Edwards, viz., "reasoning out of the Scriptures," is almost entirely abandoned. The opposers of the obvious Bible doctrine on this subject were the first to forsake the ground on which they had been worsted, and their conquerors followed hard after them so far into the domain of mere nature and reason, that the authority of the Scriptures was almost forgotten. The opposers of the doctrine still cling to the easier argument from reason, and their opponents are too willing to condescend to the same low level.

Thus has anthropology been permitted to ride over both philology and theology on this fundamental truth. What is the substance of John Foster's heavy and yet popular objection to the eternal punishment of the wicked? Nothing theological, in the proper sense of the word, much less is it anything biblical; but only human and personal. Substantially this: "It shocks my sensibilities; it is too dreadful [to my feelings] to believe!" or, as Mrs Stowe's chief religious interpreter in this story has it, "I can't feel it in my bones." No matter how cogently scholars and divines may press you with arguments from the Scriptures, or annoy you by their proof-texts, you have only to appeal from them to this superior court,—
"I can't feel it in my bones!"

This latest subdivision of theology, viz., the theology of the "Bones," which, though it escaped notice in the Convention Sermon of 1850, is destined, perhaps, to become the framework in future Bodies of Divinity, is already working in the minds of many people, and will swell the number of admirers of this tale. It is the substance of no small part of the popular reasoning and preaching on the subject of future and endless punishment.

We apprehend that mere human feelings, whether in "Ole Candace's" bones, or in John Foster's large muscle, the heart, have no more to do with settling the question, what is the proper condition of the soul hereafter, than they have with defining the doctrine of the trinity or the resurrection. Fine human instincts and sensibilities have no more to do with removing the grave theological difficulties of this subject, than the flowers of May have with softening the rigours of March.

We may say—for we can feel it in every fibre of the soul—how sore a wound it is upon our sensibilities to lose a charming friend who is also probably lost for ever to the favour of God; but we cannot say—for we have neither the understanding nor the sensibilities necessary for such a work—how deep a personal dishonour it is to God, to have had that soul revolt from him, and then for long years to brace himself stoutly

against all the overtures of divine love to secure his return, and thus to die. Besides, if a feeble mortal is ever to speculate upon this great and deep subject, the worst of all times for him to do it is when the spirit of a dear but unconverted friend, recently deceased, seems to stand at his side, pleading that such a faith on this subject may be proved true as will save him, and beseeching us, by all our affection and mercy, to knock off this and cover up that horn of biblical truth, that he may not be tossed on them for ever. We protest against such representations as being unworthy of this awful subject, and as having no countenance whatever in the word of God. So far from helping us to settle the question in our own minds, they only harrow up unpleasant feelings; and thus, setting one part of our nature against another, they awaken suspicion as to the integrity of God's word, thus rendering anything like repose in him impossible. Truth is,—the future and eternal state of every soul, friend or foe of ours, will turn upon God's holy will respecting him, and not upon any amount or intensity of our personal feelings in regard to his case; and what the Holy One will be likely to do with such friend may be better determined when our minds are calm and self-possessed, candidly inquiring what God himself has said, than when reasoning from our own sense of justice, or our "fine instincts," up to what he ought to do,—and this too when our understanding is overwhelmed with tender emotions awakened by his death.

A very simple, but very comprehensive, and even exhaustive, question on this subject, to those who admit the authority of the Bible, is: Who shall say what is the proper desert and penalty of sin,—God, who knows everything, and who is strictly just; or man, who knows comparatively nothing, and is beside a deeply interested party in the case? No sinner that is willing to let God decide this question, is ever found labouring to evade or soften down the fearful representations which the word of God gives of the eternal punishment of the impenitent wicked. The mere human dicta, quite too common in certain fashionable quarters, "God ought to say this, or must not be supposed to mean that;" "the principles of immutable righteousness forbid this, or require that, in him;" and all presumptions of a like nature, weigh absolutely nothing against a clear "Thus saith the Lord," or "Thus doeth the Lord;" although they give pitch, tone, and volume to the theology of many popular preachers and writers of this day. It may seem like hoping against hope, and yet we will express the hope, that we may yet see arise some defender of the doctrine of universal salvation, scholarly enough and manly enough to treat this great question biblically and profoundly; rising

above Mr King's rhetoric and Mr Parker's ridicule alike, and restoring the controversy to methods worthy of the subject.

But, restoring ourselves to the particular subject in hand, we add in conclusion, that we can almost believe that the poet-philosopher and theological professor of the *Atlantic Monthly* had this part of Mrs Stowe's book before his prophetic eye,—for poets are seers,—when, at the last annual festival of the Unitarian denomination in Boston, his forked tongue threw off these venomous words at the heel of orthodoxy: "Be gentle with all that has been venerable in past beliefs, but which is now outworn and in decay. We need not be too forward with the axe, where we hear the *teredo* boring day and night, and see the toad-stools growing."

What we complain of in Mrs Stowe is, that, if she be at heart as sound on all doctrinal points as some of her readers affirm her to be, she did not then guard herself, in a few plain, solid words, against the possibility of such a construction as, we are sure, others of her readers are already putting upon parts of her story. She might have known that the reported fact of her receiving polite attentions from the ruling spirits of the *Atlantic* at their literary club-dinners, as well as the patent fact of her walking arm-in-arm each month with these open despisers of the religious faith she professed, and who, in these public promenades, did not hesitate sometimes, as it were before her face, to amuse themselves and their friends by stroking lovingly the beard of that grim monster, her own religious faith, and then slipping the stiletto into his bowels,—we say, she might have known that with many whose hearts are very jealous of the honour of that faith, these facts would be assumed as indicating a sympathy with those men, running much deeper into the soul than mere literary tastes. This altogether natural presumption she ought to have rebutted in season; that is, before it had time to rise.

We think we appreciate the delicacy of her situation in this respect. Many would have done no better, and some not as well. For few literary persons hold their religious principles so clenched in intelligent convictions, that some of their spikes and fastenings could not be magnetized out of them, or at least sadly loosened, should they sail too near that fabled mountain on which their fancy paints the demi-gods of poetry and wit, of good cheer and scepticism, as holding their bewitching revels. Hence, to say that Mrs Stowe did not state her own views on some religious points as clearly as the circumstances of her tale seemed to require, and as clearly as she might have done had she not known what rich matter for private merriment those views would furnish for her

literary peers in the *Atlantic* is only to say that she is human, and has the shrinking sensitiveness of a woman.

It is the opinion of some, whose judgment upon such matters is worth considering, that the *Atlantic Monthly* has already completed its specific work. We sincerely hope it is not so; for if it now declines, it is obvious that a principal part of its specific work will have been *teredo-work* upon the oaken hull of that venerable frigate, Puritan Theology, in which the destinies of New England, now for two centuries, have rode so safely: *teredo-work*, we repeat; the labour of unseen teeth, plying industriously but unsuspected beneath a smooth surface, and thus achieving at last what no broadsides of manly enemies, bearing down upon her in open day, could ever have done, even if they had had the courage to attempt. And then our regret would be, that Mrs Stowe had had some part in helping it fulfil its mission of evil,—first, by the direct influence of certain sentiments in this story, and, secondly, by having lent the powerful influence of her name for a twelvemonth, to swell the number of those who will have read this Monthly to their own damage.

ART. VI.*—*Christian Life and Doctrine*. By the Rev. W. CUNNINGHAM, D.D., Principal of the Free Church College, Edinburgh. 1859.

Ueber den unterscheidenden Charakter des Christenthums, mit Beziehung auf neuere Auffassungsweise. Von C. ULLMANN, Professor an der Universität zu Heidelberg. 1845.

The Doctrine of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, in its Relation to Mankind and the Church. By ROBERT ISAAC WILBERFORCE, A.M., Archdeacon of the East Riding. First American from the second London edition. Philadelphia: H. Hooker & Co. 1849. Pp. 411.

IN his lecture at the opening of the recent session of the Free Church College in Edinburgh, Dr Cunningham chose as his subject the nature of Christianity. It might seem that in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, it was rather late to discuss that question. There is, however, very little that is stable in human thought. The questions which now agitate the church are those about which Athanasius and Augustine contended, in their respective ages. Every man and every age have to determine anew for themselves all really life ques-

* This elaborate and masterly article is, we have no doubt, from the pen of Dr Hodge. Dr Cunningham, in the lecture referred to, did not attempt anything so arduous as to explain the nature of Christianity. But it is well if it helped in any measure as a means of suggesting to Dr Hodge to take up this subject. A few words have been omitted on personal grounds.—*Ed. B. and F. E. R.*

tions. We cannot take our faith by inheritance, if it be really ours. We are under the necessity of thinking it out for ourselves, and incorporating it into our own consciousness. The same general problems are constantly presented under new conditions, and must be perpetually rediscussed. The question, therefore, *What is Christianity?* although the same which engaged the earnest inquiries of our predecessors, comes up before the minds of this generation in a new form, and complicated with new modes of thought. In discussing this subject, Dr Cunningham says there are "two notions which seem to pass very much current in the present day as received maxims, but which, I think, can easily be shewn to be specimens of real one-sidedness, and at the same time to be fitted, when believed and acted on, to exert an injurious influence on theological study." These notions are, "First, that Christianity is not a doctrine, but a life; and, second, that the proper object of true faith is not a proposition, but a person." The writer proceeds to shew that these are indeed one-sided notions, that Christianity is both a doctrine and a life, and that the object of true faith is both a proposition and a person. It is not what the foregoing notions affirm, but what they deny, that is to be objected to. It is true that Christianity is a life, but it is untrue that it is not a doctrine. It is true that Christ as a person is the object of faith, but it is untrue that the proposition, "Jesus is the Son of God," and others of like kind, are not the objects of faith. All language is either ambiguous or inadequate, and hence all controversy degenerates into logomachy, unless we understand each other as to the use of terms. Christianity objectively considered, is the testimony of God concerning his Son, it is the whole revelation of truth contained in the Scriptures, concerning the redemption of man through Jesus Christ our Lord. Subjectively considered, it is the life of Christ in the soul, or, that form of spiritual life which has its origin in Christ, is determined by the revelation concerning his person and work, and is due to the indwelling of his Spirit. In one sense, therefore, we may affirm that Christianity is a doctrine, and in another sense we may with equal truth affirm that Christianity is a life. This subject, however, is not to be disposed of in this summary way. What is meant by those who in our day assert that Christianity is a life? They answer by saying, "The life of Christ is Christianity." If we ask, What is meant by the life of Christ? the answer is, "It is divinity united to our humanity." In consequence of this union, the divine and human are made one. "Christ's life is one." His Divinity, soul and body, are united in one life. Wherever, therefore, this life is, there are Christ's soul, body, and Divinity. If we inquire how this life of Christ is Chris-

tianity, we are told that the law of life is development—that Divinity and humanity united in Christ as a truly human life, is a germ which unfolds itself in the way of history, and constitutes the church. God became incarnate not in man, but in humanity. In the church God is still manifest in the flesh. That is to say, "Christ's life as a whole (*i.e.*, including his Divinity, soul and body), is borne over into the person of the believer as a whole," so that each individual believer and the faithful as an organic whole (the church), are the dwelling place of this theanthropic life. The Church is the form in which this life of Christ projects itself in space, and unfolds itself in history. The church, therefore, is theanthropic as truly as Christ himself was. The only difference is, that in him the Divinity is immediately united with humanity, whereas in us the union is mediate. That is, the Logos does not dwell in us personally and individually, but he dwells in that nature which comes to personality in the believer. Our connection, therefore, is with the human life of Christ, but in that life the Divinity enters and combines as one life. The church, therefore, in which God is incarnate has supernatural powers, and her sacraments are "the bearers of the Divine-Human life of the Redeemer," "divinely instituted for the purpose of bringing this theanthropic life into real contact with our nature." Vastly more, therefore, is meant by saying that Christianity is a life than strikes the ear. The words are few and simple, but they contain a whole system of Anthropology, Christology, Soterology, and Ecclesiology.

As the system above referred to has been adopted by men of the highest eminence, not only in Germany, the land of its birth, but also in England and America, as it has exerted a very extensive and powerful influence on the whole department of modern theological literature, doctrinal and practical, and as it has worked its way even into the popular mind, so that its formulas and phrases are constantly reappearing, even in quarters where its principles are either not understood or not adopted, it is entitled to serious attention. Its advocates claim for it absolute truth. All other views of Christianity are represented as behind the age, and treated with contempt. We propose a brief exposition of this system, that our readers may know the answer given to the question, What is Christianity? by many of the leading minds of the present day. We are aware that we have undertaken a very difficult task, which we have little hope of accomplishing to the satisfaction of the advocates of the system itself. This difficulty is manifold. It arises partly out of the fact that the subjects involved are in their nature the most profound which can engage the human mind—the nature of man, the nature of God,

his relation to the world, the constitution of Christ's person, his union with his people, with all its consequences here and hereafter. Besides this, every theology is in one sense a form of philosophy. To understand any theological system, therefore, we must understand the philosophy which underlies it, and gives it its peculiar form. But the philosophy of which this system is the expression is almost entirely foreign to the ordinary modes of thought among Americans and Englishmen. It is, therefore, not to be expected that it should be thoroughly understood or appreciated without much previous training. Then, again, the system itself is presented by its adherents in very different forms. The general school of Schleiermacher has been split into numerous divisions, all of which depart more or less from the great master whose authority they recognise. One man, therefore, is not responsible for the teachings of another. The substratum of Schleiermacher's system was Pantheism, yet most if not all his disciples are avowed Theists. Such being the difficulties which surround this subject, we shall not be so bold as to attempt any philosophical account of the genesis of the system. We shall not attempt an exposition of the philosophical principles to which it owes its character, but content ourselves with presenting in a concrete form the doctrines to which those principles have led.

It may be proper before entering on this exposition to remark that this system is new. It does not pretend to be in harmony with the church doctrines, whether Romish or Protestant. Ullmann, one of its most amiable and effective advocates, says, indeed it is "*Nicht etwas schlechthin Neues, (not out and out new)*." "We find it," he says, "in another form in ancient mysticism, especially in the German mystics of the middle ages. With them too, the ground and central point of Christianity is the oneness of Deity and humanity effected through the incarnation of God and deification of man." P. 59. The mystics, he adds, ignored the sinfulness of men, and the necessity of redemption. At the Reformation, the conviction of sin and a sense of the need of a Redeemer, determined the form in which Christianity was conceived and presented. The Reformers, however, looked too much to the work of Christ, and too little at the constitution of his person. They did not recognise the fact that it was the perfect unity of divinity and humanity in him which made him not only the Redeemer, but the ideal man, the model and type of manhood. We must, therefore, go back to the German Mystics of the middle ages, according to Dr Ullmann, to find the generic idea of this modern conception of Christianity. That idea is, as Dr Ullmann states, the oneness of God and man, of divinity and humanity. Another admitted fact is that this system is the product of

the German pantheistic philosophy. The results, says Ullman, which were reached by the Mystics under the guiding impulse of religious feeling, have in our days been attained in the way of speculation, thought, and reflection. The unity of the divine and human, of God and man, is the conclusion at which modern speculation in the hands of Hegel and Schelling has arrived. This, too, is the central truth of Christianity. Hegel therefore said that "Christianity is the absolute truth of religion." It was on this ground that he endeavoured to reconcile Christianity with philosophy, that is, with pantheism. This, however, was but a sham alliance. What Christianity asserts of Christ, the perfect union of the divine and human in his person, Hegel, in another form, asserted of the race. It is the nature of God to become man, and of man to recognise himself as God. The absolute spirit comes to existence, consciousness and self-manifestation in the race of men, and they return to God. This is not the uniting of two different principles in one life, but it is only the manifestation of an original and eternal oneness, in virtue of which men at a certain stage of their development come to the knowledge that they are God. (P. 37.) This view of the matter is utterly destructive of the true idea of God and of man. It is the worst form of Atheism, for it is the deification of man—besides it acknowledges no God. The doctrine of Schelling and Hegel, therefore, was soon recognised both by its advocates and opponents as irreconcilable with Christianity. Nevertheless their philosophy was regarded as a great advance. Its great principle of the union of the divine and human not merely in an individual, but in the race, was in some form to be retained. The *Mercersburgh Review*, January 1851, pp. 57, 58, acknowledges the intimate relation between the speculative philosophy and this theological system, and represents "the christological ideas" of Hegel especially, as "very significant and full of instruction." "If we are bound," says the Reviewer, "to allow this much even to Hegel, who will pretend that a still greater regard is not due to the professedly Christian speculations of Schleiermacher, and others following more or less his theological influence, as occupied with the same profound and deeply interesting themes?" Schleiermacher, whose philosophy was scarcely less avowedly pantheistic than that of Spinoza or of Hegel, had a profound devotional spirit, which he retained from his Moravian training. He proposed therefore to divorce theology from philosophy, to allow the latter full swing in her own sphere, and to construct a theological system out of the religious consciousness alone. This, from the nature of the case, was an impossibility. No such divorce is possible, and in no system is the union of these elements

more apparent and pervading than in Schleiermacher's own. The attempt, however, has had far-reaching consequences. It served to present, in a Christian garb and under orthodox names, many philosophical ideas which could not otherwise have made their way into the church. Even in his theology, Schleiermacher, in the judgment of one-half of Germany, is pantheistic in his doctrine concerning God and his relation to the world, and in the judgment we presume of all parties, his doctrine concerning sin is not essentially different from that of Schelling and Hegel. See *Martensen's Dogmatik*, p. 188. The great problem with Schleiermacher's more orthodox successors has been to bring the main idea of the modern philosophy, the union "of the divine and human fully as one life," into harmony with Theism and the gospel. This has given rise to that system of which we are now speaking, and has led to the modification of all the great doctrines of the Bible.

I. As to anthropology. The doctrine concerning the nature of man which underlies the common theology of the church is, that he consists of two distinct subjects or substances, the soul and body, associated in an intimate life-union in the same person, but capable of separate existence, and as regards the soul, susceptible of continued consciousness and activity in a disembodied state. The common doctrine also supposes that the soul is a distinct subsistence, a substance constituting an individual being. It is evident that these views of the nature of man which seem to be everywhere assumed in the Bible, must determine in large measure the view taken of our relation to Adam, of the nature of original sin, of the constitution of Christ's person, and of other important doctrines of the Scriptures. If Christ took upon him our nature, we cannot agree as to what he assumed, unless we are agreed as to what human nature is. In the modern mystical system, the old doctrine concerning man is repudiated. That system denies the essential dualism between the soul and body, and it represents humanity as a generic life. As to the former of these points, Schleiermacher in his *Dialektik*, pp. 245-255, says: "There is not a corporeal and spiritual world, a corporeal and spiritual existence of man. Such representations lead to nothing but the dead mechanism of a pre-established harmony. Body and spirit are actual only in and with each other, so that corporeal and spiritual action can only be relatively distinguished."* The late President Rauch says of the theory which admits of two substances in the constitution of man, that "it supposes the body has a life of its own, and the soul likewise; both are however intended for each other, and the former receives the latter as the engine the steam. . . . A dualism which admits of two principles

* A. U. Thomsen's *Die Schleiermacher'sche Philosophische Grundansicht*, p. 10.

for *one* being, offers many difficulties, and the greatest is, that it cannot tell how the principles can be united in a third. A river may originate in two fountains, but a science cannot, and much less individual life."* Soul and body are only a twofold expression of the same energy. "It would be wrong to say that man consists of two essentially different substances of earth and soul; but he is *soul only*, and cannot be anything else. This soul, however, unfolds itself externally in the *life* of the body, and internally in the life of the mind." "The soul has no real existence without the body, which is as necessary to it as the sheet of rain is for the rainbow." Olshausen in his Commentary, 1 Cor. xix. 20, denies that (*die Seele für sich subsistirend zu denken ist*) the soul subsists of itself. Dr J. W. Nevin says that "commonly the idea of human life is split for the imagination into two lives, and a veritable dualism thus constituted in our nature, in place of the veritable unity that belongs to it in fact." "This," he adds, "is as false to all true philosophy, as it is unsound in theology and pernicious for the Christian life. Soul and body in their ground are but one life; identical in origin; bound together by mutual interpenetration subsequently at every point; and holding for ever in the presence of the self-same organic law. We have no right to think of the body as a form of existence of and by itself, into which the soul as another form of such existence is thrust in a mechanical way. Both form *one* life. The soul to be complete, to develop itself as soul, *must* externalise itself, throw itself out in space, and this externalisation is the body. All is one process, the action of one and the same living organic principle, dividing itself only that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete."† It may be here remarked in passing, that if the soul and body are thus one life, mutually dependent and inseparable, if the soul externalises itself in the body, we can well understand how God, according to the same mode of philosophising, may externalise himself in the world, and God and world be thus mutually dependent, the different forms of one and the same life, "dividing itself that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete." Schleiermacher accordingly taught, that although God and the world are distinguished in thought, they are in fact "nothing but two values for the same postulate (*zwei Werthe für dieselbe Forderung*)."‡ He says it is vain to attempt to conceive of God as existing either before or out of the world, just as Olshausen, Nevin, and others teach, that it is vain to conceive of the soul as existing without the body. *Ohne Leib keine Seele* (no body, no soul), and "no world, no God," are propositions very nearly allied, and are inseparable at least in Schleiermacher's system.

* Rauch's Psychology, pp. 180, 184.

† Mystical Presence, p. 171.

‡ Dialektik, p. 433.

What, then, is man according to the mystical system ? The answer to this question is by no means uniform. Schleiermacher himself says, "Der mensch an sich ist das Erkennen der Erde in seinem ewigen Seyn, und in seinem immer wechselnden Werden: oder der Geist, der nach Art und Weise unserer Erde zum Selbstbewusstseyn sich gestaltet."* "*Man as such is the recognition of the earth in its eternal existence, and in its perpetually changing development: or God (der Geist) in the form in which he comes to self-consciousness on our earth.*" If this definition had been adhered to by his followers, everything would be plain. But it is so obviously pantheistic in its origin and bearing, that the theistic portion of his disciples have modified it in various ways. In the *Mercersburgh Review* for November 1850, p. 550, we are told that "the world in its lower view is not simply the outward theatre or stage on which man is to act his part as a candidate for heaven. In the midst of its different forms of existence, it is pervaded throughout with the power of a single life, which comes ultimately to its full sense and force only in the human person." To the same effect in the number for January 1850, p. 7, it is said: "The world is an organic whole which completes itself in man; and humanity is regarded throughout as a single grand fact which is brought to pass, not at once, but in the way of history, unfolding always more its true interior sense, and reaching onward towards its final consummation." According to this view, man is only one form in which "the power of a single life" pervading the world reveals and completes itself. It is hard to see wherein this differs from the previous statement. The two become identical by substituting (der Geist) God, for "the power of a single life." And that substitution would make little change in the meaning of either, as both seem to proceed on the assumption of "the essential oneness of God and man," which is the admitted groundwork of Schleiermacher's system.† The more common mode of statement among the avowed theists of this school is, that humanity is a generic life, revealing itself in a multitude of personalities. The *Mercersburgh Review*, November 1859, says: "Personality unites in itself the presence of a spiritual universal life, which is strictly and truly the fountain of its own activity in the form of intelligence and will, and a material organization as a neces-

* Dorner's *Christologie* (first edition), p. 488.

† Schleiermacher distinguishes between two kinds of pantheism. The one he denounces as a mere "masked materialistic negation of Theism;" the other, which retains the formula "one and all," still makes God and the world at least as to their functions different. This latter form, he maintains, is perfectly consistent with the highest state of the religious feeling. The religion of such a Pantheist, he says, differs little from that of many Monotheists. B. i. p. 54.

sary medium and basis of its revelation." P. 559. Take away the material organization (the body), and you have only "this spiritual universal life," which, however, has no actual existence in and of itself; that is, apart from the material organization by which it is revealed, any more than vegetable life has actual existence out of vegetable organism. "The human race," says Dr Nevin, "is not a sand heap. It is the power of a single life. It is bound together not outwardly but inwardly. Men have been one before they have been many, and as many they are still one."—*Mystical Presence*, p. 161. Archdeacon Wilberforce, who is endorsed by Dr Nevin as a true representative of the system in all its main features,* insists much on this point. From page 41 to page 57 of his work on the Incarnation, he labours to prove the reality of human nature as a generic whole, of which individual men are the partakers and manifestations. Of this generic nature it is taught, 1. That it has "a real objective existence." "It would be vicious nominalism," says Archdeacon Wilberforce, "to deny an objective reality, where an inherent law prevents the possibility of rearrangement, and confines individuals to the peculiar classes to which they severally belong," p. 49. This generic nature is declared to be an "entity." Dr Nevin calls it "a substance." "Such a collective existence," he says, "in the case of our race, not the aggregate of its individual lives, but *the underlying substance* in which all these are one, is everywhere assumed in the Bible as a fact entering into the whole history of religion."† 2. It is not only a substance, a real objective entity, but it is declared to be a life, a life power, the real source of all the activity, "of intelligence and will," as well as of the physical organism in individual men. 3. Everything, therefore, that ever comes to actual existence in the individual lies potentially in this generic life. Everything that is in the oak was potentially in the acorn, and nothing can be in the oak that was not in the life of the germ. 4. This generic human nature as a life is of course subject to all the laws of life. It is governed by fixed laws. It remains immutably the same. Vegetable life cannot pass into animal life, nor the form of life peculiar to one animal pass into that which belongs to another. Like uniformly begets like. It is subject also to organic develop-

* *Mercersburgh Review*, March 1850. Ullmann's Treatise on the Nature of Christianity, originally published in the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1845, is translated and attached as a "Preliminary Essay to Dr Nevin's work on the *Mystical Presence*." The principles of that Essay are developed in Dr Nevin's book with more clearness and thoroughness than by Ullmann himself. And the principles of Wilberforce on the Incarnation "agree substantially," says Dr Nevin, "with views presented in our own book." All these works are reproductions of the Schleiermacher school of theology.

† *Mercersburgh Review*, March 1850, p. 177.

ment. "It is a universal property of life to unfold itself from within, by a self-organizing power, towards a certain end, which end is its own realization, or in other words, the actual exhibition and actualization in outward form of all the elements, functions, powers, and capacities which potentially it includes. Thus life may be said to be all at its commencement which it can become in the end." 5. Partly from this view of humanity as a generic life unfolding itself from within, containing potentially in itself all that can become actual in its manifestation, and partly from the primary idea of the whole system, viz., the essential unity of God and man, it would seem to follow that humanity in its process of development must come at last to the conscious union of the divine and human in one life; that this is involved in the very idea of humanity, so that Christ as God-man is the ideal man, our nature reaching in him the state potentially involved in its original constitution. The incarnation, therefore, is not a grand supernatural interposition for the redemption of man from sin. It is the necessary result of the law of humanity itself, and would have occurred though sin had never entered the world. This is the avowed doctrine of some of the advocates of this general theory. Dr Liebner of Göttingen, in his *Christology*, carries out this idea to its full extent. Dr Nevin teaches, in less explicit terms, but in our apprehension no less clearly, the same doctrine. In his review of Dr Liebner's work in the *Mercersburg Review*, January 1851, he says, "That must be a false and mutilated view of the nature and history of man, which rests not on a firm apprehension of his true relationship to God, as this comes out ultimately in the constitution of the Messiah. That must ever be a false and defective view of the nature of God as related to the world, which stops short of the theanthropy, as the true and necessary central sun that serves to irradiate and complete all other revelations by which he is known." P. 56. There is not a word of objection to Liebner's doctrine, which it is the design of the review to unfold. All that is said is on the side of defence. The objection of Thomasius, one of the first and most mystical of the modern Lutheran theologians in Germany, that the system is essentially pantheistical, Dr Nevin pronounces, in his usual authoritative way, "a mere sound without any force whatever." He says, we need "a truly Christian pantheism" to oppose to the anti-christian pantheism of the day. Pantheism, however, is pantheism, whether baptized Christian or antichristian. It is not, however, only in that particular article that this idea is advanced. It is involved in his whole system as developed in his *Mystical Presence*. "Humanity," says Dr Nevin, "is never complete till it reaches his [Christ's] person. It in-

cludes in its very constitution a struggle towards the form in which it is here exhibited, which can never rest until this end is attained. Our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life. The *idea* which it embodies can never be fully actualized under any other form. The incarnation then is the proper completion of humanity. Christ is the true ideal Man. Here is reached ultimately the highest summit of human life, which is of course the crowning sense of the world, or that in which it finds its last and full signification." "History, like nature, is one vast prophecy of the incarnation, from beginning to end. How could it be otherwise, if the idea of humanity, as we have seen, required from the first such an union with the divine nature in order that it might be complete? What is history but the process by which this idea is carried forward according to the immanent law of its own nature, in the way of a regular development towards its appointed end?" Pp. 200, 201. Nothing can be more explicit than this. Humanity includes in its original constitution the idea of that union with God which is found in the person of Christ, and it reaches that end according to a law immanent in its own nature, by a regular process of historical development. We are not surprised, therefore, to be told on page 174 that Christ's "divine nature is at the same time human in the fullest sense." In man there is self-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of self; world-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of the world; and God-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of God. Schleiermacher over and over says, that the only difference between Christ and other men was that the *Gottesbewusstseyn* (God-consciousness), which he represents as a real *Seyn Gottes* (existence of God), determined in him all his activity from beginning to end. Thus he was the ideal man, that is, the man in whom the true idea of humanity was realized. But as Christ was God manifest in the flesh, the true idea of humanity must be the unity and divinity and humanity in one life, or God in the fashion of a man. "The Grundbestimmung (the fundamental idea) of Christianity," says Ullmann, "is the oneness of Christ and God, but therewith connected the equally original certainty that this oneness is not to remain individual, isolated, transient, but passes over with the Spirit and life of Christ to believers, and gradually to mankind." * Humanity reaches its culminating point of essential unity with God, first in Christ, and then through him in his people. The object of the whole system is to find some middle ground between pantheism and

* Studien und Kritiken, 1845, p. 40.

dualism, that is, between the doctrine that God and the world are one, and the doctrine that they are two. This middle ground must be narrower than a hair, rather too narrow for the foundation of a stupendous structure of Christian doctrine. It is a wonderful hallucination of self-conceit which leads these builders to condemn as rationalists, and, worse yet, as Puritans, those who will not trust their souls to their cobweb edifice.

Such, then, is the anthropology of the mystical system.* It denies any real dualism in the constitution of man. He is soul, and soul only, revealing itself outwardly in the body, and inwardly in mental activity. A man is not an individual subsistence, but the revelation of a generic life in connection with a particular external organism. And in virtue of the essential unity of Divinity and humanity, the latter by a process of organic development arrives at last to a conscious oneness with God. This view of man's nature is made consciously and avowedly to determine the whole scheme of Christian doctrine. It determines the nature of our relation to Adam, and of original sin. It decides all questions concerning the constitution of Christ's person. It determines the nature of redemption, and the mode in which believers are made partakers of its benefits. And it involves also the decision of every important question concerning the nature of the church, and the design and efficacy of the sacraments. Our immediate object, however, is to expound the teachings of this system in reference to the present state of man.

Those of its advocates who retain sufficient reverence for the Scriptures (which was not the fact with Schleiermacher), to feel bound to attempt a conciliation between their doctrine and the admitted facts of the Bible, apply their anthropology to explain our connection with Adam, and the nature of original sin. As humanity is a generic life, Adam was not merely *a* man but *the* man. He was humanity itself; its original germ and fountain-head. His act, therefore, was not the act of *a* man, but of humanity. That generic life, including intelligence and will which afterwards was developed in a multitude of personalities, then existed solely in his person, and acted in and by him. Adam's sin was, therefore, strictly and

* We have felt no little embarrassment in determining on a suitable designation for the system under consideration. It might be called "The Schleiermacher System," from its acknowledged author, but that designation is too restricted, considering the numerous and important modifications the theory has undergone since it left his hands. It might be characterised as *Transcendental*, but that term is vague and indeterminate. The word *mystical* has much to recommend it. It is inoffensive. It refers to the remote genesis of the system as connected with the mysticism of the middle ages, and it is occasionally employed by the advocates of the system themselves. At any rate it serves to distinguish it from the common doctrine.

properly, and not merely representatively or by imputation, the sin of the race. The intelligence and will which comes to self-consciousness in the successive generations of men, were the agents of that sin in the person of Adam. The only sense, therefore, in which that sin is imputed to us, is that it is strictly and properly our own act, not of our persons but of our nature, of that generic life which we have in common with Adam, and which is as much ours as it was his. "In him was comprehended in its generic form a general life, which was to develop itself by the course of natural generation to the end of time. As such he was called upon to say in the name of the general life which he embodied, whether or not he would take the Lord to be his God. In his response we have the act of not only *a* man but of *the* man, of humanity as a general conscious life."—*Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, p. 256. "Humanity was not an abstraction while Adam the individual was conscious. . . . It found in him a real conscious existence, in the free exercise of its mighty powers—a living personality, reasoning and willing for itself," p. 258. "Humanity rebelled," p. 259. "We all were comprehended in Adam in the form of a general conscious life. The *will* of this life perpetuated the rebellion. . . . So that this act was in fact our act," p. 260. "His individual personality was limited wholly to himself. But a whole world of like separate personalities lay involved in his life at the same time, as a generic principle or root. And all these, in a deep sense, form at last but one and the same life. Adam lives in his posterity as truly as he ever lived in his own person. They participate in his whole nature, soul and body, and are truly bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh."—*Mystical Presence*, p. 161. "The fall of Adam is adjudged to be the fall of his posterity because it was so actually. The union in *law* here is a union in *life*. The fall itself forms a certain condition or state, which supposes life as its subject, and how then could the one be imputed without the presence of the other? May an attribute or quality be made to extend in a real way beyond the *substance* to which it is attached, and in which only it can have any real existence? The moral relations of Adam, and his moral character too, are made over to us at the same time. Our participation in the actual unrighteousness of his life, forms the ground of our participation in his guilt and liability to punishment."—P. 160. Everything, therefore, is made to depend on the real objective existence of a generic life, which is an "entity," a "substance," which is at once corporeal and incorporeal, that is, which is one life developing itself outwardly and inwardly. In this life is consciousness, intelligence, will. It is "a conscious life." Individual

men are but the separate manifestations of this life in connection with an external organism. On this ground, it is assumed that the act of Adam was the act of his posterity, being the act of the intelligence, will, and conscious life common to them all. And the moral character and relations, the inward pollution as well as the guilt which attached to him, attach also to us, because they pertain to the life common to him and to the whole human race.

As our object is exposition and not refutation, we might pass this exhibition of the anthropology of the mystical system and its application to our relation to Adam without remark. It may be well, however, before proceeding further, just to say a few words on the subject. First, in reference to the assumption that there is no real dualism in the constitution of man, that the body is the necessary condition of the existence of the soul, that the two are only the different forms of manifestation of one and the same life, we would remark that this doctrine is inconsistent with the common consciousness of men, who uniformly refer certain acts and states to the mind as one subject or substance, and certain others to the body as a different subject or substance. The attributes of mind and of the body are in their nature so different as to render it impossible to refer both classes to the same subject. Both belong to the same person, but the person in our present state of existence is mysteriously constituted of two distinct substances. As this is a fact revealed in the common consciousness of men, it enters into the avowed convictions of men of all ages and in all parts of the world. Every nation, ancient or modern, civilised or savage, has believed in the separate existence of the soul. This is manifest from their doctrines concerning a future state. This is also the faith of the universal church. The Greeks, the Latins, the Lutherans, the Reformed, in short the whole Christian world, believe that the soul lives and acts in the full exercise of all its faculties, after it has left the body. This the mystical system, as we have seen, denies. Olshausen, in support of his position, "No body, no soul," reduces the consciousness of the departed soul to a minimum, and then asserts that this feeble flickering of its life is sustained in connection with the scattered elements of its body.* The theory, therefore, is in direct con-

* The reader may be interested in seeing what Dr. Nevin has to say in answer to this fatal objection to his whole theory. Any thing feebler or more unsatisfactory we have never seen in print from the pen of an able man. "To some," he says, "possibly this representation (viz., that the body is the necessary condition of the activity of the soul) may seem to be contradicted by what the Scriptures teach of the separate existence of the soul between death and the resurrection; and it must be admitted that we are met here with a difficulty which it is not easy at present to solve. Let us, however, not mistake the true

flict with the Scriptures, which not only everywhere teach the distinction between the soul and body as two subjects, but specially the full conscious existence of the soul between death and the resurrection. With difficulties of this sort, however, the authors of this system were untrammelled. They received nothing on the mere authority of the Bible, and discarded what did not harmonise with their theory. Schleiermacher did not believe in a creation in time, an extra-mundane God, in angels, Satan, or sin, or disembodied souls. These who adopt his principles are reduced to the sad necessity of either holding a philosophy in conflict with their theology, or of explaining away the plainest teachings of the Bible. The latter alternative is sure to be chosen.

As to the doctrine of a generic life as a real objective reality, an "underlying substance" in which all individual men are one, we would say that it is a sheer hypothesis. From the nature of the case there can be no direct evidence of its existence. It is an assumption to account for certain phenomena. If those phenomena can be as satisfactorily accounted for on another hypothesis, the whole foundation of the theory is gone. Again the theory in its present form, notwithstanding its affinity with ancient realism, is new. Both Ullmann and Dr Nevin teach that the ignoring of this idea of a generic life vitiated the theology of the Reformers. Then again this

state of the case. The difficulty is not to reconcile Scripture with a psychological theory; but to bring it into harmony with itself. For it is certain that the Scriptures teach such an identification of soul and body in the proper human personality, as clearly, at least, as they intimate a continued consciousness on the part of the soul between death and the resurrection. The doctrine of *immortality* in the Bible, is such as to include always the idea of the resurrection. It is an *ἀναστάσις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*. The whole argument in the fifteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians, as well as the representation, 1 Thess. iv. 13-18, proceeds on the assumption, that the life of the body, as well as that of the soul, is indispensable to the perfect state of our nature as human. The soul then, during the intermediate state, cannot possibly constitute, in the biblical view, a complete man; and the case requires besides that we should conceive of its relation to the body as still in force, not absolutely destroyed but only suspended. The whole condition is interimistic, and by no possibility of conception capable of being thought of as complete and final. When the resurrection body appears, it will not be as a new frame abruptly created for the occasion, and brought to the soul in the way of outward addition and supplement. It will be found to hold in strict organic continuity with the body as it existed before death, as the action of the same law of life; which implies that this law has not been annihilated, but suspended only in the intermediate state. In this character, however, it must be regarded as resting in some way (for where else could it rest?) in the separate life, as it is called, of the soul itself; the slumbering power of the resurrection ready at the proper time, in obedience to Christ's powerful word, to clothe himself with its former actual nature, in full identity with the form it carried before death, though under a far higher order of existence. Only then can the salvation of the soul be considered as complete. All at last is one life; the subject of which is the totality of a believer's person, comprehending soul and body alike from the beginning of the process to the end."—*Mystical Presence*, p. 171.

modern theory is neither one thing nor the other. If men would say with Schleiermacher that God is "not a Being by the side of other beings" (nicht Ding neben Dingen), but the "Totality and system of all things;" if they would say that he is the "underlying substance in which all lives are one," that as the soul externalizes itself in the body, so God externalizes himself variously in the world, then we could understand what is meant by this generic life. But although this seems to be the esoteric sense of many of the utterances of the professedly theistic portion of the Schleiermacher school, yet it is so badly pantheistic that it has to be stated with so many limitations and modifications that the real idea intended becomes altogether confused.* There is nothing in the Scriptures in favour of this doctrine of a generic life of the race having objective reality of its own apart from the personalities in which it is revealed. It is not, indeed, the design of the Bible to teach us ontology, but the Bible teaches facts. It teaches, for example, the fact that the soul is in a state of conscious activity when separated from the body, and it therefore teaches that the doctrine which denies the possibility of such an existence is false. There are no facts of this kind in the Bible which contradict the common doctrine concerning the nature of man, and necessitate the assumption of this generic life. The Scriptures indeed recognise a common nature as belonging to all men; that is, that all men belong to one and the same class and species of beings, have a common origin, the same physical structure, the same rational and moral faculties, and that they are in the same state of alienation from God as they are born into this world. They also teach that this nature, thus identical in all its essential elements and characteristics, is propagated from parent to child, and thus comes down to us from the progenitors of our race. With this scriptural teaching all the facts of experience agree. Experience also teaches that this nature, thus common to all mankind, may be modified by circumstances of climate, culture, social habits and other causes, so as to assume permanent varieties or types; and still further, that within these varieties there may be lesser peculiarities induced and rendered permanent, as seen in different nations and even families. All this is agreeable to the analogy observed in other departments of nature, animal and vegetable. Every distinct species, whether of animals or vegetables, is found in permanent varieties, more

* This is a vice inherent in the whole system. Strauss says of Schleiermacher himself, "That he betrayed philosophy to theology, and then again theology to philosophy, and precisely this double-facedness and double-meaningness is the essence of his position in the history of theology. And hence his influence from both sides can only be regarded as a blessed curse, or a curse-bearing blessing."—*Dogmatik*, vol. ii. p. 175,

or less marked and more or less permanent. To account for these facts of Scripture and experience, there is no necessity to adopt the theory of a generic life having objective reality. There is no need to assume that there is an entity or substance in which the lives of all horses, or all tigers, or all elephants, or all oaks, or all palms inhere, and in which they severally are all one. Who believes in any such generic life of tigers or of oaks? Why then should it be assumed in the case of man? All that the Bible assumes, and all that experience teaches, is that God ordained the permanence of species, and fixed the law that like should beget like. If it be demanded how this permanence of species is secured, it may be answered that the knowledge of the *how* is not at all necessary to faith in the fact. If a further answer is required, it may be enough to say that the greatest naturalists assume that the organic germ received from the parent plant or animal is imbued with an immaterial life principle, which determines not only the species but the variety. This life principle is just as individual as the source whence it is derived. Thus in the case of Adam, he was an individual man, with no more of the generic life of the race than any other man. He transmitted to his children his own nature, just as in any other case of reproduction in the animal or vegetable kingdom. The race were no more physically *in* him, than the Hebrews were *in* Abraham, or the Ishmaelites *in* Ishmael. His act was no more the act of the race, except on the ground of a divine covenant, than an act of Abraham was an act of all his posterity. It is very true that any act of Adam which altered his physical or moral constitution, *i. e.*, his nature, might lead to a corresponding change in the physical or moral constitution of his descendants. If he had done anything to change his complexion from the olive of an Asiatic to the black of the African, he might, and probably would, have transmitted that hue to his posterity. But the same may be said of any head of a family or tribe. If any man chooses to account for the hereditary corruption of our race on this principle, though we regard it as both unsatisfactory and unscriptural, as a solution of that dreadful fact, it is at least intelligible. The statement contains a meaning. But when it is said that the act of Adam was truly the act of the race, because he was a generic man, or that humanity as a general life acted in him, the words have no meaning. They convey no idea. As Dr Nevin would say, they are an empty sound. An act implies an agent, and a rational act a rational agent, that is, a person. Unless, therefore, humanity is a person, it could not, as a generic life, have acted in Adam. This, however, is not the theory; humanity as such is impersonal; it comes to personality only in the indivi-

dual. Into the application of this theory, however, to the solution of the question of original sin, we designedly do not enter. We have far too much work on our hands, in the further exposition of the mystical system, to be accomplished in any reasonable limits of a single article. We must, therefore, content ourselves with remarking, that the consequences drawn from this particular theory of a generic life, in its application to the great doctrines concerning the person of Christ and the method of salvation, are its most effectual refutation. These consequences are such, as we shall proceed to shew, that the theory itself must be renounced, or the faith of the church universal be given up.

II. This leads us to the second great division of our subject. The Christology of the mystical system is its centre and sum. All its other doctrines are subordinate to this, and are held for its sake, or are determined by it. There are three general classes of theologians included in the school of Schleiermacher. First, those who are in fact, as he himself was, pantheistic in their interior convictions; secondly, those who are Theists but not Trinitarians; and thirdly, those who sincerely endeavour to bring their theory into harmony with the doctrines of the Bible, and especially with the doctrine of the Trinity. Of course the Christology of these several classes must present important differences, into which it is impossible for us here to enter. We must content ourselves with the general features of the system, and especially in the form in which they are presented by those belonging to the third of the three classes just mentioned. The three principles which determine the Christology of the mystical system, as we have before stated, are, 1, That there is no real dualism in the constitution of man; 2d, That humanity is a generic life, a real entity or substance; and 3d, That there is a (*Wesenseinheit*) real oneness between God and man. As to this last point, Dörner, after endeavouring to shew that the old church doctrine as adopted by the Reformed, and as generally modified by the Lutherans (to suit their doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body) is beset with insuperable difficulties, says that these difficulties and contradictions can only be avoided by giving up the idea that the divine and human in Christ are two different natures, and admitting that they are (*innerlich eines*) inwardly one.* On a subsequent page (182) he says, we must either reject the doctrine of the Incarnation, or construct a Christology without the assumption of a twofold nature in Christ.

The general statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation, in which all Christians agree, is that the Word was made flesh,

* *Christologie*, p. 178 of the first edition.

God was found in fashion as a man, or, God assumed our nature. This may mean what the church universal understands it to mean, as her faith is expressed in the decisions of the first six oecumenical councils, adopted by the Greeks, the Latins, the Reformed, and Lutherans. Those councils declared that in the one person of the Lord Jesus Christ the two natures, human and divine, are united without mixture or confusion, inseparably and perpetually, so that he is perfect God and perfect man. The union does not destroy the difference of the natures, but the properties of each are retained. In the Council of Constantinople it was decided that there are in Christ two wills and operations, the one human and the other divine. To the integrity or completeness of the human nature "a true body and a reasonable soul" are declared to belong. Christ, therefore, is declared to be as to his divine nature consubstantial with the Father, and as to his human nature consubstantial with us men. In opposition to this catholic statement of the doctrine, some modern theologians, such as Martensen and Ebrard, seem to adopt a view very similar to that of Beron in the early ages, who held that the Logos assumed the form of a man, that is, subjected himself to the limitations of humanity. The infinite became finite, the eternal and omnipresent imposed on himself the limitations of time and space, God became man.* The statement of Ebrard is, the Logos assumed "the existence form of man." He illustrates his idea thus. "In the case of a king's son, his royalty is his original nature, servitude an assumed form of existence." In other words, he adds, *Der ewige Sohn Gottes sich in freiem Selbeschränkungsakte bestimmt hat, in die Existenzform eines menschlichen Lebens-centrums einzugehen, sodass er nun als solches agierte von der Empfängniss an, und als der in diese Form eingegangene sich einen menschlichen Leib bildete u. s. w.*" i. e., *The eternal Son of God, by a free act of self-limitation, determined to assume the existence form of a centre of human life, so that he acted as such from the conception onward, and having assumed this form, he fashioned for himself a body, &c.*† By God's becoming flesh, therefore, he understands, ein Eingehen des Logos in eine neue Seynsform. According to this view there are not two natures in Christ (in the established sense of the word nature), but only two forms of existence, a prior and posterior, of one and the same nature. Another form of statement is, as we have seen, that humanity, by a regular process of historical development, attained the point of oneness with God in the person of Christ. Another is, that this process having been disturbed, or being in its nature in-

* See Dorner, vol. i. p. 541 of the edition of 1851.

† Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 77.

adequate, God by a supernatural act constituted the person of Christ, as the ideal man, and made him a new life-centre, or point of departure ; so that from him a new development of humanity begins. The most common mode of presenting the doctrine is, that the Logos assumed our fallen humanity. By this, we are told, is not to be understood that he assumed an individual body and soul, so that he became *a* man, but generic humanity, so that he became *the* man. And by generic humanity is to be understood a life-power, that peculiar law of life, corporeal and incorporeal, which develops itself outwardly as a body, and inwardly as a soul. The Son, therefore, became incarnate in humanity, in that objective reality, entity, or substance, in which all human lives are one. Having assumed this life-power, whose law is to develop itself inwardly and outwardly, Christ had a soul and body, but the incarnation was in the "substance" lying back of these. On this fact the whole significance and efficacy of the union is made to depend. Otherwise it would be a theophany, without permanent value to the race. Olshausen, in his comment on John i. 14, says, "It could not be said that the Word was made man, which would imply that the Redeemer was a man by the side of other men, whereas, as the second Adam, he represented the totality of human nature in his exalted comprehensive personality." To the same effect he says in his remarks on Rom. v. 15, "If Christ were *a* man among other men, it would be impossible to conceive how his suffering and obedience could have an essential influence on mankind ; he could then only operate as an example ; but he is to be regarded, even apart from his divine nature, as *the* man, *i. e.*, as realising the absolute idea of humanity, and including it potentially in himself spiritually as Adam did corporeally." To this point Archdeacon Wilberforce devotes the third chapter of his book, and represents the whole value of Christ's work as depending upon it. If this be denied, he says, "the doctrines of atonement and sanctification, though confessed in words, become a mere empty phraseology." Dr Nevin, in his *Mystical Presence*, p. 210, says, "The word became flesh ; not a single man only, as one among many ; but *flesh*, or humanity, in its universal conception. How else could he be the principle of a general life, the origin of a new order of existence for the human world as such ? How else could the value of his mediatorial work be made over to us in a real way by a true imputation, and not a legal fiction only ? The entire scheme of the Christian salvation requires and assumes throughout this view of the incarnation, and no other. To make it a mere individual case, a fact of no wider force than the abstract person of Jesus himself, thus resolving his relationship to his people into their common

relationship to Adam, is to turn all at last into an unreal theophany, and thus to overthrow the doctrine altogether." Thus the whole scheme of salvation is made to depend on a certain view of anthropology. Unless we believe in a generic humanity as an objective reality, a substance underlying all individual lives, we cannot believe the gospel. And unless we believe that the Son of God became incarnate, not "in an individual case," but in this generic nature, we deny any real incarnation, and resolve the whole matter into a mere ocular illusion. In the *Mercersburg Review*, January 1850, in answer to an article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Dr Nevin says of the critic, "His own idea of the incarnation is plainly that it did not enter into the organisation of the world at all, as a fact of permanent force. Probably he has no sense whatever of this organisation as a vast whole completing itself in man, and thus reaching forward as a single historical process from the beginning of the world to the end. The world is for him neither organism nor history, but a vast sand heap, in which men are thrown together outwardly, to be formed for eternity as so many separate units, each perfect and complete by itself. The incarnation, of course, in such view becomes one of those naked units only, the man Jesus mysteriously made God for himself alone, an abstraction that comes into no real connection with our general humanity beyond the limits of his person. He stands in the world a mere theophany, not of a few hours only, as in the days of Abraham, but for thirty-three years; a sublime avatar, fantastically [!] paraded thus long before men's eyes only to be translated to heaven, and continue there (for the imagination) in no real union with the world's life whatever. This, thus left behind by the transient apparition, pursues its old course, including in its living stream nothing more than has belonged to it from the beginning." P. 7. It belongs to the force of Dr Nevin's character to outherod Herod on all occasions; and he generally does it, as in the above extract, by the way of implication and negation rather than by direct assertion. We have to transmute his negative statements into the relative affirmations to get at his real meaning. The world is an organism. Men are not units. Humanity is a stream of life. Individual men stand related to that stream as the waves to the sea. The Son of God became incarnate, not in one of those waves, but in the stream itself. Jesus alone did not become God in virtue of the incarnation. The race becomes God. Humanity is deified and flows on, not as of old, a stream of mere human, but of theanthropic life. Unless we take this view of the incarnation, he elsewhere says, "all pretended orthodoxy is reduced to a mere empty sham," *Review*, March 1850, p. 173. What Christ assumed we are told was

"that living law or power, which, whether in Adam alone, or in all his posterity, forms at once the entire fact of humanity, irrespectively of the particular human existences in which it may appear," p. 178. In the *Review*, April 1853, Christ is said to have assumed "our nature as a general life," "the substance of the human world," "the whole humanity generically," which was brought "into union with Divinity in his person," and thus it was "restored to its lawful relation to its Creator." "This for all time is henceforth the measure of its true idea." "This is true humanity." "Christ did thus restore our nature to its right relations; brought it to a union with God. This is necessarily involved in the fact of the incarnation, and is the whole substance of its idea." P. 263. It was not, therefore, an individual human body and soul that was brought into personal union with the eternal Son of God in the incarnation, but humanity as a general life, as it was henceforth to exist in the persons of believers. "This is true humanity," that is, humanity in that personal union with God which took place in Christ is the true idea of human nature; and the normal relation of man to God is that which Christ, who was at once God and man, sustains to the eternal Father. "This divine-human life, as it has come to exist in Jesus Christ," "perpetuates itself by its own inherent law," and is Christianity. We have here the answer to the question, What is Christianity? It is a life. It is the life of Christ. It is the "conscious union of Divinity and humanity in one real life."

It is to be remembered that humanity as a life includes body and soul; the one cannot be without the other. That is, such is the law of this life, that it manifests itself not only in thought and feeling, but in an external physical organism. Christ, therefore, in assuming humanity as a life-power, developed for himself a true body and a rational soul, and wherever his humanity is, there it is both corporeally and incorporeally, and as it is inseparably united with his divine nature, and as that nature is omnipresent, so is Christ everywhere present as to soul, body, and Divinity. "Christ's life," says Dr. Nevin, "was one; to enter us at all in a real way it must enter us as a totality. To divide the humanity of Christ is to destroy it; to take it away and lay it no man can tell where. . . . Christ's humanity is not his soul separately taken; just as little as it is his body separately taken. It is neither soul nor body as such, but the everlasting, indissoluble union of both." "Either Christ's human life is not formed in us at all, or it must be formed in us as a human life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on an outward form and project itself in space."—*Mystical Presence*, p. 170. "We may divide Christ in our thoughts, abstracting his Divinity

from his humanity, or his soul from his body. But no such dualism has place in his actual person. If then he is to be received by us at all it must be in a whole way." P. 181. Calvin, he says, "dwells too much on the life-giving virtue of Christ's *flesh* simply; so if this was not necessarily and inseparably knit to his soul, and to his Divinity too, as a single indivisible life; so that where the latter form of existence is present in a real way, the other must be present too, so far as its utmost nature is concerned, to the same extent," p. 157. In the *Mercersburg Review*, March 1850, it is taught at length that there is a perpetual presence of "Christ's manhood" in the world, that his man's nature is here now; that the acts of Christ in the world are the acts not of his Divinity only, but of his manhood, and therefore that manhood must be here. This ubiquity of Christ's human nature is not to be conceived of as an ubiquity of his individual body, or as a material extension. A distinction is to be made between "the simple man and the universal man here joined in one person." This universal man or humanity is "a law," "a life power," raised above the limitations of time and space, but it is nevertheless the whole of humanity in its true force and idea. "The flesh of Christ, as begotten by the Holy Ghost, and as rising generically into, and uniting with, his divine life, becomes itself a πνευματικόν; so that whilst all its attributes, holding only in time and space, are left behind, its inward power comprehending all that is really necessary as the germ of an actual humanity, remains permanently and for ever linked with his person."—*Mercersburg Review*, October 1854, p. 512. It was very generally objected to Schleiermacher that he reduced the historical to a mere ideal Christ, or if he admitted a historical God-man, he represented his existence after his course in this world as merged in a general life. To this the above representation would seem to agree. The flesh of Christ rises "into his divine life;" all that belongs "to time and space," i.e., all the limitations of time and space are left behind; nothing remains but "a power." The common statement, however, is that Christ is both an individual and universal man, so that while his human nature, as the germ of a new life, is ever and everywhere present in the world, his own human body and soul are in heaven.

The hypostatic union, therefore, is the assumption on the part of the eternal Son of God not simply or primarily of a true body and a reasonable soul, but of humanity as a generic life, of our fallen humanity, of that entity or substance in which all human lives are one. The effects of this union are, 1. That humanity is taken into Divinity, it is exalted into a true divine life. The life of Christ is *one*. It may be designated as divine

or as human. It is both, it is "divine-human." On this point, more than any other feature of the mystical system, its advocates are specially full and earnest. We have already seen that Schleiermacher, the father of the system, ignores all essential difference between God and the world. They differ in our conception, and functionally, but are essentially one. We have seen that Dorner, the learned and accomplished historian of the doctrine concerning Christ's person, avows that the church view of two distinct substances in the same person involves endless contradictions, and that no true Christology can be framed which does not proceed on the assumption of the essential unity of God and man. We have also seen that Ullmann makes this *Wesenseinheit* (essential oneness), between the divine and human, the fundamental idea of Christianity. We have further seen that Dr Nevin denies any real dualism in Christ, saying that while we may separate the Divinity from the humanity as united in his person in thought, they are nevertheless one ; that his divine nature is human in the strict sense of the term. It is, therefore, taught, "that the properties of the divine nature attach, through the central consciousness, to the human," and "the properties of the human attach, in the same way, to the divine." The Lutherans had taught that divine attributes in virtue of the hypostatical union belong to the human nature of Christ, but the assertion that human attributes were transferred to the divine nature, they pronounced with one voice to be *blasphemia horribilis*. This difficulty, or rather the contradiction of infinite attributes belonging to a finite subject, and of the attributes of the divine nature and not the nature itself being transferred to humanity, has been gotten over, as we have seen, in the mystical system, by denying any essential difference, any difference in substance, between the divine and human. As in man there is no dualism between soul and body, so in Christ there is no dualism between his divine and human nature. They are *one* life. But human nature is a life, and the divine nature is a life ; if the life is one, the nature is one. As, therefore, in man the soul externalizes itself in the body, so God reveals himself in human nature. He takes it up into his Divinity so as to constitute with it one nature or life. The divine and human, therefore, in Christ can only be distinguished in thought. They are one. The hypostatic union is only humanity in its ideal state. The human nature is thereby exalted into a "higher sphere ;" it becomes divine but remains human. These are only different forms of one and the same life. Therefore, it is said that humanity itself is raised into the sphere of the same life (*i.e.*, the divine life), and completely transfused with its power, in the everlasting glorification of the

Son of Man.—*Mystical Presence*, p. 224. "The glorification of Christ then was the full advancement of our human nature itself to the power of a divine life," p. 226. The divine Logos, it is said on the same page, "sunk for the moment into the limitations of the fallen mortal nature with which it became thus incorporated," for the purpose of raising that nature "into the same order of existence." The great design and effect of the incarnation was thus to raise our nature into "the same order of existence" with the eternal Logos; in other words, to bring humanity to the knowledge and consciousness of its oneness with God. This idea pervades the whole system. Divinity and humanity are united as one life. The latter is so far identical with the former as to be only different in the mode of manifestation. When we receive the one we receive the other. If Christ dwells in us, it is this divine human life which dwells in us, the incarnate Logos. If in the Lord's Supper we are partakers of the body of Christ, it is "the divine human life of the Son of Man himself" of which we are the participants.

2. As, however, the humanity which God took into personal union with himself was our fallen humanity, the elevation of that nature to the sphere of a divine life required a protracted and painful conflict. Our nature had to be healed before it could be merged as one life in the life of God. The second effect of the incarnation, although the first in order of sequence, was this struggle or conflict by which it was reconciled to God, and brought back to its normal relation of oneness with the divine nature. In consequence of the entrance of the Logos into the generic fallen humanity, a new life-power was communicated to it, which overcame all its infirmities, and raised it ultimately into the life of God. This was at once the work of redemption and atonement. The reconciliation of God and man, as Ullmann and all other advocates of the system say, was effected not *by* Christ, but *in* him. The personal union of the divine and human in him was the reconciliation of heaven and earth. The two natures became united and merged in one life. Generic humanity, therefore, before and apart from its manifestation in individuals, was healed, sanctified, imbued with righteousness and holiness, and in this restored and elevated state was prepared to pass over to Christ's people, and as Ullmann says, gradually to the whole world. The whole work of redemption and reconciliation was effected *in* the person of Christ, by the mere fact of the incarnation. This idea is more or less distinctly brought into view in the numerous citations already given. It is not necessary, therefore, to multiply proof passages. In the *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, it is said, "If Christ did take up the life, and so the

substance of the human world, *the whole* humanity generically, into union with Divinity in his person, and restore it to its lawful relation to its Creator, then verily are its sins taken away, and it will be, rather it *is* saved," p. 263. In the *Mystical Presence*, p. 166, it is said, "The assumption of humanity on the part of the Logos involved the necessity of suffering, as the only way in which the new life with which it was thus joined, could triumph over the law of sin and death it was called to surmount. The passion of the Son of God was the world's spiritual crisis, in which the principle of health came to its last struggle with the principle of disease, and burst forth from the very bosom of the grave itself in the form of immortality. This was the atonement, Christ's victory over sin and hell." That is, the atonement was the successful struggle of the Logos with "the law of sin and death," in that generic humanity which he had assumed. The advocates of this system, it may be remarked in passing, always speak of Christ as sinless. They say he assumed "our fallen human nature, sin excepted." It is hard, however, to reconcile this with their other statements. The nature which he assumed is said to be fallen, to be diseased, which can hardly mean anything else than morally corrupt; it was infected with "a law of sin and death." At the same time it is said that his life was *one*, and therefore he had in himself, in his own conscious life, not a pure, but a diseased humanity, a law of sin in his own person. They doubtless have some way of reconciling these apparent contradictions. What that way is we do not understand, unless with Schleiermacher's other doctrines they adopt his view of the nature of sin, as only a necessary and temporary limitation, and having no existence for God as sin. That the work of redemption was effected by the fact of the incarnation, and in the person of Christ, is taught by Ullmann very distinctly when he says, Christianity "represents God and humanity as united not merely in idea, but in a real human life, and, therefore, assumes a real redeeming power as infused into our nature, which, not indeed by a single act of consciousness, but by a severe moral process, but thus only the more thoroughly, effects the union of God and man." P. 41. The healing process effected in Christ by the union of the Logos with fallen humanity in his person, is repeated in the case of every believer by the power of Christ's sanctified humanity, introduced as a new principle of life into that humanity, as manifested in the believer's person. "It is the union of Divinity and humanity in Christ, which not simply qualifies him for the work he was appointed to perform, but of itself involves in his person that reconciliation between heaven and earth, God and man, which the idea of redemption

requires, and for which there could be no room in any other form." March 1849, p. 154. "The reconciliation of heaven and earth," it is said, p. 161, "lies in the mystery of incarnation itself, and involves potentially and necessarily all the atonement and redemption that follow." Such is also the doctrine of Wilberforce; "The name Mediator," he says, "is not bestowed by reason of any work," but because "of the permanent union in one person of God and man." "His incarnation," says Dr Nevin, "is not to be regarded as a device *in order* to his mediation, the needful preliminary and condition of this merely as an independent and separate work; it is itself the mediatorial fact, in all its height and depth, and length and breadth." *Review*, March 1850, p. 170. "Christ has redeemed the world, or the nature of man as fallen in Adam, by so taking it into union with his own higher nature as to deliver it from the curse and power of sin: meeting the usurpation of this false principle with firm resistance from the start; triumphantly repelling its assaults; and in the end carrying captivity captive by carrying his man's nature itself, through the portals of the resurrection, to the right hand of God in glory." P. 181.

3. The third effect of the incarnation was the introduction of a new principle into the life of the world. As the Son of God took upon him the universal life of the world, and as the effect of the hypostatic union was to overcome "the law of sin and death" with which that life was infected, this renovated, sanctified human nature, by the law of development, passes over to others. As generic humanity once existed in Adam, and was communicated by him to his posterity, so that same humanity united with Divinity as one life, is communicated to those in Christ. It is as much a germ, as much a universal life to be revealed in numberless personalities, in the one case as in the other. This idea is abundantly asserted in the passages already quoted. In no other way, it is said, can we be made partakers of the benefits of the incarnation. "That the race might be saved, it was necessary that a work should be wrought, not beyond it, but in it; and this inward salvation to be effective must lay hold of the race itself in its organic, universal character, before it could extend to individuals. . . Such an inward salvation of the race required that it should be joined in a living way with the divine nature itself, as represented by the everlasting Word or Logos, the fountain of all created light and life. The Word accordingly became flesh, that is, assumed humanity into union with itself. It was not an act whose force was intended to stop in one man himself, to be transplanted soon afterwards to heaven. Nor was it intended merely to serve as the necessary basis of the

great work of atonement, the power of which might be applied to the world subsequently in the way of outward imputation. It had this use indeed, but not its first and most comprehensive necessity. The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos, as a permanent source of life." *Mystical Presence*, p. 165. The incarnation "is the supernatural linking itself to the onward flow of the world's life, and becoming thenceforth the ground and principle of the entire organism," p. 167. This new life "is in all respects a true human life. It is in one sense divine. It springs from the Logos. But it is not the life of the Logos separately taken. It is the life of the Word made flesh, the Divinity joined in personal union with our humanity." "Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his own person, but passes over to his people." "The process by which the whole is accomplished is not mechanical, but organic. It takes place in the way of history, growth, regular living development." P. 167. This is the grand idea of the whole system. Humanity as developed from Adam, impeded and weakened by sin, could never work out its true idea, could never attain the end contemplated in its original constitution. But united with the divine Logos, it is imbued with a higher life, and being developed from him it attains in his people, by a regular process of growth, its full perfection. The life of the believer is as much an organic continuance of the humanity of Christ, as the life of the men of this generation "holds" in organic continuity with the life of Adam. The generic human nature, the substance which underlies the lives of men, and in which they are all one, is, since the incarnation (so far as the church is concerned), the divine human nature of Christ, that is, Divinity and humanity united as one life. Christ's humanity constitutes the church.

III. Soterology. The whole theory of salvation, as modified by the mystical system, is determined by the idea presented at the close of the preceding paragraph. Humanity as a whole was in Adam. He was the race. Human nature, as a generic life, sinned in him—became guilty and polluted; and as this same life is the underlying substance, in which all men are one, it follows that the act of Adam was the act of all men—its guilt and pollution belong to them in the same measure and for the same reason that they belong to him. There is no imputation of his sin to his posterity further than the recognition of the fact that it is their sin. In like manner, humanity, as a whole, was in Christ in personal union with the eternal Logos. "He was the race." Human nature, as a generic life, united with the divine nature, conquered the law of sin in the old nature, fulfilled all righteousness, triumphed

over death, and was exalted to the right hand of God. This divine human life, this sanctified human nature, is the generic life of believers, in which they are all one. They therefore did all Christ did, performed all his acts. Those acts were the acts of the life which passes over to them, or is inserted in them, with all its merits, its righteousness, its holiness, and power. At first it is feeble (as in the case of our natural life, derived from Adam), but it is gradually developed, and ultimately triumphs over sin and death. The resurrection of Christ was not a miracle. It was the natural, legitimate working of his divine human life, as much as waking out of sleep is the proper working of our ordinary nature. In like manner, the final resurrection of believers is not miraculous; it is the development of their theanthropic nature, the legitimate result of the law of life which they derive from Christ. The following points are involved in the above statement: viz. 1, That the divine human life of Christ is communicated to his people; 2, That that life includes his body, soul, and divinity; 3, That it bears with it the merits, the righteousness, the holiness, and power of Christ, and is their salvation,—not its ground or procuring cause, but the salvation itself; 4, That this generic humanity, in union with the divine Logos, is the common life of Christ's mystical body, constituting all his people one. All these points are included in the passages already quoted from the advocates of the theory. Our time and space admit of only a few more citations in support of the representation just given. Ullmann, in a passage already quoted, says that the "oneness of Christ with God" is not something individual, isolated, or transient, but with his life is communicated to believers.* In the *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, it is said: we do not "partake of his divinity alone, but of his manhood, his glorified humanity, bound with his divinity in the bond of a common life," p. 273. The saint "partakes of his divine human life as really as by nature he partakes of the corrupt life of Adam," p. 272. The resurrection of Christ was not "the fruit of his creative and omnipotent energy, as is the case with miracles in the world of nature." His "life asserted its victorious power over death, and raised the body of Christ from its bondage, just as our natural life asserts its power over sleep, and by its own energy throws it off." The saints will be raised at last, not "by a miracle in the ordinary sense," but "by the activity of their Saviour's life, which has its abode in them," p. 270. Christ himself is "the ground and source of salvation, rather than his works. His merits are reached only through his life," p. 267. "Christ's acts were the acts of the life which dwelt in him, the

* Studien und Kritiken, 1845, p. 41.

activity of his divine human personality, and, as such, are the acts of that same life, whatever form it may put on in the process of outward development ;" that is, were the acts of all his people in whom it is developed. " Christ restored our nature to its right relations ; brought it to a union with God. This is necessarily involved in the fact of the incarnation, and is the whole substance of its idea. And if we, as individuals, would stand in the like relations, we can do so only by standing in living union with this new humanity, in it as our life element. No simple reckoning is sufficient in the case. It requires an actual transfer of our whole being, an ingrafting into the stock of living humanity. Thus do we partake of the salvation of Jesus Christ, only as we are penetrated with its true idea, with human nature in its true relation to God ; that is, in living union with him. Christ, therefore, himself gives us the true mode of imputation, when he says, ' Ye must be *born again*.' " P. 263. The points insisted upon by Dr Nevin in Section II. chap. iii. of his *Mystical Presence*, are, 1, That our nature as derived from Adam is incapable of raising itself to its true relation to God. 2, That the union in which we stand to Adam " extends to his entire person, body as well as soul." 3, That in Christ our falling " humanity was exalted again to a new imperishable divine life." " The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos as a permanent source of life." 4, The value of Christ's sufferings depends on this view of the incarnation. 5, " The Christian salvation, as comprehended in Christ, is a new life." " It is a new life introduced into the very centre of humanity itself." 6, This new life " is in all respects a true human life." " It is the life of the Word made flesh, the Divinity joined in personal union with our humanity." 7, " Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his separate person, but passes over to his people, thus constituting the church." 8, " As joined with Christ, then, we are one with him in his life." " Christ communicates his own life substantially to the soul on which he acts, causing it to grow into his very nature. This is the *mystical union* ; the basis of our whole salvation ; the only medium by which it is possible for us to have an interest in the grace of Christ under any other view." 9, Our relation to Christ is immeasurably more deep and intimate than our relation to Adam. 10, " The mystical union includes necessarily a participation in the entire humanity of Christ." " The life of Christ is *one*. To enter us at all in a real way it must enter us as a totality. 11, So we, too, " are embraced by it a whole way." This new life " must extend to us in the totality of our nature," body as well as soul. " We have just seen it to be a true

human life before it reaches us. It is the life of the *incarnate Son of God*." Christ's human life "must be formed in us a *human* life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on an outward form, and project itself in space." 12, This is effected, not by different forms of action, one for the soul and another for the body, but by one undivided process, as the humanity of Christ is one living organic process. 13, This does not involve a material, or actual approach of Christ's body to the persons of his people; nor, 14, any ubiquity or idealistic dissipation of his body. "Adam was at once an individual and a whole race." So in the case of Christ. 15, This union is more intimate than any other. 16, It is effected by the Holy Ghost. 17, It is apprehended by faith. 18, This new life includes degrees, and is completed in the resurrection. "The bodies of the saints in glory will be only the last result, in organic continuity, of the divine life of Christ implanted in their souls at regeneration." "We can make no intelligible distinction here," it is said, p. 181, "between the crucified body of Christ and his body as now glorified in heaven. Both at last are one and the same life." "We partake not of his Divinity only, nor yet of his Spirit as separated from himself, but also of his true and proper humanity." On page 189, it is said, "The judgment of God must be according to truth. He cannot reckon to any one an attribute or quality which does not belong to him in fact. He cannot declare him to be in a relation or state which is not actually his own, but the position merely of another.. No federal union or legal fiction, we are told, will here answer. "Righteousness, like guilt, is an attribute which supposes a subject in which it inheres, and from which it cannot be abstracted without ceasing to exist altogether. In the case before us, this subject is the mediatorial nature, or life of the Saviour himself. Whatever there may be of merit, virtue, efficacy, or moral value in any way, in the mediatorial work of Christ, it is all lodged in his life, by the power of which alone this work has been accomplished, and in the presence of which only it can have either reality or stability." P. 191. "That which is imparted to us through our faith, by the power of the Holy Ghost, is the true divine human life of the Son of Man himself," p. 243. And this divine human life, which wrought all Christ's righteousness, is imbued with his holiness and power; becoming our life, we thereby have his righteousness, holiness, and power, inherent in us, as truly and really as they are in him. "The supernatural, as thus made permanent and historical in the church, must, in the nature of the case, correspond with the form of the supernatural as it appeared originally in Christ himself. For it is all one and the same life or constitution.

The church must have a theanthropic character throughout. The union of the divine and human in her constitution must be inward and real, a continuous revelation of God in the flesh, exalting this last continuously into the sphere of the Spirit." P. 247.

It is not worth while to multiply citations. The whole thing is plain. We are one with Adam because he was the race; humanity was in him as a generic life, and sinned his sin, and incurred his guilt and pollution. Guilt and pollution are attributes which must inhere in a subject or substance; that substance is generic humanity, which unfolds itself in a multitude of individual persons. Its acts, therefore, are their acts, its qualities or attributes belong to them. The eternal Son of God assumed this fallen humanity into personal union with himself, whereby it was constituted a divine-human life. That life triumphed, through suffering and conflict, over "the law of sin and death," inherent in our fallen humanity, and sanctified it, and exalted it into the divine nature. This new life, therefore, is divine-human. It is truly divine and truly human. It is the union of Divinity and humanity as one life. This divine-human life is communicated to the people of Christ by the new birth, as they receive the nature of Adam by their natural birth. And as the nature derived from Adam comes laden with guilt, pollution, and death; as it develops itself outwardly in a frail, natural body, and inwardly in a blinded, guilty, and polluted soul; as it begins feebly in the infant, and gradually reaches maturity, and then succumbs to death, and ripens in perdition; as it develops itself not only personally in individuals, but in the whole course of history; so on the other hand, this divine-human, or theanthropic, nature of Christ comes to the believer fraught with righteousness, holiness, and immortality; it develops itself in him as body and soul, as a glorious spiritual body, and a righteous, holy soul; it begins feebly, but matures gradually, until it bursts into the resurrection, and culminates in glory; and as a generic life it reveals itself not only in the individual, but in the church, which is a living organism. It is Christ's divine humanity in a concrete form. That is, it is the form in which Christ's theanthropic nature unfolds itself in the world. This is the foundation of

IV. The Ecclesiology of the mystical system, of which our limits forbid our saying anything more than is involved in the preceding exposition. The church, as we have seen, is declared to be a real and permanent "revelation of God in the flesh." The church "is not a mere outward organisation, but a divine-human life power, originating in the person of Christ, with an inward, historical connection with the world, con-

taining the very help we need and must have as sinners." *Mercersburg Review*, October 1854, p. 529. "Christ's presence in the world is in and by his mystical body the church. As a real human presence, carrying in itself the power of a new life for the race in general, it is no abstraction or object of thought merely, but a glorious living reality, continuously at work, in an organic and historical way in the world's constitution. . . . This is the idea of the church. It comes from within, and not from without. It grows out of the mystery of the incarnation, apprehended as an abiding fact." *Review*, March 1850, p. 186. "The idea of the church, as thus standing between Christ and single Christians, implies of necessity visible organisation, common worship, a regular public ministry and ritual, and, to crown all, especially grace-bearing sacraments. To question this is to give up to the same extent the sense of Christ's mediation as a perennial fact, now and always taking effect upon the economy of the world, through the church as his mystical body. Let it be felt that the incarnation is a mystery not simply past, and not simply beyond the world, but at this time in full force for the world, carrying in itself the whole value of Christ's sacrifice and resurrection as an undying 'ONCE FOR ALL'—the true conception of the mediatorial supremacy, as the real headship of Christ's manhood over all in behalf of the church, and for its salvation; let it be felt at the same time that this mystery teaches men in and by the church, which itself is made to challenge their faith for this reason, as something supernatural and divine; and it becomes at once impossible to resist the feeling that the powers of the world to come are actually at hand, in its functions and services, with the same objective reality that attaches to the powers of nature, under their own form, and in their own place. To see no more in the ministry and offices of the church, in this view, than the power of mere outward declaration and testimony, such as we might have in any secular school, betrays a rationalistic habit of mind, which only needs to be set free from the indolence of uninquiring tradition, that it may be led to deny altogether that Christ has ever or at all come in the flesh." P. 187. "The church contains ordinances and sacraments divinely instituted, for the purpose of bringing this *theanthropic* life of the Redeemer into real contact with our neighbour," October 1854, p. 518. "The divine-human merits of Christ's life are not received immediately and directly from his person by faith, in an abstract way, but mediately through the church, and especially by the sacraments which are instituted definitely for this purpose," p. 519. "The sacraments are bearers of the divine-human life of the Redeemer," p. 520.

Such is the answer which modern speculation has given to the question, What is Christianity? It is the theanthropic life of Christ. The eternal Logos having assumed our fallen humanity, and taken it into life union with himself, his divine-human life is generic human nature, exalted and sanctified; and, developing itself in the church, it is communicated to individuals by the sacraments, which are "the only channels of his grace." It is unfortunate that the sun does not rise on America until it begins to set on Germany. This *Vermittelungstheologie* (*mediating-theology*), as it is there called, of which Ullmann is the great representative, standing, as Schwarz says, *im centrum des centrums*, has, if we may credit the Germans themselves, already passed away.* It served for a while to occupy the German mind, and then was shipped to America. Here it has been seized upon with avidity, and presented as the only possible form of Christian theology. It is, however, Christian only in name. You may leave out the name of Christ and every distinguishing fact of Christianity, and the system retain every thing essential to it. That humanity, as a generic life, became impeded in its development so as to be unable to realise its true idea without assistance *ab extra*; that God united himself with the world as an organism, and thus enables humanity to attain a true life-union with himself, is the whole system. All the rest is formulas and phrases. The theory, as a theological theory, as an exposition of the method by which sinful man may be restored to the life of God, may be held by a pagan or Mohammedan as well as by a Christian. Even as a philosophy underlying Christian doctrines, it is so uncongenial that it alters the whole nature, objective and subjective, of Christianity. That is, it changes essentially its doctrines, and it alters the whole character of our inward religion. 1, In the first place, it alters entirely our relation to Christ. To the believer, the Lord Jesus Christ, as the eternal Son of God, clothed in our nature, very God and very man, in two distinct natures and one person for ever, is the supreme object of love and worship. All the religious affections terminate on him. The believer lives in daily and hourly communion with him; relies on the merit of his righteousness as something out of himself, neither done by him nor wrought in him, as the ground of his acceptance with God. Every thing either done by himself or wrought within him, he knows to be finite, human, polluted, and insufficient. He needs an infinite righteousness; he demands immeasurably more than he can either do or experience, to give him confidence with God. He looks to the Lord Jesus as a priest for

* See Schwarz's *Geschichte der neuesten Theologie*, 1856.

ever at the right hand of God, continually presenting before God the merit of his satisfaction, and making intercession for us. He looks to him as his Shepherd to guide and feed him day by day; as his King to rule in, reign over, and to protect him from all danger and every enemy. He longs for his personal presence, to be with him that he may behold his glory, worship at his feet, and be perfectly devoted to his service in heaven. According to this new system, all this is altered. We have nothing *now* specially to do with Christ. Adam corrupted humanity, which we receive as a generic life from him. But what have we now to do with Adam? He is nothing to us, any more than the first acorn is to the present oak. So Christ healed and sanctified humanity, which we derive from him. This is an infinite good which he did two thousand years ago, as Adam did us a great harm six thousand years ago. But we are just as much separated from the one as from the other. The life of the one, as of the other, comes to us in the regular course of organic, historical development. No true Christian will allow any philosophy thus to separate him from his Saviour. He cannot do it. The whole religion of the New Testament and the whole experience of the church suppose each individual soul to be in immediate contact and intercourse with the incarnate Son of God AS A PERSON, and not as an internal life; coming to him directly, each for himself, and living in constant and conscious fellowship with him.

2. Not only does this system change our whole relation to Christ as a person, but our whole relation to his mediatorial work. All that Christ did or does in the way of atonement, or satisfaction, or sanctification, according to this theory, was done in humanity as a generic life. He withstood and overcame the law of sin in our fallen nature, he suffered but triumphed in that conflict, and transmits that sanctified humanity to us. This was the atonement, this is redemption. This system, therefore, sends the sinner naked and shivering into the presence of God, with nothing to rely upon but the modicum of theanthropic life that flickers in his own bosom. He has no righteousness but what is inherent. All he has of righteousness, holiness, joy, or glory, is in himself, in that life which is as much his as the life he derived from Adam, the heights and depths of which are sounded by his own consciousness. If he feels himself to be wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked, he is so, and there is no help for him. All his treasures are within himself. If his theanthropic life does not make him righteous, and holy, and blessed, there is nothing else can do it. The nature he derived from Adam made him subjectively unrighteous as well as miserable; so

the nature he derives from Christ must make him subjectively righteous and inwardly blessed, or he must for ever remain unrighteous and condemned. We have nothing but ourselves. Words are of no avail here. It does not help the matter to call our poor, cold, worldly, polluted, sinful life, "divine-human," "theanthropic," "humanity raised to a higher sphere," "imbued with divine power, &c." It is nevertheless something which our own conscience condemns, and our own consciousness tells us is poor and wretched. So that if our inherent righteousness is all we have, we are of all men most miserable.

3. This system not only takes from us Christ and his righteousness, but the Holy Ghost. According to the real author of the system there is no Holy Ghost. Schleiermacher did not believe in the Trinity. So far as he was theistic at all, he was a Sabellian. God as God he called the Father; God in the world, the Son; God in the church, the Spirit. It was a mere modal distinction. The common life of the church he designated as the Holy Spirit, but that life was not a person. It had no existence except in the church. In those of his followers who retain speculatively the doctrine of the Trinity, the office of the Spirit almost entirely disappears. It may be safely said that the Holy Spirit is mentioned on the pages of the New Testament one hundred times, where he is mentioned once in the same compass in the writings of the theologians of this school. We do not recollect that he is mentioned more than once, and then only by the way, in the sixty-one passages of Ullmann's dissertation. And no wonder; the system makes no provision for his person or work. What need is there of the supernatural work of the Spirit, in conveying to us the nature of Adam, or in its historical development? And what need is there of his intervention, if the divine-human nature of Christ is the source of all life and even of the resurrection to believers? Or, if we assume that the Spirit by regeneration must insert us in the theanthropic nature of Christ, as our natural birth inserts us in the generic life of Adam, it is an unnecessary assumption. It lies outside of the system. It is simply a shred of traditional orthodoxy not yet shaken off. The theanthropic life of Christ is propagated by the law of development just as naturally as the life of Adam. "The supernatural," says Dr Nevin, "has become natural." Exactly so; and therefore it ceases to be supernatural. It is all nature since the incarnation, just as much as it was before. The blessed Spirit of God, for whose presence, illumination, guidance, sanctifying and consoling power, the whole Church longs and pants, as a thirsty land for the rain from heaven; whose fellowship with the individual believer and with the whole body of the faithful, is invoked daily and hourly, somewhere in the

church, in the apostolic benediction, this blessed Spirit, τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ζωοποιοῦν, is in this system reduced to a name. One writer in the *Mercersburg Review* says the Spirit is the *modus* of Christ's theanthropic nature in the soul. Dr Nevin says, it is the force of that life. So far as the system is concerned it is nothing. We need say no more. A theory which takes away a present, personal Saviour; which takes away his righteousness; which ignores the blessed Spirit of God; which makes faith a mere consciousness of the divine-human life within us, and represents regeneration as imputation, the feeble principle of life therein implanted being all our interest in the righteousness of Christ, all we have to plead at the bar of conscience or the tribunal of God, is not a doctrine on which a soul can live.

ART. VII.—*Jeremias librorum sacrorum Interpres atque Vindex*: scripsit AUGUSTUS KUEPER. 8vo. Pp. 202.
De Jeremie Versione Alexandrina: scripsit JOANNES WICHELHAUS. 8vo. Pp. 188.

WHILE the unbelieving criticism of modern times has denied and to its own satisfaction disproved the genuineness of the Pentateuch, Daniel, large sections of Isaiah, and other books of the Bible, it is remarkable that Jeremiah has not been similarly assailed. This is, we confess, attributable solely to the forbearance of the critics, and they are entitled to all the credit which such unexpected generosity deserves. Jeremiah has no claim to any better treatment than his compeers. His writings are no more certainly his, than theirs belong to them. The external testimony to his authorship, and the internal evidence by which this is corroborated, though conclusive, have no peculiar weight in this case more than in the others. And grounds of cavil might as readily be found here as there. Indeed the great advantage of the mode of reasoning employed by our critical opponents is, that they are never at a loss for proofs, whatever may be the conclusion that they wish to establish. This facility of argumentation is, it is true, attended with the inconvenience of setting the critics at irremediable strife with one another, each deducing with equal positiveness from the same premises his own foregone conclusion. And this might give rise to the suspicion that arguments so readily gathered on behalf of any cause and made to sustain the most opposite results, are of no great intrinsic worth. This variance, however, it is to be remarked, is an amicable one; being all agreed upon the main point of refusing credit to whatever

establishes prophetic foresight or the reality of a supernatural revelation, the mode of compassing this end is esteemed of secondary importance, and the most irreconcilable diversities may here be tolerated as of small account.

Nor are there wanting sufficient motives for the application of the critical knife. If the mere love of novelty and paradox were not enough of itself, as it often is, there is much in this book to awaken suspicion of its genuineness in any mind imbued with the principles of the modern school. According to the first chapter, Jeremiah foresaw at the outset of his ministry, in the thirteenth year of Josiah, the character and subject of his future productions and the opposition with which he would meet in their delivery. "This," says Hitzig (*Der Prophet Jeremia erklärt*, p. 2), "is only conceivable as a deduction from actual experience, as a prediction *ex eventu*. He could not know this until the middle or the end of his course, and therefore the composition belongs to this later time." Fortunately for the genuineness of the chapter, this, like many other predictions of Jeremiah, was fulfilled during the prophet's own life. The great burden of his prophecies, in fact, as it was the grand lesson demanded at that period, was the approaching destruction of Jerusalem and the exile of the people. The application of the argument just recited will convince its author at least that a large majority of these prophecies could not have been originally delivered with the definiteness with which they are now recorded. But here again it is only necessary to suppose, that when the prophet committed his discourses to writing, after the destruction had occurred, or at least after things had gone so far that this issue was plain to ordinary sagacity, he consciously or unconsciously modified the form of his earlier anticipations so as to include his later knowledge and experience. Thus the maxim "prophecy is impossible" may be made to consist with Jeremiah's authorship. This, to be sure, would involve an imputation upon the honesty of the prophet and the sense of the people, which it might be difficult to explain, that he should claim to have predicted repeatedly, long in advance and with the utmost particularity what he never did predict at all, and that they who had been his constant hearers should admit the truth of his claim; still the ends of unbelief are answered, and its advocates are content.

When, however, predictions occur of so stubborn a sort that they cannot thus be compounded with, it might be expected that they would without further ceremony be declared fit subjects of the ban, which criticism stands ever ready to pronounce upon unmanageable cases. When, for example, Jeremiah xxvi. 11, xxix. 10, fixes the duration of the captivity at seventy years, and chap. l. 51, announces the overthrow of Babylon by

the Medes, combined with other Asiatic nations, there is a knot which no patience nor ingenuity can untie, which only the sword can sever. The fulfilment is too signal to be denied. The prophet did not outlive the event. The conclusion would seem to be inevitable, that these chapters did not come from Jeremiah, and yet the critics hold their hand! Hitzig himself, the very last from whom such a favour could have been looked for, enters (p. 391) into a formal argument to establish the genuineness of the prophecy against Babylon, remarking that there is not one spurious prophecy in the entire book.

It must, however, in justice to Hitzig and his fellows, be remarked here, that they have no idea in all this of abandoning their principles. This departure from their accustomed method of procedure elsewhere, is to be accounted for by the fact that the desired end is sought to be accomplished in another way. Each prophecy as a whole is suffered to stand unchallenged, but every passage which is irreconcilable with their ideas of what Jeremiah could have spoken, is set down as an interpolation, or a corruption of the text.

There are two external grounds from which it has been argued that there are errors in the existing Hebrew text of Jeremiah. One is found in the verbal discrepancies in parallel passages in the Hebrew itself, and the other from the comparison of the Septuagint translation of this book, which departs from the Hebrew to a remarkable extent. Before inquiring into the reality of the alleged disordered state of the text, however, it is important to observe that the amount of the corruption, if any exist, must be determined by the evidence, and is not to be assumed *ad libitum*. If the Hebrew requires correction from parallel passages and from the Septuagint, be it so: let the requisite correction be applied. But let it not be left at the mercy of the critics to expunge what they please, on the pretence of errors and interpolations, of whose existence there is not the shadow of a proof, and which there is no reason for suspecting, other than the maxims of unbelief. The interpolations most insisted upon, are in fact passages in which all external authorities concur in the existing text. Whether the readings of the Hebrew, the Septuagint, or of the parallel passages, be adopted, no important evidence of prophetic foresight will be called in question.

The differences between the Septuagint and the Hebrew are, as has already been intimated, very considerable, and abound in all parts of the book. In a vast number of instances individual words, clauses, or sentences, are omitted, altered or transposed; whole verses, and even paragraphs of considerable length, are not to be found in the Greek, *e.g.*, x. 6-8, 10; xvii. 1-4; xxvii. 1, 21; xxix. 16-20; xxxiii. 14-26; xxxix. 4-13;

xlvi. 45-47; li. 45-49; and the predictions respecting foreign nations, chapters xli. li., not only succeed each other in a different order, but the entire section containing them is in the Greek transferred to a different part of the book, so as to stand immediately after xxv. 13. The twofold arrangement of these predictions is as follows, viz.

<i>Hebrew.</i>		<i>Greek.</i>	
1.	Concerning Egypt.	Concerning	Elam.
2.	... the Philistines.	...	Egypt.
3.	... Moab.	...	Babylon.
4.	... Ammon.	...	the Philistines.
5.	... Edom.	...	Edom.
6.	... Damascus.	...	Ammon.
7.	... Kedar.	...	Kedar.
8.	... Elam.	...	Damascus.
9.	... Babylon.	...	Moab.

These discrepancies are remarked upon by Origen and Jerome, the latter of whom, in addition to his frequent censures of the negligence or licence of the translators, brings here the charge of carelessness against the transcribers. Buxtorf repeats, without adopting it, the opinion of R. Azarias, that the Septuagint version was made from a faulty manuscript. The idea of two varying texts of the original thus suggested, has given birth to numberless theories in which their existence is assumed, and various speculations indulged as to their origin and respective merits. Thus according to J. D. Michaelis, one edition of the prophet's writings was prepared in Egypt after his death, which was followed by the Greek translator, and another in Chaldea, which was preserved in its original Hebrew form by the Jews of Palestine. The ingenious and complicated hypotheses of Eichhorn, Bertholdt, and Movers, will be presented with more detail hereafter. It will be sufficient here to say, that in the judgment of Eichhorn the Palestine edition, or the common Hebrew text, contains the writings of Jeremiah with his latest additions and emendations; while the Egyptian edition was drawn from his unrevised papers, which, as they consisted not of a connected roll, but of separate sheets, were by some accident deranged to the extent that we now find them. Bertholdt attributes the differences of text mostly to the unscrupulousness of the Egyptian editor, whose taste was offended by the diffuseness and repetitions of Jeremiah, and who accordingly allowed himself great liberties in abbreviating. The prophecies against foreign powers he thinks to have been at first put into circulation singly, then separately collected and incorporated with the rest of the book both in Palestine and in Egypt, whence their various order and the different location assigned them. According to Movers, two independent

collations were made of the manuscripts of this book, one in Palestine by Nehemiah, and the other in Egypt, about B.C. 330, which resulted in the establishment of a distinct text in the two countries respectively. With regard to these he lays down the maxim, which is at variance with the evident characteristics of Jeremiah's style, that the briefer is in all cases to be regarded as the true reading. This rule leads him to the conclusion that neither edition was entirely accurate; most commonly he decides in favour of the Egyptian, though sometimes he prefers that of Palestine, and sometimes he thinks both to be erroneous.

The decisive objection to all these theories, and others like them, is that an Egyptian, or any other edition of the original differing from that represented in the common Hebrew Bible, is a figment unsupported by a particle of evidence. Movers, it is true, endeavours to prove a variant text from 2 Kings, Baruch, and Josephus. He supposes that he has found in 2 Kings chap. xxv. the primary form of the text by which the corresponding verses in Jeremiah, chaps. xl, xli., and lii. may be judged, and he avers that the comparison establishes that the Septuagint has in the main followed the correct edition. But the verbal variations in these and other parallel passages of Scripture can be better accounted for than as errors in the text of one or both. There is no good reason for the assumption that they were at first coincident in every word and letter, and that the existing divergence between them is proof of want of care in their preservation. The differences, such as they are, are without doubt original. The similarity is such as to afford convincing proof that they were derived from a common source, and they may possibly have proceeded from the same pen. But, as written in the books of Jeremiah and of Kings, there is no reason to believe that the passages were ever more nearly identical than they are now. The general fact brought out by a minute comparison of them is that the language of Jeremiah is fuller even to redundancy, and that of Kings is more concise. Now as the Greek translator betrays the constant tendency to abbreviate and lop off what seemed to him a needless amplification and unessential to the sense, and as moreover he may have had the text of Kings in his thoughts, it has happened in four instances, but only in four, that the Greek version of Jeremiah agrees with Kings in opposition to the Hebrew text of Jeremiah. In other places, however, the translator departs from the text of Jeremiah where it is the same with that of Kings, or agrees with it where that of Kings diverges.

That Baruch, in which large use is made of the language of Jeremiah, mostly follows the Septuagint, is simply because that

book was written in Greek. This, therefore, has no bearing upon the question of a Hebrew original with the readings of the Septuagint. The argument from Josephus is, if possible, feebler still. He almost always follows the Hebrew; but inasmuch as in Ant. x. 7, 4, he speaks of Jeremiah as threatening such as stayed in the city with famine and sword, the Hebrew adding in such passages, *e. g.* xxi. 9; xxvii. 9, 13, a third evil, the pestilence, which is omitted in the Greek, this is adduced as shewing that he there drew from a manuscript exhibiting the same text as that from which the Septuagint version was made. But apart from the fact that Josephus, who wrote in Greek, might readily have drawn from the version itself, he speaks in the very same paragraph of a pestilence prevailing in the city during the siege, which he could not have learned from the account in Kings, and Ezekiel who, in v. 12, vi. 11, &c., according to Movers himself, imitates the language of Jeremiah, names the three evils together, and consequently must have found them all in his Hebrew copy.

The entire subject of the relation of the Greek to the Hebrew text is examined in detail by Kueper, and still more elaborately and exhaustively by Wichelhaus, by the former in an appendix, and by the latter in the body of his treatise named at the head of this article. It is shewn by them both conclusively, from the nature as well as the multitude of the variations, that they are not traceable to the ordinary liabilities to error in transcription. The changes have been purposely made, and from the general consistency of the principles on which this has been done, they are in all probability the work of the same hand throughout; and they may be more naturally referred to the translator than to some editor of the original, inasmuch as there is no evidence that any Hebrew copy ever existed in which they were to be found. They consist of—1, Abbreviations; the omission or contraction of the customary formulas at the beginning or in the course of a prophecy, vii. 1, 2, xvi. 1; the omission of unimportant words, or of one of two synonymous words or parallel clauses, xxx. 19, xxxi. 28; of a passage which has occurred before, viii. 10–12: comp. vi. 13–15, xxvii. 12–14 (where *αβρολ* of verse 14 has thus been deprived of its subject), or one which the translator could not reconcile with his ideas, *e. g.* xxxiii. 14–26, where the perpetuity and multiplication promised to the house of David and of Levi appeared to him not to consist with the fact. 2, Additions; these are much less frequent than the preceding. Words which seem necessary to the sense are occasionally supplied from the connection, xlix. 4, and expressions are sometimes enlarged from parallel passages, xix. 3; comp. xvii. 20. 3, Alterations affecting either the matter or the form. There are many errors in

translation, which appear to be due to the incompetency of the translator. Some words are rendered differently every time that they occur, or nearly so, any sense being given to them apparently that would suit the connection; *e. g.* שָׁפִים iii. 2. 21, iv. 11, xii. 12, xiv. 6; for others the sense of some word which resembles it has been substituted, iv. 6, נִים φεύγετε, as if from נִים; or they are omitted entirely, xxv. 26. 34, תַּפְּצוּתֵיכֶם, שִׁשָּׁךְ. Some passages seem to be translated at random, iv. 15, xxix. 24, 25. Frequent changes are also made in number, person, and tense, xxx. 5; or, in the order of words or verses, xxxii. 35–37, 39. In like manner, as has been stated already, chaps. xli.–li. are removed from their true position, and the prophecies which they contain are disposed in a different order. Chap. xxv. 13 speaks of what Jeremiah prophesied against all the nations. This seemed to the translator the appropriate place to introduce the predictions referred to, and he accordingly inserts them, although he is thereby led to drop verse 14 altogether. It is difficult to see upon what principle the rearrangement of them has been made. It has the appearance of a purely artificial inversion. Each alternate prophecy is first transposed with the one before it. Egypt, which heads the list, is carried back before Babylon, Moab is set before the Philistines, Edan before Ammon, Kedar before Damascus. The three great powers, Elam (or Persia), Egypt, and Babylon, are then transferred to the beginning of the series, exchanging places with Moab, which, as the subject of the largest prediction relating to the minor powers, seemed to form the most fitting close.

That these discrepancies are due to the translator is further apparent, from the general character of the Septuagint, which nowhere confines itself to the original with the rigorous exactness demanded in a modern version. And in the various fidelity with which different portions have been executed, some other books have suffered as seriously as Jeremiah. The order is greatly disturbed in Exodus, chapters xxxvi., xxxix. The passage 1 Sam. xvii. 12–31 is omitted. In Proverbs, chapter xxx. xxxi. 1–9 is removed from its proper place, and attached to chapter xxiv. Several entire chapters are added to Esther and Daniel; and the latter was besides so badly translated that a different version was substituted for it in ecclesiastical use. That the author of Chronicles had before him the present Hebrew text of the book of Jeremiah may be inferred from the reference in 2 Chron. xxxvi. 20 to Jer. xxvii. 7, a verse which has been dropped in the Greek.

The relation of the Septuagint version of this book to the Hebrew has been so complicated with the question as to the

plan of this book itself, as to require some consideration of this topic in order to its proper exhibition. The manifest departures from the chronological order have led many commentators to complain of a confusion and an entire want of arrangement. Thus Lightfoot: "The prophecies of Jeremiah are either utterly undated, and so not easily if at all to be referred to their proper time, or those that are dated are most generally dislocated, and it is not easy to give the reason of their dislocation." And Blaney: "The disorder complained of is common to both the Hebrew and Greek arrangements, and consists in the preposterous jumbling together of the prophecies of the reigns of Jehoiakim and Zedekiah, in the seventeen chapters which follow the twentieth according to the Hebrew copies; so that without any apparent reason many of the latter reign precede those of the former, and in the same reign the last delivered are put first, and the first last. As such an unnatural dislocation could not have been the result of judgment, nor scarcely of inattention in the compiler of these prophecies, it follows that the original order has most probably by some accident or other been disturbed." Blaney has consequently rearranged these chapters with the view of restoring their true order, in the following way, viz.—

Chapters xx.	xxx.	xxxix. 15-18.
xxii.	xxxi.	xxxix. 1-14.
xxiii.	xxvii.	xl.
xxv.	xxviii.	xli.
xxvi.	xxi.	xl ii.
xxxv.	xxxiv.	xl iii.
xxxvi.	xxxvii.	xl iv.
xl v.	xxxii.	xl vi. &c.
xxiv.	xxxiii.	
xxix.	xxxviii.	

There has been no lack of hypotheses to account for this condition of the book. Spinoza fancied that the prophecies of Jeremiah were brought together as they were gathered out of several different records of his life. Eichhorn, Bertholdt, and Movers seek to explain, each in his own way, both the duplicate form of the text, and the supposed derangement of the book.

According to Eichhorn, Jeremiah's predictions were unwritten until the fourth year of Jehoiakim. The prophet then dictated to Baruch, xxvi. 1, 2, what he had up to that time delivered, and after the destruction of that first copy, repeated the dictation, verse 32. As his discourses were thus drawn from memory, no strict order was observed in recording them. Some were recalled only in part, others were blended together, and no definite dates were given. His subsequent prophecies

were written upon their delivery, and their dates recorded, these last like the first being preserved not on one connected roll, but upon detached pieces of paper. After the destruction of the city, he prepared an edition of his prophecies for the exiles, which was transcribed from his private papers, the casual order in which they were used upon this occasion being maintained ever after. At a later period, he revised this edition, and introduced numerous emendations and explanatory remarks; the book thus corrected has been perpetuated in the Masoretic or common Hebrew text. Subsequently after the prophet's death, his unrevised papers were transcribed in the order in which they were found, only the prophecies against foreign powers, which had accidentally become deranged, were transferred to the middle of chapter xxv. as their most appropriate place. This was the Egyptian edition afterwards translated into Greek. The agreement and the difference of these two editions seem thus to be explained; and the confusion existing alike in both is laid to the account of an imperfect memory and loose papers.

To all this Bertholdt objects that Jeremiah *read* קָרָא xxxvi. 18, his prophecies to Baruch; they must therefore have been already in writing, and a failure of memory can have had no share in deranging them. Besides the same confusion reigns in prophecies since that date, as is observable in those before it, which leads to the suspicion of a common cause. Baruch also wrote upon a single roll xxxvi. 2. 32, and not upon a number of papers. Or if the prophecies were upon detached papers, as Eichhorn assumes, it would for that reason have been the easier to arrange them chronologically, and it is the less explicable that the first casual order was adhered to in spite of its manifest incorrectness. Nor is it easy to see why the revised form of the prophecies was not circulated among the Jews in Egypt as well as in Chaldea or Palestine.

Bertholdt's own hypothesis is that the prophecies of Jeremiah were put in circulation singly as they were delivered, but no collection of them was undertaken by him nor during his life. When at length this came to be thought of, the prophecies were so dispersed that it could only be accomplished by successive steps. Those concerning foreign powers, chapters xlvii-li. were gathered first in Palestine. Some one who had seen this collection and consequently incorporated none of its contents in his own, succeeded in getting together chapters i-xxiv. transcribing them upon his roll just as he happened to discover them, without any regard to their proper order. This second collection finding its way into Egypt, incited some one who had not seen the first to a fresh search after Jeremiah's predictions respecting foreign nations; he found the same that

his predecessors had done, but put them together in a different order. A further collection made in Egypt upon the hap-hazard principle embraced chapters xxvi.-xlv. This did not at first contain xxxiii. 14-19 and xxxix. 4-14; but these passages were afterwards discovered in Palestine and introduced into copies circulating there. Chapters xxv. 1-14 and xxv. 15-38 remained by themselves on separate manuscripts. The work of putting all these together was performed independently in Palestine and in Egypt, and resulted in the twofold form of the book as represented in the Hebrew and the Greek. The derangement common to both is upon this theory referred to the casual order in which the scattered prophecies were recovered; the differences of arrangement to independent collections, and the divergencies of text for the most part to the unscrupulousness of the Egyptian editor.

This notion of partial collections is pushed to still greater lengths by Movers, who fancies six successive publications by Jeremiah, each comprising a portion of his prophecies, and each being in itself arranged in the true chronological order. 1, The prophecies written by Baruch in the fourth year of Jehoiakim in two parts; (a) chap. i.-xx. xxvi. xxxv. xxxvi. xlv.; (b) chap. xxv. xlv.-xlix. 2, Chap. xxii.-xxiv; and 3, Chap. xxvii.-xxix. in the beginning of Zedekiah's reign. 4, Chap. xxx. xxxi. xxxiii.; and 5, Chap. l. li. after the destruction of the city. 6, Chap. xxi. xxxiv. xxxvii. xxxii. xxxviii.-xlv. published in Egypt. The collection of Baruch forms the basis of the book in its present form; and the existing derangement arises from the fact that the subsequent collections were incorporated into this piece-meal upon no just principle, but according to some accidental association. Thus chap. xxi was put next to chap. xx. because Pashur occurs in the first verse of both: and chap. xxxii. follows chap. xxxi. because of the resemblance of Hanameel xxxii. 7, and Hananeel xxxi. 38.

Hitzig seeks to account for the constitution of the book by a theory of its gradual accretion; but this is so complicated in its details, and so interwoven with his individual critical conclusions, that it could not here be made intelligible.

In regard to these various hypotheses, and others like them, it may be remarked, 1, That they are built upon a false assumption. The disorder, for which they are professedly framed to account, can be shewn not to exist; of necessity, therefore, they fall to the ground. 2. They are mere figments of the brain. There is no external evidence in their favour. The only solution which they offer of the assumed fact of confusion and derangement is to resolve it into chance or accident; and thousands of other chances might be suggested equally plau-

sible and equally unentitled to credit. 3. Nothing can be safely built upon the contents of the roll dictated to Baruch, chapter xxxvi; for the particular prophecies which were found in it are not known, and cannot be ascertained. There is no reason to suppose that it was incorporated in that form in the present book, for the prophecies delivered up to that time are not preserved distinct from later ones; and Baruch's roll was prepared not for permanent preservation but for a special occasion, and it is distinctly stated that it embraced much upon the second writing which had not been contained in it before, xxxvi. 32. 4. These theories regard the formation of the book as a purely mechanical affair. Pieces are thrown together at random in violation of any proper order; and this preposterous relation once established is retained inviolate, while other changes are freely made for much slighter cause. This excludes almost of necessity the participation of the prophet in the construction of the book in its existing form, and imputes such a method of procedure to the nameless and gratuitously assumed collector as no sane editor in ancient or in modern times was ever guilty of. It would be better frankly to confess the thing inexplicable than to rest in such explanations.

Germany itself has at last grown weary of these insipid theories, and Ewald, one of her acknowledged masters in hypotheses, has led the way in a wholesome reaction toward a more rational construction of the book. He enters upon the inquiry, which had been strangely enough overlooked by his predecessors, whether there is not after all an orderly distribution of the materials, and finds cause to answer it affirmatively. In this he is followed with some modifications by Hävernicks, in his *Critical Introduction*, and Stähelin in an essay published in the third volume of the *Transactions of the German Oriental Society*. They all, however, assume a structure which is needlessly cumbrous and artificial. The most recent attempt which we have seen to exhibit the connection of the book of Jeremiah is that by Neumann in his *Commentary upon this book*. This is highly ingenious and sufficiently simple, but not adequately borne out by the facts of the case. He thinks that the two visions of the first chapter contain a summary of the entire after ministry of the prophet, which is therefore to be regarded as a simple expansion of these initial lessons. The vision of the almond tree is expanded in the first seventeen chapters; and after two symbolic actions significant of the people's rejection, the vision of the seething-pot is expanded in the chapters which follow. Without dwelling, however, upon the various views of these and other writers, we proceed to develop what we conceive to be the true state of the case.

That the book in its present form proceeded from the prophet's own hand, is shewn among other things by the frequent use of the first person, not only in the body of various prophecies, but in the headings and formulas of transition. This, in the extent to which it occurs, proves that he was not only the author of the individual discourses, but that he likewise collected and arranged them. This is particularly evident from xxvii. 12, where, after reciting a prophecy delivered in the reign of Jehoiakim, Jeremiah, speaking in the first person, assigns as a reason for adding in immediate connection, one delivered in the reign of Zedekiah, that it was upon the same subject. This affords us also the welcome hint from an authoritative source, that the guiding principle in the arrangement was topical rather than chronological.

In the fourth and fifth years of Jehoiakim, Jeremiah twice reduced the prophecies to writing, which he had delivered up to that date, xxxvi. 2, 32. He was again directed, xxx. 2, probably in the reign of Zedekiah, to write what had been communicated to him. That the present book could not have been produced upon any of these occasions is apparent from the fact that some of its contents bear a still later date. That it was not gradually prepared, receiving fresh accessions as new prophecies were delivered, but is in so far a single composition that it received its present written form about one time and under a single impulse, appears from several considerations. 1. Prophecies from different portions of his ministry are often put together, while those belonging to the same period are dispersed through the book. 2. Remarks are occasionally introduced which are manifestly of later date than the prophecies in connection with which they are found. Thus, xxvii. 1, introduces a prophecy from the beginning of the reign of Jehoiakim; but that this was not recorded as we now have it until the reign of Zedekiah, appears from verse 3, which state that an injunction here made was carried into execution at that time. Chap. xxv. belongs to the fourth year of Jehoiakim, verse 1, but was not written until the prophet could speak of the desolation of Jerusalem as already accomplished, verse 18. 3. There are allusions in the course of the book to succeeding portions of it, which shew that the prophet as he wrote had a definite conception of what was to follow. Thus, xxv. 13, refers to the prophecies against Babylon and against all the nations, which are "written in this book." These not only stand at its close, chap. xlii.-li., but some of them were delivered in the following reign of Zedekiah, and it would appear that this was the case with that against Babylon in particular, xlix. 34, li. 59. 4. The systematic disposition of the matter, as that is now to be exhibited, shews that the writer

began his work with all his materials before him, and proceeded throughout upon one consistent plan.

Leaving out of view chapter lii., which is a historical appendix, the book divides itself into three parts, viz.

1. Chapters i.-xxxiii. Prediction of the judgment upon Judah, and the future restoration.

2. Chapters xxxiv.-xlv. The history of the judgment.

3. Chapters xlv.-li. Predictions respecting foreign nations.

The first section is again divisible into four parts, viz.

(1.) Chapters i.-xx. General denunciation of the people as a whole.

(2.) Chapters xxi.-xxiii. Denunciation of their civil and spiritual leaders.

(3.) Chapters xxiv.-xxix. The design and duration of the judgment.

(4.) Chapters xxx.-xxxiii. The blessings which would succeed it.

In this whole section rebuke and threatening greatly preponderate, there being but a few words of promise in each division, except the last, which is entirely occupied with encouragement and consolation. The first division does not consist of separate discourses delivered upon different occasions, and in different reigns, as may be inferred from the absence of dates, or of anything to indicate the existence or mark the limits of such discourses. The same predictions substantially were uttered by him from the beginning to the end of his ministry, and there was consequently no reason for keeping what he said at one time separate from what he said at another. Only one date is given, viz. iii. 6, "In the days of Josiah the king," in order to shew that these warnings were uttered even at that early period, and under the reign of so pious a monarch. The substance of all that he delivered upon the subject of this first division is wrought up into a connected form, in which he follows a definite train of thought, and the only partition to be made is that which arises from the logical distribution of his theme. Promises are here made to Israel, iii. 12-iv. 2, whom Judah regarded as utterly apostate and cut off, and to the Gentiles, xii. 14-17, who were thought to be excluded from the covenant of mercy, but there is scarcely a word to break the heavy and reiterated denunciations upon Judah. The only words which bear the semblance of a promise to this branch of the people, iii. 18, xvi. 14, 15, respect the distant future, and contain an implication of the woe which was just at hand. If they are to be brought back from their captivity, they must first be carried into captivity.

In the second division, sentence is passed upon the un-

righteous leaders of the people, who are guilty of their ruin, and in contrast the reign of a better prince is promised, xxiii. 3-8. In the third division, the true intent of the judgment thus far denounced is declared to be to separate the people. The abandoned portion are left in Jerusalem to be extirpated ; the better portion are carried into exile. And with the heavy doom pronounced upon the former, and the protracted sentence which even the latter must bear, are mingled a few words of promise to the exiles, xxiv. 4-7, xxix. 10-14. These denunciatory chapters are followed, and the entire section closed, by the fourth division, in which upon the eve of the catastrophe the assurance was given, that amidst the apparent wreck, nothing which was really precious should be lost. The covenant which secured it was as unalterable as that of day and night.

The second main section of the book, in which the history of the judgment is traced, may be subdivided as follows, viz. :—

(1.) Chapters xxxiv.—xxxviii. Evidences of ripeness for judgment.

(2.) Chapter xxxix. The destruction of the city.

(3.) Chapters xl.—xlv. The fortunes of the surviving remnant.

Before reporting the grand catastrophe, it is justified in the first division of this section, by the recital of various facts adduced as specimens and evidences of the universal corruption and the desert of judgment. Their reprobation was proved by their persistence in transgression in the prospect of the divine retribution, and by the evident hypocrisy and hollow-heartedness of the seeming submission which was extorted from them. Chapter xxxiv. In the extremity of the siege the people had solemnly bound themselves to set their Hebrew servants free ; but upon the siege being temporarily relaxed, they reduced them to bondage again, in palpable violation of the law of Moses, and their relation to them as brethren equally in covenant with God. Chapter xxxv. The Rechabites obey generation after generation the arbitrary requirements of their ancestors, but Judah, even with the enemy at their gates, verse 11, will not hearken unto God. Chapter xxxvi. Jehoiakim, instead of heeding the divine warnings read before him on the day of the public fast, commemorative of the recent capture of the city, verses 6-9, shewed his contempt and defiance of them, by deliberately cutting up the roll on which they were written, and throwing it into the fire, and seeking to take the prophet's life. Chapters xxxvii. xxxviii. Jeremiah's instructions are unheeded by Zedekiah and his princes, and the prophet himself is cast into prison, and his life is repeatedly in peril.

Then upon the account of the destruction of the city and the captivity of the people, follows in the third division, the sequel to this sad history, in which the fortunes of the surviving remnant and Jeremiah's ministry among them are traced to its abrupt termination. The slight reviving under Gedaliah's administration was soon extinguished by his murder, chapters xl. xli. In opposition to the divine mandate, the people remove into Egypt, chapters xlii. xliii., deserting of their own accord the Holy Land, distrusting God's protection, and preferring that of a heathen power. There they, chapter xliv., openly and boldly renounce the worship of God, and declare their determination to serve instead the queen of heaven. Whereupon the curtain drops upon the prophet's labours, his last recorded utterance being the Lord's solemn oath of their utter rejection and extirpation. They have by this avowal of apostasy cut themselves off from being the Lord's people, and they shall be dealt with accordingly.

There is not in all these chapters a single promise to the people as a whole, only three promises to individuals are in each division, that they should be preserved amidst the general ruin, to the Rechabites, xxxv. 18, 19, to Ebed-melech, xxxix. 15-18, and to Baruch, chapter xlv.

The other quarter from which unfavourable conclusions have been drawn respecting the text of Jeremiah is parallel passages. Mention has already been made of the deductions of Movers from the slight verbal discrepancies between this book and Kings in a section common to them both. There have been inferences of a like character from the numerous phrases and expressions borrowed by Jeremiah from earlier writers. Every discrepancy in a word or letter has been charged to inaccuracy of transcription, whereas these diversities are properly to be regarded as original. In transferring or alluding to the language of other inspired writers, Jeremiah is in the habit of introducing slight alterations, in place of making exact citations. The allusion remains evident, though a different turn is frequently given to the thought or form of expression; and the seal of inspiration rests upon it in the shape in which it proceeded from his pen, no less than in that which was employed by his predecessor. Thus for קדקד, Num. xxiv. 17, Jeremiah substitutes קדקד, xlvii. 45; for גרועה, Isa. xv. 2, גרועה, Jer. xlviii. 37; for אנשי, Isa. xvi. 7, אנשי, Jer. xlviii. 31; for נמרים, Hab. i. 8, נשרים, Jer. iv. 13.

A more serious and sweeping charge, however, has been based, not upon the discrepancies, but the correspondences of this class of passages. It is alleged as the result of a recon-dite investigation, that many of them are interpolations, and it is contended on this ground that certain chapters must have

been wrought over again by a later writer. Some elucidation is needed to discover the secret spring of this conclusion.

The dependence of the sacred penmen upon their predecessors in thought and language was denied by some of the older writers, under the impression that such an admission would be to the prejudice of their plenary inspiration. They preferred to assume in all cases of coincidence of language, even where this was continued through considerable paragraphs, as in *Isa. ii. 2-4*, *Micah iv. 1-3*, that the words were independently suggested to each writer by the Holy Ghost. But while this assumption is plainly unnecessary, it is quite as foreign from the truth to regard these coincidences as indolent appropriations of the language of their predecessors, or as evidencing a lack of original and independent thought, or a period of declining taste. They serve to mark the unity of the book of revelation. Each writer, by adopting and repeating what had been uttered before, both recognizes the inspiration and authority of his predecessors, and gathers confirmation from them for his own announcements. This is done not only by intentional citation and direct appeal to antecedent revelations, but incidentally likewise, and perhaps even unconsciously, by the frequent employment of language shaped by intimate familiarity with those writings, which were at once the standard authority in religion and models of good composition.

This conscious or unconscious relation of the sacred writers to those who went before them, is attended to us with the incidental advantage of establishing the existence of the books referred to, and the manner in which they were understood at the time that the citation or allusion was made. And hence these references from Scripture to Scripture, found throughout the sacred volume, interpose a formidable barrier in the way of those who would bring the genuineness of any of its parts into discredit, or who would impose upon them a false interpretation. Hengstenberg was one of the first to exhibit this in its true importance and bearings in respect to the Pentateuch, and to add to the other proofs of its Mosaic origin, that derived from the fact that its existence is recognised or pre-supposed in the entire subsequent history and literature of the Israelitish people. And what is of special significance, its binding obligation was confessed not in Judah alone, but in the schismatical kingdom of the ten tribes, who were from their fundamental organisation under the strongest temptation to reject it if that were possible: yet its institutions and laws were still perpetuated amongst them, in spite of their apostasy, with only such modifications as their severance from Jerusalem and their worship of the calves compelled them to make, and even these

were made with a consciousness of their sin. This is abundantly proved from the history of the disruption in Kings, and from the books of the two prophets of that kingdom, Hosea and Amos.

Kueper, as the title of his treatise indicates, has undertaken to exhibit what the prophecy of Jeremiah contains toward vindicating the genuineness or establishing the correct interpretation of earlier books of Scripture. All the coincidences of expression between him and other Old Testament writers are carefully examined in detail with a view to the light shed upon the points referred to. At the time of Jeremiah's ministry a great crisis in the affairs of Judah was just at hand. The cup of the people's transgressions was almost full, and the punishment long ago foretold, was about to be meted out to them. The prophet Jeremiah in labouring to arouse the besotted people, plants himself upon these ancient predictions, and reiterates them with the greater earnestness, as the period of their accomplishment was approaching. Hence the great abundance of his allusions and appeals to the earlier Scriptures, particularly to the Pentateuch, especially the book of Deuteronomy with its solemn recapitulation of the law and words of warning, and to the books of the preceding prophets. It is conclusively shewn by Kueper, among other interesting and important consequences, that Jeremiah performs the same service in relation to the book of Isaiah, which, as has been already mentioned, Hosea and Amos perform in relation to the Pentateuch. The use which he makes of Isaiah, and the frequent expressions which he borrows from him, prove him to have been in possession of the book of his prophecies, and that the book was of the same compass then as now. His references to the book in all its parts are abundant and undeniable, not only to those portions which modern criticism allows to pass as genuine, but quite as frequently to those which have been pronounced spurious, and alleged to proceed from some nameless author at or near the close of the exile. So that to the other evidence by which all the prophecies found in the book accredited to him are proved to be the productions of Isaiah, is added the proof that they were actually in existence, and were used by Jeremiah before the exile had begun.

But then forsooth the conclusion from which neological criticism revolts, will be established. The Babylonish exile, and the deliverance by Cyrus will have been predicted not only before Cyrus was born, but before the empire of Babylon itself had attained to separate and independent existence. This must not be admitted. Hypothesis must be brought to sustain hypothesis; the baselessness of both is nothing in the account, if they afford escape from so unwelcome a conclusion. The

allegation of the spuriousness of the suspected writings of Isaiah must therefore stand at every cost, and in spite of any conclusiveness of evidence. If Jeremiah quotes them, his own writings must in consequence fall under the ban. The forger of Isaiah's prophecies has had the book of Jeremiah, and rewritten some of its chapters, introducing passages here and there in his own peculiar style. Everything which looks like a testimony to Isaiah's genuineness is straightway dismissed as an interpolation. "Die Schreibart ist pseudo-jesaianisch;" and this settles the matter. It might not be difficult upon the same method to maintain that the American Declaration of Independence was a forgery produced within the last decennium; and when confronted with proof that it had been mentioned, quoted, and referred to long before, the reply would be always ready, that all such allusions prior to the date assumed were interpolations, made by the forger himself in these various works. Such proofs of an erroneous text may be estimated at what they are worth.

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- ART. VIII.—1. *A Manual of the Sea Anemones commonly found on the English Coast.* By the Rev. GEORGE TUGWELL, Oriel College, Oxford. London: John Van Voorst, 1856.
2. *A Monograph of the Fresh Water Polyzoa, including all the known Species, both British and Foreign.* By GEORGE JAMES ALLMAN, M.D., &c., &c., Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Edinburgh. London: Printed for the Ray Society, 1856.
3. *The Story of a Boulder; or, Gleanings from the Note-Book of a Field Geologist.* By ARCHIBALD GEIKIE, of the Geological Survey of Great Britain. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co., 1858.
4. *On the Recent Foraminifera of Great Britain.* By WILLIAM CRAWFORD WILLIAMSON, F.R.S., Professor of Natural History in Owen's College, Manchester. London: Printed for the Ray Society, 1858.
5. *Sketch-Book of Popular Geology; being a Series of Lectures delivered before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh.* By HUGH MILLER. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co., 1859.
6. *The Oceanic Hydrozoa; a description of the Calyphoridæ and Physophoridæ observed during the Voyage of H. M. S. "Rattlesnake," in the years 1846-50, with a General Introduction.* By THOMAS HUXLEY, F.L.S., &c., Professor of Natural History, Government School of Mines. London: Printed for the Ray Society, 1859.

7. *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.* By CHARLES DARWIN, M.A., F.R.S., &c. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1859.
8. *On the Classification and Geographical Distribution of the Mammalia*; being the Lecture on Sir Robert Reade's Foundation, delivered before the University of Cambridge, in the Senate House, May 10. 1859. To which is added an Appendix "on the Gorilla," and "on the Extinction and Transmutation of Species." By RICHARD OWEN, F.R.S., Reade's Lecturer in the University of Cambridge, &c. &c. London: John W. Parker & Son, West Strand, 1859.
9. *History of the Old Covenant*; from the German of J. H. KURTZ, D.D., Professor of Theology at Dorpat. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1859.
10. *The Book of Genesis in Hebrew, with a Critically Revised Text, various Readings, and Grammatical and Critical Notes.* By CHARLES HENRY HAMILTON WRIGHT, B.A., of Trinity College, Dublin. London: Williams & Norgate, 1859.
11. *Commentary on the Pentateuch.* Translated from the German of Otto Von Gerlach. By Rev. HENRY DOWNING, Incumbent of St Mary's, Kingswinford. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1860.
12. *The Natural History Review, and Quarterly Journal of Science.* London: Williams & Norgate, January 1860.

"Who is he," asks Bentley in one of his characteristic sermons, "so abandoned to sottish credulity, as to think that a clod of earth in a sack may ever, by eternal shaking, receive the fabric of a man's body?" Sottish credulity! Our great master in criticism puts the case strongly. In his charitable respect for human nature,—and his severe experience in Old Trinity, had taught him that man has many more sides than one—he in his best vein of indignant irony, discards the most remote suspicion of any one in the wide world, and especially any man of polite learning, turning towards the light of common observation the sottishly credulous side of atheistic materialism.

Richard Bentley, however, shrewd almost to a proverb as he was in the detection of ignorance and fraudulent pretence in questions of classical and antiquarian interest, had but imperfectly inquired into and inadequately discriminated the manifold possibilities of a credulity, in some respects more sottish, than the expectation of producing even an idiot—not to mention a philosopher—by any concussion, however smart, of clods in a sack.

"The highest mind," remarks an ingenious, though rather

inscrutable, German philosopher, "is an anatomised or dismembered mesmerism, each member whereof has been constituted independent in itself." A somewhat novel mode of deciphering the mysteries of anthropology, and likely, at first sight, to induce in ordinary minds some little perplexity and doubt, the reader may perhaps innocently conclude. A rather hasty and precipitate judgment is this, however. Any little obscurity that may be felt will, doubtless, be instantly and for ever dispelled by the announcement by the same ingenious naturalist, that "the liver is the soul in a state of sleep," "the brain is the soul active and awakening;" that "theology is arithmetic personified," and that "God is a rotating globe." And such propositions are the growths of a highly gifted mind—the germs of a philosophy that is alleged to have taken root among philosophers—and were serenely and confidently published to the world! Surely Dean Swift must have rather seriously miscalculated the courage of some naturalists, at least when he remarked, "How shall any man who hath a genius for history undertake such a work with spirit, when he considers that in an age or two he shall hardly be understood without an interpreter."

It will, however, be neither an innocent mistake as to the activity and duration of mischievous opinions, nor candid as regards the scientific men of Germany, to suppose that the doctrines of Oken are merely a part of the inoperative history of knowledge in our own country. Greatly modified in form, and clothed in language, in some measure, compatible with the sobriety and decorum of thought presented by the more reverential spirit of the English people, the spirit and ideas of pantheistic atheism are, as shall be more distinctly explained hereafter, from time to time, more or less directly, influencing the speculations and tone of a portion of the scientific mind among us.

At present, however, we are more immediately desirous to invite the attention of the reader to a peculiarly cheering testimony borne to the reality of man's highest relations and responsibilities, by the most distinguished of all the naturalists of the present age. Towards the close of Professor Owen's lecture in the Senate House at Cambridge, in May last, there is the following passage:—

"The supreme work of Creation has been accomplished that you might possess a body—the sole erect—of all animal bodies the most free, and for what?—for the service of the soul. Strive to realise the conditions of the possession of this wondrous structure. Think what it may become,—the Temple of the Holy Ghost. Defile it not."

Most memorable words assuredly, alike in their meaning and moral spirit ! Prophetic, as may be earnestly hoped, of a purer era in the combined activities of the divines and naturalists of the world, they cannot fail more immediately to encourage the heart of many a humble labourer in the scientific field, whose services are already, in no mean degree, fragrant with the sacred perfumes of God's altar. Counsels so ripe in wisdom and so boldly spoken to an auditory so greatly eminent in social position and intellectual culture, will be thankfully welcomed by every sincere friend of truth and goodness.

It is not merely that they furnish emphatic evidence of the fact that the blind and debasing figments of the Priestleys and Belshams of a former age, who were not ashamed to avow that "man consists of one uniform substance, the object of the senses," are authoritatively repudiated by the calm voice of rigid scientific thought. They also, as we fondly believe, strongly tend to hasten on the blessed advent of the time when an anthropology as ethically mischievous as it was philosophically meagre and inadequate—but towards which, about five-and-thirty years ago, not a few of the more active students of natural science were too favourably disposed—shall, through the diffusion of sounder views, have become impossible as an element in any influential public opinion.

Nor do we confine our grateful acceptance of Professor Owen's counsels within these limits merely, wide and important though they be. Vindicating the just claims of matter, as a divine creation, to a more thoughtful estimate than is implied in the too prevailing suspicion of its inherent corruption and necessary vileness, he, at the same time, in taking for granted the trustworthiness of man's intellect as an organ of truth within the proper limits of the argument for the divine existence, makes his *Natural Theology*, so far as it goes, the sacred forerunner and herald of the revealed truth, that in the present and everlasting indwelling of the Holy Ghost in man's complex but unique nature is the gracious and sublime accomplishment of all truth.

But, as already indicated above, other and opposite views, active alike in effort and influence, to a certain extent prevail in this country. Several strong currents of opinion, moving at higher or lower depths in the thoughts of naturalists, all of which are more or less prejudicial to the legitimate claims of supersensuous and divine truth, in relation to the arrangement and purposes of matter, are from time to time evincing their existence in novel aspects of old and customary errors.

Special pleading by means of partial instances of fully accredited laws, together with a large, and, not uncommonly, rather clumsy application of negative evidence, forms a prime feature

in the discussion of too many questions that demand for their solid solution the widest compass of investigation with the most chastened statement of results. As nothing is, at any time, easier or more frequent than for imperfectly grounded inquirers in natural science, to lose themselves in almost utter helplessness amidst a vast and ever-enlarging labyrinth of details, so few things are more ominous of evil than the efforts of one and other of our many accomplished theorists, who, in striving after the attainment of higher uniformities of expression with a view to the explanation of exceptional facts, lose sight of palpable realities amidst the obscurity and vagueness of an isolated logic. In reference to this point, the following sagacious words of the late Archdeacon Hare, have a wide and instructive application :—" When nothing more than the mere faculty of reasoning, Reason is most fallible, as is proved by the myriads of abortions and misgrowths which swarm in the history of philosophy and science. This its fallibility does not arise merely or mainly from slips of inaccuracy ; though such blunders also, at any link in a chain of argument, render the whole chain brittle and untenable. Reason has erred still more from its neglect of those corrections and adjustments which must be introduced at every step, before logical inferences can become scientific inductions ; and from its precipitance in building up systems, by arbitrarily impressing its own forms on outward objects, instead of searching laboriously among the multitude of those forms for such as will suit them."

In using the space now allotted to us, it is intended to essay an estimate of the prevailing aspects of Natural Science in its present relations to certain fundamental interests of Natural Theology and the divine claims of the Mosaic record, adverting occasionally, on the one side, to some recent speculations of an adverse character, and, on the other, producing from the large mass of accumulated facts, a few of the more significant and serviceable testimonies of a friendly and corroborative kind.

That results of a highly instructive and beneficial nature may be acquired from an exact and conscientious review of the correlative influences of natural and sacred science, is a proposition too obvious to require a minute or prolonged exposition. Out of place it never can be to assert directly and positively the value of a just conception of the argument of Final Causes, or to associate in an intelligible method the more recent evidences supplied, more especially by organic phenomena, of its logical validity and material extent. Too late it never can be to enliven and illustrate that argument in its hold on the heart as well as the understanding, by such fresh and cogent appeals to the imaginative faculty as are

suggested by the detection of novel and unexpected facts in organic structures and functions. It must ever be seasonable and serviceable, by the aid of the many luminous testimonies to the fact that the postulate of a personal intelligence in creation is strictly demanded by the primary conditions of man's intelligent study of its manifold products, to preserve in sharpest outline the broad and irreconcilable distinction between the theory of a living Creator and the dreamy hypothesis of the solution of all the various forms of existence by the chaotic menstruum of Pantheism. Nor at any time, and especially not now, will it be regarded by those who love the lively oracles of God, and have been taught from above to revere the divine law so picturesquely expressed by the ancient prophet in the words, "The thing was true, though the time appointed was long," a work of supererogation, to assert from time to time, that the Mosaic record cannot be divested of its essential character of a divinely revealed history either by a silent avoidance of its claims, or a fanatical opposition to its reconcileableness with the disclosures of cosmographic or ethnological science.

The first point to which, in the prosecution of our present task, we solicit the reader's attention is, that in some popular speculations in natural science of more immediate and vital interest to the theologian an *explicit* assumption of Theism is neutralised by an *implicit* Atheism.

Oecumenius, in his commentary on the Second Epistle of John, thus describes the Atheist—"ὁ ἕξω τῆς ἐντολῆς τοῦ Ἐυαγγελίου Ἰδὺς, ἄθεος ἑαυτον ἀποσχοινίσας τοῦ ἔχειν Θεον." This, of course, is no valid definition of Atheism. It nevertheless embodies its essential and characteristic element as a practical creed. It is emphatically significant of that dialectic *animus*, which is peculiar to the advocates of the tenet of the merely natural in contrast to the miraculous in creation. The ἀποσχοίνισις—the tacit, though active, exclusion of the supernatural agency of a personal Jehovah from the primordial origin and successive transmission of vital species,—can alone explain the fact of an avowed Theism being associated with conclusions and results no less logically impure than morally antagonistic. We speak here, of course, merely of recorded opinions, to the true nature of which we shall have occasion, ere we conclude, of more specially adverting. Men themselves, as considered apart from their formal principles, and especially their scientific dogmas, may be morally better than any one article, or all the articles of their creed taken together, it being unhappily by no means uncommon for scientific inquirers to embark in speculations, not knowing in what region of limbo and disaster an iron-handed logic may compel them eventually to land.

History, it is sometimes said, though with no great originality, has manifold practical applications. And this in a certain sense cannot be doubted. At the same time practical men, whose claims to some small share of still surviving modesty are legitimate, are occasionally disposed, more especially when gravely pondering the marvellous repetition, at distant intervals of time, of grave errors,—a circumstance emphatically noticed by Aristotle in his *Meteorologica*,—to question their own special fitness for attaining to any certain results. There are theories, for example, of world-building, that having been given after the prolonged elaboration of years by their authors to their fellow-men, sometwenty-five or thirty centuries ago, and having had some measure of acceptance for a season, among the leaders of national thought and opinion, then passed away their small ingredients of truth, which were insufficient to keep afloat the greater weight of error by which they were incrustated, being absorbed for onward transmission by some more novel and popular system. Has the written story of such philosophical pastimes of folly ever since kept the wide world awake to the perilous hazard of misinterpreting facts, or vainly attempting to secure abiding results of knowledge by methods of inquiry and inference long since proved to be illustriously chimerical in principle, and of the most futile application? And, more especially in reference to such theories of nature, as while apparently based on a theistic principle, are moulded and overruled by a tacit atheism, have the naturalists of the present time nothing to learn from the blind and barren results of ancient speculation? Had history repudiated the function of rendering the reasonings of a past age serviceable as a safe guide amidst the quicksands of modern theories, when a naturalist of no mean reputation recently employed the following ominous words—"Throughout whole classes various structures are found on the same pattern, and at an Embryonic age the species closely resemble each other, Therefore I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modification embraces all the members of the same class. I believe that animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number.

"Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants have descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a doubtful guide. Nevertheless, all living beings have much in common, in their chemical composition, their germinal vesicles, their cellular structure, and their laws of growth and reproduction. We see this even in so trifling a circumstance as that the same poison often similarly affects plants and animals; or that the poison secreted by the gall-fly produces monstrous growths on

the wild rose or oak tree. Therefore I should infer from analogy that all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed."

In every exposition, however, of what is known by the name of "development," as opposed to the doctrine of a miraculous creation of species, as in every discussion of the transmutation of species, which is merely a more plausible modification of the former, with which the reader may be familiar, it is deserving of special remark that the postulate of creation, as an idea generically distinct from generation, seems to be more or less openly avowed. Anaxagoras, in like manner, twenty-three centuries ago, sought to transmute preceding cosmogonies into a better and happier shape than was at all compatible with the genius of a hard and naked atheism. He sought to introduce a higher name. He aimed at the display of a more plausible and prevailing symbol. He adopted the *Noûs*, or the regulative faculty of intelligence, as a higher and more consistently comprehensive cause of the various phenomena of matter, with their disposing forces. He, nevertheless, at the same time excluded from his theory the element of creation. Repudiating the ideas of his Ionic predecessors, who accepted matter as the efficient cause of all things, he, in common with them, believed in the eternal existence of a chaos, the rudiments of which were, in his view, reproduced in time, by the energy of the cognitive principle, in the forms and organisms of which the world now consists.

Is it not, then, eminently instructive when, as at the present day, voices of no dubious import in natural science are heard pronouncing, with a very peculiar emphasis, the terms "creation," "development," and "transformation," as if the conceptions ordinarily denoted by them were logically comprehensible by any intelligible scheme of Theism, to know that Socrates or Plato, in the mantle of "the old man eloquent," charges Anaxagoras with giving an atheistical tendency to his age?

"Having at one time," says Socrates, "heard an individual reading from a book, written, as he said, by Anaxagoras, and setting forth that intelligence disposes and produces all things (*ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακισμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἰτίας*), I was delighted with this cause. It, moreover, seemed to be in a manner right that thought should be of all things the cause; and so I concluded, if such is the case, that all things would be disposed of and arranged by the ruling mind as is best. . . . From this wonderful hope, however, I was soon cast down, when, in my more familiar acquaintance with his

writings, I perceived that this man makes no use of mind, nor ascribes any causes to the arrangements of all things (*ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν οὐδὲν χρωμένον οὐδὲ τινὰς αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πρᾶγματα*), but air, ether, and water, and many other things equally irrational."

But in vain does the history of opinions invite attention to such pregnant criticism of philosophic beliefs in past times, if the inherent seminal weakness of a Theism,—which though more or less explicitly avowed is at the same time silently yet organically tainted with the moral virus of Atheism,—does not, even at first sight, appear.

It will of course be admitted, with all the promptitude of a grateful intelligence, on the part of the philosophic naturalist, that natural phenomena, alike organic and inorganic, will, in proportion as scientific methods of treating them attain to higher degrees of ideal simplicity and force, be, within certain limits of thought, more accurately understood and prove more serviceable to man. The gases, fires, and fluids (*ἀέρες τε καὶ αἰθέρες καὶ ὕδατα*) of an earlier time, casting off all crude disguises and "ill-favoured visors," become, in obedience to a more acute and dominant analysis, much more than the mere alphabet of higher knowledge. In proportion, also, as data and appropriate formulæ accumulate, the faculties of the inquirer submit almost unconsciously to more advanced forms of scientific discipline and control. More enlarged thoughts of the vital connections of the concrete and the abstract, as the ministers of daily advantage to man in his probationary life here, are almost spontaneously occurring to the patient student of dead matter. In like manner also, the visionary, though far from meaningless or un instructive, and in some respects deeply plaintive mythology, that was considered in ancient times equal to the interpretation of organic nature, when,—

"The mass
Of Nature's lives and wonders pulsed tenfold,
To feel the sun-rise and its glories old,"—

has been, after the manifold reactionary theories of centuries, long superseded by more credible and consistent views, not only of the characteristic momenta of animal and vegetable life, but also of their congenial conditions.

Are there, then, not some cogent reasons for disappointment and painful surprise, on the part of the thoughtful and discreet student of nature, who has been instructed, not only as to the logical value of duly discerned facts, but also in regard to the ethical import of the lessons of history, and who has especially been led to expect in theoretical naturalists a progressive insight into the strictly scientific account of the origin of

organisms, when he meets with the following extract of a work published so lately as the close of 1859 ?

“ On the view,” remarks Mr Darwin in his recent volume ‘*On the Origin of Species*,’ from which we have already quoted, “ that species are only strongly marked and permanent varieties, and that each species first existed as a variety, we can see why it is that no line of demarcation can be drawn between species, commonly supposed to have been produced by special acts of creation, and varieties which are acknowledged to have been produced by secondary laws.”

And that this opinion of Mr Darwin’s differs in no essential respects from that of the author or authors of the “*Vestiges of Creation*,” the reader will easily see from the following sentences contained in the latter work.

“ Organic beings came not at once, as they might have been expected to do if produced by some special act on the part of the Deity. . . . They came in a long succession in the order of progressive organization.”

And that both extracts are as antagonistic to sound views of the philosophy of nature as to the oft-repeated instructions of history from the very earliest to the most recent times, will, it is hoped, be apparent from the following observations which, though not perhaps strictly expository of the enfeebling effect of a pantheistic feeling in some minds on the Theistic argument, may contribute to an exposure of its insufficient results in relation to the origin of organic beings.

The question immediately raised by Mr Darwin is obviously this. Admitting the evident fact of variations in animals and plants, is there any good evidence of so wide a departure, even in the domesticated state of organic life, from a common central type or idea as to warrant the inference that all did not originally descend from common stocks ? In the young, for example, of the common hare (*Lepus timidus*), the eyes and ears are perfect, the body is covered with fur, and the limbs are fit for locomotion. In the rabbit (*Lepus cuniculus*) on the contrary, there is the converse of each of these facts. Again, in the red deer (*Cervus Elaphus*), the female is gravid eight months, and produces one at a birth, while the roe (*Cervus capreolus*), is gravid only five months, and produces two at a birth. But, in all these cases, illustrative of every varying condition of life, domestic and wild, and admitting of varieties more or less extensive, the same definite adherence to one specific idea is maintained. Nor in examining the fossil remains of these respective members of the families Leporidae and Cervidae, does anything in their osseous structure at all deviate from the type of the living animals. On the contrary the evidences of a permanent adherence to it are manifest.

"The most common fossil remains," remarks Professor Owen in his "British Fossil Mammals and Birds," "of the deer tribe, are those which cannot be satisfactorily distinguished from the same parts in the species *Cervus Elephas*, which most abounded in the forests of England until the sixteenth century, and which still enjoys a kind of life, by virtue of strict protecting laws in the mountains of Scotland. The oldest stratum in Britain, yielding evidence of a *Cervus* of the species of the red deer, is the Red Crag at Newbourne. More conclusive evidence of the specific character of this sized deer, is afforded by antlers as well as teeth and bones, and these attest the existence of the *Cervus Elephas*, through intermediate formations, as the new freshwater pliocene and the mammoth silt of ossiferous caves up to the growth of existing turbaries and peat-bogs. Similar fragments of shed antlers of the red deer, associated with others referable to the *Megaceros* and the great *Strongyloceros* have been found in Kent's Hole at Torquay ; they all shew the effects of gnawing, and indicate that all the three species of deer coexisted in England with the *Hyæna*, and other extinct carnivora at that remote period."

And the only exception, which however is more apparent than real, to the specific identity also, in remote and recent periods, of the roe, the hare, and the rabbit, is in the case of the hare. Of its fossil remains as discovered both in the cave at Kirkdale, and in Kent's Hole, the Professor states:—

"The fossil lower jaws which I have examined have presented a somewhat shorter interspace between the molars and incisors, than in the common hare of this country, with the same properties and dimensions, and the same sized teeth ; whereby it would appear that the hare of the caves had a rather shorter head, and resembled in that respect the variety or species to which the name of *Lepus Hibernicus* has been given, and which has also stouter limbs than our English hare. I cannot detect any difference between the fossil hare and the Irish hare in the forms and proportions of the bones of the extremities."

Nor in vindicating the doctrine of specific identity as prevailing throughout great changes, in condition and vast successions in time, is it possible to overlook the fact that, by the marked steadfastness of the most ancient genera of organisms that occur in a fossil state, a forcible presumption against specific transmutations is presented to the mind. For let the definition of species be what it may, so long as an objective reality is assumed as the ultimate and essential basis in all definitions, or in other words, in so far as the logical definition of a term, by which mere words in relation to notions are more clearly understood, is not confounded with the real determination of the contents of a notion, or the elucidation of the relation of notions to things, it is impossible without denying the validity or falsifying the lessons of geological history to refuse an assent

to the fact of permanent generic types in organic structure and habits.

In illustration of these remarks on the persistent character of generic and specific identity in union with instances of variation, in so far as that identity is traceable by us, we invite the attention of the reader to two extracts from German writers, limiting our own criticism of them to a few connecting sentences. The one is taken from Spring's treatise on the "Ideas of Genus, Species, and Variety in Natural History." The other is from Burmeister's "Zoonomische Briefe."

"The idea of the species," according to Spring, "is never fully expressed by a single individual; it can only be exhausted by the aggregate of all the individuals existent in all places and times. Every discrepancy between individuals is a more or less full development of the idea of the species produced by external influences; and the common opinion is erroneous which regards those discrepancies (the varieties) as deviations from and not as contained in the idea of the species. They belong universally to the idea of the species, in which they are expressed as regards their possible existence. For the same reason they are not accidental, as others say; for, given the possibility in the idea of the species, then, by necessary consequence, certain external conditions will produce certain alterations or degrees of development."

If, then, a separate origin and distinctness of race, discriminated by a constant transmission of some essential and fixed element in structure and function—and this seems to be all in the way of the definition of a species that is now called for—is a marked feature in the Tertiaries, does not a generic similarity of type in vital organisms, based, of course, on more superficial and general characters and pervading widely divided geological eras of anterior date, supply something more than merely negative evidence against the theory of transmutation as explanatory of phenomena at any period in the history of nature, and a special auxiliary to the doctrine of a universal specific identity during the ages more immediately preceding the historic period?

"The study," observes Burmeister, "of the formation of Corals at the epochs anterior to history, or, should another mode of expression be preferred, in pre-Adamic times, is a subject most profoundly interesting to the geologist. It discovers to him the amazing activity of these small creatures on the largest scale, proving at the same time the entire agreement of organization between the most ancient polyps and those in being at the present time. In all times, when we revert to the most distant antiquity of the globe, there have been polyps in our terrestrial seas, at least as long as organic life has existed in the earth. It is corals that furnish the most ancient evidence that this earth was inhabited long before the larger animals came into being. The entire structure and habits of these antique

corals agree completely with those now living. We find, indeed, in the most ancient formation, genera which, though distinct from, yet closely resemble those of the present day ; but even at that distant period all the existing families were represented."

But as further illustrative of the compatibility of permanency in specific character with a wide range of varieties, or in other words the capability of a central type's allowing of its essential appearance in manifold aspects, we may glance at one or more of our native plants and animals. In looking, for example, at the specific characters, the peculiar habitats, and the geographical distribution of the Common *Erythræa* (*Erythræa Centaurium*), it is obvious, that while varying much in the size and breadth of its foliage and flowers, and at first sight leading to the conclusion that even six or seven species have been included in it, on a more accurate comparison, the latter will be seen to run into one another so much, that no precise limits can be assigned to them. Why, then, should any one who acknowledges the fact of unity in nature as the comprehension and reconciliation of a plurality in forms and relations refuse to allow, for example, that the Large-flowered, the Common, the Broad-leaved, and the Linear,—the most prominent forms of the *Erythræa*,—are descended from one stock, having a positive existence in nature, and which will also come true from seed ? Or what reason can be alleged against the entire consistency of the *Mustela Putorius*, as a permanent species, with the varieties springing from the crossing of the Albino (*M. Furo*) with the dark individuals with which the latter is known to breed freely ?

But, in still further elucidation of this point, the following extracts from Dr Williamson's valuable work on the Foraminifera will doubtless be welcomed by the reader :—

"In 1847 I ventured to publish my monograph on the British species of the genus *Lagena*, basing my classification on a principle of which Montague, Maton, and Rackett, and Fichtel, and Moll had already obtained faint glimpses, viz., that amongst the Foraminifera, the widest variations of form and aspect were compatible with specific identity. Hence I united numerous varieties hitherto regarded as specifically distinct. . . . What amount of variation is compatible with specific unity, is perhaps the most important inquiry now engaging the attention of philosophic zoologists ; and the reply to this query must be the common postulate of many philosophical syllogisms. No satisfactory response to the question has yet been given, even by the higher organisms ; still less by those diversified inferior creatures whose histories present so much that is anomalous and obscure. It is from among these latter, in all probability, that the most important materials for solving the problem must finally be drawn ; but these are precisely the objects whose history is most difficult to read, from the impossibility of tracing their infinitesimal germs through

all their conditions of life and development. . . . I have observed that we can detect a few stray gleams illuminating this obscure subject. The existence of some definite relationship between the outward forms of successive generations is indicated by the frequent prevalence of special varieties in particular localities. Thus the remarkable variety of Polymorphina, represented in fig. 149, prevails at Southport, in Lancashire, and also near the Eddystone lighthouse, and Plymouth Sound; the probability is, that in each locality these examples are the common products of some ancestral individuals, amongst which acquired peculiarities of contour have been hereditarily transmitted. Be that as it may, the study of specimens, both from our own coasts and foreign stations, satisfies me that there exists among the Foraminifera, a strong tendency to the perpetuation of certain unvarying types of form; and the similar occurrence of many existing varieties in a fossil state demonstrates that this tendency has operated through countless ages. But side by side with this disposition to constancy of form, we have the opposite one to endless differentiation. Whence do these diverse tendencies originate, and what circumstances are essential to their free operation?"

"In another part of this volume (pp. 19 and 20), I have called attention to the specimens represented by figures 32 a, 41 a, and 49), as indicating the existence of spontaneous fission amongst the soft animals of the Foraminifera. In each of these examples there appears to have been an abortive attempt at division of the uncalcified germ, which attempt the premature supervention of the calcifying process has arrested. Whenever such specimens occur, *it invariably happens that the two halves of the twin organism belong to the same variety or type.* It is fair to conclude that if the spontaneous fission had not been arrested, but the germ had affected its division into two parts prior to calcification, both of these, when calcified, would have retained their identity of form, just as they have done when linked together. Whether these germs were merely unimpregnated gemmiferous products, or whether they have resulted from the union of a sperm-cell, cannot now be determined, though probably both these processes will ultimately be demonstrated to exist among the Rhizopoda. The former of these is merely a modification of true spontaneous fissions, being but a small portion of the organism pinched off, in the place of its being divided into two nearly equal halves. The specimens just referred to indicate that *fission tends to repetition of identical types and not to differentiation*; hence I am disposed to believe that the origin of varieties of Foraminifera must not be sought amongst non-sexual fissiparous products, any more than a florist would seek corresponding varieties amongst the slips and cuttings from older plants. Analogy renders it probable that some equivalents for true ova exist amongst these creatures; if so, we might expect the tendency to differentiation commencing amongst these ova, just as new varieties of flowers result from varied potentialities hidden within the different seeds of individual plants. This hypothesis is perfectly compatible with the fact that the same individual Foraminifer often undergoes important changes in its progress

to maturity, the newer segments differing from the older ones; we must here carefully distinguish between true primary variations and those merely dependent on age and unequal development. The tendency to such ultimate differentiation in each individual resided potentially in each primary embryo; but this tendency must be distinguished from the variations between different individuals, *the sum of which variables, whether potential or actual, constitute the characteristics of the species, distinguishing it from all other species.*"

Nor in identifying the doctrine of Theism with the distinct creation—as opposed to natural development in every form—and enduring identity of species in all ages, may the more prominent objections to the main result or the methods of its accomplishment be overlooked.

Is it alleged that miraculous agency in producing distinct forms of plants and animals, as sharply contrasted to natural generation, is obviously unnecessary as an element in the true notion of the divine existence, or of the adequate definition of the primordial creation of the world? In so far as our argument is concerned—while inclined to a strong recoil from all such attenuations of the doctrine of a Creator, as would seem to assume that the human faculties can competently deal with the work of Creation as if it were a question regarding the maximum or minimum of divine energy in its performance—we have no special call to combat this position. Our present question does not refer to the separate ideas essential to the formal construction of the lowest possible notion of creative agency. It is not a speculative question merely that is now to be answered; on the contrary, in a great measure, it is practical, viz.—Is not a higher, because more comprehensive conception of God than what embraces merely intelligence in union with power,—and no more than this seems to be implied in the most reputable Theistic system of the supporters either of development or transmutation,—absolutely necessary to the protection of the speculative mind of the naturalist against the noxious moral influences of the atheistic spirit. In other words, will the *Noûs* patronised by Anaxagoras rescue the soul of any one, who is involved in speculations about laws and forces, from practically becoming something more than passively atheistic? is a question to which none but a negative reply seems possible.

Nor does this practical view tend either to invalidate the strictly logical character of the doctrine of the divine existence, or to the intermingling of any merely subjective element with the data in external nature on which it rests. On the contrary, it cannot fail to promote its more lively and robust assertion. It is in the recognition of the moral perfections of God—that of his living personality—that living man, in the

intelligent study of creation and the application of a sound logic in vindicating the doctrine of final causes, will realise the sources of his strength and security. This train of reflection, however, we will not prosecute farther, having, since entering into it, fortunately met with the following apposite passage in Dr Ogilvie's "Master Builder's Plan:"—

"Yet—strange to say—neither in Oken, by whose penetrating intellect were laid the foundations of the science of typical forms, nor in some of those who, since his time, have most successfully prosecuted it, did the principle they unfolded awaken any recognition of the moral attributes of God. Immersed in dreamy pantheism, they could regard him only as the animating principle of the universe, or lower still, simply as a necessary existence, manifesting itself by a continual succession of phenomenon, like a great panorama ever unrolling. But the reproach which has in consequence attached to such investigations is most unfounded; for so long as the truth of the divine personality is firmly grasped, the evidences of unity of organisation, instead of militating against the free agency of God, tend greatly to elevate our conceptions of His power and wisdom. We then see that in His works a greater problem is solved than the mere adaptation of means to ends, for this, without losing any of its completeness, is combined with a certain harmony and uniformity in the means themselves. We see the Almighty Creator, for the manifestation of His glory or other wise purposes, subjecting himself, as it were, to laws,—restricting himself, so to speak, in the choice of the mechanism of His work, that the power and wisdom which bring it to perfection all the same, may be the more apparent."

It is not, however, the conclusion merely that is objected to in this argument of specific identity as opposed to the transmutation of species. In the method or evidence of its attainment essential weakness is alleged to exist. At page 279 of his "Origin of Species," Mr Darwin remarks:—

"In the sixth chapter, I enumerated the chief objections which might be justly urged against the views maintained in this volume. Most of them have now been discussed. One, namely, the distinctness of specific forms and their not being blended together by innumerable transitional links is a very obvious difficulty. I assigned reasons why such links do not commonly occur at the present day, under the circumstances most favourable for their presence, namely, on an extensive and continuous area with graduated physical conditions. I endeavoured to shew that the life of each species depends in a more important manner on the presence of other already defined organic forms than on climate, and, therefore, that the really governing conditions of life do not graduate away quite insensibly like heat or moisture. I endeavoured, also, to shew that intermediate varieties, from existing in lesser numbers than the forms which they connect, will generally be beaten out and exterminated

during the course of further modification and improvement. The main cause, however, of innumerable intermediate links not now occurring everywhere throughout nature depends on the very process of natural selection, through which new varieties continually take the places of, and exterminate their parent forms. But just in proportion as this process of extermination has acted on an enormous scale, so must the number of intermediate varieties, which have formerly existed on the earth, be truly enormous. Why, then, is not every geological formation and stratum full of such intermediate links. Geology, assuredly, does not reveal any such finely graduated organic chain; and this perhaps is the most obvious and gravest objection which can be urged against my theory. The explanation lies, as I believe, in the extreme imperfection of the geological record."

A remarkable passage this! On it, however, as a whole, no minute or prolonged criticism is desirable, especially as something like a dim feeling of insecurity seems to have been at work in the author's mind in the moment of inditing it. And what is less an object either of envy or praise than that peculiarly nervous state of reflection that is induced by the suspicion that a favourite theory in both frame-work and bottom is irretrievably going to pieces? "If you strike a solid body," says Bacon, "that is brittle, it breaketh not only where the immediate force is, but breaketh all about into shivers and fritters." How much more will a speculation such as Mr Darwin's, having in it so little of what is solid, as compared with its large amount of visionary assumptions, either in his use of its materials, or by virtue of its cementing power, "break all about into shivers and fritters," no greater shock being sustained by it than what may be accounted for by the tremors of its author's uneasy thoughts?

Deserving however, of special attention is Mr Darwin's mode of accounting for the absence of transitional links among species in the geological record. He ascribes his own defective proofs to the extreme imperfection in the stony registers. The entries in the venerable journals of ancient nature have no report to make in his favour. He may not bribe them into silence, because they cannot but speak out in unimpassioned antagonism to his darling dream. Therefore, he alleges that full many a page of organisms that, doubtless, should have borne witness to the validity of that dream, has, in some inexplicable way, by some unaccountable agency, been torn out of its proper place, and gone disastrously amissing. In short, the great archives of the geological ages are hopelessly and intractably perverse and stupid.

Is it not, however, an instructive circumstance, that in so far as the history of organic nature in pre-historic eras can be interpreted, its lessons uniformly inculcate the doctrine of

permanency in types of structure, that where the traces of species disappear in one age, they are never repeated in any other succeeding it, a certain limitation of existence being assigned to each peculiar form, and especially that in comparing the more ancient with the more recent formations, the organic series of phenomena is equally conspicuous by an increase in the number of species, and also by an identical correspondence in many of them to such as presently exist? The explanation accordingly, supposing it consistent with facts, in which Mr Darwin takes refuge from his misgivings, is virtually an appeal from our knowledge, which is adverse to his whole theory, to our ignorance, which, if it suggest any presumptions at all in connection with that theory, must obviously increase the general improbabilities on which it rests. And this is an appeal which, of course, he cannot expect to be allowed, unless he adopt the peculiar philosophy, broadly hinted at in the poet's remonstrance,

"As if 'tis nothing worth, that lies concealed,
And science is not science till revealed."

But is it true, we may now ask, that there is any such great imperfection in the geological record as will suit the purpose of Mr Darwin? Are there any such blanks in the fossiliferous deposits, in so far as they are known, at all warranting the assertion that the information afforded by them regarding their vital phenomena is materially defective?

That great imperfections of various kinds may be expected in geological history,—that no articulate reply to many interesting questions regarding the forms and conditions of ancient life can be given by the most accomplished naturalists,—and that no theory in regard to the grouping and succession of vital phenomena will be so entirely satisfactory as to leave out no exceptions are propositions of no greater originality in conception than one of visionary Burnet's most obvious remarks, that, "for theoretical learning and sciences, there is nothing yet complete." At the same time, it cannot but be equally obvious to any one who will carefully estimate the precise use intended by Mr Darwin's averment of imperfection, that, while making every fair deduction from our confidence in the certainties of geological discoveries, as being of comparatively recent origin, and, by their vast and rapid accumulation of facts, presenting peculiar hindrances to adequate explanation, no such blanks occur in the order of strata, either as regards general collocation or special superposition, throughout the globe, as affords the least presumption in favour of Mr Darwin's view. Go wherever the geologist may, he meets with a most instructive uniformity of arrangement in the order of geological structure, the missing links of any

series in one district or country being supplied by their representatives in another.

But on this point we will not enlarge ; nor on the doctrine in aid of which Mr Darwin has summoned the negations of geology, can we dwell longer. We will merely take the benefit of the following remarks of Professor Owen :—

“ As to the successions, or coming in of new species, one might speculate on the gradual modifiability of the individual ; on the tendency of certain varieties to survive local changes, and thus progressively diverge from an older type ; on the production and fertility of monstrous offspring ; on the possibility, for example, of a variety of auk being occasionally hatched with a somewhat longer winglet, and a dwarfed stature ; on the probability of such a variety better adapting itself to the changing climate, or other conditions, than the old type—of such an origin of *Alca torda*, e. g. ; but to what purpose ? Past experience of the chance aims of human fancy, unchecked and unguided by observed facts, shews how they have ever glanced away from the gold centre of truth.”

How consolatory to the hearts of such as are alive to the scientific validity and higher relations of natural theology, amidst the confusions of thought that from time to time arise from the premature use of facts but imperfectly discerned, and especially from impure analogies, to realise the harmony subsisting between the instinctive modes of sanctified reason in men but little skilled in the interpretation of intricate phenomena, and the serene judgments of a highly-trained and vigorous intelligence. Amidst the strange doctrines in regard to the origin of life that now and again unexpectedly issue from what is regarded by many—perhaps too superstitiously—as the peculiar haunt and region of mature thought in the explanation of nature,—doctrines that, when adequately tested, are found to be almost identical with the cosmogonies so pungently derided in the ancient satirist's lampoon,

Ἐγείβους δ' ἐν ἀπείροσι κόλποις,

Τίττει πρώτιστον ὑπηνέμιον, Νῦξ ἢ μελανόπτερος ὦον,

how cheering to listen to words such as these of Britain's greatest anatomist, which are not more lofty in their wisdom than exemplary by their humility !

It would, however, be in no small degree unworthy of any friend of truth, and a marked violation of that candour and justice to which Mr Darwin is, as an accomplished and beneficial naturalist, peculiarly entitled, were the foregoing strictures given to the reader without any reference to the many valuable features of his recent work on the “ Origin of Species.” The most remarkable fact, indeed, connected with his book is, that while abounding in numerous illustrations of special adaptations and the doctrine of final causes, as co-extensive

with the ever-widening compass of natural history, he should be the advocate of a doctrine so utterly at variance with the fact of creative agency in the production of specific forms of animal and plant life. This is deeply to be regretted, for the author's sake, and because of the injury done to truth. And all the more, that there are few books in natural science, of recent production,—and no one, we believe, will question the fact of the marked fertility of the present day in the publication of works auxiliary to natural theology,—that may, to a larger extent, be laid under contribution for lively and apposite illustrations of design in creation.

To such of our readers as may not have seen Mr Darwin's work, the following extracts may be acceptable:—

"I am tempted," says Mr Darwin at page 73, "to give one more instance shewing how plants and animals, most remote in the scale of nature, are bound together by a web of complex relations. I shall hereafter have occasion to shew that the exotic *Lobelia fulgens*, in this part of England, is never visited by insects, and consequently, from its peculiar structure, never can set a seed. Many of our orchidaceous plants absolutely require the visits of moths to remove their pollen masses, and thus to fertilise them. I have also reason to believe that humble bees are indispensable to the fertilisation of heart's-ease (*Viola Tricolor*), for other bees do not visit this flower. From experiments which I have tried, I have found that the visits of bees, if not indispensable, are at least highly beneficial to the fertilisation of our clovers; but humble bees alone visit the common red clover (*Trifolium pratense*), as other bees cannot reach the nectar. Hence I have very little doubt that if the whole genus of humble bees become extinct or very rare in England, the heart's-ease and red clover would become very rare, or wholly disappear. The number of humble bees in any district depends in a great degree on the number of field mice, which destroy their combs and nests; and Mr H. Newman, who has long attended to the habits of humble bees, believes that "more than two-thirds of them are thus destroyed all over England." Now, the number of mice is largely dependent, as every one knows, on the number of cats; and Mr Newman says, "Near villages and small towns I have found the nests of humble bees more numerous than elsewhere, which I attribute to the number of cats that destroy the mice." Hence it is quite credible that the presence of a feline animal in large numbers in a district might determine, through the intervention first of mice and then of bees, the frequency of certain flowers in that district."

Nor are we to conclude from Mr Darwin's theory that he does not, in his volume, recognise the principle of final causes. At page 216 we meet with the following passage:—

"It is now commonly admitted that the more immediate and final cause of the cuckoo's instinct is, that she lays her eggs not daily,

but at intervals of two or three days, so that if she were to make her own nest and sit on her own eggs, those first laid would have to be left for some time unincubated, or there would be eggs and young birds of different ages in the same nest. If this were the case, the process of laying and hatching might be inconveniently long, more especially as she has to migrate at a very early period, and the first hatched young would probably have to be fed by the male alone. But the American is in this predicament; for she makes her own nest and has eggs and young successively hatched all at the same time."

It is impossible, however, even after the most favourable view that may be taken of the author's more reverential sentiments and words, his explicit mention of a Creator, and the many vivid illustrations of the adaptations of special means to special ends in nature, to avoid the painful inference, as regards the general scope and bearings of his volume, of its being but a slight modification of the doctrine of that book of most mischievous conception and mysterious parentage—the "*Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*." In both the salient features of the crude imaginings of Anaxagoras are reproduced. Tested by the rules of logic, creation in time, viewed as a special agency of a living God, is necessary neither to the validity of their original data, nor the consistency of their speculations. Both are most easily construed on the assumption of an incomprehensible activity of matter from all eternity. Not only in referring to a Creator do they extemporise, merely for the occasion, an unknown God, but they suggest the impossibility of a real God ever being known to man. In parting with Mr Darwin, we cannot but express a feeling of deep sadness and regret. How much better for the sacred cause of truth—how much more worthy of his scientific name, if using the "*fairly tales of science and the long result of time*," in child-like deference to the authority of the great I AM, he had spoken to the world in words like those of Richard Owen, in the Senate House of Cambridge. Of permanent injury, however, as the result of this or similar works, none at all deeply read in the past history of scientific thought will entertain any serious apprehension. In the noble words of Galileo, the friends of truth at all times can say, "*Quin ipsa philosophia talibus edisputationibus non nisi beneficium recipit. Nam si vera proponit homo ingeniosus veritatisque amans, nova ad eam accessio fiet; sin falsa, refutatione eorum priores tanto magis stabiliuntur.*"

But another topic of rather anxious interest to the theologian, emerging in connection with the large growth of difficult questions in natural science, is the frequent tendency to *theoretical exaggeration* in the vindication of the plan and method

of creation. And this tendency—no less hazardous in its results than irrational in its spirit—may be detected both in some ingenious conjectures, such as Mr Gosse's prochronism, in imaginary reconciliation of the geology of the rocks with the Mosaic genesis of natural phenomena, and also in such an extension of the doctrine of typical forms as oversteps its basis in facts, and therefore proves so much in excess of the true limits of natural types, as virtually to neutralise some of the most serviceable portions of the argument.

At present the attention of the reader is invited to a few strictures on what appears to be a manifest discrepancy in logic between actual phenomena and their general expression in the unity of a type. We purposely defer any discussion of Mr Gosse's argument, until we can embrace it in a more general inquiry into the geological value of the Mosaic record.

The *status questionis* in the matter of typical forms in creation, appears to us to be this. In studying individual phenomena, *e.g.*, the wallflower or common *Arabis* of our gardens—the blue tit among birds, or the familiar *Vanessa Urticæ* among *Lepidoptera*—the fifteen-spined stickle-back of our sea-ward rivulets, or the common shore crab—do we not discover a certain relation to some general type or types, which have constantly pervaded all natural organisms, and which contain within them in a potential form, the various modifications of structure and function, which are necessary to fit them for their respective conditions in living nature. In other words, is it not evident, on a comprehensive and exact view of the works of creation, in so far as man can know them, that in the idea of one general plan or method is to be found the most adequate explanation of the existence and relations of individual facts and organs?

In an affirmation of this sovereign and controlling unity is the highest expression of natural science, viewed as a part of philosophy. In this great thought is the most mature wisdom of the ripest naturalists of the day. It is, for example, in its recognition that Dr Carpenter has thus expressed himself:—

"In the several tribes of organised beings we have not a mere aggregation of individuals, each formed upon an independent model, and presenting a type of structure peculiar to itself; but that we may trace through each assemblage a conformity to a general plan, which may be expressed in an 'archetype' or ideal model, and of which every modification has reference either to the peculiar conditions under which the race is destined to exist, or to its relation to other beings. Of those special modifications, again, the most important themselves present a conformity to a plan of less generality; those next in order to a plan of still more limited extent, and so on, until we reach those which are peculiar to the individual itself. This

is, in fact, the philosophical expression of the whole science of classification."

On this conception of an order or system—a general scheme or method of agency in creation—viewed as a result of inductive reason, together with the obvious fitness of certain means to accomplish certain ends, the science of natural theology primarily rests. In the light of their organic union the dark spectral shapes of chance and blind necessity disappear. At their sovereign bidding the multitudinous forms of individual existence, in submitting to the laws of human thought, not only assume a vital harmony of arrangement, but become in their many obvious relations the outward symbols of pre-determining intelligence and wisdom. In their due study, man, conscious of design, as a primary law of his own spirit, is enabled to detect them as the witnesses to himself of the presence and agency of the living and true God,

"Who instructs the Brutes to scent
All changes of the element,
Whose wisdom fixed the scale
Of Natures, for our wants provides
By higher, sometimes humbler, guides,
When lights of reason fail."

Some rather unhappy misconceptions, however, of the true nature of this unity in creation, and the suitable method of knowing it, are sometimes observable in the theistic arguments both of divines and naturalists. The object of contemplation is, in some degree, denuded of its essential character, in consequence of a serious mistake in regard to the observer's legitimate and successful point of inquiry.

In the conscious unity of our own minds is the source of our expectation of unity, not only in the works of our fellow-men, but also and especially in the divine workmanship. In looking on a piece of mechanism, *e. g.*, a reaping-machine or a microscope, we unconsciously assume that its framer, in ordering and adjusting its several parts towards a definite end, was guided by a first principle of unity in his own mind. And, in like manner, with no less certainty, though it may be in certain cases with much less definite knowledge of the elementary constituents of objects, we assume that, as in the creation of every inorganic form, there is a chemical whole, so in every animal and plant there is a unity of structure and function. In the common foxglove, for example, no two bells of which are precisely the same, either in shape or colour—or in the edible crab, in which every segment of the breast-plate differs in some degree from another—or in the almost ceaselessly varying notes of the song of the missel-thrush—we feel—at the same time that we may be entirely incompetent to explain the

grounds of the conviction—that there is unity. Nor can it be otherwise.

“Unity,” remarks Dr Macvicar, in his profound Treatise on Human Nature, “is the very key-stone of a reflective nature; unity is, as it were, the very foundation of its structure. . . . But not the analysis of the conception of self-directive power only, thus giving unity as one of the conditions indispensable to the existence of such a power, attests the fact of unity, as a leading attributive of the self-directive principle. There are many other arguments for it; and among these we cannot regard as a trivial one, the fact of the existence of the idea of unity in the human mind itself, holding that conspicuous place in consciousness which it does. That the idea exists, I presume no unsophisticated mind will dispute. Now, whence can the soul have got such an idea? Not a single object in the outward, which any of the five senses could name, manifests a true unity. It cannot be from outward nature that this idea is derived. The soul, therefore, must have it from herself. The soul herself must be the fountain of the idea of unity, its object, and its archetype. Yes; and so she is. And this explains why the idea exists so fully in the soul, as it plainly does. She carries it about with her every where; and among all objects, be what they may, which are presented to her, her main intellectual engagement consists in seeking for unity.”

And in like manner, Archdeacon Hare has expressed himself in the following noble passage:—

“The principle, I said, which leads and compels us to seek for unity in all the objects of our contemplation, notwithstanding the diversity, and multiplicity, and contrariety wherewith they assail us, is the unity of our consciousness, in which our Divine Maker mirrored the unity of His own being. Accordingly, it is only so far as we retain this true unity in ourselves, that we can succeed in discovering a living unity without us. That there must be an essential pervading all God’s works, is implied indeed in the very fact of their being his works. Even in man’s works, in the works of the same man, there is a unity, whereby they reveal the mind they sprang from; though, as in all men there is more or less of disorder and distraction, the harmony in all has been marred and is incomplete. In a far higher degree, then, there must be a unity running through all the works of Him, who is essentially, and entirely, and indivisibly, and eternally One. But this true unity we cannot make out, unless we gain sight of its principle, unless we have hold of the only clue, with the aid of which we can explore the multitudinous chambers in the endless labyrinth of the universe,—unless we can trace back the countless streams of life to their one primary source in the wisdom and goodness of their Author. Cut off from this source, they seem unconnected, vagrant, often opposite. Hence there are two main causes, through the combined operation of which we are apt to miss unity; and no man has ever lived over

whom these two causes have not both of them exercised continually more or less sway. Both of them are the results of that separation from God, of that depravation of the Divine idea in man, which took place at the fall; unless it would be more correct to say that they are both parts of that very act through which man fell."

It is not, however, man's expectation of unity in nature that we have had in view in making these quotations, so much as the hints incidentally supplied by them on the important question as to the adequate method of its realisation.

Do we then err in believing that the likelihood of attaining to the discovery of that unity of creation that we naturally expect will greatly depend on the logical idea we may have antecedently formed of the generic character of that unity itself?—or are we mistaken in supposing that, in allowing one's self to theorise at all on that point, no small risk is incurred of entailing on subsequent inquiries an injurious influence?

Now, it may help in some measure, to elucidating these queries, if we state that, within the last few weeks, according to a newspaper report of the proceedings of a scientific society, the geometrical relations of trees and their elements, as determined by the goniometer, have again become the subject of grave discussion with certain theoretical naturalists. The typical form of precise figure in extension is alleged to pervade the vegetable kingdom, so that, altogether irrespective of every special end that may be subserved by the operation of chemical, physiological, and vital forces, and of their general combination in promoting one or other ultimate end, a geometrical unity is supposed to be *un fait accompli*. But where is the evidence of this? In standing beneath an elm or oak in the "leafy month of June," and gazing upward among its verdant mysteries of intricate foliage and complex branching, that display an almost endless variety in colour and outline, who is ever conscious of being disturbed by any thing like a departure from unity, unless recalling the fiction of a geometrical type, he is also constrained to recall the rather mischievous story of the Scottish engineer's renowned facilities of triangulation in "easing any angle" that was likely to prove obstinate and troublesome?

All such speculations originate, in our opinion, in ingenious and peculiarly ductile error. It is assumed that a *certain kind* of unity in nature, together with man's consciousness of that special unity, is a final cause; but, on the contrary, is not all unity the natural effect of the outward expression of the simplicity of the Divine mind, which, instead of confining itself to one or other unifying form in the phenomena of creation, as if

there were not innumerable methods of revealing the oneness of the infinite Creator, is constantly unfolding its all-sufficient fertility in reconciling contrasts, in educating the like from the unlike, and while ever responding to man's consciousness of unity, leaving him with still higher aspirations of knowing it more fully in the patient study of the infinite variety and glorious *integrity* (we use the term literally) of natural phenomena. Of this every day's increasing knowledge continues to furnish the most ample evidence. At the same time, while in man's sovereign consciousness is the evidence of his being a moral unit—one entire being, he is also aware of being formed of “similitude in dissimilitude, and dissimilitude in similitude,” of parts like and unlike, contrasted and conformed, and is thereby divinely taught to exercise caution in receiving stereotyped theories of the Plan of Creation, which some men, while making confession of their own ignorance, seem ready to confine within the narrow limits of certain categories, every one of which is more or less open to serious debate, if not prompt and peremptory denial.

In further illustration of the need of vigilance in scrutinising all such imposing schemes of interpretation as have been already referred to, as well as of exemplifying the wholesome nature of that method of investigating the unity of nature of which we have spoken, the commonly received notion of the relationship between plants and the climate in which they live may be adduced.

At first sight, the inference of a peculiar climate as deducible from the prevalence of certain plants, seems to have been not only probable but certain. If asserted as a general law or typical form, it seems entitled to claim as high a position in the categories of a General Plan of nature as has been awarded by some writers to the idea of Number or Colour. And, accordingly, confiding in this relationship between climate and plants, important conclusions drawn from a consideration of *fossil* plants, have been generally entertained in regard to climatal alterations equally great in extent and influence in previous conditions of the surface of the earth.

“Before drawing conclusions,” remarks Professor Balfour, “as to the climate or physical condition of the globe at different geological epochs, the botanist must be well informed as to the vegetation of different countries, as to the soils and localities in which certain plants grow, whether on land or in the sea, or in lakes, in dry and marshy ground, in valleys or on mountains, or in estuaries, in hot, temperate, or cold regions. It is only by a careful consideration of all these particulars that any correct inferences can be drawn as to the condition of the globe.”

And in the views set forth by the learned professor, in

these well chosen and careful words, the student who has been duly disciplined in the methods of a cautious induction cannot but fully concur. How easily, however, may such views be exaggerated, more especially if the humble path of a strictly inductive inquiry be forsaken for the more ambitious course of concussing nature into an artificial support of some special theory of unity !

To use the apposite words of Professor Harvey, in an exceedingly able review of Alphonse de Candolle's *Geographie Botanique, Raisonnée*, in the *Natural History Review*, "many persons suppose that the presence or absence of such and such forms of vegetation is a certain indication of a precise climate, as if each plant individually were a sort of natural thermometer. This incorrect notion has been perhaps chiefly mischievous in reference to the obscure regions of fossil botany, where certain climates have been hastily assumed to have existed in certain localities at a former epoch, because certain forms are found fossilised in the strata. Thus, because *Zamias* are now found at the Cape of Good Hope, in New Holland, and in the table-land of Mexico, and because fossils of kindred structure are imbedded in the strata of England, and of other northern countries, it has been assumed that the England of the Zamian era must have had a similarly hot and dry climate to that of Southern Africa, or of Western Australia, where these forms of vegetation are now common. The inference, however, is a very vague one, resting on a very narrow basis, as will be evident when we examine a little more carefully the climates where the Cycadeæ are now found. We shall then discover, that though none inhabit a very cold country, yet the range of climate, especially as regards humidity, over which the order is distributed, is very extensive, some species growing in the moist jungles of tropical India, others in the low islands of the Pacific archipelagos, besides those more familiar forms which we have from the arid regions of the Cape and Australia. It would be impossible to tell, from the mere inspection of a modern Cycadeous stem and foliage, whether they had grown in a tropical or extra-tropical climate; and it must be just as hazardous to pronounce on the nature of the climate which nourished Cycadeæ in the earlier eras of our planet. It would be as reasonable to judge from the finding of fossil *acorns* or oak-logs that such indicated a climate in the regions where they occurred similar to that of Modern England. But in this hasty assumption we should lose sight of the fact that the genus *Quercus* has a wide distribution in tropical as well as in temperate and cold latitudes, species being found from very high latitudes on the American continent nearly to the equator, and occurring on

the mountains and table-lands of tropical India, and of the islands of Java. Were the species of oak now existing in Java fossilised there, leaving no descendants, some future geologists, knowing the oak only as a form of vegetation of cold or temperate climates, might draw, from its presence in the strata of Java, a very false inference respecting the early climate of that tropical island.

"That a plant does not indicate a particular climate in a manner analogous to a thermometer or hygrometer, must be evident to any one at all acquainted with the powers of endurance which certain species display, and the feebleness of endurance equally obvious in other species; so that each species of plant has, in some degree, its own *charter*, one enjoying more extensive privileges than another. Nor, until we have ascertained the facts regarding species by particular observations, can we with certainty foretell what will be the effect of change of climate upon them. What would be more natural than to suppose that all the plants spontaneous at the Cape of Good Hope, supposing they occurred at a tolerably uniform elevation above the sea, would be influenced by change of climate in a like degree? Their native climate is a very remarkable one—remarkable for the intensity and amount of solar light throughout the year; for rapid changes of temperature, and for the very unequal distribution of moisture at different seasons. We should expect among them a common feeling—so to say—on their removal to this country; and such, to a certain extent, is the case. But the exceptions are very numerous; for while some—such as the Heaths and Pelargoniums—flourish and actually improve in the artificial climates of our greenhouses, others—as many of the bulbs—are with difficulty induced to blossom, and rapidly degenerate.

"As might be expected, most Cape plants require the protection of glass in winter; but to this there are many remarkable exceptions. The *Agapanthus* flowers freely in the south of Ireland, in the open ground, from year to year; and the *Tritomanthe* (hot-poker plant) is even still more hardy; for we have seen it raise its spike of scarlet uninjured from among the snow. Yet this plant is a native, not of high mountains or table-lands, but of the low plains at the Cape, where the thermometer may stand on a summer day in the ground, close to its roots, at a height of 130° to 160° . When we find such wide discrepancies as these among plants of the same region, we may well agree with our author in maintaining that the question of the relation of plants to climate is a very complicated one; and that we can only rightly understand by regarding plants as "living machines," having a certain work to do, and struggling to perform it at all hazards, fighting under

difficulties against physical agencies. Beyond a minimum of light, heat, moisture, life ceases. With fair proportions of these (according to the wants of each individual species), it is maintained with vigour; and there are a thousand intermediate stages of excess or deficiency in which a struggle for existence is by the more hardy species maintained."

While, therefore, recognising the scientific value of man's instinctive expectations of an objective unity—the natural result of his own personal consciousness,—and the importance alike to his own well-being and the advancement of knowledge, of his actively endeavouring to realise that expectation, we cannot fail, if we would not repudiate the legitimate claims of natural science, to discriminate between the widely-different practical tendencies, on the one hand, of a theory of unity that is specially directed towards its own proximate verification in external phenomena, and on the other, of an instinctive belief, the verification of which in nature is not only, in its constant demands of the utmost caution, forbearance, and self-restraint in the inquirer, an important means of mental discipline, but is also the only reliable mode of ascertaining what the divine plan and order of nature really is.

In the language of Professor Tappan, "the conception of final causes, like other universal and necessary conceptions, accepts the observations of the senses as its condition and antecedent in time; but it can rest upon an idea of the reason alone as its constitutive element. Phenomena fleeting and apparently irregular and confused are grasped by this idea, and reduced to orderly and beautiful relations. And it is not only in fields of observation actually presented, that it arranges and composes phenomena, and reduces system; as a watchful and expectant eye, it is ever looking about to find phenomena that shall fall in with its own preconceptions. It is a necessary prophetic thought, which wanders through the universe. Where no observation can reach, it has full assurance there is design."

ART. IX.—*Leaders of the Reformation: Luther, Calvin, Latimer, Knox.* By JOHN TULLOCH, D.D., Principal and Primarius Professor of Theology, St Mary's College, St Andrews. W. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1859. 8vo. Pp. 324.

THE Reformation from Popery in the sixteenth century was the greatest event, or series of events, that has occurred since the close of the Canon of Scripture; and the men who are

really entitled to be called the "Leaders of the Reformation" have a claim to more respect and gratitude than any other body of uninspired men that have ever influenced or adorned the church. The Reformation was closely connected in various ways with the different influences which about that period were affecting for good the general condition of Europe, and in combination with them it aided largely in introducing and establishing great improvements in all matters affecting literature, civilisation, liberty, and social order. The movement, however, was primarily and fundamentally a religious one, and all the most important questions that may be started about its character and consequences, should be decided by tests and considerations properly applicable to the subject of true religion. The Reformers claimed to be regarded as being engaged in a religious work, which was in accordance with God's revealed will, and fitted to promote the spiritual welfare of men; and we are at once entitled and bound to judge of them and their work, by investigating and ascertaining the validity of this claim.

There are two leading aspects in which the Reformation, viewed as a whole, may be regarded; the one more external and negative, and the other more intrinsic and positive. In the first aspect it was a great revolt against the see of Rome, and against the authority of the church and of churchmen in religious matters, combined with an assertion of the exclusive authority of the Bible, and of the right of all men to examine and interpret it for themselves. In the second and more important and positive aspect, the Reformation was the proclamation and inculcation, upon the alleged authority of Scripture, of certain views in regard to the substance of Christianity or the way of salvation, and in regard to the organization and ordinances of the Christian church. Many men have approved and commended the Reformation, viewed merely as a repudiation of human authority in religion, and an assertion of the right of private judgment, and of the exclusive supremacy of the Scriptures as the rule of faith, who have not concurred in the leading views of the Reformers in regard to Christian theology and church organization. In this sense, rationalists and latitudinarians have generally professed to adopt and act upon what they call the principles of the Reformation, while they reject all the leading doctrines of the Reformers. Men of this class usually attempt to pay off the Reformers with the credit of having emancipated mankind from ecclesiastical thralldom, established the right of private judgment, and done something to encourage the practice of free inquiry. But while giving the Reformers credit for these things, they have often rejected the leading doctrines of the Reforma-

tion upon theological and ecclesiastical subjects, and have been in the habit of claiming to themselves the credit of having succeeded, by following out the principles of the Reformation, in educing, either from Scripture or from their own speculations, more accurate and enlightened doctrinal views than the Reformers ever attained to. There has been a great deal of this sort of thing put forth both by rationalists and latitudinarians who professed to admit the authority of the Christian revelation, and by infidels who denied it. Dr Robertson in his life of Charles V. spoke of some doctrinal discussions of that period in such terms as justly to lay himself open to the following rebuke of Scott, the son of the commentator, in his excellent *Continuation of Milner's "History of the Church of Christ."*

"It is manifest what is the character that Dr Robertson here affects, which is that of the philosopher and the statesman, in preference, if not to the disparagement, of that of the Christian divine. This is entirely to the taste of modern times, and will be sure to secure to him the praise of large and liberal views among those who regard a high sense of the importance of revealed truth, and all 'contending earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints,' as the infallible mark of narrow-mindedness and bigotry." (Vol. i. p. 270.)

Dr Campbell of Aberdeen, too, who was a very great pretender to candour, has, in the last of his Lectures on ecclesiastical history, made it manifest that he considered the chief benefits which the Reformers had conferred upon the world, to be the setting an example of free inquiry, and the exposing of church tyranny, superstitious and idolatrous practices, and clerical artifices, and that he despised all their zealous efforts and contentings in restoring the pure gospel of the grace of God, the true system of Christian theology, as conversant only, according to the common cant of latitudinarians, with metaphysical subtleties and scholastic jargon.

But the climax, perhaps, of this practice of paying off the Reformers with some commendation of their services in promoting free inquiry, while all their leading doctrines are rejected, is to be found in the facts, that in our own day such a man as Bretschneider wrote a "*Dissertatio De Rationalismo Lutheri*," and that Wegscheider dedicated his "*Institutiones Theologiæ Christianæ Dogmaticæ*," which is just a system of Deism in a sort of Christian dress, "*Piis Manibus Martini Lutheri*," mainly upon the ground, that he had opened up liberty of thought, and encouraged posterity to advance much farther in the path on which he had entered.

A somewhat different aspect of this matter has been presented by certain writers, who are not disposed to allow to the Reformers even the credit of having encouraged and promoted

free inquiry. It has been alleged that there is little or nothing said in the writings of the Reformers about the right and duty of private judgment, and that the absence of this, combined with their great zeal for what they reckoned truth, and their strenuous and vehement opposition to what they reckoned error, proved that after all they were nothing better than narrow-minded bigots. Hallam, in his "Literature of Europe during the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries," has some statements to this effect; and the facts on which he founds are in the main true, though they certainly do not warrant his conclusions (Pt. i. ch. iv., Sects. 60 and 61). It must, however, we fear, be conceded to Hallam and others who take this view, 1st, that the Reformers were not much in the habit of formally and elaborately discussing, *as a distinct and independent topic*, what has since been called the right and duty of private judgment; and 2d, that they ever professed it to be their great object to find out the actual truth of God contained in his word, that they were very confident that in regard to the main points of their teaching they had found the truth, and that they were very strenuous in urging that other men should receive it also upon God's authority. And these facts are amply sufficient to secure for them in certain quarters the reputation of being narrow-minded bigots.

The Reformers did not discuss at much length, or with any great formality, the subject of the right of private judgment as a general topic, but they understood and acted upon their right as rational and responsible beings to reject all mere authority in religious matters, to try everything by the standard of God's word, and to judge for themselves, on their own responsibility, as to the meaning of its statements. And by following this course, by acting on this principle, by setting this example, they have conferred most important benefits upon the church and the world.

The fundamental position maintained by the Reformers was this, that the views which they had been led to form, as to what should be the doctrine, worship, and government, of the church of Christ, were *right*, and that the views of the Church of Rome upon these points, as opposed to theirs, were *wrong*. This was the grand position they occupied, and they based their whole procedure upon the ground of the paramount claims of divine truth, *its* right as coming from God and being invested with his authority, to be listened to, to be obeyed, and to be propagated. When the papists opposed them in the maintenance of this position, and appealed on their own behalf to tradition, to ecclesiastical authority, to the decisions of popes and councils, the Reformers in reply pushed all this aside, by asserting the supremacy of the written word as the

only standard of faith and practice, by denying the legitimacy of submitting to mere human authority in religious matters, and by maintaining that men are entitled and bound to judge for themselves, upon their own responsibility, as to what God in his word has required them to believe and to do. They asserted these positions more or less fully as circumstances required, but still they regarded them as in some sense subsidiary and subordinate. The primary question with them always was, What is the *truth* as to the way in which God ought to be worshipped, in which a sinner is saved, and in which the ordinances and arrangements of the church of Christ ought to be regulated? They were bent upon answering, and answering aright, *this* important question, and they brushed aside everything that stood in their way and obstructed their progress.

There can be no doubt that the only satisfactory explanation of the conduct of the Reformers is, that they regarded themselves as fighting for the cause of God; and it is creditable to Hallam that, unable, as he admitted, to understand their theology, and having no predilection on their behalf, he should have seen and asserted this, in opposition to the ordinary calumnies of the Papists.* But the great, the only really important, question is, Was it indeed the cause of God? or in other words, was it indeed the truth of God which they deduced from His word, and which they laboured to promote and to enforce? If it was not so, then they have deserved little gratitude, and they can have effected little good. In estimating the value of what God gave to them, and what they have transmitted to us, almost everything depends upon the truth, the Scriptural truth, of the doctrines which they taught and laboured to advance. The highest honour of the Reformers, or rather the principal gift which God gave them, viewed as public teachers

* Hallam's statements about Luther and the Reformers are certainly very defective and erroneous; but they have much the appearance of being chiefly traceable to what may be called honest ignorance and blundering. He seems to have intended to be fair and candid in his statements regarding them; and he probably was about as much so as could reasonably be expected of an irreligious man who was very imperfectly acquainted with theological subjects. He admits (P. 1, c. iv., s. 61), that "every solution of the conduct of the Reformers must be nugatory, except one,—that they were men absorbed by the conviction that they were fighting the battle of God." He describes Luther (s. 59), as a man "whose soul was penetrated with a fervent piety, and whose integrity, as well as purity of life, are unquestioned." He admits (c. vi., s. 26), that he had but a "slight acquaintance" with Luther's writings, and that he had "found it impossible to reconcile or understand his tenets concerning faith and works." After all this, it was scarcely to be expected from Hallam's usual good sense and fairness, that he should have charged Luther with Antinomianism. There is a thorough exposure of the blundering incompetency of Hallam, as well as of the more discreditable delinquencies of Sir William Hamilton in this matter, in Archdeacon Hare's admirable "Vindication of Luther."

who have exerted an influence upon the state of religious opinion and practice in the world, was that, in point of fact, they did deduce from the word of God, the *truths* or *true doctrines* which are there set forth, and that they brought them out and expounded and enforced them in such a way as led, through God's blessing, to their being extensively received and applied. Christian theology, in some of its most important articles, had for a long period been grossly corrupted in the Church of Rome, which then comprehended the largest portion of Christendom. The Lord was pleased, through the instrumentality of the Reformers, to expose these corruptions, to bring out prominently before the world the true doctrines of his word, in regard to the worship which he required and would accept, the way in which he had provided and was bestowing, and in which sinners were to receive, the salvation of the gospel, and the way in which the ordinances and arrangements of His church were to be regulated; and to effect that these true Scriptural doctrines should be extensively disseminated, should become powerfully influential, and should be permanently preserved over a considerable portion of His church. The Lord did this by his Spirit at the era of the Reformation, and he employed in doing it the instrumentality of the Reformers. He guided them not only to the adoption of the right method, the use of the appropriate means for detecting error and discovering divine truth, but what was of primary and paramount importance, he guided them to a right judgment, that is, right in the main and with respect to all fundamental points, as to what particular doctrines were true and false according to the standard of His own written word. Their unquestionable sincerity and integrity, their unwearied zeal and activity, their great talents and their undaunted courage, would only have shed a false glare around a bad cause, if it was not indeed the cause of God which they were maintaining. Their other good qualities would have tended rather to evil than to good results, if it had not been really error which they opposed and God's truth which they supported. We believe nothing *because* the Reformers believed it, and we approve of nothing *because* they practised it; but judging of them by the same standard which they applied to the Church of Rome, and by which they professed to regulate their own opinions and conduct, *because* we believe with them that it is the right standard, we are firmly persuaded, that what they opposed was error—grievous and dangerous error—and that what they maintained was in the main truth—God's own truth—taught in His word, and revealed to them by the teaching of His own Spirit.

There is so much unanimity among the Reformers, so much harmony in the confessions of the Reformed churches, as to

entitle us to speak of the *theology of the Reformation*, as conveying a pretty distinct idea of a particular system of doctrine upon the leading articles of the Christian faith ; and we think it can be proved, not only that this theology was sound and Scriptural, as compared with what had previously prevailed in the Church of Rome, but that the deviations which Protestants have since made from it have been in the main retrogressions from truth to error. We do not set up the Reformers as guides or oracles ; we do not invest them with any authority, or believe anything because they believed it. There is, indeed, no authority in religion but that of God, and authority, in its strict and proper sense, does not admit of degrees. The fact that certain doctrines were taught by some particular class or body of men, is either at once and of itself a sufficient reason why we must embrace them, or else it is of no real weight and validity in determining what we should believe. It is entitled to be received as authoritative and determining, only when the men in question can produce satisfactory evidence that they have been commissioned and inspired by God. There is a sense, indeed, in which some respect or deference is due to the opinions of others. But this respect or deference should never be transmuted into anything like authority or obligation. It may afford a valid call for careful attention and diligent investigation, but for nothing more. It should have no determining or controlling influence. The Reformers, with respect to all points in which they were substantially of one mind, may be regarded as being upon the whole entitled to more respect and deference, than any other body of men who could be specified or marked out at any one period in the history of the church. But it holds true universally, that God has never given to any uninspired man or body of men, to rise altogether above the influence of the circumstances in which they were placed, in the formation and expression of their opinions upon religious subjects. And even the greatest admirers of the Reformers readily admit that they, all of them, though not in the main features of their theological system, yielded more or less to the various sources of error which prevail among men, and more particularly, that they exhibited, on the one hand, traces that they had not wholly escaped from the corrupting influence of the system in which they had been educated, and on the other hand, what is equally natural, that they were sometimes in danger in avoiding one extreme of falling into the opposite one.

These obvious views about the position and services of the Reformers have been suggested to us by the perusal of Principal Tulloch's work on the Leaders of the Reformation. It is intended as a popular sketch of the main features in the his-

tory of Luther, Calvin, Latimer, and Knox ; and regarded in this light, it is fairly entitled to very considerable commendation. We cannot say that the work displays any great power of thought, or any great extent of research. We have no idea that Dr Tulloch is familiar with the writings of the Reformers, or that he is qualified to appreciate them in connection with the highest departments of the work which they performed. But he has given a very intelligent, interesting, and candid survey of the principal features of the life and the general character and position, of the men whom he has selected as the leaders of the Reformation. He has taken considerable pains to understand and to state accurately most of the points he has discussed. He has shewn a large measure of fairness and candour in the principal views he has put forth ; and he has presented them generally in a very pleasing and interesting style.

Dr Tulloch's book, as a whole, would have been entitled to very considerable commendation, if it had not put forth some very objectionable and dangerous views in regard to the theology of the Reformers, by far the most important feature in their history. The object of the work did not require of Dr Tulloch to enter into theological exposition or discussion, and we might have passed over the work with commending what was commendable in it, if he had entirely ignored theological subjects. But he has not done this. He has put forth certain views in regard to the theology of the Reformers which we believe to be unsound and dangerous, and which we think it incumbent upon us to expose.

The Reformers themselves reckoned it the great duty which they were called upon to discharge, the great work which God gave them to do, to bring out from the sacred Scriptures right views of Christian theology and of church organization, in opposition to those which generally prevailed in the Church of Rome. They believed that they were enabled, by God's grace, to succeed to a large extent in doing this ; and all who have since concurred with them in this belief have also, as a matter of course, regarded their success *in this respect* as a very great service rendered to the church and the world, as, indeed, the greatest service which they rendered, or could render. We believe that the theology of the Reformation, in its great leading features, both as it respects doctrine in the more limited sense of the word, and as it respects the organization of the church as a society, is the unchangeable truth of God revealed in his word, which individuals and churches are bound to profess and to act upon. Dr Tulloch, we fear, has come to a different conclusion upon this important question, and has plainly enough given the world to understand

that, in his judgment, the theology of the Reformation, though a creditable and useful thing in the sixteenth century, and a great improvement on the state of matters that then prevailed in the Church of Rome, has now become antiquated and obsolete, and quite unsuitable to the enlightenment which characterizes this age.

He does not adduce any specific objections against the theology of the Reformation; but having attained to a much greater elevation, a far higher platform, than the Reformers ever reached, he coolly but conclusively sets aside the results of all their investigations of divine things, as now scarcely worthy of being seriously examined. This not only, as we have already explained, deprives the Reformers of what all who have in the main adopted their principles, have regarded as the greatest honour which God conferred upon them, the greatest service they were enabled to render; but it bears, and, as we believe, bears injuriously, upon a matter of infinitely greater importance than any question affecting the reputation of any body of men, even the accurate exposition of the system of revealed truth. Dr T. does not profess to discuss any theological questions; and his views upon these points are brought out very vaguely and imperfectly. But he has said enough to shew that he has given up the theology of the Reformation as untenable and unsatisfactory; and he evidently thinks that all liberal men who are abreast of this enlightened age must do the same. It is quite evident that men's whole views and impressions in regard to the history of the Reformers must be greatly influenced by the admission or the denial, that they were God's instruments in bringing out to a large extent the permanent truth revealed in His word, and in restoring the church to a large measure of apostolic purity; and it is highly creditable to Dr T. that, denying this, he should have treated them with so large a measure of justice and fairness in most other respects. But it was scarcely possible that one who withholds from them their highest and most peculiar honour should be perfectly just and fair to them in everything else; and there are indications, though not many or important, of his depreciating them even in matters not much connected with their theology. There is not much to complain of in what he says of Luther and Knox, barring their theology, except that he underrates their intellectual powers, when he says of the former (p. 72) that, "as a theological thinker he takes no high rank, and has left little or no impress upon human history;" and of the latter (p. 317) that, "as a mere thinker, save perhaps on political subjects, he takes no rank."*

* This somewhat supercilious way of disposing of eminent men is in great favour with Dr T. He applies it to Beza likewise, calling him (p. 145) "a

Few, we think, who have read the principal works of Luther and Knox will concur in this opinion of these men, and even in some of the things which Dr T. himself has recorded about them, there is enough to convince discerning men that they did take high rank as thinkers on theological subjects. Luther, notwithstanding his great mental powers, and the great light he has thrown upon many important topics of discussion, had yet such defects and infirmities, as to unfit him very much for being appealed to as a guide or oracle on theological subjects; and Knox, overshadowed by Calvin, is not so frequently contemplated as a theologian, though his treatise on Predestination proves, we venture to think, that he is entitled to take high rank as a thinker. For the reasons now referred to, neither Luther nor Knox seems to have strongly excited Dr T.'s anti-theological zeal, and he certainly deals out to them a large measure of justice and candour, though he does not appreciate fully either their talents or their services.

Calvin, however, as might be expected, does not fare so well in Dr T.'s hands. He was so thoroughly the great representative of all that Dr T. seems most heartily to disapprove and dislike, viz., a distinct and definite system of theological doctrine, and a church organisation upon the model of apostolic precept and practice, that it was scarcely to be expected that the great Reformer would get justice from him. He does not, indeed, so far as we remember, make any direct attempt to depreciate Calvin's intellectual powers, or to dispute *his* right "to take high rank as a thinker." But we have a strong impression that he comes far short of a just appreciation even of Calvin's mental powers and capacities. And it should not be forgotten, that it has become very much the fashion now-a-days, even among Romanists, as a matter of policy, to praise Calvin's talents. Even Audin, his latest Popish biographer, who is just as thoroughly unprincipled as the champions of Popery usually are, has given the appearance of something like candour to his "*Life of Calvin*," by strong statements about his great talents, his literary excellencies, and his commanding influence. Dr T., while he makes no direct attempt to depreciate Calvin's talents, does injustice, we think, in several respects to his general character. He says nothing, indeed, against him which has not been said often before. He just repeats what has been so frequently alleged against Calvin, his want of the lively, meddlesome, serviceable, but by no means great man." Sir William Hamilton, who, when he condescends to praise any of the Reformers, and particularly when the question respects their talents and acquirements, must be regarded as a somewhat higher authority than Dr T., has pronounced such a eulogium on Beza as plainly implies that *he* reckoned him a great man, and he expressly describes him as "this great thinker and illustrious divine." (Be not Schematics, &c., p. 30, 35.)

more amiable and engaging qualities, his pride and coldness, his sternness and cruelty. He does not seem to appreciate the purity and elevation of the motives by which Calvin was animated, and of the objects he aimed at. He does not appear to have turned to good account the greater accessibility now-a-days of Calvin's Letters, which are so admirably fitted to counteract some of the prevailing misconceptions of his character, and to shew that there was nearly as much about him to love as to admire, as much to excite affection and confidence as veneration and respect. Dr Jules Bonnet, who has done so much to make Calvin's Letters more widely known, describes, in the preface to the English translation, his letters to Farel, Viret, and Beza, as exhibiting "the overflowings of a heart filled with the deepest and most acute sensibility." It might have been supposed that no one who had really read the two volumes of Calvin's Letters, to which this statement is prefixed, would have any doubt of its truth and accuracy. But Dr T. it seems has not been able to find anything of this sort, and, accordingly, he disposes of Dr Bonnet's statement in this way (p. 153)—"Overflowing of any kind is exactly what you never find in Calvin, even in his most familiar letters." We fear that Dr T. must understand the word "overflowing" in a different sense from other men; for if we had space we could easily produce plenty of extracts from his Letters which most men, we are confident, would, without any hesitation, declare to be overflowings of the warmest and tenderest feeling, outpourings of the most hearty and cordial kindness and sympathy, and of the purest and noblest friendship. Calvin's character, intellectual, moral, and religious, has been most highly appreciated by the most competent judges; and the collection of testimonies in commendation of him and his works, published in one of the last volumes of the Calvin Translation Society, containing his Commentary on Joshua, is probably unexampled in the history of the human race. But we are not sure if a more emphatic tribute to his excellence and his power is not furnished by the hostility of which he has been the object; often breaking out into furious rancour, and frequently, even when assuming a greatly modified aspect, indicating a strong disposition to depreciate him, and to bring him down to the level of ordinary men. But we cannot dwell longer upon this topic, though, if space permits, we may take an opportunity of stating, in the concluding part of this article, our general impressions of Calvin, and our views of the way in which the charges commonly adduced against him ought to be disposed of. We must hasten to notice the position which Dr T. has assumed in regard to the theology of the Reformation; and here it will be necessary in fairness to give him an opportunity of speak-

ing for himself. His views are brought out pretty fully in the following extracts:—

"The spiritual principle is eternally divine and powerful. It is a very different thing when we turn to contemplate the dogmatic statements of Luther. So soon as Luther began to evolve his principle, and coin its living heart once more into dogma, he shewed that he had not risen above the scholastic spirit which he aimed to destroy. It was truly impossible that he could do so. Not even the massive energy of Luther could pierce through those intellectual influences which had descended as a hoary heritage of ages to the sixteenth century." (P. 83).

"The Reformation, in its theology, did not and could not escape the deteriorating influences of the scholastic spirit, for that spirit survived it, and lived on in strength, although in a modified form, throughout the 17th century. In one important particular, indeed, the scholastic and Protestant systems of theology entirely differed: the latter began their systematising from the very opposite extreme to that of the former—from the divine and not from the human side of redemption—from God and not from man. And this is a difference on the side of truth by no means to be overlooked. Still the spirit is the same—the spirit which does not hesitate to break up the divine unity of the truth in Scripture into its own logical shreds and patches, which tries to discriminate what in its moral essence is inscrutable, and to trace in distinct dogmatic moulds the operation of the divine and human wills in salvation, while the very condition of all salvation is the eternal mystery of their union in an act of mutual and inexpressible love. This spirit of ultra-definition—of essential rationalism—was the corrupting inheritance of the new from the old theology; and it is difficult to say, all things considered, as we trace the melancholy history of Protestant dogmas, whether its fruits have been worse in the latter or in the former instance. The mists, it is true, have never again so utterly obscured the truth, but that dimness, covering a fairer light, almost inspires the religious heart with a deeper sadness." (P. 84-5.)

"While thus claiming for Calvinism a higher Scriptural character, it would yet be too much to say that Calvinism, any more than Lutheranism, or latterly Arminianism, was primarily the result of a fresh and living study of Scripture. Calvin, no doubt, went to Scripture. He is the greatest Biblical commentator, as he is the greatest biblical dogmatist, of his age; but his dogmas, for the most part, were not primarily suggested by Scripture; and as to his distinguishing dogma, this is eminently the case. Like Luther, he had been trained in the scholastic philosophy, and been fed on Augustine; and it was no more possible for the one than for the other to get beyond the scholastic spirit or the Augustinian doctrine. An attentive study of the "Institutes" reveals the presence of Augustine everywhere; and great even as Calvin is in exegesis, his exegesis is mainly controlled by Augustinian dogmatic theory." (P. 166.)

"This appeal to an earlier catholicity on the part of the reformed

theologies—this support in Augustine—beyond doubt greatly contributed to their success in their day. For few then ventured to doubt the authority of Augustinianism, and the theological spirit of the 16th century hardly at any point got beyond it. It was a natural source of triumph to the great Protestant confessions against the unsettled belief or more superficial theologies which they encountered, that they wielded so bold and consistent a weapon of logic, and appealed so largely to an authoritative Scriptural interpretation. Calvinism *could not but* triumph on any such modes of reasoning or of biblical exegesis as then prevailed; and so long as it continued to be merely a question of systems, and logic had it its own way, this triumph was secure.

“But now that the question is changed, and logic is no longer mistress of the field; now, when a spirit of interpreting Scripture, which could have hardly been intelligible to Calvin, generally asserts itself—a spirit which recognises a progress in Scripture itself—a diverse literature and moral growth in its component elements, and which, at once looking backward with reverence, and forward with faith, has learned a new audacity, or a new modesty, as we shall call it, according to our predilections, and while it accepts withal the mysteries of life and of death, refuses to submit them arbitrarily to the dictation of any mere logical principle; now that the whole sphere of religious credence is differently apprehended, and the provinces of faith and of logical deduction are recognised as not merely incommensurate, but as radically distinguished,—the whole case as to the triumphant position of Calvinism, or indeed any other theological system, is altered. An able writer in our day (Mansel, in his Bampton Lectures), has shewn with convincing power what are the inevitably contradictory results of carrying the reasoning faculty with determining sway into the department of religious truth. The conclusions of that writer, sufficiently crushing as directed by him against all rationalistic systems, are to the full as conclusive against the *competency* of all theological systems whatever. The weapon of logical destructiveness which he has used with such energy, is a weapon of offence really against all religious dogmatism. What between the torture of criticism, and the slow but sure advance of moral idea, this dogmatism is losing all hold of the most living and earnest intelligence everywhere. And it seems no longer possible, under any new polemic form, to revive it. Men are weary of heterodoxy and of orthodoxy alike, and of the former in any arbitrary and dogmatic shape still more intolerably than the latter. The old *Institutio Christianæ Religionis* no longer satisfies, and a new *Institutio* can never replace it. A second Calvin in theology is impossible. Men thirst not less for spiritual truth, but they no longer believe in the capacity of system to embrace and contain that truth, as in a reservoir, for successive generations. They must seek for it themselves afresh in the pages of Scripture, and the ever-dawning light of spiritual life, or they will simply neglect and put it past as an old story.” (P. 167-9.)

These extracts fully justify the statements we have made in

regard to the scope and tendency of this book, and in commenting upon them in order to shew this, we shall speak of the theology of the Reformation and Calvinism as substantially identical, not meaning by Calvinism the personal opinions of Calvin, but the leading features of the Calvinistic system of theology, as distinguished from the Arminian and Socinian systems. In this sense Calvinism may be fairly called the theology of the Reformation, as it was certainly, though with different degrees of accuracy and fulness, maintained by the great body of the Reformers, and professed in most of the Confessions of the Reformed Churches. We never hesitate to call ourselves Calvinists, though there are some of Calvin's opinions which we reckon erroneous; and in adopting this designation, we mean simply to convey the idea, that we are firmly persuaded, that the fundamental principles of the Calvinistic system of theology, as generally set forth in the symbolical books of churches usually reckoned Calvinistic, are taught, and can be proved to be taught, in Scripture, as the revealed truth of God. And here a practical difficulty at once arises in dealing with Dr T. If we were to judge of him solely from the statements contained in this book, we would have little hesitation in saying, that he is not a Calvinist, in the sense above explained. But of course we are aware that he has, like ourselves, subscribed a Calvinistic creed, and that he holds an office, the chief duty of which may be said to be, to expound this creed. We have, therefore, scarcely a right to say that he is not a Calvinist, unless he had said so more explicitly, perhaps, than he has done. And in anything we may say bearing on this point, we wish it to be understood, that we make no categorical assertion as to what Dr T.'s theological opinions in point of fact are, and that we intend merely to set forth what seem to us to be the scope and tendency of the views indicated in this book. With this explanation, we have no hesitation in saying that we are unable to comprehend how any intelligent Calvinist could have published the statements we have quoted; and that they are plainly fitted to lead to the conclusion that the author has renounced, if he ever held, the theology of the Reformation. It is a significant fact, that Dr T., though a professor of theology, has not from the beginning to the end of his book, given any distinct indication that he is a Calvinist, or made any profession of regarding the Reformers as having succeeded in the main in bringing out God's truth from his word. There are several statements which look like a profession of Calvinism, but which, when carefully examined, are clearly seen to come short of this. But we are not confined to negative materials. We are plainly told that Calvinism once triumphed, but that this triumph was temporary, and is long since over, that no theological system can now occupy a triumphant position, since we have

at last reached a demonstration of the incompetency of *all* theological systems whatever.

Dr T.'s position is pretty distinctly indicated in the somewhat enigmatical deliverance, "The old '*Institutio Christianæ Religionis*' no longer satisfies, and a new *Institutio* can never replace it." There is a sense in which we could assent to the notions suggested by this quotation. But in the sense in which Dr T. evidently understands it, we regard it as unsound and dangerous. "The old '*Institutio Christianæ Religionis*' no longer satisfies." Every Calvinist will admit this to be true, if it be understood to mean merely, that there are views set forth in the "*Institutes*" of Calvin which can be proved from Scripture to be erroneous, and that the progress of discussion since his time has indicated defects existing in that work and improvements that might be made upon it, as to the arrangement of the subjects, the mode in which several topics are presented, singly or in their relation to each other, the comparative prominence assigned to them, and the validity of all the proofs by which they are supported. There are points coming under these various heads, in which the "*Institutes*" do not now satisfy, and we hold it to be a mark of the respect to which Calvin and the "*Institutes*" are entitled, to be prepared to specify the grounds of our dissatisfaction. But those things about the "*Institutes*," which do not satisfy us, are few and unimportant, and do not materially affect the present and permanent value of that great work. It is plainly in an entirely different sense from this, that it no longer satisfies Dr T. and other men of progress in the present day. He evidently regards it as having proved an entire failure in regard to its main substance, its principal contents or materials, and its leading design. The materials of which the "*Institutes*" are composed are, of course, just the leading doctrines of Scripture, according to the view which Calvinists, from Augustine to the present day, have always taken of their meaning and import. And the main question in judging of any work which professes to exhibit in a scientific or systematic form the leading principles of Christian theology must of necessity be,—Are the materials of which it is composed, or the doctrines which it expounds and defends, accordant, in the main, with Scripture? Are they as a whole the views which Scripture teaches, and which it warrants and requires us to believe, as immutable truth resting upon divine authority? Every Calvinist who has read Calvin's "*Institutes*," of course, believes that the materials of which that work is composed, are in the main the doctrines of God's word, and therefore possessed of unchangeable verity. Most Calvinists have also been of opinion that the great doctrines of Christian theology are upon the whole about as well arranged, as ably and accurately expounded, and as satisfactorily and conclusively

defended in Calvin's "Institutes" as they ever have been or can be. We do not exact of every Calvinist that he must concur in this commendation of Calvin's Institutes. But, of course, no man can call himself a Calvinist, unless he believe that the leading doctrines set forth in the "Institutes" are indeed taught by God in his word. And it is not very likely that any man could be found, who, while professing to hold the Calvinistic doctrines taught in the "Institutes," should, at the same time, assert that either he himself, or any one else, could expound them more ably and defend them more conclusively than Calvin has done.

But it is of comparatively small importance in what light the "Institutes" ought to be regarded, viewed merely as a specimen of Calvin's powers and achievements. The only vital question is this—Are the leading doctrines taught in the "Institutes" true and Scriptural? Was the theology of Calvin in its fundamental principles correctly derived from the word of God? This is a vital question. We answer it in the affirmative, and we consider ourselves warranted in asserting that Dr T. has answered it in the negative. There is, as was natural in the circumstances, a good deal of vagueness and confusion in his statements upon this subject. It was scarcely to be expected that he would at first speak out in an explicit and manly way. Men of progress in theology usually require to grope their way for a time, through hedges and along bye-ways. But with all the vagueness and confusion which characterise his statements, he has, we think, afforded sufficient grounds for charging him with maintaining,

1st, That the main features of the theology of the Reformation, the leading doctrines of the Calvinistic system, are not revealed to us in the word of God.

2d, That the Reformers erred thoroughly in their whole theological system, because they had erroneous notions of the true province of logic, of the object and design of the sacred Scriptures, and of the way and manner in which they ought to be interpreted and applied in the formation of our religious opinions.

3d, That the crude and erroneous notions of the Reformers in regard to the province of logic, and the method of explaining and applying Scripture being corrected and taken away, it is now a fixed and settled thing that all theological systems are incompetent.

We believe that these three propositions exhibit accurately the sum and substance of Dr T.'s teaching upon the most important subject touched on in his lectures. It would afford us sincere gratification if Dr T. could and would repudiate these views, and shew that we had no sufficient grounds for imputing them to him. But this we fear is hopeless, and the next best thing would be, that he should plainly admit that he holds

these positions in substance; and having thus come into the open arena, should boldly and manfully defend his convictions. The reputation of the Reformers, the settlement of any questions that may be started about the amount of the commendation that should be bestowed upon them, and about the grounds on which it should be based, all this is insignificant. But the question of the truth or falsehood of the theology of the Reformation is too important to be trifled with. There may turn out to be nothing formidable in the attack now made upon it, but from the magnitude of the interests involved, we like always to see who are the assailants, and what means of assault they have provided.

A combination seems to exist at present for the purpose of undermining and exploding the theology of the Reformation, without meeting it fairly and openly in the field of argument. A man of higher standing than Dr T. has yet reached, one who has rendered many important services to the cause of Christian truth, Mr Isaac Taylor, has lent a helping hand to this object by publishing (anonymously) the following statement:—

“The creeds and the confessions of the Reformation were, indeed, with scrupulous care based upon the authority of Holy Scripture, and looking at them simply as they stood related to the manifold corruptions of the twelve centuries preceding, they might well claim to be Scriptural. But in what manner had they been framed? *A certain class of texts* having been assumed as the groundwork of Christian belief, then a scheme of theology is put together accordingly, whence by the means of the *deductive logic*, all separate articles of faith are to be derived. As to any passages of Scripture which might seem to be of another class, or which do not easily fall into their places in this scheme, they were either ignored, or they were controlled, and this to any extent that might be asked for by the stern necessities of the syllogistic method.”

Dr T. has not put forth anything against the Reformers so outrageously discreditable as this, but he evidently occupies ground the same in substance, so far as concerns the erroneousness, both of the process by which they investigated divine truth, and of the results which they reached. He cannot, indeed, be so ignorant of the history and writings of the Reformers as to be capable of believing what Mr Taylor has said about a “certain class of texts.” But in all other respects there is a wonderful harmony between them. They concur not only in the belief that the theology of the Reformation is fundamentally unsound and untenable, but also in their leading views of the errors attaching to the process by which this erroneous result was reached. They both think that it was the “deductive logic” that was the main cause of all the mischief, combined with certain erroneous notions of the way in which the Scriptures ought to be used and applied, meaning

by this, apparently, just the doctrine of inspiration as it has been usually held by the Christian church, and its immediate consequences. They both expect an entirely new theology, which is to replace the superannuated logical theology of the Reformation. They expect this first from abandoning the deductive logic, and then from the introduction of new modes of Biblical exegesis. Mr Taylor, indeed, held out to the world the prospect of a new "exegetical method," which was to work wonders in reforming theology. We are not aware that this exegetical method has yet made its appearance. But Dr T. speaks as if the new and improved process of investigating divine truth, and of explaining and applying the Bible, were already in operation, and had already succeeded, not only in bringing down Calvinism to the dust, but even in doing something to introduce a simpler and sounder theology. In the quotation we have given from him, he calls it a certain "spirit of interpreting Scripture," which he describes in terms very magniloquent, but not such as to convey to us any very definite idea of what this spirit is, or where it is to be found. We would like to know something about this "spirit of interpreting Scripture," which is to work such wonders, and to effect such improvements in theology. But as Dr T. assures us that it "could hardly have been intelligible to Calvin," we fear we must renounce all hope of ever catching a glimpse of its import.

Dr T.'s work contains no theological discussion, and therefore we are not called upon to engage in theological discussion in reviewing it. There is no distinct specification of what it is in the theology of the Reformation, or in the system of Calvinism, which is unsound and untenable. There is no specification of what it was that was erroneous in those old modes of reasoning or of biblical exegesis, which led to the temporary triumph of Calvinism, or of what are the grounds of that new "spirit of interpreting Scripture," which has demolished Calvinism and introduced a sounder, that is, a more scanty and obscure, theology. We do not refer to the absence of anything of this sort, as if it were a defect in a book, which does not profess to discuss theological topics. We refer to it for the purpose, first, of expressing a doubt whether it was quite right and fair in Dr T. to introduce what has so unfavourable a bearing upon the theology generally professed in Scotland, *without entering into theological discussion*, or setting forth with some fulness the grounds of the views expressed; and, second, of shewing that we are not called on, in reviewing Dr T.'s book, to engage in theological discussion, since he has not given us anything distinct and substantial to answer.

The nearest approach to anything like definiteness, which Dr T. makes under this general head of the theology of the Refor-

mation, is an allegation to the effect, that the Reformers formed their system of doctrine by carrying to an unwarranted length the practice of drawing inferences from Scripture statements, and by exercising greatly too much their logical faculties in classifying, combining, and expanding the materials which Scripture affords. But even this is only a vague generality, of no real value or use, apart from its proved applicability to actual processes of investigation which have been adopted by individuals or bodies of men, and to actual theological results which have been brought out. No one can well dispute, that men are entitled and bound to use their intellectual powers, not only in investigating the meaning of particular statements, but in classifying and combining a number of statements, in order to bring out as the result the full teaching of Scripture upon the subject to which the statements relate, and that we are to receive, as resting upon divine authority, not only what is "expressly set down in Scripture," but also what "may, by good and necessary consequence, be deduced from Scripture." It is admitted, on the other hand, that men have often gone too far in making deductions from Scriptural statements, and especially, what is with many a great bugbear in the present day, in making deductions from doctrines assumed to be already established, upon the principle of what is sometimes called the analogy of faith. But though these are dangers to be guarded against, we fear that no rules can be laid down, marking out distinctly what is warrantable and legitimate in these respects, and what is not; and, therefore, no decision upon these points can be founded upon mere vague general declamation about dangers and excesses. Each case in which error, either in the process adopted, or in the result brought out, is alleged, must be judged of and decided upon its own merits. The theology of the Reformers is not to be set aside, merely because men have often gone to an extreme in making deductions from Scriptural statements, nor even because they themselves have sometimes erred in this respect. We insist that their theology, as a whole, and every doctrine which enters into their system, shall be judged of fairly and fully by the standard of Scripture, and of Scripture used and applied according to its real character and design. We embrace the theology of the Reformation just because we think we can prove, that all the particular doctrines which constitute it are taught in Scripture, rightly interpreted and applied; and while, on the one hand, we undertake the responsibility of asserting and proving this, we must, on the other hand, insist that any one who repudiates the theology of the Reformation, shall distinctly specify what the errors of the system are, and bring forward the evidence from Scripture that they are errors.

But Dr T assures us (p. 169) that Mr Mansel, in his Bampton Lectures, has conclusively established the incompetency of all theological systems whatever. Mr Mansel has not proved, and has not professed to prove, this. We expressed in our number for April last, our sense both of the excellencies and the defects of Mr Mansel's book, and we cannot now dwell upon that subject. Its fundamental principle is really and in substance just the doctrine which has always been a familiar commonplace with orthodox divines, viz., that the human faculties are unable adequately to comprehend all truths and all their relations, and that men have therefore no right to make their full comprehension of doctrines, or their perception of the accordance of doctrines with each other, the test or standard of their truth. And the principal merit of the work is, that it brings out this very important but very obvious and familiar principle in a philosophic dress, establishes it upon philosophic grounds, and connects it with the best philosophy of the age. The most legitimate and valuable application of Mr Mansel's principles, so far as theological subjects are concerned, is to expose the unwarrantable presumption of the objections commonly adduced against the leading doctrines that seem to be taught in Scripture, on the ground of their alleged contrariety to reason. We admit that his principles would also preclude the competency of founding a positive argument in support of the mysterious doctrines of theology, on what may be called rationalistic grounds derived from their intrinsic nature or mutual relation. But this is not sufficient to warrant Dr T.'s allegation that they establish the incompetency of all theological systems, *because it is not by any such unwarrantable rationalistic process that theological systems are formed.* The advocates of every theological system profess to find in Scripture all the materials of which their system is composed, and to be prepared to defend every doctrine they hold and their system as a whole, by the authority of Scripture. The Reformers professed to derive their whole theology from Scripture, and undertook to produce evidence from Scripture for every doctrine they inculcated. And so do all Calvinists still. They may find some confirmation of their doctrines individually, and of their system as a whole, in considerations derived from natural reason and the exercise of their logical faculties. But they refer to Scripture as affording the chief direct positive proof of all they teach, and they undertake to shew that the materials which Scripture furnishes, rightly and rationally used and applied, establish every part of their theological system. Calvinists do not pretend, that when they have proved some one of their doctrines from Scripture, they can derive all their other doctrines from this one, by mere logical deduction.

They profess to produce direct positive proof from Scripture, sufficient to establish every one of them, and to have recourse to rational considerations only for confirming the proof, and, especially, for answering, or rather disposing of, objections. In regard, then, to every one of the doctrines which enter into our theological system, we profess to shew, that it accurately expresses or embodies the sum and substance of what is asserted or indicated in Scripture upon the point. There is nothing in Mansel's "Bampton Lectures," or anywhere else, which proves, or even appears to prove, that there is anything in this process which is incompetent or unwarrantable, or involves a transgression of the just "limits of religious thought." If there be men who mainly rest the truth of their doctrines individually, or of their systems as a whole, upon any other ground than this reasonable and competent application of Scriptural materials, they cannot plead on their behalf the example of the Reformers, or of any of the best defenders of Calvinism. We base all the doctrines of our system upon statements contained in Scripture, we undertake to prove them by a fair and rational application of the materials which Scripture furnishes, and there is no ground for alleging that the processes required in doing this, whether conducted so as to lead in point of fact to a correct result in any particular case or not, go beyond the fair and legitimate exercise of men's mental powers. We are entitled to demand that our scriptural proofs shall be fairly faced and disposed of, in place of the whole subject being set aside as incompetent, upon the ground of a piece of palpably irrelevant metaphysics.

These remarks may be illustrated by selecting an instance of a particular doctrine, and we shall choose with this view the great doctrine of justification, which, in some aspects, may be regarded as the great distinguishing feature of the theology of the Reformation.

Dr T. has given (p. 82) a statement of this great doctrine of Luther in a somewhat mystical and not very intelligible style, to which it is not worth while to advert. What we have to do with at present is this, that he complains, that Luther and the defenders of the theology of the Reformation, in place of being contented with some vague generalities upon this subject, should, by definition and exposition, have drawn it out into precise and definite propositions, alleging in substance that the whole process by which this is done is unwarrantable and incompetent, and that the result is not truth, but error. Let us take one of these precise and definite descriptions of justification, and see how the case stands; and in order to give Dr T. every advantage, we shall select it from a period when the odious process of what he calls "ultra-definition" had been

carried somewhat farther than was done by the Reformers, and when, of course, all that he reckons so objectionable was most fully developed. About the middle of the seventeenth century, an assembly of divines put forth the following statement of what they believed to be taught in Scripture on the subject of justification:—

“Those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth; not by infusing righteousness into them, but by pardoning their sins and by accounting and accepting their persons as righteous; not for anything wrought in them, or done by them, but for Christ's sake alone; not by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them as their righteousness, but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them, they receiving and resting on him and his righteousness by faith, which faith they have not of themselves—it is the gift of God.”—(Westminster Confession of Faith, c. xi.)

Every one acquainted with the history of theological discussion, knows that this remarkable statement not only affirms, positively and explicitly, certain great truths, but, by plain implication, denies certain errors opposed to them, which have been held by Papists and Arminians to be taught in Scripture; and the question raised by it is this, Are the doctrines asserted, or the doctrines denied, here, revealed to us in Scripture as true? It is quite possible that some men may refuse to adopt either of these alternatives, and may contend that Scripture teaches a third doctrine upon the subject of justification, different from either, or that it does not teach any definite doctrine whatever upon the points here brought under consideration, and furnishes no materials for an intelligent and rational decision among the contending creeds. Our position upon the subject is clear and decided, and we wish to understand distinctly the position of any one whose views upon these matters we may be called upon to consider. We believe that the statement quoted from the Confession of Faith presents an accurate embodiment of the sum and substance of what Scripture warrants and requires us to believe upon the subject of justification; and we hold ourselves bound to produce, in suitable circumstances, the Scripture proof that all the Protestant Calvinistic doctrines there asserted are true, and that all the Popish and Arminian doctrines there denied are false. In what precise way Dr T. would define his position in regard to this matter, we can scarcely venture to say. We presume he will not venture to affirm, that he believes either the one or the other set of opinions to be taught in Scripture, and to be binding upon men's consciences. He is not likely, we should suppose, to put forth a third set of opinions upon these points, different from the other two. The ground which, it would

seem, he must take, in order to escape from the degradation of professing, in this nineteenth century, a precise set of opinions upon justification, is to maintain that Scripture does not furnish materials for laying down any such definite doctrines upon the subject. And this can be established only in one or other of two ways, either by producing some direct general proof of it *à priori*, as an abstract position, or by following the method of exhaustion and proving in detail, that not one of the attempts which have been made to deduce a definite doctrine of justification from Scriptural materials has succeeded. There is thus a vast deal to be done beyond what has ever yet been attempted, before the great doctrine of justification, as set forth in the confessions of the Reformed churches, can be exploded, and the way opened up for restoring that obscurity and confusion, in regard to the way of a sinner's justification, which the Reformers did so much to dissipate, and which the men of progress in the present day seem so anxious to bring back.

There is one theological topic on which Dr T. has given something like a deliverance, and it may be worth while to advert to it as a specimen of the new or advanced theology. In treating of the controversy between Luther and Erasmus on the subject of the bondage or servitude of the will, he gives the following sage and satisfactory deliverance regarding it :—

“ It would be idle for us to enter into the merits of this controversy ; and, in truth, its merits are no longer to us what they were to the combatants themselves. The course of opinion has altered this as well as many other points of dispute, so that under the same names we no longer really discuss the same things. There are probably none, with any competent knowledge of the subject, who would care any longer to defend the exact position either of Luther or of Erasmus. *Both are right, and both are wrong. Man is free, and yet grace is needful ;* and the philosophic refinements of Erasmus, and the wild exaggerations of Luther, have become mere historic dust, which would only raise a cloud by being disturbed.” (P. 52.)

And in referring to the same point as controverted between Calvin and Pighius, he disposes of it in this way :—

“ So far as the merits of the controversy are concerned, it cannot be said that he is any more successful than the German Reformer. He is here and everywhere more simple and cautious in his statements, but his cold reiterations and evasions really no more touch the obvious difficulties, than Luther's heated paradoxes.” (P. 123.)

The great controversy, then, about the bondage of the will, to which the Reformers attached so much importance in their discussions with the Romanists, and the Calvinists in their dis-

cussions with the Arminians, Dr T. pronounces to have been a mere logomachy—a question of no practical importance whatever, unworthy, it would seem, of receiving any serious consideration. Here, again, we fear that Dr T.'s deliverance must be held to imply a denial, that the doctrine taught by the Reformers is really revealed to us in Scripture. That doctrine, as set forth by the Westminster Divines, is, that "man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation." Luther, in defending this doctrine, in reply to Erasmus, has made some rash and exaggerated statements, which no one adopts. But Calvin, in defending the same doctrine, in reply to Pighius, has, as Dr T. admits, avoided these excesses. And, independently of all peculiarities of individuals, we would like to know how Dr. T. would deal with the doctrine as stated by the Westminster Divines. Is that, too, a mere logomachy, which is just as true and as false as the opposite doctrine taught by Papists and Arminians? Are there really no materials in Scripture for deciding either for or against the great Reformation doctrine of the bondage or servitude of the will of fallen man to sin? Is the whole of the process of investigating the meaning of Scripture for the decision of that question, as it has been conducted on both sides, unwarrantable and illegitimate? Or is there really an utter want of materials in Scripture for determining the question either on the one side or on the other? The way in which Dr T. has spoken in regard to this important doctrine of the Reformation, suggests and warrants such questions as these; and we would like to see him meet them, as well as those formerly proposed in regard to justification, openly and manfully, in order that we might, if possible, learn something about that "spirit of interpreting Scripture," of which Dr T. discourses so magniloquently and unintelligibly, and by which Scripture seems to be rendered so inadequate to be a light unto our feet and a lamp unto our path.

There is another important subject, in regard to which the Reformers have been generally regarded as having rendered good service to mankind, viz., the right organisation of the Christian church. This, in one aspect, might be comprehended under the general head of theology or doctrine, as it consists essentially in bringing out a portion of the mind and will of God, as revealed in his word. But it is common, and in some respects useful, to distinguish them, and Dr T. has given them a separate treatment. The questions to be entertained and settled upon this subject are these, Has God given us in his word any indications of his will with respect to the worship and government of his church, which are binding in all ages? and if he has, What are they?

It is generally conceded that the Reformers restored the church to a large measure of apostolic purity and simplicity with respect to worship and government. But it cannot be said that they reckoned this matter so important as the restoration of sound doctrine, or that they were to so large an extent of one mind in the conclusions to which they came. In this, as well as in theology, more strictly so called, Calvin was the great master-mind, who stamped his impress most distinctly upon the church of that and of every subsequent period. His own contributions to the establishment of principle and the development of truth, were greater in regard to church organization than in regard to any other department of discussion, of such magnitude and importance, indeed, in their bearing upon the whole subject of the church, as naturally to suggest a comparison with the achievements of Sir Isaac Newton in unfolding the true principles of the solar system. The Christian church is mainly indebted to Calvin, much more than to any other man, for bringing out distinctly, pressing upon general attention, and establishing, the following great principles:—

1st, That it is unwarrantable and unlawful to introduce into the government and worship of the church anything which has not the positive sanction of Scripture.

2d, That the church, though it consists properly and primarily only of the elect or of believers, and though, therefore, visibility and organization are not *essential*, as papists allege they are, to its existence, is under a positive obligation to be organized, if possible, as a visible society, and to be organized in all things, so far as possible,—its office-bearers, ordinances, worship, and general administration and arrangements,—in accordance with what is prescribed or indicated upon these points in the New Testament.

3d, That the fundamental principles, or leading features of what is usually called presbyterian church government, are indicated with sufficient clearness in the New Testament, as permanently binding upon the church.

4th, That the church should be altogether free and independent of civil control, and should conduct its own distinct and independent government by presbyters and synods, while the civil power is called upon to afford it protection and support.

5th, That human laws, whether about civil or ecclesiastical things, and whether proceeding from civil or ecclesiastical authorities, do not, *per se*—*i. e.*, irrespective of their being sanctioned by the authority of God,—impose an obligation upon the conscience.

Calvin professed to find all these principles more or less clearly taught in Scripture; and we have no doubt that he

succeeded in proving that they are all sanctioned by the word of God, and that thus they may be said to embody the permanent, binding, constitution of the Christian church. We do not say that none of these principles had ever been enunciated till Calvin proclaimed them. But some of them had never before been so clearly and explicitly set forth. None of them had ever before been so fully brought out in their true meaning, and in their complete evidence. And the presentation of them all in combination, expounded and defended with consummate ability, and at the same time with admirable moderation and good sense, furnishes a contribution to the right permanent organization of the Christian church such as no man ever made before, and no man could have an opportunity of making again. Calvin may be said, in a sense, to have settled permanently the constitution of the Christian church, not by assuming any jurisdiction over it, or by any mere exercise of his own talents and sagacity, but simply because God was pleased to make him the instrument of bringing out from the sacred Scriptures the great leading principles, bearing upon the organization of the church, which till that time had been very much overlooked, and had been far from exerting their proper influence. We believe that the leading principles which Calvin inculcated in regard to the organization of the church, never have been, and never can be, successfully assailed ; while there is certainly no possibility of any one being able again to bring out from Scripture a contribution of anything like equal value.

Of course, every thing depends upon the settlement of the question, whether or not these principles are taught in Scripture, as truth revealed for the permanent guidance of the church. The general process by which this is to be investigated and ascertained, is perfectly competent and legitimate in all its features, though opposite conclusions have been brought out by different parties who professed to follow it. It has been contended,

1st, That Scripture sanctions the great principles above stated, as the permanent constitution of the church.

2d, That Scripture teaches something which is different from, or exclusive of, or opposed to, these principles, upon all or most of the points to which they relate.

3d, That little or nothing bearing upon matters of worship and government is prescribed to, or imposed upon, the church, and that there are no adequate materials for deciding upon the truth or falsehood of the two preceding positions.

Something plausible may be adduced in support of each of these three positions. But the question is, Which of them is true? which has really the sanction of Scripture? We embrace the first of them, and profess to be able to establish it by an accu-

rate exposition and a reasonable application of materials which Scripture furnishes. The third of these positions is in substance that which is maintained by Dr T. and other latitudinarians. He seems to think, that except, perhaps, in regard to some great general principles, so evident as scarcely to leave room for a difference of opinion, the church is left at liberty to settle questions about government and worship for herself, in the way which she may think best at the time and in the circumstances; that the views upon these subjects brought out by Calvin and the Reformers, though improvements upon the previous condition of things and well suited to the times, furnish nothing like a pattern of what ought to be the permanent state of the church; and that Scripture cannot be shewn to afford materials for deciding those controversies which have been carried on between different churches about questions of government and worship. These are the sort of notions which he indicates plainly enough in such passages as the following—

“There are two distinct views that may be taken of this part of Calvin’s work. It presents itself, on the one hand, as a moral influence—a conservative spiritual discipline suited to the time, as it was called forth by it; and on the other hand, as a new theory, or definite reconstitution of the church. In the first point of view, it is almost wholly admirable; in the second, it will be found unable to maintain itself any more than the Catholic theory which it so far displaced,” (p. 175). “It is a very different subject that is before us when we turn to contemplate the theocracy of Calvin, in its formal expression and basis as a new and definite outline of church government. In this respect he made more an apparent than a real advance upon the old Catholic theocracy. He took up the old principle from a different and higher basis, but in a hardly less arbitrary and external manner. There is a kingdom of divine truth and righteousness, he said, and Scripture, not the priesthood, is its basis. The Divine Word, and not Roman tradition, is the foundation of the spiritual commonwealth. So far all right; so far Calvin had got hold of a powerful truth against the corrupt historical pretensions of Popery. But he at once went much farther than this, and said, not tentatively, or in a spirit of rational freedom, but dogmatically, and in a spirit of arbitrariness, tainted with the very falsehood from whose thralldom he sought to deliver men, “this is the form of the Divine kingdom presented in Scripture,” (p. 179). “Presbyterianism became the peculiar church order of a free Protestantism, carrying with it everywhere, singularly enough, as one of the very agencies of its free moral influence, an inquisitorial authority resembling that of the Calvinistic consistory. It rested, beyond doubt, on a true divine order, else it never could have attained this historical success. But it also involved from the beginning a corrupting stain in the very way in which it put forth its divine warrant. It not merely asserted itself to be wise and conformable to Scripture,

and therefore divine, but it claimed the direct impress of a divine right for all its details and applications. This gave it strength and influence in a rude and uncritical age, but it planted in it from the first an element of corruption. The great conception which it embodied was impaired at the root by being fixed in a stagnant and inflexible system, which became identified with the conception as not only equally but specially divine," (p. 181). "But were not these 'elements,' some will say, really biblical? did not Calvin establish his church polity and church discipline upon Scripture? and is not this a warrantable course? Assuredly not, in the spirit in which he did it. The fundamental source of the mistake is here. The Christian Scriptures are a revelation of divine truth, and not a revelation of church polity. They not only do not lay down the outline of such a polity, but they do not even give the adequate and conclusive hints of one; and for the best of all reasons, that it would have been entirely contrary to the spirit of Christianity to have done so; and because, in point of fact, the conditions of human progress do not admit of the imposition of any unvarying system of government, ecclesiastical or civil. The system adopts itself to the life, everywhere expands with it, or narrows with it, but is nowhere in any particular form the absolute condition of life. A definite outline of church polity, therefore, or a definite code of social ethics, is nowhere given in the New Testament, and the spirit of it is entirely hostile to the absolute assertion of either the one or the other," (p. 182-3).

In order to establish his position, Dr T. is bound either to produce Scripture evidence in support of the general notions or maxims on which he bases it, or else to prove in detail the utter inadequacy of all the attempts which have been made to shew, that any definite views in regard to government and worship ought permanently to guide the churches of Christ. We profess to establish our position by both these classes of argument. In so far as we profess to lay down any general rules whether of an imperative or of a prohibitory character, and in so far as we urge any specific arrangements as permanently binding, we undertake to produce sufficient evidence from Scripture for all we assert or require. Dr T. has not entered upon any defence of the ground he has taken upon this subject; and, therefore, we are not called upon to discuss it. But as the loose and dangerous views which he has put forth are very prevalent in the present day, and as they are by no means destitute of plausibility, while, at the same time, we are persuaded that a large share of the favour they have met with, is to be ascribed to ignorance and misapprehension, we shall take the opportunity of making a few explanatory observations regarding them.

Of the views generally held by the Reformers on the subject of the organization of the church, there are two which have

been always very offensive to men of a loose and latitudinarian tendency,—viz., the alleged unlawfulness of introducing into the worship and government of the church any thing which is not positively warranted by Scripture, and the permanent binding obligation of a particular form of church government. The second of these principles may be regarded, in one aspect of it, as comprehended in the first. But it may be proper to make a few observations upon them separately, in the order in which they have now been stated.

The Lutheran and Anglican sections of the Reformers held a somewhat looser view upon these subjects than was approved of by Calvin. They generally held that the church might warrantably introduce innovations into its government and worship, which might seem fitted to be useful, provided it could not be shewn that there was anything in Scripture which expressly prohibited or discountenanced them, thus laying the *onus probandi*, in so far as Scripture is concerned, upon those who opposed the introduction of innovations. The Calvinistic section of the Reformers, following their great master, adopted a stricter rule, and were of opinion, that there are sufficiently plain indications in Scripture itself, that it was Christ's mind and will, that nothing should be introduced into the government and worship of the church, unless a positive warrant for it could be found in Scripture. This principle was adopted and acted upon by the English Puritans and the Scottish Presbyterians; and we are persuaded that it is the only true and safe principle applicable to this matter.

The principle is, in a sense, a very wide and sweeping one. But it is purely prohibitory or exclusive; and the practical effect of it, if it were fully carried out, would just be to leave the church in the condition in which it was left by the apostles, in so far as we have any means of information; a result, surely, which need not be very alarming, except to those who think that they themselves have very superior powers for improving and adorning the church by their inventions. The principle ought to be understood in a common sense way, and we ought to be satisfied with reasonable evidence of its truth. Those who dislike this principle, from whatever cause, usually try to run us into difficulties by putting a very stringent construction upon it, and thereby giving it an appearance of absurdity, or by demanding an unreasonable amount of evidence to establish it. The principle must be interpreted and explained in the exercise of common sense. One obvious modification of it is suggested in the first chapter of the Westminster Confession, where it is acknowledged "that there are some circumstances, concerning the worship of God and government of the church, common to human actions and

societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be observed." But even this distinction between things and circumstances cannot always be applied very certainly ; that is, cases have occurred in which there might be room for a difference of opinion, whether a proposed regulation or arrangement was a *distinct thing* in the way of innovation, or merely a *circumstance* attaching to an authorised thing and requiring to be regulated. Difficulties and differences of opinions may arise about details, even when sound judgment and good sense are brought to bear upon the interpretation and application of the principle ; but this affords no ground for denying or doubting the truth or soundness of the principle itself.

In regard to questions of this sort there are two opposite extremes, into which one-sided minds are apt to fall, and both of which ought to be guarded against. The one is to stick rigidly and doggedly to a general principle, refusing to admit that any limitations or qualifications ought to be permitted in applying it ; and the other is to reject the principle altogether, as if it had no truth or soundness about it, merely because it manifestly cannot be carried out without some exceptions and modifications, and because difficulties may be raised about some of the details of its application which cannot always be very easily solved. Both these extremes have been often exhibited in connection with this principle. Both of them are natural, but both are unreasonable, and both indicate a want of sound judgment. The right course is to ascertain, if possible, whether or not the principle be true, and if there seem to be sufficient evidence of its truth, then to seek to make a reasonable and judicious application of it.

With regard to the Scripture evidence of the truth of the principle, we do not allege that it is very direct, explicit, and overwhelming. It is not of a kind likely to satisfy the coarse, material, literalists, who can see nothing in the Bible but what is asserted in express terms. But it is, we think, amply sufficient to convince those who, without any prejudice against it, are ready to submit their minds to the fair impression of what Scripture seems to have been intended to teach. The general principle of the unlawfulness of introducing into the government and worship of the church anything which cannot be shewn to have positive Scriptural sanction, can, we think, be deduced from the word of God by good and necessary consequence. We do not mean, at present, to adduce the proof, but merely to indicate where it is to be found. The truth of this principle, as a general rule for the guidance of the Church, is plainly enough involved in what Scripture teaches, concerning its own suffi-

ciency and perfection as a rule of faith and practice, concerning God's exclusive right to determine in what way he ought to be worshipped, concerning Christ's exclusive right to settle the constitution, laws, and arrangements of his kingdom, concerning the unlawfulness of will worship, and concerning the utter unfitness of men for the function which they have so often and so boldly usurped in this matter. The fair application of these various Scriptural views taken in combination, along with the utter want of any evidence on the other side, seems to us quite sufficient to shut out the lawfulness of introducing the inventions of men into the government and worship of the Christian church.

There is no force in the presumption, that, because so little in regard to the externals of the Church is fixed by Scriptural authority, therefore much was left to be regulated by human wisdom, as experience might suggest or as the varying condition of the church might seem to require. For, on the contrary, every view suggested by Scripture of Christianity and the Church, indicates, that Christ intended his church to remain permanently in the condition of simplicity as to outward arrangements, in which his apostles were guided to leave it. And never certainly has there been a case in which it has been more fully established by experience, that the foolishness of God, as the apostle says, is wiser than men, that what seems to many men very plausible and very wise, is utter folly, and tends to frustrate the very objects which it was designed to serve. Of the innumerable inventions of men introduced into the government and worship of the church, without any warrant from Scripture, but professedly as being indicated by the wisdom of experience, or by the Christian consciousness of a particular age or country, to be fitted to promote the great ends of the church, not one can with any plausibility be shewn to have had a tendency to contribute, or to have in fact contributed, to the end contemplated; while, taken in the mass, and of course no limitation can be put to them unless the principle we maintain be adopted, they have inflicted fearful injury upon the best interests of the church. There is a remarkable statement of Dr Owen's on this subject, which has been often quoted, but not more frequently than it deserves; it is this—"The principle that the church hath power to institute any thing or ceremony belonging to the worship of God, either as to matter or manner, beyond the observance of such circumstances as necessarily attend such ordinances as Christ himself hath instituted, lies at the bottom of all the horrible superstition and idolatry, of all the confusion, blood, persecution, and wars, that have for so long a season spread themselves over the face of the Christian world."

It is no doubt very gratifying to the pride of men to think that they, in the exercise of their wisdom, brought to bear upon the experience of the past history of the church, or, to accommodate our statement to the prevalent views and phraseology of the present day, in the exercise of their own Christian consciousness, their own spiritual tact and discernment, can introduce improvements upon the nakedness and simplicity of the church as it was left by the apostles. Perhaps the best mode of dealing with such persons, is to call upon them to exemplify their own general principle, by producing specific instances from among the innumerable innovations that have been introduced into the church in past ages, by which they are prepared to maintain that the interests of religion have been benefited, or if they decline this, to call upon them for a specimen of the innovations, possessed of course of this beneficial character and tendency, which they themselves have devised and would wish to have introduced; and then to undertake to shew, what would be no very difficult task, that these innovations, whether selected or invented, have produced, or would produce if tried, effects the very reverse of what they would ascribe to them.

There is a strange fallacy which seems to mislead men in forming an estimate of the soundness and importance of this principle. Because this principle has been often brought out in connection with the discussion of matters which, viewed in themselves, are very unimportant, such as rites and ceremonies, vestments and organs, crossings, kneelings, bowings, and other such *ineptiæ*. some men seem to think that it partakes of the intrinsic littleness of these things, and that the men who defend and try to enforce it, find their most congenial occupation in fighting about these small matters, and exhibit great bigotry and narrow-mindedness in bringing the authority of God and the testimony of Scripture to bear upon such a number of paltry points. Many have been led to entertain such views as these of the English Puritans and of the Scottish Presbyterians, and very much upon the ground of their maintenance of this principle. Now, it should be quite sufficient to prevent or neutralize this impression to shew, as we think can be done, 1st, That the principle is taught with sufficient plainness in Scripture, and that therefore it ought to be professed and applied to the regulation of ecclesiastical affairs. 2d, That, viewed in itself, it is large, liberal, and comprehensive, such as seems in no way unbecoming its Divine author, and in no way unsuitable to the dignity of the church as a divine institution, giving to God his rightful place of supremacy, and to the church, as the body of Christ, its rightful position of elevated simplicity and purity. 3d, That, when contem-

plated in connection with the ends of the church. it is in full accordance with everything suggested by an enlightened and searching survey of the tendencies of human nature, and the testimony of all past experience. And with respect to the connection above referred to, on which the impression we are combating is chiefly based, it is surely plain that, in so far as it exists *de facto*, this is owing, not to anything in the tendencies of the principle itself or of its supporters, but to the folly and presumption of the men who, in defiance of this principle, would obtrude human inventions into the government and worship of the church, or who insist upon retaining them permanently after they have once got admittance. The principle suggests no rites nor ceremonies, no schemes or arrangements; it is purely negative and prohibitory. Its supporters never devise innovations and press them upon the church. The principle itself precludes this. It is the deniers of this principle, and they alone, who invent and obtrude innovations; and they are responsible for all the mischiefs that ensue from the discussions and contentions to which these things have given rise.

Men, under the pretence of curing the defects and shortcomings, the nakedness and bareness, attaching to ecclesiastical arrangements as set before us in the New Testament, have been constantly proposing innovations and improvements in government and worship. The question is, How ought these proposals to have been received? Our answer is, there is a great general Scriptural principle which shuts them all out. We refuse even to enter into the consideration of what is alleged in support of them. It is enough for us that they have no positive sanction from Scripture. On this ground we refuse to admit them, and where they have crept in, we insist upon their being turned out, although upon this latter point, Calvin, with his usual magnanimity, was always willing to have a reasonable regard to times and circumstances, and to the weaknesses and infirmities of the parties concerned. This is really all that we have to do with the mass of trumpery, that has been brought under discussion in connection with these subjects. We find plainly enough indicated in Scripture a great comprehensive principle, suited to the dignity and importance of the great subject to which it relates, the administration of the church of Christ,—a principle “majestic in its own simplicity.” We apply this principle to the mass of paltry stuff that has been devised for the purpose of improving and adorning the church, and thereby we sweep it all away. This is all that we have to do with these small matters. We have no desire to know or to do anything about them; and when they are obtruded upon us by our opponents, we take our stand upon a higher platform, and refuse to look

at them. This is plainly the true state of the case ; and yet attempts are constantly made, and not wholly without success, to represent these small matters and the discussions to which they have given rise, as distinctively characteristic of English Puritans and Scottish Presbyterians ; whereas, in all their intrinsic littleness and paltriness, they are really characteristic only of those who contend for introducing or retaining them.

It was a great service, then, that Calvin rendered to the church when he brought out and established this principle, in correction of the looser views held by the Lutheran and Anglican Reformers. If all the Protestant churches had cordially adopted and faithfully followed this simple but comprehensive and commanding principle, this would certainly have prevented a fearful amount of mischief, and would, in all probability, have effected a vast amount of good. There is good ground to believe, that in that case the Protestant churches would have been all along far more cordially united together, and more active and successful in opposing their great common enemies, Popery and Infidelity, and in advancing the cause of their common Lord and Master.

There is another principle that was generally held by the Reformers, though not peculiar to them, which is very offensive to Dr T. and other latitudinarians, viz., the Scriptural authority or *jus divinum* of one particular form of church government. This general principle has been held by most men who have felt any real honest interest in religious matters, whether they had adopted Popish, Prelatic, Presbyterian, or Congregational views of what the government of the church should be. The first persons who gave prominence to a negation of this principle, were the original defenders of the Church of England in Queen Elizabeth's reign, Archbishop Whitgift and his associates, who scarcely ventured to claim a Scriptural sanction for the constitution of their church. They have not been generally followed in this by the more modern defenders of the Church of England, who have commonly claimed a divine right for their government, and not a few of whom have gone the length of unchurching Presbyterians and Congregationalists. But they have been followed by some men in every age who seemed anxious to escape from the controlling authority of Scripture, that they might be more at liberty to gratify their own fancies, or to prosecute their own selfish interests.

From the time of Whitgift and Hooker down to the present day, it has been a common misrepresentation of the views of *jure divino* anti-prelatists, to allege, that they claimed a divine right—a positive Scripture sanction, for the details of their system of government. Dr T. seems to have thought it

impossible to dispense with this misrepresentation, and accordingly he tells us that Presbyterianism "not merely asserted itself to be wise and conformable to Scripture, and therefore divine, but it claimed the direct impress of a divine right for all its details and applications." This statement is untrue. There may be differences of opinion among Presbyterians as to the extent to which a divine right should be claimed for the subordinate features of the system, and some no doubt have gone to an extreme in the extent of their claims. But no Presbyterians of eminence have ever claimed "the direct impress of a divine right for *all* the details and applications" of their system. They have claimed a divine right, or Scriptural sanction, only for its fundamental principles, its leading features. It is these only which they allege are indicated in Scripture in such a way as to be binding upon the church in all ages. And it is just the same ground that is taken by all the more intelligent and judicious among *jure divino* prelatists and congregationalists.

Dr T., in the last of the quotations we have given from his book, endeavours to prove that no form of church government was or could have been laid down in Scripture, so as to be permanently binding upon the church. His leading positions are embodied in this statement :—

"The Christian Scriptures are a revelation of divine truth, and not a revelation of church polity. They not only do not lay down the outline of such a polity, but they do not even give the adequate and conclusive hints of one. And for the best of all reasons, that it would have been entirely contrary to the spirit of Christianity to have done so ; and because, in point of fact, the conditions of human progress do not admit of the imposition of any unvarying system of government, ecclesiastical or civil."

It is well that Dr T. admits that the Scriptures are "a revelation of divine truth ;" and since the truth revealed in them is not the theology of the Reformation, we hope that some time or other he will enlighten the world as to what the "divine truth" is which they do reveal. As to the position that "the Scriptures are not a revelation of church polity," we venture to think, that it is possible that something may be taught in Scripture on the subject of church polity for the permanent guidance of the church ; and if there be anything of that nature taught there, then it must be a portion of the "divine truth" which the Scriptures reveal. Whether anything be taught in Scripture on the subject of church polity must be determined, not by such an oracular deliverance as Dr T. has given, but by an examination of Scripture itself, by an investigation into the validity of the Scriptural grounds which have been brought forward in support of the

different theories of church government. Dr T. will scarcely allege, that there is nothing whatever taught in Scripture as to what should be the polity of the church ; and if there be anything taught there upon the subject, it must be received as a portion of divine truth. He is quite sure, however, that the sacred Scriptures "not only do not lay down the outline of such a polity, but they do not even give the adequate and conclusive hints of one." Here we are directly at issue with him. We contend that not merely "hints," but what may be fairly called an "outline" of a particular church polity, are set forth in Scripture in such a way as to be binding upon the church in all ages.

We admit, indeed, that when this position is discussed in the abstract as a general thesis, a good deal of the argument often adduced in support of it is unsatisfactory and insufficient, as well as what is adduced against it. When the position we maintain is put in the shape of an abstract proposition, in which the advocates of all the different forms of church government—papists, prelatists, presbyterians, and congregationalists may concur, in other words, when the general position is laid down that a particular form of church government, *without specifying what*, is sanctioned by Scripture, we admit that the materials which may be brought to bear in support of this position are somewhat vague and indefinite, and do not tell very directly and conclusively upon the point to be proved. The strength of the case is brought fully out only when it is alleged, that some one particular form of church government specified, as prelacy or presbyterianism, is sanctioned and imposed by Scripture. The best and most satisfactory way of establishing the general position, that the Scripture sanctions and imposes a particular form of church government, is to bring out the particular principles, rules, and arrangements in regard to the government of the church which are sanctioned by Scripture, and to shew that these, when taken together or viewed in combination, constitute what may be fairly and reasonably called a form of church government. By this process not only is the general proposition most clearly and directly established, but, what is of much more importance, the particular form of church government which Scripture sanctions, and which, therefore, the church is under a permanent obligation to have, is brought out and demonstrated.

Attempts, indeed, have been made to prove and to disprove the general thesis in the abstract by *à priori* reasonings, but most of these reasonings appear to us to possess but little force or relevancy. It is contended on *à priori* grounds, on the one hand, that there *must* have been a particular form of church government laid down in Scripture ; and it is contended on

similar grounds, on the other hand, that this *could not* be done, or that it was impossible consistently with the general nature of the Christian church, and the circumstances in which it was, and was to be, placed. But the truth is, that nothing which can be fairly regarded as very clear or cogent can be adduced in support of either of these abstract positions, unless the idea of a form of church government be taken, in the first of them, in a very wide and lax, and in the second, in a very minute and restricted, sense. On the one hand, while there is a large measure of *à priori* probability, that Christ, intending to found a church as an organised, visible, permanent society, very different in character from the previously subsisting church of God, especially in regard to all matters of external organization and arrangement, should give some general directions or indications of his mind and will as to its constitution and government, we have no certain materials for making any assertion as to the extent to which he was called upon to carry the rules he might prescribe as of permanent obligation, or for holding that he might be confidently expected to give rules so complete and minute as to constitute what might with any propriety be called a form of church government. And on the other hand, while it is evident that the Christian church was intended to be wholly different in external organization from the Jewish one, and to have no such minute and detailed system of regulations, while it was intended for all ages and countries, and, of course, could contain nothing inconsistent with this, while on these grounds, but little as compared with the Jewish system was to be subjected to precise and detailed regulations, and something might thus be left to the church to be determined by the light of nature and providential circumstances, there is no antecedent improbability whatever, arising from any source or any consideration, in the idea, that Christ might give such general directions on this subject as, when combined together, might justly have the designation of a form of church government applied to them. On these grounds, we do not attach much weight to those general *à priori* considerations, by which many have undertaken to prove, on the one hand, that Christ *must* have established a particular form of government for his church, or, on the other hand, that he *could not* have done so; and we regard the case upon this whole subject as left in a very defective and imperfect state, until the advocates of the principle of a Scripturally sanctioned or *jure divino* form of church government, have shewn what the particular form of church government is which the Scripture sanctions, and have produced the evidence that Scripture does sanction *that* form, and, of course, *a* form.

We think we can prove from Scripture statement and apos-

tolie practice, the binding obligation of certain laws or rules, and arrangements, which furnish not only "hints," but even an "outline of church polity," and which, when combined together, may be fairly said to constitute a *form of church government*. In this way, we think we can shew, that there is a particular form of church government, which, in its fundamental principles and leading features, is sanctioned and imposed by Scripture, viz., the presbyterian one.

If the general *à priori* considerations which have been frequently brought into the discussion of this subject are insufficient to establish the true position, that Scripture does sanction one particular form of church government, much less are they adequate to establish the false position that it does not. Dr T., as we have seen, asserts that we have "the best of all reasons" to shew that the Scriptures do not lay down even an "outline" of a church polity. But his "best of all reasons" are not likely to satisfy any but those who are determined beforehand to be convinced. His reasons are two:—1st, "It would have been entirely contrary to the spirit of Christianity to have done so;" 2d, "The conditions of human progress do not admit of the imposition of any unvarying system of government, ecclesiastical or civil." This is the whole proof which he adduces; and these he calls "the best of all reasons." This, forsooth, is to prove that it is impossible, that even the "outline" of a church polity could have been set forth in Scripture as permanently binding. Even Divine Wisdom, it would seem, could not have devised an outline of a church polity, which would have been accordant with "the spirit of Christianity and the conditions of human progress." Our readers, we presume, will not expect us to say anything more for the purpose of refuting and exposing this. "The spirit of Christianity and the conditions of human progress" might have had some bearing upon the question in hand, if there had been on the other side the maintenance of the position, that the Scriptures imposed upon the church a full system of minute and detailed prescription of external arrangements, similar in character and general features to the Jewish economy. But when it is considered how entirely different from everything of this sort is all that is contended for by intelligent defenders of the divine right of a particular form of church government, most men, we think, will see that Dr T.'s appeal, for conclusive evidence against its possibility, to the spirit of Christianity and the conditions of human progress, is truly ridiculous.

The disproof of the position, which has been received so generally among professing Christians, that Scripture does sanction and prescribe the outline of a church polity, cannot be effected by means of vague and ambiguous generalities, or

by high-sounding declamation. It can be effected, if at all, only by the method of exhaustion, that is, by the detailed refutation of all the different attempts which have been made to establish from Scripture the divine right of a particular form of church government. And this species of work is much more difficult, requires much more talent and learning, than declaiming about "the spirit of Christianity and the conditions of human progress."

At the same time, we must admit that it has become somewhat common and popular in modern times, to scout and ridicule the advancing of a claim to a divine right, on behalf of any particular form of church government. This has arisen partly, no doubt, from the ignorant and injudicious zeal with which the claim has been sometimes advocated, even by those whose views upon the subject of church government were, in the main, sound and scriptural; but principally, we are persuaded, from certain erroneous notions of the practical consequences, that are supposed to follow necessarily from the establishment of this claim.

All papists and many prelatists, in putting forth a claim to a divine right on behalf of their respective systems of church government, have openly, and without hesitation, deduced from their fancied success in establishing this claim, the conclusion, that professedly Christian societies which had not *their* form of government were, for this reason, to be refused the designation and the ordinary rights of Christian churches, or even to be placed beyond the pale within which salvation is ordinarily possible. This mode of procedure, in applying the claim to a divine right in judging of other churches, universal among papists, and by no means uncommon among a certain class of prelatists, must appear to men who know anything of the general genius and spirit of the Christian system, and who are possessed of any measure of common sense and Christian charity, to be absurd and monstrous; and by many the disgust which has been reasonably excited by this conduct, has been transferred to the general principle of claiming a *jus divinum* on behalf of a particular form of church government, from which it was supposed necessarily to flow. All this, however, is unwarranted and erroneous. Presbyterians and congregationalists have as generally set up a claim to a divine right on behalf of their systems of church government as papists and prelatists have done, but we do not remember that there has ever been a presbyterian or a congregationalist of any note, who unchurched all other denominations except his own, or who refused to regard and treat them as Christian churches, merely on the ground that they had adopted a form of government different from that which he believed to have, exclusively, the sanction of the word of God.

But many seem to suppose that presbyterians and congregationalists, in not unchurching other denominations on the ground of rejecting what they believe respectively to be the only Scripturally sanctioned form of church government, are guilty of an amiable weakness, and fall into inconsistency, by declining to follow out their assertion of a *jus divinum* in judging of others, to its natural and legitimate consequences. This notion is erroneous and unjust, as will appear by attending to the true state of the case. All that is implied in claiming a divine right for presbyterianism, for instance, is that the person who does so believes, and thinks he can prove, that Christ has plainly enough indicated in his word his mind and will, that the fundamental principles of presbyterianism should always and everywhere regulate the government of his church. Prelatists and congregationalists, professing equally to follow the guidance of the sacred Scriptures and to submit to the authority of Christ, have formed a different and opposite judgment as to the true bearing and import of the materials which Scripture furnishes upon this subject, and have in consequence set up a different form of government in their churches. This being the true state of the case, the sum and substance of what any candid and intelligent presbyterian, even though holding the *jus divinum* of presbytery, has to charge against them, is just this, that they have mistaken the mind and will of Christ upon this point, that they have formed an erroneous judgment about the import of the indications he has given in his word, as to how he would have the government of his church to be regulated. And this, which is really the whole charge, does not, upon principles generally acknowledged, afford of itself any sufficient ground for unchurching them, or for refusing to recognise and treat them as Christian churches. It is a serious matter to adopt and to act upon erroneous views in regard to any portion of divine truth, anything which God has made known to us in his word, and we have no wish to palliate this in any instance. But let the case be fairly stated, and let the principles ordinarily and justly applied to other errors be applied to this one. There can be no possible ground for holding, that the adoption and maintenance of an error on the subject of the government of the church, by words or deeds, involves more guilt, or should be more severely condemned, than the adoption and maintenance of an error upon a matter of doctrine in the more limited sense of that word; and on the contrary, there is a great deal in the nature of the subject, viewed in connection with the general character, spirit, tendency, and objects of the Christian economy, and in the kind and amount of the materials of evidence which Scripture affords us for forming a judgment upon such questions, which indicates, that errors in regard to government should be treated with less severity of con-

demnation, and should less materially affect the intercourse of churches with each other, than errors (within certain limits) with regard to doctrine, which are not usually considered to warrant the unchurching of other denominations, or to form an insuperable obstacle to the maintenance of friendly relations with them.

These grounds on which we establish the unwarrantableness and unfairness of the common allegation, that claiming a divine right for one particular form of church government, implies the unchurching of other denominations who may have come to a different conclusion as to the bearing of the Scripture testimony upon this subject, apply equally to the wider and more comprehensive principle, formerly explained, of the unlawfulness of introducing anything into the government and worship of the church which is not positively sanctioned by Scripture. Lutherans and Anglicans generally contend that this principle is not taught in Scripture, and, on this ground, refuse to be so strictly tied up in regard to the introduction of ceremonies and regulations. We believe that, in denying this principle, they have fallen into an error in the interpretation and application of Scripture, and that the ceremonies and regulations which, in opposition to it, they may have introduced, are unlawful, and ought to be removed. But we never imagined, that because of this error in opinion, followed to some extent by error in practice, other denominations were to be unchurched, or to be shut out from friendly intercourse, especially as the Scriptural evidence in favour of the principle, though quite sufficient and satisfactory to our minds, is of a somewhat constructive and inferential description, and as differences sometimes arise among those who concur in holding it about some of the details of its application.

If these views, which are in manifest accordance with the dictates of common sense, and with principles generally recognised in other departments of theological discussion, were admitted, there would be much less disinclination to yield to the force of the Scripture evidence in support of the two principles which we have explained, and which form, we are persuaded, the only effectual security for the purity of church administration, and the authority of church arrangements.

But there are, in every age, some men who seem anxious to have the reputation of being in advance of all around them in the enlightened knowledge of theological subjects, and who, with this view, are very desirous to escape from the trammels of implicit deference to the authority of Scripture. The great source of error in religious matters is, that men do not fully and honestly take the word of God as their rule and standard. They may profess to do so, and they may do so to some extent; but there have been many contrivances, by which men have laboured

to undermine the authority of Scripture as a rule of faith and practice while professing to respect it, and have virtually set up themselves or their fellow-men as the ultimate standard of truth. Papists and Quakers, Rationalists and Traditionalists, Fanatics, and Mystics, all undermine the supreme authority of Scripture, and substitute something else in its room; and the elements of the leading notions of these various parties, singly or in combination, are now in extensive operation amongst us. Indeed, one of the most remarkable features of the present age, is the extent to which these different, and apparently opposite, elements are combined even in the same persons, and co-operate in producing the same result. There are persons of some influence in the religious world, in the present day, in regard to whom it would not be easy to determine under which of the heads above mentioned they might most fairly be ranked—men who seem to be at once traditionalists, rationalists, and mystics, and who, under the influence of a combination of the elements of these different systems, set aside to a considerable extent the authority of Scripture, and pervert the meaning of its statements, or, at least, come far short in turning the Scriptures to good account, or in deriving from them the amount of clear and definite knowledge of divine things which they are fitted and intended to convey.

It might be a useful and interesting subject of investigation, to bring out a view of the way in which these different and opposite tendencies are, in the present day, combined in producing error and unsoundness, and especially indefiniteness and obscurity, on religious subjects. The great bugbear, indeed, now-a-days, is the inculcation of clear and definite doctrines upon theological topics. Men seem now quite willing to employ any pretence, derived from any quarter, for discountenancing definite and systematic views of Christian truth, and for bringing back again over the church all the confusion and obscurity of the dark ages. The men of progress in the present day seem to have resolved to gain distinction by extinguishing light, and plunging back into darkness; and they evidently hope that in this way they will acquire the reputation of being very advanced and very profound.

In every age since the revival of letters, there has been a class of men, who were anxious to distinguish themselves from those around them by going ahead, by turning aside from the path which most of their friends and associates were pursuing, and by taking what they reckon a more advanced and elevated position. What they may happen to regard as constituting the advancement and elevation which minister to their self-complacency, may depend upon a great variety of causes and influences. But it has not usually been found very difficult to discover something or other which might be made to appear advanced and elevated, although it really was not so when tried

by any standard reasonably and legitimately applicable. In this way, men of a certain stamp have usually found it easy enough, to get up some plausible grounds for regarding and representing themselves as liberal and enlightened, and the generality of those around them as narrow-minded and bigoted; and at present, the greatest credit in theological matters is to be gained, it seems, by taking as little as possible from Scripture, by repudiating all clear and definite views upon doctrinal subjects, and by displaying a "voluntary humility" in striving to get back to the primeval condition of ignorance and obscurity. This condition of comparative ignorance and obscurity might be harmless and innocent before errors were broached and controversies were waged, but it has now become for ever unattainable on the part of intelligent and educated men, and if it were attainable, could be realised only through a sinful refusal to improve the opportunities which God has given us of acquiring an accurate knowledge of his revealed will. There is, indeed, a bigotry which is despicable and injurious, the bigotry of those who refuse to practise any independent thinking, who slavishly submit to mere human authority, who never venture to entertain the idea of deviating in any point from the beaten track and denounce as a matter of course all who do so, who can see only one side of a subject, or perhaps only one corner of one side of it, who are incapable of forming a reasonable estimate of the comparative importance of different truths and different errors, who contend for all truths and denounce all errors with equal vehemence, who never modify or retract their opinions, who have no difficulties themselves and no sympathy with the difficulties of others. We meet occasionally with bigots of this sort, and they are very despicable and very mischievous. There is also a species of progress which is creditable and praiseworthy, exhibited by men who are thoroughly conversant with, and reasonably deferential to, the attainments of the churches and the achievements of the great theologians of former times, who can comprehensively survey and judiciously estimate the past, who can read the lessons "of doctrine, reproof, and correction" which it is fitted to suggest, who are thus by the study of the past qualified in some measure to anticipate and to guide the course of discussion in the future, and who, while, it may be, only confirmed by their researches and meditations in the soundness of their own leading convictions, have learned, at the same time and by the same process, a larger measure of friendly forbearance for those who differ from them. This is a kind of progress which should ever be regarded with approbation and respect, and in which all of us, according to our capacities and opportunities, should be seeking to advance. But this is a very different kind of thing from the latitudinarianism which finds its representatives in every age, and which at bottom is little better than a

desire of notoriety, and an affectation of superior wisdom where no superior wisdom exists. We believe that the general run of latitudinarians, or men of progress, to be found in every generation of theologians from the Reformation to the present day, have upon the whole been as ignorant, as narrow-minded, and as self-conceited, as the bigots. We have no respect for any of the "men of latitude" and progress in the present day regarded as theologians; we have a very decided conviction, that the leading views in which the generality of the Reformers concurred, both with respect to the substance of Christian theology and the organization of the Christian church, can be fully established from Scripture; and we certainly never shall be shaken in this conviction by vague generalities, high-sounding pretensions, or supercilious declamation. But we have no wish to remain in darkness while the light is shining all around us. And we promise that, if Mr Isaac Taylor or Dr Tulloch will abandon the vague and equivocal declamation which they have put forth on this subject, if they will plainly and explicitly declare what are the Reformation doctrines on theological and ecclesiastical subjects which must now be dismissed as untenable, producing at the same time the detailed proof that these doctrines are not sanctioned by Scripture rightly interpreted and applied, we shall give them a careful and deliberate hearing; and we shall examine their statements with the more earnestness and respect, if they not only refute the theology of the Reformation, but at the same time expound and establish a different theology that may be entitled to take its place.

The really vital questions which all men are called upon to solve as well as they can, are these:—What ought we to believe concerning God and ourselves, concerning Christ and the way of salvation, concerning the church and the sacraments? We have long held, that men who made a thorough and adequate, an accurate and comprehensive, use of the materials furnished by Scripture, would be constrained to admit, that the true answer to all these questions is, in substance, what is set forth in the confessions of the reformed churches, the most important body of uninspired documents in existence. But the subject is too vitally important to be set aside as altogether beyond the pale of farther investigation, and we would not refuse to attend to any feasible attempt to shew, that these questions ought to be answered in a different way.

Dr T. rejects the views which the Reformers derived from Scripture upon these points. But he has not told us what other views Scripture requires us to adopt, and he has given us nothing but some dark, mysterious hints, as the nature of the process by which it may be shewn that the theology of the Reformation will not do for the nineteenth century.

We know something of the process by which Arminians and Socinians, rationalists and latitudinarians, have laboured to shew, that the theology of the Reformation is not taught in Scripture. We are well satisfied that nothing more formidable can be adduced against it than has been brought forward, consistently with an honest admission in any sense of the divine authority of Scripture, and we are confirmed in this conviction by the fact, that some of the most learned modern German critics have admitted, that the apostles believed and taught the leading doctrines of the Reformers, while they of course refuse to believe any thing so irrational upon the authority of apostles. Surely it is high time that Mr Isaac Taylor should develop his new "exegetical method" which is to revolutionise theology, and that Dr T. should unfold his "spirit of interpreting Scripture, which could have hardly been intelligible to Calvin," but which it seems is quite adequate to demolish Calvinism. We strongly suspect that Mr Taylor's "method" and Dr T.'s "spirit," if they ever make their appearance in a tangible shape, will turn out to involve a denial or evasion of the supreme authority of Scripture as the rule of faith, and the setting up of man himself, the whole man, with all his natural capacities and susceptibilities, as the ultimate standard of religious truth and duty. But whatever this mysterious method or spirit may be, we are not afraid of it. Let it be brought freely out to the open field of conflict, and let it do its best to overturn the theology of the Reformation. We have no anxiety about the result.

One of the worst passages in Dr T's book is the conclusion of his sketch of Luther. It is so bad that we must quote it at length.

"They were consistent in displacing the Church of Rome from its position of assumed authority over the conscience, but they were equally consistent, all of them, in raising a dogmatic authority in its stead. In favour of their own views, they asserted the right of the private judgment to interpret and decide the meaning of Scripture, but they had nevertheless no idea of a really free interpretation of Scripture. Their orthodoxy everywhere appealed to Scripture, but it rested in reality upon an Augustinian commentary of Scripture. They displaced the mediæval schoolmen, but only to elevate Augustine. And having done this, they had no conception of any limits attaching to this new tribunal of heresy. Freedom of opinion, in the modern sense, was utterly unknown to them. There was not merely an absolute truth in Scripture, but they had settled, by the help of Augustine, what this truth was; and any variations from this standard were not to be tolerated. The idea of a free faith holding to very different dogmatic views, and yet equally Christian—the idea of spiritual life and goodness apart from theoretical orthodoxy—had not dawned on the sixteenth century, nor long afterwards. Heresy was not a mere divergence of intellectual apprehension, but a moral obliquity—a statutory offence—to be punished by the magistrate, to

be expiated by death. It is the strangest and most saddening of all spectacles to contemplate the slow and painful process by which the human mind has emancipated itself from the dark delusion, that intellectual error is a subject of moral offence and punishment, as if even the highest expressions of the most enlightened dogmatism were or could be anything more than the mere gropings after God's immeasurable truth—the mere pebbles by the shore of the unnavigable sea—the mere star dust in the boundless heaven, pointing to a light inaccessible and full of glory, which no man hath seen, neither indeed can see. It required the lapse of many years to make men begin to feel—and it may still require the lapse of many more to make them fully feel—that they cannot absolutely fix in their feeble symbols the truth of God; that it is ever bursting with its own free might the old bottles in which they would contain it; and that, consequently, according to that very law of progress by which all things live, it is impossible to bind the conscience by any bonds but those of God's own wisdom (Word) in Scripture—a spiritual authority addressing a spiritual subject—a teacher, not of 'the letter which killeth, but of the Spirit which giveth life.'” (P. 87–8.)

We have not now space for exposing as it deserves this remarkable and significant passage. We can only suggest a few hints as to its import and bearing.

1. Dr T. makes the statement, absolutely and without qualification, that heresy is not a “moral obliquity,” that it is “a dark delusion that intellectual error is a subject of moral offence and punishment.” Is this anything different from what Warburton, a century ago, denounced as “the master sophism of this infidel age, the innocence of error?”

2. When Dr T. intimates his approbation of “the idea of a free faith, holding to very different dogmatic views, and yet equally Christian,” we presume he just means in plain English, to tell us, that Calvinism, Arminianism, and Socinianism, perhaps even pantheistic anti-supernaturalism, are all equally Christian.

3. In this passage he seemed to confound or mix up together all interference with heresy or “intellectual error” in religious matters, whether by the civil or the ecclesiastical authorities, as if all exercise of ecclesiastical discipline on such grounds, were just as unwarrantable and offensive as persecution, in the shape of the infliction of civil pains and penalties on the ground of error in religion. This confounding of things that differ, was one of the leading artifices of the infidels and semi-infidels, who discussed these subjects in the early part of last century, the Tindals and Collinses, the Hoadleys and Sykeses.

4. Dr T. seems here to employ another piece of confusion and sophistry, derived from the same not very respectable source, when, upon the grounds, that creeds and confessions are human productions, and of course exhibit indications of human imperfections, and that they are not fitted to serve all the purposes to

which they have been sometimes applied, he would intimate that they are of no worth or value whatever, and are not fitted to serve any good or useful purpose. His views upon this point are certainly not brought out clearly and explicitly, but what has now been stated, seems, so far as we can judge, to be the substance of what he intended to insinuate, especially in the last sentence of the quotation. There is a notion which seems to be pretty prevalent in the present day, though as yet in a somewhat latent and undeveloped form, and which produces some sympathy in the minds of many with what is said in disparagement of creeds and confessions. It is a doubt, at least, whether creeds and confessions, which are to be made terms of ministerial communion and of course grounds of division among churches, should be so long and so minute as some of them are. We have noticed of late some indications of this feeling in quarters for which we have much more respect than we have for Dr T., in men who are far superior to the vulgar aversion to confessions, and whom there is no reason to suspect of unfaithfulness to their own confession. We admit that this is a fair and reasonable topic for discussion, and we are not aware that, as distinguished from some of the other branches of the controversy about confessions, it has ever yet been subjected to so thorough, deliberate, and comprehensive an investigation as its importance deserves. We have no wish to encourage the raising of a discussion upon this subject. But we see symptoms which seem to indicate, that it is likely to be pressed upon the attention of the churches, and it may be well that men should be turning their thoughts to it. If the discussion is raised, we trust that those who may advocate the shortening and the generalizing of some of our creeds and confessions, will be men who believe the confession they have themselves subscribed, and not men who offend the moral sense of the community, by making it manifest that they have ceased to believe the creed to which they still by public profession adhere, and that they are pleading as they do, merely in order to escape from a discreditable position into which they have brought themselves.

5. Men who are familiar with the common cant of latitudinarians, will easily see that some of the statements contained in this passage, especially those which speak of the influence of Augustine, and of an "Augustinian commentary of Scripture," are intended to insinuate such notions as these—that the Reformers derived their leading theological views, not from the word of God but from the writings of Augustine; that they adopted Augustine's views, not because they had satisfied themselves of their accordance with Scripture, but from deference to his authority, or from some other adventitious, or accidental, or it may be unworthy, cause; that having adopted Augustinian views for some other reason than their accordance with Scrip-

ture, they then did what they could to bend and twist Scripture to the support of Augustinianism, and that in this way they brought out of Scripture what is not to be found there, what it does not sanction. All this Dr T.'s statements seem to us to insinuate. It would have been more creditable to him to have openly and explicitly asserted it. But as he has produced no evidence in support of these notions, we could only meet even an assertion of them, as we now meet the insinuation, by a denial of their truth. We assert, that the notions which Dr T. here insinuates with regard to the theological views of the Reformers are not true, and in flat contradiction to them we assert, that the Reformers adopted Augustine's views because satisfied, as the result of careful and deliberate investigation that they were in accordance with the teaching of Scripture ; *that they were right in entertaining this conviction* ; that they brought out the evidence of the Scriptural authority of the doctrines of Augustine much more fully and satisfactorily than he himself had done ; in short, that they proved conclusively and unanswerably, that Augustinianism or Calvinism is revealed to us by God in his word.

The substance of what he has insinuated here against the Reformers, we have no doubt he would direct equally against those benighted men who in this nineteenth century are willing to acknowledge themselves Calvinists. He no doubt thinks that we too have been led to profess Augustinian or Calvinistic doctrines, not from an intelligent and honest study of the sacred Scriptures, but from some adventitious, irrelevant, inadequate, perhaps unworthy, motive or influence, and that we are perverting, or in some way or other misapplying, the materials furnished by Scripture, in order to procure support to our opinions. Dr T. has no right to expect that any mere insinuation or assertion of his on such a subject will carry much weight or excite much feeling. But since he has not hesitated to set aside the theology of the Reformation, the theology which has generally been professed in Scotland from the Reformation to the present day, and to do this in circumstances which did not admit of theological discussion, we think it probable that he is willing and ready to bring forward the grounds on which his views upon this subject are based. We must presume after what he has said, that he is prepared to give to the world a detailed exposure of the theology of the Reformation, a new "Refutation of Calvinism." He can scarcely avoid attempting something of this sort, and we venture to assure him beforehand, that he will not succeed.

We would have liked to have made an attempt to do fuller justice than Dr T. has done to some features in the character and services of Calvin, but our space is exhausted, and the attempt must be postponed.

X.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Studies on Pascal, by the late ALEX. VINET, D.D. Translated by the Rev. Thomas Smith, A.M. T. & T. Clarke, 1859.

MR SMITH has done good service by rendering into clear and elegant English, the "*Studies on Pascal*," and adding to them his own instructive notes in the shape of an appendix. No one could be better qualified, in many respects, than Professor Vinet for criticising the details, and vindicating the substance, of Pascal's teaching; for while we have always thought that he was misnamed, when he was described as the "*Chalmers of Switzerland*," we have long admired the rare combination of his powers, both as a refined and ingenious thinker, and as a striking, eloquent, and accomplished writer. His previous works, especially his "*Vital Christianity*," and "*Gospel Studies*," which are already familiarly known to the Christian public in this country, have left on many minds such a favourable impression, both of his original genius and of his personal piety, as will predispose them to receive with much favour any other contribution to sacred literature from the same gifted mind.

His present work labours under the disadvantage of being a posthumous publication. It had not the advantage of that careful revision which the author would no doubt have bestowed upon it, had he been spared to superintend the preparations for its being placed in the hands of his readers. It consists, too, of several detached pieces, prepared for different occasions, and delivered in the shape of lectures at successive periods, from 1832 to 1847, which may be said to have a certain unity by reason of their common relation to the same subject, but which will be found, like all occasional productions of a similar kind, to make use of the same quotations, and the same remarks more than once in different connections. But with all these abatements from its value, as a systematic exposition of Pascal, it cannot fail to be welcomed as a valuable contribution to the Christian literature of the age.

The two first pieces in the series were written and delivered as lectures at Basle and Lausanne respectively, the one before and the other after the publication of the new and complete edition of Pascal's writings, which appeared in 1844, under the careful and able editorship of M. Faugère.* It had come to be suspected in literary circles at Paris and elsewhere, that Pascal's remains had been to some extent tampered with, by certain friendly but politic and not over-scrupulous Jansenists, and that the printed text as published by the original editors differed in many respects more or less material from the letter of his manuscripts. Such a suspicion, even while it rested only on vague rumour, could hardly fail to leave an uneasy impression of uncertainty on the minds of Pascal's readers, as to the genuineness of those precious fragments which they had so often studied and admired; and their uneasiness grew to a head, and

* "*Pensées, Fragments, et Lettres de Blaise Pascal, publiés pour la première fois conformément aux Manuscrits originaux en grande partie inédits.* Par M. Prosper Faugère. 2 vols. Paris, 1844. For the benefit of the English reader, Fauère's edition of the "*Pensées*," has been translated, along with the "*Provincial Letters*," by Chas. Pearce, Esq., and published by the Messrs Longman, in 3 vols. (1849).

reached its climax, when M. Cousin prepared, and presented to the French Academy in 1842, an elaborate memoir, in which he proved the rumour to be true, by referring to authentic documents, and called for a new edition, based on a thorough revision of the manuscripts. Fortunately these manuscripts were still extant and accessible, and on application to M. Villemain, the Minister of Public Instruction, M. Faugère obtained full authority to collate and publish the text of the various MSS. which were preserved in the Royal Library. To M. Faugère this seems to have been a labour of love, and he has executed his difficult task with singular care, assiduity, and success.

Vinet's first series of lectures had been prepared with reference to the "Thoughts," as published by the original editors; and such was the effect, even on his mind, of the rumour which had reached him respecting the doubtful genuineness of the text, and still more of the proof which had been adduced in M. Cousin's memoir, that we find him exclaiming in words which are quoted by M. Faugère, "Nous n'avions plus le livre de 'Pensées;' il était dans nos bibliothèques sans y être." Fortunately the desideratum was speedily supplied, and Vinet was enabled to devote a second series of lectures (No. II.) to "the Restoration of Pascal's Thoughts," by M. Faugère.

We cannot advert even cursorily to all the topics which are naturally suggested by the reproduction of Pascal's "Thoughts" in their original form; but there are two questions which appear to possess peculiar claims on our attention, viz.—1. What new light has been shed on the general design of his great work, considered as the outline of a grand apology for Christianity, and on the use which he intended to make of some of the materials which he had collected, and which he left behind him in the shape of detached fragments,—especially whether any of them were merely notes of objections which he meant to answer,—of difficulties that awaited their solution,—or whether they are all to be regarded as the expression of his own sentiments, and incorporated as parts of his work? 2. What new light has been shed on the *questio vexata* of his alleged Pyrrhonism?

The former of these questions is sufficiently justified by the shape in which these precious fragments came into the hands of his literary executors. They were written on little detached pieces of paper, and are described by M. Faugère, in the words of Madame Perier, as "de petits morceaux de papier qu' on avait trouvés mal écrits," "les premières expressions des pensées qui lui venaient lorsqu'il méditait sur son grand ouvrage contre les athées;" and in the words of her son, "les pensées plus parfaites, plus suivies, plus claires et plus étendues, étant mêlées, et comme absorbées, parmi tant d' autres très imparfaites, obscures, à demi digérées, et quelques-unes même presque unintelligibles à tout autre qu' à celui qui les avait écrites." In short, the MS. which fell into the hands of his executors was little more than a commonplace book in which, according to M. Faugère, "Se trouvaient des fragments, plus ou moins étendus, matériaux d'un grand ouvrage qui devait être consacré à l'apologie de la Religion Chrétienne, des pensées sur tous les sujets, des lettres, et divers écrits sur quelques sujets distinct de philosophie, de théologie, ou de morale." In these circumstances, the question naturally arises, whether all these *disjecta*

membra are to be regarded as expressing his own deliberate and matured opinions, or whether some of them may not have been mere *notanda* for future consideration, and even notes of objections and difficulties which might be raised by his opponents, and which it might be expedient for him to anticipate and answer? And this question becomes the more urgent in proportion as we become better acquainted with his mental habits,—“*qui avait accoutumé,*” says his sister, “*de tant travailler tous ses ouvrages, qu’il ne se contentait presque jamais de ses premières pensées quelque bonnes qu’elles parussent aux autres, et qui a refait souvent jusqu’à huit ou dix fois des pièces que tout autre que lui trouvait admirables dès la première.*” It is not wonderful, therefore, that M. Vinet, in reviewing the former editions of the “*Thoughts,*” should have said:—“It may sometimes be asked, in the perusal of these fragments, whether this or that passage were intended as it is supposed to have been, or whether its intention were not *exactly the contrary*? Who knows whether, in some instances, what we take to be the thought of Pascal be not the thought of his opponent?—an objection, a challenge to which the great thinker meant to pay attention when he should have leisure.” The same question had been raised at a much earlier period; for it is surely a remarkable fact, although we do not remember to have seen it noticed, that NICOLE, himself a Jansenist, and an intimate friend of Pascal, who is supposed to have supplied the materials of several of the “*Provincial Letters,*” and even, as Faugère thinks, to have had some hand in the concoction of the original edition of the “*Thoughts,*” took express exception to some parts of the latter when they first appeared, on the ground that they could not *all* be regarded as expressing the personal convictions of the writer. His exact words deserve to be quoted:—“*Je ne dirai pas que tout soit également bon. Qu’on me permette donc d’exprimer ma pensée. J’y trouve un grand nombre de pierres assez bien taillées et capables d’orner un grand bâtiment; mais le reste ne m’a paru que matériaux confus, sans que je visse l’usage que M. Pascal en voulait faire. Il y a même quelques sentiments que ne me paraissent point tout à fait exacts, et qui ressemblent à des pensées hasardées, que l’on écrit seulement pour les examiner avec plus de soin.*” * The question which is thus raised could scarcely be answered by a mere restoration of the original text, or an exposure of the alterations which it had undergone in the hands of its first editors, unless some indications could have been discovered of the author’s intention in jotting down certain thoughts, and of the use which he meant to make of them. No such indications have been brought to light, beyond the very general, but most precious exposition of the plan and outline of his great work, † which was delivered *viva voce* in conversation with his friends, some jottings respecting its order of arrangement; and this question, therefore, may be said to be left *in statu quo*.

The second question respecting his alleged Pyrrhonism is also justified by many expressions which have often created a feeling of distrust and uneasiness in the minds of his most intelligent and ardent admirers. He seems often to speak as if he belonged to that Scep-

* “*Pensées de Nicole,*” appended to Didot’s Edition of Pascal, p. 379.

† Faugère’s Edition, I. 371; also “*Ordre,*” II. 378.

tico-dogmatic school, which has long existed in the Popish Church, and which was represented in a former age by Huet, Bishop of Avranches, and in more recent times by Lamennais; a school which sought to undermine the authority of reason, with a view to shut men up to the authority of revelation. A more absurd and suicidal system could scarcely be conceived, as has been admirably proved by Bartholmess, in his able and interesting monograph, entitled, "*Huet, ou le Scepticisme Théologique.*" How far Pascal was liable to the charge of having imbibed the spirit, or adopted the maxims of that school, is a question which must obviously depend, to a large extent, on the answer to the previous one,—how far each of his "*Thoughts*" is to be regarded as expressing his own opinion; for if they are *all* to be received as conveying his deliberate and mature conclusions, he cannot be exculpated from the charge. M. Vinet thinks, however, and we are disposed to agree with him, that making due allowance for the uncertainty arising from the fragmentary state of his remains, and also for a certain degree of excitement occasioned by his struggle against a proud and contemptuous rationalism, he is not justly chargeable with Pyrrhonism in its most objectionable sense, since he vindicates the authority of the *first principles of human knowledge*, and objects only, or at least chiefly, to the supposed sufficiency, or usurped supremacy, of reason. All our readers will remember his striking words, "*La nature confond les Pyrrhoniens, et la raison confond les Dogmatistes,*"—a smart antithesis, but one which loses much of its point as soon as it is seen that *nature* in the one clause is not exclusive, but comprehensive of reason in the other, and that *reason* itself differs from mere *reasoning*, with which it is apparently confounded, just as in any other case a *power* differs from an *act*.*

The Unity of the Faith, in its Relation to the Authority of Scripture, the Sacredness of Conscience, and the Supremacy of Christ. By the Rev. ALEXANDER LEITCH, Author of "*Christian Errors Infidel Arguments,*" &c. Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 1859.

THOUGH all men have minds, and some philosophers have made the essence of mind to consist in thought, yet one of the rarest things in our peopled world is a man that thinks. In books and conversation you will find multitudes who *appear* to think, who speak commonplaces and truisms as if by inspiration, as if they had risen from the dead to declare them, or who merely pass the thoughts of other men through their own logical mill. You will not find one in ten thousand who, on Sabbath or on week-day, "*thinks his own thoughts, and speaks his own words,*" who looks upon things with his own eyes, who forms regarding them his own impressions, and who speaks these impressions in his own words. Now this rare thing on the earth, "*rara avis in terris,*"—we have found in Mr Leitch. You may differ from him in all his premises, processes, and conclusions; but no one can read his book without admiring and respecting him as a fresh and original thinker and writer, without being both refreshed and instructed.

The general subject of the book is stated in the title,—"*The Unity of the Faith.*" The unity which Mr Leitch advocates is a

* Degerando, *Histoire Comparée*, iii. p. 433.

visible unity of Christians, of individuals into congregations, of congregations into associations, of all into one visible church, as contrasted with the multiplicity of sects at present existing among our evangelical churches. The existing denominationalism, Mr Leitch contends, is not only a calamity and a scandal, but a sin. Whenever there are two communion tables in one parish, or two denominations of Christians in one country, there, in that visible separation, is the evidence of guilt lying on one or other, or both, of the parties. Either they are kept asunder by opposite views of Bible truths, or they are not. If they be not, then their division must be owing to their sinful passions, their personal resentments or coldness. If they be, if they have opposed views of Bible truth, then one or other, or both, of them must have missed the truth, which is one and makes one. And *whoever has missed the truth must have committed sin*; for the truth is sufficiently revealed, so that all shall find it who seek it with sufficient diligence and candour, none can fail of finding it save through a sinful negligence or insincerity. On these grounds, Mr Leitch contends that all our denominational differences are to be lamented as the evidence of sin; that a union of all Christians in the truth is to be sought as our bounden duty.

These views are most clearly brought out as opposed to others, that have obtained very considerable currency in our day. Mr Leitch's book is polemical, rather than dogmatical. Throughout its five divisions, he is mainly occupied with refuting a certain theory of unity, or rather, of multiplicity, underlying the thoughts and saying of a very large proportion of the leaders of our public opinion on such matters. The theory is substantially this,—that different parties may, without sin, arrive at opposite views of divine truth; that denominational differences are to be regarded as the unavoidable results of the exercise of private judgment; and that the union to be sought among Christians of different denominations is a union, not in truth but only in love, not of faith but only of charity, the differences being overlooked on account of the agreements. This theory Mr Leitch sets himself to oppose, with extraordinary acuteness and power, throughout his book. By the mouth of "Bellarmine," he shews that such a view of private judgment is justly exposed to all the charges which Romanists have ever advanced against the formal principle of Protestantism; in the person of "Lord Herbert," he shews that upon the same view the infidel must be deemed irresponsible for his unbelief; while "Theophilus" shews, that on the same ground on which the infidel is made responsible for his unbelief, and the Christian made free from implicit faith in the Pope, all Christians are bound to find the truth, and to be united in the visible profession and practice of it.

For his polemic against the really infidel latitudinarianism which tacitly assumes that there is no discoverable truth, Mr Leitch is entitled to the gratitude of all the churches of Christ. As an earnest and powerful exposition of the real nature of unity and of schism, of the obligation to unity and the sin of schism, his work is peculiarly well-timed, and is fitted to do great and permanent good. But while thankfully acknowledging its many excellencies, we are constrained in conscience to take notice of some defects or blemishes.

First, as to *form*. It is questionable whether Mr Leitch, in choosing the dialogue form, has not fallen into a serious mistake. In spite of his admirable clearness, and precision, and force of thought and expression, his reader will frequently feel his head spin among so many speakers, and his memory racked in the endeavour to keep Mr Leitch's own view before his mind; nay, even after he has finished the book, he will feel that he has not got a very full and detailed knowledge of Mr L.'s opinions, that he has got little more than the abstract proposition about the nature and guilt of schism, and that it would have been desirable to have, in Mr Leitch's own person, a much more full and detailed dogmatic statement, than can anywhere be found in the book.

Second, as to *matter*. We are not satisfied with the reasonableness of Mr Leitch's rejection of the distinction between essential and non-essential, as an instrument of determining what ought to be the terms of Christian communion, though not of office. Some *reasons* may be given for the distinction, which are truly absurd; or, as we believe Mr Leitch has done, *another* distinction may be substituted and refuted in its place. But the distinction itself, and its use, are founded on the very nature of the things concerned. So, in fact, after Mr Leitch has rejected it under one name, he adopts it under another. He holds that no church union can be completed without men's sitting down together at the Lord's Table: now this sitting at the table, as distinguished from hearing the word, has no meaning at all unless there be implied in it at the least a joint profession of personal faith in the "essential" truths, of Christ's incarnation and expiatory sacrifice, and continued indwelling in the church. And again, we find Mr Leitch mentioning as a sufficient reason for separation from a view or a church, the denial of some "*characteristic and fundamental*" truth of Christianity—i. e., some "essential truth."

Further, we are sorry to find Mr Leitch, from time to time, lug in what appears to be a favourite speculation of his own, about the salvation of the heathen, men's being saved by practising all the truth within their reach, &c. This speculation has nothing to do with the truth of our responsibility for our belief, the duty of union in the truth, the guilt of disunion. Historically, the party in the seventeenth century who contended for that universal grace, sufficient grace to believe, salvation by acting up to one's light, &c., were the avowed enemies of the truth, of "the light of nature," on which Mr Leitch's whole argument is based. The friends of this truth were the open enemies of that speculation.

The Book of Ecclesiastes: its Meaning and its Lessons. By ROBERT BUCHANAN, D.D. London: Blackie & Son. Pp. 436.

DR BUCHANAN has already gained high and well-merited fame as an author, by the "Ten Years' Conflict," and the "Clerical Furlough," works which, though in no way uncongenial to his professional occupations, did not lie within the usual routine of professional effort. This work on Ecclesiastes will certainly not detract from his reputation as an author, though it may possibly not engage the interest of so wide and miscellaneous a circle as his former books. It contains abundant evidence that Dr Buchanan's high talents and varied

accomplishments are not reserved for productions intended only for the press, but are brought to bear faithfully and conscientiously upon his preparations for the pulpit, and his ordinary professional labours. We are confident that those who have admired Dr Buchanan's former works, will recognise in this the same fine powers and the same valuable qualities, applied to a still higher and more important subject, the exposition and application of a very interesting portion of the inspired record.

Roots and Fruits of the Christian Life ; or, Illustrations of Faith and Obedience. By the Rev. WILLIAM ARNOT. London : T. Nelson and Sons, 1860. Pp. 430.

MR ARNOT has taken his place as one of the most fresh and racy, vigorous and effective, pleasing and useful, writers on religious subjects in the present day. We expressed some time ago our high admiration of his "*Illustrations of the Book of Proverbs.*" We can scarcely affirm that this work is superior to the last. But it will not detract from the author's reputation, and we are sure it will be found both pleasant and profitable.

The Song of Christ's Flock in the Twenty-third Psalm. By JOHN STOUGHTON. Pp. 336. London, 1860. J. Nisbet & Co.

Sermons on our Lord's Parables, preached to a village congregation. By ARTHUR ROBERTS, M.A., Rector of Woodrising, Norfolk. Pp. 290. London : J. Nisbet & Co., 1860.

Sermons on the Book of Job. By the late Rev. GEORGE WAGNER, Incumbent of St Stephen's Church, Brighton. Pp. 290. London : J. Nisbet & Co., 1860.

THESE are three excellent volumes of sound, practical instruction, well adapted for family reading. Mr Stoughton's ranks decidedly first among them, both with respect to its literary qualities and its handsome outward appearance. But they will all be found well fitted to impress and to edify.

The Missing Link ; or, Bible Women in the Homes of the London Poor. By L. N. R., author of the "*The Book and its Story.*" London : J. Nisbet & Co., 1859. Pp. 296.

Haste to the Rescue ; or, Work while it is Day. By MRS CHARLES W. J. Nisbet & Co. 1859. Pp. 252.

Our Homeless Poor ; or, A Voice from the Refuges. 1860. J. Nisbet & Co. Pp. 240.

THESE are all books of deep and enchaining interest, giving an account of efforts which have been made of late both in London and in the country, for the improvement and elevation of the lowest classes of our countrymen. The efforts in general seem to have been conducted with great wisdom, devotedness, and perseverance. The narratives of them are profoundly interesting, and will, no doubt, lead to the wide extension of similar plans and appliances. We observe that the first two have been republished in the United States.

Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Religion, derived from the literal fulfilment of Prophecy. By ALEXANDER KEITH, D.D. 37th edition, much enlarged, with daguerreotype views. London: T. Nelson & Sons, 1859. Pp. 554.

It is, of course, needless to say anything in commendation of a work so well known and so highly appreciated as this. We merely chronicle the fact that the learned, ingenious, and indefatigable author, has gone on perpetually improving his work, and that now, in the 37th edition, it has, by a profusion of beautiful daguerreotype illustrations, been rendered peculiarly interesting as well as peculiarly valuable.

The Physical Geography of the Sea. By M. F. MAURY, LL.D., U.S.N., Superintendent of the National Observatory, Washington. London: T. Nelson & Sons, 1859.

It is scarcely possible to form too high an estimate of the simple and unpretending purpose of this noble work, or the amount of high effort and resources displayed in its execution.

"The primary object," says the author in his Introduction to the First Edition, published in 1855, "of the 'Wind and Current Charts,' out of which has grown this treatise on the Physical Geography of the Sea, was to collect the experience of every navigator as to the winds and currents of the ocean, to discuss his observations upon them, and then to present the world with the results on charts, for the improvement of commerce and navigation."

As a trustworthy contribution to the more skilful methods of navigating those great water-courses of the ocean that connect the distant parts of the world—their ever expanding powers of economic production and exchange, together with their rising seaports—the "Physical Geography of the Sea" cannot fail to become an abiding monument to its author's genius and persevering toil. By its letter-press and charts,—which latter are, in this excellent and handsome edition of the Messrs Nelson, impressively coloured,—it is admirably adapted to aid the intelligent seaman towards a safe solution of many anxious inquiries, and promote a still more marked improvement of the better navigation of the day.

Nor is its value limited to the advantages that may be derived from its pages by the student of mere seamanship. As a means of solid instruction in the logic of the departments of physics and natural science embraced by physical geography, its careful perusal will amply repay any expenditure, however large, of thought and time. By the strict tension of mind necessary to the mastery of the data and processes of its main propositions, the ordinary reader cannot fail to acquire an increase of dialectic edge and vigour. Nor will the student of severe science, who has learned the salutary lesson of avoiding a one-sided culture, be slow to acknowledge, that in becoming more intimately conversant with the facts of the "Physical Geography of the Sea," he is not required to renounce his admiration of the many images of beauty or terror with which the poetical mind has in all ages invested them.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JULY 1860.

ART. I.—*The Book of Genesis.*

Bunsens Bibelwerk. Vollständiges Bibelwerk für die Gemeinde. In drei Abtheilungen. Von C. C. J. BUNSEN. Erster Theil: Das Gesetz—GENESIS Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1858.

A Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament, with a New Translation. By M. M. KALISCH, Ph. D. M.A. **בראשית**—GENESIS. London: Longmans. 1858.

THE book of Genesis is, in many and important respects, possessed of peculiar interest to the biblical scholar. As the first of that noble series of books which constitute the Old Testament Canon, it deals with topics which must ever attract the attention and stimulate the curiosity of mankind; but respecting which it is scarcely possible to obtain any trustworthy information, apart from that which revelation itself supplies. The great questions relating to the creation of the world and the origin of the human race—the introduction of sin and the announcement of a divine plan for its subjugation—the early fortunes of mankind and the manner in which the earth was gradually overspread—the social, intellectual, and spiritual condition of the world's "grey fathers," and the manner in which their descendants either retrograded or advanced—questions which will ever suggest themselves to intelligent minds, and which must, as civilization spreads, acquire more and more, a universal and commanding interest, find their only satisfaction in the venerable records of that most precious book which is, in the course of the following article, to engage our consideration.

It was a favourite saying of Luther, "*Nihil pulchrius Genesi, nihil utilius.*" Most reflecting minds will be ready to re-echo this sentiment of the great reformer, and to express gratitude to the God of providence as well as grace, for having preserved to us the very valuable, and otherwise unattainable, knowledge contained in this book, which forms the stately portal to the magnificent edifice of inspired Scripture. The same principle which has led God in the *natural* world to do far more than merely provide for our pressing wants, may also be detected in rich and benevolent operation in the *spiritual*. It has been often and powerfully observed in proof of the goodness of the Creator, that in addition to what was absolutely necessary for man's support, He has lavishly bestowed upon him much that is fitted to minister to his gratification. And so in that volume, which has for its great leading object the discovery of the way of salvation, God has been graciously pleased to insert much that is calculated to gratify the natural and noble curiosity of man's intellect, no less than to meet the wants and secure the happiness of his immortal soul. A benevolence delighting to display itself, and restrained only by infinite wisdom and holiness, may thus be discovered in the *word* no less than the *works* of God; and may well challenge our admiration, and excite our gratitude, in the one department of his working as well as in the other.

A learned living countryman of Luther, in adopting that expression of the reformer which has been quoted, and in illustrating and enforcing its truthfulness, has commenced his interpretation of Genesis with some very striking and animated remarks, as to the peculiar value attaching to this book among the writings of Scripture. Its extreme importance, he observes, at once appears in the foundation which it furnishes for the whole course of subsequent divine revelation. All the law rests upon Genesis, and all the Old Testament rests upon the law. The scheme of redemption, again, as fully developed and proclaimed in the Gospel, finds its basis in the Old Testament, and the present condition, as well as the bypast history of our world, can be explained only in connexion with the scheme of redemption; so that on the pillars furnished by the book of Genesis, must depend for ever the whole structure of man's salvation. The books of Moses occupy the same place in the Old Testament that the Gospel holds in the New. Nor is the parallel of a merely fanciful or superficial nature, but deep and important. Not only do the beginnings of the two portions of the canon correspond, but the *beginning* of the one seems to be organically connected with the *end* of the other. Genesis and the Apocalypse—the Alpha and the Omega of the canonical Scriptures—*complete the circle* of divine revelation.

The creation of the present heaven and earth, related in the opening chapters of Genesis, corresponds to the creation of the new heaven and the new earth, recorded in the closing chapters of the Apocalypse. And the former creation, which had the first Adam for its *end*, finds its correlative in the new creation, which has the second Adam for its *beginning*. Thus the Holy Scriptures form one complete and rounded whole, to prove to us, that, not this or that book merely, but the whole Canon, is the work of the Holy Spirit. *He* has manifestly been the *principium architectonizans* of the finished and perfect structure. The book of Genesis, and the law generally, as being the *σκιὰ τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν*, is the sacred foundation of the whole: the Apocalypse, again, is the lofty summit penetrating into that *αἰὼν μέλλων*, to which all had looked forward.*

It is interesting to compare these striking observations of a continental critic, with the similar, but, so far as we know, independent remarks of an eminent biblical scholar among ourselves. In a noble passage in his *Hulsean Lectures*, Dean Trench writes as follows:—"The Bible marks itself as one by returning visibly in its end upon its beginning. Vast as is the course which it has traced, it has been a circle still, and in that most perfect form it comes back to the point from whence it started. The heaven, which had disappeared from the earth since the third chapter of Genesis, reappears again in visible manifestation in the latest chapters of the Revelation. The tree of life, whereof there were but faint reminiscences in all the intermediate time, again stands by the river of the water of life, and again there is no more curse. Even the very differences of the forms under which the heavenly kingdom reappears, are deeply characteristic, marking, as they do, not merely that all is won back, but won back in a more glorious shape than that in which it was lost, because won back in the Son. It is no longer Paradise, but the New Jerusalem,—no longer the garden, but now the city of God, which is on earth. The change is full of meaning: no longer the garden, free, spontaneous, and unlaboured, even as man's blessedness in the state of a first innocence would have been, but the city, costlier indeed, more stately, more glorious, but at the same time the result of toil, of labour, of pains: reared into a nobler and more abiding habitation, yet with stones which after the pattern of the elect Corner-stone, were, each in its time, laboriously hewn, and painfully squared for the places they fill."†

* Die Genesis ausgelegt von F. Delitzsch. Leipzig, 1852, pp. 1-2.

† *Hulsean Lectures*, 1845, by R. C. Trench, p. 31. The leading thought in the above extract, and even some of the expressions employed, are so similar to those of Delitzsch, that if, as can scarcely be doubted, the two authors wrote independently of each other, we find in their words a very interesting case of literary coincidence.

Delitzsch adds, in further expression of the inestimable value which he attributes to this portion of Scripture, these glowing and eloquent words:—"It may be said of the whole five books of Moses, that they are an unexhausted ocean of knowledge—a mine of still unexplored intellectual wealth—a storehouse of yet undeveloped and secret treasures—and what is thus true of the whole law, is true in an especial sense of the book of Genesis."

But, while the book before us is thus justly pronounced so precious, the difficulties lying in the way of a full appropriation of its treasures are exceedingly great. Much, indeed, that is most valuable at once accrues to the simplest reader of this portion of Scripture. He gathers a wisdom from its pages, which could never be acquired by the highest efforts of heathen antiquity. He transcends at once the knowledge possessed by the most famous philosophers of Greece and Rome, in learning from this book these certain facts—that there is *one* living and true God—that the world is an *effect* of his wisdom and love—that he formed his creatures upon earth *holy and happy*—that *sin* is the only cause of all their sufferings—and above all, that as they are involved in a common ruin, so God has graciously provided for them a common and almighty Redeemer. All these, and many other points of the greatest interest and importance, may be learned by the humblest piety in perusing the book of Genesis, and remind us very forcibly how great is the advantage possessed by those to whom have been committed the "oracles of God." A sublime theology, compared with which, the loftiest speculations on divine and eternal things to be found in the pages of Plato, are but the inane wanderings of a mind vainly striving to pierce through the gloom in which it was enveloped, has been gathered by many a peasant from this book, and has proved to him at once satisfying to his intellect, comforting to his heart, and sanctifying to his soul, as he journeyed towards that perfect knowledge, and happiness, and holiness, to be enjoyed in the Paradise above. But it cannot at the same time be denied, that some of the difficulties which suggest themselves to earnest and intelligent students of Scripture, in connection with Genesis, are of the most formidable kind. Its authorship, its sources, its interpretation, and its divine authority—are all inquiries which force themselves upon our attention, and which have occupied the minds, and tasked the learning, both of the friends and foes of revelation. Was Moses really the author of this book, as has generally been maintained, both by Jews and Christians? or did it take its rise many centuries later than the age of the great lawgiver of Israel, as has been affirmed by many of the learned rationalists of these later times? And if

Moses was the author, living as he is generally admitted to have done about 1500 years B.C., then in what way did he obtain his information of events so long anterior to his own times? Was it by immediate divine revelation, through means of visions of the past set before him, or suggestions miraculously conveyed to him? Or was it chiefly, or wholly, from the oral traditions which had been carefully preserved till his day, and which he was the first to commit to writing? Or did he to any extent make use of written documents, and may some of these be regarded as having contained authentic records of the very earliest times? Or finally, did he merely, like many other chroniclers, transfer to paper the floating ideas of his age, modifying them according to his own judgment of what was true, and moulding them into the form of a regular and continuous narrative, which they had not before possessed?

And then, according as one or other of these views is adopted, what amount of authority ought to be attributed to the book? What is the deference which we are *now* called upon to yield it? What claims can be made out in its favour on the principles of historical criticism? And what is its true interpretation, both as regards particular passages which it contains, and in reference to the book as a whole? Is it all to be viewed as strictly historical, or are some portions of it allegorical, or even mythical? And what are the conclusions to be formed, or the explanations to be given, when we bring its statements into comparison with the principles and results of such sciences as astronomy, ethnology, comparative philology, and geology, as these have been elaborated, and are now held to be established, at the present day?

The last particular here referred to, suggests a class of difficulties as necessary to be grappled with by modern expositors of the book of Genesis, from which the ancients were completely free. The philological difficulties, properly so called, were all with which they had to deal. Science, in its various departments, had not yet asserted the claim to be listened to as of co-ordinate authority with Scripture; but, such as it was, rested calmly in subordination to the apparent meaning of the Bible, as commonly interpreted by the Church. In our day, however, the case is very different. The human mind has now for many ages zealously pursued investigations into the natural sciences; and has attained to many conclusions which are deemed sure and irrefragable truth. And, as the book of Genesis touches on not a few of the points which science by a method of her own claims to have settled, the question has necessarily arisen as to the harmony or inconsistency which exists between the two authorities, as to the manner in which, if apparently conflicting, they are to be reconciled, and as to

which of them ought to be held as possessed of paramount authority, if they are really found in direct opposition to each other, and if one or other must therefore be abandoned.

Two great classes of difficulty, then, beset the student of the book of Genesis at the present day. There are those of a purely philological character, which would have existed though the natural sciences had never been heard of; and there are also those which have arisen from the zealous prosecution in modern times of these sciences, and the authoritative results which, as is generally believed, have now been reached. We propose in the sequel to make some observations on both these classes of difficulty, and to notice various particulars included under them respectively; but as that is to be done chiefly in connection with the works named at the head of this article, a few remarks on the authorship and objects of these works may here, in the first place, be submitted to our readers.

The author of the first work is the eminent Baron Bunsen, so well known throughout Europe for his valuable writings in several departments of literature, and perhaps, since the death of Humboldt, the most remarkable of the living celebrities of Germany. The voluminous work, of which only the first part is here specially to engage our attention, is intended to embrace the whole Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament, and to embody all that the gifted and learned writer has gathered, in the course of a long life of study, for the interpretation and elucidation of the Bible. Amid the many different scenes and occupations in which he has mingled, he had always looked forward to the completion of that gigantic undertaking in which he is now so industriously employed; and had ever regarded it with fond anticipation as what he hoped would prove the *magnum opus* of his life. In a very interesting passage contained in the multifarious introductory matter which the author has collected, he thus describes "the advantages which he had enjoyed above most of his contemporaries," for the preparation of such a work, and the use to which he had turned them.

"From his earliest years," he tells us, "his thoughts were so constantly directed by truly Christian parents to Christ and the Bible, that, even as a boy, he was introduced to the original languages of Scripture. In the year 1805, he read at school the book of Genesis in Hebrew and the Gospels in Greek; and by 1807, he had read the latter also in the Syriac language, under the tuition of a scholar of Michaelis. On repairing to the University in 1808 for the study of theology, he had the good fortune to find in Arnoldi and Hartmann faithful and careful instructors in his exegetical studies, particularly in the Old Testament. Devoting himself soon afterwards to classical

pursuits, he by no means lost sight of sacred criticism, but kept it in view as that to which he intended subsequently to return. After a seven years' course of study at Marburg and Göttingen, he removed to Paris, where he enjoyed the instructions of De Sacy in Persian, and partly also in Arabic. At last, called to a new and active life at Rome (where he resided twenty-two years), he had the happiness, during more than six years of intercourse with Niebuhr, the master of historical criticism, to carry on, in concert with that great man, his investigations in the field of sacred criticism. The life of Jesus and that of the Apostle Paul, the Gospels generally, and, in particular, that of John, the books of Genesis, Joel, and Jonah, and the book of Psalms, successively received his earnest and continuous attention. Removing from Rome to England (in which he resided nearly fifteen years), he had, both as a *litterateur* and an ambassador, manifold opportunities of learning the inestimable worth of the Bible from two points of view almost completely opposed to each other. During his stay in England, he adhered strictly to the rule which he had prescribed to himself in Rome, to labour directly, for at least one or more months in the year, on his projected work on Scripture. And at last, in the summer of 1834, he found himself restored to that complete leisure which he had long desired, but in vain sought to obtain. Returning to his native land, after forty years' absence, he immediately resolved to engross in one work the materials which he had collected, and to bring to a close his long-continued preparations. The work, therefore, which is now presented to the public, is the result of almost twenty years of learned preliminary labours (1817-35), following on seven years of academic professional studies. The twenty-two years, from 1836 to the autumn of 1857, are the time in which the work has been regularly in hand; and the author hopes, from the experience of a long life, and the mental vigour which it has pleased God to continue to him, that it will be permitted him in his old age to pay the eagerly formed vows of his youth".*

No one can read this passage without a feeling of deep respect for the learned and indefatigable author. It is seldom, indeed, that any life is marked by such a noble persistency in study as that of Bunsen has been; and seldomer still, that one so much involved in public affairs as he has been, retains, amid all political changes, the early academic passion for learned pursuits; and, after a lifetime of preparation, sets himself in his closing years to realize the dreams of youth. Should the execution of the grand purpose at all correspond with its conception, we feel at once that by no one better than the author, could the exulting words of the Roman lyricist be appropriated,—

"Exegi monumentum ære perennius,
Regalique situ pyramidum altius."

But just according to the greatness of the design is the risk

* Bunsen's *Bibelwerk* (condensed), pp. cxviii.—cxx.

of failure attending it. Much is justly expected from one who could preface his work by such a statement as that which has been quoted ; and deep will be the disappointment should not some results very valuable to the church universal have accrued from so laborious and long-continued preparations. Whether or not that is the case, we shall immediately be enabled to determine.

Dr Kalisch, the author of the second work named above, is a learned Jewish scholar among ourselves. His undertaking is not less gigantic than that of Bunsen himself. It is intended to embrace the whole of the Old Testament ; and if the work be carried out in the same elaborate manner in which it has been commenced, it will certainly be a remarkable memorial of the erudition and industry of its author. Only two volumes have as yet been published, on Genesis and Exodus respectively ; but these of themselves amply evince the extensive scholarship, the comprehensive knowledge, and the painstaking industry of the writer. The volume on Genesis alone is a large octavo of nearly 800 pages, and grapples with every topic even remotely connected with the book to whose illustration it is devoted. There is, first, a preliminary essay to the sacred narrative of the creation, "On the relation between the Scriptures and the Natural Sciences, especially Geology and Astronomy ;" and in this there is a large and intimate acquaintance shewn with almost all that has been written on these points down to the present day. Then, interspersed at their fitting places, we find long and interesting essays on "Paradise and the Fall," on "Science and the Noachian Deluge," on "The Genealogy of Nations," and on "The history of Babylon and Assyria ;" while a new English translation of the whole book is presented, and every philological difficulty is carefully and learnedly discussed in the accompanying notes. Nothing could be more thorough than the plan which the writer has adapted ; while his style is, generally speaking, so clear and lively, that the reader is saved from that feeling of oppression which too often falls upon one in the perusal of such multifariously learned and copious works.

It is with the deepest and most heartfelt regret that, after this account of the works in question, we feel that we have nothing more to say in their favour. We must, on the contrary, express our humble but decided opinion that it would upon the whole have been better for the Church of God that they had *never* been published. Truly lamentable it is to be compelled to announce such a conclusion respecting works whose erudition is unquestionable, and which deal with a portion of Scripture as deeply interesting as it is vitally important. But truth requires us to declare, that instead of

helping us to the solution of any of those difficulties which press most heavily upon the student of the book of Genesis, they are rather fitted to impede the progress of a true and reverent exegesis of Old Testament Scripture, and to hinder, by their rash and unfounded canons of criticism, the approach of that day which we are sure will yet arrive, when truth will be proved to be *one*, and when God's works will most plainly be found to symphonize with his holy word.

The work of Bunsen, so far as any principle can be discovered in its construction, proceeds on the assumption of the validity of those rationalist theories now happily abandoned by most of the ablest living scholars of Germany. In this point of view, we think the work of the learned Baron fitted to effect much mischief, by preventing for a time the spread of that sounder faith in Scripture among the German clergy in general, which has already taken a firm hold of most of the universities. It is well known that while the leading men at the German seats of learning are now found walking in "the old paths," and are honest believers in the divine authority and natural import of God's word, the spirit of rationalism, in its various forms, still lingers among the clergy. And this work of Bunsen, intended as it is for general circulation, appears but too well suited for preserving yet for a time that spirit, which is dying at the springs of German thought, and from which it is so much to be desired that the teachers of the people should be completely free. His whole commentary, so far as we have examined it, is imbued with an anti-evangelical spirit; and by rejecting the plain, historical meaning of Scripture, often exhibits the merest folly in the interpretation of the sacred narrative, and can only be regarded as illustrating the freaks of a varied but useless and pernicious erudition. Take, *e.g.*, such a passage as the following on the statement (Gen. ii. 2):—"And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made."

"The *seventh* creation-day is the day in which we live, and whose length no one knows. God rests in man, his image, and man seeks and finds his rest in God: for, as the body, so also must the soul, return to its original. The week (which, among Shemitic nations, is called by a word denoting a period of seven days) is the emblem of completed unity. It has its natural foundation in the casual duration of the four phases or appearances of the moon's disc, and the union of these forms the month, the next measure of time according to the universal idea of the Shemitic races. The number *seven* has its outward astronomical representation throughout the ancient world, and particularly among the descendants of Shem, in the seven planets, or moving-stars, as they appear to the eye—viz., the

Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Hence, also, has arisen the succession now fixed among the days of the week. For, if a rule of twenty-four hours' duration be assigned to each of the planets, and we begin to reckon backwards from Saturn the most remote of all, and thus continue the reckoning, the first hour of the first day of the week will fall to Saturn (Saturn's day, the English Saturday); the first hour of the second day, *i.e.*, the twenty-fifth hour, will fall to the Sun (Sunday); the first hour of the third day will fall to the Moon (Monday); the first hour of the fourth day to Mars (Mars' day—Wednesday); and so on. This is one of the results of the Chaldean astrology—a system which has exerted a great influence almost down to our own day. God himself, the Creator of heaven and earth, was designated by the early descendants of Shem, and then also by the Egyptians, as "The Eighth," *i.e.*, as the concentration of the seven, as Lord of the heavenly host (Sabaoth), as the Unity of the creative powers. All these figurative representations take for granted faith in the unity of the Eternal, as the Foundation and Cause of all phenomena. But this faith is preserved only in the Biblical narrative: *the emblematic form there employed does not hide from view the actual truth*, but on the contrary allows it to shine through the veil of imagery."

Such is the note furnished by the learned writer to the Mosaic account of the first Sabbath! Our readers will probably deem it an eminent illustration of the practice of "darkening counsel by words without knowledge," and will not be surprised at what follows.

"The *serpent* is the natural, original symbol of the *understanding*, insinuating itself through every thing without apparent means or instruments—of the *reason* when severed from conscience, the preservative against evil. . . . Thereby the divine gift bestowed on man becomes an evil power, and persecutes him whom it was intended to enlighten and render happy. But humanity does not bear such a state of things with patience. With every generation there awakens the new divinely-implanted instinct for life, which struggles against the Evil, and reposes confidence in the Good. And to such a faith, and to it only, is the victory given. In this sense, it is true, that in chapter iii. 15, the Gospel—the *Protevangeliium*—was proclaimed to our first parents. Spiritually, then, Jesus Christ was made known to them, but *only in this sense, that He exhibits human nature in its perfection.*"

We need not multiply extracts. It must be very plain that these would have but little value in themselves; and enough has been presented to enable our readers to judge of the position occupied by the learned Baron as an interpreter of Genesis. Happily, amid all our dearth of profound scholarship in this country, the *evangelical sense*, so indispensable to a successful exposition of Scripture, is so generally possessed, that nothing so crude and unsatisfactory as Bunsen's explanations would

obtain a moment's hearing; and there is far more light thrown on the real meaning of the first book of the Old Testament by the simplest commentary in use among us, than is to be found in the learned, yet most disappointing pages of that elaborate work, for which, as we have seen, its author made such laborious and long-continued preparations.

We are disposed to attribute a much higher value to the work of Dr Kalisch than to that of Bunsen. There is an immense amount of information contained in it, and that is presented in such a methodical form as to be at once accessible to the reader. Many large, expensive, and not easily-mastered works, are condensed into the interesting Commentary on the sacred text presented by Dr Kalisch; and the original matter furnished by himself, is highly creditable to his talents, taste, and erudition. The following passage on the covenant of God with Noah, will give our readers some idea of the varied learning, the vivid style, and also, we must add, the fatally erroneous principles which are characteristic of his work.

"The rainbow shall serve as the *sign* (אֵימָה) of this perpetual covenant. Well might a reflecting mind look with wonder at the marvellous arch, which in magic swiftmess, and in more magic colours, encompasses the still cloud-covered part of heaven; whilst the radiant sun sends his glorious beams from the other part, already restored to its usual serenity. Its beauty delights the eye, while its grandeur elevates the mind: it teaches the omnipotence of God, but still more His love: when the flashes of lightning have ceased, and the roaring of the tempest is silent, its chaste brilliancy falls like morning dew on the troubled heart; admiration and gratitude mingle in the breast; and when the pearly bow then appears, like an eternal bridge, to connect heaven and earth, the soul rises on the soft wings of veneration, disturbed by no doubt and awed by no fear, to those regions where love and beauty never cease. Almost all ancient nations, therefore, have connected religious ideas with the appearance of the rainbow. The Greeks considered it generally as the path on which Iris, the messenger of the king and queen of Olympus, travelled from heaven to earth (*Serv. Æn.* v. 610). Homer describes it as fixed in the clouds to be a *sign* (τίμας) to man, either of war, or of icy winter (*Il.* xi. 27, 28; xvii. 547, 548). But Iris herself was very frequently identified with the rainbow, and she was considered to be the daughter of Thaumas (*Wonder*) by Electra (*Brightness*), the daughter of Oceanus (*Hes. Theog.* 265), which parentage describes appropriately the nature and parentage of the rainbow. Her usual epithets are "swift-footed" (ἀελλόπους), and "gold-winged" (χρυσόπτερος); and the probable etymology of her name (from εἶρω, to join or unite), points either to the external, or perhaps to the internal connection between earth and heaven, between man and the Deity; and thus she is the conciliating, the peace-restoring goddess (she is represented with the herald-staff in her left hand); and Iris is kindred with Irene (εἰρήνη: comp. *Virg.*

Æn. iv. 694 ; v. 606 ; ix. 2 : Ovid, Met. i. 270 ; xi. 585 ; Val. Flacc. vii. 186)."

After referring to the Persian, Hindoo, Chinese, and Scandinavian views of the rainbow, he adds—

"These analogies are sufficient to prove the generality with which higher notions were attached to the rainbow : *they account for its application in the Pentateuch to a very remarkable purpose* : they explain (!) why the New Testament represented the rainbow as an attribute of the divine throne (Rev. iv. 3), or of angels sent as messengers upon the earth (Rev. x. 1) ; but they are likewise clear enough to manifest in this point also the great superiority of Biblical conceptions. In the Mosaic narrative every superstitious element is banished ; the sign is appointed more for God than for the sake of man ; *God* sees it, and remembers thus the everlasting covenant with the earth ; and if the men are rejoiced at the sight of that beautiful phenomenon, it is merely because it gives them the certainty that the covenant is not forgotten : when torrents of rain begin to inundate the earth, and the thunder rolls through the heavy air, when lowering clouds conceal the light of the orb of day, and the heart of man begins to despond and to tremble, the rainbow appears suddenly like a thought from a better world ; it announces the peace of nature, and the renewal of the eternal promise. . . . The words "*I have given*" (נָתַתִּי) seem to imply that the rainbow existed before the time of Noah, but that it was then instituted to serve as a mark of Divine promise : the beautiful phenomenon was endowed with a new meaning : the wondrous enigma received *a solution satisfactory to the Hebrew mind* ; and the sterile admiration for a marvel of nature was converted into a deep religious sentiment, combining the three heavenly sisters, faith, and love, and hope."

This extract forms a fair specimen, both of the excellencies and the errors of the Commentary of Kalisch. It is impossible to deny that the former are great, while the latter are most mischievous and lamentable. The author is never weary in extolling the Bible above all the other remains of antiquity. Both the ideas which it contains, and the language in which it has enshrined them, are over and over again lauded with a deep and earnest eloquence. The heart of the writer often seems profoundly moved by the sacred narrative, and this imparts great vividness and power to the very interesting and instructive remarks which are to be found on almost every page of his work. But still, there is a grand defect, a vital error, pervading all his labours. It is *Moses* and the *Hebrew mind* that he commends, as compared with the other writers and nations of antiquity : the Spirit who, as Milton says, *inspired* of old

"That shepherd, who first taught the chosen seed
In the beginning how the heavens and earth
Rose out of chaos,"

is completely overlooked throughout the volume, and His agency *always*, by implication, denied. Accordingly, the plainest and most decided statements are often made as to the manifold errors to be found in Genesis, especially in reference to the scientific announcements which it is supposed to contain. The very object of the elaborate essay with which the work opens, is to set these fancied errors in the clearest light; and the "final result" as described by the writer is the following:—

"We believe we have indisputably demonstrated, both by positive and negative proofs, that, with regard to astronomy and geology, the Biblical records are, in many essential points, *utterly and irreconcilably at variance with the established results of modern researches*. We must acquiesce in the conviction, that at the time of the composition of the Pentateuch, the natural sciences were still in their infancy, and that the Hebrews were in those branches not materially in advance of the other ancient nations. But, on the other hand, they succeeded completely in removing, even from their physical conceptions, every superstitious and idolatrous element."

The position occupied by Dr Kalisch is thus one of no ambiguity, but it appears to us to be, on mere grounds of philosophy, utterly untenable. He attributes no higher authority to the ancient Hebrew records than he does to those of other nations, yet he can scarcely find language sufficiently strong to set forth the superiority which, on every ground, scientific as well as spiritual, he holds to belong to the former as compared with the latter. Not a tinge of superstition or idolatry is, according to him, to be found even in "the physical conceptions" of the Hebrews; while every other ancient system of cosmogony is justly branded by him as essentially both silly and superstitious. Here, then, a problem presents itself, which, we are afraid, must somewhat task the powers of his philosophy in its solution. The Hebrews were, in all spiritual truth, clearly and most notably distinguished from every other ancient nation: even in the domain of natural science, they succeeded in avoiding "every superstitious and idolatrous element," and thus, also, were signally marked out from all the nations of antiquity: what, then, the explanation to be given of these facts? what the solution which can be offered of the problem thus suggested by Dr Kalisch himself to his considerate and philosophical readers? It is manifestly vain to tell us of the *great superiority of the Hebrew mind*, for that is itself the very phenomenon to be accounted for, as it is presented to us in those writings respecting the origin of which we inquire. Nor, apart from the supposition of inspiration, does the Hebrew mind appear at all superior to that of other nations; if we may not rather say it ranks greatly inferior to

some of them. No one will compare the Hebrew intellect with the ancient Greek, or even the ancient Egyptian, in regard to general culture, or penetrative and comprehensive genius. Wherever we have an opportunity of contemplating the ancient Hebrew mind manifesting its character in disjunction from what we believe to have been the special influences of the Spirit of God, we find it distinguished by narrowness rather than breadth, and exhibiting a *very marked tendency to fall into superstition and idolatry*. The slightest glance at the history of the Israelitish nation is sufficient to establish these points; and yet we possess, in the book of Genesis, a system of the world, not only resting on the highest spiritual truths, and teaching the purest theology, but even in its physical aspects, exhibiting, as is confessed, no mixture of idolatrous or superstitious elements. If, then, on simply philosophical grounds, we here have recourse to the idea of divine inspiration, must it not be admitted that there is "dignus vindice nodus?" In no possible way, we believe, can the vast superiority which Dr Kalisch justly claims for the ancient Hebrew views of God, and of the universe, over every other, be accounted for, but by the admission of a special divine influence having been at work in the one case, which was wanting in every other. And if the fact of such divine guidance or inspiration be in *any* degree admitted with reference to the Old Testament writers, their absolute immunity from *all* error on *all* subjects, whether spiritual or secular, moral or scientific, follows as a necessary conclusion. It would revolt our every notion of the infinite perfection of God, to suppose that He can ever deliberately promulgate or sanction what is false. And it would even appear, that He had not only deliberately, but needlessly, done so in the earlier chapters of Genesis, unless these be held to embody actual and important truth. There was no *necessity* that a revelation from God should contain any system of the world at all. He might have made known to man all that was necessary for him to know in order to salvation, without in any degree entering on the domain of natural science. The inspired word which He graciously gave for the guidance of fallen man to pardon and peace, might have dealt only with spiritual truths; and we are perfectly sure *would* have done so, had not the beneficent Author of all truth seen it important to convey to us authentic information on certain other interesting and perplexing points. The very fact that the Bible *does* contain scientific statements ought to be sufficient to convince every sincere and reflecting believer in its inspiration, that these statements must be in the highest degree important, since they were deemed worthy of the place which has been given them; and

that in order to their importance, or indeed as essential to *any* useful purpose which they could possibly serve, they must possess the attribute of absolute and infallible truth.

We hold, then, that on the ground assumed by Dr Kalisch (and there are many others at the present day who occupy the same or a similar position), the divine authority and absolute veracity of the book of Genesis may conclusively be established. If it be granted, as it is granted, that the primitive Hebrew records are, in every respect, superior to those of all other ancient nations, it follows that this superiority can be attributed only to the special interposition of God. Such is the first point which we maintain to be an inevitable corollary from the language of those who extol the books of Moses above all other ancient literature, and who justly pronounce them free from the errors and absurdities which have been mixed up so largely with the speculations of all other writers with respect to the creation of the world, the nature of God, and the primitive condition as well as early history of the human race. And then, if God *did* interpose to inform the minds, guide the thoughts, and guard the expressions of these ancient Hebrew writers, by whom He was pleased to reveal himself to others, it cannot be supposed that He would, after all, but imperfectly fulfil his design, and allow them to blend truth with falsehood. Above all, if He led them, as according to Dr Kalisch He has done, to insert, in a book professedly dealing for the most part with spiritual truth, "a most comprehensive and magnificent" account of the creation, then it is plain, on every principle of reason, that this account must not only be true as coming from the God of truth, but must be charged with important and enduringly valuable information to all those for whom the revelation, either primarily or ultimately, was designed.

In writing thus, we do not assert that it was at all a leading object of the Bible to reveal scientific truth ; or that such truth has, in any instance, been communicated in a strictly scientific form. On the contrary, we hold it of importance to maintain the negative on both these points. It was certainly not at all the purpose of that revelation which God gave to man, to supersede his inquiries into the natural world, or to dictate to him the scientific truths which he was to believe. But extreme views, as it appears to us, have been adopted on both sides of the question as to the relation subsisting between the Bible and science. Some have maintained that the Bible had really *nothing to do* with science, and others that it was in some places its manifest object to *teach* science. On the one hand we are told :

"It is an obligation resting upon the Bible, if it is to be consistent

with itself, that it should *refuse* to teach science, and if the Bible even had taught any one art, science, or process of life, capital doubts would have clouded our confidence in the authority of the book. By what caprice, it would have been asked, is a divine mission abandoned suddenly for a human mission? By what caprice is this one science taught and others not? Or these two, suppose, and not all? But an objection even deadlier would have followed. It is clear as is the purpose of daylight, that the whole body of the arts and sciences comprises one vast machinery for the irritation and development of the human intellect. For this end they exist. To see God therefore descending into the arena of science, and contending as it were for his own prizes, by teaching science in the Bible, would be to see him intercepting from that self-evident destination (*viz.*, man's intellectual benefit) his own problems by solving them himself. No spectacle could more dishonour the divine idea—could more injure man under the mask of aiding him. *The Bible must not teach man anything that man can teach himself.* Does a doctrine require a revelation? Then nobody but God *can* teach it. Does it require none? Then, in whatever case God has qualified man to do a thing for himself, he has in that very qualification silently laid an injunction upon man to it." *

There is truth, and truth well-expressed, in these remarks, but it is truth considerably alloyed with exaggeration. The language used with respect to the course necessary to be followed in any and every divine revelation, is manifestly inconsistent with the plain facts of the case. Science is *not* ignored in the Bible; but is, on the contrary, touched at many points of its wide domain, and may thus be said, in a sense, to be *taught*. There are numerous passages of Scripture which may even be said to be *devoted* to science, though it is science doubtless in subordination to, and acting as the handmaid of, spiritual truth. And *he* must surely be animated by even worse than the spirit of a Vandal, who would desire to see these passages struck out from the Bible. So far from agreeing with the writer quoted above, that it is inconsistent with the idea of revelation to embody in it any hints for the successful prosecution of natural science, we look upon it as one of the glories of the Bible, that it embraces the wide circumference of human interests, and offers its guidance, as well for the cultivation of man's intellect, as for the sanctification of his soul. We delight to find Holy Scripture touching on all that can interest or influence humanity; and while we readily acknowledge and strenuously affirm that revelation ever keeps clearly in view its great leading object—the spiritual enlightenment and emancipation of mankind,—we do at the same time maintain that it has a word to say about *science* as well as other things,

* *De Quincey, Selections, VIII. 133.*

and that its voice is worthy of being listened to in the study of the philosopher, no less than in that of the divine.

But having seen the one extreme which is sometimes adopted on this point, let us now glance at the other, as brought before us in the following passage from the prefatory essay of Dr Kalisch:—

“There is,” he says, “a very large class of scholars who attempt to evade these (scientific) questions altogether, by simply asserting that the Bible does not at all *intend* to give information on physical subjects—that it is exclusively a *religious* book, and regards the physical world only in so far as it stands in relation to the moral conduct of men. But this is a bold fallacy. With the same justice it might be affirmed that the Bible, in describing the rivers of Paradise, does not speak of geography at all; or in inserting the grand list and genealogy of nations (in the tenth chapter), is far from touching on the science of ethnography. Taken in this manner, nothing would be easier, but nothing more arbitrary, than biblical interpretation. It is simply untrue that the Bible entirely avoids these questions; it has in fact treated the history of creation in a most comprehensive and magnificent manner; it has in these portions, as well as in the moral precepts and theological doctrines, *evidently not withheld any information which it was in its power to impart.*”*

Here also there is truth, but truth accompanied by manifest and pernicious error. It is quite true, as we have already said, that the Bible does in many particulars touch upon science, and may thus be said to *teach* science; but it is *not* true that this is as much one of its objects, as is the revelation of spiritual truth; nor is there the least shadow of a reason for the assertion made above, that in regard to mere earthly knowledge “it has not withheld any information which it was in its power to impart.” This is quite a gratuitous—it may almost be said even ludicrous—assertion. Will any one venture to maintain that Moses, who “was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians,” might not have filled the Pentateuch, if he had so pleased, with many curious disquisitions on a great variety of subjects, dwelt upon in their schools of learning? There cannot be a doubt that he was familiar with their cosmogonies, so very different from that which he has presented; and had his object been to withhold no secular knowledge which it was in his power to impart, we should undoubtedly have been treated to a lengthened account of their speculations and hypotheses. But nothing of this is to be found within the wide compass of the Pentateuch. There is sufficient acquaintance manifested with Egyptian customs and habits of thought, to prove that the writer was familiar with the state of things in the

* Kalisch, Commentary, p. 2.

land in which he is related to have spent his youth ; but there is nothing whatever to shew that he wished to parade his knowledge on any subject, or carried it at any time to the point of exhaustion. On the contrary, there is manifest proof that he must have exercised *self-restraint* as to the limits within which he confined his references to mere secular knowledge. With his head full of the learning of Egypt, it seems scarcely possible that he could have treated the history of the creation in the brief and dignified manner that he has done, unless he had been under the direction of a spirit superior to his own. Let our readers only conceive of the circumstances in which Moses wrote, and they will probably agree with us, that, but for his inspiration, such a production from his pen as that contained in the earlier chapters of Genesis, would have been a literary impossibility. He proposes to give an account of the creation of the world, the origin of the human race, the introduction of sin and other such subjects, with speculations on which the Egyptian, like every other ancient literature, was full ; and yet, though perfectly conversant with all the wisdom of Egypt, there is not a trace of it to be found in the narrative with which he has furnished us. Does this look like the conduct of one who "evidently withheld no information which it was in his power to impart?" Or, does not the comparatively brief reference which is made to mere questions of science shew that, while not avoiding any point of importance to be noticed, the writer kept spiritual objects before him as those at which he was called specially to aim ? And does not the remarkable reticence which he displays with regard to the Egyptian learning in which he had been trained, tend to prove that there was a higher Spirit than his own guiding all his statements, and guarding him from all admixture of error with the truth ?

We may have occasion in the sequel to refer to the unscientific form in which, while nothing but truth is taught, points of science are set forth in Scripture. But in the mean time we proceed to a more particular consideration of those other important questions connected with Genesis, which were previously enumerated, and from which we have till now been detained by the peculiar character of the works before us. On several of these questions neither Bunsen nor Kalisch specially treats in the portions of their respective undertakings yet published, though ominous hints are dropped here and there as to the conclusions which have been formed regarding them. Kalisch observes in his preface, that "a later portion of this work will contain a general introduction to the Pentateuch, in which many questions regarding Genesis, here not yet admitting of a final decision, will be more fully examined ;" and

he subsequently speaks (p. 235) of "a far more comprehensive inquiry on the sources of the Pentateuch, which we must postpone to a future occasion." Bunsen also defers to the second part of his work, his discussion of the various momentous and interesting questions usually treated in introductions; and gives no certain indications, in the part before us, of the opinion which he has formed on the very important points which now solicit our attention.

The first question which occurs respects the *authorship* of the book of Genesis. Is it properly attributed to Moses, or must it be referred to some unknown writer in later times? The great majority of critics have no difficulty in ascribing it to him whose name it bears; but numerous objections to this have been urged by the learned and lynx-eyed rationalists of Germany. Several of these objections do not deserve to be mentioned, since they rest on mere subjective feeling, which cannot be allowed any influence in settling the question at issue. Others it is sufficient *simply* to mention, as it must at once appear they are of no weight. Of this nature are the objections grounded on the use of the expression, "unto this day," which occurs several times in Genesis, but always respecting events which took place some hundred years before the days of Moses; on the remark made (Gen. xii. 6), "The Canaanite was then in the land," as if that presumed a knowledge of the future history of the Israelites which could not have been possessed by Moses; on the nature of the offerings presented by Cain and Abel, as manifesting an acquaintance with the Levitical institutions, though, even if that were the case, such an acquaintance might surely be allowed to Moses; and several other similar particulars by which it is sought to bring down the whole law to a later period than the age of the great lawgiver of Israel.

The only objection to the Mosaic authorship of Genesis, which we deem it necessary specially to notice, is that derived from the well-known passage, Gen. xxxvi. 31-39; and particularly from the words, "*These are the kings that reigned in the land of Edom, before there reigned any king over the land of Israel.*" This clearly shews, it has been argued, that the book must have been written long after the days of Moses, when the Israelites had, like other nations, passed under the dominion of kings. The way by which this objection has been often met, is by supposing the whole passage an interpolation—probably a marginal gloss which has crept into the text. Such is the course followed by Rawlinson in his recently published *Bampton Lectures*. He regards the passage as plainly interpolated, and says it *could* not possibly have been written by Moses. But we confess ourselves dissatisfied with this mode

of escaping the difficulty. The supposition of interpolation is always a very rude way of mastering a difficult passage. At the best it only cuts the knot, instead of unloosing it, and it seems to sanction a very dangerous and uncritical mode of dealing with the sacred text. We are therefore inclined to take this passage for what it purports to be—a genuine portion of the book of Genesis; and we see nothing in it which hinders us from ascribing it to Moses. The rulers of Edom here mentioned, all appear to have flourished before his times: probably the last of them, Hadar, was himself a contemporary of the leader of the Israelites; and hence the names of his wife, his wife's mother, and grandmother are recorded, a particularity not observed in the other cases; so that the list of these Edomitish kings may easily have been compiled by the Jewish lawgiver. And as to the mention of kings in Israel, it is certain from Gen. xxxv. 11, and Deut. xvii. 14-20, that Moses was *familiar with the idea*, that his nation was destined to be subjected to such a class of rulers. We find him saying in the last passage referred to, "When thou art come unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt say, *I will set a king over me*, like as all the nations that are about me," &c., and there appears therefore to us nothing unnatural, when he has occasion to mention in Genesis the kings of Edom, in his adding that so many, down to his day, had reigned over the descendants of Esau, before as yet any such ruler was known in Israel.

The *positive* proofs of the Mosaic authorship of Genesis are of the amplest and most satisfactory kind. It, and the other books of the Law, have constantly borne his name. All parties and sects among the Jews ascribed it to him. A long list of heathen writers, some of whom derived their information from other than Jewish sources, relate that Moses was the author of the written laws among the Jews. Rawlinson enumerates the following—Hecataeus of Abdera, Manetho, Lysimachus of Alexandria, Eupolemus, Tacitus, Juvenal, Longinus—as the leading heathen vouchers for this fact, and adds the important remark, "Nor is this, as an objector might be apt to urge, the mere echo of Jewish tradition, faintly repeating itself from far off lands; in part at least, it rests upon a distinct and even hostile authority, that of the Egyptians. Manetho certainly, and Lysimachus probably, represent Egyptian and not Jewish views; and thus the Jewish tradition is confirmed by that of the only nation, which was sufficiently near and sufficiently advanced in the Mosaic age, to make its testimony on the point of real importance."* Above all, there is the repeated testimony of the New Testament. Again and again do Christ and

* *Bampton Lectures*, p. 44.

his apostles refer to the five books of the law, as the production of Moses. De Wette and others have sought to set aside this conclusive testimony, by somewhat scoffingly remarking, that Christ and his apostles did not come into the world to instruct the Jews in criticism—that they fell in with the views which they found prevailing in regard to the Old Testament; and that a true faith in Christ at the present day does not impose any bounds to the indulgence of doubts, and the pursuit of critical investigations. But it is manifest to every earnest believer in Christ, as the incarnate Wisdom and Truth of God, that whatever *He* sanctioned must be altogether remote from falsehood. Never do we, on any occasion, find him making an approach to compromise the truth, in order that he might propitiate the prejudices, or take advantage of the prepossessions of his hearers; but we always see him resolutely upholding the true, and refuting the false, whatever might be the immediate effect produced upon those who heard him. His testimony then, so often given (*e. g.* Matt. xix. 7; Luke xxiv. 27), is decisive as to the Mosaic authorship of the whole law, and, among the other books, to that of Genesis.*

We now proceed to a more difficult, and far more controverted question; that viz., which relates to the *sources* of the book of Genesis. Moses being admitted to have given it the form in which we now possess it, *how did he obtain his information?* There are two classes of answers which may be given to this inquiry, both of which again admit of several phases and modifications. It may be supposed *first*, that Moses obtained by immediate Divine revelation, a knowledge of these events, so long anterior to his own time, which are described in Genesis; or *secondly*, that he depended for the substance of his narrative, on the materials which had by the ordinary channels of human conveyance reached his day, and that (under supernatural guidance or not), he shaped these into the form in which we now possess them.

It is scarcely necessary to say a word respecting the first of these possible modes of accounting for the origin of Genesis. Although perhaps, it is the idea which lurks indefinitely in the popular mind on this subject, we will hardly find a single Biblical scholar who favours it. The objections that may be urged against it are at once felt to be fatal. Not only is it

* The striking remarks of *Witsius* (Miscell. i. 117) are worth quoting, as furnishing a real, though anticipative, reply to those of De Wette. "Enim vero non fuere Christus et Apostoli critices doctores, quales se haberi postulant, qui hodie sibi regnum literarum in quavis vindicant scientia: fuerunt tamen *doctores veritatis*, neque passi sunt sibi per communem ignorantiam ant procerum astum imponi. Non certe in mundum venire, ut vulgares errores foverent, suaque auctoritate munirent, nec per Judæos solum, sed et populos unice a se pendentes, longe lateque spargerent."

entirely gratuitous, the sacred narrative giving it no countenance whatever, but it is also of such a factitious and unnatural character, as immediately excites in the mind the greatest opposition to its acceptance. There is, indeed, *one* part of the book of Genesis, which must have been originally derived from a supernatural source. The account of the creation could be obtained, directly or indirectly, only from God. But are we to suppose, that the knowledge contained in the first chapters of Genesis was altogether concealed from man till the days of Moses? Did Adam, and Noah, and Abraham, know nothing of the origin of the world, and of the human race? And was it only at last, in the desert of Midian, that an account of these things was either dictated by a voice from heaven to the favoured shepherd, or that the great creative process was revealed by a series of magnificent visions to his wondering eyes? Surely it is far more probable that since God was to make man acquainted with what preceded his introduction upon earth, he would do so to the first man while yet in innocence, and that from him this knowledge would be conveyed to his descendants, than that the divine communication would be deferred to so late a period as the days of Moses. We find it, for our own part, impossible to conceive that the knowledge which *we* now possess of the origin of things, was denied to those ancient patriarchs who were admitted to so frequent and friendly intercourse with God; or that such knowledge was, either for the first time, or in a new and more excellent form, communicated to Moses when he commenced the composition of the book of Genesis. Despite, therefore, the lofty and fascinating eloquence with which the vision theory (liable, by the way, to special and formidable objections of its own), has recently been presented to the world by the gifted Hugh Miller, it cannot be regarded as furnishing us with any aid in our present inquiry. And the remarkable chapters in which it has been expounded must be esteemed rather as a memorial of the powerful fancy and truly devout spirit of their author, than as a sober contribution to the solving of a difficult problem in sacred science.

Believing, then, that to *Adam* was the revelation made, which is now embodied in the opening chapters of Genesis, we turn to the second category of opinions as alone that which can lead us to truth on the question as to the sources of this book. But here again we meet with several shades and varieties of explanation. Some there are who escape all difficulty on the subject, by denying the historical truth of the events narrated in Genesis, so far at least as the first ten or twelve chapters are concerned. We shall afterwards have occasion to make some remarks on this opinion, and may in the mean time leave

it altogether unnoticed. Others again believe, that Moses collected into this book, and perhaps modified and corrected, whether divinely guided or not, the oral traditions which had floated down to him from antiquity. Many who hold this view strongly insist that these accounts, though depending solely on memory, might have been conveyed to the writer without the intermixture of much or important error; since, in virtue of the extreme longevity of the early patriarchs, they had to pass through only a very few hands, in reaching him, from the primeval ancestors of mankind. A third class are of opinion, that Moses, in compiling the book of Genesis, was able to avail himself of *documents*, as well as traditions. They suppose that, from a more or less ancient date, written records were in use among the chosen people of God; and that these, collected, digested, and modified by Moses, either according to the best judgment which he himself was able to form, or as he was guided by the Spirit of truth, formed an important portion of the materials on which he depended, in the composition of this book.

It is with much hesitation that we venture to express an opinion on this very deep and difficult subject. But we believe that the cause of truth is aided, through the humblest effort which may be made by a sincere and honest inquirer, to overcome those difficulties which are often felt in its investigation. It is by many minds being turned to a controverted point, and by viewing it in the various lights in which it may present itself to different inquirers, that the truth is likely to be reached at last, and the obscurity cleared away which has rested upon the subject. *Confusion* is more apt to be prejudicial to the search after truth than is even positive *error*. A clearly expressed view of any obscure and perplexing question, although it may not commend itself to acceptance, will yet do some service to the cause which it is sincerely intended to benefit; and even, if itself easily proved untenable, may nevertheless be the pioneer of the desired success. In the hope, therefore, that our readers will believe that we are as far as possible from intending to dogmatize on the subject, and that they will at least find our remarks somewhat suggestive, we proceed to state, and briefly illustrate, the conclusion which, after some thought, we have formed as to the sources of Genesis.

We believe, then, that Moses, in the composition of this book, depended almost entirely on *written* memoirs—that these proceeded originally from *many* different hands—that they were, in their merely human aspect, of the very *first* authority—and that Moses in selecting, arranging and modifying them, was under the unerring guidance of the Spirit of God.

Many objections may at first sight appear to lie against this hypothesis ; but we are humbly inclined to think that, when these are fairly looked at, they become insignificant, or finally disappear. One of the most weighty of these objections will doubtless be, that we assign a much higher antiquity to the art of *writing* than can be allowed it. Many have contended against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, from an idea that, even in the days of Moses, the practice of writing was unknown. Both Gesenius and De Wette once promulgated the opinion that writing took its rise among the Hebrews only in the time of the Judges ; and Norton, in the Appendix to his work on the Genuineness of the Gospels (vol. ii. note D, 3), referring to the days of Moses, says "There is no satisfactory evidence that alphabetical writing was known at this time ; and if known to others, it is improbable that it was known to the Hebrews." But this opinion is now almost universally abandoned. Both the eminent German scholars mentioned saw cause to alter their judgment on the point in question ; and afterwards agreed in dating the practice of writing among the Hebrews, at least from the days of Moses. This can scarcely be said to be now controverted. Rationalists, as much as others, now freely admit, for the most part, that there can be no doubt as to the existence of the art of writing among the Israelites at the time of their exodus from Egypt, and that, so far as this matter is concerned, there is no difficulty whatever in attributing the Pentateuch to him whose name it bears.

But for ourselves, we are inclined to go much further. We see no ground of reason for dating the rise of alphabetical writing among the Hebrews, about the time of Moses. The fact that *he* is the first to whom the authorship of a book is ascribed, is far from proving that the art of writing was not practised till his days. "*Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona,*" and it is quite capricious to suppose that there were none who *wrote* before Moses. We now know to a certainty that writing was practised among the Babylonians and Egyptians long before the days of the Jewish lawgiver. In the opinion of Sir H. Rawlinson, inscribed bricks have been found among the Babylonian relics, which date from about 2200 B.C. And, as the brother of this celebrated scholar well remarks,* we must not suppose that this was the first appearance of the art of writing among the Babylonians.

"In estimating," he says, "the antiquity of alphabetic writing, we must remember that the earliest extant specimens of the Babylonian (which have been assigned to about the 22d century B.C.), present

* *Bampton Lectures*, p. 341, note 46.

indications of previous stages having been passed through, which must have each occupied some considerable period. It is certain that the Babylonians, like the Egyptians, began with picture writing. But in the most ancient remains this stage has been long past : a few letters only still bear a resemblance to the objects ; while the bulk have lost all trace of their original form. The writing too has ceased altogether to be symbolical, and (with the exception of certain *determinatives*) is purely *phonetic*, having thus passed the second stage of the art. In Egypt, the hieroglyphics of the Pyramid period (B. C. 2450–2300) sometimes ‘written’ (Wilkinson) ‘in the cursive character, prove that writing had been long in use.’”

The same conclusion is derived from the hieratic papyri, which of late years have been an object of so much interest to Egyptologists, and which have, to a considerable extent, been successfully deciphered by their earnest and unremitted labours. There has hitherto been felt a great want of *material* in this very interesting, though somewhat recondite walk of scholarship. The urgent cry of Egyptian students is for *more* papyri, in order that by comparison and mutual elucidation, the sense of those which they already possess may be more certainly determined. All the documents of this kind as yet available are the following:—(1) A papyrus belonging to the 19th dynasty (about 1300 B.C.), which was recently purchased for the British Museum from Madame D’Orbiney, an English lady, who had long had it in her possession ; (2) A collection of thirteen papyri also in the British Museum, all of which date from the same period—the 19th dynasty ; (3) A papyrus of much more ancient date than those yet mentioned, which is now in the Bibliothèque Impériale at Paris, to which it was presented by M. Prisse d’Avennes, and is therefore known as the Prisse papyrus. It probably dates from some period between the 7th and the 11th dynasties (3000–2500 B.C.) It thus appears that while most of the papyri which have as yet been examined belong to the 19th dynasty—the age of Rameses II., and of Moses, *one* at least is well-known to scholars as extending to a period of far higher antiquity.*

* A very interesting account of these hieratic papyri is contained in the *Cambridge Essays* for 1858. The writer (Mr Goodwin), after describing the papyri of the 19th dynasty, preserved in the British Museum, says, respecting the Prisse papyrus, “I have now to present to the reader an author to whom these (the writers of the former) would have bowed as a venerable sage, and have acknowledged themselves but children in comparison with him. Rise up Ptah-hotep, king’s son, provincial governor, or lord-lieutenant in the reign of Assa, sovereign of both Egypts. It will be asked, when then did king Assa reign ? Perhaps no more can certainly be affirmed of him than that he belongs to one of the earliest Egyptian dynasties (Lepsius places him in the 7th). Speaking vaguely, he may be placed about 3000 B. C. The work which bears the name of Ptah-hotep may not, perhaps, be quite so old as this,—but may very possibly be a production of some writer of the 11th dynasty.”—P. 277.

There cannot, then, be the least doubt that the art of writing was known among the Babylonians and Egyptians long before the days of Moses. And now the question arises, whether or not it was practised among the Hebrews? The only means which we have of settling this point, beyond the probability that *they* were not, in regard to this matter, behind the nations which have been mentioned, is to be found in the contents of the book of Genesis. And it humbly appears to us that these leave little doubt as to the conclusion which should be reached. The particulars recorded in that book are of such a nature that it seems impossible they could have been preserved by mere oral tradition. The untrustworthy character of such a mode of transmission is universally acknowledged. According to Sir G. C. Lewis, "In a nation which has no consecutive written history, *leading events* would be perhaps preserved, in their general outlines, for about a *hundred years*," (*Credibility of early Roman History*, i. 101). In the same work (p. 99) it is remarked, after Mallet, that "Among the common class of mankind, a son remembers his father, knows something about his grandfather, but *never bestows a thought on his more remote progenitors*. This would carry back a man's knowledge of his own family for about a hundred years; and it is not likely that his knowledge of public affairs, founded on a similar oral tradition, could reach to an earlier date."

Now, on the ground of these common-sense remarks, and after taking into account the longevity of the ancient patriarchs, it appears to us altogether impossible, that such facts as those contained in Genesis could have been conveyed to Moses by mere unwritten tradition. Rawlinson has placed the argument from longevity, in probably as favourable a light as it admits of when he says,

"It is to be noted, in the first place, that as Moses was on the mother's side grandson to Levi, he would naturally possess that fair knowledge of the time of the first going down into Egypt, and of the history of Joseph, which the most sceptical of the historical critics allow that men have of their own family and nation to the days of their grandfathers. He would thus be as good an historical authority for the details of Joseph's story and for the latter part of the life of Jacob, as Herodotus for the reign of Cambyzes, or Fabius Pictor for the third Samnite war. Again, with respect to the earlier history, it is to be borne in mind, through how very few hands, according to the numbers in the Hebrew text, this passed to Moses. Adam, according to the Hebrew original, was for 243 years contemporary with Methuselah, who conversed for 100 years with Shem. Shem was for 50 years contemporary with Jacob, who probably saw Jochebed, Moses' mother. Thus Moses might, by mere oral tradition, have obtained the history of Abraham, and even of the Deluge,

at third hand : and that of the Temptation and the Fall, at fifth hand.”*

But it is evident, that even receiving the Hebrew chronology as correct, in preference to that of the Septuagint or Samaritan Pentateuch, we are not thus furnished with any satisfactory account of the origin of the book of Genesis. The *leading events* might perhaps have been accurately reported from generation to generation without the use of writing, and might thus have reached the ears of Moses in a form substantially correct. But granting this, there is still an infinity of minute particulars recorded in Genesis, which we cannot by any effort conceive to have been handed down in this manner. We may merely mention such points as the various measures of the ark—the very detailed account of “the generations of the sons of Noah” contained in the tenth chapter—the numerous conversations, scenes and events in the lives of the patriarchs, which are very circumstantially reported ; and enough, we believe, is suggested, to shew the utter inadequacy of oral tradition to have borne to the days of Moses the particulars contained in Genesis. Every such explanation appears to us necessarily to involve the idea of a miraculous agency at work in the case of each successive patriarch ; and how utterly gratuitous, as well as improbable, is any idea of the kind, will at once be acknowledged by every one of our readers.

The book itself then suggests, by the very nature of its contents, the constant practice of the art of writing from the very earliest times. And what is there to hinder us from concluding that written documents, carefully preserved even from the first, really did form the basis of that narrative which we possess in Genesis ? The old anti-scriptural opinion, that man was created in a state of ignorance, is now universally abandoned. Instead of having slowly emerged from a savage to a civilized condition, the contrary appears, in the first instance, to have been the case. Our first parents were certainly possessed of language, and this was as certainly, we believe, a gift bestowed upon them by God. Their Creator graciously became their teacher, and it seems to us in the highest degree probable, that the knowledge of the *art of writing* was conveyed to them at the same time with the gift of language. Those divine fingers, which afterwards wrote on tables of stone the ten commandments, also, we are inclined to hold, furnished our ancestors in Eden with an exemplar of the most precious, and almost indispensable art of writing. In accordance with this belief we find every nation which has been possessed of the art, ascribing its origin to the suggestion of a deity ; and no in-

* *Bampton Lectures*, p. 50.

stance is on record of any person having invented an alphabet, without having in some way been made acquainted with one previously in existence.

If these views are accepted, all becomes easy with respect to Genesis; and a great additional interest appears to us to be imparted to its contents. The *document-hypothesis*, which has so often been presented in a form fitted to alarm and repel all sincere believers in the divine authority of Genesis, is not only robbed of its terrors, but is made subservient to that confidence which we cherish in the unequalled interest and unrivalled antiquity belonging to the records contained in this book. We can attribute these to the very persons best qualified to have composed them. The histories of the later patriarchs,—the intensely interesting narrative of Abraham's life,—the genealogies of the antediluvian patriarchs, and so on, will all have flowed from the pens of those best fitted by personal knowledge to record them. Who so natural a chronicler of the events connected with the Deluge as Noah? And who so qualified to give an account of Paradise and the Fall as the first great father of our race? Let it only be supposed that the practice of writing was known from the first, and we can have no difficulty as to the means by which the memory of these events was preserved. If Noah or Adam *could* write, then they certainly *would* write an account of the marvellous and momentous scenes in which they had mingled. Human nature was the same then as now, and we cannot but believe that both Adam and Noah, who lived hundreds of years among men, after the great events associated with their names happened, would have been *importuned* by others, even if not spontaneously moved themselves, to leave some authentic account of the incomparably interesting occurrences with which they had had a personal acquaintance. And if in this way any written records of the early history of mankind did descend from Adam to Noah, we may be sure, on the general principles of human nature, that these would be most carefully preserved in the ark from the ravages caused by the waters of the flood. If Julius Cæsar, when his life was in danger in the bay of Alexandria, saved his *Commentaries* from destruction, by holding them with one hand above his head, while he did his best to swim with the other, we can have no doubt that the utmost care would be taken at the epoch of the Deluge to preserve any of those precious memorials of the primeval state which may have descended from the first fathers of mankind.

This conclusion seems to us strongly supported by some indubitable facts which meet the eye in Genesis. It appears impossible, without some disingenuousness, to deny that it *does* bear the marks of various authorship. The well-known

distinction in the names of the Divine Being, especially as observed in the first three chapters, seems most naturally accounted for by the compiler having made use of different documents. On this, as on some other points connected with Genesis, extreme opinions appear to us to have been formed on two opposite sides. Some German critics have indulged in the wildest speculations on the subject of the documents employed in the composition, not of this book only, but of the whole Pentateuch. They have denied it in any sense the character of unity, and have supposed chasms and repetitions and supplementary sections to occur from time to time, in the most capricious, and, as most sober inquirers have felt, vexatious and irritating manner. But, on the other hand, attempts have been made, as we humbly conceive, to escape the honest consideration of the palpable facts which the book does unmistakably present. It has been sought to explain the various names given to the Divine Being throughout the book, by affirming that *the sense of the passage* required the employment of a different name at one time from another. However ingenious such efforts have been, we do not think they can be regarded as satisfactory; and we willingly rest, as has been said, in the conclusion that, while the whole of the book of Genesis is, in a sense, the work of Moses, inasmuch as it proceeded from his hands in the form in which we still possess it, he did nevertheless make use of various written records, handed down from the most ancient times, in its composition.

It should not be overlooked, moreover, in support of this opinion, that there is a *double* account given of some events, and especially of the Creation, in the first and second chapters respectively. These accounts have often been represented as contradictory, but on the very weakest grounds. Let us present the several features of supposed disagreement, as they are enumerated by Dr Kalisch, and our readers will at once see that the difficulties found in harmonizing them are purely imaginary.

“In the first cosmogony, vegetation is immediately produced by the will of God (i. 11, 12): in the second, its existence is made dependent on rain and mists and the agricultural labours (ii. 5, 6): in the first, the earth emerges from the waters, and is, therefore, saturated with moisture: in the second, it appears dry, sterile, and sandy: in the first, man and his wife are created together (i. 27): in the second, the wife is formed later, and from a part of man (ii. 21–23): in the former, man bears the image of God, and is made the ruler of the whole earth (i. 26, 27): in the latter, his earth-formed body is only animated by the breath of life, and he is placed in Eden to cultivate and to guard it (ii. 7, 15): in the former, the birds and beasts are created before man (i. 20, 24, 26): in the latter, man before birds and beasts (ii. 7, 19).”

Truly desperate must be the condition of the assertors of contrariety between the two accounts, when they have to rest on such grounds as these. They find a discrepancy in the fact, that, in the one case, God is represented as *himself* the author of vegetation, and that, in the other, it is spoken of as, *under Him*, due to mists and rains and the industry of man, &c.; the only difficulty throughout being to account for the lamentable phenomenon of learning and ability employed to conjure up contradictions where it is manifest that none exist, instead of applying themselves to the explanation of such, where they may apparently be found. The two accounts *do*, we believe, bear marks of having proceeded originally from different sources; but they are in the plainest and closest harmony with each other. The second was manifestly inserted by Moses, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit of God, as in some respects a valuable and interesting development of the information contained in the first; and as, in other respects, carrying forward the narrative of man's primeval state. The one naturally flows into the other; and it would be as reasonable to maintain that the daylight contradicts the dawn, or that the flower fully developed is the antithesis of the bud in which it lay concealed, as that the more expanded narrative of the second chapter is opposed to that contained in the first.

As a yet further confirmation of our hypothesis, that Moses employed written memorials in the composition of Genesis, we may notice the fact, long ago remarked on by Vitringa,* that the heading of many of the sections of the book, "These are the generations" (אֵלֶּה הַדּוֹלָרוֹת) xxxvi. 1, xi. 10, &c.), seems naturally to refer to written records which were quoted. This is especially the case at chap. v. 1, where we read, "This is the *book* of the generations of Adam" (סֵפֶר הַדּוֹלָרוֹת), and then the list is appended. It seems to us scarcely possible that such language could have been used had the writer been giving a mere traditionary account. On the other hand, nothing could have been more natural than the employment of the terms referred to, provided the sources from which Moses derived his information were really such as we have suggested.†

* *Observat. Sac.* p. 36. Having argued, like ourselves, that it is in the highest degree probable that the early patriarchs committed to writing authentic narratives of the Creation, the Fall, &c., Vitringa adds, "Has vero schedas et scrinia Patrum, apud Israelitas conservata, Mosen opinamur collegisse, digessisse, ornasce, et ubi deficiebant, complésse, atque ex iis primum librorum suorum confecisse."

† We have just found that in the first part of his "Urkunden," newly published, Bunsen himself ascribes the second account of the Creation to *Abraham*. This is to us an interesting confirmation of the necessity which will ultimately be felt of dating the art of writing much farther back than the days of Moses; and of concluding that the book of Genesis contains many written records handed down from the ancient patriarchs. We ought, however, perhaps in

It will thus be observed that we regard the book of Genesis as having arisen in a way quite analogous to what we *know* to have been the case with Luke's Gospel. The evangelist informs us, that although not himself an eye-witness of the things which he related, he "had diligently searched out these from the beginning," and then woven the information which he thus procured into the very precious and complete evangelical history which we possess under his name. And there can, we think, be no doubt that *he* availed himself of documents. The first chapter is itself a sufficient proof of this, in the very detailed accounts which it contains of the circumstances attending the birth of the Baptist and our blessed Saviour. The evangelist has, in that part of his work, manifestly done little more than bring together, under divine guidance, the written accounts which had been preserved of these very momentous occurrences; and just as we are sure that we thus possess in the Gospel of Luke passages composed by Zacharias and the Virgin Mary, so we believe that in the book of Genesis we likewise possess accounts written long before the days of him who first, by a divine impulse, was led to collect and arrange them. Moses as well as Luke acted under the unerring guidance of the Spirit of God in composing his work. But, as in the one case, so also in the other, this did not by any means hinder the most ample and diligent use being made of the labours of former writers. And, as in the Gospel, Luke has preserved to us memorials written by persons who occupied the very first place in the bringing in of the evangelical dispensation, so we believe that, in the book of Genesis, Moses has presented to us narratives composed by many of the ancient patriarchs,—some by Abraham, some by Noah, and some which, in their substance at least, may have originally proceeded from our primeval ancestor himself.*

fairness to state, that the celebrated Orientalist, Professor Max Müller, holds very decidedly, in his recently published "History of Ancient Sanscrit Literature," that the Vedic hymns were handed down by oral tradition for many centuries before the art of writing was practised or invented. As the Rig-Veda contains 1017 hymns, or 10,417 verses, this, as a mere feat of memory, would far surpass any thing required in the transmission from age to age of the contents of Genesis. But there is, of course, a great difference between repeating hymns, or poems such as the Homeric, and thus transmitting them from age to age, and in accurately reporting, from generation to generation, such particulars as those recorded in Genesis,—a thing which, as stated above, we cannot but regard as impossible.

* Of course, this is not meant to conclude any thing as to the question which has been agitated respecting the *primitive language*. Moses, or those who went before him, may easily be supposed to have translated the documents which they employed into the Hebrew, if that was not the language first employed, just as we may conceive Luke to have translated from the Aramean into the Greek. But the question as to the original language is still unsettled. One important result, however, has been reached. As Kalisch states, "The linguistic researches of modern times have more and more confirmed the theory of one primitive Asiatic language, gradually developed into the various modifi-

Advancing now to another point, formerly referred to, it need scarcely be said that we regard the whole book of Genesis as being strictly *historical*. Both the authors before us, as might be expected, take a different view, and seem inclined to resolve the whole of the first part of the book into mere allegorical or mythical representations. This opinion is, we fear, pretty extensively prevalent, even among some sections of comparatively orthodox theologians at the present day. But it appears to us, instead of having any foundation on which to rest, to be totally opposed to the true character of the book before us. Not the least appearance of mythology can, in our estimation, be detected in it. The marvellous narrations which it contains, all bear the impress of being sober, literal truth, and are all connected with the great leading idea of divine revelation — *the recovery and restoration of fallen man*. Besides, it is always found that myths are subject in successive ages to variation and developement, whereas the accounts contained in Genesis were always accepted by the Hebrews in the form in which we still possess them, and are assumed in the New Testament as embodiments of actual and literal truth. It can therefore only be regarded as an exhibition of a most perverse and mischievous tendency, when an attempt is made to deny their strictly historical character; and when, with whatever ascriptions of sublimity and superiority, they are dealt with as if they belonged to the same category as the ancient Greek or Oriental mythologies.

We shall now briefly notice a few of those passages in Genesis which have always been felt to present the greatest difficulty in translation, and inquire what aid has been contributed to their elucidation, by the learned and elaborate works which have been under our consideration.

The very first verses of the book, are sufficient to test the exegetical tact and power of an interpreter. And here our authors are completely at variance. Bunsen departs from every version, ancient and modern, in making the *creation*, spoken of in the first verse, quite secondary to the production of light, v. 3. He attempts to support his rendering by an appeal to two ancient Jewish commentators, and to some philological remarks of Ewald, but it appears to us as groundless as unnatural. It is as follows: "In the beginning, when (da) God created heaven and earth, and the earth was waste and desolate, and darkness was upon the flood, and God's breath (hauch) moved above the waters, God said, Let there be light, and

cations by external agencies and influences." Many learned men at the present day think the probability in favour of the Sanscrit. But the whole question is still *sub judice*; and without presuming to do more than judge by present appearances, it seems to us highly probable that the old opinion in favour of the Hebrew, will yet be acquiesced in by the majority of scholars.

there was light." Kalisch, on the other hand, renders as follows: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was dreariness and emptiness, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the spirit of God hovered over the face of the waters. And God said, Light be; and light was." This is a fair enough translation, and it is accompanied by some interesting philological remarks in reply to such views as those of Bunsen. "It is not necessary," says Dr K., "to translate, 'In the beginning when, &c.,' and to read with Rashi בְּרֵא instead of בְּרָא"—to which, we may observe, Bunsen is inclined (Comp. Proleg. 139), although he denies that it is essential to his interpretation. "For it is an erroneous notion of ancient interpreters, that the word **רֵאשִׁית** is only used in the *status constructus*. It matters little that it indeed occurs forty-three times in that form; for "the beginning" is a *relative* notion, and requires generally a complement, as we have in fact, in our instance to supply—"In the beginning of *all things*:" or that our text reads **בְּרֵאשִׁית** not **בְּרֵאשִׁית**, for it is here intended to express the unlimited indefinite commencement of matter." So far, we quite agree with Kalisch; but we think his unhappy determination to look favourably on no attempt to reconcile Scripture and science, betrays him into some very hasty remarks on this passage (Introduct. Essay, p. 48), where, referring to the opinion, "which," he says, "as far as we know, Dr Chalmers was the first to propose in 1804," that the first chapter of Genesis does not fix the antiquity of the globe; he remarks, "The connecting particle *and* (v. 2!) expresses here *necessarily immediate sequence*, it is inadmissible to translate,—'But afterwards, the earth became waste and desolate:' it is utterly impossible to separate the two first verses, and to suppose between them an immense interval of time. This acceptance would mock all sound principles of interpretation." We do not think the proposed explanation quite so untenable as it is here represented, nor are we persuaded that the use of the Hebrew particle which it implies, is so unexampled as Dr K. affirms; but in his great and laudable dread of putting glosses upon the sacred text, and satisfying ourselves with deceptive modes of reconciling difficulties, he seems unfortunately to have rushed to the opposite extreme, and to be bitterly hostile to any attempt at explanation whatever.

Let us now glance at the very enigmatical passage, chap. iv. 7, thus rendered in the English version, "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door. And unto thee shalt be his desire, and thou

shalt rule over him." The versions are here in great confusion. The Septuagint is very peculiar: "If thou offerest well, but dost not divide properly, hast thou not sinned? Be at peace: to thee shall be his resort, and thou shalt rule over him." Of the two translations before us, Bunsen has, "Whether thou bringest agreeable gifts, or not agreeable, sin lurks before the door, and after thee is its desire. But thou shouldst be lord over it." Kalisch gives, "If thou doest well (wilt thou not find) acceptance? And if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door, and to thee is its desire: but thou shalt rule over it." This rendering appears to us to be on the whole the most eligible; and the note of Dr Kalisch seems, with considerable success, to bring out the meaning. It is as follows: "The rejection of his offering was a proof of Cain's sinful disposition. But it was more; it was an admonition to banish low sentiments from his heart: it was a warning, that if iniquity was not eradicated from the bosom in the very germ, it would, with its luxuriant weeds, soon destroy all its health and vigour. God's answer contained the grave lesson, that one evil deed is always the parent of other and greater sins: that it is extremely difficult to arrest the demoniac power of wickedness, in its baneful career: 'if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door.' Envy ended with murder: the noxious root had matured a poisonous fruit: moral disease finished with moral death. It impressed the momentous truth, that sin has the irresistible propensity of attacking and tempting the heart of man; that an eternal warfare is roused in his bosom from the moment that sin first enters it; 'that its desire is to him.' But since every human heart encloses the seed of evil, this struggle agitates, though in very various forms, every man: it is the main element of his internal life: it is the principal task of his spiritual existence, to proceed as conqueror out of these severe combats: therefore God said in conclusion to Cain, more as an encouragement than a reproach, 'but thou shalt rule over it:' it was still in his power to obtain a triumph: if he was unable to destroy the enemy, he might at least disarm him; if he could not expel him entirely, he might at least prevent his progress."

Another very obscure passage is found at chap. vi. 3, thus rendered in the English version,—“And the Lord said, My Spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh; yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years.” Bunsen's translation is, “Then said the Eternal, My Spirit shall not for ages onwards remain in man, on account of his transgressions: he is flesh: his years shall be an hundred and twenty.” Kalisch's rendering is, “And the Lord said, My spirit shall not always preside in man, while he is also flesh; but his days shall be a hundred and twenty years.” We

have not room for a consideration of the very interesting, but, as we believe, unsatisfactory philological remarks, by which Dr K. endeavours to support this version. He thinks that a "heathen element has here been retained in the Mosaic narrative;" that the sons of God are "the *δαίμονες*, or fallen angels of mythology;" that the spirit here referred to "existed before the creation of the body, and is independent of it, for it is a part of God (*רוּחַ*); but the body exists only with it and through it," and so on. Upon the whole, our common English version, both as respects the translation, and the theology which that bears in its bosom, seems to us to come as near the meaning as any one, ancient or modern, with which we are acquainted.

One of the most puzzling verses in the whole book, is that which occurs at chap. xx. 16. The English translation here is scarcely intelligible,—“And unto Sarah he said, Behold I have given thy brother a thousand pieces of silver: behold he is to thee a covering of the eyes, unto all that are with thee, and with all others. Thus she was reproved.” The different versions of this verse are almost innumerable. We mention only those of the authors before us. Bunsen has, “And to Sarah he said, Behold I have given thy brother a thousand shekels of silver; behold, let him be to thee a veil for all which has occurred to thee: the whole matter is now put right.” Kalisch gives quite a different turn to the verse from that which is found in our translation. According to him, the words of Abimelech “implied no blame or reproach;” and we are inclined to think his explanation one of the best which has been proposed. He says, “Since Sarah, as well as her husband, deserved a compensation for the anxiety suffered by her, in the house of the stranger, he gave to Abraham for her, a thousand shekels of silver (for the property of the wife belonged to the husband), and addressed to her a remark embodying the experience which he had just made, and the respect with which it inspired him; he said, though she might profess that Abraham was her brother, he was her protection against every man: she might be taken by others as his sister, but she would soon be *known and convicted* of being his wife, by the supernatural interference of God, who, both in his case and that of the Egyptian king, had watched over her purity.” The last and very difficult word of the verse, *וְנִכְחַתָּ*, is thus rendered, “and thou wilt be convicted,” being taken for *וְנִכְחַתָּ* sec. per. fem. of Niphal, of *נִכַּח*, like *וְלִקְחַתָּ* xxx. 15; while others regard it as a very uncommon Aramaism for *נִכְחַתָּ*, third per. fem. Niphal, and render “she was convicted” or overwhelmed with shame. Kalisch’s explanation seems to us, on the whole, preferable; and his translation of the passage is, “Behold, I have

given to thy brother a thousand shekels of silver: behold, he is to thee a protection to all who are with thee, and with all; and thou wilt be recognised."

We can only notice farther, the very important verse, xlix. 10. Both our authors here discard the personal reference in the word *Shiloh*. Bunsen renders as follows—"The sceptre departs not from Judah, nor the ruler's staff away from his feet, until he comes to Shiloh, he, to whom the peoples yield obedience." The meaning is explained to be, that Judah would appear as the chief of the tribes when Shiloh was reached, and that his pre-eminence would then by no means cease, but would, on the contrary, be maintained and manifested by the subjugation of the Canaanites. Kalisch's rendering is, "The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between his feet, even when they come to Shiloh; and to him shall be submission of nations. He gives a long and learned note upon the passage, in which he argues that "Judah and Joseph are in our song treated almost alike," and explains the meaning to be, "The Sceptre shall not depart from Judah, *even if many flock to Shiloh, and join the crown of Joseph*." Both these interpretations appear to us, on pure philological grounds, quite inadmissible. We hold in opposition to Kalisch, that the phrase *כִּי עַד* must be rendered "until;" and we also hold against Bunsen, that this *does* clearly point to a period when the sovereignty of Judah would cease. The personal Messianic reference of the term *Shiloh* appears to us unshaken, notwithstanding all that has been said against it. It is upheld at the present day by not a few *Jewish* authorities; and it also retains the sanction of the majority of Christian scholars. The exact meaning of the term *Shiloh* is indeed very obscure. Its pointing, derivation, and interpretation, are all doubtful. Some of the most ancient versions imply that the reading was *שִׁלָּה*, and the pointing *שִׁלָּה*, and accordingly render, "until he comes to whom it (the right to rule) belongs;" *ש* being regarded as a contracted form of the relative *אֲשֶׁר* and *לָהּ* being used instead of *לָו*. A remarkable parallel to the rendering thus yielded, is found in Ezek. xxi. 27, "until he comes whose right it is;" but the ellipsis in our passage is much harsher than in the prophet, and besides, the abbreviated form *ש* for *אֲשֶׁר* seems to belong only to later times. Upon the whole, and as the great majority of Hebrew MSS. read *שִׁלָּה*, we think it better to suppose the term derived from the verb *שָׁלַח*, *to be at peace* (though we must admit that analogy does not favour this derivation), and to render the verse as follows—"The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between

his feet," i.e., he shall not cease, generally speaking, to possess both the reality and the insignia of superior power "until Shiloh (*Peace*, or abs. for con. *the Prince of Peace*) comes, and to Him (shall be given) the obedience of nations."

Our space is more than exhausted; and we can now, in conclusion, make only a few remarks on the very important and much-vexed question, as to the relation subsisting between Genesis and science. We have no new solution to propose of the many difficulties which here present themselves. We do not presume to enter at all on the consideration of the scientific questions which are suggested, or the manifold explanations which have been offered, of the various perplexing problems thus originated. But, as earnest believers in the plenary inspiration and perfect accuracy of God's word, we crave leave to say a few words as to the *principles* which we humbly think ought to guide the conduct of all the friends of revelation in dealing with this subject. And we observe,—

(1.) *That it is both duty and policy to maintain a high position on this subject, with respect to the authority of Scripture.* We have not the slightest desire to overbear science by an appeal to the Bible. On the contrary, we would protest most energetically against any such course. *Truth* is in every department to be sincerely and earnestly pursued, and no considerations whatever ought to lead us to disregard her voice. But, then, is not the Bible *truth*? Does not its authority rest on a basis of evidence, as sure and impregnable, as does that of any of the sciences? If any one answers this question in the negative, then we are quite ready to meet him on grounds of argument and reason. But we do not now refer to such. We take for granted that the Bible is *admitted* to be a revelation from heaven; and we maintain that, such being the case, its authority on all subjects ought to be most jealously guarded, and most constantly respected. We really cannot comprehend how some of high name as thinkers, should profess themselves believers in the divine authority of the New Testament, and yet should count themselves at liberty to reject the testimony which it bears to the full inspiration and absolute truthfulness of the Old. How can any one consistently profess to accept of Christ as a divine teacher, and yet refuse to listen to that emphatic declaration which He makes, "*Thy word is truth?*" And how can any one persuade himself, that he *does* yield a fitting deference to the New Testament, when, after reading its unambiguous announcement, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God" (or, "All Scripture inspired of God is profitable," &c.; it matters not how the words are taken, for *Genesis* was certainly ranked by the Apostle among the inspired books), he yet sets aside as much as he thinks fit of that

ancient revelation, which is thus solemnly characterised? The only consistent course manifestly is, either to discard the New Testament entirely, as well as the Old; or, accepting the former as inspired and divine, to submit, in every particular, to the declarations which it contains respecting the latter. God has either spoken to man by Jesus Christ, or He has not: if He has, then surely He has sanctioned nothing as *true* which can be shewn to be *false*; if He has not, then the dispute as to science and revelation is at an end, since the latter is no longer allowed to exist.

With these views, it has often pained us to see how lightly the Word of God has been dealt with, by those who nevertheless professed themselves believers in revelation. They have openly declared some of its statements to be erroneous—have admitted that on points of science it was frequently mistaken, and have sought in this way to propitiate adversaries, and get them to accept of it as a certain guide in *spiritual*, while acknowledged an erroneous one in *scientific*, truth. Vain hope! and as mischievous as it is vain. If divine at all, the Bible must be, as our Lord describes it, *truth*; and to yield up its claims on any *one* point is, in fact, to renounce them altogether. “Let God be true, though every man be deemed a liar.” God certainly is true, and has never been other than true: if the Bible is His word, it is of necessity a word of truth; to yield its veracity in any particular associated with the name of God, is just to assume the ground of the infidel; and is, in fact, to prove at once recreant to duty, shortsighted in policy, and the foe instead of the friend of that revelation which He has been pleased to give us.

Maintaining, then, as we hold every consistent believer in divine authority of Scripture must maintain, its absolute and universal truthfulness, we now observe—

(2.) *That the natural meaning of the Bible is, in almost every case, to be held the true one, and no dependence is, in general, to be placed in far-fetched interpretations.* God having spoken to man, has, of course, spoken so as to be understood. In condescending to use human language, He has graciously used it in the same manner as those do by whom it is generally employed. The Bible is therefore to be interpreted by the ordinary principles applicable to human speech. To suppose anything else would be to constitute Scripture a collection of riddles, which might serve the purpose of testing man’s ingenuity, but could in no sense be regarded as satisfying the end contemplated by revelation. Yet, how often have the most arbitrary meanings been affixed to portions of the Word of God! Interpretations which would at once have been seen to violate common sense if applied to other books,

have without scruple been adopted by harmonizers in reference to the Bible.

"*The earth*" has been held to mean "*a narrow district*;" *all* and *whole* have meant *some* and *a little*; *day* has been made synonymous with *period*, and has proved so accommodating and elastic as in one part of a verse to denote four and twenty hours, and in the other part to mean ten thousand years; and so on, in a manner the most bewildering and capricious. Now, with the deepest respect for those eminent men who have thought thus to reconcile Scripture and science, we must express our humble conviction, that such a plan will never succeed. The Bible is a book at once of simplicity and truth. It may, with great safety, be generally held to mean what it *seems* to mean. No doubt there are many passages which are figurative—many in which universal terms are used where it is plain they must not be pressed to their full extent, and many where the language of common life is adopted instead of what scientific strictness would have required. All this should ever be kept in view, and in all this the Bible is just like other books. It takes for granted *common sense* on the part of its readers. It supposes that when one reads that "Jerusalem and all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan, went out" to be baptized by John, he will not suppose that the city and all its inhabitants, with the whole adjoining district, literally transported themselves to the desert; and that, after men have fully agreed that it is the earth which moves and that the sun in relation to the earth is stationary, they will not (while even in scientific treatises continuing to talk of the rising and setting of the sun), suppose that the Bible teaches anything necessarily opposed to truth, when it tells us, as a *marvel*, that the sun once "stood still," or that the earth has been "established for ever."

But, while common sense at once suggests the modification of the literal truth which is to be adopted in such passages, no like justification can be pleaded for the arbitrary meanings which have often been attached to some expressions made use of in Genesis. We have given some specimens of these above, and more may be found in the numerous works issued on the subject of geology and Scripture. For our own part, we have no confidence in such interpretations. The mind may for a moment yield to the plausibility with which some of them may be supported; but it is sure, unless violently concussed, to fall back ultimately on the old and natural meaning of the words. Not one of the explanations which have been founded on an arbitrary or very ingenious rendering of Scripture, will, we are persuaded, endure. Many of them, after enjoying some little reputation, have already been abandoned. And such, we are

convinced, will ultimately be the fate of all. The natural, obvious meaning of Scripture will triumph. There may indeed long prevail misconceptions as to what is really the import of certain statements in the Bible. Men may, in their ignorance, find dogmatic assertions where none such are intended. They may suppose, for a time, as many did suppose, that such passages as those which have been referred to, teach authoritatively, as matters of science, that the earth is stationary, and the sun ever in motion. But it is now plain to common sense that no such meaning ought to be ascribed to these statements. And, in this way, we have no doubt that the true exegesis of Scripture may and will be aided by the advancement of natural science, as well as the further prosecution of philology. But this will never be effected by our being led, under the pressure of some scientific discovery, to attach an arbitrary or artificial significance to the declarations of the Bible. For our own part, we expect a flood of light yet to be thrown on God's Word by the continued, earnest study of his works. We expect "the two records" yet to speak in the very same language. It may be that thus meanings will be found in Scripture, which we do not now attribute to it, but these will appear, after all, to be just the most natural interpretation of the words. And in order to be in the way of coming upon the latent harmony which *must* exist between Scripture and science (since one truth can never contradict another truth), we should take care to keep in the track by which alone that is likely ever to be reached—that, viz., which is pointed out to us by the principles of a fair, and honest, and natural interpretation.

It must be admitted, however, that the harmony eventually to be looked for has not yet been attained. The contrary even, appears to be the case. Carrying out the two principles which have been stated, it seems as if the Bible and science came into open and decided collision. What then is to be done? Must we abandon one or both of these principles? Must we admit either that the Bible is *erroneous* in points of science, or that, in order to believe its correctness, we must attribute an *unnatural* meaning to its words? In opposition to any such course, we now observe—

(3) *That there ought to be a disposition displayed, both by theologians and men of science, to wait for more light on the questions at issue, before they either begin to speak of contradictions, or have recourse to forced interpretations.* Nothing is more certain than that as science advances, the value of the Bible, *even as a scientific authority*, is being more and more acknowledged. It is sufficient to refer, in proof of this, to the most recent discoveries and conclusions in the sciences of ethnography, archæology, and comparative philology. We cannot

now go into this subject at length, but we may quote the condensed and valuable statement of Rawlinson (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 68), who thus writes :—

“ The sacred narrative (in ceasing to be general and becoming particular) throws out in a chapter of wonderful grasp and still more wonderful accuracy, a sketch of the nations of the earth, their ethnic affinities, and to some extent their geographical position and boundaries. The *Toldoth Beni Noah* (Gen. x.) has extorted the admiration of modern ethnologists, who continually find in it *anticipations of their greatest discoveries*. For instance, in the very second verse the great discovery of Schlegel, which the word Indo-European embodies—the affinity of the principal nations of Europe with the Aryan or Indo-Persic stock—is sufficiently indicated by the conjunction of the Madai or Medes (whose native name was *Mada*) with Gomer or the Cymry, and Javan or the Ionians. Again, one of the most recent and unexpected results of modern linguistic inquiry, is the proof which it has furnished of an ethnic connection between the Ethiopians or Cushites, who adjoined on Egypt, and the primitive inhabitants of Babylonia—a connection which was positively denied by an eminent ethnologist (Bunsen) only a few years ago, but which has now been sufficiently established from the cuneiform monuments. In the 10th of Genesis we find this truth thus briefly but clearly stated : ‘ And Cush begat Nimrod,’ the ‘ beginning of whose kingdom was Babel.’ So we have had it recently made evident from the same monuments, that ‘ out of that land went forth Asshur, and builded Nineveh,’ or that the Semitic Assyrians proceeded from Babylonia, and founded Nineveh long after the Cushite foundation of Babylon. Again, the Hamitic descent of the early inhabitants of Canaan, which had often been called in question, has recently come to be looked upon as almost certain, apart from the evidence of Scripture ; and the double mention of Sheba, both among the sons of Ham, and also among those of Shem, has been illustrated by the discovery that there are two races of Arabs—one (the Joktanian) Semitic, the other (the Himyaric), Cushite or Ethiopic. On the whole, the scheme of ethnic affiliation given in the 10th chapter of Genesis is pronounced ‘ safer’ to follow than any other.”

The value of Scripture having recently been proved thus great in matters of pure science, it is surely not unreasonable to ask geologists to be cautious as to any conclusions which they announce with regard to the erroneousness of any statements contained in the Bible. Theologians have often been accused of obstinacy in clinging to certain notions of their own, after these were clearly proved incorrect ; but while we admit that there has sometimes been too much foundation for this charge, we also believe, on the other hand, that men of science have not unfrequently run to the opposite extreme of rashness. The danger of this is well shewn by the following

somewhat amusing, but instructive statement, made before the British Association in 1858, by one of the most celebrated *savans* of whom our country can at present boast:—

“ Professor Owen said that some time ago he was sent for to the north, to examine a fossilized tree, which had been found in digging the Jarrow Dock, which bore undoubted evidence of having been cut by human hands. It was supposed to be a most important discovery, as shewing the antiquity of the human race; and at first everything appeared satisfactory. On prosecuting his inquiries, however, he learned that one of the navvies, not then on the works, was said to have discovered a similar tree in another part of the dock, which he cut, to lay down a sleeper. The man was sent for; and on his arrival he declared that the tree pointed out was the one *he* had cut. It was endeavoured to be explained that this was impossible, as the place had not been excavated before; but, looking with supreme contempt upon the assembly of geologists and engineers, the man persisted in the identification of his own work, and exclaimed, ‘The top of the tree must be somewhere;’ upon which he (Prof. Owen) offered half-a-crown to the first navy who produced it. Away ran half-a-dozen of them; and in a few minutes they returned with the top. *This explained the mystery.* The man had cut off the top with his spade; the stump afterwards got covered up with silt, and on being again uncovered, it was supposed a great discovery. Never had he so narrow an escape from introducing ‘a new discovery’ into science, and never had he a more fortunate escape.”*

Fortunate indeed! One can conceive the shout of triumph which would have been raised by the enemies of the Bible, had this fancied discovery actually been promulgated under the sanction of so great a name as that of Professor Owen. “Here,” it would have been said, “is a tree, which, once waving in all the pride of arboraceous life, had manifestly then been cut by human hands. And so lengthened is the period which has passed since then, that its woody fibres have hardened into stone; and it now appears, by its form only, that it was once a tree. What, then, becomes of the Bible, with its account of the recent introduction of mankind? Must we not?”—but hush! be not too hasty in your conclusions. It is true that the antiquity of the tree is undeniable. It has lain so long in the earth as to have passed entirely, in its substance, from the vegetable to the mineral world:—

“*Tantum ævi longinqua valet mutare vetustas*”—

its age can hardly be guessed at, and may be allowed to be as great as you please, but as for *the antiquity of the man* who cut it, see—there he is still living and laughing at your side!

Let the lesson be learned. Geologists may not *always* find

* Report of British Association, *Athenæum*, Oct. 2. 1858.

the navy after they have found the tree which he cut. The friends of the Bible may not *always* be able to furnish the explanation which is demanded, of an apparent discrepancy between its statements and science. But let both classes be patient. Let them rest assured that the necessary solution does in reality exist—that were the whole truth known, all difficulty would disappear—that a little further investigation may result in a very simple and satisfactory explanation—that, in every case, to use the navy's words on this occasion, "The top of the tree must be somewhere."

ART II.*—*Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, presented at the Meeting held at Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 4-7, 1859.* Boston: Press of T. R. Marvin & Son, 42 Congress Street. 1859. Pp. 196, 8vo.

THE American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions has been long and justly held in the highest esteem by all the Christian people of this country. As to ourselves, for nearly one quarter of a century a profound respect for it was one of our most vigorous and cherished sentiments. Perhaps that Board never was entitled to be considered a national society. Yet confessedly it was an honour to the whole land, and the lustre which it shed on the American name throughout Christian Europe, and even in darkened Asia and Africa, was of the highest, the noblest, the truest kind. Now, however, we grieve to say, it has ceased to have any just title to be called the American Board, for it has declared itself a sectional thing. No longer, in any sense, can it claim to represent this confederacy of Christian States. This is the fiftieth year of its existence, and it has made this year to mark a new era in its history. This year it has elected to claim no longer a national but a sectional status. *Sectional?* What does that word signify? We at the South, for the most part (few indeed are the exceptions *now*), have felt the mighty power of a filial instinct impelling us to be sectional—for the section that is *our mother* has been assailed. But there are many at the North who have been sectional without this sacred necessity. They have been

* There is no danger that Southern notions on the subject of slavery, even when advocated by such men as Drs Thornwell and Adger, will exert any influence upon the minds of men in this country. And for this reason we have not scrupled to republish this view of an important and interesting subject, notwithstanding the pro-slavery spirit which pervades it. If any defence of the Board appear, we shall gladly lay it before our readers.—E. B. & F. E. R.

sectional in order to assail us. It is with these gratuitous and voluntary sectionalists, these fiery and bitter assailants of the South, that this Board has now elected to be sectional. It is a new era, therefore, in their history. The course which they have adopted towards the venerable fathers and brethren of their Choctaw mission at the late meeting of the Board in Philadelphia, was altogether unwelcome to many of the leading New School Presbyterians who co-operate with them. It may turn out, as these gentlemen apprehended, that their churches will not be satisfied with the position assumed. For this and for other reasons, we expect to see no long continuance of the union between the New School and our Congregational friends in the work of Foreign Missions. The American Board will soon be simply the New England Board—the organ of the Congregationalist churches alone. Will it be the organ of *all* of these? Will it re-unite with itself once more those Abolitionist elements in New England that broke off from it some years ago and formed the American Missionary Association? Logically, that should be the very next step in their new course. Will the inauguration of such a re-union form part of the programme in their next year's Jubilee Meeting?

There are several distinct grounds upon which our long and profound respect for the Board based itself, independently of those ties of personal friendship which bound us to one of its deceased Secretaries, and which still bind us to its oldest living Secretary; and independently, also, of those ties of common service which twenty-five years since united us to the Prudential Committee. One of these grounds is, that this Board has sent out so large a body of missionaries and their helpers into all parts of the world. Excluding from the account those seven missionaries to the Choctaws, recently cut off, they have now 162 ordained missionaries in the field—more, perhaps, than any other organisation in this country can report. Their whole number of labourers from this country (excluding again the 22 assistant missionaries cut off), is 375. They support (again excluding the four Choctaw ministers cut off) a band of 493 native helpers of various kinds in the various nations. Their churches (excluding the 16 Choctaw churches cut off) are 137. The church members now alive (excluding again the 1400 members of the Choctaw churches) number 23,394. These results are certainly enough to make a missionary board worthy of profound interest and respect. It is the largest and most flourishing missionary society of our country. Their receipts for their last year were dols.350,915 15 being an advance upon the year previous of dols.16,816 97. It is the oldest missionary organisation, if we mistake not, now existing in this country. Not that theirs were the first American mis-

sionary efforts ever made. Far from it ! To say nothing of the "Society for propagating the Gospel in New England," which, in 1649, was incorporated in England, and which sustained Elliot, Mayhew, Bourn, and other American missionaries to the American Indians ; and to say nothing of the missionaries supported among the Indians by the Society in Scotland for promoting Christian Knowledge, in whose service the great Jonathan Edwards laboured as an Indian missionary for six years, and which, (aided to a considerable extent by the Presbyteries of New York and New Brunswick), supported both David and John Brainerd during all their labours—to say nothing of these, there were tentative efforts by the Synod of New York and Philadelphia to establish a mission in Africa, made as early as 1774, but effectually hindered by the commotions of our revolutionary struggle. There was a missionary society incorporated in Massachusetts in 1787, which passed, however, into the hands of the Unitarians, and still feebly exists. In 1796, the New York Missionary Society was formed ; in 1797, the Northern Missionary Society, in the northern part of the State of New York ; and in 1802, the Western Missionary Society, at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 1803, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church made its first appropriation for a mission to the heathen. It was 200 dols., for the support of Rev. Mr Blackburn of Tennessee, who had, in 1797, proposed to Union Presbytery in Tennessee the establishment of schools among the Cherokees. Mr Blackburn's labours can be traced from 1803 down to 1812, when it is probable they were broken up by the war, in which, on one side or the other, all the Southern Indians were engaged. Thus missions to the heathen were not the invention of this century. From 1646 to 1675, New England did more (says Mr Tracey) in proportion to her ability, for the conversion of the heathen, than she did from 1810, when the American Board was founded, down to 1839. From 1646 to the present time, there has been in this country an uninterrupted course of expenditure of wealth and life for the conversion of the heathen world to God.*

But though not the first, the American Board is the oldest missionary institution of this country, and it has more missionaries, and more churches, and more church-members among the heathen than any other society. Hence our respect for it. But what do we mean by this statement ? In what sense has it got these missionaries and churches ? It *supports* the former and *they have gathered* the latter. And where do they get the funds with which to support all this army of missionaries ? The Churches of New England and the New School Presbyterian Churches give it to them. They are Commissioners for

* See Rev. Jos. Tracey's *History of the American Board*, p. 21.

Foreign Missions. They are the agents of all these churches to disburse their benevolence towards the heathen. And they are the representatives of all these missionaries. They have it in charge to collect and to disburse missionary funds, and by diffusing intelligence from the missions among the churches, to increase the interest taken by them in the cause ; and they have it also in charge to direct, to a certain limited extent, the operations of the missionaries abroad. This is what gives them their honourable character. It is this *official position* sustained by them which we always respected, perhaps without knowing the individual members of either the Board or the Committee. Is it not needful sometimes to make this distinction we are pointing out ? Do we not sometimes clothe an institution of this kind with honours that belong not to it, but to the numerous patrons that support it, or to the humble, unnoticed workers that make it what it is ? The missions of this Board do not belong to it, nor even to the churches which act through this Board. On the contrary, it is those missions and the fruits God gives them which confer upon the Board to a great extent its honourable character and position. It is conceivable that the missions could live without the Board. There could be missions, and very flourishing ones, without it. But what would the Board be, and what use would there be for a Board, without the missions ?

These remarks suggest themselves, because there seems to prevail at the annual meetings of the Board, and sometimes to run through the letters of the Secretaries, the notion that somehow the missionaries are the inferiors of these Secretaries, and the dependents of these churches. Alas ! we are, all of us together, the mutually dependent as well as the unprofitable servants of a Master, whose long-suffering, patience and forbearance, is our only hope. Men in official position need to be watchful of their spirit, and to walk humbly before God. And when they deal with the character and standing of his ministers and his churches among the far-off heathen, they must remember that these are his representatives, nor should they forget how jealous he is for his word and his ordinances. When a whole Presbytery with all its churches (some of the members of this court of the Lord's house being missionaries of forty years standing) are cut off by a Committee and its Secretaries, that have dogged them long and cruelly, for the "*immorality*" of building up Christianity amongst slaves and slaveholders, and when, in less than two months after this act, one of these Secretaries, a member of this same Committee, has to be suddenly and disgracefully turned out of his office upon a charge of *sinful and scandalous conduct*, it appears very much like a voice of special and solemn warning to all

who "trust in themselves that they are righteous, and despise others." If this allusion appear to any reader unkind, we beg him to pass it over until he shall have read the remainder of this article.

Another reason why the American Board has commanded so much respect, is, because they have been rightly considered as being engaged, along with their large band of missionaries all over the world, in working out the true principles of the conduct of American Christian Missions. We think it is not presumptuous to say that the American Churches have some advantages for the Foreign Missionary work. There is a certain kind of practical wisdom that belongs to the American character, there is a simplicity and directness belonging to all our forms and modes, and there is an independency of all political connections or aims or objects, which make it easier for our missions to adapt themselves to the various phases of things among the heathen nations. Accordingly it will probably be found a universal fact that American Missions escape certain difficulties that stand in the way of missions from most other countries. Moreover, as to the missionaries themselves, we speak what we do know, at least to a certain extent, when we say that this Board counts many men of the highest character amongst those whom it represents. Its missionaries in Turkey for example (speaking now of those whom we left there in 1846), are a band of choice spirits—men of large heart—in many cases of eminent learning and distinguished ability, and perhaps, universally, of humble piety. It has been given them to guide their missionary bark through dangerous seas with successful skill. There in Turkey, and in many other countries, have the missionaries and their friends, the Prudential Committee and the Secretaries, been long considered as engaged together in studying and finding out the right methods of the Foreign Missionary work. To lay down the precedents which are to guide the conduct of a work like this, is certainly an office and an employment of the grandest and the noblest kind. And there have been amongst these Secretaries and members of the Prudential Committee, not a few men of real prudence and true wisdom. Worcester and Evarts, and Cornelius and Wisner and Armstrong, Secretaries in the old times, and Bartlet, Spring, Morse, Reed, and Woods, early members of the Prudential Committee, were all princes in Israel.

It is a painful sight to see such a Board as this guided amiss, and persuaded to adopt principles of missionary policy which will not stand the test of Scripture. To witness a serious blunder, by those we were long accustomed to venerate, is distressing—it is like witnessing the stumbling of one's father.

The American Board may have often erred—but it can be demonstrated, perhaps, that they never before committed so great an error as this.

For yet another reason, we acknowledge that this Board long deserved respect—namely, that it endeavoured for years to remain true to the original principles of its constitution, whilst the Abolitionists were striving to enlist its influence for their cause. We do not ascribe to this Board the merit of a perfectly firm and unflinching attitude, at the beginning, in favour of their own non-intervention with a subject over which they had no just control; nor can we assert that they very long continued to resist, without any yielding, the unfair pressure to which they were exposed. Neither yet can we say that, once drawn into a discussion with the Abolitionists, they expressed, even as early as 1845, at Brooklyn, such sentiments respecting slavery as a full and just understanding of the whole subject would have enabled them to do. But we say that, considering their position and circumstances, they deserved our respect for the efforts they made to keep their institution true to the original principles of its constitution. They have been forced into their present position, after vain efforts at resistance.

This Missionary Board was instituted by the General Association of Massachusetts, on the 29th June 1810, for the purpose of “devising ways and means, and adopting and prosecuting measures, for promoting the spread of the Gospel in heathen lands.” They were incorporated on the 20th June 1812, by the commonwealth of Massachusetts, “for the purpose of propagating the Gospel in heathen lands, by supporting missionaries, and diffusing a knowledge of the Holy Scriptures.” To devise the *ways and means, and to adopt and prosecute measures, for the support of missionaries and the diffusion of the Bible* was, therefore, the end of their creation. And their name corresponds to this end—“*Commissioners for Foreign Missions.*” To them, as *Commissioners*, were the funds of the friends of Foreign Missions all over the United States invited to be sent, and they would faithfully carry out the wishes of the donors. Now, we say that they made long and earnest efforts to continue faithful to this original design and end of their creation, and for this, as long as it continued, they were entitled to respect.

It is curious to notice the history of the pressure that has resulted in forcing them to ally themselves to the Abolitionists. It commenced in 1840, when the Board was meeting at Providence, Rhode Island, with a memorial from sundry ministers in the State of New York, remonstrating against the Board’s sending their collecting agents to the South, or accepting the

subscriptions of slaveholders. The report adopted by the Board, on this memorial, acknowledges the justice of the memorialists' ground, that God will not accept the fruits of robbery for sacrifice; suggests caution in judging the character and motives of donors to missions; but, declines to take any order on the subject, on the ground of the practical difficulties that would attend any attempt to apply the principles of the memorial.

This, of course, was enough gained by the Abolitionists, through this first movement, to encourage their renewal of the onset. Their principles and reasonings are acknowledged as, on the whole, correct. Practical difficulties in the application of them, alone, are pleaded before the bar of the rising fanaticism, as though it could recognise any such difficulties.

Thus, after thirty years' receipt and use of the money of slaveholding Christians—after all the foundations of the foreign missions of the Board have been laid in blood and sin, it begins to be determined that no more of such materials shall be employed in the superstructure!

The next year, 1841, at Philadelphia, there is a memorial from ministers in the State of New Hampshire, complaining of the Board's "studied silence" on the subject of slavery, and calling on them to "make known their views and feelings, so that they should be recognised by all, as sympathising with those Christians who deeply abhor that system of abomination." The memorialists, "in addition to the consideration that it is right," say also, that "a regard to the pecuniary safety of the Board renders it expedient." "The contributions must ultimately, and that before long, be suspended, if the Board shall think it their duty to observe such a studied silence."

In reply to this memorial, the Board urge that they were "incorporated for the express purpose of propagating the gospel in heathen lands, by supporting missionaries and diffusing a knowledge of the Scriptures;" that they and their missionaries "have always confined their efforts to this *one object*—great enough for angels as well as men;" and they declare it "a duty of the first importance—a duty required by a conscientious regard to the sacred trust committed to us, to continue to pursue our one great object with undivided zeal, and to guard watchfully against turning aside from it, or mixing any other concern with our appropriate work as a Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions."

Had they stopped there, the memorialists would doubtless have felt that they had gained nothing at all by this effort. But the Board's reply goes on to say, that "it is indeed evident that *this Board* of Commissioners for Foreign Missions can

sustain no relation to slavery which implies *approbation* of the system, and, *as a Board*, can have no connection or sympathy with it. And, on the other hand, it is equally evident that *the Board* cannot be expected to pass resolutions or adopt measures against this system, any more than against other specific forms of evil existing in the community."

Next year, 1842, at Norwich, Conn., there are several memorials on this subject. Amongst other things, it is urged that the Board had expressed opinions relative to other prevailing evils, as intemperance, &c.

The Board say, in reply, if they have referred to any hindrances to the progress of Christianity, as prevailing in the countries where their missions are established, and as counteracting the work there, it was, of course, a legitimate subject of their animadversion. "But if, at any time, it had gone any further than this, and expressed opinions relative to immoralities or evils of any kind prevailing in this country, and not directly counteracting the labours of the missionaries, such action was a departure from the great principles on which the Board was organised, and by which its proceedings should always be governed." And then they conclude their deliverance on this subject by intimating that, if any do not approve of their position, they can choose some other agency for carrying out their efforts to spread the Gospel abroad.

In 1844, at Worcester, Mass., more memorials are presented, to which the Board make no new reply, referring simply to its former declarations, and repeating its hint that those dissatisfied with its conduct should employ other agents—which accordingly was done, about this time, by the formation of the "*American (!) Missionary Association*" by a few Abolitionists. This year, however (1844), occurs the first reference in the memorials of the disaffected to the subject of Choctaw slaveholding. Nothing can be done with the Board on the subject of slaveholders' offerings, and, therefore, a new point of attack is sought out and found. And the Board promises, this year, to look into the subject of the Christian Choctaws' connection with slavery, and report the next year;—and thus the ball rolls along.

In 1845, at Brooklyn, New York, the Board came out with sufficiently strong expressions relative to the "wickedness of the system of slavery," respecting which there is "probably among the members of the Board and its friends little difference of opinion." But they declare as "among the fundamental principles to be adhered to in planning and conducting every mission undertaken under the authority of the great Redeemer and Head of the Church" these two:

1. "That the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper

cannot be scripturally and rightfully denied to those who give credible evidence of repentance and faith in Christ."

2. "That the missionaries in connection with the churches which they have gathered, are the rightful and exclusive judges of what constitutes this adequate evidence."

We recall to mind just here that it was this same year (1845), about four months previous to this meeting of the Board, that the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, Old School, meeting at Cincinnati, Ohio, while they condemned what no good man at the South, no Christian slaveholder, will approve, viz.: the evils that are incidentally connected with the system of slavery, as with all human institutions, did yet declare to the same effect with these two fundamental principles adopted by the American Board, that "the Church of Christ is a spiritual body, whose jurisdiction extends only to the religious faith and moral conduct of her members, and that she cannot legislate where Christ has not legislated, nor make terms of membership which he has not made." They added that they could not denounce the holding of slaves as necessarily a heinous and scandalous sin, calculated to bring upon the church the curse of God, without charging the apostles of Christ with conniving at such sin, and introducing into the church such sinners." Standing firm on this scriptural ground, this church has ever since enjoyed peace and quiet on the subject of slavery, while at the same time, through her ministers and churches at the South, she has been humbly endeavouring to preach the gospel to both bond and free. What an honour and what a blessing it would have proved to the American Board, if New England, instead of being a country where a little knowledge generally diffused, has proved itself a dangerous thing, (making every man, and many a woman, a teacher and a reformer, to set up his or her miserable "half-truths" oftentimes against even Christianity itself), had enjoyed a sober and enlightened state of public sentiment, which could have acquiesced in these fundamental Christian principles, and allowed the Board, like the Presbyterian Church, to go on with its good work of forty years' standing amongst the Choctaw Indians and their African slaves! And surely, it would seem as though these plain Scriptural principles, maintaining alike the rights of our Head and King to prescribe his own terms for the admission of any man into the fellowship of his kingdom, the church, and also the rights of his church, untrammelled and uncontrolled by any outside pressure, to judge through her representatives, respecting the application of these terms; surely it would seem as though these principles would have been enough to settle for ever the right of the Choctaw Christians to be free of the spiritual tyranny of their Congregational brethren in New Eng-

land ! But, on the contrary, the Prudential Committee had now at length so far succumbed to the rising power of this tyrant fanaticism, that on the 19th November 1845, immediately after this Brooklyn meeting, they write to the Choctaw missionaries that they should "train their church members to the duty of emancipating their slaves," and that they "should do whatever they could as discreet Christian men and missionaries of the Lord Jesus to give the Indians correct views on this subject, and to induce them to take measures, as speedily as possible, to bring this system of wrong and oppression to an end." In other words, the Prudential Committee now take the ground that "missionaries of the Lord Jesus" *may, nay must, as such, interfere with the politics* of the countries and peoples they are sent to,—but *discreetly* ! How far does this fall short of the course pursued by the Jesuit missionaries in various countries, which has made their name deservedly so odious ? And is the American Board willing to be understood as requiring its missionaries to interfere with the politics of all the governments to whose subjects it sends them, and from which governments it at the same time claims for these missionaries protection by the United States ? Or, is it only the poor Choctaw Indian government with which it makes so free ?

Let us proceed with our sketch of the progress of this pressure on the Board.

In 1846, the subject of slavery was barely introduced. In 1847 (says the *New Englander* for May 1849), it appeared to be the "impression on some minds that the letter of instruction by Mr Greene (the letter just now referred to) had not been regarded" by the missionaries to the Choctaws ; but, as it was proposed to send out shortly a Secretary to visit that mission, the whole subject was deferred till the subsequent meeting. At the same meeting in 1847 the question appears to have arisen whether indeed the Board had *the power* to give *instructions* to its missionaries about their teaching. The Prudential Committee is requested to present a written report at the next meeting "on the nature and extent of the control to be exercised over the missionaries, and on the moral responsibility of the Board for the nature of the teachings of the missionaries, and for the character of the churches." Meanwhile two vacancies occurring among the Secretaries, they are filled with two men of abolitionist sympathies, viz : Rev. Mr Treat and Rev. Dr Pomroy. And now you shall see a more rapid progress of the American Board towards the point whither fanaticism has long been driving it.

The meeting of 1848, at Boston, comes on, and the report on the control of the missionaries' teaching is presented. Amongst other points, the Prudential Committee claim that

the Board has the right to enforce *correct religious teaching*—and the rule by which they propose to judge of the teaching of the missionaries is “the Evangelical doctrines generally received by the churches and set forth in their confessions of faith,” and “the ecclesiastical usages prevalent among the churches operating through the Board.” As to the mission churches, they can be reached only “through the missionaries,” but “the Committee may and must inquire whether the missionaries are doing their duty.”

The reader who has patiently followed us from the beginning down to this point is no doubt astonished to perceive how far, in a few years, driven by the lash of faction, and led by two Secretaries (out of three) that sympathise with abolitionists, the Prudential Committee has travelled from the original principles of the Board's Constitution? Did any of its founders or patrons at the beginning dream, or did the legislature of Massachusetts design to clothe this junto of gentlemen in Boston—this Board *ad interim*, consisting of eight laymen and three ministers—with all this power? Were they expected to interpret confessions and judge of doctrines for all Europe, Asia, Africa and America? Let us do the Board the justice to state distinctly that they did not adopt this document, but resolved that “the whole subject be left for the present where it now is, in the hands of the Prudential Committee.” We believe it has never been taken out of their hands since that time. The doctrines of the report have, however, been publicly denied in the Board's meetings.

At this same meeting of 1848 was also read the report of Mr Secretary Treat's visit to the Choctaw Missions, and his famous letter addressed to those missionaries on behalf of the Committee. This letter takes the ground distinctly that “the system of slavery is always and everywhere sinful,” and that “all slaveholding is sinful, too, except where it is involuntary or continued solely for the benefit of the slave.” The missionary must denounce it, “but *discreetly*,” and must require of all slaveholders who would come to the communion table, “proof that they are free from the guilt of the system.” The missionary must also “abstain from using slave labour, for thus he helps to make the system profitable to the owner of the slave.” And the Committee has “the right to withhold support from them” if they do not obey these instructions.

This monstrous production, so unscriptural in its doctrines, so false in its philosophy, so low in its moral tone, so confused in its reasonings, and so narrow in its spirit, was reviewed by the Rev. Dr Hodge, in the *Biblical Repertory* for January 1849, and along with it the report of the Prudential Committee, before referred to, was also reviewed. The reviewer described the letter

as unexceptionable in manner. It was "couched in the blandest terms. It was evidently penned with the determination that no word should grate on the most delicate ear. Nevertheless, it is perfectly Archbishopal in its tone. It is written just as 'the Servant of Servants' is wont to write." The reviewer also pointed out how preposterous as well as dangerous were the claims of this Committee to the control over missionaries and missionary churches. He also dwelt upon the position taken by the Committee against allowing the use of slave labour in the domestic and farming operations of the missionaries. Their poor, sickly wives must not hire a slave to cook or to wash for their large boarding-schools, lest the system of slavery be thereby encouraged! And yet the whole North, and the Committee, doubtless, likewise, were daily using the products of slave labour! This, said the reviewer, is "straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel. It is being dreadfully troubled about the mote in our brother's eye, while totally unmindful of the beam that is in our own eye. We are sincerely sorry to say that this whole letter seems to us full of a mistaken, self-righteous spirit—carping at trifles in laborious, devoted men in the wilderness, while blind to tenfold greater evils of the same nature, which pass without rebuke in our pampered churches at home."

The reviewer also thus sets forth the general character of this letter: "The doctrine, then, of this letter is, that slavery is everywhere and at all times sinful. Christ condemned it, though not in words. The Apostles abstained from denouncing it only on motives of expediency. Slaveholding is excusable and consistent with church-membership only when involuntary, or when temporarily continued at the request of the slave, and for his benefit. The missionaries are to inculcate these principles, and to pursue such a course as shall free the mission churches from all participation in the system. Even hiring slaves is to be abstained from, though the consequence should be the disbanding the missionary schools. We have never understood that the avowed abolitionists go any farther than this. They inculcate these doctrines in plainer terms, and in a more straightforward, clear-headed manner. They are more peremptory in their demands, and violent in their spirit. But as to all essential matters, their doctrines are those here presented."*

The effect of this review was sensibly felt at the Missionary House, Boston. In February 1849, immediately on its appearance, the Secretaries issued a printed circular, over their own names, setting forth that there was a "misapprehension" in the minds of many regarding the nature of the Prudential Committee's correspondence with the Choctaw Mission. Mr Treat's letter "had not an authoritative character"—did not "give the

* See *Bib. Rep.*, Jan. 1849.

instructions of the Committee, but only their opinions, suggestions, and arguments, to be replied to by the Mission, with its opinions, suggestions, and arguments." "With this practical distinction in view (they plead), it will be seen that the Committee and the Secretaries have done nothing inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the two fundamental principles recognised by the Board at Brooklyn, namely, that credible evidence of piety is the only thing to be required for admission into the churches gathered among the heathen; and that the missionaries and their churches are the rightful and exclusive judges as to the sufficiency of this evidence." They add, what now sounds even more strangely: "We merely add, that the Committee have never had any intention of '*cutting off*' the Choctaw Mission from its connection with the Board." On the contrary, they "would repeat the sentiment in the letter of Mr Treat, expressing their undiminished confidence in the integrity and faithfulness of these servants of Christ."

In 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, nothing worthy of note, in respect to this matter, occurs at the meetings of the Board, except that, in 1852, it falls to the lot of this same Mr Treat, whose letter made the Choctaw missionaries partakers in the sins of Choctaw slaveholders, to bring in a report on the success of the Indian missions, in which, along with the strongest expressions, repeatedly employed, in praise of the growing temperance, improving agriculture, advancing education, excellent government, and consistent, prayerful, intelligent, and zealous piety of these same slaveholding Choctaws, we find the following language about their churches: "When we enter their churches, we feel that the Lord, in very deed, is in the midst of them." In 1852, then, the Choctaw churches were not very great sinners, in the Board's apprehension, albeit fully tolerating in their communion a system pronounced, in 1849, to be "always and everywhere sinful;" nor were the Choctaw missionaries, condemned in 1849, in a very bad position in 1852—for where they were, their Lord was likewise. They allowed slaveholders to come to the Lord's Table, without "proving themselves free from the guilt of the system," and their Lord allowed it, too, for in very deed He was Himself "in the midst" of those churches to bless them!

In March 1853, there is held, at the Mission House, Boston, a formal correspondence on slavery, between the two Secretaries of the Board sympathising with the Abolitionists, in which one of them asks, and the other answers, certain questions about the connection of the Choctaw missionaries with slavery. This is printed for use, as a circular. Mr Treat is author of the answers, and gives the most favourable account possible of the progress of things in that mission! In like manner, he adds at the annual meeting this year, 1853, another very fine

report of progress among the Choctaws. It is evidently the policy of the Prudential Committee, and the Secretaries, to let their action in 1848 pass into oblivion, if the Abolitionists will only let them alone.

But this may not be. In 1854, at Hartford, Connecticut, this Choctaw question again comes up under the full blast of the Kansas excitement. There had, also, been some legislation by the Choctaws against Abolitionists excluding from the nation any citizen of the United States who should be found interfering with the rights of slaveholders. This legislation, it is quite possible, had been provoked by the visit and letter of Mr Treat, referred to before, for he was somehow regarded by the Choctaws as an Abolitionist — especially by the application which the mission, it was suggested, should make to the nation to release them from their contract about the boarding schools, rather than continue to hire the slaves who cooked and washed for the mission families. This legislation of the Choctaws, deemed by them, no doubt, a measure of self-defence, was extremely offensive to all the Abolitionists in the Board. At the close of a debate, which, like the one preceding the recent action at Philadelphia, terminated at a very late hour of the night, the Treat letter was endorsed in full by the Board.

Soon after this, the Prudential Committee appears to have felt that they had gone too far, for such men as Horace Holden, in New York, were found to be protesting against their course. Their New York Secretary, Rev. G. W. Wood, is, therefore, sent off to the Choctaw country to arrange a new platform. Amongst ten thousand men that might have been employed on such a mission as this, very few would be capable of conducting it as skilfully as did Mr Secretary Wood. We know Dr Wood personally well, and personally love him much, — albeit his proceedings in this case did not consist perfectly with the estimate we had formed of his character during an intercourse of several years whilst we were colleagues in missionary labours in the East. He has so much genuine kindness of heart, and so much softness and gentleness of manner, and so clear and discriminating a mind, that, coming as he did, a deputation, clothed with so much power, he of course proved a most persuasive legate of the Board. The platform which he drew up, and which the missionaries signed, was so completely pervaded with the principles of abolition, that it is amazing how such men as those missionaries are well known to be, could ever have given it their assent. Their own statements of the views they held, which had been previously published, are in utter inconsistency with that Goodwater platform. When, however, Dr Wood's report of the result of his embassy was pub-

lished in the New York Observer, soon after his return, presenting this platform and his comments upon it, the missionaries felt so sensibly that they were put into a false position by it, that, as we happen to know, they immediately forwarded to the Secretaries and Committee, their protest against the whole report.

In October 1855, the Board meets at Utica, New York. The senior Secretary, Rev. Dr Anderson, is absent in India. The other two Secretaries, Rev. Mr Treat and Rev. Dr Pomroy, attend that meeting, having, as we have been credibly informed, and can see no reason at all to doubt, this protest of the missionaries with them; and yet, they suffer the whole case to be publicly settled on the basis of that Goodwater platform, and Dr Wood's narrative and comments, without the most distant allusion to the missionaries' protest then folded away in their own pocket! So much aggrieved by all this are the missionaries when the tidings reach their ears, that they, or some of them, send in their resignation without delay. The senior Secretary by this time has returned from India, and he is anxious to have the missionaries withdraw their resignation. The Committee accordingly propose this. The missionaries consent, on condition that the Treat letter and all the previous legislation of the Board about slavery be considered as withdrawn, and the missionaries be allowed to go on in their work "according to the instructions of our Lord and his Apostles." "To entertain this proposition for a moment was impossible," said the Hon. Linus Child, the Committee's representative in the late Philadelphia discussion; yet with these terms as demanded by the missionaries lying before them, the Committee voted for that year the usual annual appropriation for the Choctaw mission, and have continued to do the same ever since, until the last meeting of the Board!

At the next meeting, which occurs at Newark, New Jersey, in 1856, the Board, now guided by the senior Secretary, seeks by one stroke of policy to set itself right with the New School Presbyterian Church (which has always been of their constituency), in relation to the East India missions, and at the same time with the Old School missionaries amongst the Choctaws. They substantially renew the Brooklyn platform, declaring that they have themselves no ecclesiastical power, and no control over the missionary churches, and remitting to the missionaries and their churches, all questions of internal discipline, as belonging rightfully to them alone.

In 1857, the Board say of their Indian Missions: "We cannot too highly appreciate the perseverance, the faithfulness, and the cheerful and self-denying labours of our missionaries." The Prudential Committee tell of the missionary stations among

the Choctaws, that have "received decisive marks of the divine favour." And they close their report about these Choctaws with this language: "We may hope that He who keepeth covenant, and sheweth mercy, will not forsake this interesting people, but that his grace will abound to them more and more." The Committee, then, hoped, in 1857, that he who keepeth covenant will not forsake this interesting people, notwithstanding the guilt that still lay upon them by their slaveholding! Where is, meanwhile, the resignation of the missionaries? It is sleeping and taking its rest. The Committee's conscience will not, at this time, suffer them to accept it: they have before them the fear of the Covenant-keeper, who has not forsaken, and will not forsake, the poor Choctaw churches. On the other hand, however, the fear of the Abolitionists is also before the Committee's eyes, and they dare not refuse to accept this resignation. It must rest for a while till the Committee can see the path of duty, and of safety, more plain and clear before their eyes!

In September 1858, the Board meets at Detroit. In May of that year, the Abolitionists had met with a humiliating defeat in the Tract Society at New York, and one of their leaders, the Rev. Dr Leonard Bacon, a corporate member of the Board, is present at Detroit, and is smarting under his own and his party's discomfiture. He is appointed Chairman of the Sub-Committee on that portion of the Board's Annual Report which relates to the Choctaws and some other Indian Missions. In his report he speaks of "various religious bodies in the States nearest to the Choctaws, among whom there has been, as is well known, a lamentable defection from some of the first and most elementary ideas of Christian morality, in so much that Christianity has been represented as the warrant for oppression, and Christ as the minister of Sin." This report was adopted unanimously! At a subsequent meeting, on Dr Bacon's own motion, the language was amended so as to read thus: "Insomuch that Christianity has been represented as the warrant for a system of slavery which offends the moral sense of the Christian world, and Christ has thereby been represented as the Minister of Sin." Reference is had in this report to the fact that "Our brethren among the Choctaws are in ecclesiastical relations with religious bodies in the adjoining States, the States from which the leading Choctaws are deriving their notions of civilization and of government." The report concludes by expressing the wish that "the Board might be relieved, as early as possible, from the unceasing embarrassments and perplexities connected with the Missions in the Indian territory." The Congregationalist newspaper of Boston, commenting on this report, gives the sense of it thus: "By the

adoption of Dr Bacon's report, incipient measures have been taken to withdraw from all connection with the Cherokee and Choctaw nations, the Board thus bearing its testimony against slavery as existing among them. This action, so harmoniously secured, has relieved the Board of what, as some feared, might prove a serious embarrassment."

Thus the Board has, at length, been driven to the resolution of withdrawing its support from the Choctaw missionaries, and so, its connection with the Choctaw churches, and of withdrawing "*as early as possible*." But how shall this be done? With the prompt decision of men believing what they assert, namely, that the religious bodies with which their missionaries are in full sympathy as well as outward connection, and *therefore*, of course, *these missionaries themselves*, and the *Indian churches* they have gathered, "have made a lamentable defection from some of the most elementary ideas of Christian morality; have made *Christianity the warrant for 'the sum of all villainies,' and Christ the minister of Sin*"? Oh, no! Not thus did the Committee proceed; but they open a fresh correspondence with these degraded, immoral and blaspheming missionaries!! It is again the Rev. Mr Treat who writes to these abandoned sinners, and he has not yet laid aside his smooth blandishments. We subjoin his letter, with the answer of the missionaries, and we request the reader to notice with care, not only the fraternal kindness expressed in these letters for the wicked missionaries themselves, but the "most cordial and friendly sentiments" entertained towards those corrupt and degraded Choctaw churches. Let him also carefully observe the grounds on which the Committee base the proposed separation from men and churches that have abandoned the most elementary ideas of Christian morality—namely, to free themselves from "embarrassments," and to save their "treasury" from loss. The necessary sinfulness of slavery, and the dishonour and wrong of being in any way connected with it as a sinful thing, are not felt.

Letter of Mr Secretary Treat.

"MISSIONARY HOUSE, BOSTON, October 5. 1858.

"*To the Choctaw Mission:*

"DEAR BRETHREN,—The proceedings of the Board at its recent meeting are already in your hands. You will have read, with special attention, the report of the Committee on that part of the Annual Report which relates to your mission. This paper, you will remember, has the following sentence: 'It seems to your Committee desirable that the Board should be relieved, as early as possible, from the unceasing embarrassments and perplexities connected with the missions in the Indian Territory.' The Prudential Committee, concurring in this opinion for various reasons, respectfully submit for your

consideration, whether, in existing circumstances, it be not wise and expedient that your connection with us should be terminated.

"You will readily believe that this suggestion is made with unfeigned regret. We have always felt a deep interest in your labours. For the churches which you have gathered, we entertain the most cordial and friendly sentiments. For yourselves, we have a strong fraternal feeling. For the older brethren, especially, we must ever cherish the tenderest affection. It is with emotions of sadness, therefore, that we contemplate a separation from you.

"We are not able, however, to call in question the facts on which the Committee at Detroit founded their opinion. We find in our churches an increasing desire that the Board may be freed from the 'embarrassments' above referred to. By reason thereof, it is said, the donations to the treasury are less than they would otherwise be, to the manifest injury of our churches on the one hand, and of our missions on the other. It is said, too, that the political agitations, which are likely to take place in coming years, must, of necessity, aggravate the evil.

"The report to which your attention is now called, refers to difficulties which you have encountered, because of your present relation. This consideration you will at once appreciate; the Committee have no occasion, therefore, to enlarge upon it. They will only add that these difficulties will be likely to increase hereafter.

"But there is another obstacle to our future co-operation, which the report, already mentioned, did not notice. The Prudential Committee question their ability to keep your ranks adequately filled. When tidings came to us, a few days ago, that our excellent friend and brother, Mr Byington, was dangerously sick, an inquiry of painful interest arose, 'Who can take his place?' We had no person ready to occupy such a post; and, in view of our past experience, we could hardly expect to find one.

"The Committee do not propose to raise any question as to the agreement of your opinions with those of the Board. In any view of the case, which they have been able to take, the result would be the same. The measure is proposed as one of Christian expediency; and it is on this ground that we present it for your consideration.

"We have said that this communication is made with unfeigned regret. But our sorrow is lessened by the hope, that the interests of the people among whom you dwell will not suffer. We have thought it probable that you would come into connection with that Missionary Board, under which two of your number formerly laboured—a Board which has your cordial sympathy and your entire confidence. Its missionaries are your 'fellow-workers unto the kingdom of God,' in a common field. This would facilitate a transfer of your relation. Ecclesiastically you would make no change.

"Praying that the God of missions may keep you henceforth, and direct all your labours, so that the comfort and joy which you have hitherto received therein, shall be forgotten by reason of the more abundant coming of the Spirit of promise, I am,

"Very respectfully yours, in behalf of the Prudential Committee,
 "S. B. TREAT, *Secretary of the A. B. C. F. M.*"

Reply of the Missionaries.

"YAKNI OKCHAYA, CHOCTAW NATION, December 24. 1858.

"To the Rev. S. B. Treat, Secretary of the A. B. C. F. M. :

"DEAR BROTHER,—We have received your kind letter in behalf of the Prudential Committee, under date of Oct. 5. We cordially reciprocate to yourself and the Committee the fraternal feelings which you have expressed towards us.

"You refer us to the report in relation to our mission, adopted by the Board at Detroit, and especially to the following sentence: 'It seems to your Committee desirable that the Board should be relieved, as early as possible, from the unceasing embarrassments and perplexities connected with the missions in the Indian Territory.' And you add, 'The Prudential Committee, concurring in this opinion for various reasons, respectfully submit for your consideration, whether, in existing circumstances, it be not wise and expedient that your connection with us should be terminated.'

"You do not mention the source of these 'embarrassments and perplexities;' but, we presume, they arise from our relation to slavery. Such have been the peace and quiet among us on this subject, for the past two years, that we fondly hoped the agitation had ceased, not to be renewed in such a way as seriously to affect us. Hence the action of the Board at Detroit took us by surprise.

"We have taken into prayerful consideration the question submitted to us by the Prudential Committee. We have sought for light on the subject. As for ourselves, through the favour of a kind Providence, we see nothing in our present circumstance requiring a separation. Our position and course in reference to slavery are defined in our letter from Lenox, dated Sept. 6. 4856. These so far as they are known to our people, meet with their cordial approbation; we are, therefore, going forward without disturbance in our appropriate work as missionaries. Whether circumstances may not hereafter arise, which will render a separation necessary, we are of course unable to say; but we apprehend no such difficulty from the Choctaw people, or from others in this region.

"In regard to our course above mentioned, we would remark, that it is the same as has been uniformly practised by the mission from its commencement, more than forty years ago. It had the full approbation of the Secretaries and the Prudential Committee for more than five-and-twenty years, and was finally approved with perfect unanimity by the Board at Brooklyn in 1845. However great may have been our shortcomings in duty, we believe this our course to be right and scriptural; and we cannot believe that it is unwise and inexpedient for the Board to sustain us in what is scriptural and right.

"In your letter you say, 'We have thought it probable you would come into connection with that Missionary Board under which two of your number formerly laboured.' That Board, as you have said, 'has our cordial sympathy and entire confidence.' But that Board is the organ of the 'religious bodies in the adjoining States,' with which we 'are in ecclesiastical relations;' and 'the various religious bodies' in these States are charged, in the report adopted by the

Board at Detroit, with 'a lamentable defection from some of the first and most elementary ideas of Christian morality.' Is not this an implied censure upon us? If not, is there not an inconsistency in the above suggestion of the Prudential Committee? We have no assurance that, under these circumstances, that Board would consent to a transfer of the mission to their care.

"We, therefore, refer the question back to the Prudential Committee, to be disposed of as they shall deem best. We regret that either the Board or the churches should sustain injury on our account. We, however, do not think that, in our labours as missionaries, we have done that which, by the gospel standard, can be regarded as just cause of offence.

"Be assured, that it is not a light matter with us to differ with the Prudential Committee and the Board, as respects the question which you have submitted to us. In our opinion important principles are involved.

"We trust and pray that the great Head of the Church may give wisdom from above, that wisdom which is profitable to direct.

"Most respectfully yours, in behalf of the Choctaw Mission,

"C. KINGSBURY, *Chairman.*

"C. C. COPELAND, *Clerk.*"

We confess ourselves amazed at the tortuous windings of this whole transaction, as we have been tracing it along from the beginning, but at no portion of it more than at this last strange proceeding of the Committee. Our wonder is not diminished when we recall how, at the Board's meeting at Detroit, after the unanimous adoption of Dr Bacon's Report, the President of the Board, Rev. Dr Mark Hopkins, in his closing address, declared that "this Board is not an Anti-Slavery Society, and may not be used either directly or indirectly for any of the specific purposes of anti-slavery men." This speech and the report of Dr Bacon are surely not both to be taken as representing the sentiments of the American Board! How are we to account for this use of language, *semi-officially*, which contradicts the official expressions before employed? Were the resolutions of the Board designed as a plaster for Dr Bacon's wounded feelings, and as a gratification of the Abolitionists, while the closing speech of the President was to serve as a net to encompass the Conservatives? Or, does the Board say things it does not mean, and utter charges it does not believe? When they talk of Slavery as contrary to the most elementary principles of morality, and resolve, on account of it, that they are bound to abandon their own work of forty years' standing, and yet say, at the same time, that their Board is not anti-slavery, and may not be used directly or indirectly for anti-slavery purposes, and then, through their Prudential Committee and Secretaries, write and submit to the missionaries the wisdom and the expediency of severing the connection, we are reminded that it has been

said, there are a class of Christians, so called, who, when convinced that a thing is sinful, must after that be also convinced it is *expedient* to abandon it.

The reader is no doubt impatient, and so are we, to reach the end of this painful narrative. We have seen how, after the Board has publicly declared that *Slavery is a sin*, and the Missionaries *involved in the guilt of it*, and that they must therefore *be got rid of*, the Committee "*respectfully submit*" to these very men "whether in existing circumstances it is not *wise and expedient* that the connection should cease." And we have seen how the missionaries refuse to fall into the snare set for them, by acquiescing in any sense in the wisdom or expediency of their own excision. Had they expressed the opinion that it was *wise and expedient* that the connection should be severed, the Committee might then have acceded to it, as *desired by the missionaries*, and would thus have avoided what (by Mr Treat's own acknowledgment to one of the members of the Mission) the Committee all along strove to avoid: namely, the creation of a sympathy at home on behalf of the missionaries. But, while more than two years before this time, the missionaries had resigned for injustice done them, they will not say now that wisdom, or truth, or justice, requires them to be cut off; and if they are to be cut off, the Committee and the Board must take the whole responsibility of the act.

At length, therefore, the Committee despair of either forcing or persuading the missionaries in any respect to change their ground, either as to their work among the Choctaws, or as to their relation to the Board. They will stand just where they have stood for forty years, and the changes shall all be on the part of their friends in Boston. So the Prudential Committee, beat out by the firmness and prudence of these simple-hearted, but clear-headed brethren in the wilderness, resolve to "*discontinue*" the Choctaw Mission. Of course, Mr Treat again appears on the stage. He has a difficult part to act. We subjoin his letter, that it may be seen how he acquits himself. The reader who has traced with us the progress of this history from the beginning, needs no commentary on this letter. Let him notice, particularly, the grounds on which the cutting off is placed. Let him also observe the acknowledgments of the Committee in their remarks appended to this letter of their Secretary. We take them from their late Annual Report.

Letter of Mr Secretary Treat.

"MISSIONARY HOUSE, BOSTON, July 27. 1859.

"*To the Choctaw Mission:*

"DEAR BRETHREN,—Your favour of December 24. would have received an earlier answer, but for the desire of the Committee to

give it their most careful attention. Seldom have they felt more deeply their need of that wisdom which cometh from above, than during the deliberations which this letter has occasioned. It is their prayer and their hope that the Divine approval will rest upon the result to which they have been brought.

"The suggestion which was submitted to your consideration, in regard to the discontinuance of the efforts of the Board among the Choctaws, you have referred back to the Committee, 'to be disposed of as they shall deem best.' In doing this, however, you have made the following statement :—'Our position and course, in respect to slavery, are defined in our letter from Lenox, dated September 6, 1856. These, so far as they are known to our people, meet with their cordial approbation ; we are, therefore, going forward without disturbance in our appropriate work as missionaries.' Had this extract been received in September last, it might have given a different direction to our correspondence.

"It is proper that we should review, in the fewest possible words, the history of a question which has received so much attention within the last few years. You remark that your policy had 'the full approbation of the Secretaries and the Prudential Committee for more than five-and-twenty years, and was finally approved with perfect unanimity by the Board at Brooklyn.' For much of the time *since* the meeting at Brooklyn, we have supposed that there was no material difference between your mission and ourselves. In the year 1848, indeed, there seemed to be some divergency ; but in the following year you declared your assent to the letter of the Cherokee mission, dated March 21. 1848, 'as expressing in a clear and condensed manner' your 'main views and principles ;' and verbal statements, subsequently made by some of your number, gave the Committee very great satisfaction. Whatever doubts may have arisen in 1854, they were effectually removed by the report which Mr Wood presented to the Committee in June, 1855. The statement of principles which received your assent at Goodwater, fully confirmed our previous impressions. When, therefore, we received from four of your number the letter of November 13. 1855, asking that their connection with the Board might be dissolved, we were slow to believe that there was any substantial disagreement, and immediately requested them to take the subject into consideration a second time. We could harmonise the facts which had come to our knowledge, only by supposing that these brethren had written under very serious misapprehensions. Hence, too, the Committee did not regard the letter of September 6. 1856, signed by six of your number, as final. The view which they entertained of the case, was embodied in their minute of December 8. 1857, in which they affirmed their belief that the sentiments of the brethren who signed the Goodwater document, were in substantial accordance with those of the Committee, and that their difficulties were the result of misapprehensions, which could not be easily removed without a personal conference.

"In looking back from their present position, the Committee are

constrained to admit that their action, after receiving the letter of September 6. 1856, was of doubtful expediency. The brethren who signed it declined to withdraw their 'letter of resignation,' and, at the same time, embodied their main difficulties in the following propositions, viz., '1. The objections which we have had to endorsing the letter of June 22. 1848, still remain. Nor can we acquiesce in the suggestions and arguments of that letter, or declare our readiness to act in accordance with them. 2. We were much grieved by the action of the Board at Hartford; and we still deeply regret it. 3. The construction put upon the Goodwater document, by the Board at Utica, makes it impracticable for us to regard that as an exponent of our views.'

"The event has proved that an acceptance of the 'resignation,' just at this point, would have been the simplest and easiest solution of a problem, which has occasioned so much perplexity. The friends of the Board would have felt that the Committee were justified in taking this step; indeed, it would have been generally supposed that no other course could have been safely pursued. It would have been better for your work also, so far as the Committee can judge, if they had assented to the proposal at once. Still, in view of all the circumstances, the appropriations for 1857 were made as usual. With the previous history of the question distinctly in mind, the Committee might reasonably hope that your position, sooner or later, would materially change; and they were then, as they always have been, extremely reluctant to entertain the idea of closing their labours among the Choctaws.

"In 1849, as we have already remarked, your mission accepted the letter of the Cherokee brethren, dated March 21. 1848, 'as expressing in a clear and condensed manner' its 'main views and principles.' In 1855, the members of that mission accepted the declaration of principles, which received your assent at Goodwater. By these they still abide. Your late communication, however, refers to the letter of September 6. 1856, as defining your position; and you also say that its sentiments, so far as they are known, have the cordial approbation of your people, and therefore you are going forward without disturbance in your appropriate work. A recent letter from the Superintendent and Trustees of the Choctaw schools, in this connection, has a special significance. It requests the Committee to 'authorise some person to meet' them, and 'make a final separation from the American Board.' 'We have no apology to make,' it continues, 'or argument to offer.' 'We only hope it might be effected in peace and friendship.'

"The result therefore to which we are obliged to come, is briefly this: 1. The position which the Board, with the Committee, on the one hand, and you, with the Cherokee mission, on the other, occupied at the annual meeting in 1855, six of your number, after the maturest reflection, and with entire conscientiousness we doubt not, have relinquished. 2. In doing this, they dissent from the opinions, not only of the Board and the Committee, but, as we believe, of the great majority of our constituents. We are thus taken back to the cir-

cumstances in which we found ourselves in October 1856, when these brethren declined to withdraw their resignation; with this difference, however, that no additional delay can be expected to issue in a favourable change. The letter of November 13. 1855 had said, 'We are fully convinced that we cannot go with the Committee and the Board as to the manner in which, as ministers of the Gospel and missionaries, we are to deal with slavery;' and it had also said, 'We have no wish to give the Committee and the Board further trouble on the subject; and as there is no prospect that our views can be brought to harmonise, we must request that our relation to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions may be dissolved in a way that will do the least harm to the Board and our mission.' The Committee find themselves compelled at length to act in substantial accordance with the desire which was then expressed. It has been our cherished and earnest hope, as the long delay will have shewn, to escape the necessity of this result. Now, however, we are persuaded that the greatest efficiency of the Board, as also the highest success of your efforts, require that a connection which awakens so many pleasant reminiscences, should in its present form come to a close. A wide-spread dissatisfaction has arisen among the churches, which, as the case now stands, is almost certain to increase. Aside from the injury that will accrue to the spiritual interests of our constituency from a prolonged agitation, the income of the Board must inevitably suffer; while the claims of nearly all the great missionary fields are so urgent, that any diminution of our receipts would prove a serious calamity. On the other hand, continued discussion can hardly fail, as it seems to the Committee, to embarrass your labours.

"We do not forget what you say in regard to the peace and quiet which have prevailed among your people for the last two years. The fact is easily explained. The Board has been free from agitation during this period, and so you have felt no disturbing force. But if your relation to the Board continues on its present footing, neither you nor we can rely on this exemption hereafter. The letter from the Superintendent and Trustees of the Choctaw schools, already referred to, shews us what we have reason to expect.

"The inquiry may possibly occur to you, 'Why did the Committee send us the letter of October 5. 1858?' The answer is to be found in the peculiarities of the case. They said in that letter, you will remember, that they did not raise any question as to the agreement of your opinions with those of the Board. They could not assume that you accepted the Goodwater statement; nor, on the other hand, could they assume your final rejection of it. Hence they pursued a line of argument, suggested by the action of the Board at Detroit, which rendered any discussion of this topic unnecessary.

"All that was said in that letter to express our sorrow in view of the contemplated change, and our affection for you and your people, we would repeat with additional emphasis. The thought that this letter brings your mission to a close is exceedingly painful! There is no other course, however, which we can properly pursue. It is

the recorded judgment of the Board that it should be relieved, as early as possible, from the difficulties which have grown out of its operations in the Indian Territory. In this opinion, for the reasons already set forth, the Committee are obliged to concur.

"It only remains that I apprise you of the formal action of the Committee, on the 26th of July; which is as follows:—

"*Resolved*, 1. That in view of the embarrassments connected with the missionary work among the Choctaws, which affect injuriously, as well the labours of the brethren in that field, as the relations sustained by the Board to its friends and patrons, it is incumbent on the Prudential Committee to discontinue the Choctaw mission; and the same is hereby discontinued.

"*Resolved*, 2. That the members of this mission be informed that the preceding resolution does not at once terminate their *personal* relations to the Board; that they are, nevertheless, at liberty to make such arrangements for the future as they shall severally judge proper, and that the Committee fully recognise their claim to such pecuniary aid, whenever they shall retire from their connection with the Board, as, in accordance with its rules and usages, it is able to afford.

"I am also authorised to say, (1) that the Committee propose to give you as a retiring allowance, in whole or in part, the property now in your possession and occupancy (except so much as may be in the boarding schools); and (2), that they regard Messrs Kingsbury and Byington, in consideration of their advanced age and long continued service, as having special claims upon the Board; and, therefore, unless they shall elect to become united with some other missionary organisation, these brethren will be at liberty to look to the Board for such annual assistance as shall be needful for their comfort and support during the residue of their lives.

"I remain, dear brethren, very respectfully and affectionately yours, in behalf of the Prudential Committee,

"S. B. TREAT, *Secretary of the A. B. C. F. M.*"

"It gives the Committee great pleasure in closing this report, to believe that a work has been accomplished among the Choctaws, of high and permanent value. Whatever may be said of Indian missions, in the general this is no failure. The efforts of the Board have demonstrated, beyond all controversy, that the red man, in favourable circumstances, may attain to all the blessings of a Christian civilisation. For the honour of our aboriginal tribes, and, still more, for the honour of the Gospel of Christ, this truth should live for ever."

When the Board meets in Philadelphia, in September last, it confirms the act of the Committee, and so the affair ends. We append here the report of the Sub-Committee of the Board to whom that portion of the Prudential Committee's Annual Report was submitted, that it may be seen how unwilling were some of the Board to acquiesce in this course; also, a Minority Report from the same Sub-Committee. Neither of these

reports was accepted, yet both have great significance. The one exhibits the attitude of the Conservative elements in the Board. The other is the production of Hon. Linus Child, who was elected, at the last meeting, a member of the Prudential Committee, and who took, as we would judge, the most prominent part amongst the speakers who defended the action of the Committee. After a long debate, both this report and Mr Child's substitute are laid on the table, and not well knowing what to do in the premises, the Board, at 1 o'clock at night, agree to adopt and sanction the action of the Prudential Committee, as set forth in Mr Treat's last letter.

Majority Report.

The Committee to whom the Report on the Choctaw Mission was referred, would respectfully submit the following Statement and Resolution, as expressive of their views :

"This Mission, as it was one of the earliest, so it has been one of the most cherished under the care of this Board. For more than forty years it has been in existence, occupying, during all this period, a large place in the interest and affection of the churches here represented. It has passed through trials, but in spite of them it has flourished and prospered.

"Repeated revivals of religion ; the ingathering of many, from time to time, into the Church ; the holy lives of those brought out of Pagan darkness into the light of the Gospel, have been the divine attestation to the faithfulness of the Apostolic men who, for so many years, have laboured in this field. The wild Indian reclaimed from barbarism, and the savage brought into a state of civilization, has refuted the oft-repeated assertion that, in his case, to civilize was to destroy.

"Were these churches fully prepared to sustain the institutions of religion without further aid, their separation from this Board would be the natural and necessary result of their growth—a result full of joy to those who had so long contributed to secure it. But when such a separation is contemplated before this time has arrived ; when it is proposed to discontinue the Mission, and dismiss the labourers from the field, solely on the ground of a difference of opinion between the Missionaries and this Board, in respect to the manner of preaching the Gospel, or the application of its principles to the evil of slavery, then it is fit that such a step should be taken only after a thorough investigation of the real difficulties of the case has satisfied the members of this Board of its necessity.

"It may be that the best interests of the Mission and the usefulness of the Board will be greatly promoted by the separation ; but, in this case, it should be brought about deliberately, and after the whole subject has been fairly presented to the Churches. Your Committee feel that, for this Board to confirm, at this meeting, the action of the Prudential Committee in discontinuing this Mission,

would be regarded by many of the churches contributing largely to its resources, as at least premature.

"In order, therefore, to secure deliberate and intelligent action on this question, your Committee recommend :

"That this whole subject be committed to a Committee of ———, (members of this Board,) with instructions to examine it ; and if, in their opinion, it is expedient to discontinue the Choctaw Mission, to consider what arrangements are necessary to render such discontinuance least perilous to the interests of religion in that nation, and just to the members of the Mission, and report thereon at the next meeting of the Board.

"Your Committee also recommend that, for this year, the Prudential Committee should grant the Mission the usual supplies."

Minority Report.

"I. *Resolved*, That, in consideration of the facts involved in the intercourse between the Prudential Committee and the Missionaries in the Choctaw Mission, since the year 1847, the happiness of the Missionaries and their prosperity in their work, will be promoted by their separation from this Board while, at the same time, the termination of their connection will greatly relieve the Board of the serious and painful embarrassments to which it has been subjected.

"II. *Resolved*, That this Board entertain feelings of the highest respect, confidence, and affection for the devoted men connected with this Mission, and cordially and gratefully appreciate their self-denying and faithful labours, which have been signally blessed of God to the temporal and spiritual welfare of the Choctaw Nation, and most earnestly desire that larger fruits of these years of toil may cheer them in the future prosecution of their benevolent and Christian enterprise.

"III. *Resolved*, That, while we cannot withhold an expression of deep regret at the withdrawal of this Board from a field which has been cultivated for so long a period, with so much prayer and Christian zeal on the part of the Churches, and with so many severe hardships and struggles on the part of the Missionaries, we are constrained to recommend that the action of the Prudential Committee, terminating the connection of the Choctaw Nation with the Board be concurred in, with this distinct modification, that the usual appropriations for a year be made and placed at the disposal of the Missionaries, in order that, with comfort to themselves, they may go on with their work until they shall have fully matured their plans for the future."

We also here put on record, as a concluding portion of this history, the correspondence of the *discontinued* Mission with the General Council of the Choctaw Nation. This body has appropriated, we learn, 8000 dols. for NEIGHBOURHOOD schools in different parts of the nation, besides the 800 dols. referred to in the resolutions, for the Female Boarding Schools at Pine

Ridge, Wheelock and Iyanobbi—this being the amount heretofore appropriated to these three schools by the American Board.

“STATEMENT BY THE MISSIONARIES.

“To the General Council of the Choctaw Nation, relative to the three Female Boarding Schools, recently under the care of the American Board.

“To the Honourable the Senate and House of Representatives of the Choctaw Nation, in General Council assembled :

“As the American Board of Missions has withdrawn its patronage from the Mission and the schools which it had in this nation, the undersigned, having been appointed by the Mission a Committee to lay the subject before your honourable bodies, beg leave to make the following statement :

“The Choctaw Mission was commenced forty-one years ago last June. The Missionaries were sent by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to establish schools for the education of Choctaw children, and to preach the Gospel. What we have done in the way of education is known to the nation. We need not speak of that now.

“In accordance with the directions of the Saviour, we preached the Gospel, as we had opportunity, to all who were willing to hear it. We made no distinction between the red man, the white man, and the black man, and when any gave evidence of piety, whether they were masters or slaves, we received them into our churches.

“For labourers, both in-doors and out, we hired such as we could find in the country. We hired white people, and red people, and slaves, as we had need, and as we had opportunity.

“Our practice, in relation to these subjects, was the same from the commencement of the Mission ; and for many years it received the unqualified approbation of the Board and of its officers. In 1844 memorials were presented to the Board against our receiving slaveholders into our churches ; and before this time objections had been made to our employing slave labour. These memorials were referred to a Special Committee.

“In 1845, this Committee made their report. It was a long and able document, and fully sustained the course the Mission had taken. The report of this Committee was approved by every member of the Board that was present at that meeting.

“But notwithstanding this unanimous approval of the Mission by the Board, the subject was not suffered to rest. There were those among the supporters of the Board who continued to agitate the question of slavery in the Choctaw Mission at the annual meetings of the Board.

“In 1848, Mr Treat was sent out to confer with us in relation to the difficulty. We could not agree with Mr Treat. He went back and wrote us a letter, in which we were strongly urged ‘to pursue

such a course as shall deliver the Choctaw churches from all connection with slavery ;' and 'to dispense altogether with slave labour.' To this letter we could not give our assent. For years efforts were made to obtain our assent to that letter, but it was never obtained.

"At almost every annual meeting of the Board, slavery in the Choctaw Mission was brought up, and remarks were made, and resolutions passed, which we could not approve, and which were calculated to disturb the peace and harmony of our people. Believing that we could never come to an agreement with the Board, in 1855 we sent in our resignation. This was not accepted, and we were requested to reconsider the whole matter, and to withdraw our resignation.

"In 1856, we informed the [Prudential] Committee that we could not withdraw our letter of resignation ; that our difficulties still remained. At the same time we stated concisely, but clearly, the points on which we differed from the Committee and the Board, and that, so far as our views were known to the people among whom we laboured, they met their approbation. Having thus frankly stated our position, we told the Committee they could do as they thought best as to granting our supplies. Our supplies for 1857 and 1858 were granted as usual.

"At the meeting of the Board at Detroit, in 1858, the Sub-Committee on 'North American Indians, No. 1,' in their report, say, 'It seems to your Committee desirable that the Board should be relieved, as early as possible, from the increasing embarrassments and perplexities connected with the Missions in the Indian Territory.'

"The [Prudential] Committee of the Board, finding that there was no hope that their Missionaries among the Choctaws would change their ground, resolved to *discontinue* the Choctaw Mission ; and in July last they addressed us a letter containing their decision. Thus our relations to the American Board have been brought to a close by this act of their Committee.

"In our correspondence with the Committee of the Board we have contended that we were not sent here either to advocate slavery or to oppose it—that so far as the relation between master and slave is concerned, we had nothing to do with it. In accordance with the example and instructions of the Apostles, we have preached the duties which masters owe to their servants, and servants to their masters. This the Apostles did ; and this, as ministers of Jesus Christ, we ought to do.

"The letter which the Committee addressed to us in July last was kind and courteous in its expressions of friendly feelings towards ourselves, towards the Choctaws, their churches, and their schools. They regretted the step they felt compelled to take in discontinuing the Mission. They also expressed a willingness to aid us, as individuals, until we should get help from other sources.

"The Female Boarding Schools at Pine Ridge, Wheelock, and Iyanobbi, having been given up by the American Board, are now in the hands of the Council, to be disposed of as they shall think best. These schools have not been discontinued for a single day.

They were commenced on Wednesday last by those who have them in charge.

"If it should be the wish of the Council to have these schools continued for a time by those who now have the care of them, they will be willing to do it on such terms as may be mutually agreed on.

"All which is respectfully submitted.

C. KINGSBURY,

J. E. DWIGHT,

Committee of the Mission.

"BOGGY DEPOT, October 10. 1859."

ACTION OF THE COUNCIL.

"Report of the Committee of the Choctaw Council.

"Your Committee, to whom was referred the communication on behalf of the late Missionaries of the American Board of Foreign Missions among the Choctaws, would report,

"That the General Council of the Choctaw Nation can but regret the agitation of a question which has brought to a close the long and successful operations of the American Board of Foreign Missions in behalf of the Choctaw people.

"They, however, rejoice that those who have been so long the labourers under the patronage of that Board are not disposed to leave their field of labour, so long as they can be useful, and can obtain a comfortable support therein.

"That the General Council of the Choctaw Nation do accord to the Missionaries referred to, their confidence and good will; and would wish that their lives and labours may be even more abundantly blessed in the dissemination of light, knowledge, and truth among the Choctaw people than at any former period.

"Your Committee would further recommend the accompanying resolutions in reference to the schools which have been heretofore under the care of the American Board of Foreign Missions.

"All of which is respectfully submitted.

(Signed)

JOSEPH P. FOLSOM,

JAS. DUKES,

P. P. PITCHLYNN,

J. McCURTAIN,

Committee.

"Read in the House and approved.

ADAM CHRISTY, *Speaker.*

"October 22. 1859.

"Read in the Senate and approved.

GEO. W. HASKINS,

President of the Senate.

"October 22. 1859.

"Resolutions recommended by the Committee.

"Be it resolved, &c., That the General Council of the Choctaws are

disposed, on behalf of the Choctaw people, to make a contract for the continuance of the Female Boarding Schools, which have been heretofore under the care of the American Board of Foreign Missions, of such a nature that they may still be under the charge of the present Superintendents thereof, provided such a contract can be made on terms agreeable to all parties concerned.

"Be it further resolved, That Joseph Dukes, the present Trustee for schools in Apukshanobbi District, and R. W. Nail, Superintendent of Trustees, be authorized, on the part of the Choctaw Nation, as soon as possible, to enter into a contract with the several Superintendents of the several Female Boarding Schools at Pine Ridge, Wheelock, and Eagle Town, or with others, whereby these Female Schools may be continued.

"Be it further resolved, That whenever the above-desired contract is effected, R. W. Nail, Superintendent of Trustees, shall forthwith inform Gen. D. H. Cooper, U. S. Indian Agent, of the existence of such a contract, and further request that the appropriations for the above-named Female School be paid to the Superintendents thereof, as heretofore.

"Be it further resolved, That the sum of two hundred and sixty-six dollars and sixty-seven cents be appropriated annually, for four years only, out of the National Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to each Female School named above, in case the contract be entered into between said Joseph Dukes and R. W. Nail, and the Superintendents thereof.

"Read in the House and passed.

ADAM CHRISTY,
Speaker of the House.

"October 22. 1859.

"Read in the Senate and passed.

GEO. W. HASKINS,
President of the Senate.

"October 22. 1859.

"Approved, October 22. 1859.

BASIL L. LEFLORE,
Governor of Choctaw Nation."

We have no apology to offer, either to the American Board or to our readers, for taking up this subject. It is true the Old School Presbyterian Church long since ceased to act in the matter of Foreign Missions through this Board of Commissioners, but up to the time of its late meeting at Philadelphia, our Church was still connected with the Board through this Choctaw Mission. In defence of our own Old School *Presbytery of Indian* from unjust charges made against them in common with our Church generally, we have felt bound to discuss this question. Again, our own past relations personally to the American Board give us a necessary interest in the case; we knew the Board, and respected and loved it, in its better days, and we claim the right to mourn its fall. More-

over, the important principles which the case involves, and the grave consequences of which it is, perhaps, significant, seem to open the whole subject to all the world, and to invite who will to take part in its consideration.

The first topic then, upon which we shall freely comment, is the way in which this step is likely to affect the Mission and the Board, respectively.

We have no doubt whatever that, borrowing the language of the Minority Report, "the happiness of the Missionaries, and their prosperity in their work, will be promoted by this separation." To be rid all at once, and for ever, of the constant barking at their heels which has been kept up for fifteen years, we suppose these brethren must doubtless estimate as constituting of itself a pretty tolerable share of carnal comfort and worldly happiness for poor Indian missionaries to enjoy! As to their support, of course the Presbyterian Church will not suffer them to want. And as to prosperity in their work, their faith, we should think, might very confidently look up to "the Covenant Keeper"—to the Lord whose "presence has always been in their churches." They have suffered for their adherence to His truth, and He may well be trusted to be with them to give prosperity in their future labours.

But we do not believe the Board will find itself in any respect the gainer by this step. Will it, indeed, gain "peace from serious and painful embarrassments?" Is it, can it be, sure of this? Will the Abolitionists have no more demands to make upon it—no more work for it to do in their service? Will there arise no future "serious and painful embarrassments" out of this precedent? Does the experienced and sagacious senior Secretary find it impossible to conceive of any troubles in any quarter that may arise hereafter out of the principles which have now been established as part of the Board's policy?

Again: Will the Board gain income by this measure? Will the increased gifts of the Abolitionists overbalance their losses in conservative quarters? We could not, if we would, give any answer to this question; but if we could, we would not. In the Board's behalf, as one of its true friends, we scorn the whole inquiry. The time was once when the American Board would have scorned it too! We verily believe the old Secretaries and members of the Prudential Committee would have resented the insinuation conveyed in almost the first effort of Abolition to control their action; they would have told the memorialists of New Hampshire, in 1841, that their appeal to pecuniary motives, by way of persuading the Board to depart from its own proper path, was offensive, and that it was enough for the Board that any given course was right or wrong. Still more would they have resented the imputation made upon the Board

by the *New Englander* of May 1849, wherein the Rev. Dr Dutton, of New Haven, after about eighteen pages devoted to the "sinfulness" of slaveholding, and "*the duty*" of the Board to separate itself from this Choctaw Mission, brings out at the close, as the chief and crowning consideration which should affect the conscience of the Board, this idea: that "the American Board *cannot afford*, in the present state of public sentiment, to sustain" these missionaries, and that it had already "*lost more aid* from that cause than from any other." It would appear that amongst "the first and most elementary ideas of Christian morality," according to the estimate of this New Haven Doctor, and, we are compelled to add, of the Prudential Committee, with its secretary, Mr Treat, are to be reckoned the "wisdom and expediency" of so conducting the Board's operations as by no means to fail of securing as much money as possible from its numerous patrons. But so reasoned not, and so felt not, the fathers of this institution.

There is another question: Will the Board gain in point of character by this step? And this question refers not only to the immediate associates of the Board, the ministers and the churches of New England, but to those of the whole country and the whole church; and not only to the men of this generation, but to those who are to follow. Will impartial history honour the institution for this step? This depends upon another question: Did the Board act on Scriptural principles in this whole transaction? Did it act an honest part throughout? Did it first adopt right principles, and then carry them out with a simple, truthful consistency?

We assert that it did not act on principle at all, but always *on expediency*, and most especially so at the last. Look at Dr Bacon's Detroit report, where this action is put upon the ground of "relieving the Board from unceasing embarrassments and perplexities." The same ground is taken in the final action of the Committee and Board, although very skilfully "*the happiness of the missionaries, and their prosperity*," and also the avoiding of the "*injury that will accrue to the spiritual interests of our constituency from a prolonged agitation*," are coupled with this *relief to the Board*. Nowhere is the pretence made that the Board is cutting off the missionaries because they have committed an offence, or because they are guilty of sinful conduct in their relations to the "wicked system." "Wicked" the system is; subversive of "the most elementary ideas of Christian morality," is the attitude of those churches which receive slaveholders to their communion; but still these missionaries, that have themselves so done, are "devoted men, whose self-denying and faithful labours have been signally blessed of God to the temporal and spiritual welfare of the Choctaw

nation ;" and so Mr Treat can "pray that the God of missions may keep you henceforth, so that the comfort and joy which you have hitherto received therein shall be forgotten by reason of the more abundant coming of the Spirit of Promise"—albeit the missionaries still pertinaciously maintain the very same principles with those "religious bodies which have made a lamentable defection from some of the first and most elementary ideas of Christian morality." Who can trace, as we have done in this article, the whole course of this transaction, from the beginning to the end of it, without feeling ashamed of the Board's, and still more the Committee's and the Secretaries' failure, all along, to act from any higher motive than that of mere expediency? Has not this Board been whipped to its late work for the Abolitionists, as perhaps not one Southern slave in one million ever was whipped to his labour? Has it not been ever prone to stop in its onward progress as soon as the tyrant Fanaticism would for a while cease to urge it forward? In 1844, when the senior Secretary visited Smyrna, we remember telling him that the Board was yielding inch by inch to the pressure of the Abolitionists, then recently commenced, but he resented the imputation with considerable feeling. But where does he find them now?

And what are those unscriptural principles to which, for the sake of expediency (that is, for ease and money's sake), they have now lent their sanction?

1. One is, that these eleven gentlemen of Boston, eight of them not ministers of the Gospel, may compel a whole Presbytery to teach certain doctrines, on pain of being cut off from support. It is, in other words, the principle reported to the Board by the Committee in 1848, but not adopted by the Board; nay, repudiated in form frequently, and yet in fact often asserted, and now carried out into actual operation. Dr Pomroy, for example, in 1854, in a published letter, defined the position of the Board thus:—"Now the question is asked, in some quarters, why does not the Board interfere and cause these slaveholders to be cast out of the churches? . . . The Board is not an ecclesiastical body, and has no more right to interfere with the internal discipline of those churches than it has with the churches in Vermont. . . . But why does not the Board instruct its missionaries to teach the true Scriptural doctrine on this subject, and use such influence as they properly may, to abolish this evil? My answer is, that they *have done, and are doing, this very thing.* (The italics are Dr P.'s.) The views expressed by the Prudential Committee, as read by Mr Treat in 1848, have not been lost sight of in their correspondence with the Indian Missions. . . . But the Board can certainly withdraw support and call home its mis-

sionaries, if these churches persist in their sins; can it not? Undoubtedly it can. But would that cure the evil? Besides, it may be doubted whether that is the Gospel method of converting the world. At any rate, we have not supposed it to be the proper way of conducting Christian missions to go and say to a people, 'If you will not abandon your sins you shall be deprived of the Gospel.' The Board does not manage its missions in this way." In 1854 it did not, but in 1859 it does so manage. The claim so to manage, if it chooses, was then made, and now is acted on, however ridiculous and absurd the actual exercise of it then looked even to Dr Pomroy's eyes. The claim is not to exercise *ecclesiastical* control. Oh, no! That is a terrible thing ever since Dr Hodge, in the *Repertory*, pointed out how unfounded was the Committee's claim to that power! But without ecclesiastically controlling, the Committee may, *pecuniarily*, control the missionaries! That is, of course, a very different affair! The Committee may *starve* the missionaries, if they will not consent to look through these Boston gentlemen's spectacles. The junto in Boston may control the teaching of the missionaries, if only they do it not *ecclesiastically*! The thing to be objected to is not *control*, but only *ecclesiastical* control—and so, of course, nothing can be said against a control that is *pecuniary*. Such was the exposition in 1854, of the Committee's rights and powers, by one of the Secretaries. And wherein does this late "discontinuance" of the Choctaw Mission differ from what was thus claimed? The Committee take a certain ground in 1848, and in 1854 the Board confirm it, but the missionaries persist, down to 1859, in holding contrary opinions, *and this, and nothing but this*, on their part, is the cause of their being cut off. The Majority Report of the Sub-Committee, which we inserted above, states that "it is proposed to discontinue the mission *solely on the ground of a difference of opinion* between the missionaries and this Board in respect to the manner of preaching the Gospel, or the application of its principles to the evil of slavery." If they had assented to Mr Treat's, or to Dr Wood's, views of slavery, the Committee would have gladly retained them; they protested against those views, and could neither be forced nor persuaded to change their ground, and therefore they have been *cut off*, that is, *discontinued*! We say, then, that in this act the Boston Committee not only exercised ecclesiastical power, but exercised it in a way, and upon grounds, that no Synod or Assembly of Presbyterians, and no truly Protestant Bishop of the Episcopal Church, would consider sufficient. Outside of the Bible, none of these would go to find cause for such summary and severe discipline.

2. A second unscriptural principle which the Committee

sanction for the sake of expediency, is, that men may make new terms of church-membership, not laid down by our Lord or his apostles. We need not argue this point. It is plain that the missionaries are cut off because of their not acting upon the Treat doctrine, that voluntary slaveholders may not be church members. And this is now the attitude in which the American Board is placed! Good, and true, and faithful missionaries are cut off because they would not agree to deprive the King of his crown-rights! All honour to the Choctaw missionaries that would not betray their master for money, nor barter away his honour and kingdom for their very bread! Alas! for this great Board, that has so sadly been led astray!

3. A third unscriptural principle, which the Committee have carried out, is, that missionaries of Jesus, *as such*, must sometimes interfere, "discreetly" with the politics of the nations. This the Committee instructed these brethren to do in this case. Had they obeyed, and done it with sufficient secrecy and craft, they might have been, to-day, in connection still with the Committee. They refused, and have been "discontinued."

4. There is yet another very unscriptural principle enacted by the Committee, namely, that a Missionary Board may properly quit their work in any given field, although the Lord smiles on that work, if only they have to encounter very great "embarrassments and perplexities" in carrying it forward. In this case the Board were perplexed and embarrassed by reason of the calm and quiet firmness of their brethren in the wilderness, whom neither the letters nor the visits of secretaries could induce to give up their judgment upon important questions of principle. Moreover, this Board was grievously worried and harassed by the constant agitation, at their annual meetings, and elsewhere, which the Abolitionists produced; and so, after nineteen long years of patient endurance of this severe trial of their faith, the Lord meanwhile blessing the labours of the missionaries, the Board, for the sake of ease and money, conclude to give up their Master's work! So did not Paul nor the other apostles. What trials and troubles did not he patiently endure from the Corinthians and the Galatians! So do not any other missionary organizations of this day; while the Lord smiles on their work they never abandon a field that is in need of their labour. So does not this very Board in regard to any other description of difficulties or embarrassments.

The great error and misfortune of the Board is, that they consented, many years ago, to yield a little to the spirit of abolition, and, by so doing, helped to nurse its vigour for their own complete overthrow. Once involved in this difficulty,

there was, possible for them, no more consistent action. God gave them a testimony to maintain for him against rampant error clothed in the garb of truth—but they have failed to keep it. Subterfuges and shams and shuffling have long marked their course. Had the senior secretary, obeying the impulses which we dare to say he sometimes felt, but resisted the Committee's action, and rallied the conservative strength which he could, doubtless, have commanded at the last meeting of the Board, there might have been achieved, by him, the glory of another Tract Society victory—a victory over fanatical clergymen by sober and rational laymen! There remains for the American Board the lasting dishonour achieved for it by false friends! Impartial history will condemn it as selling principle for gold! How vainly will any future apologist seek to represent them as cutting off their missionaries for the sake of some important principle—suppose, for example, the principle that slave-holding church members may not be acknowledged; seeing that they dare not base their excising upon this ground, but dismiss these brethren with sugared words—nay, actually vote them a year's pay, and present them with a considerable amount of property! If the missionaries were scandalous sinners, why give them all this money of the churches? If they were not such sinners, why cut them off? There is but one answer, and that one the Board itself gives—it was for money and for quietness.

There is another topic upon which, in closing this review, we shall offer a few observations:—

We look upon this act of the American Board as having great significance in a political point of view. This Board has a wide constituency, extending over all New England, and through New York, into Ohio, and the other North-Western States. It is, therefore, one of the great pulses of the country. Our friends in New York and Philadelphia would have us believe *the North* is sound enough upon the question of the rights of masters in the South; it is only a few rabid fanatics here and there who make a great noise, which we are not to regard as of the least consequence. With great respect for their authority, it does not silence the loud contrary testimony of this act of the American Board. Not on principle, but confessedly upon expediency, we see it here doing what it would gladly not do to those excellent Choctaw missionaries. How strong and how general must be the anti-slavery sentiment which has thus governed that Board! What a mighty thing was that "expediency" which forced the reluctant Board so far down from its former position! Here is another bond of union broken—another bulwark thrown down for the waves of civil strife to break in upon our country!

We are well aware of the distinction that will immediately be drawn by our sincere friends at the North, when they read these remarks. They will say that, of course, the North generally, perhaps universally, is anti-slavery, but they will reiterate that there are very few real *Abolitionists* to be found. We reply to our friends, that it matters little to us what distinctions of names they make. Be it, if they will have it so, that the Abolitionists at the North have little weight! We point here, then, to a fact which shews how dangerous to the peace of our country is that *Anti-Slavery*, which they acknowledge to be so general. It is, indeed, the misfortune of the United States, that a generation has grown up at the North during thirty years past, under the influence of a great misapprehension of the principles of the slavery question, and a systematic misrepresentation of its facts. And now the fruits of this training begin to appear. The sentiments inculcated so long and so zealously, are developed into actual form and life before us. They appear in one shape at Harper's Ferry; they appear in another shape, not so bloody, but quite as significant, at the Board's last meeting at Philadelphia.

We reiterate the opinion expressed by us before, in this journal, that there is but one hope for a peaceful future to our country, and that is the hope of a great change of sentiment at the North regarding the principles and the facts of the question of slavery. Do our friends in New York and Philadelphia cherish any such hope as this? Doctrines must produce their own proper fruit. Ideas rule. Can there be brought about a great change of ideas at the North? As for the South—the *Christian* South—we believe her views are sustained by truth and reason. She has carefully, intelligently, and prayerfully examined the whole question. She will not, cannot, ought not to abandon her defence of slavery. The negro being here, and being a negro, the relation in which he stands to the white man must be maintained. If it is essential to the white man's peace, it is likewise essential to the black man's existence on this soil. For the South, no change of sentiment is possible. She must stand where she is standing, and if need be and God so order, there she must fall and perish!

Our true friends at the North must bear with us when we say, that it is not to be expected the Southern people should put the very highest estimate on the value of the demonstrations now making in the great commercial centres of the North. We do not believe and would not intimate that there are none, or that there are but few of those who make those demonstrations, that are sincere. Those meetings have called out, we do not doubt, many a retired patriot, influenced by none but the purest motives. But we say the people of the South must be

expected to give a considerable portion of the credit of these demonstrations to the interested motives of those centres of commerce which draw their wealth, in large proportions, from this section. What is needed is to see this kind of demonstration, or rather *to have seen them* at the very outset, in the rural communities, and especially in the second and third rate cities and towns of the North, not so immediately affected by the loss of Southern trade. These demonstrations are too late in their appearing. It appears to us, in this aggrieved section, that there ought to have been witnessed, at once, a simultaneous movement at a thousand points all through the non-slaveholding States, abjuring and denouncing the late invasion. We cannot but think such a movement would have been witnessed, had this thing happened thirty years ago, and that it would have been witnessed now, also, but for those anti-slavery sentiments which prevail almost universally at the North; we say those *anti-slavery* sentiments, those *innocent* sentiments, which our best friends at the North do not expect us to condemn. What is needful to give the South confidence in the friendship of the Northern masses, is for us to see the ballot-box repudiating enmity to the South; is to see the action of such bodies of men as gather at the meetings of the American Board rebuking denunciation of us and our churches; is to see the Northern press put away the sneers and taunts of slaveholders, with which it has long teemed. It has been said that, in relation to the Harper's Ferry case, the Northern press did, for the most part, discharge well their duty. We acknowledge that much of what has come under our own eye of this "well-discharged duty" has seemed to us to lack heart. Even amongst those papers which have the most manfully and earnestly spoken out, as it became brethren and patriots to speak for brethren and for their country, there has been evinced sometimes a singular deadness to the just claims of our much-abused South. A New York paper, which stands nearly at the head of the list in that city, for its bold advocacy of what is our due, after glorying in the late patriotic meetings there, turns to Richmond and Charleston and New Orleans, and putting into one and the same category, "the disorganising movements of the Northern Abolitionists and Southern Fanatics," calls on these cities to come out, like New York, Philadelphia and Boston, and denounce all "non-intercourse" and "retaliation" movements, as equalling "the rampant sectionalism of the North." Thus do the best friends of the South, in New York, misconceive her position. Is this people—for thirty years harassed unceasingly and increasingly by a most unjust persecution; irritated by meddlesome and mischievous impertinence, and provoked by officious ignorance; threatened with

every loss that can befall a free and brave people, and the threats actually beginning to be executed, while our Northern friends for a long time keep silence and stand still—is this people to be classed with their very assailants? When the best-informed and best-intentioned Northern newspapers use such language, they demonstrate how complete a revolution in the sentiments of the North is necessary, in order to warrant the hope of any peace for these United States in the future.

We believe such a revolution of sentiments might take place if there were but time for truth to work. Slavery is stronger now at the South than ever, and is daily getting stronger. We mean the Christian doctrine of slavery, viz., that Slavery is government, and as such is good, and is sanctioned of God; that masters have rights and duties; that slaves also have rights and duties; that ignorance and superstition, barbarism and licentiousness, indolence, disobedience, and deceit, are all evils, but that slavery, as regulated by Christian communities, should and does lift the negro out of these evils, and is therefore good; that whilst God, in His providence, has given to us these people to serve us, He has given us to them to protect them; to govern them; to restrain them by wholesome and firm, yet kind, discipline; to improve them; above all, to go forward in the fear of God with them to the judgment-seat, and to give them all the assistance in our power to prepare for that meeting with Him. We say that this Slavery, this existing relation between two races which can never be separated—which relation is the source of such great advantages to them both, and without which relation each race would speedily become, here on this one common soil, an unspeakable and an intolerable curse to the other—this Slavery is daily growing stronger in the confidence and affections of the South. Give it time, and it would vindicate itself also at the North, and to candid Europe. But those *innocent* anti-slavery sentiments which confessedly possess the Northern mind, have already raised a whirlwind of passion there, and an answering whirlwind of passion here is rising fast to meet it, and only our Maker knows what the end will be. Before him we firmly believe that the South, the Christian South, is representing his truth in this controversy, and in him we do calmly confide that he will vindicate his truth in the South, and by the South against all opposers! Equal rights to all things he never gave to all men. Freedom from just and necessary and wholesome restraints he grants to no creatures in heaven, earth, or hell. The restraints of slavery, which neither we nor our fathers established, he has already made the greatest blessing to the slaves of the South of which they are capable. We are in his hands with them, and going forwards in the effort to discharge

our duties to God in this relation, whilst in his fear we maintain, at every hazard, our just rights in respect to all who assail us, we anticipate the coming storm with a stedfast and a fearless heart.

Recurring to the main point of this article, we disclaim all unkind feelings to the American Board, although we have spoken in simplicity and sincerity just what we think. For that Board, as a Christian organization of great importance, we have prayed, and will pray, that their folly and weakness and sin, in this case, may be overruled of God for good. We would not injure their good name unjustly, but would rejoice to see them retrieving their damaged character. And so we bid them, affectionately and faithfully, farewell !

ART. III.—*The First and Second Adam. The Elohim revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man.* By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, New Jersey. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1860. Pp. 688.

THE opinion which we expressed of this work in our last number was founded, as there stated, on a very casual inspection. That opinion has been somewhat modified by a more extended examination. Although we still think that it is an able, laborious, and valuable work, its faults are greater than we then apprehended. There is throughout an overweening and unfounded confidence, a great display of half-knowledge, a lack of discrimination and power of analysis, and the advocacy of principles more entirely subversive of the system of doctrine taught in our standards, than we were at first aware of. The writer seems, of set purpose, rather than from any logical relation of the subjects, to have introduced every specially mysterious and difficult doctrine in the whole range of theology. The Trinity, the inscrutable relations of the several persons of the Godhead, the councils of eternity, the relation of God's efficiency with second causes, the nature of sin, the origin of evil, the origin of the soul, the propagation of sin, the freedom of the will, God's agency in human actions, the person of Christ, the mystical union, are all discussed and searched out to their utmost limits. Here, therefore, if anywhere, diffidence, caution, and discrimination, are pre-eminently needed.

But these are the attributes in which Dr Baird's book is specially deficient. He speaks as though "the deep things of God" had been all revealed to him. Nothing is obscure and nothing doubtful. He marches through rivulet and river, puddle and ocean, with equal ease, finding bottom everywhere. He is equally confident on all subjects. Everything is "incontestable," and everything is represented as all but essential. To deny that universals are objective realities, or that souls are propagated, or that the substance of our souls is numerically the same as that which sinned in Adam, is to deny original sin altogether, or to endanger the whole system of scriptural doctrine. That man's nature was designed to reveal the relations of the persons of the Trinity, that Adam's "generative nature" was an important element in his likeness to God, is declared to be incontestable; and that he breathed is "demonstrated" to be a designed outshadowing of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other persons of the Godhead. Arguments which have not the weight of a feather are declared to be irresistible, and objections to which every other mind succumbs are pronounced futile. The language of Edwards, "in the very statement of his doctrine," is said to be "a contradiction in terms," because he speaks of a "privative cause," whereas "a cause is a force of some kind, by the positive action of which the contemplated effect is produced." If Dr Baird were sinking in the water, and a spectator should refuse to stretch out a hand to save him, he might learn that there are other kinds of causes than positive forces. The tendency of Edwards's philosophy is said to be to Pelagianism and also to Pantheism; that is, it has diametrically opposite and incompatible tendencies. A doctrine of divine efficiency held by every Augustinian theologian, Romish, Lutheran, and Reformed, until within a recent period, is constantly spoken of as "Edwards's doctrine." With the same propriety he might speak of Edward's doctrine of immutability, or of the deity of Christ. The doctrine of simultaneous and predetermining concurrences is no peculiar doctrine of Edwards. He says the venerable President makes motives "as external forces" the efficient causes of volition. The distinction "which Edwards draws between the freedom of the soul and the freedom of the will," is declared to be "altogether inconclusive and impertinent." We could fill half our number with quotations exhibiting the same want of discrimination, and the same absence of modesty. Such overweening confidence is not to be referred exclusively to the will; it arises in no small measure from the character of the intellect. The less clear-sighted a man is, the less can he see differences. A man may have very considerable ability in dealing with things

in the concrete, in investigating and arranging facts ; he may be an effective writer ; he may be able to construct a luminous argument founded on such facts, and yet be a very indifferent metaphysician. And a book may have very great merits as a record and classification of facts and opinions, and yet be sadly disfigured by serious blemishes arising from the mistaken assumption on the part of the author that he has a special gift for philosophical discrimination and analysis. We should be very sorry to speak as we have done of the faults of the work before us, if we did not conscientiously believe that it is likely to do the cause of truth serious harm, should its readers allow themselves to be deceived by the tone of confidence and mastery with which its erroneous principles are announced, and the doctrines of the Reformed Church are misrepresented. It is no want of respect for Cicero to think he was a bad poet ; and it is no disrespect for Dr Baird to think or to say that his forte does not lie in metaphysics. His book goes over so much ground, so many important subjects are brought to view, the opinions of so many theologians of different schools are adduced, that the volume will prove eminently suggestive, and will take a high rank in the theological literature of our country, although the writer may be regarded as neither sound nor discriminating.

The Lutheran and Reformed Churches, the two great historical divisions of the Protestant world, happily are perfectly united on all points concerning our relation to Adam and to Christ. They agree as to the whole class of doctrines connected with the fall and redemption of man ; the covenant with Adam ; the nature of the union between him and his posterity ; the effect of his sin on his descendants ; and they consequently are of one mind as to imputation, depravity, and inability ; and, on the other hand, as to the nature of our union with Christ, justification and sanctification. Not only in the symbols of these churches, but in the writings of all their leading theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is this thorough agreement on the subjects above mentioned. They all acknowledge that our union with Adam and our union with Christ, the relation of the sin of the one and of the righteousness of the other to our condemnation on the one hand and our justification on the other, the derivation of a corrupt nature from Adam, and of a holy nature from Christ, are included in the analogy between the first and second Adam, as that analogy is presented in the Bible. It would, however, have been little short of a miracle had a whole system of theology been evolved perfectly from the beginning, had there been no confusion or inconsistency, no undue prominence given to one principle over others no less true. This would be

contrary to all the ordinary methods of God's dealings with the church. The truth is usually elicited by conflict; agreement is the result of comparison and adjustment of divergencies. We accordingly find in the history of Protestant theology much more of inconsistency and confusion during the sixteenth than during the seventeenth century. It was not until after one principle had been allowed to modify another, that the scheme of doctrine came to adjust itself into the consistent and moderate form in which it is presented in the writings of Turretin and Gerhard. Nothing human, however, is either perfect or permanent. While the Protestant theology retains its power over the minds of the vast body of the purer churches of the Reformation, there has been not only open defection from it as a whole, but also the revival of the one-sided views which, in many instances, were presented during its forming period. These views have been either advocated singly, or wrought up into entirely new philosophical systems.

All Protestants at the Reformation, and afterwards, agreed in teaching, 1. That Adam was the natural head or progenitor of the whole human race. He was admitted to be the father of all men. 2. That he was the covenant head or representative of all mankind. 3. That all men are born in a state of condemnation, destitute of original righteousness, and morally corrupt; needing redemption by the blood of Christ, and sanctification by his Spirit from the commencement of their existence. 4. That this ruin of our race, or the fact that men are born in this estate of sin and misery, is due to their connection with Adam. All men were in such a sense, in him, that they sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. All these points are affirmed in the symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed churches; and no one of them is denied in the writings of any standard theologian of the period of the Reformation. There is, however, no little diversity as to the relative importance ascribed to these several points. In accounting for the fact that the sin of Adam involved the race in ruin, the principal stress was sometimes laid on the covenant relation between him and his posterity; at others, on the natural relation. The fact that men are born under condemnation was sometimes specially referred to the imputation of Adam's sin as something out of themselves; at others, to the corruption of nature derived from him. What finally modified and harmonised these representations was the acknowledged analogy between our relation to Adam and our relation to Christ. It was soon seen that what the Bible plainly teaches, viz., that the ground of our justification is nothing subjective, nothing done by us or wrought in us, but the righteousness of

Christ as something out of ourselves, could not be held fast in its integrity without admitting that the primary ground of the condemnation of the race was in like manner something neither done by us nor infused into us, but the sin of Adam as out of ourselves, and imputed to us on the ground of the union, representative and natural, between him and his posterity. It was this that determined the theology of the Lutheran and Reformed churches as to all this class of doctrines. Those churches, therefore, came to teach with extraordinary unanimity, 1, That Adam, as the common father of all men, was by divine appointment constituted not only the natural, but the federal head or representative of his posterity. The race stood its probation in him. His sin was the sin of the race, because the sin of its divinely and righteously constituted representative. We therefore sinned in Adam in the same sense that we died in Christ. 2. The penalty of death threatened against Adam in the event of his transgression was not merely the dissolution of the body, but spiritual death, the loss of the divine favour and of original righteousness; and the consequent corruption of his whole nature. 3. This penalty came upon his race. His sin was the judicial ground on which the favour and fellowship of God were withdrawn or withheld from the apostate family of man. 4. Since the fall, therefore, men are by nature, or as they are born, the children of wrath. They are not only under condemnation, but destitute of original righteousness, and corrupted in their whole nature. According to this view of the subject, the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin is the federal union between him and his posterity, in such sense that it would not have been imputed had he not been constituted their representative. It is imputed to them not because it was antecedently to that imputation, and irrespective of the covenant on which the imputation is founded, already theirs; but because they were appointed to stand their probation in him. Moreover, the corruption of nature derived from Adam is not, as Dr Baird, with strange confusion of thought, persists in regarding it, a physiological fact, but a fact in the moral government of God. Our author treats it as a question of physics, belonging to the general category of propagation, to be accounted for on the ground of what he calls "the mysteries of generation;" ignoring the distinction between physical laws and the principles of God's dealings with rational creatures.

In strict analogy with the relation, as above stated, between Adam and his posterity, the Lutheran and Reformed theology teaches, 1, That Christ, in the covenant of redemption, is constituted the head and representative of his people; and that,

in virtue of this federal union, and agreeably to the terms of the eternal covenant, they are regarded and treated as having done what he did and suffered what he suffered in their name and in their behalf. They died in him. They rose in him; not literally, so that his acts were their acts, but representatively. 2. That the reward promised to Christ in the covenant of redemption, was the justification, sanctification, and eternal salvation of his people. 3. That the judicial ground, therefore, of the justification of the believer is not their own personal righteousness, nor the holy nature which they derive from Christ, but his obedience and sufferings, performed and endured in their name, and which became theirs in virtue of the covenant and by the gracious imputation of God. 4. That the believer is not only justified by the righteousness of Christ, but sanctified by his Spirit. These two things are not to be confounded, because they differ not only in their nature, but in their source. Justification is a forensic or judicial act, by which the sinner is pronounced just on the ground of a righteousness which is not subjectively his, and which therefore does not constitute his character. Sanctification is an efficient or executive work, in which God by the power of his Spirit renovates the corrupted nature of man, and restores him to his own image in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. The main point in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant church, and as exhibited by the apostle is, that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offence as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of our race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence. It is this principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology, and to the evangelical system, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied Dr Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation.

It has already been remarked, that in the early writings of the period of the Reformation, the imputation of Adam's sin, and the corruption of nature as derived from him, are often confounded, and, without intending to deny the former, more stress is in many cases laid upon the latter. This is the more easily accounted for, inasmuch as just the opposite tendency was at that time prevalent in the Church of Rome. Many of the Popish theologians made the sin of Adam the only ground of the condemnation of his race, and seemed inclined to hold

(although contrary to the decisions of their own church), that inherent corruption was not properly of the nature of sin, or in itself a ground of condemnation. Calvin, therefore, was accustomed to say, that men are condemned not *per solam imputationem*, not on account of the imputation of Adam's sin alone, but also on account of their own inherent corruption. This was not a denial of imputation, but the assertion of another and equally important ground of the condemnation of the race. By *death* was understood eternal death, and the reformers were anxious to shew that they did not teach that those personally innocent and pure were condemned to eternal perdition. They therefore made original sin, in its wide sense, to include two sins; original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent*. The latter they regarded as the penal consequence of the former. On the ground of the personal sin of Adam, as the representative of the race, God withdrew from men his favour and Spirit; they thereby lost his image, and became inwardly depraved. This depravity being truly and properly of the nature of sin, subjects those infected with it to the penalty of sin. God in his infinite mercy, through the merits of Christ, saves from that penalty all who die in infancy, that is, all who have no other sins to answer for than sin imputed and sin inherent. This we may, and do believe, without denying the fact that we fell in Adam, and without questioning the righteousness of that divine constitution.

These two things, the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent corruption, thus often confounded or combined in the writings of the Reformers, came afterwards to be so separated that the former was entirely denied or left out of view. Placcæus, in the French church, taught that the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, was the only ground of the condemnation of men, apart from their own personal transgressions. This theory received the name of *Mediate Imputation*—not because it involved the idea, properly speaking, of the imputation of Adam's sin, but simply because Placcæus was content to use the words, provided they were understood in accordance with his theory. Men are first depraved, and because of this inherent depravity, it may be said the sin of Adam is imputed to them, inasmuch as it is derived from him. *Hoc posito*, inquit Placcæus, *distinguenda est Imputatio in immediatam seu antecedentem, et mediatam seu consequentem. Illa fit immediatè, hoc est, non-mediante corruptione; hæc mediatè, hoc est, mediante corruptione: illa ordine naturæ corruptionem antecedit, hæc sequitur: illa corruptionis causa censetur esse, hæc effectum: illam D. Placcæus rejicit hanc admittit.* This was said in answer to the decision of the Na-

tional Synod of France, condemning his denial of the imputation of Adam's sin. The meaning of Placæus was not that Adam's sin is imputed to us, but that on account of the inherent corruption derived from him, we are regarded as being as deserving of death as he was. Imputation, therefore, is not the judicial ground of corruption, but corruption is the ground of imputation of guilt.

1. The obvious objections to this theory are, that it denies any probation to the race. They come into the world under the burden of spiritual death, infected with a deadly spiritual malady, by a sovereign or arbitrary infliction. To put a man to death in consequence of a righteous judicial sentence, is one thing; to put him to death without any offence or sentence, is another thing. According to Placæus, men being born in sin, and having no probation in Adam, are condemned without trial or offence.
2. It refers the propagation of sin to a mere physical law. Like begets like. All lions inherit the nature of the first lion; and so all men inherit the corrupt nature of fallen Adam. God deals with moral and immortal beings as he does with brutes. There is no distinction admitted between physical laws and the principles on which a holy God deals with responsible creatures.
3. The principle on which this doctrine is founded subverts the whole evangelical system. That principle is, that it is not only inconsistent with the justice of God, but irreconcilable with his very nature as an omniscient and truthful being, that his judgments of rational creatures should be founded on anything else than their inward, subjective character. He cannot regard and treat those personally innocent as guilty. Then by parity of reason, he cannot regard the personally unrighteous as righteous, he cannot justify the ungodly. Then what is to become of us sinners? The objections against the imputation of sin bear with all their force against the imputation of righteousness. Those, therefore, who reject the one, have, as a general and necessary consequence, rejected the other. This is a fact familiar to every one acquainted with the history of theology in our own and other countries.
4. A fourth objection to his doctrine is, it destroys the analogy between Adam and Christ, or it necessitates the adoption of the doctrine of subjective justification. We must either deny that the sin of Adam (as *alienum peccatum*) stands in a relation to our condemnation analogous to that in which the righteousness of Christ, as distinguished from our own, stands to our justification; or we must admit the analogy to be, that as we derive a corrupt nature from Adam and are on that account condemned, so we derive a holy nature from Christ, and are on the ground of that nature justified. But this, as every one knows, is to

give up the great point in dispute between Romanists and Protestants; it is to renounce Luther's famous doctrine, *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*. 5. This doctrine is in direct conflict with the declarations of Scripture. The design of the apostle in Romans v. 12-21, is not simply to teach that as Adam was in one way the cause of sin and death, so Christ was in another way the cause of righteousness and life; but it is to illustrate *the mode* or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification. From the third chapter and twenty-first verse he had been engaged in setting forth the method of justification, not sanctification. He had insisted that it was not our works, or our subjective character, but the blood of Christ, his propitiatory death, his righteousness, the righteousness of God, something therefore out of ourselves, which is the judicial ground of our justification. It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shews that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the offence of one. To deny this, and to assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing which the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument. It is to take sides with the Jews against the apostle, and to maintain that the righteousness of one man cannot be the ground of the justification of another. This doctrine, which denies the immediate or antecedent imputation of Adam's sin, and makes inherent corruption as derived from him the primary ground of the condemnation of the race, was consequently declared, almost with one voice, to be contrary to Scripture, to the faith of the Reformed churches, and even of the church catholic. It was unanimously and repeatedly condemned by the National Synod of France to which Placæus belonged. It was no less unanimously condemned by the Church of Holland. The Leyden Professors, in their recommendation of the work which their colleague Rivetus had written against Placæus, declare the doctrine in question to be a *dogma contrarium communi omnium fermè Christianorum consensui*, and pronounce the doctrine of immediate imputation to be a *dogma verè catholicum*. The same condemnation of this theory was pronounced by the churches in Switzerland. It was one of the errors against which the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, published in 1675, was directed. In that Formula it is said, "Non possumus, salva cœlesti veritate, assensum præbere iis qui Adamum posteros suos ex instituto Dei repræsentasse ac proinde ejus peccatum posteris ejus ἀμέσως imputari negant, et sub imputationis mediatæ et consequentis nomine, non imputationem duntaxat primi peccati tollunt, sed hæredi-

tariæ etiam corruptionis assertionem gravi periculo obijciunt."

It would, however, be a great mistake to assume that the doctrine of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin is a doctrine peculiar to Calvinism. It is as much inwrought in the theology of the Lutheran as in that of the Reformed churches. It is not even a distinguishing doctrine of Protestants. It is truly a catholic doctrine. It belongs as much to the Latin Church as it does to those who were forced to withdraw from her communion. It was, therefore, no exaggeration when the theologians of Holland declared the doctrine of mediate imputation to be "contrary to the consent of almost all Christians." Dr Baird does not adopt that doctrine. He pronounces mediate imputation a figment. He devotes a whole section to prove that his view is not identical with that of Placæus. This was the more necessary, as he adopts all the principles on which that doctrine is founded, and urges all the arguments against immediate imputation which were ever advanced by Placæus, or by Pelagians, Socinians, or Remonstrants. His doctrine is neither the one nor the other. It is neither the old intelligible doctrine of immediate imputation of Adam's sin as not our own act, but the act of our divinely constituted head and representative; nor is it the equally intelligible, although, as we think, erroneous and dangerous doctrine, that the thing imputed to us, and the primary and only ground (apart from our personal actual transgressions) of condemnation, is the corrupt nature derived from Adam. This, we say, is intelligible. We know what a man means when he refers everything to the law of propagation, and explains the derivation of a corrupted nature from Adam on the same principle that the asps of to-day get their poison from the asps before the deluge. This is in one sense intelligible; but we defy any man to put any intelligible meaning on what Dr Baird says. Wherein he differs, or supposes he differs from this doctrine, he deceives himself with words. He does not see that what he says means nothing. He makes distinctions where there is no difference; and supposes himself to be saying something when he is saying nothing. On the justice of this judgment our readers will decide. In our opinion Dr Baird's theory, when stripped of its words without meaning, is nothing more than the familiar doctrine adopted by the more orthodox of our New England brethren, who repudiate the idea of imputation, and yet maintain the propagation of a morally depraved nature from Adam to his posterity.

The following extracts may suffice to give an adequate idea of his views. "In the angelic hosts each several individual is

possessed of a several nature, original in and peculiar to him. The history of the person and of the nature is contemporaneous and the same. But in man it is different, The nature of the entire race was created originally in Adam, and is propagated from him by generation, and so descends to all his seed. Hence arise two distinct forms of responsibility ; the nature being placed under a creative obligation of conformity to the holiness of God's nature, and each several person being, in a similar manner, held under obligation of personal conformity of affections, thoughts, words, and actions, to the holy requirements of God's law. The apostasy of this nature was the immediate efficient cause of the act of disobedience, the plucking of the forbidden fruit. Thus there attached to him the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal disobedience. The guilt thus incurred attached not only to Adam's person, but to the nature which, in his person, caused the act of transgression. Thus, as the nature flows to all the posterity of Adam, it comes bearing the burden of that initial crime, and characterised by the depravity which was embraced therein. In both respects the nature is at variance with the law. In both respects it is guilty of sin (the sin of nature). In addition to this, Adam's posterity find the depravity thus embraced and indwelling, an unfailling and active cause of other sins. The apostate nature works iniquity. Thus originate the personal sins which fill the world. Such is the ground upon which the apostasy of man's nature from holiness and its embrace of depravity, is called sin, and, as such, charged upon the race of man." P. 256.

According to this statement, the nature of man being a unit, and that one nature being concentrated in Adam, the sin of his nature was the sin of the entire race to which that nature was propagated. We, that is, our nature, sinned in Adam as truly, properly, and strictly, as he himself did. On p. 311, it is said, "We are *not* held accountable for Adam's breach of the covenant, in consequence of the transaction respecting the tree ; but because of the inscription of the covenant in Adam's nature, and our in-being in him in whose nature it was inscribed. Again, it is said, "the offence of Adam is ours immediately ;" "when Adam sinned, all his seed were in him, and so sinned in him in the same act with him," p. 422. The cause of actual sin is depravity, "the cause of which was the wicked apostasy of our nature from God, in the person of Adam, an apostasy in which we are as truly criminal as Adam was, because the nature by which it was committed is as really in us as in him," p. 502. The doctrine of this book, therefore, is that we sinned in Adam actually and in the proper sense of the term. His sin is imputed to us, because it is "intrinsic-

cally" ours. It is ours, not in a forensic and legal sense, but literally, because of the identity of nature between him and us. The ground, therefore, of the imputation is this community of nature, and not the covenant by which he was constituted our head and representative. It would have been ours had no such covenant been established. The only effect of the covenant was to limit the period of man's probation. "To object, therefore, to the positive transaction between God and Adam," says our author, "is to complain that God did not give us a myriad chances of falling instead of one; since the only effect of that transaction was, to secure confirmation and eternal life to man, upon condition of Adam's temporary obedience; instead of the race being held to a perpetual probation in Adam and in themselves. To complain of being held responsible for Adam's sin, is to object to being held to obedience at all; since, in any case, Adam's sin was our sin; the forces which are in us, the nature which we inherit from him, is the very nature which in him rebelled; the same, not in kind merely, but as flowing continuously from him to us." P. 302. "Had Adam, made as he was, been placed in probation without limit as to time, and had he remained upright, whilst one of his posterity became apostate, the crime and corruption thus introduced would have flowed to the family of the apostate precisely as that of Adam does to us his seed," p. 509. This is a great truth, our author intimates, which few have sense enough to see.

Such is the doctrine which is here set forth as the faith of the Reformed churches, and specially as the doctrine of the Westminster Confession. It rests on the following principles:—1. The identity of the race with Adam; or, the assumption that humanity is a generic life, a substance, a nature, a "sum of forces" numerically the same in Adam and all his descendants. 2. That a nature can act impersonally; or, the apostasy and rebellion of human nature is to be distinguished from the personal act of Adam. 3. That souls are propagated. 4. That community, in a propagated nature, involves all those to whom that nature is communicated in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in the progenitor whence it originated. 5. The real germinating principle from which the whole theory springs is, that God cannot regard and treat a rational creature otherwise than he is in himself; if he is not subjectively a sinner, he cannot be treated as such, and if he is not subjectively righteous, he cannot be treated as righteous.

The first remark which we think must occur to every intelligent reader in reference to such a system is, that it is simply a physiological theory. It is a peculiar view of an-

thropology, of the nature of man as an animal, and the laws of his propagation. Had there been no God, or had God nothing to do in the government of the world; or did he take no cognizance of the character and conduct of men, all that this system supposes would be just as it is. When God created the first oak, he gave it a certain nature, and impressed upon it a certain law of propagation. All subsequent oaks are the development of the identical life-principle embodied in the first oak. So when the first lion, tiger, or elephant was created, a generic leonine, feline, or elephantine nature was called into being, and that identical original substance is communicated, with all its peculiar characteristics, from one generation to another. So too when man was created, the same thing happened. There was no covenant with the first lion that all other lions should inherit his nature; and the propagation of Adam's nature to his posterity, with its guilt and pollution, is altogether independent of any covenant—it is simply a physiological fact. A second remark no less obvious is, that we need no divine revelation on which to rest our faith in this fact. Physiologists teach us what is the law of propagation in the animal world; to that world man belongs; he falls under the general category. Human character is transmitted by the same law which regulates the transmission of the nature of other animals. What need then have we for any special divine revelation on the subject? It is very evident that the theory does not rest on the testimony of the Bible. It has a purely inductive basis. A man may hold it and not believe in the Bible; he may reject it, and his faith in the Scriptures be undisturbed. A third remark is, that even as a physiological theory it has no substantial foundation. From the nature of the case, it is merely a hypothesis to account for certain phenomena; it cannot be anything more. The fact is, that like begets like. Genera and species are, within certain limits, permanent and indestructible. An oak never becomes an apple-tree, a lion never becomes an ox, a man never becomes a monkey, nor a monkey a man. Even distinct varieties of the same species of plants and animals become permanent. There are therefore fixed types in nature, either original or acquired. Men, as men, have a common nature—that is, they have the same anatomical structure, the same *φύσις*, the same rational and moral faculties, the same social dispositions and constitutional principles. These are permanent and universal, and belong to men as men, and therefore to all mankind. But within the limits of this specific identity, we see all the varieties of the Caucasian, Malayan, and African races; the national, and even family peculiarities transmitted from generation to generation. These

are admitted facts. How are they to be accounted for? How are we to explain this immense diversity and this permanency in the different forms of life? One hypothesis is, and that the most simple and sublime, the most captivating to the imagination, the most specious to the natural understanding, the oldest and most persistent of all the forms of human thought, underlying the philosophy and religions of ages and nations, viz, that all these diversified forms of life are manifestations of one all-pervading principle—God, in the various forms and states of self-development. This is a hypothesis, which is to the theory which Dr Baird adopts what the ocean is to a gutter. Another hypothesis, less ambitious than this pantheistic system, is that this world is a living organism, imbued with one life, of which all that lives are different forms, and man the apex of the pyramid. Another, that humanity is a generic life, a substance having objective reality which reveals itself, or comes to personality in connection with individual material organisms. As light is a subtle fluid diffused through space, and becomes luminous only on certain conditions, so this diffused principle of humanity comes to existence or self-manifestations only in combination with appropriate corporeal forms, which it fashions for itself under specific conditions. Still another is, that each genus or species of plants and animals is something, it is hard to say what—a force, a law, a life, a substance, a something having objective reality, and which propagates itself, each according to its kind, the individuals being only the extension of the original force, principle, or substance. This is the hypothesis which constitutes Dr Baird's book, without which it is nothing. This is the foundation on which rests his theology. If this fails, his theology disappears. On page 25 he says, Nominalism, as opposed to Realism, gave a great impulse to Pelagianism. "According to the philosophy," he says, "which prevailed before the rise of that sect, such universal conceptions as those of genera, species, and nature, have as their ground some kind of objective realities. They are not the mere result of thought, but have in some proper senses a real existence, and lie as essences at the base of the existence of all individuals and particulars." According to the Platonic doctrine, as we all know, these universals existed from eternity in the divine mind. They are the ideas of which individuals are the manifestations. The universal is alone real; the individual is simply apparent. This was the original form of Realism as taught by Scotus and Anselm. According to another statement of the doctrine, it was held, "*Eandem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse individuis; quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine acci-*

dentium varietas." To the word *homo*, man, there answers, therefore, one substance or essence, which is distinguished in individuals only by accidental diversities. Dr Baird says that according to one theory, "general conceptions are the mere product of the imaginative faculty—results of logical deduction from the observation of many like individuals. A second theory represents universals as being realities which have actual objective subsistence of their own, distinct from and independent of that of the particulars and individuals. A third holds that universals are, in a certain sense, realities in nature, but that the general conceptions are merely logical, the universals not having an existence of their own, separate from the individuals through which they are manifested." "The third," he says, "is the scriptural doctrine, according to which the substances were at the beginning endowed with forces, which are distinctive and abiding; and which in organic nature flow distributively in continuous order, to the successive generations of the creatures. Of these forces the word *nature* is the expression. In its proper use it conveys the distinct idea of permanent indwelling force. It expresses the sum of the essential qualities or efficient principles of a given thing, viewed in their relation to its substance, as that in which they reside, and from whence they operate. Such is the sense in which the word is constantly employed in the Scriptures." P. 149. "Thus the human nature consists in the whole sum of the forces, which, original in Adam, are perpetuated and flow in generation to his seed. And our oneness of nature does not express the fact merely, that we and Adam are alike; but that we are alike, because the forces which are in us, and make us what we are, were in him, and are numerically the same which in him constituted his nature and his likeness." P. 150.

According to this view, humanity is one substance, in which inhere certain forces. This substance was originally in Adam, and has been by propagation communicated to all his descendants, so that the substance, with its forces, which constitutes them what they are, is numerically the same as that which was in him, and made him what he was. The principle here involved is asserted to be true in its application to all the genera and species of plants and animals. The lion of to-day is the same numerical substance with the lion first created; the oak of to-day is the same numerically as the original oak in Eden. What is meant by this? We take up an acorn in the forest—in what sense is it identical with the first created oak? Not in the matter of which it is composed, for that is derived from the earth and atmosphere; not in its chemical properties, for they inhere in the matter, or result from its combinations,

These properties are doubtless the same in kind with those belonging to the first acorn, but they are not numerically the same. No one assumes the existence of any chemical substance, in which those properties inhere, as transmitted by the laws of propagation. Wherein then does this assumed numerical identity exist? Is it in the principle of life? But can any one tell what that is? Is it a substance? Has human skill ever yet discovered what life is, whether in plant or animal? And must a whole system of theology be founded on a conjecture as to its nature? Is a confidence on this point, which can only spring from ignorance, to be allowed to control the faith of the church? There may be an immaterial principle which determines the species of every plant and animal, and secures its permanency, but what necessity is there for assuming that principle to be a substance, numerically the same with the first of each kind? If the chemical properties belonging to an acorn, or to the germ of a nascent animal, may be the same in kind from generation to generation, without assuming the transmission of a chemical substance, why may not the principle of life remain permanent, without any such transmission of substance? The realistic hypothesis of the objective reality of genera and species is not only purely gratuitous, but it overlooks the continued presence and agency of God in nature. The development of a plant, and the growth of an animal body, are not to be referred to blind forces, inherent in matter, nor in any substance, material or immaterial, but to the omnipresent Spirit of God. The intelligence manifested in organic structures is clear evidence of the presence of mind guiding the operation of natural forces. It might as well be assumed that a book was written, and the letters arranged by such forces, with no present mind to control their operation. If a plant or human body can be fashioned by a transmitted substance, then a world can be so constructed. The principle on which the argument from design in favour of the being of God is founded is, that the adaptation of means to an end is evidence of a present, active intelligence. As all organic nature teems with manifestations of such adaptations, it teems in like measure with evidence of the omnipresent, active intelligence of God. We are not about to enter on the mediæval controversy about universals. All we are concerned about is, that the assumption of a generic human nature, as an objective reality, constituting all men numerically one in substance with Adam, is a pure figment, unentitled to any weight or authority in determining Christian doctrine.

The second principle on which our author's theory rests, is that natural acts are to be distinguished from personal acts; or, that a nature may act independently of the person to which

that nature belongs. We are not responsible for Adam's personal act, but we are held to have performed the act of his nature, because that nature is numerically the same in him and in us. The rebellion and apostasy of his nature, which preceded and caused his personal transgression, were our rebellion and apostasy. On this subject, the author says in a passage already quoted, "There attached to him (Adam) the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal disobedience," p. 256. "It is certain that nothing may be predicated of the person which does not grow out of the nature, and if this must be admitted, there appears no ground on which it can be claimed that the nature, because existing in another person, is entitled to exemption from its essential guilt." "The nature which was the cause of my person was there. And as every power or principle of efficiency which is in the effect must have been in its cause, it follows *inevitably* (?) that everything in me, upon which resistance to apostasy might be imagined, was actually there and took part in the rebellion," p. 257. "Throughout the entire argument Paul carefully distinguishes two features which are essentially united in Adam's apostasy. The one is the violation of the positive precept, which he designates as the offence, the disobedience, and the transgression. The other is the violation of the law written in Adam's heart, and so in the nature of the race, and by the offence transgressed in both. Its violation was the embrace of that which the apostle calls sin." P. 419. "There are two classes of actions, which should be carefully distinguished, Of these, one is such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These in no respect change the nature, &c." To this belong, he says, all the sins of our immediate ancestors, for which we are not responsible. "The other consists of such agency, as springing from within constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed. The single case referrible to this class is that of apostasy, the voluntary self-deprivation of a nature created holy. Here, as the nature flows downward in the line of generation, it communicates to the successive members of the race, not only itself thus transformed, but with itself the moral responsibility which attaches inseparably to it, as active in the transformation wrought by it and thus conveyed." P. 509. "The sin was the apostasy of man's nature from God ; apostasy by the force of which Adam was impelled into the act of transgression as an inevitable consequence of the state of heart constituted by the apostasy. Now let it be carefully observed that apostasy is an act, not a habit ; and, on the other hand, depravity and corruption is a habitual state, and not an act." P. 497. The obligation of the law, he says,

extends "to the *substance* of the soul." "It is to the *very substance* of the soul that the law is addressed ; and upon it the penal sanctions of that law are enforced. The soul is that, which, in its substance and powers intrinsically, as much as in their exercises, was created and ordained to be the image and glory of God. Conformity of this substance to this its exalted office is holiness ; the reverse is sin." P. 258.

If there is any meaning in all this, we confess ourselves to be too blind to see it. We have no idea what is meant by the law being addressed "to the very substance of the soul," or by saying "conformity of substance to the image of God is holiness, and the reverse, sin." It is as unintelligible to us as speaking of the moral character of a tree, or the correct deportment of a house. It has often happened to us in reading German metaphysics, not to comprehend at all the meaning of the author ; but we have always had the conviction that he had a meaning. We do not feel thus on the present occasion. The distinction which the author attempts to draw between *sinful* acts of nature and personal sins is a distinction which means nothing, and on this nothing his whole theory is founded. There are, of course, actions of very different kinds in a creature composed of soul and body ; some of these may properly enough be called natural, and others personal. But this does not apply to moral acts, whether good or evil. The mere natural functions of the body, as the process of respiration, digestion, and the circulation of the blood, are acts of nature in the sense of not being acts of personal self-determination. There is also a distinction between outward acts and acts of the soul. And this is what our author seems sometimes to have in his mind, as when he tells us we must distinguish between the act of Adam in plucking and eating the forbidden fruit, and the act of his heart. The former, he tells us, was personal, and peculiar to himself ; but the latter was natural, and belongs equally to us. But at the same time he admits there is no moral character in an external act in itself considered, and this distinction between outward and inward acts is nothing peculiar to Adam's first sin. It is no less true of every sin of word or deed he or any one else ever committed, and every such sin is a personal sin. There can, indeed, from the very idea of sin, be no *actual* sin which is not personal, because that which acts rationally and by self-determination, two elements essential to actual sin, is a person. *Actual* sin can no more be predicated of a nature as distinguished from a person than of a house. There is also, beside the different kinds of actions already mentioned, another equally obvious distinction, viz., between those which, being consentaneous with nature, do not change it, and such as from their peculiar

character produce a permanent change in the nature itself. Thus of the physical acts of Adam, his eating and drinking were perfectly normal acts, belonging to his nature as originally constituted, and producing no change in its character. It is conceivable, however, that he might have performed some act which should change his physical constitution. For example, he might have done something which changed his skin from white to black. Such change might have been permanent, and all his descendants been black. Or, he might have so poisoned himself as to have made his body perishable instead of immortal, and his descendants inherited his disease. So, also, as has already been admitted, it is conceivable that as by his apostasy from God, his moral nature became depraved, that corrupt nature, by the general law of propagation, might be transmitted to his posterity. This is the view presented by many Augustinians, before and after the Reformation, and also at times by the Lutheran and Reformed during the forming period of their theology. This also is the doctrine of a large class of our New England and New-school brethren, of Dr Dwight and of Dr Richards, and the class whom they represent. This is Mr Barnes's doctrine, as presented in many of his writings. This, too, is what Dr Baird has in his mind about one-half the time. But this is very different from the doctrine that *we*, as persons, committed Adam's sin, because our nature committed it. This supposes that actual sin can be committed by persons before they are persons. That *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed, is as monstrous a proposition as ever was framed. The doctrine of pre-existence, as held by Origen, revived in our day by Dr Müller and others in Germany, and by Dr Edward Beecher in this country, is, compared to that proposition, clear sunshine. Apostasy, we are requested carefully to consider, "is an act," it is "a voluntary act," it is an act of "*self*-depravation," and it is affirmed to be our act. That is, we performed a personal act—that is, a voluntary act, an act of self-determination, before that *self* had any existence. There is no definition of a personal act more precise and generally adopted than an "act of voluntary self-determination." Such was apostasy in Adam, and if we performed that act, then we were in him—not by community of nature merely, but personally. For we are said to have done what nature, as nature, cannot do; what of necessity implies personality. Apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all. If any man says he believes this, then, as we think, he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says. Dr Baird, however,

asserts that he did thus act in Adam, and that he feels sorry for it. He teaches that we are bound to feel remorse and self-reproach for this act of *self-determination* performed so many centuries before self existed. This is represented as a genuine form of religious experience, an experience due to the teachings and influence of God's Holy Spirit. This is a very serious matter. To attribute to the Spirit of God the mistakes and figments of our own minds—to represent as a genuine form and manifestation of the divine life what is a mere delusion of our own imagination, or offspring of our pride of intellect, is a very grave offence, and a very great evil. It is very true that when the father of a family commits a disgraceful crime, the whole family is disgraced; or if a son or daughter is led astray from the paths of virtue, the whole household hide their faces, and weep in secret places. It is also true, that when our country is honoured or degraded, we feel that it is our honour or our shame. We share in the common life of the community. The same is true of the whole human race. The sins of men are a disgrace to humanity. We may well blush for our common nature when we read of the vileness and the enormities by which our fellow-men have in all ages been guilty. But this is a very different thing from saying that we performed their acts. When a father commits murder, or a son forgery, the whole family, although humbled and distressed, although they feel a participation in the shame which does not pertain to strangers, yet do not pretend that they were guilty of the crime, and were partners in the act. Such confusion of ideas is not found in the common life. It is peculiar to those who are not content to take things as they are, who are not satisfied with phenomena, but must search into being.

The *πρώτον ψεύδος* of such speculations is, that moral principles or dispositions owe their character to their origin, and not to their nature. It is assumed that innate, hereditary depravity cannot have the nature of sin in us unless it be self-originated; hence some assume that we existed in a former state, where, by an act of self-determination, we depraved our own nature. Others assume that humanity is a person, or that personality can be predicated of human nature as a generic life, and that individuals are the forms in which its comprehensive personality is revealed; a conception as incongruous as the hundred-headed idol of the Hindoos. Others again, as Dr Baird, distancing all competitors, insist that *we* performed the act of self-depravation thousands of years before we existed. All these are not only gratuitous but impossible assumptions, to account for the admitted fact that innate corruption is truly sin, which they say it cannot be unless it have an origin in an act of our own. Things are, however,

what they are, no matter how they originated. If a man is black, he is black, whether he was born so, or made himself so. If he is good, he is good; if bad, he is bad, whether he is the one or the other by birth or self-determination. If Satan had the power to create, and should create fiends, they would not be innocent angels. Adam was created righteous. Original righteousness in him had a moral character. It was truly of the nature of holiness. It constituted Adam's moral character in the sight of God, although not self-originated. It is a first principle of Pelagianism, that moral character can attach only to acts of self-determination and their consequences. All Pelagians, therefore, deny that Adam was created holy. He could not be holy, they say, unless he originated his own character. So all these false theories assume that inherent corruption cannot have the nature of sin unless self-originated. If we are born corrupt, that corruption must have sprung from our own act, either in a former state of existence, or in the person of Adam. When God, by the almighty power of his Spirit, quickens the spiritually dead, the holiness thus originated is none the less holiness. It is not essential to its moral character that it should be our own work. The graces of the Spirit, although due to the divine energy, constitute the moral and religious character of the believer. In like manner the depraved nature which we inherit from Adam constitutes our moral character, although it did not originate in any act of our own. It is clearly revealed in Scripture that we are born in sin, that we are by nature the children of wrath. This divine declaration is authenticated by our own convictions and experience, and by the history of the world. To account for this fact, to reconcile it with the justice and goodness of God, may be as difficult as to account for the origin of evil. But it is to darken counsel by words without knowledge, and even without meaning, to assert that *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed. The Bible solution of the difficulty is infinitely better than this. Our depraved nature is the penal consequence of Adam's sin, not of ours; just as our holiness is the gracious gift for Christ's righteousness, and not something self-originated and self-deserved.

A third general principle on which Dr Baird's theory is founded is, the propagation of souls. On this point, he is just as dogmatic and confident as on all others. On page 19, the immediate creation of the soul, as opposed to the theory of propagation, is declared to be "the fundamental doctrine of the Pelagian system." On page 364, he complains of orthodox theologians as uniting "with Pelagians in explaining away the teachings of the Scriptures on the origin of the soul, in obe-

dience to the dicta of an intuitive philosophy." The doctrine that the soul is an immediate creation, he says, "introduces a gross and revolting dualism into man's nature. As originally made, Adam comprehended in one being the two distinct elements of soul and body. In the unity of these elements, there subsisted a common identity, a common consciousness, common moral relations, and a common moral character." On the same page it is said, "There is no distinct mention of the creation of the soul at all; but the whole style of the narrative (in Genesis) seems to imply that it was created within the body, in an original, perfect, inseparable identification with it," p. 365. This is as near materialism as any orthodox writer could well go. Here is a denial of "dualism" in man's nature; and the assertion of "a perfect and inseparable identification" of soul and body. Then the soul and body are one and the same thing, or at least inseparable, incapable of separate existence. This is the doctrine, on the one hand, of such materialists as Priestley, and, on the other, of the mystical school of modern Germany, as shewn in our last number. Dr Baird, however, is so characteristically incorrect and indiscriminating in his language, that it is by no means certain that he intended, even when he wrote what has just been quoted, to assert that the body and soul are identical, or even that they are inseparable.

On page 377, our author says, that "on the admission that the soul is created, the doctrine of original sin becomes altogether inexplicable." It is in fact irreconcilable with that doctrine." It is irreconcilable with Dr Baird's gross, materialistic theory of original sin, but not with the scriptural and church doctrine on the subject, as has been shewn a hundred times by the most eminent theologians of the Reformed churches. Our author quotes Van Mastricht, as saying that the first error of those who insist on the propagation of the soul, is "that they suppose corruption (in us) numerically the same with Adam's to be propagated; whereas it is only the same in species." To this Dr Baird replies, "If not numerically the same, it comes not to us from him. Its origin is not, then, in him. He was only the first sinner in the order of time. The alternative is that each soul successively apostatizes, or that they are created corrupt. Such are the inconsistencies to which the most orthodox writers are led, when they attempt to vindicate the creation theory in consistency with the testimony of scripture respecting the nature of man." He pronounces the theory of creation to be "Manichean-Pelagianism," that is, a mixture of Manicheism and Pelagianism. The opposite doctrine of propagation of souls, he says, is "inevitable," "unavoidable," &c., &c., from the plain teaching of the Scriptures.

On this subject we would remark, 1. That it is from its nature inscrutable. It lies beyond the sphere of observation or experiment. It lies no less beyond, or aside from the purpose and design of the teachings of the Bible. The Scriptures are designed to teach us facts, and not metaphysics, psychology, or ontology. They teach us that we derive a corrupt nature from Adam, but they are silent as to the mode of propagation. They teach us that we are regenerated by the power of the Spirit of God, but directly assert that the mode of that new birth no man can know. All positive dogmatism on this subject, therefore, is unseemly and injurious. 2. It is a point on which the church has always differed, and as to which the most profound have been the least confident. In the early church Jerome was decidedly for creation, Tertullian for propagation; Augustine for creation, but with admissions of difficulties on both sides which he could not solve. The Augustinians of the middle ages were for creation; the Lutherans in the general for propagation, the Reformed or Calvinists almost in a body for creation. Such being the historical facts in the case, we think it would require a very ordinary degree of modesty to prevent any man from pronouncing the doctrine of propagation, renounced as it ever has been by the great body of the Reformed churches, a matter perfectly plain, clearly taught in Scripture, inevitable and unavoidable. Still less should we expect any one to denounce the opposite doctrine as Manichean-Pelagian, as irreconcilable with original sin, &c., &c. All this is rather unseemly, somewhat hard to bear with becoming equanimity. 3. The origin of the soul has no necessary connection with Pelagianism one way or the other. A man may hold the theory either of creation or of propagation and be a Pelagian, and he may hold either and be a thorough and consistent opponent of Pelagianism. If he holds that responsibility is limited by ability; that we are responsible only for our acts, and only for that class of acts which are under our own control, then he must deny original righteousness and original sin. Moral character can be predicated only of voluntary action, and consequently nothing concreated, innate, or hereditary, can be of the nature either of holiness or of sin. It is clear that a man may hold all these principles, and yet believe that the soul is the product of generation; and he may deny them and yet believe the soul to be immediately created. The two things have no logical connection whatever. And hence the most thorough Pelagians are the advocates of propagation of the soul, as Priestly and men of his school. On the other hand, the most thoroughly anti-Pelagian body in the whole history of the church, has been the most strenuous advocates

for the theory of immediate creation. It is, therefore, a manifestation of no small degree of courage, for any man to assert that theory to be the fundamental principle of Pelagianism, and totally irreconcilable with the doctrine of original sin. He might as well assert that it is the fundamental principle of conic sections. The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin, made by Reformed (or Calvinistic) theologians, is, that original sin is propagated *NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM*. It is not a material infection of the blood; it is not a substance either corporeal or spiritual, to be transmitted by physical laws, but it is a punitive infliction. It is the consequence of the withdrawal of the fellowship and favour of God from the descendants of Adam, as the judicial consequence of his apostasy. This is the Calvinistic doctrine, and is a thousand times better than the doctrine of "the identification of soul and body," which Dr Baird would have us believe is essential to orthodoxy.

A fourth characteristic principle of this book is one which is announced with great formality, and often repeated, and which is made of the last importance. That principle is thus stated. "Community in a propagated nature constitutes such a union or oneness, as immediately involves the possessor in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in the progenitor whence it springs," p. 317. This does not mean, and is not intended to mean simply, that a progenitor transmits his own nature to his posterity; that as genera and species are permanent and transmissible in the animal world, so moral character is transmissible in the human race. This is the Placæan and New School doctrine. More than that is intended by the principle above stated. Community in a propagated nature involves community not only in moral character, but in guilt. We are said, on account of this community of nature, not only to inherit a depraved nature from Adam, but to have sinned his sin, and to bear the criminality of his apostasy. His act of self-determination in turning from God was our act, and imposes the same responsibility on us as it did on him. "We share in the moral responsibility of his apostasy as though we had wrought it for ourselves." We are "morally chargeable with that sin." "No man is held to answer for the first sin as it is Adam's; and if it is not his own, as it is sin or crime, justice will not account it his, as it is a ground of condemnation." The principle is that what a nature does in the progenitor of a race, all who receive that nature co-operated in doing. Being an act of nature it is common to all who possess that nature, and involves all in the same criminality.

This is a principle which is of wide application. It cannot

be taken up and laid aside at pleasure. If true at all, it is true universally. If community of nature involves community in guilt and pollution for acts of nature, then it must be for all the acts of that nature. It is purely arbitrary and contradictory to confine it to one of those acts, to the exclusion of all others. If in virtue of community of nature, we are agents in Adam's first sin of nature, and morally chargeable with its criminality, then we are morally chargeable with all his moral acts. If the ground of imputation of his guilt is the covenant, then it is limited to his first sin: but if that ground be community of nature, it must extend to all his sins. Dr Baird (unconsciously perhaps) admits this. "Any exertion of Adam's will or powers," he says, the effect of which had been to strengthen holy principles within him, affecting as it would his nature, would have been imputed to those who in him were partakers of his native holiness. Any act of his will, or exertion of the powers of his being, the tendency of which had been to weaken those principles in his nature, would have been in like manner imputed. On the contrary, actions which bore no relation to such effects as these, were personal to the actor, and not imputed to others. To the former class belong acts of obedience to God, such as tilling the ground, observing the Sabbath, and worshipping God—acts which, by the force of habit, gave increasing strength to the holy nature in which he was created; or any want of watchfulness, in view of the dangers which were at hand, or failure to seek divine strength to uphold him in integrity. To the latter class of actions pertained such as partaking of food, and indulging in nightly slumbers—acts which had no special moral character, and exerted no plastic influence on his nature." P. 306. This is a fair carrying out the principle. Community of nature makes us morally responsible for all the moral acts of our progenitor. But what is to limit the application of the principle to our original progenitor? What is the specific difference between our natural relation to Adam and our natural relation to Noah? Human nature, as common to the extant race of men, was as truly and completely in the latter as in the former. We are as truly the descendants of the one as of the other. If community in a propagated nature makes us morally responsible for all the moral acts of a common parent, why are we not responsible for the moral acts of Noah? Again, what difference, as to community of nature, is there between our relation to Adam, and the relation of the Hebrews to Abraham? If we, on the ground of that community, are responsible for all Adam's moral acts, why are not the Hebrews responsible for all the acts of Abraham? Nay, why are we not responsible for the acts of our immediate progenitors, and of all our progenitors back to Adam? What is

to hinder our being morally chargeable with every act ever committed by all our ancestors? Can Dr Baird answer that question? He does indeed answer it, and just as might be expected, by denying his principle, and upsetting his theory. He says this objection confounds two classes of actions—"of these, one consists in such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These in no respect change the nature, nor indicate any change occurring therein; but constitute mere criteria by which the character and strength of its attributes may be known." "To this class, he adds, "belong the sins of our immediate ancestors;" which, therefore, are not imputable. "The other class," we are told, "consists of such agency as springing from within, constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed," p. 509. But, in the first place, this is not the principle. The principle is, that community of nature involves us in *all* the moral and legal responsibilities of our progenitor, and not in a single class of his responsibilities only. And, in the second place, it is not the author's own exposition and application of his principle. He distinctly states that we share the responsibility of all Adam's moral acts; everything which tended to strengthen or to weaken his nature is imputable, and nothing, according to our author, can be imputed, which is not morally chargeable. It is not therefore merely acts which change nature, but acts which strengthen or weaken it, that is, all moral acts, the guilt and pollution, or merit and holiness, of which are transmitted. If this principle is true at all, it must involve us in moral responsibility for all the moral acts of the nature which we have inherited. Besides all this, the author tells us that it is acts or agencies which change nature, in which the recipients of that nature are involved; and, therefore, that if all men had remained holy, save one individual, and he should apostatize, his descendants would be involved in his crime and depravity. Then, if a man's nature is changed by the power of the Holy Ghost, why is not that holy nature transmitted? The fact that it is not, is proof that this whole theory is a chimera. It is not by physical transmission of substance that sin or holiness is propagated.

A more serious consequence of this theory arises from its application to Christ. It is admitted by our author that Christ partook of a human nature derived from Adam. The Scriptures, he says, "lay much stress on the derivation of his human nature and person from the common fountain of the race,"* p. 582. He was the Son of man, the Son of David,

* Dr Baird speaks of the derivation of Christ's *human person* from Adam, as though he were two persons. This is of course an inadvertency.

the Seed of Abraham. His genealogy is carefully traced up to Adam. He was a partaker, therefore, of the nature which apostatized from God in the progenitor of the race. He was consubstantial with those whom he came to redeem. If, however, he was truly the Son of David according to his human nature; if he was, in the strict and proper sense of the words, the seed of Abraham; and if community of nature involves community in the guilt and pollution belonging to that nature, how are we to avoid the inevitable, although shocking, conclusion, that Christ was guilty and polluted? If we, because we are descendants of Adam, are partakers in his apostasy, why is not Christ, who also was a descendant of Adam, also a partaker in that crime? If it is morally chargeable on us, *on the ground of community of nature*, why is it not in like manner chargeable on him? Dr Baird's answer to this difficulty is again a denial of his theory. He refers to the mystery of the miraculous conception. But this does not avail him. It is indeed supposable (even on the theory of propagation) that the *pollution* of our nature was removed by "the power of the Highest," before its assumption into personal union with the Son of God. But *guilt* cannot be removed by power. If a man commits a crime he is guilty, and even Omnipotence cannot undo the deed. If it is true that we apostatized in Adam, Omnipotence cannot make it untrue. And if it is true that all who partake of Adam's nature shared in his apostasy, and are morally chargeable with its guilt, then it must be true of Christ. That his human nature sinned in Adam is a simple fact of the past, according to the theory of this book, and all the power in the universe cannot make it no fact. Contradictions and absurdities are not the objects of power. They have no relation to it, and do not fall within its sphere. It is, therefore, only by a denial of the principle which the author admits underlies his whole book, that he can escape a conclusion which no Christian can admit. The principle, therefore, must be false—the whole fabric which it sustains falls to the ground. It may indeed be said that all sin is personal, and that as the human nature of Christ is not a person, it cannot be chargeable with sin. But, in the first place, this is not Dr Baird's doctrine. He holds to the distinction between personal sins and sins of nature. He teaches that the nature sinned in Adam, and that the guilt and depravity resulting from that sin attaches to all the persons to whom that nature belongs. In the second place, although the human nature in Christ is impersonal, yet it was assumed into personal union with the divine nature, so that all that belongs essentially to that nature belongs to the one person Christ. He could say, *I thirst, I am exceeding sorrowful*. If,

therefore, the nature assumed by Christ had sinned in Adam, he assumed it with the moral criminality of that act. It was his sin morally as being the sin of his nature.

The answer given by the Protestant theologians to this difficulty, shews that they held a very different doctrine from that contained in this book. They say that although Christ was in Adam naturally, he was not in him federally. He was not embraced in the covenant made with Adam as the natural head of the human family; and, therefore, he had no part in the guilt of his sin. This, of course, supposes that the federal, and not the natural union, is the essential ground of the imputation; that the sense in which Adam's sin is ours, is a legal and not a moral sense; and that the sense in which we sinned in him is that in which we act in a representative and not a literal sense. And as to the pollution inherent in human nature, as has already been remarked, the Protestant theologians teach that it did not flow to Christ, because it is propagated "neither through the body nor through the soul, but through guilt." If there were not community of guilt, if Adam did not represent Christ in the covenant of works, then spiritual death, the punitive infliction for that offence, would not affect him. Thus Hornbeck, in his *Confutation of Socinianism*, after saying, that men are in Adam, first, as their natural head, and, secondly, as their federal head, adds—"Illâ ratione etiam ex Adamo naturæ suæ humanæ originem trahit Christus. Sed non posteriori ratione consitus in Adamo fuit, ut in capite morali et foederali, qui non pro Christo legem aut tenuit aut prævaricatus fuit;—quique proinde nec cum peccato originali (cujus in Adamo non fuit particeps, haud censitus in ejus federe) concipiendus erat." And Ursinus, in his *Explication of the Heidelberg Catechism*, says—"Transit peccatum originis neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam parentum, propter quam Deus animas, dum creat, simul privat originali rectitudine et donis, quæ parentibus hæc lege contulerat, ut et posteris ea conferrent vel perderent, si ipsi ea retinerent vel amitterent. Neque Deus hoc faciens fit injustus vel causa peccati. Nam hæc privatio respectu Dei eam infligentis ob culpam parentum, non peccatum, sed justissima poena est; esti respectu parentum sibi et soboli suæ eam attrahentium, peccatum sit." See *De Moor's Comm. Perpetuus*, Caput xv., § xxxii. How Dr Baird can quote these and other authors of the same class in support of his views, we cannot understand. They distinctly contradict every point in his peculiar theory, and affirm the contrary. They deny the propagation of the soul, and assert its immediate creation. They deny that the communication of original sin is through community of nature, and assert that it is through the federal relation.

They deny that the loss of original righteousness is due to our own sin, and assert that it is (*ob culpam parentum*) on account of the fault of our first parents. In short, they hold one system of doctrine, and he another.

The only other principle involved in the theology of this book, to which our limits permit us to advert, is the denial that anything can be imputed to a person which does not personally belong to him ; any act which is not his own act ; any sin that is not morally chargeable upon him as his own ; any righteousness which is not subjectively his. No one can be punished who is not personally a sinner, and no one can be justified who is not inherently righteous. It need not be remarked how thoroughly this overthrows the whole system of evangelical doctrine and of evangelical religion.

1. The general principle is laid down, that nothing can be imputed to a man which is not really his own ; his own, that is, on the ground of a legal relation, but his own morally, as constituting his personal character. "If there is any one principle which shines forth," says the author, "on the pages of the Scriptures, with a light as of the noon-day sun, it is that thus attested. It is, that at the bar of God every man shall be judged and rewarded in precise accordance with his deserts ; which certainly have respect to the attitude of the soul and its affections, as well as the actions of the life. When the Scriptures speak of the justice of God, the meaning is not obscure or doubtful. We are plainly and abundantly taught that the rule of all his judgments is his law, which is the only criterion of merit or crime ; that there are but two classes of cases recognised at his bar, namely, those who are conformed to the law, or righteous, or those who are not conformed, and are therefore criminal or sinners ; and that God's justice consists in the fact, that to these severally he will render a reward appropriate and precisely proportionate to their desert." P. 489. On another page, Dr Baird says : "He who supposes that God's dealings with his creatures are, in any case or manner, controlled by relations, or imagined relations, not in accordance with the intrinsic state of the case, as it is in every respect, not only denies that the judgments of God are in accordance with truth, but involves himself in the further conclusion that the Almighty is without a moral nature at all. For, to imagine that he can look upon one as guilty, in a matter in which he is not guilty, or liable to be punished as a sinner, when in fact he is not a sinner, is to assume that holiness is no more in harmony with God's nature than sin, truth no more pleasing to him than a lie." P. 330.

2. In the second place, he applies the general principle, that the only ground of God's judgment is subjective character and

personal merit or demerit, to the case specially of sin. Sin he defines to be that which includes criminality and pollution. He therefore insists that sin can be imputed only to one who is criminal and polluted, and on the ground of such criminality. Thus, as we have seen, he constantly teaches that Adam's sin cannot be imputed to us, unless we are morally chargeable with it. He devotes a whole section to prove that men cannot be regarded and treated as sinners on account of Adam's sin, unless it is theirs in such a sense as to constitute their moral character. "It is only because truly and immediately ours, that a God of infinite goodness and mercy charges it upon us," p. 422. We are partakers "of the moral enormity of his deed." "We were so in Adam, that we share the moral responsibility of his apostasy, as really as though we had wrought it for ourselves personally and severally; and that in consequence we are guilty, and condemned under the curse at the bar of infinite justice," p. 475. The word *guilt*, he says, means "criminal liability to punishment." It includes, we are told, two ideas: "The one is violation of law; and upon the character of the law which is violated, depends the moral enormity which the word implies. . . . The second element in the meaning of the word is, the liability to punishment which the transgression involves. Hence no one can be guilty except he has violated the law which condemns him." P. 462. By parity of reason, no one can be righteous who does not fulfil the law which justifies him.

3. In accordance with the above principle, our author teaches that none but sinners can be punished; and by sinners, he means those chargeable with moral criminality and pollution. On page 488, he says, the idea of criminality can never be separated from the word sin; "the primary conception always contained in the word is, crime—moral turpitude." The language of the Bible, he says, "knows not even how to threaten punishment, without uttering the charge of sin." "The only way in which," he adds, "we can conceive the attempt to be made to evade the force of this argument is by the assumption that, although there must be sin in order to the infliction of punishment, it does not necessarily follow that they coexist in the same party. If a creature is punished, it implies that some one has sinned; but it does not necessarily intimate the sufferer to be the sinner! To this subterfuge, two insuperable objections may be sufficient. The first is, that the entire argument of the apostle is predicated upon directly the opposite doctrine, to wit, that wherever there is punishment, it is conclusive proof of sin, (*i. e.*, 'of moral turpitude'). . . . The second is, that it sweeps utterly away the whole doctrine of the Scriptures respecting God's justice. The doctrine in-

volved in the justice of God, and proclaimed in his word, is, that every intelligent creature shall be dealt with in precise accordance with his works" [and yet the author expects to be saved!], "under the provisions of the law, and the covenant therein incorporated. That provides that the sinner," [he who is chargeable with crime and moral turpitude], "and the sinner only, shall be punished, and that in precise proportion to the enormity of his sins."

If then sin cannot be imputed where there are not crime and pollution in the person or persons to whom the imputation is made, then it follows that our sins were not imputed to Christ. And if sinners only are punished, if punishment implies crime and moral turpitude in the person punished, then Christ's sufferings were not of the nature of punishment: and the doctrine of atonement, as that doctrine has ever been held in the church, and as it is the foundation of the believer's hope, must be given up. It would be difficult to find in the writings of Socinians or Pelagians more sweeping, emphatic, and bitter denials of the principles on which the great doctrines of satisfaction and justification rest, than are to be found in this book. How does Dr Baird avoid these conclusions from his principles? He attempts it in two perfectly inconsistent and contradictory ways. First, by denying the principles themselves in their application to Christ, making him an exception; and secondly, by asserting that after all they do apply to him. This latter course is taken in a confused and faltering manner; it is, however, attempted. First, he denies the application of his principles to Christ: "It may be said that the Lord Jesus Christ was regarded and treated as a sinner. To this proposition we must emphatically except. He is regarded and treated no otherwise than as being precisely what he was, God's spotless Son, the spotless substitute, the vicarious sacrifice for sinners. But, that he was regarded and treated as a sinner, NEVER!" P. 449. The only exception to the principle that rational creatures shall be treated according "to their deserts," he says, "is the Lord Jesus Christ, in his atoning work. And unless we are disposed to deny the uniqueness of the person and work of Christ, and the wonderful wisdom, as well as grace, displayed in the plan of redemption, we must admit that this very exception confirms and establishes the rule. In God's own Son, and in him alone, shall innocence ever be visited with the inflictions appropriate to crime; and in his people, and in them alone, shall sin ever fail of the curse of God." P. 490. On the same page, "The doctrine which we oppose, involves the confounding of all moral distinctions—the infliction on the sinless, of the punishment of crime—the endurance by innocence, of the curse of

the just and holy One. If this be so, then we are forced to conclude that there is no essential difference between holiness and sin; or else, that whatever the distinction, the Lawgiver and Judge of all is indifferent to it." This is certainly most extraordinary writing. The punishment of the innocent, on the ground of the sin of others, is declared to be a violation of justice, inconsistent with the very nature of God, involving the assumption that he is indifferent to the distinction between holiness and sin; and yet it is admitted that Christ, although perfectly innocent, was punished! That is, God did, in the case of Christ, what his very nature forbids to be done, and what it is atheistical to say a holy God can do! On page 492, our author says, "Had Christ's sufferings been involuntary, they would have been a violation of justice, instead of being a signal display of it." But how does this help the matter? If a thing is essentially wicked, our consenting to its being done cannot make it right. "If the infliction on the sinless, the punishment of crime," is a moral enormity, it is an awful thing to say that God has done it. How can what is impossible be done? If sinfulness in the victim is the necessary condition of punishment, then consent is no vindication of the justice of its infliction. A man may consent to suffer, but consent does not make him a sinner, and therefore, according to this doctrine, cannot render punishment just, or even possible.

The principle on which this whole book rests, renders a satisfaction to justice by vicarious punishment an absolute impossibility, because it makes sinfulness in the victim an essential condition of its infliction. All this difficulty and confusion arises out of the unwillingness or inability of the author to see that punishment has nothing to do either with the degree or nature of the suffering, or with the character of the sufferer. Everything depends on the design of the infliction. Suffering endured in satisfaction of justice is punishment, whatever be its nature or degree, and whatever be the character of the victim. If Christ suffered to satisfy divine justice for the sins of his people, his sufferings were penal.

Dr Baird, when speaking of our relation to Adam, says it is a subterfuge to say that the sin may be in one party and the punishment on another,—that Paul insists that wherever there is punishment it is conclusive proof there is sin in the sufferer. Although, as we have seen, in some places he makes Christ an exception to this principle, in others he seems disposed to carry the principle through. Community in a propagated nature involves all who partake of that nature in the moral character and responsibilities of the progenitor whence the nature originated, is a principle which he expressly says applies to

Christ. P. 317. "Unless Christ occupied such a relation to the sins of his people that they may, in some proper sense, be called his sins, they cannot be imputed to him, nor punished in him," p. 607. He had just before said that Christ's "position must be such that justice, in searching for the transgressors, shall find him in such a relation to them, to render him the party responsible to justice for their sins." All this, and much more to the same effect, may be interpreted in a perfectly good sense; but when it is interpreted in the light of the principle that community of nature involves community of character, that sin cannot be punished except in the person of the sinner; when it is remembered that our participation in Adam's sin, which is said to involve us in the charge of its moral criminality, is placed on the same ground, and declared to be analogous to the participation of Christ in our sins; then it must be admitted that the language above cited comes dreadfully near to charging the adorable Redeemer with crime and pollution. That this is in words denied is very true. But to say that sin cannot be imputed to the sinless, that it cannot exist in one person and be punished in another, is to say, either that it was not imputed to Christ and punished in him; or, that Christ was personally a sinner. A man cannot assert a thing in his premises, and deny it in his conclusion.

4. The fourth application of the principle that God's judgments are founded on subjective character, is to the doctrine of justification. Here again we are referred to our relation to Adam for illustration. The method of our justification, Dr Baird says, "resembles the method of our condemnation in Adam." "The sentence of the law, whether condemnatory or justifying, must have some real ground; since the judgment of God is according to truth. The condemnation of sinners is for sin. The justification is of righteous ones, for righteousness." P. 425. But as the sin for which we are condemned is, and according to Dr Baird must be, our sin, so the righteousness for which we are justified is subjectively our own. As we are chargeable with the moral criminality of Adam's apostasy, so we are morally meritorious for Christ's righteousness. The one is ours in the same sense that the other is. And as the one is ours in such a sense as to constitute our moral character, and to expose us to the curse of God on the ground of that character; so the other is ours so as to constitute our character, and entitle us on the ground of our subjective state to justification before God. And as Adam's sin is a proper ground of remorse, so Christ's righteousness is a proper ground for self-complacency. P. 448. We are justified not by Christ's righteousness extrinsic to us and only nominally ours, but "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us

free from the law of sin and death." Bellarmine teaches the doctrine of subjective justification more consistently than Dr Baird does, but we do not think that he teaches it more explicitly, or that it flows more necessarily from the principles of the former than it does from those of the latter.

The principle that God's judgments must be according to truth, that if he pronounces a man guilty, he must be guilty; and if he pronounces a man just he must be just, is indeed self-evidently true. It is, however, no less true, that the same man may be at the same time both guilty and not guilty, righteous and unrighteous. In other words, the terms guilty and righteous have each two distinct, recognised, and perfectly familiar meanings. They are used in a moral, and also in a forensic sense. A man, therefore, may be guilty in one sense, and righteous in another. God pronounces the ungodly righteous. This is the very language of the Holy Ghost. Should any one convicted of theft, or of any other crime, bear the full penalty of his offence, his moral character and ill-desert remain the same, but in the eye of the law he is righteous. It would be unjust to inflict upon him any further punishment. Justice, so far as his offence is concerned, is satisfied. In justification God pronounces us righteous, legally, not morally. His declaration is according to truth, because in the sense intended, we are righteous. The demands of justice have been satisfied in our behalf. When Christ is said to be guilty, or to bear our guilt, the word is of course used not in its moral, but in its legal sense. He assumed the responsibility to satisfy justice for the sins of his people. And thus when we are said to bear the guilt of Adam's first sin, it does not mean that his sin is crime and pollution in us, but that, in virtue of our relation to him, we are justly exposed to the penalty of his sin. That such is the plain doctrine of the Scripture is the faith of the church in all ages. It is the doctrine of all the Augustinians in the Latin church; it is the faith of the Lutherans and of the Reformed, and it is the foundation, more or less distinctly apprehended, of the hope of salvation in every true believer. In opposition to this system, Dr Baird would have us believe, that God's judgments are founded exclusively on the moral character or subjective state of his creatures; that if he pronounces any creature guilty, that creature must be morally criminal and polluted; if he pronounces him righteous, he must be subjectively holy; that only sinners, in the moral sense of the word, can be punished, and only the righteous, in the moral sense of that term, can be justified. With whatever orthodoxy in phraseology, with whatever earnestness of protestations against heresy, these principles may be set forth, they are none the less subversive

of the whole system of evangelical religion. If none but sinners can be punished, then Christ did not bear the penalty of the law; and if none but the subjectively righteous can be justified, then no human being can be saved.

It is one of the infelicities of a Review, that it is commonly written *currente calamo*, and sent piecemeal to the press before the ink is thoroughly dried. It is, therefore, apt to bear the impress of the feelings which the book reviewed makes at the time on the writer's mind. If it could be laid aside, and allowed to cool, much might be softened or modified. It is very possible that when we come to see this review in print, we may wish that some things had been otherwise expressed. We would very gladly have written in a style of laudation all the way through. Our first short notice of this volume is evidence that we were even too ready to commend. If we have said anything in this more protracted review which offends in the other extreme, we shall be sincerely sorry. But an author who does not hesitate to pronounce principles held by nineteen-twentieths, and we believe by ninety-nine hundredths of his brethren, to be Manichean, Pelagian, and atheistical; who represents the advocates of those principles as Pharisees who make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, can have no right to complain that those who hold these principles should speak their minds with all frankness. We at least feel bound to enter a solemn protest against doctrines which, we firmly believe, subvert our whole system of faith, and are inconsistent with the preservation of evangelical religion.

ART. IV.—*Edwards on the Atonement.*

The Atonement.—Discourses and Treatises by Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, Griffin, Burge, and Weeks. With an Introductory Essay, by Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor of Christian Theology, Andover, Mass. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1859. Pp. lxxx. 596.

THE Introduction here named has a separate title, to wit—The Rise of the Edwardean Theory of the Atonement; an Introductory Essay. This is a true description of what the author undertakes in this Introduction, whatever views may be taken of the success of his endeavours. In the course of his remarks, he embraces in his series of “successors of Edwards,” besides those whose works appear in the book before us, the names of Bellamy, Hopkins, and West. These three,

whose works on the atonement are not published in the series before us, Dr Park represents as having a position second to none of the successors of Edwards. The reason why these are omitted, and others of less importance are inserted, does not appear at the first glance. This, however, is to be said, that of Bellamy he testifies, that: "Like the elder Edwards, he sanctioned in the main both the views and the phraseology of the old Calvinists. He repeatedly declares, that God must and does always, throughout all his dominions, not only in word threaten, but in fact punish sin, with infinite severity, without the least mitigation or abatement, in any one instance whatever." As to Hopkins, he says: "We do not deny that, like his teacher, Edwards, and his companion, Bellamy, he makes an impression favourable in many respects to the more ancient form of Calvinism." But as he makes Dr West more fruitful in sources of argument for the new theory than either of the others, it is not to be supposed that the others, or that West himself, would have been excluded, because the impression which their whole treatises would have made would have been too favourable to the old Calvinism. But, certainly, the republication of West's treatise would have been a public benefit, could we have had it in the place of some which have recently been published.

The Introduction is the main attraction of the book.

It is of great importance, as a means of defining the position of the author, and of the large and influential body of ministers and people, in sympathy with him. There are two reasons, in our view, why it has been so little noticed. One is, that it consists very much of subtle and abstruse disquisitions and quotations, not to be understood without labour; and the other is, that it is not to be bought without purchasing a volume of nearly seven hundred large octavo pages, consisting of treatises on the atonement by other authors, most of whom are already well known to the public; to which volume Professor Park's work is put as the vestibule. But, for present purposes, the vestibule is more important than the house; especially for the light it throws on what has seemed ominous and mysterious in existing accounts of theological speculation. It goes far to enucleate the paradox of Edwardeanism against Edwards, that lately developed system which is claimed to be most in accordance with Edwards, and yet is made vastly more consistent and improved by positions in conflict with him. During the development of this scheme, Calvinists have looked on with suspicion. It has been a painful mystery to them, that those opposing the distinctive features of the system of Edwards and Calvin, should assume the name of Edwardeans, and virtually deny it to those who, in all points, adhered

to that system. The mystery has been still more painful, from our remembrance of a similar phenomenon attending the early development of Unitarianism among us. Then it was contended that the Liberals were the only true successors of the Puritans. Now, the work before us, though it may not allay the anxiety in the case, will give us the needed information. It comes from one who ought to be able to tell us all about it; and one who, upon the main point, has not been wanting in frankness.

The author's frankness in the concession, that the elder Edwards is against him, is worthy of all praise. What other writers have attempted to prove, he more than confesses. He not only admits this in general, but he specifically states the points of conflict between Edwards and the Edwardeans. He then goes on to shew how elements of opposition to Edwards were eliminated from him; how the progeny has devoured its parent; how the inference has annihilated its premises.

Our author uses the term Edwardean in the sense, not of those who believe with Edwards, but with "the successors of Edwards." This is a favourite phrase with him, as if the inheritance of his name had somehow gone out of his family, and out of possession of those who adhere to his system. He traces the line of Edwardean succession down through such honoured names as Bellamy, Hopkins, Dwight, Smalley, Emmons, Maxcy, and Griffin, and makes it terminate in himself and those like him, who hold views on material points, as he himself shews, opposite to those of the elder Edwards.

But we must no longer delay to let our author speak for himself. The joint product, which he gets from the writings of Edwards, developed by the long line of successors, and which he adopts as his own theory of the atonement, he lays down in the following distinct propositions:—

"Our Lord suffered pains, which were substituted for the penalty of the law, and may be called punishment in the more general sense of that word, but were not strictly and literally the penalty which the law had threatened."

"Secondly, the sufferings of our Lord satisfied the general justice of God, but did not satisfy his distributive justice."

"Thirdly, the humiliation, pains, and death of our Redeemer were equivalent, in meaning, to the punishment threatened in the moral law, and thus satisfied him, who is determined to maintain the honour of this law; but they did not satisfy the demands of the law itself for our punishment."

"Fourthly, the active obedience, viewed as the holiness of Christ, was honourable to the law; but was not a work of supererogation performed by our substitute, and then transferred and imputed to us, so as to satisfy the requisitions of the law, for our own active obedience."

"Fifthly, the law and the distributive justice of God, although honoured by the life and death of Christ, will yet eternally demand the punishment of every one who has sinned."

The four following propositions in the series, are deductions framed against a limited atonement. But regarding as we do, and as Dr Griffin has most clearly proved, the controversy about a limited or a general atonement, as a dispute very much about words and definitions, we attach little importance to those points. The five points above specified contain the gist of those departures from Edwards, which are most worthy of our attention. These are, what our author calls Edwardean principles involved in the doctrine of the atonement. That Edwards himself taught them, he does not pretend. He says of Edwards, that "he adopted, in general, both the views and the phrases of the older Calvinists with regard to the atonement. But, like those Calvinists, he made various remarks, which have suggested the more modern theory." Here we are given to understand, that Edwards gave no more countenance to the modern theory, than did his predecessors in Calvinism, such as Owen and the Puritan writers generally. But some casual expressions, some *obiter dicta* of his, have been seized upon, and, whether legitimately or not, we shall hereafter see, have been pressed into the service of the new theory.

Now, upon these five propositions, our first object will be to shew, both that our author has proved, and that he might still further have proved, that they are contrary to the views of Edwards. Take, first, the fourth proposition, which, stripped of its argument, and reduced to a mere statement, is, that *Christ's active obedience was not wrought out for us, and imputed to us, to supply the want of our obedience, and to be a ground of our justification before God.* On page 19, he quotes Edwards, as asserting what he here denies.

"By that righteousness being imputed to us, is meant, no other than this, that the righteousness of Christ is accepted for us, and admitted, instead of that perfect inherent righteousness, which ought to be in ourselves. Christ's perfect obedience shall be reckoned to our account, so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves."

"There is the very same need of Christ's obeying the laws in our stead, in order to the reward, as of his suffering the penalty of the law in our stead, in order to our escaping the penalty."

Our author gives a generous page of quotations to the same point. So it is no matter of dispute between him and us, that Edwards taught exactly the contrary of what he and his Edwardeanism teach, touching this cardinal point of the doctrine of justification by faith. To quote all which Edwards

said, in intensely arguing out what our author denies, would be to quote twenty-two pages of his work on justification by faith, to say nothing of what appears in his other works. As to the fourth proposition, then, there can be no question, that the *true* Edwardeans are in direct opposition with the *new* Edwardeans.

We will next demonstrate the same touching the first proposition, which is in substance, that *Christ did not strictly and literally suffer the penalty of the law*. The phrase, "*strictly and literally*," here binds like an India-rubber clasp, more or less according to convenience and occasion. And how much it binds will be seen in the sequel. The point here reasoned against is not a literal, but substantial and real suffering of the penalty of the law. As to the play of thought under the terms literal and figurative, we shall speak more under an appropriate head. We are here to shew, that Edwards did teach that Christ really and substantially, though not in literal form, endured the penalty of the law for sinners. We shall shew it first, and mainly, through our author's shewing. He first tells us that Edwards, on this subject, "adopted in general both the views and phrases of the old Calvinists;" and he fully concedes that these made Christ's atonement to be an endurance of the penalty of the law. In the quotations from Edwards already referred to, are found such sentences as these:—

"There is the same need of Christ's obeying the law in our stead, in order to the reward, as of his *suffering the penalty of the law in our stead*, in order to our escaping the penalty." "That Christ suffered the full punishment of the sin that was imputed to him, or offered that to God that was fully and completely equivalent to what we owed to Divine justice for our sins, is evident from Psalms lxix. 5." "If he unites himself to guilty creatures, he of necessity brings their guilt on himself." "The general meaning of the phrase, to bear sin, is lying under the guilt of sin, having it imputed and charged upon the person, as obnoxious to the punishment of it, or obliged to answer and make satisfaction for it." "Thus Christ bore our sins; God laid on him the iniquity of us all; and he bore the burden of them. And so his bearing the burden of our sins may be considered as something diverse from his suffering God's wrath. For his suffering wrath consisted more in the sense he had of the other thing, viz., the dreadfulfulness of the punishment of sin, or the dreadfulfulness of God's wrath inflicted for it." "Thus Christ suffered, that which the damned in hell do not suffer; for they do not see the hateful nature of sin."

These are a part of the quotations which our author makes from Edwards, shewing that Edwards believed that Christ

really suffered the penalty of the law. We might make many more equally in point; but since there is no dispute here, we will save the space. It is then clearly seen and fully conceded, that on this radical point also, the new Edwardeans are directly opposed to Edwards.

The next point to come under notice is, that Christ's sufferings satisfied the general justice, but did not satisfy the distributive justice of God. By general justice, our author means the benevolence of God. In this he follows the younger Edwards and many other standard writers. The younger Edwards says: "General justice comprehends all moral goodness." Indeed the prevalent notion of general justice, is rectitude, or goodness of conduct touching all things. So, when it is said, that in the death of Christ, God satisfied general justice, it means that God did right, or his act was good, or accordant with truth and justice—an assertion which requires no very high orthodoxy to receive.

But what is meant by saying that Christ's sufferings did not satisfy distributive justice? Distributive justice has a well-defined meaning, having been in use from the days of Aristotle. Does not the whole include all the parts, and does not general or universal justice include distributive justice? And can all of God's justice be satisfied, and leave this part unsatisfied? The younger Edwards, who should be good authority with our author, says: "General or public justice comprehends all moral goodness." "Whatever is right is said to be just, and an act of justice." So Aristotle divided justice into universal and particular. Concerning the former he says; "In justice every virtue is summarily comprehended." (*Ethic. ad Nicom.* lib. v. cap. 12.) And he affirms, that justice nowise differs from virtue in general, unless in respect to its relation to another being. But he says, particular justice is a part thereof, under the same name—which he again distinguishes into *distributive* and *commutative*. In this definition Aristotle has been followed by the schoolmen and by all later divines. Here it is both implied and asserted that distributive justice is a part included in general justice. Hence it is a plain contradiction to say, that general justice is satisfied when distributive justice is not.

The truth is, there are not two kinds of justice in God. These distinctions obtain in our narrow conceptions, and are set up as convenient waymarks in our reasoning. God's justice is one and simple. If in any branch his justice fails of execution, the simple truth is, he is unjust; there is no evasion of the fact by hair-splitting. Thus, punishment has been defined as "an expression of God's distributive justice, which exercise is an expression of all God's attributes." That is, all

that is right in God comes into exercise in his distributive justice. And if so, when his distributive justice goes unsatisfied, there is a chasm in his universal right doing.

The question whether God's justice was satisfied in the death of Christ for sinners, is simply the question whether that justice that sustains and administers law and deals out retributions, had its demands met in the death of Christ. As to this question, our author quotes Edwards as saying :—

“Christ has satisfied justice fully for his sins, so that it is a thing that may be challenged, that God should now release the believer from punishment. It is but a piece of justice, that the creditor should release the debtor when he has fully paid the debt.”

Here, it will be seen, Edwards uses the terms justice in no narrow sense. For the justice which Christ satisfied fully in view of man's sin, was not the punishing of the individual sinner. Then in the next quotation which he makes from Edwards, the term vindictive suggests the idea of vindication or enforcing of public justice, as follows :—

“Yet in these sufferings was the mark of the vindictive expressions of that very justice of God. Revenging justice spent *all its force* upon him, on account of our guilt . . . And this is the way and means by which Christ stood up for the honour of God's justice, viz., by suffering its terrible executions. For when he had undertaken for sinners, and had substituted himself in their room, Divine justice could have its due honour in no other way, than by his suffering its revenges.”

By quotations so much in point, does our author shew, that Edwards was *toto cœlo* against him on this radical point. We might add indefinitely to the appropriate quotations which he has made. So in his sermon on the Excellency of Christ, Edwards says: “In Christ has been seen already an actual, complete accomplishment of those threatenings.” “He will do nothing contrary to the threatenings of the law and their complete fulfilment.” “He suffered as though guilty from God himself, by reason of our guilt imputed to him; for he was made sin for us, who knew no sin; and he was made subject to wrath, as if he had been sinful himself. He was made a curse for us.”

But we will not weary the reader with further proofs of what is not in dispute.

Our author's third point is, that Christ's sufferings did not answer *the demands of THE law* itself for our punishment. This differs little, except in form, from the preceding, which is, that they did not answer the demands of justice. And many of the quotations already made are good to shew, that Edwards held that they did answer the demands of the

law as well as of justice. And that quotation (page 16) which begins with, "The truth of the Lawgiver makes it necessary that the threatening of the law should be fulfilled in every punctilio; the threatening of the law is absolute—thou shalt surely die," &c, is in point. Again, God "would not abate him [that is, Christ] the least mite of that debt, which justice demanded." "God hereby shewed, that not only heaven and earth should pass away, but which is more, that the blood of him who is the eternal Jehovah, should be spilt, rather than one jot or tittle of his word should fail, till all be fulfilled." So much for the proof exhibited by our author, that Edwards was against his position as to the atonement meeting the demands of the law.

We have but one more point to bring under consideration: that is, that "both the law and distributive justice of God," notwithstanding the atonement of Christ, "will yet eternally demand the punishment of every one who has sinned." This is a fearful conclusion, and it becomes us to look to it. That it was no doctrine of Edwards, may be seen in quotations already made. So in this: "The justice of God that required man's damnation, and seemed inconsistent with his salvation, now does as much require the salvation of those that believe in Christ, as ever before it required their damnation. Salvation is an absolute debt to the believer from God, so that he may in justice demand and challenge it; not upon the account of what he himself has done, but on account of what his Surety has done." But as we have already quoted much more than is in point we will proceed no further in this line.

Now in our main positions so far we have the happiness perfectly to agree with our author. His quotations are more full than our space will allow ours to be, all shewing that on the five points specified, to wit, the main pillars of the doctrine of the atonement, himself and Edwards are in direct contradiction. That is, what he calls the *Edwardean System* is the opposite of the system which Jonathan Edwards held. Now, however skilfully he may describe an alleged process of sliding from the standpoint of Edwards to his own, and however imperceptible he may shew the steps to have been which have carried him so far from the platform of Edwards, no skill in deduction and no intermediate facts in the case can justify the application of the name of Edwards to principles which Edwards opposed. One thing which we complain of, and which cannot be reconciled either to general or distributive justice, is, that the favour which attaches to the name of Edwards and his doctrines, in this community, is, by an unwarranted use of his name, made to support the contrary doctrines and rule out the principles which he held; and no skill

in dialectics can transmute this wrong into a right. By common consent for generations past, the name of Edwards has stood as an index of the Calvinistic sentiment of New England, and the sentiment usually indicated by that name was *what Edwards really held*, and not till very recently did any one dream of being excommunicated from the Edwardean family for holding the very doctrines which Edwards taught. And now the great body of our people, who are not in the secret of these new methods, are misled by this use of names. When they hear certain parties called Edwardean, they take it in good faith, and not as meaning just the opposite of what is expressed; and under this name sentiments are propagated around them, and under their unconscious concurrence and aid, from which they would revolt.

It is a universally acknowledged principle in reasoning, that we are not to attribute to an opponent, as his belief, even the warrantable inferences which we draw from his principles. We are not to call them his principles till he has acknowledged them as such. Now apply this maxim of just controversy to the case in hand. It is set forth that a long line of Edwards's successors have, with a long pull, and a strong pull, and a pull altogether, drawn out of Edward's principles, inferences diametrically opposite to the main features of his system. Now admit that these inferences are all just, which is so far from fact, yet it is a violation of all right rules to attribute them to him and give them his name, for they are such as he has repudiated. Every application of the term Edwardean to this theory is an abuse of Edwards's good name, as well as a perversion of the truth of history.

It would take us quite too much aside from our purpose were we to follow the author in all his comments on the Edwardean successors. Suffice it here to say that if such a line of expounders have in their writings, taken together, furnished the data from which conclusions can be fairly drawn so opposite to Edwards' system, it is self-evident, that so far as these utterances gave ground for opposing his system, so far they were his opponents, and not his successors. We have no occasion here to say, that in none of the writers whom the author calls Edwards's successors, there may be found here and there expressions dropped or theories maintained, which may serve the purpose of his conclusions. Nor do we care to deny that for each and every conclusion opposing Edwards, which he has wrought into his own scheme, he may find ground in some one of his line of Edwards's successors. We go still farther; we admit that in some of these (a little for a starting-point in the younger Edwards, more in Emmons and others) may be found plain departures from the Calvinistic view as held by Edwards,

And this is easily accounted for without supposing that either one of the number intended a serious difference from Edwards. After the days of Edwards, and while most of these writers were on the stage, the controversy between a limited and general atonement was rife and hot. For a part of the time it was carried forward with intense feeling, the traces of which are manifest in some of the productions of the writers under notice. On each side the writers took partial and one-sided views, and hence were betrayed into statements which were not justified by the round-about common sense which looks at all sides. From this source, as we conceive, came the individual errors of which the author has taken advantage to construct the errors of his theory. And yet he cannot shield himself under the name of all or any one of these writers. For, though by sweeping a drag-net through the whole mass of their writings, gathering the bad into vessels and casting the good away, he may have found material enough to construct his system, yet there is no one of them who, considered in his whole system of theology, was not substantially and nearly as much against our author as was Edwards himself. This shews, in a strong light, the fallacy and the wrong of the idea of being Edwardean, because one stands not with Edwards, but with Edwards's successors, when he really stands with neither him nor any one of them.

It would be interesting to trace minutely the history of these *obiter dicta*, and inconsiderate utterances, referring each error to its true author. But for this work we have neither space nor time. It should be done completely if attempted at all, and it should in each case expose the sophisms by which the criticism has been misled. Yet it is not to be assumed in advance that all the author's conclusions are based on what is found in these works; for he begins his work by attempting to shew Edwards at variance with himself. If his deductions from the successors are framed like those from Edwards himself, they must sometimes lead us astray. For instance, on page 12, he misconceives and misapplies what Edwards says about the sovereignty of God in reference to the atonement. But here first let it be observed that Unitarianism sets the atonement wholly aside, by holding that God may safely forgive the sinner on repentance and as a merely sovereign act; and all those theories that depress the doctrine from its high Scriptural ground, in proportion as they approximate more or less to Unitarianism, make more or less use of the sovereignty of God put in the place of law and justice. They represent God as doing this or that in virtue of his sovereignty, which, in fact, he does in adherence to law. Hence it is very important for our author to get the countenance of Edwards in this

misuse of God's sovereignty. He says, page xii. : "He (Edwards) exalts the sovereignty of God in connection with the atonement. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the new divinity is, that it gives prominence to God as a Sovereign in applying and conducting as well as originating the redemptive work."

He then goes on to specify some ways in which Edwards exalts the sovereignty of God in connection with the atonement, and one is, "that the degree of glory which we are to enjoy in heaven is determined not by the *atonement* of Christ, but by the *sovereignty* of God." Very good. But how is this an instance of sovereignty applied to the doctrine of the atonement? Edwards's paragraph brought to prove it, argues that each one's measure of happiness in heaven is to be full, and that so much results from the atonement and righteousness of Christ, but that the different measures of the capacity of different souls are determined by an act of *sovereignty in the Creator*; so that, in truth, this is only an instance of God's sovereignty exercised in creation, and not in applying the atonement.

And equally aside from Edwards's true intent is our author when he says:

"President Edwards occasionally represents the act of imputing Christ's righteousness to us as an act of sovereignty. He distinguishes sharply between strict *law and justice* on the one hand, and sovereign pleasure on the other. But he says that 'God, of his sovereign grace, is pleased, in his dealings with the sinner so to regard one that has no righteousness that the consequence shall be the same as if he had.'"

Now, if this were a true representation of Edwards' views, it would make him teach bald Unitarianism—that is, that the sinner is forgiven and treated as righteous by mere sovereignty, and without an atonement. And the reader will be slow to believe, that even by an inadvertence he so taught. And he is made to appear to teach it only by separating his words from their connection. The passage (vol. 7, page 11, Worcester ed.) reads as follows:—

"It is evident that the subject of justification is looked upon as destitute of any righteousness in himself, by that expression, *it is counted or imputed to him for righteousness*. The phrase, as the Apostle uses it here, and in the context, manifestly imports that God, of his sovereign grace, is pleased, in his dealings with the sinner, to take and regard that which indeed is not righteousness, and in one that has no righteousness, so that the consequence shall be the same as if he had righteousness, which may be from the respect which it bears to something that is indeed righteous."

Here, it will be seen, by comparing the quotation given by

us with that given by our author, that the passage from Edwards is so cited that its sense is sadly perverted. It is hardly fair in quotation to give a mere condensation of an author's words in quotation marks, as his own; and much less, when that condensation makes him speak a very different thing from what he did speak. Our author makes him say, that God is sovereign *in the act of imputing Christ's righteousness*. What his words imply is, that God, of his sovereign grace, establishes that constitution of things which imputes righteousness in one that has none of his own, out of respect to something that is indeed righteous. And this method of wresting the sense of Edwards is a part of the process by which we have our purified and consistent Edwardeanism.

The fact is, that Edwards carried the idea of law and justice, to the exclusion of sovereignty, into the atonement, even farther than many sound men of the present day now do. Take an example (from vol. 7, page 61):—

“It is absolutely necessary that in order to a sinner's being justified, that the righteousness of some other should be reckoned to his account; for it is declared, that the person justified is looked upon as (in himself) ungodly; but God neither will nor can justify a person without righteousness, for justification is manifestly a forensic term as the word is used in Scripture. And the thing is a judicial thing, or an act of a judge; so that if a person should be justified without righteousness, the judgment would not be according to truth. The sentence would be a false sentence, unless there be a righteousness performed, that is properly looked upon as his.”

In the next place our author tells us that Edwards condemned the distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ, and makes a quotation to shew it; and leaves it to be inferred, that in so doing he favoured our author's theory which excludes the positive righteousness of Christ from being a ground of our justification; whereas, these remarks against the distinction between active and passive obedience, come in in answer to an objection, which occurred in the way of Edwards's argument *against* the main pillar of our author's theory—his argument to shew that the obedience of Christ rendered in our stead is an indispensable ground of our justification. Yet, though Edwards does not make the distinction between the active and passive obedience that some have made, he makes the distinction which others indicate by those terms: that is, the distinction between the suffering of the penalty, and thereby making an atonement, on the one hand, and obeying the law, and thereby laying the ground for our being counted righteous, on the other. The proof of this distinction is a cardinal part of his work on justification. (See page 57.)

Under the fifth head, our author says, that "the President maintained that we are delivered from hell on the ground of our Lord's sufferings as a *penalty*, and not on the ground of them as meritorious," leaving the reader to infer that, so far, he favoured the new theory, that only the *sufferings* without the positive righteousness are needful to our justification. True, Edwards did maintain that Christ's sufferings delivered us from hell, and yet that without his obedience or positive righteousness considered as *meritorious*, none can be lifted to heaven; as our author himself admits in the next proposition, where he undoes upon one page the work done on the preceding.

We come now to the main source of bewilderment touching this whole subject; that is, the interpretation of phrases that qualify the figurative language of the Scripture. Our author tells us (page xxi.):—

"President Edwards introduces various *explanations*, which have suggested to his successors the propriety of a nomenclature needing fewer explanations. He introduces brief modifying phrases, which happily illustrate the tendency of his thoughts, and relieve his bolder statements from the objections originally suggested by them. Thus he says 'that Christ suffered the wrath of God for men's sins, *in such a way as he was capable of*.' Although he affirms that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, he speaks with peculiar frequency of our Lord's agonies as '*equivalent*,' '*equal in value and weight*,' to the punishment threatened us. He often employs the phrase '*as it were*,' and similar qualifying words, to denote that his original terms are not to be taken in their strict and precise meaning."

Now, if the reader will note the method of interpretation which the New Edwardeanism here adopts, he will be able to trace the error to its grand source. Much of what is said in the Scripture about the atonement is in figurative language, and is conceded to be so on all sides. Now, it is said, that this is only a figure, and we may make it mean as little as we choose. If it is said, Christ suffered the wrath of God only in such a way as he is "capable of," this means nothing, if it is clear to us that he is not capable of suffering it at all. It is by such a play upon figurative language, more than any other means, that there has sprung up a system of Edwardeanism, in opposition to Edwards and Calvinism.

But the truth is, that the figurative language on this subject has a meaning, as determinate and clear to common sense, as literal language has on any subject. The language of Scripture applied to invisible things must be tropical, having first been formed upon objects of sense, to match ideas gained by sensation and reflection. But the senses give no ideas of the unseen world; and our language in its original structure provides no names for them; and God's revelation constructs for

us no new language for these subjects. It simply takes the existing language, formed upon sensible objects, and bends it to the higher purpose of spiritual discourse. So it describes the saving change of the soul as a birth, and the relation formed upon that as an adoption. And to the abode of the blest it gives the name first applied to the visible expanse above us, and to the properties of God, names borrowed from those of men. Such anthropomorphitic modes of expression are indispensable. They are indeed figurative or symbolical, and yet as literal as any language in such a case can be. They give the truth as far as the resemblance holds, and leave it to common sense to fix the limit. And this is important to be borne in mind, in all our inquiries on these subjects. It is not safe to say that the language is figurative, and therefore must mean something far less than it seems to mean. For though all Scripture language is figurative so far as applied to invisible objects, yet it conveys a clear and determinate sense, obvious to the common mind, which instinctively modifies and limits anthropomorphitic forms of speech. Indeed it was written not for the learned, but for the common mind. And touching all these subjects it has an *obvious* sense, and that is the true sense, which the Holy Spirit intended to convey. The literal meaning is one thing, and the obvious sense is often quite another. The obvious sense is that by which we are bound.

Now President Edwards, when he spoke of Christ suffering, "*as it were*," the penalty of the law for us, and used the other qualifying phrases referred to, recognised this very principle, which every safe interpreter must recognise; that is, he took the language of the Scriptures as the nearest possible approximation to the idea, and yet allowed for the *anthropomorphism* necessary in the case. He read out of the Scriptures the truth that Christ endured the penalty of the law, in our stead, not in form, circumstances, and duration the same, but in substance, essential ingredients, and moral significance the same. He allowed that in some respects he did not endure precisely what the sinner in hell endures; and he maintained that in some respects he endured what the sinner never can endure. And yet he saw in it the *substantial* execution of the threatened penalty, a full execution of what God's justice required.

This much is clear, that this mode of understanding the passages of Scripture bearing on this subject meets the obvious meaning of those passages, and diminishes nothing from the force with which they speak to the common mind, and answers exactly to the sense in which we understand Scripture terms on other subjects, as depravity, regeneration, and sanctification, and indeed all branches of Christian theology; while the mode attempted by these Edwardeans lands us in a virtual de-

nial of what is obviously asserted in the Scriptures. Take now the assumptions which these Edwardeans, feeling "the propriety of a nomenclature needing fewer explanations," have chosen, and see whether that, or Edwards's form of speech, best answers the obvious sense of Scripture. These assumptions are, that Christ has not paid the penalty of the law, has not satisfied the justice of God, has not answered the demands of the law, has not wrought out a righteousness as the ground of our justification, has not delivered us from the curse of the law demanding our eternal punishment. And then take those of Edwards, which are the opposite of these. Now, read a little of Scripture and see which best strikes the obvious sense, and "needs fewer explanations."

"Who his own self bore our sins in his own body on the tree; by whose stripes we are healed." "He hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows; he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed." "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief." "When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed:" "he shall bear their iniquities," and "he bore the sins of many." "For even Christ our paschal Lamb is sacrificed for us." "Now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." "Who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity." "Ye are bought with a price." "The Church of God which he hath purchased with his own blood." "Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, but with the precious blood of Christ." "In whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins." "Having made peace by the blood of his cross." "Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world." "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation; so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous."

These are but a small part of passages that are equally to the purpose. Now, let the reader judge, whether these passages, in their obvious sense, better accord with the sense of Edwards or of his opponents. In Edwards's reading of them they require no modification, except now and then the phrase *as it were*, indicating the anthropomorphic sense; but in the other reading of them, we need a metaphysical argument to evade their proper force, at every turn.

And here we have an illustration of the evils of an attempt to force Christian doctrine into the cramping irons of a rationalizing metaphysics. In the Bible, God has laid out Christian doctrines, in phrases that give the sense, in a way to be most easily apprehended by the common mind, and with no intention to favour metaphysical definitions. Indeed, many of the things revealed, being matters to be learned by spiritual experience, are intrinsically incapable of being defined in a language framed upon sensible objects. Hence, there is a clear absurdity, and an abundance of mischief, in the design of reducing Edwards's teaching of Christian doctrine, by a process of metaphysical definitions and reasonings, into a "CONSISTENT CALVINISM," set forth under "a nomenclature needing fewer explanations." This is a sin of theologians, which, when it is conceived, bringeth forth death. Just as soon as this scheme of reducing Christian doctrine to the narrow limits of man's metaphysics, and enclosing God's thoughts, which are heaven-high above ours, in definitions framed by man's conceptions—that is, just as soon as we get the Infinite nicely ensconced in the finite, we find, on comparison of our system with God's book, that one is in conflict with the other. And nowhere has this tendency been more strikingly and sadly exemplified, than in such philosophizing upon the doctrine of the atonement.

We are well aware, that the new Edwardeans are not the only offenders in this line. The old Calvinists have, in some instances, built metaphysical conclusions upon literal interpretations of the texts, and have not sufficiently allowed for the anthropomorphism. And, instead of reasoning from the plain fact, that there has been a substantial execution of the penalty, they have sometimes pressed their theories to extreme points, and drawn unscriptural conclusions, when they had for their premises only a literality of Scripture expression, and not the obvious sense of Scripture.

But to return from this digression, it is one of the main principles of the scheme, as laid down in our author's categories, that God's justice will yet "eternally demand the punishment of every one who has sinned." How plainly this conflicts with the Scriptures, may be seen at a glance. "There is now no condemnation [no demand of justice] against them that are in Christ Jesus." "It is God that justifieth, who is he that condemneth?" "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." "We are not under the law, but under grace." If by saying, that the law will eternally demand the punishment, even of the believer, he meant no more, than that every believer, considered in his relations to law, and not in his union with Christ, *deserves* punishments

he would have said no more than all have always admitted, and so he would have said that which was not fit to stand as number five, in his series of the principles of what he calls "the *new* divinity." But when he says, and says it as a part of the *new* scheme, that the law "*will eternally demand*" the sinner's punishment, he says it to shew, that the demands of the law have not been satisfied in case of the believer, that God saves believers in a sovereign way, leaving law and justice still crying, "Give, give." The theory, that the law has been honoured, indeed, but not satisfied, that justice has been expressed, but not executed or satisfied, comes out under this phrase. It is true that the younger Edwards uses expressions something like this; but he connects with them such a definition of distributive justice, as to shew, that he means no more than that, considered in his personal character, Paul will always *deserve* to be damned. It is by the same definition, that he makes the salvation of Judas consistent with God's justice. And it is very plain, that justice, in that sense, is not satisfied; for Judas has gone to his own place. And Paul may be content to have his damnation demanded, by a kind of justice, that would save Judas.

We notice another assumption pervading our author's speculations on this subject, that is, that God's justice has *expression*, but not an *exercise or execution* upon Christ in his sufferings and death; or, in other words, he makes himself to *appear* to be just, while he does not, as the protector of law, execute justice; he *shews* justice, but he does not *do* justice; he *shews* a firm purpose, that law shall be executed, but he does not execute that purpose. Now, common-sense teaches, that the true way to appear to be just, is actually to be so; and the true way to shew a purpose that the law shall be executed, is to put it in execution, on the offender, or on his surety.

But how has God's justice had expression, where it had no execution? We are told that, instead of a substantial execution of justice on one standing in the sinner's place, God did another thing on another person, not the sinner's surety, which cost him as much reluctance to do, as it would to send the whole human race to hell, and because it cost him as much reluctance to do this other thing, as it would to execute his law, therefore, what he did was equivalent for all purposes to the execution of law. But how so? If an officer of government were charged with the execution of a certain criminal condemned to death, would he be considered as having done an equivalent to the execution of the criminal, for the purposes of law, if he had gone and set fire to his own property, though it might have cost him double the reluctance that it would to have done the office of a hangman? We cannot see how God

honours his law or justice, in letting off the offender, by simply doing a thing that costs reluctance, if there is on no one an actual execution of the law. Allow of a substitution of a surety or victim in the place of the offender, and let the evil threatened in the law spend itself on him, as a surety, then, according to a principle universally acknowledged, we see, that the law has a fit vindication, but not otherwise.

But, after all, this question, whether God only expressed, or whether he actually executed his justice, on his Son, is a question of the plain obvious import of Scripture language. To us it is irresistibly plain, that such Scriptures as the following shew, that the Lord executed the penalty on his Son, "It pleased the Lord to bruise him." "Thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin." In bearing our griefs and carrying our sorrows, he "was stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted." "Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of Hosts; smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered." "The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." "The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink of it?" Do not these plainly import more than a *show* of justice, even an actual *execution* by the lawgiver of the penalty on the Son? Here we see the tendency of such speculations, to lead the mind away from the Scriptures.

The book under examination was prepared, as an introduction, to a series of works on the atonement, collected from different authors, and published by the Congregational Board of Publication. The whole design of the collection, with its introduction, is not to give to the public works that were difficult of access, for a part of them had been recently reprinted before. But both the collection of treatises and the Introduction were designed to sustain the author's special theory, which he calls the "new divinity." But, however many shreds and patches of argument may have been gathered from these selected writings, the system which is here offered us, is, as a system, that of the author of the Introduction, and, in some of its features, very diverse from anything which has yet appeared under a Calvinistic name.

We have not space to follow our author through all his misconceptions of the views of Edwards. We have rarely met with an instance, in which so distinguished an author as Edwards has met with so much injustice at the hands of a commentator. In witnessing such an amount of hard labour employed, to shew him to be inconsistent with himself, on so many points, as to leave him little worthy of confidence or respect, as a consistent thinker, and that labour bestowed by one who claims to be an Edwardean, while, in the main drift

of his system opposed to Edwards, we are forced to ask—what all this means? It can only mean, that the homage and deference which have been paid to Edwards, in the departments of mental science and theology, must now be transferred to the greater lights of the present age. But at the risk of being set down as behind the times, we shall venture to express our deliberate opinion, that no author of the present age is better qualified to put forth a profound, comprehensive, and self consistent system of theology, than was Jonathan Edwards. And, as to these after-thoughts, said to have been elicited by the successors of Edwards, in the light of which Edwards's own system is stultified, it could be easily shewn, that most of them had been carefully examined, and, for good reasons, repudiated by Edwards himself.

But this conceit of setting aside a system of theology, in the act of completing its constructive idea, and putting in its place and under its name a very different system, constructed by inference, could hardly be named with a sober face, had it not come forth under such high auspices. The illusions spread abroad by it, after it has found entertainment in respectable quarters, are immense. The mass of people to whom the representation is addressed, that this new system is peculiarly Edwardean, and substantially Calvinistic, have not the means of detecting the error; and, under the sanction of imposing names, are made to receive for Calvinistic and Scriptural truth, that which runs counter to it.

Our author is strongly opposed to a limited atonement scheme. His chief labour upon his theory seems to look mainly to an escape from what he conceives to be the dangers of that system. The writer of this article has no partiality for what is peculiar in that theory, and yet, he is free to say, that no living writer has done so much to give currency to that theory as the author of this Introduction. This Introduction, unless we are much mistaken, will be made use of extensively to convey the impression, that the doctrine of a general atonement cannot be carried to its logical conclusions, without abandoning, so far as our author has abandoned, the essential elements of the old doctrine. The way has here been opened, for an host of superficial thinkers to rise up and say, That is just what we have maintained. This Edwardean system has now been proved to have laid the foundations for a logical exclusion of the strict doctrine of atonement. Nor is this mere prophecy. We have seen results akin to this, on many minds. Many younger men in New England, having been familiarised to these deductions from Edwards's successors, and not readily detecting their fallacy, as deductions, and yet convinced that the conclusion is unscriptural, and so feeling,

that they must choose between a limited atonement, and an abandonment of the atonement, are preferring the former. So we speak advisedly when we say, that the doctrine of a general atonement has not, in this generation, received so severe a wound, as in this deduction carried through Edwards's successors, giving an apparent *reductio ad absurdum* to Edwards's system, and presenting, to one who admits these conclusions, the alternative of receiving the limited atonement scheme, or rejecting the substance of the doctrine of the atonement, as a proper satisfaction to divine justice.*

ART. V.—*The Ancient Church: its History, Doctrine, Worship, and Constitution, traced for the first three hundred years.*
By W. D. KILLEN, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Pastoral Theology to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1859. Pp. 656. 8vo.†

THIS work is distinguished from all other modern contributions to church history known to us, by the attention which its author gives to the polity of the apostolic and primitive church. Fully one-third of the whole volume is devoted to the direct discussion of these topics, and they are also incidentally referred to, very often, in the other portions of the volume. The father of modern church history himself employs far less than a tythe of his large first volume in the elucidation of these themes. Schaff, in his *Apostolic History*, gives to these topics about one-sixteenth part of the whole volume; in his elegant first volume on the Christian church, he despatches these questions in about fifty pages. But when we take up, for example, Gieseler or Guericke, Waddington, Milman or Robertson, all they have to say upon these points is contained in a very few pages, or even paragraphs.

Not only do all the modern church historians treat these subjects briefly, but some of them are of a very doubtful mind respecting church polity. Milman says:—

“The primitive constitution of these Churches is a subject which

* We concur in the general tenor of these concluding observations, but we apply them differently. We believe that scriptural views of the proper nature of the atonement are inconsistent with its universality, and the inference we draw is, that the doctrine of its universality must be rejected.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

† Dr Killen's very valuable work, which was published at London by James Nisbet and Co., was issued at the same time in the United States, and is very highly appreciated, as this article shews, by the Presbyterians of that country.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

it is impossible to decline, though few points in Christian history rest on more dubious and imperfect—in general, on inferential evidence.”*

Schaff, who has had the advantage of all that “bold and searching criticism of the modern German historians, as applied to the apostolic and post-apostolic literature, which has done good service by removing old prejudices and placing many things in a new light;” and who, in his last work, has made “large use of the new sources of information recently brought to light, such as the Syriac and Armenian Ignatius, and especially the *Philosophoumena* of Hippolytus,”† seems to have ended all his researches in a state of considerable doubt regarding some of the main questions of the prelatial controversy. “The most important and also the most difficult phenomenon of our period (A. D. 100–311), in the department of church organization, is the rise and development of the Episcopate.” “There is large room here for critical research and combination.” “Whatever may be thought of the origin and divine right of the Episcopate,”‡ &c. In his previous work, Dr Schaff’s position on these subjects was the same equivocal position, although his testimony is, on many points, as clear for Presbyterian principles as it must be admitted to be impartial. Thus, he tells us:—

“Church government was instituted by Christ himself in person.” “Church officers were not creatures of the congregations,” “although the people participated in the government of the church.” “These church officers are so related to one another that the higher include in themselves the lower, but not the reverse.” “With all their comprehensive authority, the apostles still regarded themselves always as a collegiate body,” and as “personally representing the church.” And thus the apostles, as well as the presbyters, “controlled the people not by force of law, but through their own free conviction.” “They never forced any measure upon the church, but administered the government in active sympathy with them and by their full consent.” “In the whole company of saints they saw a family of free children of God.” “Primitive Christianity sanctions the *synodical* form of government in which all orders of the church are represented.” From all tyranny over conscience, from all arbitrary hierarchical despotism, they were infinitely removed.” “The name presbyters or elders is, no doubt, of Jewish-Christian origin, a translation of the Hebrew *זקנים*.” “The bishops of the New Testament are not diocesan bishops, like those of a later period, but simply congregational officers. This is placed beyond question in every passage in which we meet this title.” And “this identity of presby-

* History of Christianity, Vol. ii. p. 274.

† Preface to Christian History, p. vi.

‡ History of the Christian Church, pp. 414, 415, 421.

ters and bishops was acknowledged by the most learned church fathers on exegetical grounds,"* &c.

Yet he elsewhere says:—

"If we consider that in the second century the Episcopal system existed as a historical fact in the whole church, East and West, and was unresistingly acknowledged, nay universally regarded, as, at least indirectly, of divine appointment, we can hardly escape the conclusion that this form of government naturally grew out of the circumstances and wants of the church at the end of the apostolic period, and could not have been so quickly and so generally introduced without the sanction, or at least acquiescence, of the surviving apostles; especially of John, who laboured on the very threshold of the second century, and left behind him a number of venerable disciples. At all events, it needs a strong infusion of scepticism, or of traditional prejudice, to enable one, in the face of all these facts and witnesses, to pronounce the Episcopal government of the ancient Church a sheer apostasy from the Apostolic form, and a radical revolution."†

He adds in a note:—

"Our position is not dogmatical and sectarian at all, but entirely historical. The high antiquity, the usefulness and the necessity of the Episcopal form of government in the times before the Reformation, does not necessarily make it of force for all succeeding ages. For we have no passage in the New Testament which presents three orders, or any particular form of church government (excepting the ministry itself) as essential to the existence of the church."

Waddington's position may be expressed in two sentences:—

"Neither our Saviour nor his apostles have left any express and positive ordinances for the administration of the church, desiring, perhaps, that that which was intended for every age and condition of man, to be the associate and guardian of every form of civil government, should have the means of accommodating its external and earthly shape to the various modifications of human polity."

This is one of Waddington's principles, or fundamental facts. The other is this:—

"It is certain that from the moment in which the early churches attained a definite shape and consistency, and assumed a permanent form of discipline, as soon as the death of the last of the apostles had deprived them of the more immediate guidance of the Holy Spirit, and left them, under God's especial care and providence, to the uninspired direction of mere men; so soon had every church, respecting which we possess any express information, adopted the Episcopal form of government."‡

Robertson, who himself speaks of himself as "an advocate of the Episcopal theory of apostolical succession," and who is

* History of the Apostolic Church, pp. 497, 499, 506, 507, 515, 516, 522, 523.

† Apost. Church, pp. 540, 541.

‡ Waddington's History of the Church, vol. i. p. 35.

the latest writer on church history belonging to the established Church of England, devotes just one page and a half to all the questions of the original polity. His position is that—

“The Apostles having been, at first, the sole depositaries of their Lord’s commission, with all the powers which it conferred, afterwards delegated to others, as their substitutes, assistants, or successors, such portions of their powers as were capable of being transmitted, and were necessary for the continuance of the church.” “Those to whom the apostles conveyed the full powers of the Christian ministry were not the deacons, nor the presbyters, but (in the later meaning of the word) the bishops; and the existence of the inferior orders, as subject to these, is a simple matter of history.”

This is Robertson’s theory. He seems to scorn, as quite needless, any attempt to establish it. All that he offers of that sort is contained in the following paragraph :—

“Resting on the fact that the apostles were, during their lives on earth, the supreme regulating authorities of the church, we may disregard a multitude of questions which have been made to tell against the theories of an Episcopal polity, of a triple ministry, or of any ministry whatever, as distinguished from the great body of Christians. We need not here inquire at what time, and by what steps, the title of *Bishop*, which had at first been common to the highest and the second orders, came to be applied exclusively to the former; nor whether functions, originally open to all Christian men, were afterwards restricted to a particular class; nor in how far the inferior orders of the clergy, or the whole body of the faithful, may have shared in the administration of government and discipline; nor whether the commissions given by St Paul to Timothy and to Titus were permanent or only occasional; nor at what time the system of fixed diocesan bishops was introduced. We do not refuse to acknowledge that the organization of the church was gradual; we are only concerned to maintain that it was directed by the apostles, and that in all essential points it was completed before their departure.”*

Gieseler’s discussion of this topic is very short, but not very unsatisfactory. He is clear, that in the apostolic church,

“The elders, (called both presbyters and bishops) were officially of equal rank; that the duty of teaching, as an office, was by no means incumbent on them, but the capacity of instructing was a free gift of the Spirit to certain individuals; that there was no longer to be a distinct priestly order; that the idea set forth by Christ of the union of His people with Himself, and with one another, in one joint body, was kept alive by the apostles; that these apostles were the external centre point of this unity; that they exercised a general survey over all the churches, and were co-overseers in every single church; that the first arrangements in the newly planted churches, even the appointment of elders in them, was made by the apostles

* History of the Christian Church, by James Craigie Robertson, M.A., Vicar of Bekesbourne, in the Diocese of Canterbury, vol. i. p. 7.

themselves; that afterwards the elders nominated officers with the consent of the churches; that in newly established churches Paul sometimes transferred his power to an assistant, and that James stood in Jerusalem quite in the relation of a later bishop, but without the appellation.”*

Neander's position on this subject is that of a very decided support to the *jus divinum* of Presbyterian Church government, and Guericke follows very closely in his tracks. The former says, that—

“A guild of priests having the exclusive care of providing for the religious wants of other men—such a priestly caste, could find no place within Christianity; that no one individual was to be the pre-eminent organ of the Holy Ghost for the guidance of the whole, but that all were to co-operate, each in his own sphere; that every man who felt an inward call to it might, under the transient inspiration, give utterance to the word in the assembled church; but that not all the members of a community were fitted for the ordinary and regular office of teaching; that the inner fellowship demanded for its exhibition an external organization; that some of the members received the gift (charism) of government; that their guidance of the community was performed as a council of elders, called presbyters, and also bishops; that in each town, from the beginning onwards, one single community formed itself under the guidance of a senate of elders; that the function of teaching, and that of church government, and the gifts requisite for each, were originally distinguished and held separate from each other; that these functions, however, were united often, but not necessarily and always in the same individual, so that some presbyters were worthy of double honour; that these rulers were not masters of the community, but conducted all things as their ministers and with their co-operation; that they were elected by the people; that even the apostles, whose office was peculiar and not transferable, were far from lording it over the faith of which the foundation had once been laid, and which was now to develope itself with freedom, and give shape to every thing by its own inherent power alone.”

So much of a constitution for the church does Neander find in the Scriptures, and the considerate reader will feel the definiteness of these views, and the completeness of the system they summarily set forth. Then Neander tells us that—

“After the age of the apostles, there occur three changes in the constitution of the church, as follows: 1, The distinction of bishops from presbyters, and the developement of the Monarchico-Episcopal church government; 2, The distinction of the clergy from the laity, and the formation of a sacerdotal caste; 3, The multiplication of church offices.”

Now, taking these seven modern church historians as specimens of the whole body, let us look again, for one moment,

* Gieseler's Eccl. History, vol. i. pp. 88-93.

at their various positions regarding church government. Two of the German writers hold clearly to a system of church government distinctly revealed in the New Testament, and that system is the Presbyterian, received from them both in considerable fulness. The other two German authors clearly hold to the apostolic origin of certain principles, which logically conduct to the Presbyterian system, but, strangely enough, they add their historical judgment, also, in favour of diocesan episcopacy as at least indirectly of divine appointment. Of the English writers, Robertson "rests on the fact that the apostles were, during their lives on earth, the supreme regulating authorities of the church," and on the bare averment, without the least attempt at proof, that although "the organisation of the church was gradual," yet it was "directed by the apostles through bishops (in the later meaning of the word), to whom the apostles conveyed the full powers of the Christian ministry." But, on the other hand, Milman holds that the whole question rests on the most dubious grounds; and Waddington, that the Saviour and his apostles established nothing, but that we find the whole church to have been episcopally governed from the time of her being first left to the uninspired direction of mere men.

It is not amongst writers of church history alone that doubt and uncertainty of mind prevail, respecting the whole subject of the order of the kingdom set up on earth by Jesus Christ. Many theologians, and whole schools of theology, also are in doubt about it. The theory of Erastus is, indeed, a definite one, viz.: that all church power rests in the Christian magistrate, who appoints the form of government for the church according to his pleasure, and holds in his hands the keys of discipline. So, indeed, the Roman Catholic position (held likewise by some prelatists) is also a definite one, viz.: that one particular form of church government is not only appointed, but is appointed as being essential, so that there can be no church where that form of government is not. This is the theory of the *jus divinum*, with a vengeance—and the vengeance has always been felt under its sway wherever there was power to inflict it. But there is another theory of the *jus divinum*, in which there is inherent no vengeance and no spite, and it also is, nevertheless, a definite theory of church government: It is, that the substantial of church order are all laid down in Scripture, in particular rules respecting officers, ordinances, courts, and discipline, while the circumstantial are also laid down in Scripture, but in general rules of order, decency, and edification. This is the *jus divinum* theory of church government as distinctly held forth in our standards.* According to

* See Confession of Faith, chap. i. 6. Form of Government, chap. i. 3, 6, 7; chap. viii. 1.

this view of the subject, a church government is revealed in the Scriptures, just as the other great doctrines of Christianity are revealed there. But the truth on this subject may be discerned by different minds with more or with less clearness, and may accordingly be followed out in practice with a more or less complete obedience by different churches. A church may, therefore, hold erroneous views on this subject, leading to erroneous practice, and still be a true church. Not to receive and practise the doctrine of church government laid down in the Scriptures, makes an imperfect church—it does not destroy its title to be considered a true church of Christ, and to be acknowledged as such by us. We must acknowledge all whom we believe Christ acknowledges, and fellowship all whom he receives. We must be in communion with all who hold the Head, or be guilty of the sin of schism.

But there are other theories held by many which may be called *indefinite*—as, that “God has instituted government for the Church only as He has for the State, having simply forbidden anarchy, but leaving the form of government to the discretion of men.” In other words, that “Christ has left the matter of church government undetermined, so that Christian societies have a discretionary power of modelling the government of the church in such a manner as the circumstantial reasons of times and places may require; and that, therefore, the *wisest* government of the church, for any given age or country, is the best and the most divine.” Again, it is held by many, that the germs of church order are given in the New Testament, and the early fathers were allowed to fill up the outline. This is a prevailing form of opinion among Episcopalians. Not very different from this is an indefinite theory prevailing extensively amongst Presbyterians, even of the Old School, and which is found to be as much of *jure divino* Presbyterianism as some of those who hold high places in our Church are able to swallow and digest—viz., the theory that the essentials are laid down in the Scriptures, but the details left to be filled up by the church at her discretion. This theory, like the other two, we call indefinite, for it defines nothing. It does not tell us what are these divine essentials, and what these human details. Can it, indeed, be so that a root shall be divine, and the branches, twigs, and leaves growing out of it human? Or can it be that the main branches, as well as the root, shall be divine, but the twigs and leaves human?

Now, where this indefinite Presbyterian theory prevails, there is usually felt a great horror of what is called “*High Church* Presbyterianism,” which is described as—

“A disposition to attribute undue importance to the external

organization of the church—the desire to make everything relating thereto a matter of divine right, and to insist that no society, however orthodox and pure, can be a church unless organized in one particular form.”

It is argued that

“The institutions of the Christian church are designed for all nations, ages, and portions of the globe. It is inconceivable that any one outward form of the church can be suited for all these different circumstances. We can readily believe that one style of building and one mode of dress might suit all parts of Palestine, but who can believe that God would prescribe the same garments for the Arabs and the Laplanders? * * * When we open the New Testament, the first thing that strikes the reader is its comparative silence on this subject. * * * Those Protestants who adopt the *jus divinum* principle are obliged to substitute conjectures as to what was done in place of positive commands as to what we should do.”

And it is declared that

“Not only in Romanists and Prelatists, but even in Presbyterians and Independents, we see manifestations of this disposition, which has a deep root in human nature, to let the external and the visible overshadow the spiritual; to make obligatory what God has left indifferent; to regard as essential, points which are unimportant or injurious; to subject the conscience to human authority; to alienate those who ought to be united; and impede the church's progress by afflictive and disgraceful schisms.”*

It has never fallen to our lot to see any such Presbyterians as are here described, nor do we know of any persons in any branch of the Presbyterian Church to whom this description applies. Most especially did we never hear of any Presbyterians so holding to the *jus divinum Presbyterii* as to maintain that “no society, however orthodox and pure, can be a Church, unless organized in one particular form.” This must be viewed, we suppose, simply as one of those exaggerations of statement to which the wisest men are liable in the heat of argument, or in the haste of composition. We submit, with great respect, the inquiry whether, after all, the evil which calls for rebuke be not really the very opposite of that overzealous regard for Presbyterian church government which is thus ridiculed and denounced? Does there not prevail generally amongst Presbyterians too little confidence in the Scriptural authority of the church polity handed down to them from their fathers in Scotland, who received it from Geneva fresh exhumed by Calvin from that grave where prelates and popes had so long kept it buried?

* See *Bib. Repertory* for Jan. 1849, pp. 6, 7.

In view of this unsettled state of the question of church polity especially, we hail Dr Killen's "Ancient Church" with great delight. We hail the appearance of it, because of the decided views he expresses on all these questions, and because of the full and complete and able discussion of them, with which God has enabled him to favour the church. Dr Schaff says that "Presbyterians of the Scotch *jure divino* school are one sided and pedantic, too little regarding even many important facts of the New Testament, and either entirely rejecting or distorting the weighty testimony of church antiquity."* But here is a writer of that one-sided school who ventures to think, alluding, doubtless, amongst others, to Dr Schaff himself, that the "progress of the Christian commonwealth, for the first three hundred years, recently described by British, German and American writers of eminent ability, is not yet an exhausted subject." "Several documents lately discovered have thrown fresh light on the transactions of the ancient church. There are, besides, points of view disclosing unexplored fields for thought, from which the ecclesiastical landscape has never yet been contemplated."† We believe this. We are satisfied there yet remains much land to be possessed in this quarter. The field of research has by no means been fully explored. And precisely because we are satisfied that Dr Killen neither "regards too little" any "important facts of the New Testament," nor "neglects" nor "distorts the weighty testimony of church antiquity"—precisely for these reasons we are sure his book will be read with advantage by all impartial inquirers. The value of his argument is due to its being derived so entirely from Scripture, and so strikingly confirmed by the most recently discovered illustrations of primitive church history.

As to one of these, viz : that of the new recension of the Ignatian Letters, we are confident that every honest mind will acknowledge the ability and thoroughness of Dr Killen's investigations. In 1845 a new turn was given to the Ignatian controversy, by the publication of a Syriac version of three of the Letters. In 1846, Dr Cureton, of the British Museum, their editor in England, published his "*Vindiciæ Ignatianæ, or the Genuine Writings of St Ignatius*," &c.; and in 1849, his more full discussion of the subject in his *Corpus Ignatianum*, in which he maintains that only the three are genuine. His views are understood to have the sanction of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the English metropolitan, to whom his work is dedicated, by permission. Bishop Pearson's celebrated book in defence of the authority of all the seven epistles, which (says Killen) "few have ever read, but under the shadow

* "Apostolic History," p. 541.

† Preface of Dr Killen, p. v.

of the reputation of which prelatists have for two centuries been reposing quietly," is thus abandoned by the highest representatives of prelacy in our day. They are compelled, by the investigations of the British Museum, to confess that about three-fourths of the matter which the Bishop of Chester spent six years of his mature age in attempting to prove genuine, is the work of an impostor. In 1847 appears Bunsen's work, in letters addressed to Neander, in which the three recensions of the Ignatian letters, Greek, Latin, and Syriac, are elaborately compared. He also maintains that the three are the only genuine. His work produces a profound impression, and is considered by many to have settled the question. But our author thoroughly investigates anew this old controversy, and sheds a flood of new light upon it. So far as we can judge, Dr Killen goes to the very root of the matter, and we strongly incline to say that he takes the only consistent ground. Very significant, indeed, is the past history of these letters. In the sixteenth century, fifteen of them were offered to the world as from the pen of the pastor of Antioch, but scholars refused to receive them all as genuine, and immediately eight of them were admitted to be forgeries; and then,—as in the case of that other forgery, the Sybilline letters,—a smaller number of them is proposed to our confidence. In the seventeenth century, the seven letters appear in a somewhat altered form, and claim to be the genuine and original copies; but discerning critics again refuse to acknowledge their pretensions. This second apparition, however, piques the curiosity of scholars, and they ransack Greece, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, till at length, in the Nitrian Desert, three letters are found, written in Syriac. There is a new era in the controversy now. It is confessed, even by prelatists, that four of the seven so long insisted to be genuine, are apocryphal, but it is boldly said that the remaining three are above challenge. Bunsen himself acknowledges them, and even Presbyterians of learning acquiesce in his conclusions.* But, says Killen:

"Truth still refuses to be compromised, and sternly disowns these claimants for her approbation. The internal evidence of these three epistles abundantly attests that, like the last three books of the Sybil, they are only the last shifts of a grave imposture." "Ignatius, in his new dress, has lost nothing of his absurdity and extravagance. The passages formerly felt to be so objectionable, are yet found here in all their unmitigated folly. Ignatius is still the same anti-evangelical formalist, the same puerile boaster, the same dreaming mystic, and the same crazy fanatic. These are weighty charges, and yet they can be substantiated." "It is truly wonderful that men, such as Dr Cureton, have permitted themselves to be befooled by these

* *Biblical Repertory* for July 1849.

Syriac manuscripts. It is still more extraordinary, that writers, such as the amiable and pious Milner, have published, with all gravity, the rhapsodies of Ignatius for the edification of their readers. It would almost appear as if the name of *Bishop* has such a magic influence on some honest and enlightened Episcopalians, that when the interests of their denomination are supposed to be concerned, they can be induced to close their eyes against the plainest dictates of common sense, and the clearest light of historical demonstration." "Bunsen rather reluctantly admits that the highest literary authority of the present century, the late Dr Neander, declined to recognise even the Syriac version of the Ignatian epistles." "And it is no mean proof of the sagacity of the great Calvin, that, upwards of three hundred years ago, he passed a sweeping sentence of condemnation on these Ignatian epistles. At the time, many were startled by the boldness of his language, and it was thought he was somewhat precipitate in pronouncing such a decisive judgment. But he saw distinctly, and he spoke, therefore, fearlessly. There is a far more intimate connection than many are disposed to believe between sound theology and sound criticism; for a right knowledge of the Word of God strengthens the intellectual vision, and assists in the detection of error wherever it may reveal itself. Had Pearson enjoyed the same clear views of Gospel truth as the Reformer of Geneva, he would not have wasted so many precious years in writing a learned vindication of the nonsense attributed to Ignatius. Calvin knew that an apostolic man must have been acquainted with apostolic doctrine, and he saw that these letters must have been the production of an age when the pure light of Christianity was greatly obscured. Hence he denounced them so emphatically; and time has verified his deliverance. His language respecting them has been often quoted, but we feel we cannot more appropriately close our observations on this subject than by another repetition of it. 'There is nothing more abominable than that trash which is in circulation under the name of Ignatius.'—*Instit. Lib. I., c. xiii., § 29.**

We propose, very briefly, to state to our readers the substance of our author's argument on this subject.

According to the current accounts, Ignatius was the second Bishop of Antioch at the time of his martyrdom, and was probably far advanced in life. When Trajan visited the capital of Syria, A. D. 107, Ignatius voluntarily presented himself before him and avowed his Christianity. In consequence, he was condemned to be carried to Rome and consigned to the wild beasts for the entertainment of the populace. On his way thither he stopped at Smyrna. The legend represents Polycarp as then chief pastor of that city. There Ignatius received deputations from the neighbouring churches, and thence he wrote them several letters. From Smyrna he goes to Troas, and thence writes other epistles, including one to Polycarp.

* Killen's Ancient Ch., p. 427.

Now, there is every reason to believe that, in the second century, Ignatius was connected with the church at Antioch, and about the same period suffered unto death for the cause of Christianity; and possibly, also, he was sent to Rome by the chief magistrate of Syria, for Pliny, in Bithynia, was accustomed, at the beginning of the persecution of Trajan, to send Roman citizens who were accused of Christianity to the Emperor himself. Upon some such substratum of facts as this is, has been erected a huge mass of incongruous fictions. For it is much to be doubted if Trajan's visit took place so early as the legend states. It is also difficult to discover any reasonable apology for the fool-hardiness ascribed to Ignatius, of appearing of his own accord before Trajan to proclaim his Christianity. Moreover, the report of his behaviour before the Emperor represents the martyr as totally wanting in the humility of a Christian. And then the story of his transmission to Rome is full of difficulties. He is sent thither that the sight of such a distinguished victim passing through so many cities might terrify the Christians. But we are told he went from Syria to Smyrna *by water*; and then, had he gone by land, the lesson designed for the Christians would have been just one with which they were unhappily already quite familiar. He is represented as being hurried along violently and barbarously from East to West, and yet as remaining many days together in the same place, receiving deputations and writing magniloquent epistles.* And then, strangest of all, though pressed hastily forwards by the soldiers, and the vessel speedily carried to Italy by prosperous winds, yet is one of these same letters supposed to outstrip the fast-sailing ship, and to reach Rome before himself and his impatient escort!

As to the testimony which accredits these letters, it is not necessary to examine any later witness than Eusebius. But his acknowledgment of the genuineness of the seven letters is of doubtful value, because the correspondence in question bears date two hundred years before his own appearance as an author. Nor is his judgment in such matters acknowledged to have been a very critical one; he published as genuine the correspondence between Abgarus and our Saviour!

Before the fourth century there is only one authority that

* The author falls into a small error, in his remarks here, regarding the time Ignatius must have remained at Smyrna in order to have received a deputation from Magnesia. "Had notice been sent to them immediately on his arrival at Smyrna, the messenger must have required three days to perform the journey, and had the Magnesians set out immediately they must have occupied three days more in travelling to him. And so, with all the precipitation with which he was hurried along, he could scarcely have been less than a week in Smyrna!" We have, ourselves, more than once, travelled the whole distance in seven or eight hours moderate riding.

notices those letters, and that is Origen, who quotes twice, evidently from the Syriac version. Probably Origen first met with them when visiting Antioch, on the invitation of the Emperor's mother, Julia Mammœa, and probably, too, they had just then been fabricated. The epistles wear all the characteristics of the former part of the third century. Ritualism had then supplanted the freedom of evangelical worship; baptism was beginning to be viewed as an "armour" of marvellous potency; the tradition of Peter's founding the great Church of the West was now extensively propagated, and there was an increasing disposition to yield precedence to Rome. It was the greatest virtue then to be subject to the *Bishop*; to maintain uniformity was more than to maintain truth. Celibacy was then confounded with chastity, and mysticism was in place of the knowledge of the Word. Above all, the admiration of martyrdom, which in these epistles presents itself in so startling a form, characterised that period. If presented to Origen by parties interested in the recognition of their claims, these epistles were exactly the documents to impose upon Origen. The student of Philo, and the author of "*Exhortations to Martyrdom*," could not but admire such writings as these. Moreover, there are other apocryphal writings noticed by Origen, with no intimations of their being spurious works.

It has been attempted to shew that both Irenæus and Polycarp, before Origen, noticed these letters; but the author most conclusively disposes of this pretence: and then he dwells upon the strangeness of the fact that no other writer has mentioned them. Asia Minor is moved by the presence of the martyr on his way to Rome, there to die,—Greece catches the infection of the excitement,—the capital itself, with breathless anxiety waits the coming of the illustrious bishop,—yet no Western father mentions even his letter to the Romans for two or three hundred years after the time of its assumed publication! Where was Tertullian, the scholar and the Montanist too, a resident also for years of the city of Rome, that this document should have escaped his notice! And how is it that Hippolytus, of Portus, within a few miles of the city, conversant with the history of the Church there, and likely to sympathise as much as Tertullian with the rugged and ascetic spirit pervading this correspondence, has no testimony from these letters respecting any one of all the heresies he writes against?

The positive arguments adduced by Dr Killen against all these epistles, we must merely mention, without stating them fully. They are as follows:—

"1st. The style is suspicious.

"2d. They ignore God's word, which never characterizes any of the early fathers.

"3d. The chronological blunders in these epistles betray their forgery.

"4th. Various words in them have a meaning which they did not acquire until long after the time of Ignatius.

"5th. The puerilities, vapouring and mysticism of these letters betray their forgery.

"6th. The unhallowed and insane anxiety for martyrdom, which appears throughout these letters, is a decisive proof of their fabrication."

We have dwelt at length upon our author's discussion of this subject because of the great importance which the advocates of the hierarchy have always attached to the testimonies they have quoted from these epistles; testimonies which now would seem the "worthless coinage of pious fraud." When Episcopalians are asked to explain by what steps prelacy (which many of them, like Waddington, admit was not the original form of government for the church of Christ) came to be established, as we find it was in the latter part of the second and in the third centuries, Ignatius is their great resource. It is he who makes out that the apostles, or such of them as survived the destruction of Jerusalem, placed a bishop at the head of each church, with peculiar powers, as the representative of the unity of the church; and so it is he who exhibits prelates as the true and only successors of the apostles. And we have, therefore, sketched at some length our author's argument, in order that the reader may see how little it avails our prelatie brethren to appeal to the first century for any support to their cause. It is not Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, the second of the apostolic fathers, a disciple and companion of the very apostles, whose long life closing, indeed, early in the second century, did yet as to its labours and its testimony run far back into the first century; it is not this father of the first century from whom they get the testimony they quote so often, but it is from some one of the numerous forgers and falsifiers of the third century.

If Dr Killen's discussion of the Ignatian letters be an important service for the cause of truth in the prelatie controversy, his discussion of the primitive constitution of the church is entitled to be considered such, also, as regards both the prelatie and the popish controversies. Let the reader recall the acknowledgment of Milman (himself a churchman, and now dean of St. Paul's), that "the primitive constitution of the church rests on dubious and mere inferential evidence;"—and that of Waddington (another churchman, and now

dean of Durham), that "neither Christ nor his apostles left any positive ordinances for the administration of the church government;"—and also that of Schaff, not a churchman himself, but standing (if it can be called *standing*) on the fence between Presbytery and Prelacy, that "the most difficult, as well as important, phenomenon of the primitive period, in respect to church organization, is the rise and development of the Episcopate." Now, Dr Killen solves this difficult problem. He explains how the Presbyterian principles that Schaff finds in the New Testament gave place gradually to the prelatical ideas whose introduction and progress are such a puzzle for Dr Schaff. Killen, having recourse constantly to original authorities, traces definitely the rise of the Episcopate, out of which the Papacy was naturally and necessarily developed. And he thus furnishes a fresh, and we think a complete, demonstration of the utter weakness of the historical basis on which the Church of Rome rests her claims.

Upon this point, also, let us present the reader a brief sketch of the course of his narrative and argument.

Two documents of extreme antiquity, and universally acknowledged to be genuine, shew to us what was the kind of church government existing from the close of the first century to the middle of the second—these documents dating one at each of these periods. The first is the letter of Clemens Romanus to the Corinthians; the second is the letter of Polycarp to the Philippians. Both these letters refer plainly to the government of those churches by *elders*, and neither of them hints at a government by one man. Had there been a diocesan bishop either at Rome or Corinth, at the close of the first century, Clement must have alluded to him. Again, had there been one half a century later, either at Smyrna or Philippi, Polycarp must have alluded to him. In Clement, especially, we see a presbyter of Rome, on the verge of the apostolic age, personally conversant perhaps with some of the apostles, honoured exceedingly by the Church of Rome, who yet comes forward, and by a silence more expressive than words, contradicts both her assumptions and the less developed ones of prelacy.

But of course, from the beginning, that all things might be done decently and in order, it was indispensable to have some presiding officer in every church assembly of the elders. Starting with that parity which the Saviour himself ordained amongst them, it was natural that they should preside in turn. And that the elders in each church did preside in turn, seems to be indicated in the striking fact of the confusion which exists in the so-called Episcopal succession just where it needs to be sustained, if it is to have any value, by

the most decisive and perspicuous evidence. The lists of bishops, commencing with the ministry of the apostles, and extending over the latter half of the first century, are little better than a mass of contradictions. The compilers seem to have set down, almost at random, the names of some distinguished men whom they found connected with some of the different churches, and thus the discrepancies are nearly as numerous as the catalogues.*

Now, the first step towards a change of the original constitution was to make the oldest elder successively the permanent moderator. Hilary, a Roman deacon of the fourth century, whose works are commonly appended to those of Ambrose, and who is one of the best commentators of the ancient church, bears explicit testimony to the existence of such an arrangement. His statement is variously confirmed. 1st. The language of the most ancient documents, applied to the primitive presidents, confirms it. The Bishop is called *ὁ πρεσβύτερος*, "the old man." 2d. In none of the great sees, before the close of the second century, do we find any trace of a young or even middle-aged bishop; they are usually fourscore years old and more. 3d. The wonderful rapidity with which bishop succeeds bishop, especially in the earlier part of the second century (long a difficulty with many students of church history), may perhaps be best accounted for by this theory of the presidency.

The second step towards Prelacy is taken first at Rome, just before the middle of the second century, when they depart from this rule of seniority, and elect the ablest and most vigorous-minded presbyter to be their standing president. Valentine, Cerdo, and other Gnostic heretics, appear there at that time and give rise to great distractions, and it is suggested that greater powers be given to the central officer, so as to enable him better to cope with these new and dangerous foes. Upon the death of Telesphorus, A. D. 139, who had been president of the Roman presbytery, Hyginus appears to have succeeded him with new powers. But, beginning at Rome, so far as we can discover, this change appears to have been imitated elsewhere. The same necessity for a stronger ecclesiastical ad-

* "At Antioch some, as Origen and Eusebius, make Ignatius to succeed Peter. Jerome maketh him the third bishop, and placeth Evodius before him. Others make them contemporary bishops. * * * Come we to Rome, and here the succession is as muddy as the Tyber itself, for here Tertullian, Ruffinus, and several others, place Clement next to Peter. Irenæus and Eusebius set Anacletus before him; Epiphanius and Optatus both Anacletus and Cletus; Augustinus and Damascus, with others, make Anacletus, Cletus, and Linus all to precede him. What way shall we find to extricate ourselves out of this labyrinth?"—*Bishop Stillingfleet's Irenicum*, quoted by Killen, p. 506.

ministration appears to have arisen simultaneously at Lyons, Corinth, Athens, Ephesus, Antioch, and Alexandria, for the errorists seem to have commenced their discussions at all these points as if on a pre-concerted signal. If in these few leading cities the new system inaugurated at Rome were approved, its general adoption would gradually, but surely, follow.

Thus, in an evil hour, the dominant party is tempted to change the constitution of the church, and to aim at putting down heresy and disturbance by ecclesiastical innovation. Believing, as many do now, that "parity breedeth confusion," and expecting that the "seeds of schism"* might thus be destroyed, they sought to invigorate the administration by giving the presiding officer authority over his brethren—themselves in some cases tainted with the new heresies. Accordingly, also, the principle is now adopted that he should be cast out who would not submit to the bishop.

The steps of the progress of this modified prelacy, beginning in the days of Hyginus, are clearly traced by our author from original authorities. The power passes from the presbyters to their president. He is dignified with additional authority and invested with peculiar privileges, and in a new sense he receives the name *bishop*, henceforth appropriated solely to him. Amongst many proofs of this kind of change commencing in the time of Hyginus, one of the most striking is from the *Pontifical Book*, a document of great weight in the Romish Church, and ascribed to Damasus, Bishop of Rome in the fourth century. It is a curious passage, out of keeping with much that is in the book, as it contradicts rather awkwardly the pretensions of the Papacy, and has been, therefore, very puzzling to commentators. Damasus testifies that Hyginus "arranged the clergy and distributed the gradations." Dr Killen, taking Hilary and Jerome for the interpreters of this passage, understands it as proving that Hyginus was the real framer of the hierarchy. At a Synod in Rome, he brought under the notice of the meeting the confusion and scandal created by the movements of the errorists, and with a view to correct these disorders, the council agreed to invest the moderator of each presbytery with increased authority, to give him discretionary power as the general superintendent of the church, and to require the other elders, as well as the deacons,

* Killen quotes from Jerome's commentary on Titus these two passages:—

"Postquam vero unusquisque eos quos baptizaverat suos putabat esse non Christi, in toto orbe decretum est ut unus de presbyteris electus superponeretur cæteris ad quem omnis ecclesiæ cura pertineret, et schismatum semina tollerentur."

"Paulatim vero, ut dissensionum plantaria evellerentur, ad unum, omnem solitudinem esse delatam."

to act under his advice and direction. Thus a new functionary begins to be created under an old name, and thus a third order begins to be added to the ecclesiastical brotherhood.

This change in the government of the church, perhaps, gave rise to the journey which Polycarp made to Rome. But although it encountered opposition and remonstrance, the innovation exerted, without doubt, a most extensive influence. For many reasons, such a change at Rome would work powerfully all over the church. And so, *little by little*, as Jerome testifies, this modified prelacy increased and spread itself. In Smyrna, in Cesarea, and in Jerusalem, we know that the senior presbyter was the president until about the close of the second century, and the church was there still governed, it would seem, by the "common council of the presbyters." In many other places, even at a later period, the Episcopal system was still unknown. But its advocates were active and influential. The very efforts of heretics to create division in the church, helped on these plans and arrangements for strong government and visible union. The *Catholic* system is first heard of towards the end of the second century. Those in communion with the bishop were the "Catholics;" those out of communion with him were "sectaries" and "schismatics." This Catholic system was an integral part of the policy which invested the presiding minister with additional authority, and arose contemporaneously with prelacy. At the head of this Catholic system which, of course, could not be a local system, but must spread rapidly over the whole church—at the head of it, the Bishop of Rome soon found himself placed by uncontrollable and imperious influences. There is no doubt that by the close of the second century he was acknowledged as the chief pastor of Christendom. Victor, in his dealing with Asiatic bishops, concerning the paschal festival, was only striving to realise this idea of the unity of the church—and it was still this same idea of visible unity which Stephen, sixty years afterwards, was endeavouring to work out in his conflict with the Bishop of Carthage.

Pursuing the history from the second into the third century, as it gradually develops itself into the rising Papacy, we come to the time when was written a work of the early church, long lost, but lately discovered, which not only sheds light upon the ancient heresies and the history of philosophy, but also contributes by a few most important testimonies to our better understanding of the condition of the Roman Church in the third century, and also of the state of the church doctrine at that time.

"In A. D. 1551, as some workmen in the neighbourhood of Rome

were employed in clearing away the ruins of a dilapidated chapel, they found a broken mass of sculptured marble among the rubbish. The fragments, when put together, proved to be a statue representing a person of venerable aspect sitting in a chair, on the back of which were the names of various publications. It was ascertained, on more minute examination, that some time after the establishment of Christianity by Constantine, this monument had been erected in honour of Hippolytus—a learned and able controversialist, who had been Bishop of Portus in the early part of the third century, and who had finished his career by martyrdom, about A. D. 236, during the persecution under the Emperor Maximin. Hippolytus is commemorated as a saint in the Romish breviary; and the resurrection of his statue after it had been buried for perhaps a thousand years, created quite a sensation among his Papal admirers. Experienced sculptors, under the auspices of the Pontiff Pius IV., restored the fragments to nearly their previous condition; and the renovated statue was then duly honoured with a place in the Library of the Vatican.

“ Nearly three hundred years afterwards, or in 1842, a manuscript which had been found in a Greek monastery, at Mt. Athos, was deposited in the Royal Library at Paris. This work, which has since been published, and which is entitled ‘*Philosophoumena*, or a Refutation of all Heresies,’ has been identified as the production of Hippolytus. It does not appear in the list of his writings mentioned on the back of his marble chair; but any one who inspects its contents can satisfactorily account for its exclusion from that catalogue. It reflects strongly on the character and principles of some of the early Roman bishops; and as the Papal see was fast rising into power when the statue was erected, it was obviously deemed prudent to omit an invidious publication. The writer of the *Philosophoumena* declares that he is the author of one of the books named on that piece of ancient sculpture, and various other facts amply corroborate his testimony. There is, therefore, no good reason to doubt that a Christian bishop who lived about fifteen miles from Rome, and who flourished little more than one hundred years after the death of the apostle John, composed the newly discovered Treatise.”—Pp. 344, 345.

This treatise of Hippolytus lets us into the secret that Victor, Bishop of Rome, A. D. 192–201, had countenanced the errors of Montanus, and that his two successors, Zephyrinus (A. D. 201–219) and Callistus (A. D. 219–223), held unsound views respecting the Trinity. Callistus, as well as Hippolytus, is a saint in the Romish breviary; yet the latter describes the former as both a schemer and a heretic. It is very clear, also, that Hippolytus never dreamed of acknowledging Callistus as his metropolitan; but that all bishops were then on a level as to equality of power. Hippolytus says Callistus was afraid of him, as well indeed he might be of such a man, possessing co-or-

dinate authority with himself. Yet still it is plain, from various admissions in the *Philosophoumena*, that the Bishop of Rome was beginning to presume upon his position.

Dr Killen makes, also, very good and full use of the discoveries made since the sixteenth century in those long labyrinths under the ground around the city of Rome, called the Catacombs.* These streets, all taken together, are supposed to be nine hundred miles long. The galleries are often found two or three stories deep. They were originally stone-quarries or gravel-pits, and were commenced long before the time of Augustus. During the frequent proscriptions of the second and third centuries these "dens and caves of the earth" supplied shelter oftentimes to the Christians at Rome. As early as the second century these vaults became the great cemetery of the church. Many of the memorials of the dead which they contained have long since been transferred to the Lapidarian Gallery in the Vatican, and there in the palace of the Pope these venerable tombstones testify to all who will consult them how much modern Romanism differs from ancient Christianity. These inscriptions know no worship of the Virgin. They point only to Jesus. Their tone is eminently cheerful. They speak not of purgatory or of masses for the dead, but describe the believer as having entered immediately into rest. And they give clear proof also that the early Church of Rome did not impose celibacy on her ministers, for they refer constantly to different presbyters as holding to the various deceased the relations of husband and of father.

It is not necessary to follow the author through all the testimonies he adduces, from Jerome and others, to the antiquity of the Presbyterian polity. We have sufficiently indicated how he makes good his allegation that the Presbyterial government existed in all its integrity during the whole course of the second century. At the close of that period we meet with a wide spread of prelacy; and the principle of a permanent priority having been once introduced amongst the originally equal brethren, it was necessarily developed in a still wider departure from the simplicity of the divine constitution of the church. One brother having become superior to the rest, at several different points, these superiors must needs again contend together for supremacy. And, thus, finally emerges from the din of this unholy strife a supreme pontiff and a bishop of bishops in the capital of Christendom.

But the most valuable service performed for the cause of truth, in this volume, is done in those chapters where Dr Kil-

* From *κατὰ*, down, and *κύβητος*, a cavity.

len proves that the Presbyterian system is contained in the Scriptures, and was instituted by Christ and his apostles.

The author remarks, in his preface, that "one of the most hopeful signs of the times is the increasing charity of evangelical Christians." Yet he maintains that no apology is due for the free utterance of his sentiments upon the important questions he discusses. The divided state of the Christian church is indeed to be deplored. Barriers to mutual fellowship, and to a real and visible unity amongst the disciples of a common Saviour, are a reproach to the Gospel. We thank God that Presbyterians generally do not set up any such barriers; introduce no tests of communion not ordained by the Lord; acknowledge as true ministers of Jesus Christ all who are called and ordained by any evangelical church, according to its own rules; and fellowship every church which holds the Head. We look with intensest satisfaction upon all efforts at union of prayer amongst the different branches of the church of Christ—and wherever a union of active effort, likewise, is possible, without a forbidden sacrifice on either or both sides, we rejoice, also, in such displays of the charity of the Gospel. Yet, we have no faith in compromises of principle respecting the government of the church, any more than the doctrine, for we believe both to be divine. Neither would it be a possible thing now, any more than it was in Baxter's day, to unite Episcopacy, Presbyterianism, and Independency, together, so as to form one common religious government and discipline;* because the principles on which each is founded are diverse. The believers of each must "agree to differ" about this doctrine, as about others, and they must wait and pray for more light from above. In the mean while they may kindly and faithfully reason with one another out of the Scriptures, with a view to a better understanding of each other's real position. Every honest effort of this kind is entitled to kind and candid consideration.

When we take up the three forms of church government above named for a comparison of them together, we find Prelacy standing at one extreme and Independency at the other. To the former there arises at once, and we cannot help feeling it, a very weighty objection, viz.: that it seems to destroy the brotherhood Christ established amongst his ministers, and thus

* Owen long and attentively considered Baxter's scheme for uniting all parties in one, and then returned the papers with these words: "I am still a well-wisher to these mathematics:" a reply sufficiently laconic—expressive of his general approbation of the scheme (considered as an effort for peace and harmony), but of his doubts, also, about the calculating process of his ingenious correspondent.—*See Orme's Life of Owen*, p. 237.

to form just a resting-point on the road towards Popery. Leaving this extreme and glancing at Independency, two things appear to be very plainly made known in the Scriptures, viz.: *first*, that the whole Church of Christ is one body; and, *secondly*, that our Lord, by his apostles, instituted certain offices, and attached to these offices the powers belonging to them; so that the church is not immediately to direct her own affairs, but she is directed and ruled by her representatives, her chosen rulers, who are officers ordained of God.

In the middle, between these two extremes, just where truth always lies, you find what is called Presbyterianism—the Scriptural form of church government. We call it the Scriptural form, because it seems to us that the Scriptures directly reveal all the main features of it, out of which necessarily flow the secondary features. As we said before, the *substantials* of the system are laid down in Scripture, in *particular rules*, respecting the church herself, her officers, her courts, and her discipline; whilst the *circumstantials*, also, are there laid down in *general rules* of order, decency, and edification.

First, *as to the church herself*, the Scriptures plainly teach that she is one body. The church of the Old Testament was one body, having one worship, one High Priest, and one place of sacrifice. And Paul describes the New Testament church not as “a loose mass of independent congregations,” but a body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth. Dr Killen well remarks that—

“While the Apostle does indeed here refer to the vital union of believers, he seems, also, to allude to those *bands* of outward ordinances by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and those *joints* of visible confederation by which their communion is upheld, for were the church split up into an indefinite number of insulated congregations, even the unity of the Spirit could neither be distinctly ascertained, nor properly cultivated.”—P. 250.

Accordingly, Dr Killen regards the Twelve as

“Representatives of the doctrine of ecclesiastical confederation—for though commanded to go into all the world and preach to every creature, yet, as long as circumstances permitted, they continued to co operate. ‘When the apostles which were at Jerusalem heard that Samaria had received the word of God, *they sent* unto them Peter and John;’ and, at a subsequent period, they concurred in *sending* ‘forth Barnabas that he should go as far as unto Antioch.’ These facts distinctly prove that they had a common interest in everything pertaining to the well-being of the whole Christian commonwealth.”—Pp. 250, 551.

This unity of the church in adjoining provinces was maintained by meetings together of the delegates of the churches. As to different countries, the communion of saints was kept up also by deputations and letters.* During the lives of the apostles, there were preachers in whom they had no confidence, managing, by *letters of commendation*, to get access to apostolic churches.† All the churches of that day were, perhaps, more really united than they have ever been since.

So far from all the churches being independent, we read of all the congregations in Jerusalem, where were myriads of believing Jews, as *the church in Jerusalem*.‡ So we read of the Christians at Antioch, to whom so many “prophets and teachers ministered,” as *the church of Antioch*. Probably, also, the true reading of the passage in Acts ix. 31—“Then had the churches rest throughout all Judea and Galilee and Samaria”—is, “then had *the church* rest,” referring to the church of Palestine.

So much for the Scripture representation of the church as not a number of separate congregations, but one united body.

Secondly, *as to officers of the church*. There are two lists of these officers in two of Paul’s epistles, as follows:—

1. Christ “gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers,” Eph. iv. 11.

2. “God hath set some in the church, first, apostles; secondarily, prophets; thirdly, teachers; after that, miracles; then, gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues,” 1 Cor. xii. 28.

Now these passages evidently mention both ordinary and extraordinary functionaries. When the helps (that is, the deacons) and the extraordinary officers are left out of these apostolic catalogues, “it is rather singular (says Dr Killen) that, in the passage addressed to the Ephesians, we have nothing remaining but ‘PASTORS AND TEACHERS,’ and in that to the Corinthians nothing but ‘TEACHERS AND GOVERNMENTS.’ There are good grounds for believing that these two residuary elements are identical—the pastors mentioned before the teachers in one text being equivalent to the governments mentioned after them in the other.” We have long been convinced that this is the true interpretation of the expression, “and some, pastors and teachers.” If the apostle did not intend to put these into one *order*, why did he not repeat *some* before *teachers*, as before all the other officers he names? It is plain, in our apprehension, that he designed to speak

* See 2 Cor. viii. 4, 18, 22. Phil. ii. 25, 28. Col. iv. 7–9. 2 Tim. iv. 9–12.

† See 2 John, verse 10. 1 John iv. 1. Phil. i. 15–18.

‡ The expression is *ποσάι μυριάδες*, how many ten thousands.—Acts xxi. 20. See also Acts xi. 22; and xv. 4.

separately, first, of the *extraordinary* functionaries—that is, apostles, prophets, evangelists, and then, under one category, of the *ordinary*—that is, pastors and teachers, or ruling elders and teaching elders. The ordinary office-bearers of the apostolic church, then, were pastors, teachers, and helps—or, reversing the order a little, teachers, rulers, deacons.

Again, we read of elders and bishops, and these names are interchangeably applied. These are the same officers as the pastors. There were generally a plurality of elders as well as of deacons in every church or congregation.* But it is by no means correct to say that all the primitive elders or bishops were preachers. The elders were appointed simply to “take care of the church of God,” to be “overseers of the flock,” its shepherds, guardians, rulers, its head men and guides. It was not necessary all of them should have the *charism* of teaching, and they did not all have it; for Paul’s language to Timothy shews plainly that there were elders who did not labour in the word, and yet were worthy of honour, because faithful to their sole duty of ruling. And it is indeed remarkable, as the reader has probably noticed, how the apostle, when enumerating the qualifications of a bishop or elder, scarcely refers at all to any oratorical endowments. Only one word of that sort is used by him, rendered in English by the phrase *apt to teach*. This does not imply that he must be qualified to preach, for *teaching* and *preaching* are repeatedly distinguished in the New Testament;—but only that he must be able and willing, as opportunity occurs, to communicate sound instruction, and that from house to house. The aged women Paul required to be *teachers* of good things. All believers are to *teach* and admonish one another. The description which Paul gives of the qualifications of a bishop or elder is evidently a description of one called to *rule*.

Still, preaching is the grand ordinance of God to edify saints as well as to convert sinners, and therefore God gave some teachers as well as rulers, and these held the most honourable position in the church. In the courts of the church, however, which are assemblies of rulers, and nothing else, both these classes of rulers stand on a level, just as in official position and power, each individual of each class is equal to every other of the same class.

All these officers are to be elected by the free choice of the people. Yet, when elected, they have authority in the Lord, and obedience is due to them by the people. They are the Lord’s ministers, as well as the chosen rulers of the church.

Such is the Scriptural account of the officers of the church. Thirdly, *as to the courts of the Church*. The Scriptures

* Acts. vi. 3, xiv. 23; Titus i. 5; James v. 14.

shew that the ruling of the elders was not singly, as individuals, but jointly, as courts—not as presbyters, but as presbyteries. They also shew that these courts were some lower and some higher, and therefore courts of appeal.

The elders of the Jews had always acted as a body, and appeals from the inferior tribunals to that at Jerusalem were explicitly enjoined.* And obedience was actually rendered by foreign Synagogues to the orders of the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem.†

Every one of the apostolic churches, like every synagogue of the Jews, had its elders, and every city had its presbytery, consisting of the spiritual rulers of the district. Repeatedly, in the Acts, we find “the apostles” acting together as a court, as “the Presbytery of Jerusalem,” ordaining deacons, exercising discipline, and sending forth missionaries.”‡ Obviously, the same functions were performed by the prophets and teachers at Antioch.§ Titus is instructed to have elders ordained—that is, a presbytery established—in every city. Timothy was ordained by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. Thus did the eldership—that is, the parochial presbytery, or the session, the most ancient court of the church—arise with the first preaching of the gospel. And the classical presbytery is also found at Jerusalem and Antioch, and elsewhere, even at the beginning, and this manifestly was a higher court than the former. But can we find any court that was higher still than the classical presbytery! When at Antioch arose the discussion about circumcising the Gentile converts, there were individuals there present as competent to decide that question, we should say, as any that could be found anywhere—for example, Paul and the prophets that ministered in that church. Yet the Christians there acted as the Jews before them would have done—they sent the case up to Jerusalem. There was to be found not only the presbytery of Jerusalem, but also all the virtual rulers of the universal church, the apostles—and also elders from every country, resorting, as did the Jews from of old, to the Holy City. It is to this body the appeal comes, and is determined by them as the highest court of the Christian Church.

Dr Killen argues with great force that the elders of the church, called together at Miletus by Paul, were not the elders of Ephesus alone, but of the district around, called together as a synod or a classical presbytery. He reasons from the cause assigned for this calling of them together. Paul

* See Deut. xvii. 8–10; 2 Chron. xix. 8–11; Ps. cxxii. 5.

† Acts ix. 1, 2, 14.

‡ Acts ii. 14, 41, 42; iv. 4, 32, 33, 35; v. 14, 42; vi. 6, 7; viii. 14.

§ Acts xiii. 1, 3.

would not spend the time in Asia, but was hastening to Jerusalem. Had he merely wished to see the elders of the metropolis he might have gone to them as rapidly as his messenger could travel. But he was unwilling to offend the other churches, and he would see them all together by their representatives, and so he sends to Ephesus, and thence by a second set of messages he calls all the elders of the province together. Our author reasons, also, from the opening words of Paul's address to them, "Ye know from the first day that I came *into Asia* after what manner I have been *with you* at all seasons." The Evangelist informs us that Paul spent only two years and three months at Ephesus, yet here Paul tells his audience that for the space of *three years* he had not ceased to warn, &c. He suggests some other considerations, confirming this view of the matter, but we shall only refer to his quotation from Irenæus. "In Mileto enim convocatis episcopis et Presbyteris qui erant ab Epheso et a reliquis proximis civitatibus."*

As to the fact that Scripture takes so little notice of Christian judicatories, let it be considered that the machinery of the church's government (as Dr Killen suggests) did not require to be written down for the heathen to read about, as much as the doctrines and the history of Christianity. It might thus have been only so much the more exposed to the attacks of enemies. Hence its courts probably assembled in secret, both during the very earliest days, and also afterwards, during the persecutions which preceded the second half of the second century.†

* Contra Hæres. iii. c. 14, § 2.

† Neander has asserted, as Mosheim did before him, that synods commenced not until the middle of the second century. The statement is unsupported (says Killen) by a particle of evidence, and a number of facts may be adduced to prove that it is altogether untenable. The earliest writers, who touch upon the subject, speak of them as of apostolic origin—witness the reference to the synod at Miletus, just now quoted from Irenæus. Cyprian and Jerome are both quoted by Killen to the same effect. Our author also denies that synods originated in Greece. He brings proof that there were councils held both at Carthage and Rome, before those Greek councils which Tertullian refers to as occasioned about the middle of the second century by the Montanistic troubles. Nor does Dr Killen treat with any respect the idea that the once famous Amphictyonic Council suggested their establishment amongst Christians. In the second century of the Christian era the council of the Amphyctions was shorn of its glory, and though it then continued to meet, it had long ceased to be either an exponent of the national mind, or a free and independent assembly. And it is not to be imagined that the Christian community, in the full vigour of its early growth, would all at once have abandoned its apostolic constitution and adopted a form of government borrowed from an effete institute. Synods, which now form so prominent a part of the ecclesiastical polity, could claim a higher and holier origin. They were obviously nothing more than the legitimate development of the primitive structure of the church, for they could be traced up to that meeting of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem, which relieved the Gentile converts from the observance of the rite of circumcision.—P. 615.

But if there be few notices of these courts in the Scriptures, they are sufficiently numerous to give them a divine warrant, for a single Scripture precedent is as decisive as a multitude. One solitary reference of an appeal from a lower to a higher court, in connection with the other concurrent revelations of Scripture, is all we need to establish the Christian doctrine of church government by courts of review and control.

Now the power which belongs to these courts, from the highest down to the lowest, is all of it merely *declarative*. They cannot make any laws, they can only expound and declare the laws of Christ—for Jesus is the sole King and Head of his church.

Moreover, this power is all of it *spiritual*, and none of it civil, or political, or temporal; for Christ's kingdom is not of this world. His church, in her highest courts, can inflict no penalty but a spiritual one. Indeed, she can there handle no business but what is *spiritual*, that is, strictly *ecclesiastical* and belonging to them as *courts of the Lord's house*. There are to be discussed only those questions which arise out of the relations which men bear to men as members of Christ's church.

Yet, on the other hand, the power of these courts is a real and living power, given them of God—for they bind on earth and it is bound in heaven;* and they have the promise of divine guidance in their bindings.† So much the more ought it not to be prostituted to any but the affairs of Christ's house and kingdom!

Such, we believe, is the doctrine revealed in Scripture respecting the courts of the church.

Fourthly, All that has been said of the Scriptural exhibition of church government, as to its substantial, leads to this final statement—that the system set up in the New Testament for the government of the church is the *representative system*. The whole church is one body; this body is governed by officers of the people's own free choice; these officers meet together for consultation in all their ruling, and rule according to a revealed constitution and laws. They are chosen to act for the church, but are left free to act according to their own judgment and conscience, guided solely by light from above. This is the *representative system*, distinguished plainly from congregationalism, or the direct and immediate government of the people themselves, and distinguished, also, quite as plainly from the government of prelates.

This government, by representatives, is also to be distinguished from the deputy system, which prevailed among all the nations arising out of the conquests by the Teutonic races,

* Matt. xviii. 17, 18.

† Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.

whereas, only in England and her colonies has the representative system prevailed. Congregationalists hold to popular government; but presbyterians to government by representatives, who are not *deputies*, that is, as Leiber expresses it (see *Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, vol. ii. p. 181), "Attorneys sent with *specific powers* of attorney to remedy *specific* grievances, but representatives, general representatives, that is, *representatives from the body at large*, and with the general power of legislation. This is universally now acknowledged to be the most important of all the guarantees of civil liberty." This is the only contrivance which the highest political wisdom has ever found out for "organically passing over public opinion into public law;" for barring "against the absolutism of the executive on the one, and of the masses on the other hand;" for securing an essentially popular government, and yet the supremacy of law; in other words, for securing the united and harmonious existence of *liberty and order*. Milton (expounded in this Review, for June 1848) "distinctly sets forth the peculiar value of the representative principle in political affairs, when he said it consists in the probability, which it furnishes, that *reason only shall sway*. The danger of democracy is from the ignorance and the passions of the people; of monarchy, from the caprices, tyranny, or ambition of kings; of an oligarchy, from the selfishness incident to privileged orders. Reason, whose voice is God's will, is much more likely to prevail in a deliberative assembly of men coming from the people, and knowing their real interests as well as their wishes. It is a great mistake to suppose that the end of government is to accomplish the will of the people. The state is a divine ordinance founded on justice, and having great moral ends to subserve. The will of the people is to be done only when the people will what is right. And the representative principle is both a check on their power and a bulwark of their freedom."

"Now these principles, which constitute the glory of modern politics, were found embedded in the Presbyterian system, ages before a representative republic, in the true sense of the term, existed on the earth." Our church government is not in the hands of the mass of the people, nor yet in the hands of individual officers whom they have appointed, but in the hands of representative assemblies chosen by the people. This it is which distinguishes it from prelacy on the one hand, and congregationalism on the other. And it is worthy of special notice that in these free representative assemblies, instituted by Jesus Christ for the rule of his church, there is provided an arrangement answering precisely to that most important check which, in the freest modern states, is imposed on their popular assemblies, viz., the principle of *two chambers*, composed

of different persons, belonging to different classes or elected for different terms of service. Our courts have both ministers and elders, and the one class operates as a check upon the other. So, too, our higher courts are a check upon the lower. Thus is the discovery of truth promoted, and the probability diminished that party-interest or temporary prejudices shall predominate in the result.

We find in the 15th chapter of Acts (verses 4, 6, 13, 19, 22) this very picture of a representative assembly. The apostles and elders come together to consider of the matter referred to them from Antioch; all the multitude keep silence while James and the other representatives, after Paul and Barnabas have reported, give their sentence in judgment; and then it pleases the apostles and elders, with *the whole church*, in whose name and on whose behalf they were acting, to send chosen men of their own company, viz., Judas and Silas, with their decree down to the lower court at Antioch. The people not only *could not* all meet for deciding such questions; they *must not*, if they could; they had *no right* thus to meet, or thus to decide. That is not the government set up by the Lord. He established his church as an organized body, and not a mere crowd or mob of disciples; as an organized body, with her divinely authorised officers, through whom she must always act. It is the church that does all, it is the bride, the lamb's wife, to whom all power is given; but it is not the individual, or private men and women that can tumultuously assemble and intrude themselves, without authority, into duties or work, not appointed of God to be done by them. And so, in like manner, there may not any man intrude himself into the representative assembly of the people, except he be strictly and really a chosen ruler of that people. That assembly is always an assembly of *rulers chosen*. The people may not be governed by any they have not chosen. On the other hand, they may not usurp the government themselves, nor refuse obedience to their chosen rulers.

Now, if the Scriptures do thus reveal that the church is one; that she is to be governed by elders; that these elders are representatives; that these representatives rule and govern her, not singly, but jointly, in free deliberative assemblies, which assemblies are of lower and higher grade, so as to constitute courts of appeal; if the Scriptures do reveal all these substantial of Presbyterian church government in particular rules respecting officers, courts and discipline, is it a very *hard saying* that Presbyterian church government is of divine right? If these four heads of the doctrine of church government be acknowledged, must not the whole system be acknowledged? What more is there in the system besides these four main

things? There are only some circumstantialia; but these also are of divine right, because they are necessary for *decency and order*, and we have the divine command to do all things decently and in order. The government is specifically of deliberative assemblies representing the church and acting for her edification. Of course it is their right and duty to make all mere circumstantial rules, and every one of those rules has the divine sanction, if it accord with Scripture. The courts that make them are liable to err, and the Word is always the only standard whereby everything is to be tried. But, when agreeable to Scripture, those rules, even the minutest of them, are of divine right. They are made by an authority which the Lord himself set up, and which acts in his name. They proceed from rulers that have the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and have power to bind and to loose on earth, and it is bound or loosed accordingly in heaven.

We earnestly commend these views to all our ministerial brethren who have been disposed to make questions of church government of secondary importance—also to all our brethren of the ruling eldership. We likewise commend them especially to all candidates for the ministry. If Jesus be our King, and if he have set up the church as his kingdom on earth, we may not construe the laws of that kingdom into matters of minor moment. What we have said on this subject in the foregoing pages, and what Dr Killen has taught in his book, is the doctrine of our fathers, as laid down in their Confession of Faith and Form of Government. They confessed it because they found it in the Bible. If good enough for them, it ought to be good enough for any of us, who are in many things their inferiors. As for the charge that these views are bigoted or intolerant, it is a slander. They are perfectly consistent with the most expansive charity. To assert them is merely to assert that in our judgment such is the doctrine revealed in the Scriptures.

Having awarded nothing but praise to Dr Killen's book thus far, we will say, in closing, that we think his arrangement would admit of more clearness and compactness, and with this solitary censure we commend the work to all our readers, of every class, as exceedingly well worthy of their careful study.*

* The extent to which a *jus divinum* is here claimed for the details of church government is, we think, an untenable exaggeration. Indeed, the whole position here taken as to the *jus divinum* of circumstantialia, and the ground on which it is alleged to rest, seems to us little better than a quibble, unworthy of the ability by which the article as a whole is characterised.—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

ART. VI.—*Conference on Missions, held in 1860, at Liverpool.*
London : James Nisbet & Co.

THE history of Christianity during the eighteen and a half centuries of its existence in the world, has been very different from what the generality of its early professors must have anticipated. The momentum of the Gospel seemed so great to begin with, and its progress in the first ages was so rapid, that to those who had no supernatural insight into the future it must have appeared certain that long before this time the whole earth would be overspread with its influence. How different the issue has been from the hope ! First, the extension of the religion of the New Testament, in so far as it was a life and a light, was arrested ; and then the Church itself, as a visible organisation, became overshadowed by the Apostasy, and turned from being the body of Christ into a very synagogue of Satan. That during all these dark ages, when Antichrist was supreme, there were never wanting some who held the truth and were faithful witnesses for it, we are just as sure as we can be of anything in this world. An *apostolical* succession is a dream, and worse ; but not so an unbroken *succession* in the household of faith. God has been always able, even of stones, to raise up children unto Abraham ; and the circumstances of society, and the conditions of human nature, have never been such as to make it impossible that the line of believers should be continued. Still, so strange has been the order of events—so mysterious has been the lot of the Gospel among men—that even at this late period of the day, we cannot help feeling as if our position was very much the same as that of the early church—as if, after forty years' wandering in the wilderness, we were only now on the borders of the land which we have always been commissioned to subdue.

Shall we not say that the parallel between the church of the first century and the church of the nineteenth holds in another respect also ? On both have been poured out in unwonted abundance the influences of the Holy Spirit ; and in very many different countries men, who never expected to be so favoured, have seen with their own eyes what has helped them to read with a fresh interest and a better understanding those chapters of Holy Writ which tell of the Pentecostal awakening. Very inadequately yet, doubtless, does the church of the present time realise either the wants of the world in which it witnesses, or the grandeur and urgency of its own peculiar mission. Yet we cannot but notice with satisfaction and thankfulness the many evidences which are now presenting themselves, that it is

wakening up to a livelier sense of its responsibilities ; and however unpromising in some respects our prospects may be, we have no hesitation in expressing our conviction that we have entered on a new era of the history of Christianity. May it be with us now as it was with the Israelites on arriving within sight of Canaan the second time ! The church, on addressing itself first to the conquering of the world, was not only unsuccessful, but was itself sent back to wander for a season in a desolate wilderness. She has now raised herself to make a new attempt. May she watch against the growth of those sins, the manifestation of which might necessitate *another return* into the wilderness. Undismayed by the contemplation of the giant evils which oppose us—the cities great and walled up to heaven that are to be subdued—let us, in the strength of the Lord, and in the power of his might, address ourselves to the work, and Jordan shall be driven back, the battlements of Jericho shall fall, and “little by little” the conquest will proceed, until the much land that yet remains to be possessed shall own the sway of Him whose right it is to reign.

In the volume whose title is given at the head of this paper, we are invited to consider one of the most interesting and significant religious events which have occurred during the present year. During the whole of last winter one could scarcely open a newspaper without somewhere in it coming across the word “*Congress*,” or “*Conference*.” The world was all that time held in suspense as to whether there was or was not to be such a thing on behalf of Italy. Happily or unhappily (we shall not venture to say which) all the talk about that particular matter came to nothing. But the idea does not seem to have fallen altogether to the ground. It helped, we can at least fancy, to the suggestion of a plan which was actually carried out—that of collecting together into one place as many as possible of those who were specially interested in Christian Missions, and inviting them to confer on the best means of carrying them on with increased vigour and success. The merit of proposing this plan, and also of carrying it out, is due, we believe, to one of the merchant princes of Liverpool, Mr R. A. Macfie, who not only bore the entire cost of its execution (no light matter, as may be supposed), but who, in promoting the comfort and efficiency of the Conference, was as a “steward” in more than name only ; for, as we ourselves can testify, he made himself literally the servant of all. Of course our statesmen and politicians will pronounce this Congress a very humble affair indeed. If it had had before it such a question as the future place of Savoy on the map of Europe, its proceedings would have been watched with the deepest interest, and its “resolutions” telegraphed to the ends of the earth ! But as the great subject of discussion was

merely this : *How is the world to be soonest evangelised ?* its importance, doubtless, was not felt to be so great as to call down upon it the special notice of men of that class at all. Whatever may have been the opinion, however, of such persons in regard to it, there is no sincere believer in the truth and future of Christianity but must feel that weightier matters far come up for deliberation in a missionary conference than could have been made subjects of discussion in a congress of the first-rate European Powers.

The composition of the Liverpool Conference was such as to afford a reasonable guarantee that the end contemplated by it would be gained. The members were not absolutely numerous—there were one hundred and twenty-five in all—but they formed on the whole a very fair representation of the entire missionary interest of Great Britain and Ireland. As the value of the proceedings will be held to depend in no small degree on the character of the individuals who took part in them, it may be desirable to go a little into detail in this connection. In the first place, then, we find, on going over the list, that there were present at the Conference, thirty-five or six persons who either were still missionaries, or who had at one time laboured in the mission field. These men were from all parts of the world—India (every province in it), China, and Japan, Ceylon, South and West Africa, the West Indies, the South Seas, North America, Syria, and Siberia. The gathering together of so many labourers from so many different corners of the vineyard, was in itself a feature remarkable enough, very peculiarly to distinguish this convention. Twenty years ago, the thing would have been impossible. The simple achievement of such a result was in itself a significant proof of the progress of missions. But apart from that, it will be seen at a glance, how certainly such an assembly secured that wide diversity of missionary experience, which was needed to give weight to the findings of the Conference. While the various mission fields differ very widely from one another, and it would be worse than absurd to require that all should be cultivated in precisely the same way, there are undoubtedly certain great general principles applicable to the conduct of evangelistic efforts everywhere. To ascertain these, you must have not merely the opinions of men who have spent a lifetime in India or Siberia, but the judgments of men who have seen the Gospel brought to bear upon heathenism in every shape and form. And this is just what we have here. There met in Liverpool, in March last, persons who had preached Christ to men of every colour—white, red, yellow, and black—who had toiled under every variety of climate from the Arctic regions to the Tropics, and who had mixed in society of all degrees of development, from the simple barbarism of the

Red Indian, to the elaborate civilisation of the Chinese. And it will be reckoned a point of no small importance that the *minutes* which were adopted at the conclusion of each discussion, are presented to us as expressing the mind of all these persons together.

But, besides those personally engaged in the work, there were present a large number of individuals, whose opinions on missionary subjects are entitled to be received with great respect—the *officials* representing the different evangelistic institutions throughout the country. The Societies which may be said to have had a voice in the Conference were—The Church of England Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society, the Moravian, the Baptist, the Wesleyan, the Turkish Missions' Aid, the Religious Tract, the Welsh Calvinistic, the Colonial Church and School, the London Jewish, the Medical, the Patagonian, the British and Foreign Bible, the Christian Vernacular Education, the Female Education, with the Foreign Mission Committees of the Free and United Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, and of the Presbyterian Churches of England and Ireland. Had the conveners and the secretaries representing these various societies met alone for consultation and given the result to the world, their deliverances would have been well entitled to our earnest and respectful consideration. The Conference, therefore, which actually assembled at Liverpool may very confidently claim more than usual attention, since the list we have now given brings before us only *one element* in its composition.

Still further, in addition to the two classes described above, there was a considerable remainder of members who may be distributed under the general head of "Miscellaneous," but who were all, in one way or another (some of them most intimately) identified with the missionary cause. There were, for example, some half-a-dozen men who had spent the best part of their lives in India as soldiers or civilians. One of these—Major-General Alexander—presided over all the meetings of the Conference; and another—Mr Carre Tucker, late Commissioner at Benares—not only acted as one of the secretaries, but took a leading part in arranging for its convocation. Besides, of all who took part in the proceedings there were few around whom there seemed to circle a greater amount of interest, or who made a deeper impression by their addresses, than Major Davidson of Edinburgh and Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes, concerning each of whom it may emphatically be said, that while animated in an intense degree with the Christian spirit, he is still "every inch a soldier." The *Merchant* class was equally well represented. Liverpool had its Macfies and Croppers; Manchester its Barbours; Glasgow its Hendersons of Park.

Then Dr Baylee of St Aidans, and Principal Green of Islington, made an admirable appearance for the missionary training institutions. Mr Carlile of "The News of the Churches," *appeared* for that most influential agent in modern society, the Religious Press; and such men as Canon Stowell and Dr Raffles represented the ministry of the home church. This review, however, would be marked by a serious omission if we failed to notice one other member of the Conference—*Behari Lal Singh*, one of the Calcutta Free Church converts, and himself a preacher of the Gospel. It would perhaps have added weight and interest to the deliberations of the Congress if there had been more of this class present. But this is an element that can never be calculated on in any home meeting. And as it was, it was fortunate that even one living example of the power of the Gospel in heathen lands could be laid hold upon, and that he was able to speak of the missionary interest from the side of those on whose behalf it is exercised.

We have spoken of the composition of the Conference mainly in relation to the *classes* into which its members may be distributed. We might go yet more into detail and give a few descriptive sketches of some of the individual men who took a leading part in its discussion. The writer of this paper had the happiness to be present during all its sittings. Belonging to the "Miscellaneous" section of its membership, and to that subdivision of it which had nothing in the form of first-hand information to contribute, he sat as a silent, but not uninterested or unobservant, spectator of the proceedings; and if the space allotted to us had allowed, we could have given here some impressions which would perhaps have furthered somewhat the special end we have now in view—that, namely, of deepening the sense which, we are assured, all our readers have already, to some extent, of this Convention's importance. Enough, however, has been said by way of introduction; and we must hasten to deal directly with the blue-book which has been recently published, and which contains an authentic account of the papers read and communicated—the discussions which took place—and the resolutions which were come to. But before passing to this, we must take notice of one thing more about the Conference which will always make it to be remembered with pleasure by those who had the good fortune to be present in it. Any one who will look over its list of members will see that it was, in the broadest sense of the expression, a *catholic assembly*. There was no evangelical denomination of any size in the country that was not represented in it. There were Churchmen and Dissenters—Episcopalians and Presbyterians—Independents and Methodists—Baptists and Pædo-Baptists; and yet the essential oneness of the whole body was so real, that it

might truly be said to be *felt*. The only weak point in the theory on which the Evangelical Alliance is based lies here, that, so to speak, the means which it employs and the end which it contemplates are one and the same. Men are, by it, invited to unite. But what for? Just that they may unite. It is long since it was seen that there was not condensing power sufficient in this idea to make the body very compact or very practical. But here, in the Missionary Conference, all denominations were invited to combine, that they might consult together about a matter in which each and all of them had a direct and urgent interest,—viz, how a common enemy was to be subdued. And the essential unity which links all true Christians together was then intensely realised, without being much or immediately thought about. We had often heard before that in India, face to face with a gigantic system of heathenism, the problem of an evangelical alliance had been solved without difficulty. And now we can easily understand why it should have been so. It will ever be with a divided church just as it has often been with nations rent by internal factions. Discord ceases in a country when it is known that an enemy is on the frontier; and the more we realise the fact that there is a world lying in wickedness, not only needing to be subdued, but even threatening us with invasion, the more will a sense of common danger and common responsibility promote brotherly feeling and united action.

The plan of procedure arranged for the Conference seems to have been well considered; and it turned out to be admirably adapted for the end contemplated. Each day there were, in a manner, four meetings: *first*, one for prayer, to which the public were admitted, and in which ministers and laymen of all denominations took part; *next*, two of a more private nature for business; and *lastly*, a fourth, a sort of popular soiree in the evening, which was addressed by those of the members who had anything specially interesting or important to say. The whole series was fitly completed and rounded off by a noble public meeting, presided over by the Earl of Shaftesbury, and held in one of the two magnificent halls of which Liverpool may well be proud. We propose to restrict any remarks we have to make in the present paper, to what we may call the Business Transactions; but we should be doing violence to our own feelings and convictions, if we did not put on record here, our deep sense of the importance of many of the addresses, speeches, and essays, which form the surroundings of the Central Report. Nothing, for example, could be more interesting than Behari Lal's personal narrative, or Mr Lenpolt's account of the Indian converts during the rebellion; and nothing is more deserving, at the present time, of a wide circulation among parliamentary constitu-

encies, than the outspoken and eloquent oration of Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes. The volume altogether is undoubtedly the most important contribution to the literature of missions which has ever been published, and we sincerely trust that those who have undertaken to give it to the world, will be provided with the means, not only of sending it as was proposed to every mission station on the globe, but of placing it in every village library and on the study table of every minister in this land.

In the business meetings, the following simple order was followed throughout. A programme of the topics to be discussed at each sederunt was printed and put into the hands of each member of the Conference. These, as their turn came to be handled, were introduced by the reading of one or two short papers; then a free conversation occurred; and last of all, when the subject had, as was supposed, been sufficiently expiscated, a minute was submitted expressing the mind of the various speakers on the point considered. The value of these minutes is not, it must be candidly said, so great as it might have been. Those who constructed them were so exceedingly anxious to avoid rubbing against the angles of any one, that they have made them sometimes a little vague and pointless—a collection of truisms rather than an authoritative and suggestive statement of missionary principles. We must seek the real mind of the Conference, therefore, not so much in its excessively mild and soft-spoken resolutions, but in the frank expression of individual opinion which precedes them.

The questions which may be raised in connection with the mission enterprise are almost infinite in number; but when we come attentively to consider their nature, we find that most of them fall naturally to be ranged under two heads, viz., *the conduct of the work abroad*, and *the relative responsibilities of the church at home*. This very simple classification does not seem to have been always attended to by the preparers of the programme; and hence, subjects that might have been much better discussed separately were taken together, and the conversation, in consequence, became sometimes a little disjointed and incoherent. In the glance we are now to take of the proceedings, we shall not follow the order of the daily reports, but, keeping by the division above indicated, endeavour to collect the opinions of the Conference in regard to some of the more pressing and important of missionary problems.

With respect to the first point, the conduct of the work abroad, a complete scheme of mission policy can be traced out with tolerable distinctness in the volume before us. The means which must be employed everywhere in the direct propagation of the Gospel are either ORAL or LITERARY. By *preaching*,

teaching, or *conversation* on the one hand, or by *writing* on the other, a man may communicate to his fellows a knowledge of the way of salvation. But when this has been settled, further questions are immediately raised; as, for instance, By whom chiefly are these instrumentalities to be used, and to which of them, as most influential, is the church to devote her greatest strength? Now, these, among others, are just the questions to which this blue-book comes to offer replies, and if the deliberations it reports are to be of permanent, practical value, they should certainly shew it in the way of setting a few of them, at any rate, at rest.

Let us consider the subject of the LIVING AGENCY by which the work abroad must be conducted. Who form it? There is, to begin with, the *European missionary*; next, there is the *native evangelist*; and, finally, there is the fully organised *Christian congregation*. To each of these the Conference devoted one entire sitting. We shall glance through the record of its discussions, and mark some of the more notable things that were said about them.

"European Missionaries Abroad" was the title of the very first paper which was read. It was submitted by one who, perhaps, more than any other in the Conference, was entitled to speak with authority on the subject—*Mr Joseph Mullens*; and we have great confidence in placing some of his opinions on the subject before our readers.

"It would seem," he says, "to be a good rule, right and wise, that every missionary going to a heathen land should thoroughly master the current vernacular, and be able to address the people in their own tongue. . . . There may be exceptions to the rule in cases where the heathen understand the language of the missionary, as in a few great cities of India. We know many honoured and useful missionaries so situated; but I do not know one missionary who does not consider that, to have learned the language when commencing missionary life, would have added greatly to his usefulness. To be able fluently to preach in the language of a heathen people is a great talent, most powerful for their evangelization."

"For the first year or two, the (the missionary's) principal attention should be given to the language, and to books about the natives. . . . He must not, however, be inactive in his direct work. . . . When opportunity is given, to teach young people for a short time each day will both add to his knowledge and stir up his zeal. It is an excellent plan at the outset for a missionary to reside at a country station." "When settled in work, vernacular preaching will generally occupy the most conspicuous place in his plans as the most direct method of reaching the souls of the heathen." "The time seems now to be come for employing this agency to the largest extent—books, tracts, and portions of Scripture have long been available as its auxiliaries. Much knowledge of Gospel truth has been spread, and efforts already made should be followed up."

In these views the members of Conference generally seemed to concur. That the missionary should learn the language of the people among whom he labours, and go down familiarly among them, so as to know their thoughts, and prejudices, and ruling motives, was a point especially on which the feeling appeared to be peculiarly strong. It was admitted that there were two ways in which a Christian evangelist might do good in a heathen land, though knowing no tongue but his own. One of these Mr Mullens himself expressly mentioned ; and the other was noticed by Dr O'Meara from the Indian settlements—that of preaching by an interpreter. But in laying down a general rule to be pursued by the church in the propagation of the Gospel, it was emphatically, and, we think, rightly insisted upon, that as the heathen natives in the mass are to be converted through the medium of their own language, so those sent to declare the message of mercy to them should be able to employ that indispensable medium. As to the other matter—that of direct vernacular preaching—a somewhat singular circumstance was mentioned by Mr Hardy, late of Ceylon. One might, at first, be disposed to say that natives alone could hope to be very effective in this department, and that although Europeans should engage in it for the present, until an indigenous ministry had been created, they could not look to have much encouragement in it. But hear Mr Hardy:—

“ It was frequently his duty to catechise the children on Monday, after he and others had been preaching to them on the Sabbath day. He invariably found, when he asked them about the sermons preached by the European and the native, that relatively they could always give better answers as to the sermons of the Europeans than they could with respect to those of the natives. Of course the idiom spoken by the natives was much better than what the European could possibly acquire ; but with the discipline which Europeans had to go through, the comparative clearness of their ideas, and the readiness with which they threw them before the people, without that circumlocution which an uneducated native must almost necessarily exercise, he invariably found that they could tell much more about the sermon of the European than about the native ; and he accounted for it in that way.”

Returning, however, to Mr Mullens's paper, there was another point noticed by him evidently of high importance. It concerned the subject of the qualifications of missionaries going abroad. Is it necessary only that they should be distinguished for piety and zeal ? for aptitude in learning languages, or skill in preaching them ? That question raises this other. What, in its fullest sense, is ultimately to be the position of European ministers in heathen lands ? The time, it is to be hoped, will come when, in India, for example, numerous

native congregations will everywhere be found? Is he to become the pastor of one of these? Or, leaving them, is he forthwith to move his camp into the regions beyond? The first alternative is, of course, out of the question; and the second will only be formed after a considerable time. There is then a middle place, which he will require to occupy, that is, the place of superintendent or overseer of a congeries of native congregations. Already the Europeans have been called in various countries to assume such an episcopate. Mr Vinter was, or is, superintendent of forty Karen churches. Mr Thomas in Tinnevely was superintendent of 5000 Christians, and missionaries in the South Seas have been superintendents of whole islands. The period when those whom we send abroad shall be called on more frequently to fill such offices is, we trust and believe, drawing near; and hence the need of men not merely of piety and talent, but of great prudence and wisdom, and especially ruling gifts. There is just one other point we must notice in this connection. *What part ought the European missionary to take in the work of translation?* The native preacher who was present in the Conference seemed disposed to complain that, in this matter, the foreigner sometimes had taken too much upon him. "Hitherto," he said, "the plan of translating the Bible had been conducted as though foreign missionaries were the only successful or competent translators." . . . While "the history of all Christian nations proclaimed the fact that Christians who were natives of the soil were the most successful translators into their own language." This last fact is undoubtedly true, and we never expect to see a Hindostanee Bible which shall hold in India the same place that the authorised English version does here until a translation has been made by one speaking that language as his mother tongue. But Behari forgot, and most people, looking at these things in a superficial way, would forget also, that there is another and an equally important side to the question, namely, the native's acquaintance with the languages out of which the Scriptures are to be translated. This consideration was brought out at a subsequent diet, in a very emphatic way, by Dr Baylee of St Aidans, unquestionably the scholar of the conference.

"It will," said he, "be generations before the natives themselves will be able to execute the task of a native version. On this subject we must not confound two very distinct questions: original treatises on religious subjects, and the translation of the Bible. Educated Christian natives may write better books for their countrymen than Europeans could do; but our university training, our philosophical studies, our centuries of experience in biblical versions, have given us a discipline for which the native mind is at present unfit."

This may be strongly put ; but in the general strain of it we cannot but concur. And hence we have here another department of the work which, when he is called to it, the European missionary ought to be able to undertake, and which he cannot safely entrust to another.

The conversation which took place on the subject of a *native agency* was deeply interesting and instructive. There was but one opinion, that no heathen country would ever be quickly or completely evangelised without such a force ; and the raising up of a native ministry was therefore recognised as a point of primary importance in any missionary enterprise. But there would appear to be abundant room for diversity of opinion in regard to the *class* from which it should be taken—the *circumstances* under which it should be employed—and, above all, the *training* to which it should be subjected. We give the following extracts as a string of seed thoughts on this pre-eminently momentous subject.

"Those agents," says *Mr Hardy*, who read the preliminary paper, "have been the most efficient that have been 'thrust forth' by the Lord, to use our Saviour's own expression, as labourers into his harvest. They have been called from the plough as Elisha ; from the cattle-pen as Amos ; from the fisher-boat as Peter ; and from the school of the sage as Paul of Tarsus." "In his homogeneity with the people whom he seeks to influence, consists a considerable portion of the teacher's power ; and consequently whatever tends to deprive him of this, renders him so far less fitted for his work. This will be the effect more or less of scholastic teaching, of temporary isolation from his usual mode of living, and above all, of an increase of income, greatly beyond the means of the people among whom he has to minister." "After an extensive study of the various organisations that have been tried upon the mission-field, none have appeared to me so perfect as the one carried out by the Rev. R. B. Lyth of Fiji. . . . The great principle by which he was enabled, under circumstances the most difficult, to reduce the class around him to comparative order, was, 'by training the natives *for* their work, by training them in their work.'" "The native pastor, for the most part, and as a general rule, should be educated in the vernacular only."—*Colonel Dawes* "preferred men brought up without a knowledge of the English language ; men who were willing and able, in their own tongue, to declare the unsearchable riches of Christ." "The native agent should be as much as possible like one of those amongst whom he labours, not coming among them as one having received education in a foreign language, and having adopted a dress and manners half English and half Indian, but as one in those private matters in all respects like themselves."—The *Rev. Isaac Stubbins*, General Baptist Missionary at Cuttack, in India, said, "Out of twenty-three native ministers raised up in connection with their mission, all of them, except eight, were converted and called to the ministry as adults."—*Major Davidson*, "I believe there is a great deal of misappre-

hension with respect to the character of the people, who are to be operated upon in India." . . . "Many people in this country view the natives of India, as if they were all learned Brahmins. Now these said Brahmins constitute a mere fraction of the population. Are we then to educate our native agents as if they were to contend only with learned Brahmins, or are we to educate them so that they may be able to labour among the native population at large? . . . I am far from considering a high education as thrown away. I do believe we ought to educate some of our native converts in the highest possible manner; but for the general agency by which we are to operate upon the people of India, I do not think so high a class of education is either necessary or desirable."—*Dr Macgowan* : "Native agency was indeed all-important; but they had been pressed and impelled by friends at home to employ and trust to natives too soon; one of the results being that they were filling their churches with hypocrites, because men were anxious for employment."—*The Rev. Thomas Gardiner* : "They of the Free Church mourned that they had not more native agency in connection with their own mission. Perhaps they might have in some respects their own system to thank for it, and it behoved them to study to find out their weak points. . . . What was the training they gave to their young men in Calcutta? They introduced them into the world of English thought and feeling, English science and literature; they felt its fascinations and charms; they lived therein for years, until they were brought through a college education, and had become to a very great extent Anglicised and denationalised; and after all this, they sent them off into the country districts, where not a single English idea or sympathy was to be met with. Was it to be wondered at if such young men found themselves out of their element, and experienced a difficulty in settling down to the work of evangelising their countrymen?"—*Rev. C. B. Lenpolt of Benares* : "Very few natives understand the language well who have had a purely European training. He had seen natives of first class European training who could not write a page of Hindostanee. The vernacular must form an important portion of the training that is given to them. . . . They must get most of them (their native agents) from amongst the adult population, for such have their own peculiar advantages. They knew all about their old religion, and in this respect they possessed an advantage which the young men who had been trained in a college from their childhood did not possess."—*Rev. J. Walton of Jaffna* : "The salary question had been felt to be one of great difficulty and much embarrassment in Ceylon. It had been inseparably connected with that denationalising process which attached to their present method of training, and which he held emphatically unfitted their native brethren for mission work. . . . It now strongly behoved them to select native agents suited in every respect for the position they were to fill, and not to raise up in their churches a race of hybrids dressing like Europeans, detached from their own countrymen, and needing an income which the native churches will of themselves be unable to furnish for a long time to come."

It is impossible to mistake the general strain and tendency of these remarks. To Christianize even such a country as India, the evangelists required are men who have lived till the period of adolescence in the bosom of heathenism—who give evidence, in the fervour of their spirits, of having a special call to the work of the ministry, and who have not been denationalized by a system of European training. One conclusion forced upon us by these views is plainly this (we can have the less hesitation in stating it, that two at least of those who had experimental knowledge of the working of the system spoke most strongly of its defects), that the great collegiate institutions of the presidency towns, however well adapted they may be to serve other important ends, are not well calculated for raising up generally useful and effective native agents.

With respect to the third evangelistic force in heathen communities—the *native church or congregation*—a useful paper was read by Mr Trestrail, one of the secretaries of the Baptist Society ; and, in the conversation which ensued, many important practical suggestions were thrown out, which, we do not doubt, will be found to be of increasing value as the church proceeds with her great work. We regret, however, that we must pass the whole subject by without further remark than this, that in the division of the report which embraces the debate upon it, the reader will find some light thrown upon two deeply interesting questions—viz., What prospect there is of Christianity becoming self-sustained, to any extent, in India? and how far it is expedient to reproduce abroad the Church types with which we are familiar at home?

In assuming that the European missionary, the heathen convert, and the native church, are the three great evangelistic forces by which a country is to be Christianized, we have never for a moment been forgetting that, of course, these forces may operate under an infinite variety of forms. The European missionary, for example, may be a governess, carrying the Gospel into the zenana ; or a medical man, speaking a word for Christ to the sick and dying in an hospital ; or an indigo planter, giving instruction to his ryots ; or a teacher, telling the story of the Cross to a class of children. It is lawful for the Christian ambassador to go in by every door which Providence opens for him ; and it is, indeed, only by the use of all kinds of means that we can ever expect fully to carry out the Saviour's will, that the Gospel should be preached to every creature. In connection, however, with this point—the selection of means—it is well known that some difference of opinion exists ; and, doubtless, the report of the proceedings of the Liverpool Conference will be read by many with some curiosity, to see if it contributes anything to the setting of

this debated question at rest. It will, of course, be at once understood that we here refer particularly to that system with which the name of Dr Duff is specially associated, and which has been more or less maintained by the Established and Free Churches of Scotland, the American Board, and one or two of the great Societies of England. The subject is one of great practical importance; and we must make room for a few illustrative extracts relating to it. Let it be understood that what it is desirable to have determined is, not whether a home society may not legitimately select one department of the work, and devote its energies to the carrying on of that, to the exclusion of all others. About this there can be no debate. If a number of persons were to combine in England to send out men to act simply as translators, or as writers of Christian books or tracts, in the vernacular languages, they would not only do what was quite competent for them as Christian men, but would do immense good in connection with the propagation of the Gospel. The question we should like to see met and settled is this. Supposing a church, as such, to undertake a missionary work, in what manner is it most expedient for it, on the whole, to carry that work on? Should it, except under the pressure of necessity—when, indeed, there can be no law—should it content itself with singling out a limited subordinate department, or should it rather throw itself bodily, so to speak, into the breach, and aim directly at securing, as quickly as possible, for the masses of the people, a church and pastorate of their own? This is the real question; and the following may help towards its solution:—

The *Rev. C. B. Lenpolt*, who read the first paper “On Missionary, Education,” says, “Although missionaries daily preach the Gospel, there still remain two classes of human beings in India, whom the missionary in his preaching cannot reach at all, or but partially; these are *the young and the female population*. . . . In order to make known the gospel to those two classes, we require English, village, and girls’ schools. No missionary establishment in a great city is complete without an English school. At the present time, English schools have some advantages over vernacular schools. There is a certain class of young men whom the missionary cannot reach by vernacular schools; for they are able to obtain a knowledge of their own language at home, but they cannot obtain English, and will therefore, for the sake of acquiring English, gather round the missionary, and thus come under the sound of the gospel.” “English schools, however, are insufficient for the country at large. In these we can only teach a limited class of youths residing in towns.”—The *Rev. Thomas Smith*, late of the Free Church Mission, Calcutta, read a second paper on the same subject. In it he makes three statements, each of which he illustrates at length:—1st, That education

is a legitimate branch of missionary operation ; 2d, That while educational operations are not suitable to some localities and circumstances, they are peculiarly suitable to others ; and, 3d, That even in the localities best suited to educational operations, these ought not to engross too large a proportion of missionary strength and means. In enlarging upon this last proposition, Mr Smith goes on to say, " What is the due proportion it is impossible to determine abstractly. I am free to admit that this proportion has probably been exceeded in Calcutta, not because there is too much labour or means expended on educational operations, for I think there is still too little, but because there is far too little expended on other departments. When I joined the Church of Scotland Institution in 1839, the whole amount of missionary strength given to education was the labour of myself and one colleague, and a very limited portion of that of another. *At that time there were ten or twelve men whose whole time was devoted to vernacular preaching.*"—Yet a third paper was read by *Rev. J. H. Titcomb*, Secretary to the Vernacular Education Society for India. Among other things he is reported to have said, " There is no doubt, that in order to qualify our superior converts for important positions in the native church, good English schools will always be wanted. At the same time, if care be not taken, they may exhaust too much of our missionary strength, and impede the progress of a native pastorate. For (1), They have a tendency to hinder missionaries in their acquisition of the Vernacular. (2.) The education they give the students, unfit them for the humble and unremunerative labour of village teaching. (3.) They are not wanted as formerly. At first they were necessary starting-points for mission work. But now the case is altered. We have advanced to higher ground, and are not so much called upon to educate the general community, as to develop the resources of native agency."—*Rev. Lal Behari Singh*, said, " With regard to the results of missionary institutions in raising up native agencies, it was most desirable, in order to be able to judge of them properly, to inquire how many of these young men who had been fed, clothed, and educated at the expense of the missionary societies, were now in the ministry, and how many had left for other pursuits? Next, how many of those who had been ordained were satisfied with their present position, or with a moderate salary?"—The *Rev. Thomas Gardiner* of the Free Church Mission, Calcutta, said, " He believed there was a danger of carrying secular education too far. They found that almost all young men in their schools, at some time or other, generally when they were in the higher schools or junior college classes, came under strong convictions, not merely of the truth of Christianity, but personal convictions, more or less, of their own sinfulness, and of their need of a Saviour. If they passed that critical period without publicly professing their faith in Christ, they generally became indifferent, and there was less hope, humanly speaking, of their becoming Christians. He thought it might be an undue expenditure of missionary resources to carry on in advanced secular studies, young men of that description, and that they should ever estimate their educational work according to its

value and direct bearing upon the progress of the Redeemer's cause in the hearts of men. He felt there might be a danger of spending unduly missionary resources contributed for propagating the Gospel in that direction."—*Rev. J. Sugden*, formerly missionary at Bangalore, says, "He would put vernacular preaching and vernacular education in the first place; but he thought that a good and glorious work was to be achieved in some spheres of labour, especially in India, through English teaching and English schools."

These sentences may be held as expressing fairly the mind of the Conference upon this point. Whatever remarks were made by others they did not run counter, but the contrary, to the general strain of the extracts now given. What, then, do they seem to teach? This, clearly; that education through the medium of the English is unquestionably one way of carrying on missionary work—that, however the sphere in which this force can be profitably used is limited,—limited as to locality to some of the great cities of India, and limited as to material to the better classes among the native population—that, upon the whole, the system is not the best fitted for preparing a ministry which shall be at once learned and national—and that in the carrying it on, to its utmost limit, there is a risk of spending missionary strength and resources unduly on its merely secular adjuncts. Now, if the practical question to be discussed in those days were simply this, Would it be lawful for a body of Christians in England to combine themselves into a society for the single and exclusive purpose of working this part of the mission machinery? we should have no hesitation in answering, Yes. It would, there can be no doubt, as we have already said, be perfectly legitimate for any society to select any one department of the work,—such as the zenana scheme or medical missions, or translation work, or English education—and devote to it its undivided attention. There is room, and more than room, for all. But the real question we have to consider is this: Is it expedient for any church, undertaking as such to carry the Gospel to a particular country, to single out one of these subordinate departments, and direct the whole current of its sympathies and resources to its support? We apprehend that no unprejudiced person who reflects seriously upon it will venture to say that it is. Important as we believe the conversion of females in India to be, we should ill like to see any church giving its whole mind to the preparation of governesses for the zenana; invaluable as are medical missions, we trust that the time will never come, when none shall be thought worthy to be sent out to the East but surgeons. And influential as we admit Calcutta to be, and necessary as it is to adopt whatever means shall be deemed best to reach the better classes of that capital, we deprecate the idea of any church saying, We shall single out these classes for

exclusive attention, and shall direct all our efforts to sending what they want and need—teachers to give them instruction in the English. Such a plan is inexpedient on many accounts; and on none more than this, that do what you may, you will never get the humbler members of the home congregations to take a hearty and intelligent interest in it. Their imagination suffices to raise up before their minds the picture of a country lying under the curse of idolatry. They can understand a good man going out to settle in such a land—learning its language—and, in the ways to which they are accustomed, proclaiming the story of a Saviour's love. They will have no difficulty, in addition, in seeing that schools and other such subordinate means which indeed meet their own eye at home, must be helpful as auxiliaries, but it is vain to expect among the peasants of our rural districts, or even among the sharper intellects of our working-classes in towns—in plain terms—among the masses which form the staple of our church membership—either an intelligent apprehension of the real character of our high class institutions, or much enthusiasm in their favour. We say all this the more freely, that all parties appear to be coming round to this mind. There did seem a risk some time ago, that with the Scottish churches the sectional system would become stereotyped. But of this there is now no danger. Dr Duff himself, we understand, has asked, that the next missionary to be sent out to him in Bengal should devote himself to preaching in the vernacular; and of those present at the Conference, none spoke more freely of the educational system, its defects as well as its excellencies, than Dr Duff's own colleagues—Mr Smith and Mr Gardiner. A clear understanding upon this point, then, may now be said to have been come to. The wisdom of commencing with a school in Calcutta thirty years ago is not disputed by any one. The propriety of still maintaining schools in which English shall be taught all earnestly contend for. But with the great work before us of *nationalising Christianity in India*, it is held to be manifest that a church should throw itself most heartily into the prosecution of that scheme by which the mass of the people shall be soonest provided with a native church and a native ministry. Referring to the classification we have already employed, the means by which the Gospel is to be conveyed into a heathen country, are either *oral* or *literary*. Of the two, the former is generally the most influential. In Burmah there is a large reading population, which can be reached by books and tracts; but even there the grand instrument of success has been the living voice. Of *oral* instrumentalities, however, there are three classes—the preaching, the teaching, and the conversational. In other words, the missionary may carry on his work by the pulpit, by the school, or by

means of house to house visitation. All these in good hands are mighty, and all are necessary. In every mission they should, if possible, be combined. But if the question should ever be raised, If two must be sacrificed, which should be retained? there would, we suppose, be but one answer. The testimony of all time is, that God blesses most the public proclamation of his own word—the open announcement to sinners as such that he is willing to be reconciled to them in His Son Jesus Christ—and hence we cannot hesitate to conclude with the Conference, that the power on which the church should chiefly rely, and which she should chiefly cultivate and support both at home and abroad is that of the pulpit.

We have dwelt so long on the first branch of this great subject, *the work abroad*, that we can unfortunately spare no space for the second, namely, the *relative responsibility of the church at home*. The Conference had this point brought under its notice in various shapes. In three successive sessions it discussed these three important questions:—*How best to stir up, direct, and work the missionary feeling at home? How best to increase the present income of missionary societies? and How best to obtain and qualify candidates of the right stamp for the mission work.* FEELING, MONEY, MEN! such were the central points round which the conversation on these three things circled; and so much was said that was at once plain, and practical, and suggestive, that we cannot but hope that the wide circulation of this volume among ourselves shall give a great and immediate impulse to the missionary enterprise among the home churches. To this branch of the report we would very earnestly direct the attention of those of our readers who may be in the ministry. It strikes us that a suggestion thrown out by Mr Macfie is one which, if it were acted on, might help the mission cause immensely. He contended that the pulpit should be employed, not merely in enforcing missionary principles, but in disseminating missionary facts, and as himself the representative of busy business-men who subscribe for plenty of periodicals, but read none of them, he declared that only by the living voice of the preacher telling them on the Sabbath of the progress of the Gospel, could he hope to learn almost anything of what was doing for Christ in the world. We are decidedly of opinion that Mr Macfie is right. No wonder that there is little of a missionary spirit in the church, when there are ministers who, from year's end to year's end, scarcely allude, in the most remote way, to the fact that we have about 150 millions of fellow-subjects who are living in heathen darkness. If things are to be better, the power of the pulpit must be called more into operation; and, in order to provide those who wield it with effective material, a periodical

must be established, not a *Quarterly Missionary Review* as was proposed, which might be filled mostly with heavy and unreadable articles, nor a *Missionary Newspaper* made up chiefly of scraps, but such a journal as, for example, "*The Book and its Missions*" was at first, before it became (most excusably, because providentially) a record of Bible distribution among the poor of London. Into this subject, however, we cannot now further enter, and must be content to close with again expressing, in the strongest manner, our sense of the practical value of the volume before us.

ART. VII.—*The Works of Calvin in English, published by the Calvin Translation Society.* 52 vols. 8vo. 1843—1856.
Letters of John Calvin, compiled from the Original Manuscripts, and edited with Historical Notes by Dr JULES BONNET. 3 vols. 8vo, the first two published at Edinburgh, and the third at Philadelphia.

JOHN CALVIN was by far the greatest of the Reformers, with respect to the talents he possessed, the influence he exerted, and the services he rendered in the establishment and diffusion of important truth. The Reformers who preceded him may be said to have been all men who, from the circumstances in which they were placed, and the occupations which these circumstances imposed upon them, or from the powers and capacities with which they had been gifted, were fitted chiefly for the immediate necessary business of the age in which their lot was cast, and were not perhaps qualified for rising above this sphere, which, however, was a very important one. Their efforts, whether in the way of speculation or of action, were just such as their immediate circumstances and urgent present duties demanded of them, while they had little opportunity of considering and promoting the permanent interests of the whole scheme of Scriptural truth, or the whole theory and constitution of Christian churches. After all that Luther, Melancthon, and Zuingli had done, there was still needed some one of elevated and comprehensive mind, who should be able to rise above the distraction and confusion of existing contentions, to survey the wide field of Scriptural truth in all its departments, to combine and arrange its various parts, and to present them as a harmonious whole to the contemplation of men. This was the special work for which God qualified Calvin, by bestowing upon him both the intellectual and the spiritual gifts necessary for the task, and this He enabled him to accomplish. God makes use of the intellectual powers which he bestows upon men, for the accomplishment of his

own purposes; or rather he bestows upon men those intellectual powers which may fit them naturally, and according to the ordinary operation of means, for the purposes which he in his sovereignty has assigned to them to effect. He then leads them by his grace to devote their powers to his glory and service, he blesses their labours, and thus his gracious designs are accomplished.

Calvin had received from God mental powers of the highest order. He was distinguished equally by comprehensiveness and penetration of intellect, by acuteness and soundness of judgment. His circumstances in early life were so regulated in providence, that he was furnished with the best opportunities of improving his faculties, and acquiring the learning and culture that might be necessary with a view to his future labours. He was led by God's grace early and decidedly to renounce the devil, the world, and the flesh, and to devote himself to the service of Christ. He was led under the same guidance to abandon the Church of Rome, and to devote himself to the preaching of the Gospel, the exposition of the whole truth of God, and the organisation of churches in accordance with the sacred Scriptures and the practice of the apostles. And in all these departments of useful labour he was honoured with an extraordinary measure of success. He did what the rest of the Reformers did, and in addition he did what none of them either did or could effect. He was a diligent and laborious pastor. He gave much time to the instruction of those who were preparing for the work of the ministry. He took an active part in opposing the Church of Rome, in promoting the Reformation, and in organising Protestant churches. He entered with zeal and ardour into all the controversies which the ecclesiastical movements of the time produced, and was ever ready to defend injured truth or to expose triumphant error. This was work which he had to do in common with the other reformers, though he brought higher powers than any of them to bear upon the performance of it. But in addition to all this, he had for his special business the great work of digesting and systematising the whole scheme of divine truth, of bringing out in order and harmony all the different doctrines which are contained in the word of God, unfolding them in their mutual relations and various bearings, and thus presenting them in the most favourable aspect to the contemplation and the study of the highest order of minds.

The systematising of divine truth, and the full organisation of the Christian church according to the word of God, are the great peculiar achievements of Calvin. For this work God eminently qualified him, by bestowing upon him the highest gifts both of nature and of grace; and this work he was enabled

to accomplish in such a way as to confer the greatest and most lasting benefits upon the Church of Christ, and to entitle him to the commendation and the gratitude of all succeeding ages.

The first edition of his great work, "*The Institution of the Christian Religion*," was published when he was twenty-seven years of age, and it is a most extraordinary proof of the maturity and vigour of his mind, of the care with which he had studied the Word of God, and of the depth and comprehensiveness of his meditations upon divine things, that though the work was afterwards greatly enlarged, and though some alterations were even made in the arrangement of the topics discussed, yet no change of any importance was made in the actual doctrines which it set forth. The first edition, produced at that early age, contained the substance of the whole system of doctrine which has since been commonly associated with his name, the development and exposition of which has been regarded by many as constituting a strong claim upon the esteem and gratitude of the church of Christ, and by many others as rendering him worthy of execration and every opprobrium. He lived twenty-seven years more after the publication of the first edition of the *Institutes*, and a large portion of his time during the remainder of his life was devoted to the examination of the word of God and the investigation of divine truth. But he saw no reason to make any material change in the views which he had put forth; and a large proportion of the most pious, able, and learned men and most careful students of the sacred Scriptures, who have since adorned the church of Christ, have received all his leading doctrines as accordant with the teaching of God's word.*

The *Institutio* of Calvin is the most important work in the history of theological science, that which is more than any other creditable to its author, and has exerted directly or indirectly the greatest and most beneficial influence upon the opinions of intelligent men on theological subjects. It may be said to occupy in the science of theology the place which it requires both the *Novum Organum* of Bacon and the *Principia* of Newton to fill up in physical science, at once conveying, though not in formal didactic precepts and rules, the finest idea of the way and manner in which the truths of God's word ought to be classified and systematised, and at the

* In a work published a short time before Calvin's death, Beza made the following statement upon this point, a statement fully confirmed by all the facts of the case: "*Hoc enim (Deo sit gratia) vel ipsa insidia Calvino tribuat necesse est, ut quamvis sit ipse ex eorum numero qui quotidie discendo consensescunt, nullum tamen dogma jam inde ab initio ad hoc usque tempus, in tam multis et tam laboriosis scriptis, ecclesiæ proposuerit in quo illum sententiam mutare et a semetipso dissentire oportuerit.*"—*Abstersio Calumniarum*, p. 263.

same time actually classifying and systematizing them, in a way that has not yet received any very material or essential improvement. There had been previous attempts to present the truths of Scripture in a systematic form and arrangement, and to exhibit their relations and mutual dependence. But all former attempts had been characterized by great defects and imperfections ; and especially all of them had been more or less defective in this most important respect, that a considerable portion of the materials of which they were composed had been not truths but errors, not the doctrines actually taught in the sacred Scriptures, but errors arising from ignorance of the contents of the inspired volume, or from serious mistakes as to the meaning of its statements. The first attempt at a formal system of theology was made in the eighth century by Johannes Damascenus, and this is a very defective and erroneous work. The others which had preceded Calvin's Institutes in this department were chiefly the productions of the schoolmen, Lombard's four books of Sentences, and Thomas Aquinas's Summa, with the commentaries upon these works ; and they all exhibited very defective and erroneous views of Scriptural truth. Augustine was the last man who had possessed sufficient intellectual power, combined with views in the main correct of the leading doctrines of God's word, to have produced a system of theology that might have been generally received, and he was not led to undertake such a work. The first edition of Melancthon's Common Places, the only one published before Calvin produced the first edition of his Institutes, was not to be compared to Calvin's work, in the accuracy of its representations of the doctrines of Scripture, in the fulness and completeness of its materials, or in the skill and ability with which they were digested and arranged ; and in the subsequent editions, while the inaccuracy of its statements increased in some respects rather than diminished, it still continued, to a considerable extent, a defective and ill-digested work, characterised by a good deal of prolixity and wearisome repetition. It was in these circumstances that Calvin produced his Institutes, the materials of which it was composed being in almost every instance the true doctrines really taught in the word of God, and exhibiting the whole substance of what is taught there on matters of doctrine, worship, government, and discipline, and the whole of these materials being arranged with admirable skill and expounded in their meaning, evidence, and bearings, with consummate ability. This was the great and peculiar service which Calvin rendered to the cause of truth and the interests of sound theology, and its value and importance it is scarcely possible to overrate.

In theology there is, of course, no room for originality

properly so called, for its whole materials are contained in the actual statements of God's word; and he is the greatest and best theologian, who has most accurately apprehended the meaning of the statements of Scripture, who, by comparing and combining them, has most fully and correctly brought out the whole mind of God on all the topics on which the Scriptures give us information, who classifies and digests the truths of Scripture in the way best fitted to commend them to the apprehension and acceptance of men, and who can most clearly and forcibly bring out their Scriptural evidence, and most skilfully and effectively defend them against the assaults of adversaries. And in this work, and indeed in almost any one of its departments, there is abundant scope for the exercise of the highest powers, and for the application of the most varied and extensive acquirements. Calvin was far above the weakness of aiming at the invention of novelties in theology, or of wishing to be regarded as the discoverer of new opinions. The main features of the representation which he put forth of the scheme of divine truth, might be found in the writings of Augustine and Luther, in neither singly, but in the two conjointly. But by grasping with vigour and comprehensiveness the whole scheme of divine truth and all its various departments, and combining them into one harmonious and well-digested system, he has done what neither Augustine or Luther did or could have done, and has given conclusive evidence that he was possessed of the highest intellectual powers, as well as enjoyed the most abundant communications of God's Spirit.

The two leading departments of theological science are the exegetical and the systematic. The two most important functions of the theologian are first, to bring out accurately the meaning of the individual statements of God's word, the particular truths which are taught there; and, second, to classify and arrange these truths in such a way as to bring out most fully and correctly the whole scheme of doctrine which is there unfolded, and to illustrate the bearing and application of the scheme as a whole, and of its different parts. And it is important to notice that, in both these departments, Calvin stands out pre-eminent, having manifested in both of them the highest excellence and obtained the greatest success. He has left us an exposition of nearly the whole word of God, and it is not only immeasurably superior to any commentary that preceded it, but it has continued ever since, and continues to this day, to be regarded by all competent judges, as a work of the highest value, and as manifesting marvellous perspicacity and soundness of judgment. There is no department of theological study the cultivators of which, in modern times, are more disposed to re-

gard with something like contempt the labours and attainments of their predecessors, and to consider themselves as occupying a much higher platform, than the exact and critical interpretation of Scripture; and we think it must be admitted that, in modern times, greater improvements have been made in this department of theological science than in any other. Yet, Calvin's Commentary continues to secure the respect and the admiration of the most competent judges, both in this country and on the continent, even of those who are disposed to estimate most highly the superiority of the present age over preceding generations in the department of scriptural exegesis. And it is perhaps the most striking illustration of the extraordinary gifts which God bestowed upon Calvin, and of the value of the services which he has rendered to Christian truth and to theological science, that he reached such distinguished excellence, and has exerted so extensive and permanent an influence, *both* as an accurate interpreter of Scripture, and as a systematic expounder of the great doctrines of God's word.*

Besides the Commentary upon Scripture and the Institutes, the leading departments of Calvin's works are his *Tractatus* and his *Epistolæ*, both of which are much less known amongst us than they should be. The *Tractatus* are chiefly controversial pieces, in defence of the leading doctrines of his system when assailed by adversaries, and in opposition to the errors of the Papists, the Anabaptists, the Libertines, the advocates of compromises with the Church of Rome, and the assailants of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. His *Epistolæ* consist partly of confidential correspondence with his friends, and partly of answers to applications made to him from all parts of the Protestant world, asking his opinion and advice upon all the most important topics that occurred, connected with the administration of ecclesiastical affairs in that most important crisis of the church's history. They manifest throughout the greatest practical wisdom and the truest Scriptural modera-

* In proof of the truth of this statement of the high estimate of Calvin's qualifications and success in the department of exegesis, formed by the most competent judges in the present day, it is enough to refer to Professor Tholuck's elaborate Dissertation on Calvin as an interpreter of the holy Scripture. Tholuck has published editions of Calvin's commentaries on the Psalms, and on the New Testament; and, in the dissertation referred to, he has set forth the grounds of the high estimate he had formed of the value of these works, under the four heads of Calvin's *doctrinal impartiality*, exegetical tact, various learning, and deep Christian piety. Tholuck's very high estimate of Calvin as an interpreter of Scripture is the more to be relied on, and has probably exerted the greater influence in Germany, because he is not himself a Calvinist, and, indeed, brings out, in the conclusion of his dissertation, his divergence from Calvin's views on predestination and cognate topics. Bretschneider and Hengstenberg also, critics of the highest reputation, and of very different schools of theology, both from Tholuck and from each other, have borne the strongest testimony to Calvin's qualifications as an interpreter.

tion, as well as warm friendship and cordial affection, and the perusal of them is indispensable to our forming a right estimate of Calvin's character, and of the spirit and motives by which he was animated ; while it is abundantly sufficient of itself to dispel many of the slanders by which he has been assailed.

In these different departments of his works, we have Calvin presented to us as an interpreter of Scripture, as a systematic expounder of the scheme of Christian doctrine, as a controversial defender of truth and impugner of error, and as a friend and practical adviser in the regulation of the affairs of the church ; and his pre-eminent excellence in all these departments are, we are persuaded, such as justly to entitle him to a place in the estimation and gratitude of the church of Christ, which no other uninspired man is entitled to share. Calvin certainly was not free from the infirmities which are always found in some form or degree even in the best men, and in particular, he occasionally exhibited an angry impatience of contradiction and opposition, and sometimes assailed and treated the opponents of the truth and cause of God with a violence of invective, which cannot be defended, and should certainly not be imitated. He was not free from error, and is not to be implicitly followed in his interpretation of Scripture, or in his exposition of doctrine. But whether we look to the powers and capacities with which God endowed him, the manner in which he employed them, and the results by which his labours have been followed, or to the Christian wisdom, magnanimity, and devotedness, which marked his character and generally regulated his conduct, there is probably not one among the sons of men, beyond the range of those whom God miraculously inspired by his Spirit, who has stronger claims upon our veneration and gratitude.

We believe that this is in substance the view generally entertained of Calvin by all who have read his works, and who have seen ground to adopt in the main the system of doctrine which he inculcated as based upon divine authority. Many men who were not Calvinists have borne the highest testimony to Calvin's great talents and his noble character, to his literary excellencies and his commanding influence. But those who are persuaded that he brought out a full, and, in the main, accurate view of the truth of God, with respect to the way of salvation and the organisation of the Christian church, must ever regard him in a very different light from those who have formed an opposite judgment upon these subjects. If Calvin's system of doctrine, government, and worship, is in the main Scriptural, he must have enjoyed very special and abundant communications of God's Spirit in the formation of his convictions, and he must have rendered most important services

to mankind by the diffusion of invaluable truth. Men who are not Calvinists may admire his wonderful talents, and do justice to the elevation of his general character, and the purity and disinterestedness of his motives. But unless they are persuaded that his views upon most points were, in the main, accordant with Scripture, they cannot regard him with the profound veneration which Calvinists feel, when they contemplate him as God's chosen instrument for diffusing His truth; nor can they cherish anything like the same estimate of the magnitude of the services he has rendered to mankind, and of the gratitude to which in consequence he is entitled.

The Calvin Translation Society, which has done a great and useful work by making almost all his writings accessible to English readers, translated and circulated Professor Tholuck's Dissertation formerly referred to, and subjoined to it a number of testimonies in commendation of Calvin's works, from eminent men of all classes and opinions, of all ages and countries, including not only Calvinists and theologians, but also infidels and Arminians, statesmen and philosophers, scholars and men of letters. These testimonies have been added to from time to time, and being now collected together, they fill above 100 pages in the last volume of his works, which contains the translation of his commentary upon Joshua. Many more testimonies to the value and excellence of Calvin's writings might have been produced.* But this collection as it stands could not probably be matched in the kind and amount of commendation it exhibits, in the case of any other man whose writings and labours were confined to the department of religion.

Indeed it is probably true that no man whose time and talents were devoted exclusively to subjects connected with Christianity and the church, has ever received so large a share both of praise and of censure. He has been commended in the highest terms by many of the highest names both in Christian and in general literature; and the strength of their commendation has been generally very much in proportion to their capacities and opportunities of judging. But if he has received the highest commendation, he has also been visited with a vast amount of censure, the one being really, in the circumstances, just about as significant a testimony to his excellence and his influence as the other. The Papists had the sagacity to see that Calvin by his great talents and the commanding influence which he exerted, was really their most

* There are some additional and very valuable testimonies to Calvin's character and writings given in his life in Haag's *La France Protestante*, tom. iii. p. 109, especially from three of the most eminent literary men of the present age, Guizot, Mignet, and Sayous. Haag brings out also an interesting contrast between the candid admissions of some of the older Romish writers, and the unscrupulous mendacity of his latest Popish biographer Audin.

formidable adversary at the era of the Reformation. And in accordance with their ordinary principles and policy, they endeavoured to ruin his character by the vilest slanders. Most of these calumnies, being utterly destitute of all evidence, and therefore disgraceful only to those who invented or repeated them, have long since been abandoned by every Papist who retained even the slightest regard for character or decency, though they are still occasionally brought forward or insinuated. Some of the Lutheran writers of his own time, and of the succeeding generation, mortified apparently that Calvin's influence and reputation were eclipsing those of their master, railed against him with bitter malignity, and were even mean enough sometimes to countenance the popish slanders against his character. Specimens of this discreditable conduct on the part of the Lutherans may be seen in the answers made by Calvin himself, and by Beza, to the attacks of Westphalus and Heshusius.

During Calvin's life, and for more than half a century after his death, most of the divines of the Church of England adopted his theological views, and spoke of him with the greatest respect. But after, through the influence of Archbishop Laud and the prevalence of Arminian and Pelagian views, sound doctrine and true religion were, in a great measure, banished from that church, Calvin, as might be expected, came to be regarded in a very different light. During most of last century, the generality of the Episcopalian divines who had occasion to speak of him and his doctrines, indulged in bitter vituperation against him, and not unfrequently talked as if they regarded him with rancorous spite, representing him as a monster who ought to be held up to execration. Indeed we do not know that theological literature furnishes a more melancholy exhibition of ignorance, prejudice, and bitter hatred of God's truth, than the general mode of speaking about Calvin and his doctrines, that prevailed among the Episcopalian clergy of last century. Some of them write as if they were ignorant enough to believe, that Calvinism and Presbyterianism were invented by Calvin, and were never heard of in the church till the 16th century; and when they speak of him in connection with his views about the divine sovereignty and decrees, we might be tempted to think, from the spirit they often manifest, that they looked upon him almost as if he himself were the author or cause of the fate of those who finally perish. It is but fair to say that this state of things has been greatly improved since the latter part of last century. This is owing, partly to the high commendation which Bishop Horsley gave to Calvin's writings, and to the public advice which he gave to the Episcopalian clergy, as one of which they stood greatly in need, viz., to see that they understood what Calvinism was

before they attacked it, but chiefly to that far greater prevalence of evangelical doctrine and true religion, which, though grievously damaged by Tractarianism, still forms so pleasing a feature in the condition of the English Church.

Calvin has also had the honour to receive at all times a very large share of the enmity of "the world of the ungodly," of men who hate God's truth, and all who have been eminently honoured by him to be instrumental in promoting it. Such persons seem to have a sort of instinctive deep-seated dislike to Calvin, which leads them to dwell upon and exaggerate everything in his character and conduct that may seem fitted to depreciate him. It is not uncommon, even in our own age and country, to hear infidel and semi-infidel declaimers, who know nothing of Calvin's writings or labours, when they wish to say a particularly smart and clever thing against bigotry and intolerance, meaning thereby honest zeal for God's truth, bring in something about Calvin burning Servetus.*

The leading charges commonly adduced against Calvin's character as distinguished from his doctrines, are pride, arrogance, spiritual tyranny, intolerance, and persecution. Some of these are charges which, as universal experience shews, derive their plausibility, in a great measure, from the view that may be taken of the general character and leading motives of the man against whom they may be directed, and of the goodness and rectitude of the objects which he mainly and habitually aims at. Those who have an unfavourable opinion of a man's general motives and objects, will see evidence of pride, obstinacy and intolerance, in matters in which those who believe, that he was generally influenced by a regard to God's glory and the advancement of Christ's cause, will see only integrity and firmness, uncompromising vigour and decision, mixed it may be with the ordinary remains of human infirmity. The piety and integrity of Calvin, his paramount regard to the honour of God and the promotion of truth and righteousness, to the advancement of Christ's cause and the spiritual welfare of men, are beyond all reasonable doubt. And those who, convinced of this, examine his history with attention and impartiality, will have no difficulty in seeing that for most of these charges there is no real foundation, and that in so far as evidence can be adduced in support of any of them, it really proves nothing more than that Calvin manifested, like all other men, the remains of human infirmity, especially of course in those respects to which his natural temperament and the influence of his position and circumstances more peculiarly disposed him. The state of his health, the bent of his natural dispositions, and

* It is greatly to be regretted that both Lord Brougham and Lord Macanlay have sunk to the meanness of rounding off a sentence in this way.

the whole influence of his position, occupations, and habits, were unfavourable to the cultivation of those features of character, and those modes of speaking and acting, which are usually regarded as most pleasing to others, and best fitted to call forth love and affection in the ordinary intercourse of life. The flow of animal spirits, the ready interest in all ordinary commonplace things, and the play of the social feelings, which give such a charm to Luther's conversation and letters, were alien to Calvin's constitutional tendencies, and to his ordinary modes of thinking and feeling. He had a great and exalted mission assigned to him ; he was fully alive to this, thoroughly determined to devote himself unreservedly, and to subordinate everything else, to the fulfilment of this mission, and not unconscious of its dignity, or of the powers which had been conferred upon him for working it out. With such a man, so placed, so endowed, and so occupied, the temptation, of course, would be, to identify himself and all his views and proceedings with the cause of God and His truth, to prosecute these high and holy objects sternly and uncompromisingly, without much regard to the opinions and inclinations of those around him, and to deal with opposition as if it necessarily implied something sinful in those from whom it proceeded, as if opposition to him involved opposition to his master. Calvin would have been something more than man, if, endowed and situated as he was, he had never yielded to this temptation, and been led to deal with opponents and opposition in a way which only the commission of the inspired prophets would have warranted.

Calvin did occasionally give plain indications of undue self-confidence and self-complacency, and of a mixture of personal and carnal feelings and motives, with his zeal for the promotion of truth and righteousness. But there is nothing suggested by a fair view of his whole history, that is fitted to throw any doubt upon the general excellence of his character, as tried by the highest standard that has ordinarily been exhibited among men, or on the general purity, elevation, and disinterestedness of the motives by which he was mainly and habitually influenced. There is sufficient evidence that he still had, like the apostle, a law in his members warring against the law of his mind, and sometimes bringing him into captivity to the law of sin. And from what we know, from Scripture and experience, of the deceitfulness of the heart and the deceitfulness of sin, we cannot doubt that there was a larger admixture of what was sinful in his motives and conduct, than he himself was distinctly aware of. But this, too, is characteristic of all men, even the best of them, and there is really no ground whatever, for regarding Calvin as manifesting a larger measure of human

infirmity than attaches in some form or other to the best and holiest of our race; while there is abundant evidence that, during a life of great labour and great suffering, he fully established his supreme devotedness to God's glory and service, his thorough resignation to His will, his perfect willingness to labour in season and out of season, to spend and to be spent, for the sake of Christ and his Gospel. It was assuredly no such proud, arrogant, domineering, heartless despot as Calvin is often represented to have been, who composed the dedications which we find prefixed to his commentaries upon the different portions of the Bible, and many of his letters to his friends, expressing often the warmest affection, the deepest gratitude for instruction and services received, and exhibiting a most cordial appreciation of the excellencies of others, a humble estimate of himself, and a perfect willingness to be or to do anything for the sake of Christ and of his cause. It was certainly no such man as he is often described, who lived so long on such terms with his colleagues in the ministry, and held such a place, not only in their veneration and confidence but in their esteem and affection, as are indicated by the whole state of things unfolded to us in Beza's life of him.

With reference to the principal charge which, in his own as well as in subsequent times, was brought against his motives and temper, Calvin has put on record the following protestation in a letter written towards the end of his life, in the year 1558:—

"I can with reason boast, however much ungodly men call me inexorable, that I have never become the enemy of one human being on the grounds of personal injuries. I confess that I am irritable; and, though this vice displeases me, I have not succeeded in curing myself as much as I could wish. But, though many persons have unjustly attacked me, an innocent, and what is more, well-deserving man, have perfidiously plotted all kinds of mischief against me, and most cruelly harassed me, I can defy any one to point out a single person to whom I have studied to return the like, even though the means and the opportunity were in my power." (*Letters of John Calvin, by Dr Bonnet, vol. iii. p. 439.*)

On a ground formerly adverted to, we have no doubt that there was sometimes, in Calvin's feelings and motives, a larger admixture of the personal and the vindictive than he was himself aware of, or than he here admits. We always shrink from men making professions about the purity of their motives, as we cannot but fear, that this indicates the want of an adequate sense of the deceitfulness of sin and of their own hearts, a disposition to think of themselves more highly than they ought to think. It would not, we think, have been at all unwarrantable or unbecoming, if Calvin, in the passage we have

quoted, had made a fuller admission of the mixture of sinful motives, which he would no doubt have acknowledged that the Searcher of hearts must have seen in him. And yet, we have no doubt that his statement, strong as it is, is substantially true, so far as concerns anything that came fairly under the cognisance of his fellow-men, anything on which other men were entitled to form a judgment. Whatever the Searcher of hearts might see in him, we believe that there was nothing in his ordinary conduct, in his usual course of outward procedure, that could entitle any man to have denied the truth of the statement which he here made about himself, or that would afford any materials for disproving it. And if this, or anything like it, be true, then the practical result is, that the common notions about Calvin's irritability and vindictiveness, the extent to which he was ordinarily influenced by personal, selfish, and sinful motives, are grossly exaggerated; and that, though this might be said to be his besetting sin, that to which his constitutional tendencies and the whole influence of his position chiefly disposed him, there was really nothing in it, that entitled any of his fellow-men to reproach him, or that could be justly regarded as anything more, than a display of that common human infirmity which even the best men manifest in some form or degree.

Calvin's superiority to the influence of personal, angry, and vindictive feelings, is very fully brought out in the course he pursued, with respect to the men who filled the office of the ministry at Geneva after Farel and he had been driven into exile, in 1538, a topic which has not been brought out in any of the histories of Calvin so prominently as it should have been. Calvin and Farel had been banished from Geneva, solely because of their integrity and boldness in maintaining the purity of the church in the exercise of discipline, by refusing to admit unworthy persons to the Lord's Supper. Their colleagues in the ministry who were not banished, and the persons appointed to succeed them, were of course men who submitted to the dictation of the civil authorities in the exercise of discipline, and admitted to the Lord's table indiscriminately without regard to character. These men were, no doubt, strongly tempted, in self-defence, to depreciate as much as possible the character and conduct of Calvin and Farel, and to this temptation they yielded without reserve. Three or four months after his banishment, Calvin wrote from Basle to Farel, who had been called to Neufchatel, in the following terms (Letters, vol. i. p. 50-1) :

"How our successors are likely to get on I can conjecture from the first beginnings. While already they entirely break off every appearance of peace by their want of temper, they suppose that the

best course for themselves was to tear in pieces our estimation, publicly and privately, so as to render us as odious as possible. But if we know that they cannot calumniate us, excepting in so far as God permits, we know also the end God has in view in granting such permission. Let us humble ourselves, therefore, unless we wish to strive with God when he would humble us."

A division soon arose at Geneva upon the question, whether or not the ministry of these men ought to be recognised and waited on. Many, and these, as might be expected, were the best men in the city in point of character and the most attached to Calvin, were of opinion that these men ought not to be treated as ministers, and that religious ordinances ought not to be received at their hands. Saunier and Cordier (author of the *Colloquies*), men of the highest character and standing, Regents in the college, refused to receive the Lord's Supper at the hands of these men, and were in consequence driven from their posts, and obliged to quit the city. Calvin, who had now taken up his abode at Strasburg, was consulted upon this important question of casuistry, and gave his decision on the side of peace and conciliation, advising them without any hesitation to recognise and wait upon the ministry of these men. And this may surely be regarded as a triumph of reason and conscience over personal and carnal feeling. In the whole circumstances of this case as now adverted to, it is very plain that all the lower and more unworthy class of feelings, everything partaking of the character of selfishness in any of its forms or aspects, everything like wounded vanity or self-importance, everything like a tendency to indulge in anger or vindictiveness, must have tended towards leading Calvin to decide this question, in accordance with the views of those in Geneva whom he most respected and esteemed. If Calvin had been such a man as he is often represented, so arrogant and imperious, so much disposed to estimate things by their bearing upon his own personal importance and self-complacency, and to resent opposition and depreciation, all that we know of human nature, would lead us to expect, that he would have encouraged his friends to refuse all countenance to the existing clergy, and to the ecclesiastical system which they administered. The fact that he gave an opposite advice, may be fairly regarded as a proof, that the personal and the selfish (in the wide sense of undue regard to anything about self) had no such prominence or influence among his actuating motives as many seem to suppose, that the lower and more unworthy motives were habitually subordinated to the purer and more elevated, and that their operation, so far as they did operate, should not be regarded as distinctively characteristic of the individual, but merely as a symptom of the common human

infirmity, which in some form or degree is exhibited by all men, even those who have been renewed in the spirit of their minds.

As Calvin's conduct in this matter illustrates not only his elevation above the influence of personal and selfish feeling, but also his strong sense of the importance of respecting constituted authorities, and preserving the peace of the church, it may be worth while to bring out somewhat more fully what he thought and felt regarding it. The great general principle on which he founded his judgment upon this question was to this effect, that the men in office preached the substance of Scriptural truth, and administered the sacraments in accordance with Scriptural arrangements, notwithstanding the promiscuousness of the admission to partake in them, and that this being secured, everything else was, in the circumstances, of comparatively inferior importance, and should be subordinated, as a motive in determining conduct, to the respect due to the ministerial office and the persons who in providence held it, and to a regard to the peace of the community. He distinctly admits that the people were entitled to judge for themselves, on their own responsibility, whether or not the ministers preached the Gospel, and unless satisfied upon this point, were fully warranted to abandon their ministry, recognising thus the paramount importance which Scripture assigns to the truth and the preaching of it, as the great determining element on this whole subject. It has been well said in regard to this matter, that preaching the truth is God's ordinance, but preaching error is not God's ordinance and is therefore not entitled to any recognition or respect. The ground taken by Calvin recognises this principle, and therefore, though it is abundantly wide and lax, more so, perhaps, than can be thoroughly defended, it gives no countenance whatever to the views of those who advocate the warrantableness of waiting upon the ministry of men who do not preach the Gospel, but who are supposed to have other recommendations, on the ground of their connection with some particular system or constitution, civil or ecclesiastical. Calvin's first explicit reference to this subject occurs in a letter to Farel written from Strasburg in October 1538. The question as there put was this, "Whether it is lawful to receive the sacrament of the Lord's Supper from the hands of the new ministers, and to partake of it along with such a promiscuous assemblage of unworthy communicants?" Calvin's deliverance upon it was this :—

"In this matter I quite agree with Capito. This, in brief, was the sum of our discussion : that among Christians there ought to be so great a dislike of schism, as that they may always avoid it so far as

lies in their power. That there ought to prevail among them such a reverence for the ministry of the Word and of the Sacraments, that wherever they perceive these things to be, there they may consider the church to exist. Whenever therefore it happens, by the Lord's permission, that the church is administered by pastors, whatever kind of persons they may be, if we see there the marks of the church, it will be better not to break the unity. Nor need it be any hindrance that some points of doctrine are not quite so pure, seeing that there is scarcely any church which does not retain some remnants of former ignorance. It is sufficient for us if the doctrine on which the church of God is founded be recognised, and maintain its place. Nor should it prove any obstacle, that he ought not to be reckoned a lawful pastor who shall not only have fraudulently insinuated himself into the office of a true minister, but shall have wickedly usurped it. For there is no reason why every private person should mix himself up with these scruples. The Sacraments are the means of communion with the church; they must needs therefore be administered by the hands of pastors. In regard to those, therefore, who already occupy that position, legitimately or not, and although the right of judging as to that is not denied, it will be well to suspend judgment in the mean time, until the matter shall have been legally adjudicated. Therefore, if men wait upon their ministry, they will run no risk, that they should appear either to acknowledge or approve, or in any way to ratify their commission. But by this means they will give a proof of their patience in tolerating those who they know will be condemned by a solemn judgment. The refusal at first of these excellent brethren did not surprise nor even displease me." (P. 77-8.)

Calvin discussed the same subject more fully in a letter addressed, in June 1539, "To the Church at Geneva;" and as it is most honourably characteristic of its author, and as this topic has not received the prominence in his history to which it is entitled, we shall quote the greater part of it.

"Nothing, most beloved brethren, has caused me greater sorrow, since those disturbances which had so sadly scattered and almost entirely overthrown your church, than when I understood your strivings and contentions with those ministers who succeeded us. For although the disorders which were inseparably connected with their first arrival among you, might with good reason prove offensive to you; whatever may have given the occasion, I cannot hear without great and intense horror that any schism should settle down within the church. Wherefore, this was far more bitter to me than words can express;—I allude to what I have heard about those your contentions, so long as you were tossed about in uncertainty; since owing to that circumstance not only was your Church rent by division quite openly, but also the ecclesiastical ministry exposed to obloquy and contempt. . . . Now, therefore, when, contrary to my expectation, I have heard that the reconciliation between your pastors and the neighbouring churches, having been confirmed also by Farel

and by myself, was not found to be sufficient for binding you together in sincere and friendly affection, and by the tie of a lawful connection with your pastors, to whom the care of your souls is committed, I felt myself compelled to write to you, that I might endeavour, so far as lay in me, to find a medicine for this disease, which, without great sin against God, it was not possible for me to conceal. And although my former letters had not been very lovingly received by you, I was nevertheless unwilling to be wanting in my duty, so that, should I have no further success, I would at least deliver my own soul. Neither do I so much question your spirit of obedience (of which, indeed, I have proof) toward God and His ministers, as that I can at all fear that this my exhortation will have no weight with you, neither has my sincerity towards you lain concealed. That my advice has not been taken by you, I consider is rather to be imputed to the circumstances of the time, when such was the state of disorder, that it was very difficult indeed to determine what was best. Now at length, however, when your affairs, by the favour of God, are in a more settled and composed state, I trust that you will readily perceive that my only object is to lead you into the right way; that being so persuaded with regard to me, you may shew in reality by what motive you are brought into subjection to the truth. Especially, I ask you to weigh maturely, having put aside all respect of persons, of what honour the Lord accounts them worthy, and what grace He has committed to those whom He has appointed in His own church as pastors and ministers of the Word. For he not only commands us to render a willing obedience, with fear and trembling, to the Word while it is proclaimed to us; but also commands that the ministers of the Word are to be treated with honour and reverence, as being clothed with the authority of His ambassadors, whom He would have to be acknowledged as His own angels and messengers. Certainly so long as we were among you, we did not try much to impress upon you the dignity of our ministry, that we might avoid all ground of suspicion; now, however, that we are placed beyond the reach of danger, I speak more freely my mind. Had I to do with the ministers themselves, I would teach what I considered to be the extent and measure of their office, and to what you also are bound as sitting under their ministry. Since, of a truth, every one must render an account of his own life, each individual for himself, as well ministers as private persons, it is rather to be desired, that every one for himself may consider, what is due to others, than that he may require what may further be due to him from some one else. Where such considerations have their due weight, then also this established rule will operate effectually, namely, that those who hold the office of ministers of the Word, since the guidance and rule over your souls is entrusted to their care, are to be owned and acknowledged in the relation of parents, to be held in esteem, and honoured on account of that office which, by the calling of the Lord, they discharge among you. Nor does the extent of their function reach so far as to deprive you of the right conferred on you by God, (as upon all his own people), that every pastor may

be subject to examination, that those who are thus approven may be distinguished from the wicked, and all such may be held back who, under the guise of shepherds, betray a wolfish rapacity. This, however, is my earnest wish concerning those who in some measure fulfil the duty of pastors, so as to be tolerable, that you also may conduct yourselves towards them in a Christian spirit, and with this view that you may make greater account of that which may be due by you to others, than what others owe to yourselves. This also I will set forth plainly and in a few words. Two things here are to be considered. The one, that the calling of your ministers does not happen without the will of God. For although that change which took place upon our departure may have been brought to pass by the subtlety of the Devil, so that whatever followed on that change may justly be suspected by you: in it, nevertheless, the remarkable grace of the Lord is to be acknowledged by you, who has not allowed you to be left altogether destitute; nor let you fall back again under the yoke of Antichrist, from which He hath once rescued you already. But he rather wished that both the doctrine of the Gospel should still exist, and that some appearance of a church should flourish among you, so that with a quiet conscience you might continue there. We have always admonished you that you should acknowledge that overturning of your church as the visitation of the Lord sent upon you, and necessary also for us. Neither ought you so much to direct your thoughts against the wicked and the instruments of Satan, as upon personal and individual sins, which have deserved no lighter punishment, but indeed a far more severe chastisement. I would now therefore once more repeat the same advice. For besides that such is the particular and suitable remedy for obtaining mercy and deliverance of the Lord from that just judgment which lies upon you, there is also another very weighty reason that ought to bring you to repentance; lest peradventure we may seem to bury in oblivion that very great benefit of the Lord towards you, in not having allowed the Gospel edifice to fall utterly to ruin in the midst of you, seeing that it has held so together, that as an instance of His direct interference it must be reckoned as a miracle of His power, by which alone you were preserved from that greatest of all calamity. However that may be, it is certainly the work of God's providence, that you still have ministers who exercise the office of shepherds of souls and of government in your church. We must also take into account, that those servants of God who exercise the ministry of the Word in the neighbouring churches, have in order to check such dangerous contests, themselves approved of the calling of those men; whose opinions we also have subscribed, since no better method occurred to us by which we could consult your welfare and advantage. That you are well assured of our conscientious integrity we have no doubt, so that you ought at once to conclude, that we did nothing which was not sincere and upright. But putting out of view even all idea of kindly affection, the very discussion of that delicate point was a proof quite as sincere as could be given on my part, that you would have no obscure instruction from me. Therefore, you must seriously

look to it, that you are not too ready to disapprove of what the servants of God judge to be essential to your advantage and the preservation of the church. The other point to be well considered by you is this, that there may be due inspection of their regular discharge of duty, that they may fulfil the ministry of the church. And here, I confess, discretion evidently (nor would I wish to be the author of bringing any tyranny into the church) is required, that pious men should esteem as pastors those who do not stand only on their calling. For it is an indignity not to be borne, if that reverence and regard is to be given to certain personages, which the Lord himself desires may be assigned only to the ministers of the Word. Consequently, I readily grant you concerning that minister who shall *not* have taught the Word of our Lord Jesus Christ, whatever title or prerogative he may put forth as a pretence, that he is unworthy to be considered as a pastor, to whom due obedience can be shewn in the ministry. Because, however, it is clear to me, in reference to our brethren who at present hold the office of the ministry among you, that the Gospel is taught you by them, I do not see what can excuse you, as before the Lord, while you either neglect or reject them. If some one may reply, that this or that in their doctrine or morals is objectionable, I require you, in the first place, by our Lord Jesus Christ, that so far as may be, you will first of all weigh the matter in your mind, and without any hastiness of judgment. For since we all of us owe this on the score of charity to one another, that we may not rashly pass sentence against others, but rather, so far as lies in us, that we hold fast by clemency and justice, much more is that moderation to be practised towards those whom the Lord is pleased to peculiarly distinguish above others. And even although there may be somewhat wanting which might justly be required of them (as to which I am not able to speak definitively, since I have no certain knowledge), you must just consider, that you will find no person so thoroughly perfect as that there shall not be many things which are still to be desired. Wherefore, that rule of charity is not duly honoured by us, unless we uphold our neighbours, even with their very infirmities, provided we recognise in them the true fear of God and the sincere desire of following the very truth itself. Lastly, I cannot possibly doubt in so far as concerns their doctrine, but that they faithfully deliver to you the chief heads of Christian religion, such as are necessary to salvation, and join therewith the administration of the sacraments of the Lord. Wherever this is established, there also the very substance of the ministry ordained by the Lord Jesus Christ thrives and flourishes; and all due reverence and respect is to be observed toward him who is the minister.

“Now, therefore, most beloved brethren, I entreat and admonish you, in the name and strength of our Lord Jesus Christ, that turning away from man your heart and mind, you betake yourselves to that one and holy Redeemer, and that you reflect, how much we are bound to submit entirely to His sacred commands. And if everything He has appointed among you ought deservedly to be held inviolate, no consideration whatever ought so to deflect you from the

path of duty, that you may not preserve whole and entire that ministration which he so seriously commends to you. If already you dispute and quarrel with your pastors to the extent of brawls and railing, as I hear has occurred, it is quite evident from such a course of proceeding, that the ministry of those very persons in which the brightness of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ ought to shine forth, must be subject to contempt and reproach, and all but trampled under foot. It is therefore incumbent on you carefully to beware, lest while we seem to ourselves only to insult men, we in fact declare war on God himself. Nor, besides, ought it to seem a light matter to you, that sects and divisions are formed and cherished within the the church, which no one who has a Christian heart beating in his breast can without horror even drink in by the hearing of the ears. But that the state of matters is indeed such where a separation of this kind exists, and as it were a secession between pastor and people, the thing speaks for itself. In conclusion, therefore, accept this admonition, if you wish me to be held by you as a brother, that there may be among you a solid agreement, which may correspond with such a name; that you may not reject that ministry which, for your advantage and the prosperity of the church, I have been forced to approve of without any fear or favour in respect of men. . . . Here, therefore, with the most fervent salutation written by my own hand, do I supplicate the Lord Jesus, that He protect you in His holy fortress of defence; that He may heap on you His gifts more and more; that He may restore your Church to due order, and specially, that He may fill you with His own spirit of gentleness, so that in the true conjunction of soul we may every one bestow ourselves in the promoting of His kingdom." (P. 118-125.)

We are not prepared to adopt every statement made by Calvin in this letter to the church of Geneva, or in the one to Farel, formerly quoted; but we think it very plain, that the decision which he gave upon the important practical question submitted to him, and the main grounds on which he rested it, conclusively disprove some of the more unfavourable prevalent impressions in regard to his character and motives, and especially the supposed undue predominance of pride and arrogance, and, more generally, of the irascible and vindictive tendencies of human nature. Indeed, we cannot conceive how any one can read Calvin's letters with attention and impartiality without being satisfied of the injustice of these impressions. Knowing how prevalent, and yet how unreasonable, was the impression of Calvin's coldness and heartlessness, and of his intemperate violence and imperious arrogance, we once took the trouble of running over the first two volumes of the English translation of his Letters by Dr Bonnet, published at Edinburgh a few years ago, to collect proofs of the falsehood of these impressions, and we noted on the fly-leaf the pages which furnished materials fitted to serve this purpose

We arranged the references under the two heads of—1st, Strong and hearty affection; and 2d, Moderation and forbearance—*i. e.*, moderation in his own judgment upon interesting and important topics, and forbearance with those who differed from him. Our references under both heads, our evidences of the possession of both these features of character, soon swelled to a large extent, and at length presented a body of proof which seems to us perfectly overwhelming. It may interest and gratify some of our readers, if we copy from our fly-leaf the pages we noted in carrying out this design. They will find abundant evidence of Calvin's strong and hearty affection as follows,—vol. i., p. 75, 79, 86, 89, 111, 119, 130, 133, 147, 151, 187, 195, 205, 208, 214, 222, 230, 242, 270, 283, 421, 434, 452; vol. ii., p. 43, 50, 53, 95, 123, 257, 260–1, 295, 323, 377, 386, 407: and of his moderation and forbearance, Letters xxv. and xxvii., p. 78, 87, 90–92, 113, 117, 126, 135, 158–9, 163, 175, 188–9, 194, 204, 211, 243, 257, 266, 270, 290, 306, 315, 356, 380, 396, 409, 417, 430; vol. ii., p. 20–1, 47–9, 106, 177, 192, 212, 224, 233, 258, 270, 286, 315, 333, 346, 353, 394, 418, 428, 432.

Every one knows that the favourite topic of declamation and invective with the enemies of Calvin, is the share which he had in the death of Servetus. All who, from whatever cause, hate Calvin, and are anxious to damage his reputation, are accustomed to dwell upon this transaction, as if it were one of the most disgraceful and atrocious which history records, until, from disgust at the shameless falsehood, injustice, and absurdity of the common misrepresentations regarding it, we are in some danger of being tempted to view it, and other transactions of a similar kind, with less disapprobation than they deserve.

Gibbon said, that he was “more deeply scandalised at the single execution of Servetus, than at the hecatombs which have blazed at the Auto-da-fés of Spain and Portugal.” And Hallam has imitated the malignity of the unprincipled infidel by saying, “The death of Servetus has perhaps as many circumstances of aggravation as any execution for heresy that ever occurred,” (“Literature of Europe,” vol. i., p. 547). The latest writer we have seen upon this subject, Mr Wallace, we presume a Unitarian minister, in a work of very considerable research, entitled “Anti-Trinitarian Biography,” in three vols., published in 1850, writes about it in a style which resembles the raving of a madman, or at least the ferocity of an inquisitor. He says, “A bloodier page does not stain the annals of martyrdom than that in which this horrible transaction is recorded;” he describes it as stamping the character of Calvin as that “of a persecutor of the first class, without one humane or redeeming quality to divest it of its criminality or to pal-

liate its enormity, as "one of the foulest murders recorded in the history of persecution;" and he speaks "of the odium which his malignant and cruel treatment of Servetus has so deservedly brought upon him," (vol. i. p. 442-6). While men, who are the avowed opponents of almost every thing that has been generally reckoned peculiar and distinctive in the Christian revelation, speak on this subject with such reckless ferocity, other men whom it would be unfair to rank in this category, deal with this topic in a manner that is far from being satisfactory; and we could point to indications of this both in Dr Stebbing, the translator of Henry's admirable life of Calvin, and in Principal Tulloch. On these accounts it may be proper to make some observations upon this subject, though we cannot go into much detail.

It is common for those who discuss this subject under the influence of dislike to Calvin, to allege that those who do not sympathise with them in all their invectives against him, are to be regarded as defending or apologising for his conduct in the matter. Mr Wallace, in the work just referred to (vol. i. p. 444), says—"Among other recent apologists of the stern Genevese reformer, M. Albert Rilliet and the Rev. W. K. Tweedie (now Dr Tweedie of Edinburgh) stand conspicuous, but their arguments have been ably and triumphantly refuted by a well-known writer in the *Christian Reformer* for January 1847."

Now it is not true, in any fair sense of the word, that M. Rilliet and Dr Tweedie are apologists for Calvin in this matter. They both decidedly condemn his conduct, and they merely aim at bringing out fully the whole facts of the case, in order that a fair estimate may be formed of it, and that the amount of condemnation may be, upon a full and impartial examination of all its features and circumstances, duly proportioned to its demerits. Rilliet has evidently no sympathy with Calvin's theological views, or with his firm and uncompromising zeal for truth. He has acted only the part of an impartial historian. He has brought out fully and accurately the whole documents connected with the trial of Servetus at Geneva, and he has pointed to some of the inferences which they clearly establish, especially these, that Servetus's whole conduct during the trial was characterised by recklessness and violence, or by cunning and falsehood—that Calvin was at this time at open war with the prevailing party among the civil authorities of Geneva, on the important subject of excommunication—that they took the management of the trial very much into their own hands, without consulting with him—that Calvin's interposition in the matter was much more likely to have brought about the acquittal than the condemnation of Servetus—that Servetus knew this and acted upon it, and that this was the explana-

tion of the reckless violence with which, during one important stage in the trial, he publicly assailed Calvin. The only fair question is, Are these positions historically true? Have they been sufficiently established? M. Rilliet and Dr Tweedie answer in the affirmative, and are in consequence set down as apologists of Calvin. As to Mr Wallace's allegation, that M. Rilliet and Dr Tweedie have been triumphantly refuted in the *Christian Reformer* for January 1847, this is really little better than blustering. There is nothing in the article referred to, that refutes the above-mentioned positions of Rilliet, which must be regarded as now conclusively established. The article is mainly occupied with an attempt to prove, that the authorities of Geneva had no jurisdiction over Servetus, since the offence for which he was tried was not committed within their territory, and that there was no law then in force in Geneva attaching to heresy the penalty of death. The writer has failed in establishing these two positions, but even if he had succeeded in proving them, this would not materially affect the question, so far as concerns its bearing upon Calvin, or the estimate that ought to be formed of the part he took in it. There is more plausible ground for Mr Wallace's allegation that Dr Henry, in his *Life of Calvin*, defends his conduct in this matter, although here, too, there is a great want of fairness manifested by not giving a full view of the biographer's sentiments.

No man in modern times defends Calvin's conduct towards Servetus. No one indeed can defend it, unless he be prepared to defend the lawfulness of putting heretics to death, and this doctrine has been long abandoned by all but papists. There is no other ground on which Calvin can be defended, for he has distinctly and fully assumed the responsibility of the death of Servetus, though he endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to prevent his being burned. Some injudicious admirers of Calvin have attempted to exempt him from the responsibility of Servetus's death; and it is quite true that other causes contributed to bring it about, and that it would, in all probability have been effected, whether Calvin had interfered in the matter or not. But there can be no doubt that Calvin beforehand, at the time, and after the event, explicitly approved and defended the putting him to death, and assumed the responsibility of the transaction. Some of Calvin's admirers were at one time anxious to free him from the charge, founded on the letter which he was alleged to have written to Farel in 1546, and in which this passage occurs:—"Servetus wrote to me lately, and added to his letter a large volume of his delirious fancies. He intimates that he will come to this place, if agreeable to me. But I will not interpose my assurance of his safety, for if he shall come, if my

authority is of any avail, I will not suffer him to depart alive." There is no reason, however, to doubt the genuineness of this letter, which is preserved in the Imperial Library at Paris. And there is nothing in it which is not covered by the notorious facts, that Calvin firmly believed and openly maintained that Servetus, by his heresy and blasphemy, had deserved death—that it was a good and honourable work to inflict the punishment of death upon him, and professed that he was quite willing to aid in bringing about this result. Entertaining these views, he acted a manly and straightforward part in giving expression to them. If Calvin had been such a monster of cruelty and malignity as he is represented to have been, by his slanderers, from Bolsec and Castellio in his own time, to Audin and Wallace in the present day, he would have encouraged Servetus to come to Geneva, and then have got him tried and executed. His letter, then, to Farel, is really no aggravation of what is otherwise known and unquestionable in regard to Calvin's views upon this subject.

The injustice usually exhibited by Calvin's enemies upon this whole matter should just make his friends the more anxious to take up no untenable position regarding it, to admit fully and at once everything that can be proved as a matter of fact, and to maintain no ground which cannot be successfully defended. His enemies have little or nothing that is plausible to bring forward, beyond what is involved in the general charge of believing and acting on the lawfulness of putting heretics and blasphemers to death, except what is furnished to them, sometimes, by injudicious friends of the reformer—taking up ground that cannot be maintained.

But while the conduct of Calvin in the case of Servetus must be judged of mainly and primarily by the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of the lawfulness of putting heretics and blasphemers to death, and while every one now concedes that, tried by this test, it cannot be defended, it is quite possible that there may be other collateral views of the matter, which may materially affect our estimate of the different parties, and tell powerfully in the way either of palliation or of aggravation. Indeed, the only fair and honest question in regard to the case of Servetus, now that the lawfulness of putting heretics to death has been long abandoned, is this—Does Calvin's conduct in the matter furnish evidence that he was a bad or cruel man? Does it prove him to have been in any respect worse than the other Reformers—that is, worse than the best men of his age? This is the only question which is now entitled to consideration, and this question, we venture to assert, must be answered in the negative, by every one who is not perverted by hatred of the truth which Calvin

taught, by every one who is possessed of impartiality and candour. The leading considerations which prove that this is the only answer that can be given to the question, we shall merely state, without enlarging upon them.

1. The doctrine of the lawfulness and duty of putting heretics and blasphemers to death, was then almost universally held, by Protestants as well as Papists, by men of unquestionable piety and benevolence, if there were any such persons, and those who were zealous for God's truth were then not only willing but anxious to act upon this doctrine whenever an opportunity occurred. There is no need to produce evidence of this position, but it may be proper to advert here to a statement which seems to contradict it, made by Dr Stebbing, the translator of Henry's *Life of Calvin*, and adopted from him by Mr Wallace in his *Anti-Trinitarian Biography*. Dr Stebbing thinks that Henry has gone too far in defending Calvin, and in his anxiety to repudiate all concurrence in this, he makes the following statement, in his preface: "Henry has defended Calvin in the case of Servetus with admirable ability; but the translator believes still, as he has ever believed, that when men enjoy so large a share of light and wisdom as Calvin possessed, they cannot be justified, if guilty of persecution, because they lived in times when wicked and vulgar minds warred against the rights of human conscience." Now this statement obviously and necessarily implies, that in Calvin's time it was only "wicked and vulgar minds" who countenanced persecution, and that Calvin's conduct is indefensible, because he agreed on this point only with the wicked and vulgar, and differed from the better and higher class of minds, among his contemporaries. This is what Dr Stebbing has said. But of course he could not mean to say this, for he must have known, if he gave any attention to what he was saying, that the statement is unquestionably false. Every one knows that in Calvin's time the defence of persecuting principles was not confined to the "wicked and vulgar," but was almost universal, even among the best and highest minds. It is to be presumed that Mr Wallace did not perceive the folly or the falsehood of this statement of Dr Stebbing's, when he quoted it with so much gusto, and set it forth as a "well-merited censure from the pen of one of Calvin's most ardent admirers," (vol. i. p. 446).

2. Servetus was not only a heretic and a blasphemer, but one about whom there was everything to provoke and nothing to conciliate. More than twenty years before his death he had put forth views which led Bucer, one of the most moderate of the reformers, to declare that he ought to be torn in pieces. He continued thereafter to lead a life of deliberate hypocrisy, living for many years in the house of a Popish prelate, conforming outwardly to the Church of Rome.

while at the same time he embraced every safe opportunity of propagating his offensive heresies and blasphemies against the most sacred and fundamental doctrines of Christianity. He repeatedly denied upon oath all knowledge of the books which he had published, and he conducted himself during his trial with reckless violence and mendacity. We do not mention these things as if they excused or palliated his being put to death, but merely as illustrating the unreasonableness and unfairness of attempting to represent the case as one of *peculiar* aggravation, or as *specially* entitled to sympathy. Chaufepie, whose article on Servetus in the 4th volume of his Continuation of Bayle's Dictionary is, perhaps, upon the whole, the best and fairest view of the subject that exists, says: "Unfortunately for this great man (Calvin) he is more odious to certain people than Servetus is. They cannot resolve to render him the justice, which no impartial person can refuse to him, without doing an injury to his own judgment."

3. Servetus had been convicted of heresy and blasphemy by a Popish tribunal at Vienne, and had been condemned to be burned by a slow fire; and he escaped from prison and came to Geneva with that sentence hanging over him. During his trial at Geneva the Popish authorities transmitted the sentence they had pronounced against him, and reclaimed him that they might carry it into execution. It was then put to Servetus, whether he would go back to Vienne or go on with his trial at Geneva? He preferred to remain where he was, and there is good reason to believe that the determination of the civil authorities at Geneva to pronounce and execute upon him a sentence of death, was in some measure produced by the fear, that the Papists would charge them with being indifferent, if not favourable to heresy, if they spared him. There is abundant evidence that this consideration operated to some extent as a motive, upon the conduct of the Protestant churches at the time of the Reformation. As a specimen of this we may refer to Bishop Jewel's Apology of the Church of England, a work which was approved of by the Convocation, and thus clothed with public authority. In the third chapter of the Apology, sect. 2, Jewel boasts, that Protestants not only detested and denounced all the heretics who had been condemned by the ancient church, but also, that when any of these heresies broke out amongst them "they seriously and severely coerced the broachers of them with lawful and civil punishments." If this was distinctly set forth and boasted of as an ordinary rule of procedure, in opposition to Popish allegations, we cannot doubt that the consideration would operate most powerfully, in so very peculiar, and indeed unexampled, a case as that of Servetus, in which not only had a Popish

tribunal condemned him to the flames, but had publicly demanded his person that they might put that sentence in execution. In these circumstances, no Protestant tribunal could be expected to do anything else but pronounce a similar sentence, unless either the proof of the charge of heresy and blasphemy had failed, or they had believed it to be unlawful to put heretics and blasphemers to death.

4. Although Calvin, after having, notwithstanding extreme personal provocation, done everything in his power to convince Servetus of his errors, approved of putting him to death as an incorrigible heretic and blasphemer, he exerted his influence, but without success, to prevent his being burned, and to effect that he might be put to death by some less cruel and offensive process; so that to talk, as is often done, of Calvin burning Servetus, is simply and literally a falsehood.

5. The reformers generally, and more especially two of the mildest and most moderate of them all, both in their theological views and in their general character, Melancthon, representing the Lutherans, and Bullinger, representing the Zuinglians, gave their full, formal, public approbation to the proceedings which took place in Geneva in the case of Servetus.

6. Archbishop Cranmer exerted all his influence with King Edward, and succeeded thereby, though not without great difficulty, in effecting the burning of two heretics, one of them a woman, and the other a foreigner, whose offences were in every respect, and tried by any standard whatever, far less aggravated than Servetus's.*

As all these six positions are notorious and undeniable, it must be quite plain to every one who reflects for a moment on what these facts, individually and collectively, involve or imply, that the *peculiar* frequency and the *special* virulence and ferocity with which Calvin's conduct in regard to Servetus has been denounced, indicate on the part of those who have done so, not only an utter want of anything like impartiality and fairness, but a bitter dislike, a rancorous hatred, to a most able and influential champion of God's truth.

It might be supposed that most men, knowing these facts, would admit that there are many palliations attaching to the death of Servetus, and to Calvin's conduct in the matter, and yet Mr Wallace, as we have seen, as if determined to outstrip in the virulent ferocity of his invective all that had been said

* Burnet, after narrating (History of the Reformation, P. II. B. I, under the year 1549) Cranmer's very prominent and influential share in bringing about these two burnings, the one that of an Anabaptist woman, the other that of an Arian Dutchman, adds, "One thing was certain, that what he did in this matter flowed from no cruelty of temper in him, no man being further from that black disposition, but it was truly the effect of those principles by which he governed himself."

by Papists and infidels, describes it as being "without one humane or redeeming quality to divest it of its criminality, or palliate its enormity." The grounds on which men who are fond of railing at Calvin in this style, commonly excuse themselves, is an allegation to the effect, that he was mainly influenced in this matter by personal and vindictive feelings, that under the influence of these feelings he had been long plotting Servetus's death, and seeking an opportunity of cutting him off, and that he gave information against him to the Popish authorities at Vienne, and was thus the cause of his being tried and condemned there. These assertions are, to a large extent, utterly destitute of proof, and in so far as there is any appearance of evidence in support of them as matters of fact, they furnish no foundation for the conclusions which have been based upon them. The general allegation, that Calvin was mainly or largely influenced by personal and vindictive feelings towards Servetus, is destitute of all proof or even plausibility. There is no evidence of it whatever, and there is no occasion whatever to have recourse to this theory. All that Calvin ever said or did in the case of Servetus, is fully explained by his conviction of the lawfulness and duty of putting heretics and blasphemers to death, and by his uncompromising determination to maintain in every way he reckoned lawful the interests of God's truth, and to discharge his own obligations, combined with the too prevalent habit of the age to indulge in railing and abuse against all who were dealt with as opponents. There were very considerable differences in character and disposition between Cranmer and Calvin, but it is in substance just as true of the latter as of the former, that his conduct "was truly the effect of those principles by which he governed himself." Calvin, in his last interview with Servetus, on the day before his death, solemnly declared, that he had never sought to resent any personal injuries that had been offered to him, that many years ago he had laboured, at the risk of his own life, to bring Servetus back to the truth, that notwithstanding his want of success, he long continued to correspond with him on friendly terms, that he had omitted no act of kindness towards him, until at last Servetus, exasperated by his expostulations, assailed him with downright rage. To this solemn appeal Servetus made no answer, and there is no ground whatever to warrant any human being to call in question its truth or sincerity. The truth is, that there is at least as good evidence that Mr Wallace hates Calvin as that Calvin hated Servetus.*

* Armand de la Chapelle, whose review of Allwoerden's *Historia Michaelis Serveti* in the *Bibliothèque Raisonnée* for 1728-9, tom. i. and ii., is characterised by great ability and fairness, thus describes the conduct of some of Calvin's

We have seen some specimens of the rancorous abuse with which he assails the Reformer. But we have not exhausted his performances in this way. He assures us that Calvin formed a plan for the destruction of Servetus, and that he prosecuted it for thirteen years before he succeeded in accomplishing his object, that he "came to the deliberate determination of plotting his destruction," that "he was always on the watch for something by which he might criminate Servetus," that he "was on the watch for him and caused him to be apprehended soon after his arrival" in Geneva, (p. 430-4). These are statements for which no evidence has been or can be produced. They can be regarded in no other light than as mere fabrications. Mr Wallace also gives us to understand that, in his judgment, the conduct of Calvin in this matter shewed him to be "a man who, under the guise of religion, could violate every principle of honour and humanity," (p. 446). *Under the guise of religion!* We could scarcely have believed it possible, that any man would have insinuated a doubt of the sincerity of Calvin's conviction, that he was doing God service and discharging a duty, in contributing to bring about the death of Servetus. The sincerity and earnestness of this conviction do not, of course, furnish any proof that he was right, or supply any materials for defending his conduct. Still this conviction is an important feature in every case to which it applies, and it ought always to be taken into account. We do not believe that Mr Wallace will get much countenance even from Papists and infidels in his insinuation, that Calvin is not entitled to the benefit of it.

His allegation about "violating every principle of honour and humanity," is probably intended to bear special reference to what has been charged against Calvin, in connection with the information against Servetus, given to the Popish authorities at Vienne, and this is indeed the only feature of the case, the discussion of which is attended with any difficulty. Mr Wallace's statement upon this point is this:—

"Calvin, who was always on the watch for something by which he might criminate Servetus, soon gave out that this work" (his last work, the "*Christianismi Institutio*," which he had got secretly printed without his name at Vienne, and the substance of which he had sent to Calvin some years before) "was written by him. And availing himself of the assistance of one William Trie, a native of Lyons, who was at that time residing at Geneva, he caused Servetus to be

accusers in his time, and they do not seem to be much improved yet:—"Je soutiens qu'il n'y a que malice noire, et qu'aigre intolerance dans l'animosité personnelle que certaines gens font paroître contre cet illustre Reformateur," (*Bib. Rais* tom. i. p. 400).

apprehended, and thrown into prison on a charge of heresy. Some of the friends and disciples of Calvin have attempted to free him from this odious imputation, and he has himself represented it as a calumny; but the fact that Servetus was imprisoned at the sole instigation of Calvin is too well established to admit of dispute. Abundant proofs of it may be found in the accounts of De la Roche, Allwoerden, Mosheim, Bock, and Trechsel." (P. 433.)

We will advert first to Mr Wallace's references to authorities. He says that abundant proofs that Calvin was the author and originator of the whole proceedings against Servetus at Vienne, may be found in the accounts of De la Roche, Allwoerden, Mosheim, Boch, and Trechsel. We have not read Mosheim and Trechsel, but we are confident that the proofs to be found in the other three authors are not abundant, and are not even sufficient. De la Roche and Allwoerden published before Trie's three letters to his friend at Lyons, which Calvin is alleged to have instigated and dictated, were given to the public, and therefore were scarcely in circumstances to judge fairly on this question.

De la Roche (*Bibliothèque Anglaise*, tom. ii., 1717) does not enter into anything like a full and formal investigation of this matter. The main evidence he adduces, that Calvin was the author or originator of Trie's letters, is a statement to that effect made by Servetus himself on his trial, coupled with the fact, that in his judgment Calvin's denial did not fully meet the precise charge as laid. Allwoerden, whose work is in reality just the first edition of Mosheim's, goes much more fully into this matter, and produces additional proofs, though they are not very "abundant" or satisfactory. His authorities are only Bolsec, in his *Life of Calvin*, and the anonymous author of the work entitled, "*Contra Libellum Calvini*," &c., in reply to Calvin's *Refutation of the errors of Servetus*. Bolsec, indeed, says that Calvin wrote to Cardinal Tournon to give information against Servetus, that Trie wrote to many people at Lyons and Vienna at the solicitation of Calvin, and that in consequence, Servetus was put in prison (Bolsec, p. 11). But Bolsec's *Lives* both of Calvin and Beza have always been regarded, except by Papists, whose church Bolsec had joined before he published them, as infamous libels, to which no weight whatever is due. The other work referred to has been ascribed to Laelius Socinus and to Castellio, and it is not improbable that both were concerned in the production of it, as is supposed also to have been the case with another work bearing upon this subject, and published under the fictitious name of Martinus Bellius. The author of this work says, that those who had seen Trie's letters to his Popish friend, "think that

they were written by Calvin, because of the similarity of the style," and that they were of a higher order than Trie could have produced. This is all the evidence he adduces, and it plainly shews, that at the time the report rested merely upon conjecture or suspicion. This anonymous and unknown author says also, that "there are some who say, that Calvin himself wrote to Cardinal Tournon," a statement which shews how thoroughly the whole matter was one of mere hearsay. It is proper also to mention, that it is this work which contains the report, given, however, merely as a hearsay (*sunt qui affirmant*), that Calvin laughed when he saw Servetus carried along to the stake. This report even De la Roche, with all his prejudices against Calvin and Calvinism, denounces as an "execrable calumny," though it is really a fair enough specimen of the way in which Calvin has been often dealt with. De la Chapelle very happily ridiculed the manifest and palpable insufficiency of this evidence, in this way, "The cotemporary enemies of Calvin only suspected that he was the author of the letter, and behold now-a-days, 170 years after the event, De la Roche and Allwoerden are quite certain of it. Perhaps in another 100 years, it will be found out that it was Calvin himself who carried the letter to Lyons." (*Bib. Rais.*, tom. i. p. 390.)

But Trie's three letters have since been published, and may be expected to throw some light upon this subject. They were procured from Vienne, and published by Artigny in 1749, and they have since been commented upon by Mosheim, Bock, and many others. Bock is one of those referred to by Mr Wallace, as exhibiting "abundant proofs" that Calvin employed Trie to effect the apprehension of Servetus at Vienne. But the truth is, that Bock, though strongly prejudiced against Calvin, and though unfair enough to allege that he was somewhat influenced by personal and vindictive feelings in this matter, did not profess to produce "abundant proofs" of the point now under consideration; *nay, he expressly admits that it could not be proved*, though he was strongly inclined to believe it. The whole of what he says upon the subject is this:—"An Gul. Trie homo indoctus, proprio motu an Calvini instinctu et consilio hoc fecerit, certo quidem statui nequit; non tamen vanæ videntur conjecturæ hanc illi dictasse epistolam, qua Servetus tanquam hæreticus exurendus accusabatur" (*"Historia Anti-trinitariorum,"* tom. ii. p. 355). We accept Bock's concession that there is no proof but only conjectures, but we do not admit that the conjectures are possessed of any real weight or probability. Mr Wallace could easily have found room, if he had chosen, for a summary of the "abundant proofs" of which he boasts. But it was more convenient just

to make a flourish by a reference to Bock and other names, whose works few were likely to examine.

Trie's letters not only afford no evidence, but do not even furnish any plausible ground of suspicion, that Calvin was, in any way, connected with, or cognisant of, the origin of this matter, that is, that it was at his instigation that Trie conveyed information to his Popish friend about Servetus, and the book which he had recently published. So far as appears from the correspondence, Trie's statement about Servetus and his book seems to have come forth quite spontaneously, without being suggested or instigated by any one. It has every appearance of having come up quite naturally and easily, in the course of correspondence with a friend, who was urging him to return to the Church of Rome, on the ground of the unity and soundness of doctrine that prevailed there, as contrasted with the varieties and heresies that were found among Protestants. This naturally and obviously led Trie, as it would have led any one in similar circumstances who happened to be cognisant of Servetus and his book, to tell his friend of what had been going on of late in the way of heresy, in his own neighbourhood, and in a place where Popish authorities had entire control. In short, there is no ground to believe, or even to suspect, that Calvin was connected with originating or instigating the proceeding, which ultimately led to Servetus's apprehension by the Popish authorities at Vienne. If men are determined to put the worst possible construction upon everything relating to Calvin, they may have some suspicion that he instigated Trie to write to Vienne about Servetus. But Mr Wallace's "abundant proofs" can really be regarded in no other light than as downright audacity.

And then it must not be forgotten that we have from Calvin himself what must in all fairness be regarded as a denial of this charge. In his *Refutation of the errors of Servetus*, he intimates that it had been alleged against him, that it was through his agency (*meâ opérâ*) that Servetus had been seized at Vienne. He scouted the idea as absurd and preposterous, as if he had been in friendly correspondence with the Popish authorities, and then he concludes with saying, that if the allegation were true, he would not think of denying it, for he would not reckon it at all dishonourable to him, as he had never concealed that it was through his agency that Servetus had been seized and brought to trial at Geneva. Calvin evidently saw no material difference in point of principle, between doing what was practicable and necessary to bring him to trial at Vienne, and doing what was requisite with the same view at Geneva. He certainly could not mean by this statement to deny what he did do, in the way of furnishing materials to be used as evidence against Servetus at Vienne, for what he had done in

this respect was quite well known, and was distinctly mentioned in the formal sentence of the popish authorities, which had been publicly produced in the subsequent trial. He never could have thought of denying this, and therefore he must have meant merely to deny, that he was the author or originator of the proceedings; in other words, to deny that he had written himself, or that he had instigated Trie to write, although even of this he indicates that he would not have been ashamed if it had been true.

This leads us to advert to what it was that Calvin did in connection with the proceedings against Servetus at Vienne, and this topic may be properly connected with a statement of Principal Tulloch's on this subject. Dr T., as might be expected, seems disposed to press the more unfavourable views of this transaction. He describes it as a "great crime," he speaks of "the undying disgrace which, under all explanations, must for ever attach to the event," and assures us that "the act must bear its own doom and disgrace for ever." (*Leaders of the Reformation*, p. 101, 138, 144.) Of his more specific statements, the only one to which we think it needful to advert is the following:—

"The special blame of Calvin in the whole matter is very much dependent upon the view we take of his previous relation to the accusation and trial of Servetus by the Inquisition at Vienna. If the evidence, of which Dyer has made the most, were perfectly conclusive, that the reformer, through a creature of his own of the name of Trie, was really the instigator from the beginning of the proceedings against Servetus—that from Geneva, in short, he schemed with deep-laid purpose the ruin of the latter, who was then quietly prosecuting his profession at Vienna—and from MSS. that had privately come into his possession furnished the Inquisition with evidence of the heretic's opinions—if we were compelled to believe all this, then the atrocity of Calvin's conduct would stand unrelieved by the sympathy of his fellow-reformers, and would not only not admit of defence, but would present one of the blackest pictures of treachery that even the history of religion discloses. The evidence does not seem satisfactory, although it is not without certain features of suspicion. There can be no doubt, however, that Calvin was so far privy through Trie to the proceedings of the Inquisition, and that he heartily approved of them." (P. 138, 9.)

This is a curious and significant passage, and seems to indicate, that Dr T. occupies the position of one who is "willing to wound but yet afraid to strike." Dyer's *Life of Calvin*, the authority here referred to by Dr T., was published in 1850 and is got up with considerable care and skill. Its general object manifestly is, to check and counteract the tendency to think more favourably of Calvin, which had grown up in the community, in connection with the labours of the Calvin

Translation Society and other causes. It was this, too, probably, that called forth the special virulence and ferocity of Mr Wallace, whose *Anti-Trinitarian Biography* was published in the same year. But Mr Dyer goes about his work much more cautiously than Mr Wallace. He abstains generally from violent invective and gross misrepresentation, and labours to convey an unfavourable impression by insinuation, supported by an elaborate and sustained course of special pleading in the style of an Old Bailey practitioner, combined with a considerable show of moderation and fairness. The reference which Dr T. in the passage we have quoted makes to Mr Dyer is fitted to convey the impression, that that author goes as far as Mr Wallace in ascribing the whole proceedings connected with Servetus's apprehension at Vienne to Calvin's agency or instigation. But this is not the case. Mr Dyer was too cautious to assert this. He saw and admitted, that there is no evidence that Calvin had anything to do with the origination of the matter, that is, no evidence that Trie's first letter was written at his instigation or with his cognisance.

"The Abbé d'Artigny goes farther than the evidence warrants, in positively asserting that Trie's letter was written at Calvin's dictation, and in calling it Calvin's letter in the name of Trie. It is just possible that Trie may have written it without Calvin's knowledge; and the latter is therefore entitled to the benefit of the doubt. He cannot be absolutely proved to have taken the first step in delivering Servetus into the fangs of the Roman Catholic Inquisition; but what we shall now have to relate will shew, that he at least aided and abetted it." (*Dyer's Life of John Calvin*, p. 314.)

It is true, as Dr T. says, that Mr Dyer has made the most of the evidence about Calvin aiding and abetting in the matter. But there is really no mystery or uncertainty about this. What Calvin did, in this respect, is well known and quite ascertained, though we do not deny that there is room for a difference of opinion, or rather of impression, as to how far it can be thoroughly defended.

The principal sentence in the quotation from Dr T. is a piece of rhetorical declamation, and is characterised by the inaccuracy and exaggeration which usually attach to such displays. It is not alleged by Mr Dyer, or indeed even by Mr Wallace, that Calvin's conduct corresponded with the description which Dr T. has here pictured of it, and yet his statement plainly implies that Mr Dyer has asserted all this to be true of Calvin—has undertaken to prove it, and has produced evidence in support of it, which though not, in Dr T.'s judgment sufficient to establish it, is not destitute of weight. We cannot understand what could have tempted Dr T. to dash off such an inflated and exaggerated description of Calvin's conduct, and to ascribe it, without war-

rant, to the cold and cautious Mr Dyer. He surely could not expect that his assertion, that Mr Dyer had undertaken to prove all this, and thought that he had proved it, would be sufficient to induce some people to believe it or to regard it as probable, even though it "would present one of the blackest pictures of treachery that even the history of religion discloses."

The first charge in this indictment against Calvin, given hypothetically so far as Dr T. is concerned, *but alleged by him to be adduced and believed by Mr Dyer*, is, that "the Reformer, through a creature of his own of the name of Trie, was really the instigator from the beginning of the proceedings against Servetus." Now Mr Dyer, as we have seen, expressly admits that this position cannot be proved, and Calvin himself has denied it, while declaring at the same time that he would not have been ashamed to acknowledge it, if it had been true. The second charge is merely a rhetorical expansion and amplification of the first, with a fine touch added in the end by Dr T.'s own hand, without any countenance from his authority, "that from Geneva he schemed, with deep-laid purpose, the ruin of the latter, *who was then quietly prosecuting his profession (as a physician) at Vienne.*" The clause which we have put in italics is fitted, and to all appearance was intended, to convey the impression, that Servetus had abandoned the work of propagating heresy and blasphemy, in which he had been engaged more or less, occasionally, for about a quarter of a century—that he had retired from the field of theology, and was *quietly* occupied with the practice of medicine, giving no ground of offence to any one, when Calvin devised and executed a plot for bringing him to trial and death. Now all this is palpably inconsistent with the best known and most fundamental facts of the case. *Every one knows*, that the whole proceedings against Servetus, both at Vienne and at Geneva, originated in, and were founded on, the fact of his having just succeeded in getting secretly printed at Vienne, a large edition of his work entitled *Christianismi Restitutio*, in which all his old heresies and blasphemies were reproduced. Servetus had taken every precaution to guard against this work being known in his own neighbourhood, but a large number of copies had been sent to Frankfort and other places for sale, and one copy at least had reached Geneva. Indeed, the substance of the information which Trie's first letter conveyed to his Popish friend at Lyons was just this, that this book had recently been produced and printed in his neighbourhood, and that Servetus was the author and Arnoullet the printer of it. So far is Mr Dyer from giving any countenance, as Dr T. insinuates, to this rhetorical flourish, about Servetus "*quietly prosecuting his profession at*

Vienne," that for a purpose of his own, intending to damage Calvin in another way, he calls special attention to the consideration, that Servetus's printing his book at this time "was an overt act, and furnished something tangible to the Roman Catholic authorities, who would have looked with suspicion on mere manuscript evidence, furnished by a man whom they considered to be a great heretic himself," (p. 362).

This leads us to advert to the third and last charge in the indictment, viz., that "from MSS. that had privately come into his possession, he furnished the Inquisition with evidence of the heretic's opinions." This charge, as here stated, is not put quite accurately, but we admit that in substance it is not only adduced, but established, by Mr Dyer. He puts it thus. "But this (that is, the admission that there is no evidence that Trie's first letter was written with Calvin's knowledge) does not clear him from the charge of having furnished the evidence by which alone Trie's denunciation could be rendered effectual; and of thus having made himself a partaker in whatever guilt attaches to such an act," (p. 361).

Calvin did not perceive or admit that there was any guilt attaching, either to Trie's conduct or to his own, in this matter; but he certainly did the substance of what is here ascribed to him. The facts are these. Trie in his first letter to his popish friend, in which he told him of the publication of Servetus's work, and gave the name of the author and printer, enclosed also the first leaf of the book. His friend communicated this to the Popish authorities, who made some investigation into the case. But so effectual had been the precautions taken by Servetus to secure secrecy, that they could get hold of nothing tangible. Trie's friend was in consequence requested to write to him again, and to urge him to furnish, if possible, any additional materials that might throw light upon the matter. In answer to this application, Trie sent about twenty letters, which, a good many years before, Servetus had addressed to Calvin, and which were to be used, not as Dr T. says, "as evidence of the heretic's opinions," but as materials for establishing his identity. Trie's account of the way in which he procured the letters is this, and it is all we know of Calvin's procedure in this matter, (Dyer, p. 316)—

"But I must confess, that I have had great trouble to get what I send you from Mr Calvin. Not that he is unwilling that such execrable blasphemies should be punished; but that it seems to him to be his duty, as he does not wield the sword of justice, to refute heresy by his doctrines, rather than to punish it by such methods. I have, however, importuned him so much, representing to him that I should incur the reproach of levity, if he did not help me, that he has at last consented to hand over what I send."

Calvin had great hesitation in giving up these letters to be employed for this purpose, and it would have been better, perhaps, if he had declined to comply with the application. Not that the matter is one of any material importance, or that his conduct in this affair can affect injuriously his general character in the estimation of intelligent and impartial men, but that it is fitted to give a handle to enemies, and has been regarded with somewhat different feelings, even among those whose prepossessions are all in his favour. Calvin had no doubt as to the lawfulness of his giving up these letters for the purpose of establishing Servetus's identity. His views as to the way in which heretics ought to be dealt with, and the responsibility which in consequence he was quite willing to incur in such cases, prevented any doubt as to the warrantableness of the step proposed. His hesitation seems to have turned only on its becomingness or congruity, on the propriety of a man in his position taking, in the circumstances, an active part in a criminal process, which might result in the shedding of blood. How far Calvin's conduct in this matter should be regarded as a violation of the confidence that ought to attach to friendly intercourse, must depend very much upon the circumstances in which the correspondence was begun, and carried on, and ended; and of all this we know nothing, and cannot judge. Taking even the most unfavourable view which any reasonable man can form of the transaction, there is really nothing in it, apart of course from its assuming or implying the lawfulness of putting heretics to death, that can be considered very heinous, or that is fitted to create any strong prejudice against Calvin's general character. There is not one of the leading Reformers, against whom more serious charges than this cannot be established.

It is satisfactory to know, that although these letters to Calvin are mentioned among the *pieces justificatives* in the sentence pronounced upon Servetus by the popish authorities, they had got, before the sentence was passed, direct and conclusive evidence from other sources, to prove, in the face of his deliberate perjury, that he was Servetus, though he had lived for thirteen years in Vienne under a different name, and that he had printed and published the heretical and blasphemous book which had been ascribed to him. Dyer has given a full, and, upon the whole, a fair view, of this branch of the case, (p. 319-325).

We did not intend to dwell so long on this matter of Servetus. But since so much has been put forth of late years, by Wallace and Dyer, by Stebbing and Tulloch, fitted to convey erroneous and unfair impressions upon some features of the case, we do not regret that we have been led to enlarge some-

what upon it, although confining ourselves strictly to what seemed to require explanation.*

The impression which the more temperate and reasonable opponents of Calvin's views chiefly labour to produce with respect to his character is this, that he was a proud and presumptuous speculator upon divine things, very anxious to be wise above what is written, and ever disposed to indulge his own reasonings upon the deepest mysteries of religion, instead of seeking humbly and carefully to follow the guidance of God's word, without pressing any further than it led him. Now it is perhaps not very unnatural that men *who have never read Calvin's writings*, and who are decidedly and zealously opposed to his doctrines, may have insensibly formed to themselves some such conception of his general character and spirit, or may have very readily believed all this when they saw it asserted by others. This notion, however, has not only no foundation to rest upon, but it is contradicted by the whole spirit that breathes through the writings of Calvin. We are not at present speaking of the actual truth of his doctrines, but merely of the general spirit in which his examination of God's word and his investigation of divine truth is conducted; and upon this point, we have no hesitation in saying, that there is nothing which is more strikingly and palpably characteristic of the general spirit in which Calvin ordinarily conducts his investigations into divine truth, and his speculations on the mysteries of religion, than his profound reverence for the word of God, the caution and sobriety with which he advances, and his perfect readiness at all times to lay aside or abandon every statement, or even mode of expression, that did not clearly appear to him to have the sanction of the sacred Scriptures. And we think it quite impossible for any man of fairness and candour to read Calvin's writings without being constrained to feel that this was the state of mind and the general spirit, which he at least intended and laboured to cherish and to manifest. Men of general fairness and candour may continue, after reading Calvin's writings, to think that he has brought out from the sacred Scriptures doctrines upon some of the deeper mysteries of religion which are not taught there, and some may

* We have already intimated that we consider the Art. "Servetus," in the 4th volume of *Chauffepie's "Nouveau Dictionnaire,"* or *Continuation of Bayle*, as giving the best and fairest view of the whole case. The fullest collection of the materials bearing upon his trial at Geneva, is to be found in *Rilliets' work*, entitled "*Relation de Proces Criminel*," &c, published in 1844, or still better, in a translation of this work, published at Edinburgh, in 1846, under the title "*Calvin and Servetus*," with an excellent Introduction, consisting chiefly of a fine sketch of Calvin's life, by the Rev. Dr Tweedie, who has also contributed a valuable article to the "*North British Review*," vol. xiii., exhibiting a very successful appreciation of Calvin himself, and of his modern biographers, Henry, Dyer, and Audin.

even be disposed to allege that, misled by the deceitfulness of the human heart, he did not always know what manner of spirit he was of. But no person, we think, of fairness and discernment can fail to see and admit, that he had laid it down as a rule to himself, to follow humbly, implicitly, and reverentially the guidance of God's word, that he carefully laboured to act upon this rule, and honestly believed that he had succeeded in doing so.

From the nature of the case, it is not easy to prove this by an adduction of evidence. But there are one or two points of a pretty definite description, which may be fairly regarded as confirming it. It was not Calvin's practice to attempt to strain the particular statements of Scripture, in order to bring out more abundant evidence of doctrines which he believed to be true. On the contrary, he has incurred the suspicion of some of the more uncandid and unintelligent friends of truth, by occasionally admitting, that a particular text gave no support to a sound doctrine, in support of which it was commonly adduced. He shewed no disposition, in general, to sanction the use of unscriptural phrases and statements in the exposition of scriptural doctrines, and it has been thought that in some cases, as in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity for instance, Calvin, disgusted with the unwarranted and presumptuous speculations of the schoolmen upon this subject, even carried to an extreme his anxiety to adhere to mere scriptural terms and statements in the exposition of this mystery. Now whether he was right or wrong in the particular cases to which these observations apply, his conduct in this respect indicates a state of mind, a general spirit, and a habit of procedure, very different from what are often ascribed to him, and may be fairly regarded as affording evidence, that the great object of his desires and aims was just to ascertain and bring out truly and accurately the mind of God in his word; to submit his understanding and his opinions wholly to the control of the inspired standard; to go as far as Scripture led him, and no farther, in the exposition of divine mysteries. Whether he has in every instance succeeded in this object which he proposed to himself, is, of course, a different question; but we confess we do not know where to find a finer model, in general, of the spirit in which the examination of God's word and the investigation of divine truth ought to be conducted, than in the writings of Calvin; and we are persuaded also, that the more fully men imbibe his general spirit in this respect and faithfully act upon it, a spirit which will lead them equally to go without fear or hesitation as far as Scripture goes, and to stop without reluctance where Scripture stops, the more firmly will they be convinced that

the great doctrines, with which Calvin's name is commonly associated, are indeed the very truth of God, and do most fully shew forth the perfections of Him "by whom are all things, and for whom are all things."

We do not mean at present to attempt anything like theological discussion, but we would like to make a few observations on Calvin's historical position, viewed in relation both to the system of doctrine usually called by his name, and to his principles with respect to the worship and government of the church. The sum and substance of what Calvin aimed at, and to some extent effected, was to throw the church back, for the cure of the evils by which she was polluted and disgraced at the era of the Reformation, upon the Augustinianism or Calvinism in doctrine, and the Presbyterianism in worship and government, which he believed to be taught in the New Testament. He of course became a Calvinist and a Presbyterian, because he believed that the word of God required this. On the Scriptural evidence of his views we are not called upon at present to enter. We can merely advert to one or two features of the aspects which they present historically, especially when contemplated in their bearing upon the condition to which the church had sunk at the time when the Reformation commenced. Doctrine (viewed more especially as comprehending the exposition of the way of life, or the method of the salvation of sinful men), worship, and government, in short, everything about the church or professedly Christian society, had fallen into a state of gross corruption. There might be difficulties, from want of materials, in pointing out precisely at what times particular corruptions in doctrine, worship and government, were invented and introduced. But it might be supposed that no one could fail to see and acknowledge, that the church of the 15th century, viewed both in its Eastern and Western branches, though it is with the latter that we have more immediately to do, was very different in all important respects from the church of the 1st century, as brought before us in the writings of the inspired apostles. The system, however, which had grown up, and which overspread the church in the 15th century, was too firmly rooted in men's passions, prejudices, and selfish interests, to admit of the light of truth, as to what the church should be, being easily let in. The Reformation of the 16th century became in consequence a severe and protracted struggle, requiring and giving scope for the highest powers and qualities on both sides, both in choosing the ground to be taken, and in keeping or maintaining it. And it is here that the pre-eminent grandeur and majesty of Calvin shine forth. A profound and penetrating survey of the existing

condition and of the past history of the church, combined with the study of the word of God, in leading him to see, that the only thorough remedy, the only effectual cure, for the deplorable state of matters that now prevailed, the only process that would go to the root of the existing evils and produce a real and permanent reformation, was to reject all palliatives and half measures, and to fall back upon the thoroughness and simplicity of what was taught and sanctioned by our Lord and his apostles.

Perhaps the one most indispensable thing in order to the restoration of true Christianity in the world, was the bringing out from the sacred Scriptures of the whole doctrine of the Apostle Paul in regard to the justification of sinners, and this was the special work which God qualified and enabled Luther to effect. The history of this doctrine of justification is remarkable. In consequence of the particularly full and formal exposition of it which the Apostle Paul was guided by the Spirit to put on record in his epistles to the Romans and Galatians, Satan seems to have felt the necessity of carrying on his efforts to corrupt it in an indirect and insidious way, of proceeding by sapping and mining, rather than by open assault. Accordingly, there was scarcely anything like direct and formal controversy on the subject of justification from the time of Paul to that of Luther. But yet the true doctrine of Scripture on the subject had been very thoroughly corrupted. All that is taught in Scripture in regard to it had been thrown into the back-ground and explained away, without being directly and explicitly denied. Notions of an adverse tendency had been introduced, diffused, and mixed up with the general series of ecclesiastical arrangements, connected especially with the efficacy of the sacraments, the conditions and merits of good works, and the interposition of other creatures in procuring the favour of God. By these processes quietly and insidiously carried on, the doctrine of justification had been greatly corrupted in the church, even before Augustine's time, and he did nothing to check the progress of corruption, or to introduce sounder views, upon this important subject. Indeed, his own views upon it always continued confused and to some extent erroneous. When Luther was honoured to bring out fully the true Scriptural doctrine of justification, which had been concealed and buried so long, the Church of Rome rejected it, while all Protestant churches received it. Luther applied very fully the true Scriptural doctrine of justification to all the corruptions of the Papal system which were *directly* connected with it, but he did not do much in the way of connecting the doctrine of justification with the other great doctrines of the Christian system. It was

reserved for the comprehensive master mind of Calvin to connect and combine the Scripture doctrine of justification as taught by Luther, with the large mass of important Scriptural truth set forth in the writings of Augustine. And this combination of Lutheranism and Augustinianism is just Calvinism, which is thus the fullest, most complete, and comprehensive exposition of the whole scheme of Christian doctrine. It went to the root of the prevailing corruption of Christian truth, and overturned it from the foundation.

The grand heresy, which might be said to have overspread the church for many centuries, was in substance this, that the salvation of sinful men, in so far as they might need salvation, was to be ascribed, not to the one true God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, but to men themselves and to what they could do, or to what could be done for them by their fellow-men and other creatures. This, more or less fully developed, was the great heresy which underlaid the whole elaborate externalism of the mediæval and Romish religion. Almost everything that is distinctive, either in the specific tenets and practices, or in the more general features and tendencies, of the full-blown Popery with which the Reformers had to contend, might be traced back, more or less directly, to this great principle; while, on the other hand, almost all the particular features of the system tended to deepen and strengthen in men's minds the comprehensive heresy in which they had their root and origin. Calvin saw that the only effectual way of dealing with this great perversion of the way of salvation, so well fitted to lead men to build upon a false foundation their hopes of heaven, the only way to overturn it root and branch, to demolish at once the whole height of the superstructure and the whole depth of the foundation, was to bring out fully and definitely the whole doctrine of Scripture concerning the place held in the salvation of sinners by the Father, by the Son, and by the Holy Ghost. He made it his great object to bring out and to embody the whole doctrine of Scripture upon these subjects, and accordingly Calvinism is just a full exposition and development of the sum and substance of what is represented in Scripture as done for the salvation of sinners by the three persons of the Godhead. It represents the Father as arranging, in accordance with all the perfections of his nature and all the principles of his moral government, and at the same time, with due regard to the actual capacities and obligations of men, the whole provisions of the scheme of redemption, choosing some men to grace and glory, and sending his Son to seek and to save them. It represents the Son as assuming human nature, and suffering and dying as the Surety and Substitute of his chosen people, of those whom the Father had

given him in covenant, of an innumerable multitude out of every kindred and nation and tongue, as bearing their sins in his own body, and by bearing them bearing them away, as doing and bearing everything necessary for securing their eternal salvation. It represents the Holy Spirit as taking of the things of Christ and shewing them to men's souls, as taking up his abode in all whom Christ redeemed with his precious blood, effectually and infallibly determining them to faith and holiness, and thus applying the blessings of redemption to all for whom Christ purchased them, and finally preparing them fully for the inheritance of the saints. These are in substance the views given us in Scripture of the way in which sinners of the human race are saved. They are views which, as experience fully proves, are most offensive to the natural tendencies and inclinations of men's hearts ; and plainly as they are taught in Scripture, there is a constant and powerful disposition, especially when true religion is in a low or languishing condition, to reject them or explain them away, and to substitute in their room notions which, more or less directly, exclude or contradict them. They certainly had been thoroughly excluded from the practical teaching, and from the whole plans and arrangements, of the church, at the period of the Reformation ; while it is true, on the other hand, and it is this with which at present we have more immediately to do, that these views, and these alone, overturn from the foundation the whole system of notions which then generally prevailed, and which so fearfully perverted the way of salvation.

We believe that it is impossible to bring out accurately, fully, and definitely, the sum and substance of what is taught in Scripture concerning the place which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost hold in the salvation of sinners, without taking up Calvinistic ground, without being in a manner necessitated to assert the fundamental principles of the Calvinistic system of theology. It is, we believe, impossible otherwise to do full justice, and to give full effect, to what Scripture teaches, concerning the sovereign supremacy of the Father in determining the everlasting destiny of his creatures, concerning the death and righteousness of Christ, as of infinite worth and value, and as infallibly efficacious for securing all the great objects to which they are directed, and concerning the agency of the Holy Spirit in certainly and infallibly uniting to Christ through faith all whom the Father had given to him, and preserving them in safety unto his eternal kingdom. Those who reject or put aside the peculiar doctrines of Calvinism can, we think, be shewn to be practically, and by fair construction, withholding from God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, more or less of the place and

influence which the Scripture assigns to them in the salvation of sinners, and to be giving to men themselves, or at least to creatures, a share in effecting their salvation which the Scripture does not sanction. And when Calvinistic principles are rejected or thrown into the back-ground, not only is something, more or less, of necessity taken from the Creator and assigned to the creature, but an opening is made, an opportunity is left, for carrying on this process of transferring to man what belongs to God to almost any extent, until the Scriptural method of salvation is wholly set aside or overturned.

Men who profess to derive their opinions in any sense from the sacred Scriptures must be substantially, whether they will or not, and whether they are aware of it or not, Socinians, or Arminians, or Calvinists. The distinctive characteristic of Socinianism is, that it virtually invests men with the power of saving themselves, of doing everything that is needful for effecting their own salvation.* Arminianism virtually divides the work of saving men between God and men, and is more or less Pelagian according to the comparative share and influence which it assigns to the Creator and the creature respectively. Calvinism, and that alone, gives to God the whole honour and glory of saving sinners, making men, while upheld and sustained in the possession and exercise of all that is necessary for moral agency, the unworthy and helpless recipients at God's hand of all spiritual blessings. Calvinism not only withholds in point of fact from men any share in the work of effecting their own salvation, and ascribes this wholly to God, but when rightly understood and faithfully applied, it prevents the possibility of any such perversion of the Gospel scheme of redemption, of any such partition of the work of men's salvation. And it is upon this ground that it was so thoroughly adapted, not only to overturn from the foundation the whole system of destructive heresy that had overspread the church at the time of the Reformation, but to prevent, in so far as it might be adopted and carried out, the possibility of the reintroduction of such a dangerous perversion of Scriptural principles and arrangements.

Popery, if we view it in relation to the method of salvation, and have respect more to its general spirit and tendency than to its specific tenets, may be said to belong to the head of Arminianism. Papists concur with the Arminians in admitting the divinity and atonement of Christ and the agency of the Spirit, but they concur with them also in not giving to the Son and the Spirit the commanding and deter-

* Coleridge tells us of a friend of his, "a stern humorist," who bound up a number of Unitarian tracts into a volume, and titled it upon the back, "Salvation made easy, or, Every man his own redeemer."

mining position and influence in the salvation of sinners which the Scripture assigns to them. Popery thus realizes the general idea above indicated of Arminianism, viz., that it divides the work of saving sinners between God and sinners themselves. What may be called the Arminianism of Popery, in a sense which will be easily understood from the explanation that has now been given, was before the Reformation of a very Pelagian cast,—that is, the work of saving sinners was practically taken almost entirely from the Creator and assigned to the creature—not indeed, that men in general were represented, according to the Socinian view, as able to save themselves, but, what is the special peculiarity of Popery in regard to this subject, men were represented as on the one hand able to do a good deal for saving themselves, and then as dependent for the remainder, not merely upon the Saviour and the Spirit, but also upon fellow-men and fellow-creatures, upon saints and angels. And for this complicated system of anti-scriptural perversion of the way of salvation, the only effectual cure, the only radical remedy, was the great Calvinistic principle, which distinctly, consistently, and unequivocally ascribes the whole salvation of sinners, from first to last, to the grace and the power of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

This perversion of the way of salvation was most congenial to man's natural inclinations and tendencies. Everything had been done which human and Satanic skill could devise, to give it a commanding influence over the whole current of men's thoughts and feelings. It was firmly established over the whole of Christendom at the Reformation, and if it were to be dealt with at all, it would require the strongest appliances, the most powerful and thoroughgoing influences, to counteract it, to drive it out and to keep it out. And this was what Calvinism, and Calvinism alone, looking to the natural fitness of things, the ordinary operation of means, was adequate to effect. Calvin derived his system of doctrine from the study of the sacred Scriptures, accompanied by the teaching of the divine Spirit. But there is nothing in the fullest recognition of this that should prevent us, especially when we are comparing Calvin with the other Reformers who enjoyed the same privileges, from noticing and admiring the grasp and reach of intellect, the discernment and sagacity, which God had given to Calvin in such large measure, and which fitted him so peculiarly for the station and the work that were assigned to him. And this view of the admirable suitableness of Calvinism, to go to the root of the evils that polluted the church and endangered the souls of men at the time of the Reformation, is confirmed by the consideration, that all subsequent deviations from Calvinism in the Protestant churches, whether leading in the di-

rection of Rationalism or Traditionalism, whether tending towards Socinianism or Popery, have tended to bring back, in some form or degree, the great Ante-Reformation heresy, the great heresy indeed of all times, that of taking the work of men's salvation from the Creator and assigning it to the creature.

With respect to Calvin's views in regard to the worship and government of the church, we had an opportunity in our last number (p. 465), in reviewing Principal Tulloch's "Leaders of the Reformation," to state briefly what they were, and to point out their magnitude and importance, as throwing a flood of light upon the whole subject to which they relate. His great principle of the unlawfulness of introducing anything into the worship and government of the church without positive Scriptural sanction, evidently went to the root of the matter, and swept away at once the whole mass of sacramentalism and ceremonialism, of ritualism and hierarchism, which had grown up between the apostolic age and the Reformation, which polluted and degraded the worship of God, and which, in themselves and in their connection with unsound views on the subject of justification, were exerting so injurious an influence on men's spiritual welfare. Any other principle, or rule, or standard, that could have been applied to this whole subject, must have been defective and inadequate, and must have left at least the root of the evil still subsisting, to be a source of continued and growing mischief. The fair and full application of Calvin's great principle, would at once have swept away the whole mass of corruption and abuse which had been growing up for 1400 years, would have restored the purity and simplicity of the apostolic church, would have prevented the introduction of unauthorised and injurious innovations into the Protestant Churches, and saved a fearful amount of mischief, occasioned by the efforts made to retain or reintroduce such things.

A fact or two will illustrate the elevation of Calvin's position in regard to this class of topics. Augustine bitterly deplored the prevalence of rites and ceremonies in his time, and declared that the condition of the Christian church, in this respect, had become more intolerable than that of the old dispensation. But having, to some extent at least, abandoned the principle of the exclusive authority of the written Word in regard to rites and ceremonies, though he still held it fast in regard to matters of doctrine, he had no means of grappling with this giant evil, he did not venture to attempt to do so, and matters continued, at least without any improvement in this respect, for 1000 years. Luther objected to the mass of rites and ceremonies with which he found the worship of the Christian church overspread, mainly upon two grounds. 1st, That they had from their number become burdensome and distracting, tending to supersede

and exclude other things of more importance ; and 2d, That the idea of meritoriousness, which was commonly attached to them, more or less definitely, tended to pervert and undermine the great doctrine of justification. But these principles, though undeniably true, still left the whole subject on a very vague and unsatisfactory footing. Calvin grappled with it in all its magnitude and difficulty, by maintaining, 1st, That they were in the mass unlawful, simply because of their want of any positive Scriptural sanction ; and 2d, That many of them, independently of mere tendencies, were positively idolatrous, and were therefore directly and immediately sinful, as being violations of the first and second commandments of the Decalogue.

So much for worship, and then in regard to government, Calvin took the best practicable means both for putting an end to all existing corruptions and abuses, and preventing their recurrence. 1st, By putting an end to any thing like the exercise of monarchical authority in the church, or independent power vested officially in any one man, which was the origin and root of the Papacy ; 2d, By falling back upon the combination of aristocracy and democracy, which prevailed for at least the first two centuries of the Christian era, when the churches were governed by the common council of presbyters, and these presbyters were chosen by the churches themselves, though tried and ordained by those who had been previously admitted to office ; 3d, By providing against the formation of the spirit of a mere priestly caste, by associating with the ministers in the administration of ecclesiastical affairs, a class of men who, though ordained presbyters, were usually engaged in the ordinary occupations of society ; and 4th, By trying to prevent a repetition of the history of the rise and growth of the Prelacy and the Papacy, through the perversion of the one-man power, by fastening the substance of these great principles upon the conscience of the church, as binding *jure divino*. These great principles, so well fitted to sweep away all the existing corruptions and abuses in the government of the church, and to prevent their recurrence, are evidently in accordance with the fundamental ideas on which the modern theory of representative government is based, and with the leading features of the provision, which has commended itself to all our best and wisest men, for the management of those religious and philanthropic associations which form one of the great glories of our age.

These are the merest hints. They might be easily, and perhaps not unprofitably, expanded, but our space is already more than exhausted. We would have liked also to have attempted some illustration of the position, that, in looking back upon the last three centuries, whether we survey the history of speculative discussion or of the practical influence of Christian churches,

we have no reason to be ashamed of our Calvinism or our Presbyterianism ; but, on the contrary, are just confirmed in our admiration and veneration for Calvin, or rather in our gratitude to the great Head of the church for all the gifts and graces which he bestowed upon that great man, and for all that He did through Calvin's instrumentality.

There is another class of historical questions connected with Calvin, not without interest, though not so important as some of those to which we have alluded. We refer to the discussions which have taken place in modern times, as to what Calvin's opinions upon some points really were, such as, whether he were a supralapsarian or a sublapsarian ; whether he believed in what has since been called the immediate imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity ; whether he regarded justification as including acceptance as well as forgiveness ; whether he held a universal or a limited atonement. It has been maintained by some, that the views which have generally prevailed among Calvinists upon most of these points are to be traced to Beza rather than to Calvin. We hope to have an opportunity of explaining how it appears to us that the case stands upon these topics, in an article upon Beza.

VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.*

The Year of Grace : A History of the Ulster Revival of 1859. By the Rev. WM. GIBSON, Professor of Christian Ethics, and Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. Edinburgh : A. Elliott, 15 Prince's Street.

THE year 1859 well merits the title given it in this work : it was emphatically "the Year of Grace" to Ulster. Clear and loud rang the notes of the trump of jubilee through that favoured province of our sister isle, and the slaves of Satan emerged from their bondage into that glorious liberty wherewith Christ makes men free. A revival of living Christianity, beginning in a secluded district of Antrim, spread rapidly over that and the other northern counties of Ireland, awakening from their deep slumber the spiritually dead, both the seemingly formalists and the openly careless and wicked. Men in hundreds and in thousands were heard crying, "What must we do to be saved?" and, after a longer or shorter period of spiritual distress and conflict, were seen rejoicing in Jesus Christ as the sufficient Saviour, and gratefully dedicating themselves to him to be his followers for ever. The intelligence filled Christians everywhere with joy, not only on account of the many wanderers brought back to the Shepherd and Bishop of souls, but on account of the new de-

* We have been obliged to postpone to next number Critical Notices of some interesting and important books. We have room only for a few, some of them having been put in type for last number.

monstration furnished to the world, that the Gospel of Christ is still "the power of God unto salvation," and that "the Lord's hand is not shortened that it cannot save, nor his ear heavy that it cannot hear." And it contributed to deepen the interest taken in this great work that some of its accompaniments were fraught with mystery, and that now and then there appeared not a little which was fitted to excite anxiety, and even regret,—accidental circumstances likely to confirm the incredulous in their unbelief and the hostile in their hostility.

An authentic and connected record of this marvellous movement is at length presented in the volume before us. And its value is great. The newspaper press had furnished us with ample, but not very discriminating information in regard to the Ulster revival. And fragmentary illustrations of the work, as it appeared in this and the other locality, have been contributed by men thoroughly trustworthy. But it is now for the first time that there is given us anything like a view of the whole field over which the operations of the Divine Spirit have extended,—a history of this gracious work of God, presenting it in its true character and in its fulness. And it would have been difficult to find one better fitted to accomplish this successfully than Professor Gibson of Belfast. A man of warm piety, interesting himself deeply in everything relating to the progress of the Redeemer's kingdom, of broad and catholic sympathies, capable of appreciating every movement tending towards good, and as distinguished for sobriety of judgment as for zeal and fervent charity,—he was the very man qualified to be the historian of the Irish revival. His position, as Moderator of the Assembly of the Irish Presbyterian Church during the year of revival, and the esteem in which he is held, not only in his own church, but in others, gave him also peculiar advantages. With wealth of material presented to him, with ability to sift, and test, and use with discretion, the ample materials before him, and with fine literary taste, enabling him to group well his incidents, and to relate everything in a style marked by clearness, and force, and beauty, he could not but produce, and he *has* produced, a record of the revival that will be welcomed by the Christian public of this and other lands.

In the first chapter he describes the scene of the revival; in the second, the chief circumstances that may be regarded as having paved the way for it. The third chapter he devotes to Connor, the birthplace of the revival. From this, let us extract a few sentences, as thoughtful as they are truthful. "*We cannot fix the beginning of this revival.* The end of our vision is not the starting-point of God's working. That which is a germ in relation to one thing is a ripened fruit in reference to another. It is wisest for us to keep human agency in its own place, and to aim at reflecting all the glory on the sovereign Lord." In chap iv. and onward to xvii., the progress of the revival is described, as it appeared in Ahoghill, Ballymena, Northern Antrim generally, Belfast, County Down, and the other counties of Ulster. All of these chapters are full of heart-stirring incident, communicated by parties well known to the author, and reminding

one irresistibly of the narrative in the Acts of the Apostles. Let us specify the story of the nailer of Broughshane, as given at page 55, the good work done in the restoration of fallen women, p. 108, 109, and the washerwoman's prayer, p. 200, 201. Chapter xviii. describes the effects of the revival on the Roman Catholics of Ulster. Chap. xix. treats of a matter which has excited much interest and occasioned much extravagant statement both of a favourable and unfavourable kind—"the pathological affections connected with the revival." These, in all their various forms, are brought under notice; and, as the result, Professor Gibson gives it as his conviction, that, in addition to the bodily effects traceable to excited mental action, and to the influence of sympathy, there were those referable to *the operation of nervous disease*. "That such a disease, call it by what name you may," says he, "and by whatever means originated and propagated, has in most places been running parallel with the spiritual movement, does not admit of question."

There is a most valuable appendix to the work, from pp. 403 to 429, presenting the ascertained results of the revival in the form of a tabulated statement. From this it appears that upwards of ten thousand members have been added to 307 out of the 460 congregations in the Presbyterian church. Take, for example, the first congregation at Ahoghill. In it 202 were added to the church, and 700 hopefully awakened. In Berry Street Church, Belfast, there has been an addition of 350 communicants, and 20 Romanists are described as awakened. This appendix supplies a desideratum that was much felt.

This well-timed work of Professor Gibson's will gladden the Christian world, and will encourage Christians everywhere to be more earnest in prayer and in evangelistic effort. And it will not be of ephemeral interest, but will often be turned to in after times by those who delight to study the records of the great things which God has wrought for his church.

Christ's presence in the Gospel History. By the Rev. HUGH MARTIN, A.M. Edinburgh: T. Nelson and Sons, 1860.

THE title of this volume correctly indicates its scope. It is constructed on the principle that a Christian, to meet his inner wants, must have, not one of the elements mentioned in the title, but the union of the two—not the biography alone, which would be but a memoir, and not the presence alone, which would be but shadowy, undefined, and awful, but the conjunction of the presence and the history. This thought is wrought out very fully, and with a rare combination of fresh salient thought, and a well-poised theology. The author aims to set forth, that this exactly is what the gospel presents, and that the presence of Christ meets the Christian in the Gospel History. Various elucidations are supplied from different scenes in the life of Christ, and more particularly from his baptism, his temptation, his sermon in the synagogue, his cross, which are expounded at large; the whole being wound up by a view of the

bearing of the subject on the personality, responsibility, humanity, and individuality of the believer.

This volume is one of a very superior character, and will, we think, meet with full appreciation from the Christian public, as a word in season. Not to mention the analytic power, the clear perception of the relations of divine truth, and the mathematical precision of the author's cast of mind, the volume will be welcome to those who delight to see the sound theology of a former age reproduced with individual freshness, and with manifold applications to the phases of Christian experience.

The Book of Psalms; with an Exposition, Evangelical, Typical, and Prophetical, of the Christian Dispensation. By W. WILSON, D.D., Vicar of Holy Rhood, Southampton, and Canon of Winchester. London: James Nisbet and Co. 1860.

DR WILSON'S exposition will be welcome to devotional minds of a practical turn, from its mingled spirituality and sobriety. The author's intimate acquaintance with the original language; the learning, of which there is every proof but no parade; and the forcible and elegant English in which he expresses himself, will render it an attractive book to many. Averse to exclusive interpretations of this book of Scripture, he sees in it a testimony to Christ, as well as the typical character of David and his kingdom, but never loses sight of its application to every member of the true church. It is free from one-sidedness, withal doctrinal and practical; and the writer seems to have composed it amid trials which rendered the language of David peculiarly adapted to himself.

A Compendium of Biblical Criticism of the Canonical Books of the Holy Scriptures. By FREDERICK SARGENT. London: Longman, Green. 1860.

IN this volume, arguing an immense amount of reading, and setting forth results that ought to be known by all who have had an academic education, Mr Sargent makes a valuable contribution to the biblical criticism of the canonical books. He surveys in order, over the entire extent of Scripture, the state of the text; and without loading the volume with quotations, makes suggestions as he goes along, which will have weight with those who, with him, wish to purge the text from "extraneous corruption." There is a great amount of multifarious learning thrown in, and his remarks of a more general nature are always interesting, often arguing independent thinking (comp. Heb. i. 2); but the allusions to existing churches are rather abrupt, and might be spared. Though Mr Sargent does not refer to the modern German works, there is an allusion constantly made to almost every English work of value, and to Continental works in Latin, on the subject of the text of Scripture. The volume is well conceived, seasonable, and appropriate, and in a direction where it is hoped others will follow.

Histoire des Jesuites. Par L'ABBE GUETTEE. 3 tom. Paris: Huet. 1858-9.

THE history of the Jesuits, by Cretineau Joly, published about fifteen years ago, was the last full apology for the Order. The work before us, though not formally, yet virtually, is an answer to that publication. It is a work of much research, generally calm and dignified in tone, but occasionally shewing both a grave irony and a generous indignation, when treating of the pretensions or of the misdeeds of the Society of Jesus. We would take exception to his pressing the book of Mariana on Regicide, against the Jesuits. That eminent Spaniard was but an exceptional Jesuit, as his book of animadversions upon the Order shewed. The work of the learned Abbé is somewhat too exclusively French in the ground it goes over, and, for readers out of France, somewhat too needlessly detailed in his recounting the proceedings *pro* and *con* in that kingdom in the seventeenth century. The book is somewhat old-fashioned in style, and we fear in a generation accustomed to the vivacity with which Chateaubriand and Montalembert have treated ecclesiastical questions, may not meet with the amount of appreciation which its solid merits deserve. But to all ecclesiastical students desirous of seeing how Ultramontanism and Mariolatry appear in their Jesuit forms to a zealous and erudite Gallican, the work can be confidently recommended. Some of the French Protestant journals have objected to it as not sufficiently evangelical in tone. We think it all the more valuable that the author has not sought to assume anything else than his conscientiously held traditional Gallicanism. The book is one which Noailles or Mabillon would have delighted to welcome. By his previous book on the history of the Church of France, and by his editing the journal of the Abbé Le Dieu, Bossuet's secretary, M. Guetteé had acquired a reputation, which the volume before us will undoubtedly extend. The appearance of such a book, and the vigorous attitude maintained by the *Observateur Catholique*, are elements of hope in the existing religious condition of France.

Obras de Fernan Caballero. Madrid: Mellado. 1857-9. 13 tomos. *Coleccion de Autores Espanoles.* I and II. CLEMENCIA LA GAVIOTA. Leipzig: Brockhaus. 1860.

IT is, of course, not our intention here to review the general merits of the works of that distinguished authoress, who has gained her celebrity under the *nom de plume* of Fernan Caballero. The simultaneous appearance recently of two translations of her works in Germany, is, of itself, enough to shew how great and varied are her excellencies in the field of popular authorship. Of quite recent origin, for her very name does not occur in the latest book on Spanish literature, that of Brinckmeier (published a year after Ticknor's work), she has attained the position of the foremost contemporary prose writer of Spain. Few distinguished literary women have appeared in the Peninsula;

none has previously attained a trans-Spanish celebrity except St Theresa, whose works, with all their faults of matter and of manner, give evidence of real genius, as well as, in the Romish sense, of profound devotion. The volumes of Fernan Caballero are well worthy of study, not for the mere passing away of otherwise unoccupied hours; for, though professedly belonging to the class of light literature, they contain much proof of thought and varied reading. They are, at the present time, when, through the case of Escalante, and the incidents of the war with Morocco, public attention is much turned to Spain, valuable as giving, in an undeniable form, proof of the religious condition of that interesting country. We must confess that we do not like the tone of insular swagger and bravado with which Spain is too often written about in our press, and talked about from our platforms. The Spaniards have many elements of a noble people, and if, like Holland, like Venice, like Sweden, they have not in the nineteenth century the distinction which they enjoyed in former ages, it is not becoming a manly or a more favoured people to exult over their depression. It is not the way to recommend British Protestantism to a high-minded and sensitive people, to be always crowing over their low place among the nations. Rather let us hail every symptom of reviving intellectual, moral, and religious improvement. Fernan Caballero, in her works, affords a very interesting exhibition of a cultivated, as well as vigorous mind, clinging to Romanism in its rites, as well as in its doctrines, because aware of no other alternative than the freezing scepticism, which, in its Julian-like intolerance, as well as in its Lucian-like blasphemy, she has shewn herself capable so vividly to characterise. The hurried sketches of travellers are liable to suspicion of superficiality or exaggeration. But the leisurely-written works of a Spanish woman of genius, proud of her country, though she sees its faults, and, as in the case of the bull-fights, can vigorously attack them, are liable to no such drawback. The scripturally intelligent reader will rise from the perusal of these volumes with the conviction that many elements of good still subsist, both in the urban, and especially in the rural population of Spain, and solicitous that better laws, more extended internal communications, a more diffused education, and, above all, a purer faith, may in the future restore the lost greatness of that land. Britain would not be less strong, if Spain were less feeble.

History of the Christian Church to the Reformation, from the German of Professor Kurtz. With emendations and additions by the Rev. ALFRED CUSHIEM, Ph. D., author of the *History of the Jewish Nation*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1860. Pp. 526.

WE are anxious to express in one sentence (having at present no room for more), but in the strongest terms, our sense of the excellence and value of this work, and of its special and pre-eminent suitableness for being used as a text-book in the study of church history.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1860.

ART. I.—*The First Adam and the Second. The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man.* By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, N. J. Philadelphia: Parry & M'Millan. 1860. Pp. 688, 8vo.*

THIS book, as its title imports, covers the whole region of revealed Theology. It begins with the creation and ends with the consummation of all things. Exclusive of the Introduction, it consists of twenty-three chapters, and exclusive of the Index, of six hundred and eighty-eight octavo pages. A glance at the table of contents is sufficient to shew, that the author deals in "thoughts more elevate," and that the high themes which he discusses, "providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate," the primitive and fallen condition of mankind, the nature, consequences, and extent of sin, and the nature, consequences, and extent of redemption, are not discussed in a spirit of vain curiosity and false philosophy, but with the loyal design that he may "assert eternal providence, and justify the ways of God to men." All the topics which are successively brought before us, and they are those in which the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves are concentrated, are reviewed under the formal notion of a manifestation of the Divine perfections and glory. In the second chapter, we have, indeed,

* In our last number we published a review of Dr Baird's "First and Second Adam," from the pen of Dr Hodge of Princeton. We now submit to our readers another very able and valuable review of the same work from the pen of Dr Thornwell of Columbia, S. Carolina, who is well entitled to rank, along with Dr Hodge, among the greatest divines, and the ablest defenders of Calvinism in the present day. The importance of the subject, and the ability of the article, justify, we hope, a recurrence to this topic. Dr Thornwell's views on the subject of Imputation are much clearer and sounder than those indicated in the following article on Dr Beecher.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

as a key to the title of the work, an articulate exposition of the doctrine, that the design of all God's works, whether of creation or providence, is to reveal Himself. The heavens and the earth are treated as "an incomparable vesture," in which the Divine Majesty arrays itself in order to become visible to men, and this whole outward scene of things, the object of our sensations and perfections, is not regarded as a dark, gloomy, foreign power, but as an illustration of the Divine wisdom, a language in which God notifies to intelligence His own glory. The works are apprehended as so many words of God, and the sense with which they are all burdened is His own eternal power and Godhead. It is in man, however, that Dr Baird finds the pre-eminent revealer of the triune Jehovah. He is the image of God. To him, therefore, special attention is given. His moral history is traced from the first moment of his being to the final consummation of the scheme of grace. The plan of Providence in relation to Him is critically canvassed, and the result of the whole is that solid wisdom, that knowledge of God and of ourselves, which constitutes the perfection and unity of our moral and intellectual nature. The author lays out his chief strength upon the doctrine of original sin. This is the central topic of the book. To this everything else converges; the preliminary account of man's original condition is only an introduction to a just exposition of the effects of the fall, and the subsequent evolution of the economy of redemption is designed to cast its light back upon the nature and extent of the malady of which redemption is the remedy. The book, therefore, might very well have been entitled, a Treatise of Original Sin. It opens with a historical sketch of the doctrine in question, briefly recapitulating the state and progress of opinion, from Tertullian to Edwards. The first three chapters, on the Triune Creator, the Eternal Plan, and the Providential Administration, are designed to furnish the key to the subsequent discussion, to lay down the principle which pervades the entire divine economy, and in the light of which all doctrinal truths are reduced to harmony and irradiated with new beauty. The author then enters directly upon the consideration of man, and in the peculiarities of his being, as personal and generic, in his moral and spiritual relations to God, and in the dispensations of Providence which have determined and conditioned them, he encounters those supreme questions concerning the law, sin, and death; concerning redemption, holiness, and life; concerning, in short, the two great covenants which exhaust the divine dealings with man, that constitute the sum and substance of Christian Theology.

In the prosecution of these high themes he has exhibited abilities of no common order. He has endeavoured, everywhere,

to find the one in the many, to trace facts to their principles, and to reconcile the testimonies of Scripture with the inductions of a sound philosophy. He has no charity for error. From the beginning of the book to the end, he keeps up a running fire against Pelagians and Hopkinsians, whom he evidently regards as the pests of the Church, left, like the remnants of the nations among the Jews, to be pricks in the eyes and thorns in the sides, as a punishment for unfaithfulness in the work of extermination. His eye never pities, nor his hand spares. Wherever he finds an enemy of God and His truth, he never declines the contest, and is quite content to leave the choice of weapons to his antagonist, being equally ready to assail heresy with the sword of the spirit, and science, falsely so called, with the weapons of right reason. That he has done good service to the cause of sound doctrine cannot be denied. His chapters on Providence, the Eternal Plan, the Principle of the Law, the Nature of Sin, and on the various phases of Optimism are singularly happy specimens of judicious speculation. The chapter on Providence, particularly, is entitled to great praise, and though we are not sure that he has done justice to M'Cosh, and are quite certain that, in relation to things generated and corruptible, he will find it difficult to excogitate a better theory of identity than that of Edwards, properly restrained, yet, the whole discussion touching the connection betwixt God and His works is sound and Scriptural. It strikes us as a fault of the book that it betrays something of a captious spirit, a tendency to minute exceptions. Dr Baird detects an error where others can see only a fault of expression, and belabours opinions with great vehemence, which the reader finds it impossible to discriminate from his own. Against Edwards, particularly, he has an inveterate spite. His doctrine of causation, his scheme of identity and his theory of the will, as well as special forms of theological opinion, are made the subjects of severe and biting criticism. In some of his strictures, Dr Baird is unquestionably right, but in relation to the will, we confess ourselves utterly at a loss to discover the difference, in their fundamental principles, between the doctrines of Edwards and himself. If Dr Baird's theory is not one of rigid, absolute determinism, we are unable to understand him, and if it is, it is a matter of comparatively little moment, whether the immediate determining cause be called a motive or an impulse, since, in either case, its efficacy is grounded in the nature. What the man is, determines what he does, as clearly, according to Edwards, as according to our author, and no man has given more prominence to innate habits and dispositions as controlling the will than Edwards.

But, without dwelling longer on minor and incidental points,

we hasten to the main subject of the book. The light which the author thinks that he has thrown upon the doctrine of original sin, constitutes the distinguishing feature of the work, and gives it whatever claim it may have to special consideration as a theological contribution. He has a theory which, in his judgment, relieves the question of hereditary sin of most, if not of all, its difficulties. He can shew how we are born guilty and depraved, without any imputation upon the goodness or justice of God, or any perplexity in the notions of sin and holiness. The whole subject is perfectly clear to his mind, and the design of his book is to make it perfectly clear to the minds of others. Would that his success were commensurate with his aim! The chances are certainly against him. In a matter which penetrates into the lowest depths of human consciousness, which lays hold of the highest interests of the soul, which has agitated the most devout minds, and elicited the most earnest and anxious thoughts of the profoundest thinkers for eighteen centuries, in which all, without exception, have failed, and the more profoundly they have thought, the more intensely they have exclaimed, "Oh! the depths of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out;" on such a subject, the presumption is that no new light has dawned upon the world, either from Scripture or consciousness, to dispel the obscurity which enshrouds it. We have read Dr Baird's book with no little care, and while acknowledging its merits in other respects, we are constrained to say that, in reference to its main design, its success is no exception to the general rule. He has solved one mystery by the substitution of another, or, rather, buried the mystery altogether in impenetrable darkness. His theory briefly resolves itself into the doctrine of a numerical identity of nature between Adam and his posterity, in consequence of which, his sin is not constructively and legally, but strictly and properly, theirs. The thing which transgressed, and became guilty and corrupt in him, is the very identical thing which reappears in us, and of course brings its guilt and corruption with it. The only mystery in the case is that of the reappearance of the same thing in different forms of personal manifestation. This depends upon the law of generation. Dr Baird accordingly lays out his whole strength upon that law, as being the key-stone of the arch which supports his structure. He endeavours to shew that it involves the communication, not of a similar or like, but of numerically the same nature, from the parent to the child. The father, substantially and essentially, though not personally, is reproduced in the offspring. This is the theory, as compendiously as we can express it, upon

which the author has undertaken to solve the problem of the Fall.

Of course, in all this there is nothing new. It is as old as the introduction of realism into the Christian Church. The author himself, in his preliminary historical sketch, has treated us to some rare specimens of this style of thinking, and we have lying before us, from Anselm and the opponents of Roscelin and Abelard, illustrations equally rich of the same type of speculation. When we read Dr Baird's lucubrations upon a nature, the law of generation, and the relation subsisting between a nature and a person, we almost felt that we had been transported, by some mysterious power of enchantment, across the track of centuries, to the cloisters of mediæval monks, and to the halls of mediæval universities, and were listening again to the everlasting jangles about entities and quiddities, genera and species, which John of Salisbury so graphically describes. Dr Baird's sympathies are with the buried realism of the past. He has proclaimed an open revolt against the whole spirit of modern speculation, and has endeavoured to remand philosophy to the frivolous discussions from which, we had hoped, that Bacon had for ever redeemed it. If the proof had not been before our eyes, we could not have believed that, in the nineteenth century, a man was to be found, out of "Laputa or the Empire," who could seriously undertake to solve theological problems by an appeal to the exploded henads of the realists, or gravely attribute a real substantive existence to genera and species. The book is, in this respect, as an American production, a downright curiosity. It is a reaction against the entire current of modern thought, not only in theology, but in philosophy; as formal a protest against nominalism, and the spirit of the inductive philosophy grounded in nominalism, as against the received system of orthodoxy, grounded in the same doctrine. It is, at least, five centuries too late, and five centuries ago it would not have been needed. Realism is dead and buried, and the progress of human knowledge, in every department of inquiry, since the thorough installation of the inductive method, is a sufficient proof that the death of realism is the resurrection of truth. Dr Baird has not given his allegiance to realism in the form in which it was maintained by Plato, and in which it first entered into Christian speculation. He expressly denies the separate and independent existence of universals, *universalia ante rem*. He embraces it as it was modified by Aristotle, *universalia in re*. His doctrine is, "that universals are, in a certain sense, realities in nature, but that the general conceptions are merely logical, the universals not having an existence of their own separate from the individuals through which they were manifested." The last clause of this sentence expresses precisely the Peripatetic doctrine as

it was commonly understood. The first clause we are not certain that we fully comprehend. When Dr Baird says that general conceptions are merely logical, does he mean that they do not represent the realities which, in some sense, exist in nature? If so, then no reliance is to be placed upon them. They have only a formal validity, and subjective consistency of thought becomes no guarantee for objective consistency of being. If the universals which we think, are not the universals which exist in nature, it is obvious that we cannot pass from one to the other, or make them the subject of common predicates. If the universals which we think, are the universals which exist in nature, then how can it be said that our conceptions are merely logical? They evidently have an objective validity. This language, in the mouth of a nominalist, we can perfectly comprehend; and we can, also, understand how a Peripatetic realist can consistently maintain that our general conceptions are derived from individuals and dependent upon them, that they are logical in the sense that they are formed by the logical processes of analysis and comparison, but how he could represent them as *merely* logical, that is, as purely formal, we are unable to perceive. Dr Baird restricts the existence of universals to a "certain sense." This qualifying clause means, simply, that they are never detached from individuals, that their existence is not separate and independent; but still he makes a real distinction between the particular and universal, as pertaining to the same object. In every individual thing there are, according to him, two elements—the principle of individuation, or that which makes the thing to be this and not that, or that and not this, and the principle of universality, which determines it to a certain genus. These are not different forms of contemplating the object, or different relations in which its properties and qualities are viewed. They are really different things, as distinct as the persons of the Trinity, and as incapable of being divided. The universal realizes itself in the individual, but is not to be confounded with it. It pervades it, without being a part of it.

In estimating the value of Dr Baird's contributions, the first thing to be done is to settle precisely his notion of nature. What do we mean when we speak of the nature of a man, of the nature of a thing, and, particularly, of a moral nature? We confess that we have experienced no little difficulty in trying to compass the precise sense in which Dr Baird uses the term. In the first place, he explicitly denies that it can be legitimately used to designate "our conception of the mere aggregate of characteristics belonging to a given substance," p. 149. Does this mean, that to signalize the properties of a substance, and to indicate the mode of their co-

existence, is not to define its nature?—that its nature is something more than the sum and combination of its attributes? If so, he distinctly repudiates the sense in which it becomes applicable to a class-notion, and the only sense in which it can enter into the description of an object. Man's nature does not consist of those qualities and faculties which are manifested in consciousness. It is nothing personal, nothing individual, and nothing even generic, in the sense of an abstraction of what is similar in the consciousness of the race. It is not thought, will, nor emotion, singly, or combined in the unity of a personal subject. Neither, according to Dr Baird, is the nature something relative and accidental. In this sense it is used by Divines, when the predicates *holy* and *sinful* are applied to it. The phrase "moral nature," commonly denotes the possession of the faculties which are necessary to moral agency; while a sinful or a holy nature designates the pervading attitude of the soul in relation to God and the divine law. There are passages in which Dr Baird seems to use the term in both these senses. "A moral nature," he says, "is one, the essential characteristics of which are reason, will, the moral sense or conscience," p. 236. Again, the nature is used as a synonym of the heart (p. 160), and must, accordingly, be taken as the complement of the affinities and tendencies which belong to the soul. It is that which lies at the root of the will, and conditions and determines all its operations. But, with these occasional exceptions, the whole current of his argument requires the sense of prevailing habitude or disposition to be discounted as impertinent. In this sense the idea of a numerical identity of nature in different persons becomes simply absurd. If nature expresses the tendencies or attitudes of the soul, the mode of its existence, or the law under which it exists and acts, it must obviously be numerically different, though it may be logically the same, in the case of every human being. A mode cannot be conceived apart from that of which it is a mode. To be, and to be in some definite condition, are the same thing. Natural or abstract being is impossible. Each soul must, therefore, have its own nature. It may be holy, it may be sinful—it must be one or the other, and its holiness or sinfulness is its own. These terms define the moral character of the particular being. Other souls may also be sinful or holy, and their holiness or sinfulness is also their own. The crookedness of one tree is not the crookedness of another. The posture of the soul is as strictly individual as the posture of the body. We might as well say that the hump-back of two men is numerically the same deformity, as to confound the moral obliquity of one man with the moral obliquity of another. The identity of these relations is simply

the similarity by reason of which they are comprehended under a common term. Hence, according to that conception of nature which makes it the moral attitude of the soul, the depravity of A is no more the depravity of B, than the personal qualities of A are the personal qualities of B. A numerical identity of nature, and a personal diversity of existence, are flat contradictions. Discounting both these senses of nature, what other sense remains? Dr Baird undertakes to enlighten us. In the first place, his nature "is not expressive of a mere abstraction, but designates an actual thing, an objective reality," p. 150. This actual thing, or objective reality, is the "sum of the permanent forces which were at the beginning incorporated in the constitution of Adam and the creatures, and which, by their severalty, determine and define the several species of the living things," p. 150. Here the realism strongly crops out. Adam's constitution, in so far as he was an individual, is one thing—there is incorporated in it a set of forces which makes the *henad*, humanity, and in that set of forces his nature must be sought. Substances, we are told, "were at the beginning endowed with forces which are distinctive and abiding, and which in organic nature flow distributively in continuous order to the successive generations of the creatures," p. 148. It is clear, from these passages, that Dr Baird understands by nature a real entity, active, efficient, and powerful, which enters into and conditions the individual, but is not strictly a part of it—a something in which the individual lives and moves, and which is entirely distinct from its own properties or states. Accordingly, he explains our oneness with Adam upon the baldest principles of realism.

"Our oneness," he says, "does not express the fact merely that we and Adam are alike, but that we are thus alike because the forces which are in us, and make us what we are, were in him, and are numerically the same which in him constituted his nature and gave him his likeness. The body which is impelled by two diverse forces, x and y , moves in the direction of neither of them, but in that of a different force, z , the resultant of the two. Yet is neither of the forces lost, but merely modified, each by contact with the other. The new force, z , is simply x modified by y . So, in the successive generations of the human race, so far as their traits are the result of propagation, so far as they are the offspring of their parents, theirs are but the same identical forces which were in their parents, only appearing under new forms." P. 150.

But the crowning proof that Dr Baird means something more than mere habits and disposition, or an all-controlling generic habit, or disposition, or tendency, or law (for all these terms have been employed to express the same idea), is that he makes the nature the proper and exclusive ground of moral

obligation. The person is only a contrivance to reach the nature. The seat of obligation is not the *man*, but his *nature*. "From all this it inevitably follows," says he, "that all the responsibilities and obligations which can, in any conceivable way, attach to a person, must have their ground in the nature, and attach themselves essentially to it. Since, in general, every kind of obligation implies the exercise of some kind of efficiency, and since the moral nature is the only principle of moral efficiency in a person, it follows that all moral obligations must lay hold of the nature, else they are altogether nugatory and void," p. 249. If by nature, were here meant the properties of the personal soul, as endued with faculties adapted to moral distinctions, the meaning would be proper enough. But that sense the author has explicitly repudiated. Nature is nothing that constitutes a man—it is only what makes *the* man. To say that he here means moral habits and dispositions, would be to make him write the most preposterous nonsense. The nature in that sense is not the subject, but the end of the obligation of the law. It is the very thing which the law requires. To have a holy heart, to love God supremely, to love our neighbours as ourselves—these are the very things which constitute the matter of the command. The very essence of obedience is the possession of a right nature. How absurd, therefore, to say that they are the things bound, or to which the command is addressed. Dr Baird evidently means, or he means nothing, that behind the personal soul, with its essential cognitive and moral faculties, there exists a mysterious entity, of whose efficiency this soul, with its properties and attributes, is only the instrument. To that entity the law is addressed—that entity God holds responsible in the person—that entity is the substance of the man. The rest is mere contingency and accident. His meaning is put beyond all doubt by the comparison which he institutes between humanity and the Godhead.

"A person," he tells us, "is a several subsistence which is endowed with a moral nature. The word 'person' is expressive of the severalty, while the phrase 'moral agent,' indicates the efficiency of such a subsistence. In the blessed Trinity, each several subsistence is a person, of whom the three subsist in common in one undivided nature and essence. Among the angelic hosts, each one is a several person, having a distinct and several nature. Among men a nearer likeness to God is seen, in a plurality of persons, possessing a several and distributive property in one common nature. The relationship which subsists between men by virtue of their community of nature is a shadow of the divine unity, which falls infinitely short of the intimacy and identity which are realized in the blessed persons of the Godhead." P. 237.

Now, when it is remembered that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are *the same in substance*, that this is precisely the ground of their being one God, and equal in power and glory, it is obvious that Dr Baird must mean that the ground of identity with the individuals of the human species, is their possession of a *common substance*. Their community of natures thus resolves itself into community of substance. And as the substance of the Godhead is that Divine Spirit which can be equally predicated of the three persons, so the substance of humanity must be that spiritual essence by virtue of which each man becomes a living soul. Adam's soul was the same substance with the souls of all his posterity. The forms of consciousness which this substance has assumed are as manifold and various as the human creatures in which it has been found, but the substance itself remains ever the same. The whole substance of the human race was created in Adam—no new human substance has been created since. Man is essentially one spirit. As a dozen chairs made from the same oak are one matter, so a dozen souls sprung from Adam are the same spirit.

We have thus endeavoured to elicit Dr Baird's notion of human nature. We saw that it was not found in any of those properties and affections which constitute the personal consciousness—it was not the habitude or tendency of these properties and attributes to any given mode of manifestation—it was nothing relative or accidental. It is the ultimate ground of personality, the material condition of intelligence, responsibility, and will. It is an efficient power, or a complement of forces, which absolutely conditions and determines all the activities and all the states of the individual. It is the bond of unity to the whole race. It sustains the same relation to human persons that the substance of the Godhead sustains to the ineffable Three. It is clearly, therefore, the substance of the soul, considered as the substratum or basis of all personal consciousness—as that which contains the forces, the entire sum of the forces, that characterise the human species. Adam and his posterity are one substance; the same spiritual essence which underlay his consciousness, underlies theirs—they are partakers, not of a like, but of a common, nature. This is the doctrine, so far as we have been able to apprehend it. Hence the soul and nature are frequently used as interchangeable terms. For example—"The will is the soul disposed to the active embrace of the affinities which it realizes. It is the nature, viewed in the light of its tendency to give expressions to the aptitudes which it intuitively feels." P. 160. Again—"Edwards has much on this point; but entirely fails to bring out the fundamental fact, that at last it is the soul itself which

endows the motive with the character in which it appears. The *nature* of the transgressor is the cause of his sins." P. 160. Throughout the whole discussion upon the subject of the will, *the soul*, *the nature of the soul*, and *the moral nature*, are used as equivalent terms. One other passage will close this part of the subject. Considered as being appointed to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever, the elements, Dr Baird tells us, which are of most significance in the constitution of men, are "their moral natures and personality. The word 'nature' we have formerly defined to be the designation of a permanent force, dwelling in a substance. A moral nature is one, the essential characteristics of which are reason, will, and the moral sense, or conscience." These faculties, it will be noticed, do not constitute, but characterise a moral nature. They, themselves, are not the permanent, abiding force which is called moral, but only the marks or signs of it. This force, therefore, can be nothing less than the substance of the soul, manifesting its moral peculiarities through these faculties of the personal consciousness, as its organs. The author subsequently adds—"The proper subject of a moral nature is a spiritual substance. In no other mode have we any reason to imagine it possible for it to exist at all." Pp. 226, 227. The substance of the soul, as endowed with the forces which realize themselves in the faculties and energies of the personal consciousness, of which these operations are the signs and characteristics—that substance, as a causal force, which underlies them all, and conditions and determines them all—that substance is the nature. Or if there be any distinction between them, the substance is the ground, and the nature the causal energies which are contained in it. That is, the soul, considered as simple being, may be called substance; considered as a *cause*, or as endowed with power, it is nature; the word "nature" expressing directly the forces and substance, that in which they inhere. But for all the purposes of speculation the difference is purely formal. A substance to human thought is only the correlative of the properties which manifest it.

2. The next point to which we invite the attention of the reader, as further developing the philosophy of Dr Baird, and furnishing cumulative proof of the truth of what we have said, is the relation subsisting between person and nature. It is, briefly, that of a cause to its effect. The person is a product of the nature.

"It is certain," says he, "that nothing may be predicated of the person which does not grow out of the nature. And if this must be admitted, there appears to be no ground on which it can be claimed that the nature, because existing in another person, is entitled to exemption from its essential guilt. The opposite view assumes the

absurdity that there may be, and is, that in the person which has a subsistency and moral agency of its own; a competence to responsibility, and capacity to appreciate and experience the power of the law's sanctions, distinct from, and independent of, the nature. Is it said to be unjust to hold my person bound for an act which was committed in the person of another? The objection would be valid, were the person a force to control or modify the nature. But since the contrary is the case, it does not appear reasonable that exemption should be claimed on that ground. In fact, the nature, which was the cause of my person, was there. And as every power or principle of efficiency which is in the effect must have been in its cause, it follows, inevitably, that everything in me, upon which resistance to the apostasy might be imagined, was actually there, and so far from opposing, took part in the treason. We sinned in Adam, and fell with him in his first transgression. The accident of my personal existence, had it then been realised, would have added no new influences to those which were actually engaged, and would not have modified the result, nor changed the responsibility attaching to it. The objection here considered strikes at the root of all responsibility, as well for personal as for native sin. If I am not justly responsible for Adam's transgression, because only my nature was efficient in it, then may I, with equal propriety, claim exemption in respect to personal sins, since in them my person is the mere subject of the action, and my nature is the sole sufficient cause." P. 257.

The nature not only generates the person, but the person is only an organization or instrument through which the properties of the nature can be unfolded in action. Without the person, the nature is a power without tools. Its appetencies can find no means of gratification. If it could be conceived as existing at all, which it cannot be, its forces would have to assume the form of a vain conatus. They would be simply strivings after being or manifestation. But the person furnishes them with all that is necessary for a full and distinct realization of their energies. Of course, the person in itself is quite subordinate; and all the rhetoric about its intrinsic dignity and its superiority to things, its essential rights and its ethical importance, is but attributing to the casket the properties which belong to the jewel enshrined in it. Dr Baird distinctly affirms that the person is but an accident of the nature—inseparable, to be sure, but only an accident—and that its whole moral significance is to be resolved into the nature. It is no great thing, therefore, to be able to say I. It is not the personal subject, it is the impersonal forces which move it, that constitute the real dignity of man. All the faculties which distinguish the being that I call myself—memory, intelligence, conscience, and will—are but the organs through which a being, that is not myself, plays off its fantastic tricks. I am a puppet, called into being by this mysterious power,

only that it may have something to sport with and develop its resistless forces. Never was a poor demoniac more completely at the bidding of the possessing fiend, than the personal subject at the beck of this impersonal nature. Other philosophers have foolishly imagined that they were going to the very core of man's nature, essentially considered, when they described it as *personal*. They have signalized this peculiarity as that which contains in it the ground of every other distinction from the rest of this sublunary world—other beings are *things*, man is a person. It is his nature to be a person. But Dr Baird sharply distinguishes, though he does not divide nature and personality. The person is to the nature what the eye is to vision, or the muscles to motion. The following passage is an explicit statement of his doctrine :—

“Whilst, thus, all moral obligations arise out of the constitution of the nature, and lay hold, essentially upon it, the subject against which they are enforced, is the person in which the nature subsists; and this for evident reasons. It is only in the form of a person that a moral nature can subsist. All that is proper to the person, or in any way characteristic of it as such, grows out of the nature, and is designed and constructed as a means for the activity of the nature; so that the person is but the nature embodied in a form adapted to its efficient action. It is the organisation through which the nature may meet its responsibilities, by performing the duties demanded of it. Since, therefore, the nature can neither exist, nor, therefore, be responsible, neither recognise nor satisfy its responsibilities, but as it is embodied in a person; and since, to it, as thus embodied, the obligations which rest upon it are, for this reason, by God addressed, it follows that persons are the immediate and only subjects of moral law and responsibility. The nature comprehends all the forces which are proper to the person in which it subsists. Among these are not only included those of which obligation or obedience may be supposed, but those susceptibilities upon which may be predicated the realisation of suffering, the endurance of punishment. There is, therefore, nothing in the person of which exemption can be imagined, as apart from the nature. Were it possible to take away the nature and yet the person remain; were it possible to suppose any other forces proper to the person than all its proper forces, then would there be room for the conception, that the person might be irresponsible for the nature, and have a responsibility distinct from it. But, so long as it is true that the moral nature is that which makes the person what it is in all moral respects, and that the only existence of the nature is in the person, it will follow that the attempt to separate the obligations of the nature and of the person is absurd and preposterous. The person is bound under the responsibilities which attach to the nature as subsisting therein, and can be held to no others than such as arise therein. The form of the obligation, is, indeed, modified by the accidents of the person; but such

accidental forms are always capable of resolution into general principles which attach essentially to the nature." P. 250.

3. Let us next attend to the law of generation. In Adam, the nature and the person were concreated. He was in the first moment of his existence, both an individual and the species, a man and humanity. In him the nature of the entire race was created once for all, and from him is propagated by generation, and so descends to all his seed (p. 256). But what does the doctrine of propagation involve?

"It implies that all the powers and forces which are, or to the end of time shall be, in the living creatures, vegetable and animal, by which the earth is filled and peopled, have their origin in those creatures which were made at the beginning of the world, and were implanted in them thus to be developed and perpetuated in their seed, to the end of time. It is not that the powers which are developed in the offspring have a likeness merely to those of the parent. This would be to attribute the whole matter to a continual exercise of creative energy. But the forces of the offspring are derived by propagation from the parents. These very forces, numerically, were in the parents, and so back to the original progenitors. And yet it is as undeniable as it is inscrutable, that the entire sum of forces which operate in the living creation, vegetable and animal, were created and implanted in the primeval creatures at the beginning." Pp. 144, 145.

Dr Baird further teaches, that the first man is the efficient cause of the existence of all other men. God made Adam, and Adam made the rest of the race. The whole man, in his entire existence, as spirit and body, is the effect of which generation is the cause:—

"We take the position," says Dr Baird, "that the entire man proceeds by generation from the parents. We do not say, we do not mean, that the soul is generated by the soul, or the body by the body. But man, in his soul, body and spirit, is an unit composed of diverse elements, yet having but one personality, in which the soul is the element of universal efficiency. Of that personality, efficient thus, it is that we predicate generation, and, according to the maxim that like begets like, we hold the child, in its entire nature, to be the offspring of the parent. The entire race of man was in our first parents, not individually and personally, but natively and seminally, as the plant is in the seed. When Adam was created, among the powers which constituted his nature was that of generation. His substance was made to be an efficient cause, of which posterity, taken in their whole being, physical and spiritual, are the normal and necessary effect. Thus, in Adam and Eve, the human race had not a potential existence merely; but God, in creating the first pair, put into efficient operation the sufficient and entire cause of the existence of their seed." Pp. 340, 341.

Generation, according to this account, performs two wonders. It first propagates the nature, and next, as the indispensable condition of the existence of the nature, it creates the person in whom the nature is to appear. The person is as truly the effect of the causal energy of the parent, as the communication of the nature. Here there occurs to us a difficulty which we crave to have solved. The nature of Adam and his posterity, we are told, is one, because it descends to us by generation. The essence of generation is to reproduce the same. If, now, the law of generation establishes an identity of nature between the parent and the child, why not, also, an identity of person? If the person is as truly its product as the nature, how comes it that the generated person should be different, while the generated nature is the same? If to generate is to propagate, why may not the person be a propagation as well as the nature? Then, again, what is it that generates? Dr Baird answers, the nature *through* the person. What is generated? The nature *in* a person. What, now, restricts the identity to one part of the product, while that which answers to both parts is active in the production? To us the dilemma seems inevitable, that either every human being descended from Adam is the same person with him, or that the law of generation concludes nothing as to the identity of nature. If a person can beget a numerically different person, we do not see why he cannot beget a numerically different nature. Besides this, we have a vague suspicion that a cause and its effect are not commonly construed as the same thing. They are certainly different in thought, whatever they may be in existence. If the cause does nothing more than continue itself, if what is called the effect is only a change in the mode of existence of the cause, a phenomenal variety of being, we crave to understand how the universe can be really different from its Author? Dr Baird says that Adam is the cause, the efficient cause, of the existence of his posterity. If, now, his causal energy terminates in the reproduction of himself and they must be one with him, *because* he is their *cause*, the bearing of the principle upon the theistic argument is too palpable to be mistaken. We shall land in but one substance in the universe, the *ὅντως ὄν* of the Platonists, and all else will be shadow and appearance.

The reader must have been struck already with the close correspondence between the reasonings of Dr Baird in relation to the nature of man, and the reasonings of the Pantheists in relation to God. They postulate a great, impersonal, all-pervading ground of universal being, as he postulates a great, impersonal, all-pervading ground of human manifestation; the primal substance of the Pantheist is the life of all that lives,

and yet has no life of its own ; at the root of every consciousness, and yet without consciousness itself ; the radical principle of all knowledge, and yet unable to utter the formula, Behold I know. So Dr Baird's nature has no separate being of its own, and yet gives being to the man, is without intelligence or selfhood, and yet the basis of them both. The real being of the Pantheist conditions all, while itself is unconditioned ; determines all differences, while itself without differences ; is the secret of all relations, and yet absolved in itself from every relation. Equally absolute in reference to man is Dr Baird's nature. And, as with the Pantheist, all that we call creatures are but phenomena of the primordial substance, forms in which it realises itself, so with Dr Baird, all human persons are but phenomena of his original nature ; the vestments with which it clothes itself in order to become visible, or the instruments it seizes in order to act. The phenomenal manifestations of the Pantheist obey by the law of development—those of Dr Baird the law of generation. Each is a philosophy of one in the many. They both, too, arise from the same process of thought. The highest genus must necessarily absorb all differences, and potentially contain them, while none can be predicated of it. The descent develops these differences in increasing fulness until we come to individuals, which logically are of no value. The void absolute is the logical result of a realism which attributes real existence to genera and species. Beginning at the bottom of the line, we remove difference after difference until we reach undifferentenced being—*τὸ ὄν*. If the genus is real, it develops from itself, as you come down the line, all the varieties of subordinate classes in which it is found. The nothing, in this way, is made to yield everything. The highest genus, though itself nothing, yet as a genus, contains essentially all properties and all attributes. We have before us a curious illustration of the tendencies of realism to end in nihilism, in an elaborate argument of Fredigesius, which concludes with the famous axiom of Hegel, God equal nothing. The logic is unassailable ; the absurdity lies in attributing existence to general names. Once give up the maxim of Nominalists, that all real beings are singular, and that the law of classification expresses not only a process of thought, but the order of being, and you cannot stop until you reach an *ens realissimum* which, at one and the same time, includes the whole fulness of existence, and is totally void of predicates—at once a plenum and a vacuum. The argument is short, simple, and unanswerable. If a species is a real substance, numerically the same in all the individuals, the genus must be a substance numerically the same in all its species, and thus, in ascending from genus

to genus, we extend the numerical identity of substance, until we arrive at absolute being, which is numerically the same in all things, and which, being without attributes, must be both everything and nothing. We are quite confident that all the absurd speculations concerning the absolute, which have aimed to take away from us a personal God, and to resolve all existence into an unconditioned unity of substance, are but offshoots of the spirit of realism. The body has been buried, but the ghost still hovers about the haunts of speculation.

While on this subject of generation, there are other difficulties which we would like to have solved. Its law is that it propagates the *same* nature, not a like, but numerically the same nature. Does this nature exist whole and entire in each individual? If so, how can it be found in millions and millions of persons, and yet be only one? How can each man have all of it, and yet all have it at the same time? Upon this point we are like Bottom, the weaver, rather dull of comprehension. Or, is the nature divided? Then each man has only a distributive share, and if, in proportion to the number of heirs, the inheritance is diminished, the last man that is to be, has the prospect of a very slender interest. If, too, original sin grows less with the diminution in the quantum of nature, the race stands a chance of being considerably improved by the very law which has ruined it. How will Dr Baird solve this problem of the one and the many? He has fairly raised the question, and he ought to have answered it. He has scouted the old doctrine that generation produces sons like their fathers; he ought to have shewn us how they and their fathers can both have identically the same nature at the same time, without making that nature manifold, or without dividing it. We wish to see him fairly encounter the question which baffled the genius of Plato, and which Socrates pronounced to be a wonder in nature. It is a question which every phase of realism gives rise to, and when a man in the nineteenth century revolts to that philosophy, he ought to have something to say upon this cardinal matter.

As to the doctrine, for which Dr Baird contends, of the traduction of souls, we regard it, in a theological point of view, as of very little importance. Holding, as we do, that the child is numerically a different being from the parent, different in substance, different in person, different in nature, different in everything in which he is distinct, though in all essential respects precisely alike, we do not see that the doctrine of original sin is relieved of a single difficulty by any theory as to the mode of the production of the man. No matter how called into being, he is a separate, indivisible moral agent, and he is either mediately or immediately the

creature of God. Generation is but the process through which God creates him, and whatever causes, independently of himself, condition his being, are ultimately to be referred to God. If it were wrong to create him under guilt, it is wrong to permit him to be generated under guilt. The only effect which the doctrine of traduction has is to widen the interval between the direct agency of God and the commencement of the soul—but make the chain of second causes as long as you please, you reach God at last, and these determining intermediate influences do not shift from Him the responsibility under which that soul begins to be. They are independent of it, and its state is as truly to be referred to His will, as if He created it at once by the breath of His mouth. Let it be granted that the soul begins its being in a certain state, and the conclusion is inevitable, either that the state in question cannot be sinful, cannot be charged upon the soul as guilt, or you must seek some other ground for the imputation than the mode of that soul's production. The great difficulty is how it comes to be guilty in God's sight, before it had a being, and it is no solution of this difficulty to tell us how it received its being. It is not, and cannot be responsible for its state, unless that state is grounded in guilt which can be justly charged upon it. If it passes through a dirty channel and becomes filthy, its filth is misfortune, and not sin, unless it passes through that channel in consequence of a sin which can be regarded as its own. Hence we have never felt any zeal upon the question of traduction as a theological problem. If the child is a new being, it is a matter of no moment whether it is created at first or second hand. The guilt or innocence of its state must turn upon quite other grounds than those which determine how it came to be at all. Dr Baird's hypothesis would solve the difficulty completely, if it were not wanting in one capital condition—the possibility of being true. It implies a palpable contradiction in terms. It makes a million to be one, and one to be a million. It relieves perplexity by absurdity.

We cannot dismiss this subject without entering a caveat against the repeated representations of Dr Baird, that the parent is the cause of the child. Stapfer is even still more extravagant in the manner in which he has reasoned upon the causal relation. And they both mean, not material or instrumental causes, but causes strictly and properly efficient. But can such language be vindicated? Consider the parent in the only light in which he has any ethical value, that of a personal, voluntary agent, and is he the maker of the child? Does he produce by a conscious exercise of power, and with a predetermined reference to the nature of the effect to be achieved?

Does he act from design, or is he a blind, mechanical instrument? Can he fix the size, shape, bodily constitution, or personal features of his offspring? Can he determine the bias or extent of its intellectual capacities? Has his will, and that, Dr Baird tells us, is the exponent of the nature, anything to do with the shaping and moulding of the peculiarities which attach to the foetus? Can he even determine that there shall be any foetus at all? It is perfectly clear that he is in no other sense a cause, than as an act of his constitutes the occasion upon which processes connected with the vital and material constitution of the sexes, and entirely independent of his will, are instituted, which, under the providence of God, terminate in an offspring which the Almighty has moulded and fashioned according to His will. He simply touches a spring which sets powers at work that he can neither control nor modify. He is only a link in a chain of instruments through which God calls into being, and the organic law through which all the changes take place that form and develop the child is but the expression, in the last analysis, of the efficiency of God. We cannot say, therefore, that the parent is the efficient cause of his offspring. The relation between them is not that of cause and effect, if by cause be meant anything more than an instrument or means. Our parents have no more made us than we have made ourselves. We are God's creatures, and owe our being to His sovereign will.

The reader has now before him the grounds on which Dr Baird explains our interest in the sin of Adam. It was strictly and properly ours, as really so as if it had been committed in our own persons. Each man can say, to use language which he has quoted with approbation, "There sinned in him not I, but this which is I. My substance sinned, but not my person; and since the substance does not exist otherwise than in a person, the sin of my substance attaches to my person, although not a personal sin. For a personal sin is such as, not that which I am, but I who am, commit—in which Odo, and not humanity, sins—in which I, a person, and not a nature, sins. But inasmuch as there is no person without a nature, the sin of a person is also the sin of a nature, although it is not a sin of nature." In a single phrase, Adam was every man, and therefore every man sinned in Adam. The very identical thing which makes any one a man, is the thing which apostatized in his great transgression, and, therefore, there is no marvel that it should be held guilty wherever it is found. The rogue is a rogue, no matter under what disguise he appears. The same is the same, and must always continue so; and original sin is, herefore, as necessary and inevitable as the law of identity. The imputation of guilt is disembarrassed of all difficulty, for

it is nothing more than a finding of the real facts in the case. It finds the race to be Adam, and it simply says so. There is no fiction of law, no constructive unity of persons, no mere relations, whether moral or political. There is simply the naked fact, that every human being did actually apostatize in the person of Adam, in the whole essence of his humanity.

There are some other conclusions which seem to us to follow with as rigid necessity from Dr Baird's premises as the denial of constructive guilt. In the first place they make every man responsible for every sin of Adam. In every sin his nature was implicated—it was his nature that made him capable of sin or holiness—and his nature is expressed in every determination of his will. Now if that nature passes to his posterity precisely as it was in him, it must pass burdened with all the guilt of all the transgressions of his life. We are, therefore, answerable not for the one offence alone, which seems to have been the idea of Paul, but for all his iniquity. His personal sins cannot be detached from the nature. The person is only the tool of the nature, and, therefore, as growing out of the nature, and conditioned upon the existence of the nature, all his personal shortcomings are really and truly ours. Dr Baird has recoiled from this conclusion, but the distinction with which he has sought to evade it will not sustain him.

“There are two classes of actions which, in this objection, are confounded; but which should be carefully distinguished. Of these one consists in such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These, in no respect, change the nature, nor indicate any change occurring in it, but constitute the mere criteria by which the character and strength of its attributes may be known. After their occurrence the nature flows on, unchanged, to posterity, conveying to them, not the transient accidents which have thus arisen from it, but itself, as essentially it is. To this class belong all those sins of our intermediate ancestors, which are here objected to us. These in no wise modify the nature, nor are they fruits of any change taking place in it as inherited by them, but are the evidences and fruits of its being what it is, in the person by whom they are wrought, and to whom, therefore, they attach. The other class consists of such agency, as, springing from within, constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed. The single case referrible to this class is that of apostasy—the voluntary self-depravation of a nature created holy. Here, as the nature flows downward in the line of generation, it communicates to the successive members of the race, not only itself thus transformed, but, with itself, the moral responsibility which attaches inseparably to it, as active in the transformation wrought by it, and thus conveyed.” Pp. 508, 509.

Here, in the first place, it is explicitly stated that the only

sin in which the nature is active is that which changes its general attitude—perverts it from holiness and God. After it has become perverted it remains dormant, and the person comes forward as a mere exponent of this perverted state. Does Dr Baird mean to say that the nature is not implicated in *every* sin? If so, he eats his own words, for he has again and again affirmed that the relation of an action to the nature is the sole ground of its moral significance. Besides, how can these actions manifest the nature if they do not spring from it? If the nature is not their cause, how can we determine anything in regard to its attitude from them as effects? Moreover, if the nature always conditions the moral determinations of will, these sins are either not voluntary, or the nature has ultimately produced them. In the next place, the ground of distinction between those moral actions which indicate a perverted nature, but in which it is not itself active, and those in which it is active, is most extraordinary. A man wants to know when his nature is active, and when not? or what actions modify it, and what do not? and what is the answer of Dr Baird? Simply this, that those actions alone directly implicate the nature which change its attitude. The criterion is not in the actions themselves, but in the effect. That is to say, Dr Baird was anxious to limit the responsibility of Adam's posterity for his guilt to the single sin of his apostasy, and therefore extemporizes a distinction to suit the occasion. He does not shew us how it appears that the nature was more active in this sin than in any other—that it was any more self-caused, or that it any more sprang from within. It had graver consequences, that will be freely admitted, but the consequences of an action do not determine its origin. In the third place, we do not understand what Dr Baird means, when he says that the sins of a fallen being do not modify his nature. If his idea is that they do not change its general attitude, that is clear. But surely they increase the amount of guilt and depravity. The blindness of the sinner may daily become intenser, and his heart harder. Are these no modifications of the nature? A man can fall but once, but surely he may continue to sink lower. He but once turns his back upon God; but surely he can proceed farther in the direction to which he has turned. The body dies but once; but after death it can putrefy. Is putrefaction no modification of its state? Dr Baird's doctrine, if this is his meaning, is simply absurd. Every sin modifies the nature: it strengthens the general habit of depravity and increases the tendency to repeat itself. There are endless degrees of wickedness and guilt, from the first act of apostasy to the desperate and malignant condition of damned spirits. Guilt accumulates and corrup-

tion festers. Hence, every sin which he committed modified Adam's nature. His first turned his face from God, and every succeeding one was a step further from the Holy One. Until renewed, his heart grew harder and his mind darker with every transgression; his guilt increased in the same proportion, and if his nature were numerically the same with ours, his nature must have come to us, not only as it was perverted by the first sin, but as it was modified by every subsequent offence. This conclusion is inevitable, until Dr Baird can specify what relation his nature had to the first sin which it did not have to any other sin. The distinction must not be grounded in the effect, but in the nature of the relation itself.

Another consequence which follows from Dr Baird's doctrine—in fact, from every doctrine which resolves the propagation of sin exclusively into the parental relation—but more stringently from Dr Baird's notion of numerical identity, is, that Adam, penitent and believing, must have begotten penitent and believing children. Conversion was another change in the attitude of his nature. It, at least, was no transient accident, but revolutionized the nature itself. Under the influence of Divine grace, the renewed nature turned again to God, and embraced Him as the portion of the soul. Now, if the nature flows from parent to child, as it is in the parent—and this must be the case if it is numerically the same—then a converted parent must beget converted children. Dr Baird will certainly admit that if Adam had maintained his integrity, his descendants would have been holy; he would have propagated the nature as it was in him. Having fallen, he propagates the nature as it is now perverted—that is, he still propagates it as it exists in him. If, now, he can propagate, as a holy being, and propagate as a fallen being, why not as a renewed being? What is there, we ask, in the new attitude superinduced by Divine grace that prevents it from being imparted likewise? Or if there be anything, how can that be numerically the same, which is radically different in all its aspirations and affections? Can a crooked tree be numerically the same with a straight one? Can a holy nature and a sinful nature be one? To state the matter in a very few words: the parent reproduces his nature in the child; his nature is a renewed one—therefore, the child must be renewed. This is the difficulty which never yet has been solved by those who are reluctant to recognise any other relation betwixt Adam and his seed than that of the parent and child, and we suspect never will be.

Having considered the essential principles of Dr Baird's theory of original sin, we proceed to point out the modifications which, if generally adopted, they would inevitably work

in our current theology. And first, in relation to imputation and guilt. Dr Baird, as we understand him, does not object to the common definition, that guilt is the obligation to punishment, arising from the ill-desert of sin; neither would he cancel the distinction between the moral necessity of punishment, or that which springs from the inherent righteousness of the case, and the legal or judicial necessity which springs from the sentence of the law. To deserve condemnation, and to be condemned, are not formally the same thing. Intrinsic ill-desert divines are accustomed to denominate potential guilt, or guilt in the first act, it is *dignitas pœnæ*. The judicial sentence of condemnation they call actual guilt, guilt in the second act—*obligatio ad pœnam*. Dr Baird, however, and in this we agree with him, restricts the term "guilt" to the ill-desert itself, and makes the judicial sentence only the consequence of that. Hence, in strict propriety of speech, guilt is the ground, and not the essence, of condemnation—the moral, and not the legal, necessity of punishment. He is guilty who deserves to be condemned, whether he actually is so or not. So far, there is no difference of opinion. We also agree with Dr Baird, that the imputation of guilt is simply the declaration of the fact. To condemn a man is to find or pronounce him guilty, and not to make him so. It is a verdict upon the case as it is, and introduces no new element. But the question arises, upon what grounds is a man pronounced deserving of punishment? And here we are compelled to shake hands and to part from our brother. He explicitly maintains that the *only* ground upon which the ill-desert of an action can attach to a man is his own personal causal relation to it as its author. This we utterly deny. But we do not maintain, as Dr Baird seems to insinuate, that a man can be pronounced guilty when the sin is not really his. All that we maintain is, that a sin may be ours, really and truly ours, and therefore chargeable upon us, when we have not, in our own proper persons, committed it; when we have, in fact, sustained no causal relation to it whatever. This is the point upon which we differ: not whether a man can be punished for what is not his own, but whether there is only one way of a thing's being his own. If there is a just moral sense in which an action can be mine, without my having actually committed it, then there is a ground upon which it may be righteously imputed to me, without my being the cause of it. Dr Baird has no where proved that personal causation is the sole ground of propriety in actions. He asserts it, and confidently assumes it, but nowhere proves it. His notion is, that where there is guilt, there must necessarily be the stain. We admit that guilt springs from the stain, but we deny that

it is limited to the person in whom the stain is found. We contend that representation as really establishes the relation of propriety in actions as personal causation; that what a man does by his agent, he as truly does as if he did it in his own proper person. The maxim expresses the common sense of mankind—*qui facit per alium, facit per se*. The whole system of sponsorship in society is founded upon it, and no commonwealth could hang together for a single generation if the principle were discarded. This is the principle upon which the imputation of Adam's first sin to us proceeds. He was our representative—he was our head, our agent, on probation, not for himself alone, but for all who should descend from him by ordinary generation. There can be no question that, if he sustained this relation to us, we are implicated in all that he did in this relation. His acts are ours, and we are as responsible for them as if we had committed them ourselves. "We sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression."

According to this view there is consistency in the language of our standards, when it is said that what is imputed to us, is not our own personal act, nor the act of that which subsequently became ourselves, but the guilt of *Adam's* first sin. It was the one sin of the one man that ruined us. According to Dr Baird it was no more Adam's sin than ours. The relation of his person to it was altogether accidental—it only happened to express itself through his will—but essentially, it is ours in the very same sense in which it is his. What was peculiar to Adam is not imputed. If there is force in language, or coherence in thought, Dr Baird totally and absolutely denies that anything personal to Adam is charged upon us. What is now ourselves used him as an instrument. He was simply the paw which the roguish nature used to steal with. We are now the paws with which it continues to practise its villainy—the instruments are changed, but the agent is the same. We leave it to any man in his senses to say whether such an account is reconcilable with the language of the Westminster Formularies. "The sin of Adam and Eve, which God was pleased, according to His wise and holy counsel to permit,"* is explicitly affirmed to be the act, the personal act of eating the forbidden fruit, and the guilt of *this* sin, this personal act, is what is said to be imputed. But, according to Dr Baird, that specific act could not have been imputed—it was not the act of the nature, but only an accidental manifestation of what the nature had become. It was personal, and not generic. "The action of plucking and eating the fruit was, in itself, as a mere act, a matter utterly insignificant," p. 508. "We have shewn already that the plucking and eating of the fruit of the

* Confession of Faith, chap. vi.

forbidden tree was a mere accident, following the heart-sin," p. 497. Now, our standards just as precisely assert that *this* was the *very* sin whereby our first parents fell from the estate wherein they were created. "*By this sin* they fell from their original righteousness." Dr Baird says that they *had fallen before* they committed the deed, and that the deed was only the proof of their fall; the Confession says, that the fall was the *consequence* of the deed, and that the deed was the judicial ground of the fall. It is perfectly clear that Dr Baird does not teach the doctrines of the Westminster divines. They held that the personal offence of our first parents was imputed—he holds that only our own offence is imputed. To make it clear that they mean a personal act, they specify the act to which they trace the ruin and condemnation of the race. Dr Baird says that the race was ruined before that act was committed, and that the act itself "was utterly insignificant, a mere accident, following the heart-sin." They teach that the formal ground of the imputation of the first sin is the representative relation of Adam to his race. Dr Baird teaches that the formal ground of the imputation of the first sin is that his race committed it. It is imputed to them in the same sense and on the same principle in which it is imputed to him.

We repeat, therefore, and we defy Dr Baird to escape from the conclusion, that, upon his premises, there is no imputation of Adam's sin at all. It is not as *his*, but as subjectively and inherently *ours*, that we are held responsible for it. Upon the federal view, the sin could not be ours but as it was *Adam's*, his personal relations to it were absolutely necessary to create our interest in it. He, as a person, and not a nature, was our head and representative; and, therefore, before we can be called to account, it is presupposed that he has acted.

In the next place, Dr Baird utterly confounds the twofold relations in which Adam stood to the species, as a natural and as a representative head. According to him they are one and the same thing. The truth is, that in strict propriety of language, there is no headship at all. The nature in every case is the same, and the person is a mere channel of transmission. One man stands in the same relation to it as another, and, instead of the parent representing the child, the nature represents itself in both. But, passing over this objection, the parental relation *ex necessitate rei*, according to Dr Baird, is federal. In the very act of creation, "his Maker," we are told, p. 305, "endowed him with a prolific constitution, and in the blessing pronounced upon him at his creation, prior to any of the external actions by which the covenant of nature was formally sealed, he was ordained to multiply; to become of one the myriads of the human race. In all God's dealings with

him, he is regarded in this light, as the root and father of a race who should proceed from him. They, by virtue of this derivative relation to him, were contemplated by God, as in him their head, parties in all the transactions which had respect to the covenant. Thus, they sinned in his sin; fell in his apostasy; were depraved in his corruption; and in him became the children of Satan, and of the wrath of God." Hence, to be a man, and to be a covenant head, are the same thing. It is the propagative peculiarity which directly makes the child responsible for the parent, and the parent for the child. God could not have dealt with Adam, but as a federal head. He did not appoint him to the office, but created him in it. "By the phrase, covenant head, we do not mean that Adam was by covenant made head of the race, but that, being its head, by virtue of the nature with which God had endowed him, he stood as such in the covenant. Adam sustained in his person two distinct characters, the demarcation of which must be carefully observed if we would attain to any just conclusions as to the relation he held toward us, and the effects upon us of his actions. First, in him was a nature of a specific character, the common endowment of the human race; and transmissible to them, by propagation, with their being. Again, he was an individual person, endowed with the nature thus bestowed on him in common with his posterity. Personal actions and relations of his, which did not affect his nature were peculiar to him as a private person. But such as affected his nature, with him, and to the same extent, involved all those to whom that nature was given in its bestowal on him," pp. 305, 306. Accordingly, Dr Baird teaches that the covenant of works was not a positive institution, into which God entered with Adam after his creation, but was the very form, and the only conceivable form, under which such a creature could be subject to the moral government of God. If not a word had been said concerning the forbidden fruit, and no limitation of probation introduced, it would still have been true that the apostasy of Adam would have been the apostasy of his race. His relationship, as a parent, necessarily implicated his seed in all that affected his nature. One more extract will remove all room for doubt.

"Here, however, it is necessary to enter more particularly into consideration of the manner in which Adam was invested with the functions of a representative. That the cause of that office was the will of God, is not disputed by any who recognise the office. But it is a question how the Creator gave effect to His will in this matter. Was it by a positive arrangement, unessential to the completeness of the constitution of nature, extraneous to it, superimposed upon it, after the work of creation was complete? Or did he so order that

the relation between the representative body and its head should be an organic one, a relation implied in the very structure of Adam's nature, incorporated with the substance of his being, and constituting an element essential to the completeness and symmetry of the whole system, physical, moral, and spiritual? By many orthodox theologians of the present day, it is held that the representative relation of Adam did not exist until the positive provision was made respecting the tree of knowledge, when it was constituted by a decretive act of God's sovereignty. We are constrained to take the opposite view, and to maintain, with the older divines, that the relation is as old as the first inscription of the covenant of nature on the heart of man in his creation. We look upon it as the essential element in the parental relation as it subsisted in Adam; the element which gives the family constitution all its significance." Pp. 308, 309.

Now we do not hesitate to assert that this complete confusion, or rather, amalgamation of the federal with natural headship, is a total abolition of the federal, in the sense in which it is taken in the Westminster standards. Their covenant is an institution posterior to creation—an institution proceeding from the sovereign will of God, in which the essential elements of moral government were largely modified by grace. What these modifications were we shall not here specify, as they are unimportant to the point before us. It is enough to say that moral government and the covenant of works are not synonymous, but that the covenant was the special form which God impressed upon it after the creation of man. We say further, that considered simply as a creature, a moral creature, there is no reason to believe that, independently of the sovereign appointment of God, the character and conduct of Adam would have had any legal effects upon the destiny of his offspring. Each man would have been under the moral law for himself, and his fortunes would have been in his own hand. All this is clear, if the covenant was subsequent to the creation. What say our standards? The first covenant is represented as having "*been made with man.*" The inference would seem to be that man was already in existence. This is not language which any one would adopt who intended to describe an innate law or a connatural principle. And although ingenuity may put it to the torture, and wring out of it an interpretation to suit Dr Baird's hypothesis, no one can pretend that it is the simple and obvious sense of the words. But let us admit, for the sake of argument, that these words are not decisive, what shall we say to the teachings of the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, in which it is expressly affirmed that the covenant of works, *was a special act of Providence towards man in the estate wherein he was created.* Providence presupposes creation, and here man's previous existence in a

definite state is unequivocally affirmed, and the covenant is made with him as a creature existing in that holy and happy condition. The Larger Catechism* recounts first his creation, then his insertion into Paradise, the injunction to cultivate the garden, the permission to eat of the fruits of the earth, the subjection of the creatures to his authority, the institution of marriage and the Sabbath, the privilege of communion with God—all these before it comes to the establishment of the covenant, making it as clear as the sun in the heavens, that the covenant was regarded as posterior to the creation, and as by no means synonymous with that moral law which was confessedly the rule and measure of the holiness that he had as a moral creature. The Shorter Catechism removes all perplexity when it declares in so many words,† that “when God had created man, he entered into a covenant of life with him.” The Latin version is, “After God had created man,” *post quam Deus hominem condidisset*. It is needless to pursue so plain a matter any further. Dr Baird and the Westminster standards teach an entirely different doctrine as to the covenant, and of course as to Adam’s federal headship. One makes both concreated with man—elements of his being as a moral propagative creature, his necessary attitude to God and his posterity. The other makes both the sovereign appointment of God, gracious dispensations of Providence towards him and his race, looking to a good, which, without such an arrangement, he could have no right to expect. In support of these views we are happy to be able to cite an authority which we know that Dr Baird sincerely respects, and which is likely to have more weight with him than any arguments that we can employ. Dr Breckinridge has put this subject in its proper light in a work to which Dr Baird has more than once referred, and referred to in terms which indicate a deserved appreciation of its value.‡

Whatever, therefore, “the older divines” may have taught to the contrary, it is indisputable that the Westminster Assembly has represented federal headship as an instituted, and natural headship as an original, relation, and has clearly distinguished between them. An instituted is not, however, to be confounded with an arbitrary, relation. The appointment of Adam to the office of a federal head was not in contempt or defiance of the principles of equity and truth. His natural relations to his race rendered it consistent with justice that he should, also, be their representative. His natural headship, in other words, is the ground of his federal headship. The connection by blood betwixt him and his descendants consti-

* Quest. 20.

† Quest. 12.

‡ Knowl. God Object., Book v., c. 31.

tutes a basis of unity by which, though numerically different as individuals, they may be treated as one collective whole. There is a close and intimate union, though not an identity, among the members of the human family. They are one race, one blood, one body—an unity, not like that of the realists, growing out of the participation of a common objective reality, answering to the definition of a genus or a species, but an unity founded in the relations of individual beings. It is this unity, and not the fancied identity of Dr Baird, that distinguishes the family, the state, the church, the world. That the human race is not an aggregate of separate and independent atoms, but constitutes something analogous to an organic whole, with a common life, springing from the intimate connection between the parts, is obvious from the very organisation of society. There is one unity of nations, in consequence of which national character becomes as obtrusively marked as the peculiarities of individuals. There was one type among the Greeks, another among the Asiatics, still another among the Romans. The Englishman is in no danger of ever being mistaken for a Frenchman, and the Frenchman is not more distinguished from his Continental neighbours by his language than by his habits, his sentiments, his modes of thought. In the narrowest of the social spheres, the same principle is at work, and families are as decisively different by their characters as by their names. These facts reveal that there is a bond among men, a fundamental basis of unity, which embraces the whole race. What it is we may be unable to define; we know, however, that it is connected with blood. This basis is that which justifies, but does not necessitate, God's dealing with the race in one man as a whole. So that Adam's federal headship is the immediate ground of our interest in his sin, and his natural headship is the ground of the representative economy. Adam stood only for his children, because his children alone sustained those relations to him by virtue of which he could justly represent them. If required to specify precisely what that is which constitutes the unity, the nature and kind of relationship, we frankly confess that we are not competent to solve the problem. We do not profess to understand the whole case. We accept whatever God has thought proper to reveal, and whenever the curtain drops upon his revelation, we lay our hands upon our mouth. In the mean time, although we cannot see the whole reason which is contained in natural for federal headship, we can see that the moral economy which admits of representation is supremely benevolent. If Adam had maintained his integrity, and we had inherited life and glory through his obedience, none would ever have dreamed that there was aught of hardship, injustice, or cruelty in the

scheme by which our happiness had been so cheaply secured. The difference of result makes no difference in the nature of the principle. Those who object do not remember that the law which made Adam our head and representative, is the law by virtue of which alone, so far as we know, the happiness of any man can be secured. Without the principle of representation, it is possible that the whole race might have perished, and perished for ever. Each man, as the species successively came into existence, would have been placed under the law of distributive justice. His safety, therefore, would have been for ever contingent. It is possible, that if the first man, with all his advantages, abused his liberty and fell, each of his descendants might have imitated his example, and fallen also. It is possible, therefore, that the whole race might have become involved in guilt and ruin. Some might have stood longer than others, but what is any measure of time to immortality? Who shall say, but that in the boundless progress of their immortal being, one by one, all may have sinned? It is possible, nay, more, even probable; it is quite sure that this would have been the case with some; that multitudes, indeed, would abuse their freedom and die. But to sin under such circumstances is to sin hopelessly. There can be no redeemer if each man is to be treated exclusively as an individual. If we cannot sin in another, we cannot be righteous in another. If the principle of representation is not to be admitted into God's government, salvation to the guilty becomes hopelessly impossible. Under this principle, multitudes are, in fact, saved, when without it, all might have been lost. Hence, it is clearly a provision of grace, introduced for our good, for our safety, for our happiness, and not as a snare, or a curse. God had an eye to it when He constituted our species a race, connected by unity of blood, and not a mere aggregation or assemblage of similar individuals. He made Adam the root, because He designed to make him the head; the father, because He designed to make him the representative, of all mankind. The natural constitution is evidently in order to the federal relation. Both are necessary in order to understand the doctrine of original sin. If we consider Adam merely as our first parent his act is not necessarily the act of his child. If the paternal relation, such as it now obtains in the species, exhausted his relations to the race, it would be impossible to explain how they can be guilty on account of the first sin rather than any other. Even if it were granted that, as a father, he must propagate his own moral features, his children would receive them simply as a nature, without being ill-deserving on account of them, as a child might innocently inherit a distorted body which the parent had brought upon

himself by guilt. The natural relation, therefore, taken as exclusive and alone, is wholly incompetent to bear the load of hereditary sin. There must be something more than parent and child in the case. It is vain to appeal to those analogies in which the offspring share in the sufferings incident to the wickedness of their fathers. The offspring do, indeed, suffer, but they do not charge themselves with guilt; their sufferings are calamities, and not punishments. There must be some relation, legal and moral, by virtue of which the act of the parent becomes judicially theirs, before they can be penally responsible. This relationship is established in the covenant. That makes the act of their parent their sin and their crime. The two relations together, the natural and federal, explain the whole case, as far as God has thought proper to reveal it. I am guilty, because Adam represented me. Adam represented me because I am his child. Birth *unites* me to him, as faith unites me to Christ. The union in each case is the basis of the covenant, and the covenant is the immediate ground of condemnation or acceptance.

That Dr Baird's doctrine of guilt and imputation is not that of the Reformed Church is susceptible of superfluous proof. We have not space for quotations in detail, but there are several considerations which shew that, whatever that doctrine might have been, it could not have been the scheme of Dr Baird. In the first place, we acquit him of any sympathy with the mediate imputation of Placæus, but did it not occur to him, that the theory of Placæus could never have been originated, had the general sentiment of the Church been that we were actually guilty of the sin of Adam? Mediate imputation is an expedient for establishing a direct personal relation betwixt ourselves and the first transgression. It goes on the supposition that a man can be punished only for the sin which he has really committed. The problem it undertook to solve was, how the sin of another could be made to stand in personal relations to ourselves, and the answer it gave was, that we make it our own by a voluntary appropriation. Now, if it had been the doctrine of the church that the sin of Adam was actually ours, it would have been ridiculously absurd to cast about for expedients, in order to make us justly responsible for it. No one would ever have dreamed of doubting that a man is chargeable with his own sins. This mediate theory, therefore, is a pregnant proof that the form in which the Church held the doctrine was one which made us responsible for a crime in which we had no causal agency. In the next place, the bitter and malignant opposition of Socinians, Remonstrants, and Pelagians is wholly unaccountable, if the Reformers taught nothing more than that a man was

punished for his actual transgressions. This principle could not have been denied without abolishing moral distinctions. In Dr Baird's doctrine the vulnerable point is our numerical identity with Adam. That being given, guilt and corruption follow as a matter of course. Now, if the Reformers had stated the doctrine in this shape, the opposition would have been to the principle, and not to the consequence. Then, again, the Reformers, almost to a man, asserted the immediate creation, and denied the generation of the soul. Calvin treats the theory of traduction with utter contempt. It received hardly less favour among the divines of France, Holland, Germany, England, and Scotland. But the theory of traduction is essential to Dr Baird's doctrine. It is, therefore, certain that this doctrine could not have been held by the Reformers. These considerations are conclusive. But there is another to be added, which makes assurance doubly sure. The Reformers all taught the imputation of our sins to Christ. Our ill-desert, our guilt, was charged upon him, and yet they never dreamed of the blasphemy of making him actually a sinner. Here, clearly, imputation implied responsibility for crimes on the part of one who was absolutely free from the stain, and who sustained no causal relation to them.

But how does Dr Baird dispose of this case? Will the reader believe it? By a flat and palpable contradiction of every principle that he has sought elaborately to establish in the case of Adam and his posterity. He retracts his entire philosophy of guilt and punishment. We have never known a more remarkable instance of a theory breaking down under its own weight. He admits that Christ was our substitute; that He assumed our guilt; that He was held responsible for our sins. Was He, therefore, actually a sinner? Was the nature which He had numerically the same nature which apostatised? and was it charged only with its own proper act? Not at all. Objective imputation does not involve subjective pollution. He simply sustains a relation to His people in which their sins are, "*in some proper sense,*" to be regarded as His. What is this proper sense? The reader will remark the answer. (Pp. 606, 607.) The substance is, that He was the federal head of those whose sins He bore, and who constituted one body with Him by virtue of, not a numerical identity of nature, but of a spiritual union subsisting between them—the very doctrine for which we have contended. He actually quotes with approbation the sentence of Owen, which is an unequivocal denial of his whole doctrine. "As what He (Christ) did is imputed unto them, *as if done by them*, so what they deserved on the account of sin is charged upon Him." How true that, if you expel nature with a fork,

she will return. Dr Baird is reduced to the necessity of abandoning his whole theory of imputation, or of admitting that Christ was a personal transgressor.

As to the authorities which he quotes in the chapter, *Of the Definition of Guilt and Imputation*, they make nothing for him. They only prove that guilt is inseparable from crime; no one denies that. They prove, further, that a man cannot be punished for a crime which is in no sense his own; no one denies that. But the real point in dispute is, whether there is only *one* sense, that of actual causation, in which a crime may be said to belong to us, and this point his authorities do not touch. Nay, if he had gone further, he would have seen that these very authorities distinctly teach, not only that we *can* sin, but that we *have* sinned vicariously. Then, again, Dr Baird has quietly assumed that all those expressions by which the Reformers signalised our union with Adam, and represent his sin as ours, convey the idea of an actual participation in his offence. He has confounded union with identity. They clearly meant nothing more than that close and intimate relationship, springing from natural birth, which lies at the basis of federal representation. To be in him seminally and radically, is not to be numerically one nature with him. It is to be like him and of him. As we have already said, they never taught an arbitrary imputation. They never taught that guilt was unconnected with crime; but they did teach that the crime might *belong* to a man, might be justly called *his*, where he was not implicated in the stain of it. If this is conceded, every passage which Dr Baird has quoted in the chapter referred to goes for nothing. And that this must be conceded, we think capable of irrefragable proof. Although our limits do not allow us to enter into details, we must be permitted, in addition to the numerous quotations to be found in the popular treatises of theology, to close with one which we do not remember to have seen cited before. It is from the learned and venerable Cocceius. In allusion to the handle which Socinians made of the ambiguity of the word impute, he says: "They explain it to mean that God imputes the sin of Adam by thinking or judging that the posterity of Adam willed, thought, did, what Adam perversely willed, thought, did. Hence they represent God as judging those to be in existence who were only radically in being." That is, the Socinians charge imputation with making the descendants of Adam personally guilty of his sin. This would be to attribute an actual being to those whose existence was only potential. But, adds Cocceius, "*to impute, in the style of Scripture, is to judge that he has done a thing who has not done it; not to impute, is to judge that he has not done a thing, who*"

has done it. To impute is either to condemn or absolve many individuals by one sentence, on account of the conjunction between them.* This is exactly our doctrine, the doctrine of the Westminster standards, and of the whole Reformed Church. But it is not the doctrine of Dr Baird.

Dr Baird says, "The opinion seems to be entertained by some that the attempt to base our relation to the covenant and to the apostasy, upon our natural relation to Adam, involves, as a logical result, the doctrine of mediate imputation." He refers to ourselves, but has entirely misconceived our doctrine. We have always held that the natural is the *ground* of the federal relation. The doctrine is explicitly stated in the article referred to. What we objected to was, the idea that the natural relation alone explains our guilt and corruption; that we must receive our nature from Adam precisely in the moral attitude which it occupied in him, simply *because* Adam was our father. We insisted then, and insist now, that the law of generation, singly and alone, the law that like begets like, does not explain even native depravity, let alone guilt, and that if guilt is conceived as attaching to us in the *first instance, because* we have a corrupt nature, that is the doctrine of mediate imputation. We insisted then, and insist now, that the immediate formal ground of guilt is the covenant headship of Adam; that our depravity of nature is the penal consequence of our guilt in him, and that we are made parties to the covenant by the circumstance of birth, or the natural relation to Adam. We stated, then, that Calvin held the doctrine to which we object. We are now prepared to say, after a thorough examination of the writings of that great man, that, although he has often expressed himself vaguely and ambiguously, we are convinced that his opinion at bottom was the same as our own.

Dr Baird exults in the superiority of his theory to the current theology, on account of the completeness with which it solves the difficulties in relation to hereditary sin. We admit, very candidly, that in his case, the only difficulty is in the theory itself. Given a numerical identity of nature transmitted from father to son, and its moral condition in the one is as explicable as its moral condition in the other. The murderer is the same, whether found in a palace or a hovel, and the law seizes him, wherever it finds him, on account of a crime which his change of place cannot modify. But upon the supposition that Adam's children are not Adam, but themselves, that they are new beings, called into existence by the providence of God, two questions cannot fail to arise, which have always presented difficulties in speculation. The first is,

* Sum. Theol. chap. xxx. § 4.

how that which, now and here, begins its being, can begin it in a state of sin, without an imputation upon the character of God? The problem is to make God the author of the man without making Him the author of his sin. The second question is, how that which is inherent, which comes to us from without as a conditioning cause, and not as a self-conditioned effect, can carry the imputation of crime. How, as it exists in us, independently of any agency of ours, it can be contemplated with moral disapprobation, and render us personally ill-deserving? The answer to these questions exhausts the different theories of original sin, and Dr Baird congratulates himself that he has fairly got rid of them. Confident in the advantages of his position, he has assailed, with spirit and vigour, the stronghold within which Edwards and his disciples have thought themselves impregnable. We really enjoyed the fight, it being, as Lucretius observes, "a great satisfaction to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof, in the vale below." We felt all along, that all that was necessary was for them to take the offensive, and very feeble guns would be sufficient to demolish the fortress in which Dr Baird conceived himself so strong. He may succeed in weakening their defences, but they can utterly annihilate his. Their doctrine has difficulties, but his is an absurdity.

A complete answer to these questions in the present state of our knowledge we hold to be impossible. Until we are put in possession of the entire case, no solution that can be given will go to the bottom of the subject. There will ever remain phenomena which our philosophy does not cover. But, at the same time, we are confident that the solution must be sought in the line of those principles of natural and federal headship which the Scriptures so clearly reveal. These principles shew, paradoxical as the thing may appear, that the history of the individual does not absolutely begin with its birth. It sustained moral relations, and was implicated in moral acts before it was born. This notion is essentially involved in the notion of a covenant. When Adam was appointed to this office, all his descendants, constituting an unity of body with him, sustained the same relations to the law and God which he sustained. Morally and legally they were in being—their interest in the covenant was just the same as if they had already received an actual existence. This being so, the sin of Adam must have produced the same judicial effects upon them as upon him. Their actual existence was to begin under the law of sin and death, as his was continued under it. God, in calling them successively into being, must, as the Ruler and Judge of the universe, produce them in the state to which justice had mo-

rally consigned them. The covenant, therefore, does explain the fact of their being sinners, before they were born—does give them a history before their actual being. The only question is, Was the covenant just? That depends upon the question whether natural headship creates an union with Adam sufficiently intimate to ground these judicial transactions. If it does, the mystery is solved. We maintain that it does, but acknowledge very frankly that we do not fully see how. We understand a part of the case, and only a part. The thing which has always perplexed us most, is to account for the sense of personal demerit, of guilt and shame, which unquestionably accompanies our sense of native corruption. It is not felt to be a misfortune or calamity, but a crime. We subscribe to every syllable which Dr Baird has written upon this subject. Now, how shall this be explained? Discounting all the schemes which deny the fact itself, and construe native corruption into native misfortune, there are but three hypotheses which are supposable in the case. First, we have really had a being antecedent to our birth, in which, by a personal abuse of liberty, we determined and conditioned our mundane history. The second is, that we had a being in our substance, though not in our persons, which has determined the attitude of that substance. The third is, that we sinned in another, whose relations to us were such as to make him morally one with us. The first two hypotheses remove the difficulty, but they substitute a greater one. Of the two, if we were driven to choose between them, we should prefer the theory of a super-sensible existence. The consciousness of guilt connects it with our persons, and the argument is a short one which concludes from this consciousness to a previous personal existence. Our nature is sinful; it could not have been made so without our act; that corrupting act could not have taken place in time, for corruption begins with our life in time. We must, therefore, have had a transcendent existence, in which we could have conditioned the moral type of our appearance in time. The objections to this hypothesis are unanswerable. In the first place, the notion of a timeless existence is itself utterly unintelligible. Every finite being is conditioned, and conditioned both by time and space; and an intelligible world of real, substantive existences, without temporal relations, is altogether contradictory. In the next place, it is wholly unaccountable, how such a state, signalized by so momentous an act as that which ruined the agent, has so entirely passed from the memory, as to leave no trace behind. Surely, if anything had impressed itself upon our minds, such a condition, so different from the present, and so fruitful in its consequences, could not have failed to be remembered. Add to this the

silence of Scripture, or rather the contrary teaching of Scripture, in its necessary implications, and the argument is complete.

The hypothesis of Dr Baird being no less untenable, we are shut up to the third scheme, which we take to be the scheme of the Bible. We cannot carry human existence beyond Adam, nor Adam's existence beyond that creative fiat which gave him his being on the sixth day. Then and there the species began, and began holy. The Scriptures further inform us when and where and how he lost his integrity. From the time of his disobedience, all the race have born the type of sin. There has been no holiness in the species from that hour to this, unless as supernaturally produced by the grace of God. It would seem, therefore, that the all-conditioning act which has shaped the moral character of the race, was no other than the act which lost to Adam the image of God in the garden of Eden. Such seems to be the explicit testimony of Scripture. By one man's disobedience, many were made sinners. Either we are guilty of that act, or original corruption is in us simply misfortune. In some way or other it is ours, justly imputable to us, or we are not, and cannot be, born the children of wrath. But we are guilty; conscience testifies that we are guilty—that our native corruption is sin. But as we did not sin personally, as we did not sin naturally, we must have sinned vicariously. The only alternative is in ourselves or in another. Ourselves are out of the question. Therefore we sinned in Adam, and our history truly began before our birth. Our appearance in time was not an absolute commencement, but moral relations preceded and determined it. In bringing us into the world sinners, God did nothing more than execute the decree of justice. As to the manner in which God executed that decree, the negative agency of withholding or not imparting the Divine image is sufficient to explain the effect. To be destitute of the image of God is to be in an unholy state, and the want of original righteousness necessitates positive corruption. But still the agency of God, in the production of that corruption, is purely privative and judicial. The case is this: The being to be produced is under the curse, exposed to the penalty of the law. That implies the withdrawal of the Divine favour, as manifested in that highest proof of it, the Divine image; and that implies the dominion of sin. This is precisely the doctrine of our standards. There is, first, guilt; then the want of original righteousness; and then the corruption of the whole nature. This is, also, the doctrine of Calvin, who expressly repudiates natural generation as an adequate explanation of depravity. His words are—"For the human race has not naturally derived corrup-

tion through its descent from Adam; but that result is rather to be traced to the appointment of God, who, as He had adorned the whole nature of mankind with most excellent endowments in one man, so in the same man He denuded it."*

Dr Baird deceives himself with an analogy which, as illustrating the unity of the race, is perfectly proper; the analogy of the seed to the plant, and the oak to the acorn. But when an argument is derived from a figure of speech, the figure should be pertinent to the very point on which the argument turns. Here the design is to shew that one man has corrupted the race in the way of nature, because all have sprung from him. The true comparison, in a case thus contemplating derivative individuals, is not that of an acorn to the oak, but of a parent oak to other oaks which have come from it. God did not, at first, make acorns, but trees, and these trees produced the acorns, and these acorns have perpetuated forests. If, now, an oak in full maturity should drop an hundred acorns, and these acorns grow into a hundred other oaks, the question is, Would these hundred oaks be numerically the same with one another and with their parent stock? And would this whole forest die if the parent tree should happen to decay? This is the case which is parallel with Adam and his posterity, and we humbly think that it gives no help to those who can see nothing but nature in the propagation of sin.

But if imputed guilt makes Adam's descendants really and personally corrupt, how shall we exempt Christ from the operation of the same penal consequence? He bare our sins in his own body on the tree, and yet was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. The judicial displeasure of God did not involve Him in personal sin. But, in the first place, it is overlooked that Christ never existed as a human person. He had our nature, but the person was that of the Eternal Son. In consequence of the intimate relationship of the human nature in Him to the Divine Logos, that nature was pervaded, conditioned, and determined, in all its habitudes and in its whole being, by an influence which preserved it not only from sin, but from the possibility of sin. Jesus was what no other man ever was, or ever can be, but as made so by Him, absolutely impeccable. It is a mystery how His divine person, without disturbing His human liberty, or absorbing His human consciousness, or interfering with His human properties, or diminishing the moral significance of His temptations, could yet make it certain that He should never fail. But the case is even so. It was in consequence of this mystery that the enduring of the penalty by Him was an act of obedience. Others suffer from necessity. He obeyed, achieved an active

* Comment. Gen. iii. 7.

righteousness, as truly in His death as in His life. As the judicial displeasure of God could not destroy the personal union between the two natures, it could not destroy that life of God in His soul, which is the condition of all holiness. He could not have become a sinner without ceasing to be divine. His case, therefore, is altogether *sui generis*. In the next place, it is equally important to recollect that He stood as the head of a covenant, as a new beginning of the race, or rather of His seed. *He* was the *representative*, and not those whose sins He bore. If they had been His head, then the case would have been parallel with the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. But He was not in them—they are not the centre of union—but they are in Him, and He is, accordingly, the source of influence. In the third place, the very nature of His undertaking required Him to be stronger than the curse. The penalty could not crush Him, as it buries a creature in death, and therefore He is declared to be the Son of God, with power, by His resurrection from the dead. The case of Christ, therefore, is no manner of exception to our argument, that guilt, resting upon grounds of representative unity, must as necessarily entail a fall to the creature as personal transgression.

We have already intimated that we regard Dr Baird's account of the covenant as seriously defective. He looks upon it as a natural institution, essentially contained in the moral law, as addressed to such a creature as man. He confounds man's state, considered simply as a moral agent, under a dispensation of moral government, and his state as in covenant with God. We have not space, now, to enlarge upon this error. We shall content ourselves with an exhibition of what we take to be the teachings of Scripture and of our own standards. As a moral creature, invested with the image of God, man was under the law, as a servant, bound to execute his master's will, with no promise but the continuance of the divine favour as he then enjoyed it. The condition of his servitude was perpetual innocence. As long as he obeyed, he would remain holy and happy as he was. As soon as he disobeyed, he was to die. His state was contingent, dependent upon his legitimate use, or the abuse of his liberty. As a moral creature, moreover, he was treated purely as an individual; and had no change taken place in his relations, each man as he came into being would have been on trial for himself. Now the covenant of works was a special dispensation of God's goodness, modifying this state in several important respects. Its aim was two-fold—to change the relation of man from that of a servant to a son, and to confirm him indelibly in holiness, which is the essential notion of life. To

achieve these ends, the period of probation was first made definite, and the notion of a completed righteousness or justification introduced. In the next place, the persons on probation were limited, and one made to stand for all, and thus the notion of imputation was introduced. In the third place, the field of temptation was contracted, and the question of obedience made to turn upon a single positive precept, which brought the will of man directly, face to face, with the will of God. Had man obeyed, he would have been justified; and as this justification is the equivalent of perpetual innocence, it must have secured it, and man have been rendered immutable in holiness. This subjective change in his will from mutability to impeccability would have been accompanied with an external change in his relations from a servant to a son. This two-fold change would have realized the notion of life. Upon this view the covenant is a conspicuous manifestation of the goodness of God. But it is a view totally inconsistent with Dr Baird's notions of the constitution of man, and, therefore, with him the grace of God retreats before logical consistency.

One more thought and we have done. We regret that the importance which Dr Baird attaches to the propagative property of man has led him to rank this among the elements which enter into the biblical notion of the image of God. In the relation betwixt a parent and his child he detects a resemblance to the ineffable relation betwixt the first and second persons of the Trinity, and what is still more remarkable, in our faculty of breathing, he finds a representation of the procession of the Holy Ghost. The last is a pure fancy—there is nothing approximating to an analogy, much less to a resemblance of the things themselves. That there is some analogy in the first case may be admitted, but that is very far from proving that the analogy is any part of the Divine image. Man in his dominion over the creatures, sustains a relation analogous to that of God as Supreme Ruler, but dominion over the creatures is treated in the Scriptures as a consequence, but not as an element, of the image. The phrase has a specific, definite sense, abundantly explained in the Scriptures themselves, and we should neither add to it nor take from it. Least of all should we trust to fancy as its expositor. One thing would seem to be certain, that nothing can be included in it, which is shared by man in common with the brutes. To propagate their species and to breathe, is characteristic of all terrestrial animals, and as in these respects, the dog and the goat stand on a level with man, we are conscious of something like the degradation of a grand subject when we undertake to define the Divine image by such properties.

We shall here pause. We have singled out the prominent parts of Dr Baird's book, in which we find ourselves unable to agree with him. It would have given us more pleasure to have dwelt upon the many fine features of it which we can most cordially approve. It is by no means a commonplace work. The very consistency with which he has carried through a single leading idea, and interwoven it with the texture of a difficult and complicated discussion, shews the hand of genius and the power of disciplined thought. We thank him for his incidental death-blows to popular errors, and we love him for the zeal and heartiness with which he clings to the glorious doctrines of grace. If, in the points in which we have differed from him, we have said any thing personally offensive, it would give us more pain to discover it, than it can give him to read it. We are conscious that we have written under a strong sense of personal esteem, and we are sure that Dr Baird will reciprocate the wish, that in relation to the matters in dispute, each of us may seek, exclusively, for truth. We adopt the noble language of Socrates in the Philebus of Plato: *νῦν γὰρ δὴ πού πρὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀγῶ τίθεται, ταῦτα ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθ' ἂν σὺ, τῷ δ' ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.*

[ART. II.—*Dr Edward Beecher's "Conflict" and "Concord."*

- 1.—*The Conflict of Ages; or the great Debate on the Moral Relations of God and Man.* By EDWARD BEECHER, D.D. 1853.
- 2.—*The Concord of Ages; or the Individual and Organic Harmony of God and Man.* By EDWARD BEECHER, D.D. 1860.

THESE volumes of Dr Beecher, though published at different periods, and under different titles, are part and parcel of the same scheme of doctrine. The latter work is but a pendent, a complement, of the former, advocating and defending the same opinions, and carrying them out to greater lengths. It will be appropriate to notice the previous volume first.

By "the Conflict of Ages," Dr B. understands the controversy, which has been going on for ages in the Christian Church, respecting human depravity; those on the one side insisting, as the result of their own convictions and consciousness, on the natural and entire depravity of man; while those on the other side, not being able to reconcile such a state of things with the perfections of God, and with what he owes to new created beings, have been inclined to modify, to soften,

and in some instances to deny altogether, the fact of such depravity. In this controversy are involved what Dr B. calls the two "grand, moving powers of Christianity;" viz., the perfection of the Divine character on the one hand, and human depravity and wickedness on the other. And what is peculiarly unfortunate, these powers, he tells us, according to the present adjustment of things, are counteracting one another; so that, like a steamship whose paddle wheels should move in opposite directions, the vessel can only roll, and tumble, and whirl about in the foaming flood, without the possibility of making progress.

Dr B. defines precisely, in some of his first chapters, what is due from the Creator to *newly created* intelligent beings,—what "the laws of honour and right" demand of him, on their behalf; and he is entirely confident that these laws have not been regarded. The conclusion therefore is, that *they were not then newly created*; that they must have existed and sinned in a former state of being; and that they have been sent into this world, with all their sinful habits and propensities about them, with a view to their possible reformation and salvation.

Such is the theory of Dr B., on which he accounts for the natural and entire sinfulness of mankind; and such the argument, and almost the only argument, by which he attempts to establish the fact of our pre-existence. He admits that there is no proof of it in the direct language of Scripture; though he insists (falsely, as we shall shew), that there is no proof to the contrary. But such a supposition is absolutely necessary, in order to reconcile the fact of our natural and total sinfulness with the acknowledged perfections of God, and with what he owes to newly created beings. His argument is revolved, and re-revolved, and viewed in all possible aspects and lights, through the five hundred and fifty pages of this thoroughly elaborated volume. The history of the conflict from age to age is unfolded, objections are weighed, and an earnest effort is made to commend the theory to the consideration and acceptance of all classes of professing Christians. The spirit of the work is kind and charitable, and the author seems to have indulged the hope,—a vain one, as the event has shewed,—of bringing not only Evangelical Christians, but Pelagians and Unitarians, to unite with him in his peculiar views.

With this brief statement of the general theory and plan of the author, we proceed to offer such remarks as have occurred to us, in the reading of this remarkable volume.

And, first, the very title of the book seems to us exceptionable. "*The Conflict of Ages*;" implying that the conflict here treated of—the controversy respecting human depravity

—has been the chief, if not the only, controversy of the religious world, in all past time. And yet Dr B. knows full well that this is not the case. Other questions were mooted, and other controversies agitated, long before the days of Augustine and Pelagius, when the subject of depravity began to be discussed. Such were the controversies of the ancient philosophers respecting the existence, the nature, and perfections of God; and the controversies with the Gnostics respecting the origin of evil. The controversy concerning the Trinity and the person of Christ preceded that concerning depravity, in the Christian Church, by several generations, and has continued, with little abatement, to the present time. This controversy, certainly, is as well entitled as that concerning depravity to be denominated "*the Conflict of Ages.*" Each has been a conflict of ages,—*one*, in the midst of many others,—but neither can with propriety be termed "*the Conflict of Ages.*"

Our second remark relates to what Dr B. calls "*the moving powers of Christianity.*" These he holds to be the fallen and ruined condition of man on the one hand, and the perfection of the Divine character on the other; or, as he expresses it, "*the principles of honour and right*" which God must have observed, in his treatment of new created beings. Now, we admit that these are principles of great importance and influence; but that they are entitled to be called "*the moving powers of Christianity,*" as though they were its only, or its principal moving powers, may well be doubted. The Apostle Paul seems to regard *the love of Christ* as the great moving power of the gospel. "*The love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead; and that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him who died for them, and rose again.*" Other mighty moving forces, according to the same Apostle, are "*the powers of the world to come.*" Considerations drawn from the future world,—the resurrection, the final judgment, the glories of heaven, and the pains of hell,—these, probably have more power to stir and influence the human mind, than almost any other. It is under the influence of these truths, that men are generally awakened. It is under the influence of the love of Christ, that they are melted and subdued. Certainly, the principles referred to by Dr B., though acknowledged to be of much importance and influence, are not entitled to be regarded as exclusively, or chiefly, "*the moving powers of Christianity.*"

We come next to a consideration of what our author calls "*the laws of honour and right,*"—those which are binding upon the Supreme Being in his treatment of new created

minds. They are, says our author, such as the following: 1. That he shall not "hold his creatures responsible or punishable for anything in them of which they are not the authors, but of which he is, either directly or indirectly, the creator, and which exists in them anterior to, and independent of any knowledge, desire, or choice of their own." 2. "That he shall not himself confound the distinction between right and wrong, by dealing with the righteous as with the wicked." 3. That he shall "not so charge the wrong conduct of one being to others, as to punish one person for the conduct of another, to which he did not consent, and in which he had no part." 4. "That he shall confer on new created beings such original constitutions as shall, in their natural and proper tendencies, favourably affect their prospects for eternity, and place a reasonable power of right conduct, and of securing eternal life, in the possession of all." 5. "Not only do the demands of honour and right forbid the Creator to injure his creature in his original constitution, but they equally forbid him to place him in circumstances needlessly unfavourable to right conduct, and a proper development of his powers."

Such are "the principles of honour and right," as laid down by Dr B., and of which he has much to say, in the course of his reasonings. He regards them as imperatively *binding* upon God, in his treatment of new made intelligent creatures. In some instances, they are stated more fully and strongly than in the above quotations. For example, he says, p. 481, "In order to justify God, and to condemn his sinful creatures, all the sentiments of an honourable mind demand that it be made to appear, that he did all for his creatures that our highest conceptions of justice, honour, magnanimity, and generosity require; all that was needed to place them in the most favourable position possible, all things considered, for good conduct."

Our first remark in regard to these alleged principles of honour and right is, that we are but poorly qualified to judge respecting them. They are above our reach. We are indeed made capable of moral perception,—of distinguishing, within certain limits, the right from the wrong; so that, on a variety of questions, the appeal is pertinent, "Why, even of our own selves, judge ye not what is right?" But since the distinction between right and wrong grows out of the nature and relations of things, and since, beyond a very little distance, this nature and these relations are entirely unknown to us, we are but poorly qualified, except so far as we have the Divine word for our guide, to pass upon intricate moral questions. How much do we know respecting the nature of the Supreme Being, and the relations which he sustains to all possible and actual

existences; and how little it becomes us to decide as to the principles of honour and right which, under all circumstances, are binding upon him? *He* knows perfectly what they are, and he can, if he pleases, reveal them to us; but beyond what he has revealed, it becomes us to decide with the extremest caution.

To some of the principles which Dr B. has laid down, we could ourselves subscribe. They are so obvious as to preclude all hesitation. To others, we could subscribe with some modification. To others still, and those which are most essential to his argument, it is doubtful whether we could subscribe at all. For example, we know not that God is bound, in honour and right, to place every new created being "in the most favourable position *possible*, all things considered, for his good conduct." We are not sure that he has done as much as this for any new created being whatever. It is certain that he did not do it for our first parents; nor is it likely that he did it, at their first creation, for the angels. The angels, like our first parents, were once on trial; and trial implies something more than the possibility or the liability, to sin. It implies the existence of something to *try* the subjects of it. In other words, it implies *temptation*; and to expose a new made creature to temptation is not to place him "in the most favourable position *possible* for his good conduct." In that previous state, of which Dr B. speaks, we were not ourselves placed, according to his theory, in the most favourable position possible. We were exposed to the seductions of the great leaders in rebellion, who fell before we did, and by their "wiles and temptations" we were drawn into sin. See pp. 239, 243.

Besides, there are other principles of honour and right, which we think quite as obvious as some which Dr B. has cited, the admission of which would be fatal to his argument. For example, is it right for God to take a fallen spirit of his own creation, strip him of all consciousness of the past, reduce him to a state of infantile ignorance and weakness, send him into this world, and here subject him to all sorts of perils, and hold him liable to eternal punishment, for sins of which he has not, and cannot have, the slightest knowledge? Is it right for God to subject such an one, from the first, to the influence of corrupting moral associations, and of infernal spirits, and all this in the endeavour to convert and save him? We suggest these queries, to which others might be added, for the consideration of Dr B. In view of them, let him decide whether there are not other principles of honour and right, which are quite as obvious, and of as binding a character, as some of those which he has proposed.

It seems to us, that the manner in which God should treat

his new made creatures in this world, or in any other, will depend very much upon the kind of probation on which they are to be placed. If they are to enter upon a probation of law, of works, as the angels did, and as our first parents did, to see whether they will continue obedient and live for ever; then, obviously, their moral existence should commence without any native corruption, or inbred propensities to evil. And this is just what so many of our old standard writers, whom Dr B. quotes, have said, and truly said, respecting the state of man before the fall. But suppose a race of intelligent creatures is to enter upon a very different probation,—to see, not whether they will persevere in holiness, but whether they will turn from their sins,—not whether they will obey and be happy, but whether they will repent and be forgiven. The conditions of their existence are now mightily changed, and the obligations of their Creator towards them are changed also. If, through the operation of some wise natural law—a law which could be interrupted only by a miracle,—such persons should be left to commence their moral existence under the influence of native corruptions which were sure to shew themselves in evil, no reproach or dishonour could, on that account, be cast upon their Maker.

One of the most objectionable parts of the work before us, the one which we deem of the most hurtful tendency, is that in which the author sets forth the difficulties and alleged absurdities of attempting to connect our sins with that of Adam. These difficulties he turns over and over, looks at them in various aspects and lights, magnifies them to the utmost, arrays one class of theologians against another, and thus provokes the enemies of evangelical religion to say: "This is what we have always told you. This doctrine of depravity, as derived from Adam, is a monstrous absurdity. It shocks all our sentiments of honour and right. And now you hear as much from one of your own number. You have it on the authority of Dr Edward Beecher, that such a doctrine can never be received as true."

So great was the exultation among Unitarians and Universalists, when "The Conflict of Ages" was first published, that one of their leaders said, "This book gives to orthodoxy the severest blow that it has ever had. We rejoice to see Dr Beecher pulling away the foundation from the edifice of spiritual Babylon."* Another declared his "readiness to expend a large portion of the funds of the American Unitarian Association, in circulating the work."† And yet none of these men have any more confidence in Dr Beecher's mode of introducing sin into the world, than they have in the commonly

* Thomas Whitmore.

† Dr Ellis, of Charlestown, Mass.

received theory; and they exult in what he has done, only as they think it will go to unsettle orthodoxy, and may have a tendency to draw unwary souls into the meshes of their own delusions.

It is no part of our plan to go into a prolonged discussion of human depravity, and of its connection with the first sin of Adam. This would require a volume. We will here only say that the connection of our sin with that of Adam rests, as we have before hinted, upon a *natural law—a wise and good law*—a law of wide extent, and of far-reaching influence—a law which could be counteracted only by a miracle, and that miracle God was under no obligations to perform. Every seed among vegetables produces its like. Every living creature, whether on the earth, or in the air, or in the water, brings forth others after its kind. And our first parents did the same. When Adam fell, he became at once a depraved, corrupted, ruined man. His very nature underwent a change. He begat children in his own likeness; and these children begat others in their likeness; and so the corruption has descended from father to child, through all succeeding generations.

Nor is this saying, with the Gnostics, that our inherited corruptions belong exclusively to the body. Nor is it saying that the soul is propagated like the body. Even supposing that God gives, by an act of creation, the soul at birth, it is altogether likely that he proceeds, in this important matter (as he does in everything else), according to some established law; and this is the great law of likeness above described.

We know not that this most important law has ever been interrupted, in a single instance. God has contravened other natural laws, by the performance of miracles; but never this. So great was his regard for this law of likeness, that when the man Christ Jesus was to be brought into the world without the taint of natural corruption, God chose to perform a miracle in another way. He chose to introduce his Son upon the earth, without the intervention of a human father.

If this law of likeness made us sinners, independent of our own activities, or subjected us to punishment for sins that were not our own, we could not undertake to vindicate it. But it does neither. The very nature which we inherit from Adam is an *active* nature, else it could not be a sinful one; and its acts from the first are spontaneously, freely, selfishly wrong. They are as really our own, and as really sinful (though not, of course, to the same degree), as any of our subsequent acts. Hence, we deserve a degree of punishment for them; and the provision which God has made for our deliverance and salvation is all of *grace*,—free, sovereign, glorious grace.

In describing the case of the infant, as being a sinner in consequence of his descent from Adam, Dr B., in some instances, misrepresents it, and aggravates it, making it much harder than it is. Thus he tells us that man is "wronged at the outset;" that "from the very first, he is abandoned of God;" that his "constitution is so deranged and corrupt, as to tend to sin with a power which no man *can* overcome." Pp. 158, 458, 473. But nothing of this, as it seems to us, is true. No sins are charged upon the individual which he does not freely and actively commit, and he is punished for no one's sins but his own. Nor is he punished for these any more than they deserve; nor, in the present life, in any measure so much as they deserve. How, then, is he "wronged at the outset?"

And as to his inheriting a tendency to sin which he *cannot* overcome; this is true only in the *moral sense*. His inability is no other than a want of inclination, which furnishes no excuse for sin.

And the infant child, so far from being "abandoned of God," is taken up, from the first, by the *grace of God*, and ample provision is made for its salvation. If removed out of the world in mere infancy, it is first, as we believe, renewed and pardoned, and then taken directly to heaven. Or if its life is continued, it enters on a probation of grace, the means and provisions of which are so abundant, that salvation cannot be forfeited, but by its own fault.

Speaking of the advantages of his theory of pre-existence, Dr B. says, "Man," on this supposition, "is the author of his original depravity, and not God. What men enjoy, in this world, is a gracious gift of God to them, beyond their deserts. What they suffer is less than they deserve; for it is of the Lord's mercies that they are not consumed. The multitudes that are saved, owe eternal life to the free grace of God. All who are lost, perish entirely by their own original revolt from God, persisted in during this life. But on the other supposition,"—that man commences his existence here, and becomes a sinner through the sin of Adam,—"*none of these things is true.*" P. 244.

Now, so far from assenting to this closing assertion, we hold that, on the latter supposition, *all* the things before said, are true. They are as true on the latter supposition as on the former. On the theory we advocate, "man, and not God, is the author of his original depravity," *i. e.*, if by depravity be meant sin. Man is as much the *actor*, the *responsible author*, of his first sin, as of his last. On the theory we advocate, "what men enjoy in this world is a gracious gift of God to them, beyond their deserts. And what they suffer is less than

they deserve ; for it is of the Lord's mercies that they are not consumed." And so of the remaining statements in the above quotation. All these things are as true on the common evangelical theory, as they are on that presented by Dr B. ; and it is unaccountable that he should not have known it, and acknowledged it.

But to come more directly to the new theory of accounting for human sinfulness, we mean that of pre-existence. The doctrine is, in brief, this : That at some remote period, long anterior to the creation of this world, we were all created, pure, holy, happy spirits ;—that we persisted in holiness for a time, but at length, through the power of temptation, and the seductions of those who had lived and sinned before us, we were drawn into sin ;—that we lived in sin, no one knows how long, until evil habits and propensities had accumulated upon us ;—that, with a view to our possible recovery from sin, God determined to create a material world, and send us into it, on a probation of grace ;—that to prepare us for this new probation, he found it necessary to obliterate from our minds all knowledge and remembrance of our former state, reducing us to infantile weakness and ignorance, and allowing us to bring nothing with us from the previous world but the bare substance and faculties of our souls, together with the evil habits and propensities which had grown upon them and corrupted them. Pp. 235, 239, 243, 462, 466, 530, 535. The child thus introduced into this mortal life begins, of course, to sin from the first, and continues to sin until, peradventure, the grace of God arrests him, and he is recovered and saved.

Such is the theory of Dr B. ; by the help of which he thinks to remove all difficulties, and unite all sects and parties on the subject of human depravity and guilt ;—by the help of which he hopes so to adjust the great moving powers of Christianity, that the system shall no longer falter and flounder, but shall advance with a vastly accelerated speed, and soon fill the earth.

To the theory in question we have several objections, some of which will now be presented.

1. If this doctrine of pre-existence be true, and of so much importance as Dr B. represents, it is unaccountable that it should not have been revealed to us in the Scriptures. If it is indeed the only key which unlocks to us the mysteries of our present condition, and unfolds to us the true system of the universe ; if it presents the only method in which the facts of our existence can be reconciled with the divine perfections, and in which the vital powers of Christianity may be so adjusted that the system can advance without obstruction ; then why, we ask again, has it not been revealed ? Dr B. admits that it is not directly revealed. If learned at all, it must be

learned by implication and inference ; and by inference so obscure, that the church, in all ages, with possibly here and there an exception, has been ignorant of it.

Dr B. insists, indeed, that this doctrine does not stand alone in lacking direct support from the Bible, but that the same is true of several other great doctrines, such as the Divine existence, and the inspiration of the Scriptures. But these assertions are made, certainly, without due consideration, and cannot be sustained.

The more stress Dr B. lays upon his favourite doctrine of pre-existence, and the greater the importance which he attaches to it, the greater the marvel that it should not have been expressly revealed, and the stronger the objection which the lack of such a revelation presents.

2. The Scriptures teach, not that Adam had long existed in a former life, but that he was *created*, when he began to exist in this world. God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he *became* a living soul ;"—clearly implying that he was not a living soul before. And by one of the prophets, God is said, not only to "stretch forth the heavens, and lay the foundations of the earth," but to "*form the spirit of man within him*," (Zech. xii. 1).

3. The Scriptures also teach, in direct opposition to Dr B.'s theory, that our first parents, when first created, were holy. They are said to have been created "in the image of God," and to have been "made upright." Until they had eaten the forbidden fruit, not a word was said to them by their Creator, which indicated that they were, or ever had been, the objects of his displeasure.* So far from this, God communed with them, and blessed them, and pronounced them, and the whole creation, of which they were the constituted sovereign and head, *good—very good*.

4. The Scriptures further teach, in opposition to the same theory, that mankind have not sinned in a previous life. From their intercourse with the heathen, or from some other cause, a portion of the Jews, in Christ's time, entertained the idea, that men were often punished, in this life, for sins committed in a former state. Accordingly, they asked our Saviour, respecting the man who had been blind from his birth : "Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind ? Jesus answered, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents, but that the works of God should be made manifest in him," (John ix. 2, 3). Our Saviour here expressly

* Dr B. infers that our first parents were not holy, at their creation, from the fact that "they were naked, and were not ashamed ;—as though *they were lost to all shame !*" But on this ground, what is commonly called their fall was a benefit to them, as it gave them some sense of decency, if nothing more.

contradicts the doctrine of a pre-existent state of sin. The Apostle Paul does the same ; for he affirms, that before Jacob and Esau had been born upon earth, they had "done neither good nor evil," (Rom. ix. 11). How could this be said of them, in case they were transgressors from another world ?

5. The Scriptures expressly connect our own state of sin and death with *the fall of Adam*, and not with a pre-existent state of transgression. "In Adam, all die." "By one man (Adam) sin entered into the world, and death by sin." "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." "By one man's disobedience, many were made sinners." (1 Cor. xv. 22 ; Rom. v. 12-19.) If these passages do not connect the sinfulness of men with the fall of Adam, operating in some way as a cause, then it is impossible for language to do it ; and so the words have been understood by Christians, ever since they were written ; and for Dr B., or any one else, to say that the connection here indicated is merely *typical, analogical*, or more properly *allegorical*,—a *seeming* connection, introduced by the Apostle, to aid him in setting forth more strongly the great doctrine of salvation by Christ,—is a most unwarrantable tampering with the sacred word. We have not time nor patience to go into a critical examination of our author's interpretation of the passages above quoted,—extending, as it does, through some twelve chapters of his book. He may have satisfied himself on the subject. We presume he has. But sure we are that he has satisfied almost nobody else. The language of the Apostle is unequivocal. It as plainly sets forth our connection with the first Adam, as with the second,—our fall and ruin through the one, as our redemption by the other ; and that kind of exegesis, which would explain away its obvious sense, is very like those glosses and interpretations which would extract Unitarianism or Universalism out of the plain teachings of our Lord and his Apostles.

6. The doctrine of pre-existence is refuted by yet another representation of Scripture. If we existed and sinned in a previous life, then we must be called to an account for those sins. If we are saved, not only must they be repented of and forgiven, but an account must be taken of them, that the universe may see the amount of our indebtedness to sovereign grace. Or if we are found at last among the lost, an account of them must be taken, else the full demands of justice against us cannot be ascertained. In either case, therefore, whether we are saved or lost, the sins of that previous life (if there be any such) must be accounted for in the final day. And yet no mention is made in the Scriptures of our liability to any such reckoning. So far from this, the very supposition of it is precluded. "We must all appear before the judgment-seat of

Christ, that every one may receive the things *done in his body*"—in *the present world*—"according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad," (2 Cor. v. 10).

7. We add, finally, as an argument against the doctrine of pre-existence, that it removes no difficulties. It embarrasses the subject of human depravity with many new difficulties, but we see not that it removes any of the old ones. On this theory, as on that commonly received, the infant comes into the world imbecile, ignorant, and utterly unconscious of any former life. On both theories, he commences his existence here with a depraved, corrupted nature, with deranged sensibilities, with propensities and tendencies to evil which lead him directly into sin. On both theories, this natural corruption is the result of natural laws,—laws wisely established and sustained; in the one case, the law of habit; in the other, the law of natural descent. On both theories, the sins of the individual are all of them his own, freely, actively committed, conferring personal guilt, and deserving of punishment; so that salvation, in both cases, is entirely of grace. And now what mighty difference is there, so far as the removing of difficulties is concerned, between the two? We cannot see that the new theory removes any difficulty which has been thought to lie against a fair and reasonable interpretation of the old; while certainly it embarrasses the subject with many difficulties peculiar to itself, such as that it contradicts the Bible in a variety of particulars as we have seen, and is itself a mere assumption, without any proof from consciousness, memory, philosophy, history, or from any other source.

Dr Beecher's second volume, "*The Concord of Ages*," is, as we said, but a complement of the first; advocating the same views, as to the pre-existence of the human race, their sin and fall in a former life, and their being sent into this world, and here placed under redemptive influences, with a view to their possible recovery and salvation. And yet some of the connected points are more fully developed in the second volume, and carried out to ulterior results. He tells us that the angels were not all of them created at once; that the oldest and greatest of them date back their origin to a vastly remote period,—long anterior, not only to the placing of man upon the earth, but to the inception of a material universe. He tells of the trial on which they were placed, and of the particular temptation before which they fell. "We know what it was from which the first generation [of angels] revolted. From pleasure, of course, there was no temptation to revolt. But from a *discipline of suffering*, such as they needed to fit them to be founders of the universe with God, they could be tempted to revolt." P. 98. "That Satan and his follow-

ers needed, in some way, a *discipline of suffering*, and were called to it, and also that they revolted from it, renouncing faith, obedience, and patience, and enthroning self-will and self-indulgence, the very nature of the case, and their spirit and policy in all ages since, most clearly evince," p. 254.

The great Jehovah was, of course, grieved and distressed at the fall and ruin of so many of his creatures; but he could not prevent it. He did what he could, but "in the earlier periods of creation there was a necessary limitation of his power."* The revolt came in spite of him; his grand system was disorganized; and it only remained that he must restore it in the best possible way.

With this object in view,—having abandoned Satan and the other great leaders in revolt to the ruin they had incurred, and having reserved in safe keeping, somewhere, the less guilty rebels, who had been more recently created, and had been seduced by their wiles,—he resolved to create, for this latter class, a material world, and to send one after another, in a way of ordinary generation, into bodies here. For them he would provide a Saviour; he would furnish them with new spiritual influences and means of grace; he would make even their material organizations (which are so often represented as a temptation and a snare) a means of instruction and profit to them; and by these methods he would recover great numbers to himself. Those who cannot be in this way restored, must be left under the power of their great leader and destroyer, and go to their own place.

The course of things here indicated has been in progress now for a long period,—ever since the placing of man upon the earth; in all which time, God has been "gathering in his own elect," and "enduring, with much longsuffering, the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction." But the period of suspended light and full moral impression is now well nigh over. The repressed emotions of the Almighty will soon burst forth; his anger will burn like fire; Satan and his hosts will be confounded and confined; the glory of the Lord will suddenly be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together. Christ will soon be married to his redeemed church, and "the Concord of Ages" will be, temporarily, consummated.†

* "Either the limitation of divine power in the earlier stages of creation which I advocate, exists, or it does not. If it does not exist, then no man can defend God against the charge of malevolence. If it does exist, then there is, as I have shewn, a simple and natural solution of the origin of evil." (Conflict, &c., p. 486.)

"So long as infinite and unconditioned power at all times to exclude all sin is ascribed to God, and his suffering is denied, the malignant spirit of the system of evil cannot be exposed." (Concord, &c., p. 176.)

† All this is to be done at the pouring out of the seventh vial, spoken of in Rev. xvi. 17.

After a long period of rest and peace to the church, during which the company of redeemed ones will be vastly augmented, and by means of them Christ will be carrying on his work of re-organization throughout the universe, Satan will be loosed for a little season. But he will speedily be smitten down again, and involved in a more hopeless condition than before; and from that time onward, "the Concord of Ages" will be perpetual and eternal. It will be disturbed no more for ever.

The final victory over Satan and his rebel host will not be, however, one of force, but rather of light, of conviction, and of moral impression. "The power which prevails is not almighty force; but it is the power of longsuffering goodness and truth, in their highest forms, triumphing over its opposite spirit, so fully developed by its evil and malignant influences." "The whole is, on the part of God, a victory, not of force, but of logic, of truth, and of holy emotion, purifying and uniting the universe for ever." Pp. 555, 523.

On this condensed statement of the views of Dr B., as exhibited in his second volume, it would be easy to multiply remarks; but we must confine ourselves to a very few.

One of the first inquiries which suggests itself is this: How does Dr B. *know* all that is involved in this far-reaching hypothesis? The Bible discloses some things; but above and beyond what it reveals, *how does Dr B. know?* The Bible informs us that at some time, previous to the creation of man, God brought into being a multitude of angels; that a portion of them fell into sin; and that the great leader of the rebel host, under the guise of a serpent, became the seducer of our first parents. But how does Dr B. know that the creation and revolt of the angels took place at such a vastly remote period; that they took place, not together, but at different times; and all anterior to the material universe? How does he know as to the nature of that probation on which the angels were originally placed, the injunctions laid upon them, and the precise form of the temptation before which they fell? The Bible asserts God's unlimited power over the hearts and actions of creatures; how does Dr B. know that, in the early periods of creation, his power was so limited that he could in no way prevent the fall of the angels? How does he know so much of God's vast system of the universe, which was broken in upon by this revolt of angels, and which, through the instrumentality of his redeemed church, he has undertaken, to restore? The Bible intimates, if it does not directly assert, that *all* "the angels, who kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, are reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." How does

Dr B. know that only a *part* of them are in this hopeless condition, and that the other part are reserved for a probation on the earth? How does he know that we ourselves belong to this fallen company, and that our present depravity, though we are not at all conscious of it, is the result of sin in a former life? How does he know as to the blessed results of our present probation, and that they are to be brought about, in great measure, through the influence of material organizations? How does he know when Christ's victory over Satan is to be accomplished, and "the Concord of Ages" is to be ushered in, and that this grand consummation is to be effected, not at all by physical force, but only by the force "of logic, of truth, and of holy emotion, purifying and uniting the universe for ever?"

We might multiply questions of this sort, and wait long for an answer, were it not that Dr B. has told us, in part, how he came by his knowledge. It is not all the fruit of his logic, though on this he lays a mighty stress. Christ, he tells us, "is the great leader of his church in philosophy and logic," and Satan's beasts "are as sensitive to it as they are to fire," pp. 459, 542. But his superior knowledge, on the high topics above referred to, is chiefly the result of *revelation*. "The true and highest ground of certainty lies in the fact, that God is a real Being, and that he has a *self-revealing power*, such that he can make his presence, thoughts, emotions, and character a vivid reality to the mind. To receive and be affected by such a self-revelation of God, the mind is by its nature adapted. It was designedly so made by God, just as the eye was made to see the sun," p. 41. "There may be a thousand mysteries in the nature of God, . . . and yet we may have a true and reliable knowledge of him, as an intelligent, moral, and affectionate person; and we may so truly understand his ends, plans, and emotions, that we may be in full and perfect sympathy with him, especially *if he discloses these things to us, as he has promised, in the way of self-revelation*," p. 115.

With this revelation of God to his own soul, Dr B. is quite confident that he has been favoured; and this is his chief reliance in engaging, as he has done, in "the Conflict of Ages." "It has been feared that I should unsettle man, by assailing certain views of God which I deemed false; because, in so doing, I shake the old foundations, and men, it is said, cannot or will not reconstruct the system on the better basis proposed by me. This will be as it pleases God. He exists as a real God, in a definite character, and with a *self-manifesting power*. This is my reliance. This is a defence of the truth, that can never fail." "The mind has *divinely inspired intuitions* of intellectual and moral truth." Pp. 43, 314.

Dr B. doubtless remembers that others, besides himself, have had supposed revelations, and have relied upon them to their hurt. There is scarcely any extravagance, whether of doctrine or practice, which has not been justified in this way. The monks and mystics had revelations in abundance, received, in most instances, very much as Dr B. describes. To trust to revelations or impressions, beyond what the Bible reveals, is in the highest degree delusive and dangerous. This is the nit and root of all fanaticism.

Dr B. has much to say of "a suffering God," and thinks himself far in advance of ordinary Christians in regard to this point. Indeed, it is this feature of the Divine character,—long, patient, benevolent suffering in the behalf of his enemies,—which is to be disclosed at the termination of the existing conflict, to the utter discomfiture of Satan and his rebel hosts.

That God is a personal, spiritual Being, possessing not only intellect and will, but a most perfectly constituted emotional nature, the Bible abundantly teaches, and most Christians believe. He not only *sees* what is doing in the universe, but he *feels* in view of it; and feels just as a being of infinite wisdom and goodness ought to feel. He feels delight in view of holiness, and displeasure in view of sin. He is happy in the love of his loyal and devoted subjects; while he "is angry with the wicked every day." God sympathizes with his people, in their trials and sorrows. This is no new doctrine in the church. It has been held and taught by the ablest divines, in all periods of the church's history. They have not held, indeed, as Dr B. does, that God is pained in view of evils which he has no power to prevent; for this would be inconsistent with his immediate and perfect blessedness. But that God sees thousands of things taking place in the universe which, in themselves, are disagreeable to him, and that he feels a degree of suffering in view of them, and just that kind and degree of suffering which is most suitable to him as a benevolent being, there can be no doubt. Nor is this the kind and degree of suffering at all inconsistent with his perfect happiness. So far from this, his happiness is involved in it. He could not be holy or happy, on any other supposition. How could He be holy or happy, if He had no sympathy in suffering, and could not be displeased in view of sin?

But there is another form of suffering which Dr B. ascribes to God, respecting which there is more room for doubt. He supposes the divine nature of Christ to have participated in all the suffering of his physical nature, and more especially in the inflictions and agonies of the cross.

In view of the representations of the Scriptures, and of what we know respecting the attributes of God, we must believe

that Christ suffered in his human nature only. Still, He did not suffer as a *mere* man; for He was not a mere man. We believe Him to have suffered more, inconceivably more, than any mere man could have suffered in the same time. He suffered enough, considering the infinite dignity and glory of his person, and his ineffable nearness to the Father, to make as bright a display of the justice of God, of his regard for his law, of his holy hatred of sin, and his determination to punish it, as could have been made in the eternal destruction of our guilty race. His sufferings thus became a *full equivalent*, a *substitute*, for the penalty of the law, and laid a firm foundation of hope and salvation to all those who flee to him and put their trust in him.

Dr B. has some peculiar notions as to the reach and the efficacy of Christ's sufferings and death. They not only availed to make an atonement, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, but there was in them the power of *an example*,—the example of a *suffering God*,—which was felt, and will be felt in the world, for ever. "The essential element in the power of the cross is the power of *God's example*. Christ vindicates and establishes the law, and atones for sin, not merely by the transient infliction of a penalty upon Him, but by *the moral force of the whole act*, in all its relations, in all worlds, and for ever. No penalty inflicted on the lost world so reveals God's convictions as to holiness and sin, and so confirms the universe, as did this example." P. 190.

Throughout "*The Concord of Ages*," Dr B. reiterates his objections to the fall of Adam, and the introduction of sin, through his instrumentality. This doctrine he *certainly knows* cannot be true. "We can *know*, and that infallibly, that it is at war with the very nature of God; that he could not do what is ascribed to him, without denying himself,—without violating every sensibility of his nature," p. 177. We have heard men speak as confidently before, in opposition to God's plainly revealed truth. The Unitarian tells us that, whatever else may be true, the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be; that whatever else the Scriptures quoted in proof of it may be supposed to mean, they cannot teach or mean the Trinity. The Universalist tells us the same, in regard to the doctrine of eternal punishment. And yet the faith of the Christian world is not shaken by such confident assertions. "The foundation of God standeth sure."

Having rejected what we conceive to be the doctrine of Scripture as to the origin of human depravity, Dr B. falls back, with the utmost assurance, on his favourite theory of pre-existence. But we have no occasion to follow him here, or to discuss this branch of the subject further. It is mournful to

see so much talent, and learning, and piety, and capacity for usefulness, as are concentrated in Dr B., all devoted,—we had almost said prostituted,—to the inculcation of a dogma, which very few Christians on the face of the earth ever have believed, or can believe. He acknowledges to some disappointment as to the result of his first publication. He is conscious, perhaps painfully, that he stands almost alone. Still he has faith in God, and has no doubt that the truth and the wisdom of his speculations will ere long be vindicated. To all this we unite with him in saying, “This will be as it pleases God.”

Dr B. has several chapters on what he calls “pious ignorance.” This, he says, is the refuge under which the believers in Adam’s fall and its consequences have long sheltered themselves. They cannot explain the connection between Adam’s sin and that of his posterity; and when an attempt is made at explanation, scarcely any two agree. And yet they all cling to the doctrine, under the impression that it is revealed and must be true, whether they can understand it or not.

Now were we to admit the truth and the fairness of the above representation—which we do not admit—it would be pertinent to inquire, Is not Dr B. chargeable with the same kind of pious ignorance which he attributes to others, and in the same degree? Does he not believe a thousand things as *facts*, the *quo modo* of which he cannot understand or explain? Let him tell us, if he can, *how* the three and the one are united in the Godhead; or *how* the divine and the human are united in the person of Christ; or *how* body and soul are united in his own person? Or, to come nearer to the subject in hand, if we all existed and sinned in a previous life, can Dr B. tell us why our Heavenly Father has taken from us all knowledge and remembrance of such a state, and why he has given us no intimation of it in his word? There are a great many things respecting which we all are, and must be ignorant in the present life; and this certainly should be a “pious ignorance,” if it exists at all.

It is due to Dr B. to say, before we close, that the view which he takes as to the introduction of evil into this world is not inconsistent, necessarily, nor do we understand it to be so in his own mind, with substantial orthodoxy, on most of the great points of the evangelical faith. If we came into this world as fallen spirits from a previous state of existence; if we live here as incarnate demons, until by the grace of God we are renewed; then, certainly, we are *depraved creatures*—deeply, totally, naturally so. We need an almighty Saviour and Sanctifier; we need an atonement; we need to be regenerated by the Holy Spirit; we need to be justified, sanctified,

and finally glorified; and all this through the abounding grace of God and the merciful provisions of the gospel. And to those who despise and reject these provisions, "there remaineth nought but a fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries." All that is here stated stands connected with Dr B.'s theory of depravity as naturally, perhaps, as with our own; and on all these great points of Christian doctrine he is regarded as holding substantially the orthodox faith.

And yet we are far from thinking that the speculations in which he has indulged are altogether harmless. In fact, no considerable error, in point of doctrine, should be regarded as harmless. "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump."

The freedom which Dr B. has allowed himself, in interpreting certain portions of the Bible, we fear may encourage others in the like or worse practices. And then this doctrine of a pre-existent, sinful state, may lead to inquiries and theories of which our author, perhaps, little thinks. The following may be taken as specimens possible:—

"If we all lived and sinned in a previous state, what followed there, in consequence of our sin? Were we sent down to hell? If so, it seems we have been raised out of it; and may not others, who are now there, be raised also?"

"We were on probation in the other world, before we sinned; we may have been on probation afterwards; and now we are on probation again. How many probations is the sinner to expect? If he has already had two or three, may he not hope for another beyond the grave?"

"Have the sins which we committed in that previous state been repented of and forgiven? And if so, on what grounds? If through the atonement, then Christ must have died for fallen spirits in other worlds, as well as for men in this. May he not have died even for the devils? But if our sins were forgiven without an atonement, then an atonement is not necessary for lost spirits; and how can we know that it is necessary for lost men?"

"If our sins in that previous life have not been repented of and forgiven, then they all stand against us, and *must be repented of*, if we are ever saved. But we have lost all knowledge of them. They are gone from our sight beyond recall; and how can we repent of sins of which we have not the slightest consciousness?"

"The devils are to be vanquished, it seems, not by might, nor by power, but by the force 'of logic, of truth, of holy emotion,' of resistless moral influences. But such a conquest very much resembles a subduing of the heart. Are we to

understand, then, that the devils are to be subdued in this way—or, in other words, to be converted?”

We suggest these queries, not as those which have ever occurred to Dr B., or perhaps ever will, but as a few among the thousand which will be likely to come up, should his theory of pre-existence be extensively embraced, and by means of which erratic minds will be sure to be led astray. Certain it is, that no error, in which persons feel interested, will be likely to lie long in the mind alone. Unless renounced, it will lead on to others, and these again to others, until the whole soul is darkened, corrupted, and ruined.

But we have better hopes of the author of these volumes, though we thus speak. We trust that he has a “heart established with grace,” which will effectually prevent his being “carried about with every wind of doctrine.” Instead of wandering far from the truth, we hope to see him returning to it, to rejoice with us in the triumphs of the second Adam over all the mischiefs entailed by the first.

ART. III.—*Sir W. Hamilton's Theory of Perception.*

Reid's Collected Writings. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations, by Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, &c., &c. Third Edition. Edinburgh: 1852. (Referred to in the following article by *R.* and the page.)

Discussions on Philosophy, &c. By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c., &c. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1853. (Referred to by *Dis.* and the page.)

Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c., &c. Vol. I., Metaphysics. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859. (Referred to by *Lect.* and the page.)

THERE are probably many grateful and reverent students of Sir William Hamilton who have yet found much difficulty in understanding him, and seen many objections to his views, and who have been anxiously waiting for light from his own promised development of his doctrines. With the publication of his lectures, which are understood to be the last help such will have from his own pen, the time seems to have come for them to state their thoughts, that his more favoured friends and expounders may explain misapprehensions and answer objections, and that the truth may the sooner prevail.

This Review has already spoken the praise of Hamilton so freely and warmly, that we shall not be suspected of indifference to his pre-eminent genius and accomplishments, if we begin at once, and state, as simply as we can, some critical views of his theory of Perception, and of his Philosophy of the Conditioned—the two subjects treated in the lectures on Metaphysics, on which he has expended most labour, and of which his views are most peculiar, and have attracted most attention. The present article will be devoted to Perception.

Hamilton came out on this subject first in the *Edinburgh Review*. He had a three-fold purpose—to vindicate Dr Reid; to annihilate Dr Brown; and to re-establish the philosophy of natural realism on a refutation of idealism, materialism, and scepticism.

A brief statement of the position of the Scottish philosophy on the subject at the time the review was written, seems to be a necessary introduction to a discussion of its value.

Bishop Berkeley was troubled by materialists, and so by matter. He could not see that the hard particles are of any use, except as a basis for infidel arguments. He says that all we know of the external world is the sensations, or ideas, which it excites in us. Now matter cannot be the cause of these ideas, for by supposition it is inert; it cannot be imaged or represented by them, for they are in the mind, and as mental, totally unlike anything material; it cannot be the substratum of extension, colour, &c., for these are ideas which exist as they are perceived, and cannot therefore be in any unperceiving substance. The external cause of our sensations, or ideas, must be, he says, a spirit; because that is the only cause which we know; because its ideas alone can be the objects imaged or represented by our ideas; and because in spirit alone can ideas of extension, colour, &c., reside as in a substratum. He concluded, therefore, that God is the external cause of our ideas of sense; that He needs no reminders, in the shape of hard particles, of the proper time to act on us; and that spirits are the sole substances—spirits and their ideas our sole knowledge.*

David Hume was troubled by theologians and metaphysicians. He thought scepticism useful to keep them within the proper bounds of inquiry, by shewing them the utter unfitness of their faculties to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation about which they are commonly employed, and to make them cautious and modest in all their thinking. Among other sceptical reasonings, he argues that our senses and reason contradict each other with regard to our perception of the external world. We see a

* Three Dialogues, Works, vol. i. p. 109, ed. of 1784.

white table. An instinct common to man and the lower animals compels us to believe that the object of sight is external to our minds, and independent of our perception—the table, namely, which remains unchanged in size and figure by our change of situation, and is white, whether we look at it or not. The slightest philosophy, however, teaches us that we are mistaken in these universal and primary opinions. When we change our place, the object of sight changes its size and figure. The object of sight cannot then be the table, for that remains unchanged. Philosophers, moreover, agree that colour is a mere sensation, and that the whiteness is not only no quality of the table, but does not even represent anything external. “No man who reflects,” says Hume, “ever doubted that the existences which we consider, when we say *this house* and *that tree*, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.” But reason cannot successfully defend itself in this opinion that these perceptions are copies or representations of anything external. It cannot plead instinct, for that has now proved false; nor experience, for that supposes a prior knowledge of the objects copied; nor understanding of the process by which body impresses an image of itself on mind, for it is incomprehensible; nor the veracity of the Supreme Being, for that would assure us of the truth of the primary instinct which has proved false. (*Phil. Es.* 2, 167.) By shewing in this manner that our primary beliefs and our reason contradict each other, and that neither gives us intelligible and consistent knowledge of the external world, a universal doubt was introduced into all subjects of human knowledge and inquiry. The knowledge of mind as distinct from ideas, that of cause and effect, of a future state of rewards and punishments, of a revealed religion, were special points to which Hume directed his sceptical inquiries.

Rev. Thomas Reid, minister of New Machar, afterwards Professor of Philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen, had embraced the whole of Berkeley's system; but the consequences of Hume's reasonings gave him more uneasiness than the want of a material world; and he thought that Hume's system was as coherent in all its parts and as justly deduced as Berkeley's. It at last occurred to him, that as these reasonings turn on the statement that all our knowledge of the external world is by ideas, they might be refuted by shewing that there are no such things as *ideas* in the sense which philosophers mean. In common language, *having an idea of a thing*, means *thinking of the thing*, and “implies a mind that thinks, an act of that mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But, besides these three, the philosopher conceives

that there is a fourth—to wit, the *idea*, which is the immediate object.” (R. 226.) Reid thought that if there were no *idea* imagined for an object, the object of knowledge in perception must be admitted to be the external world; and if no *idea* of a cause, a substance, or God, were used in thinking of a cause, a substance, or God, all sceptical deductions would be nought which had been drawn from the relations of causes and substances to our *ideas*. Reid himself laid great stress on this negative part of his writings. In a letter to Dr Gregory, he says that he thinks the merit of his Philosophy “lies chiefly in having called in question the common theory of *Ideas, or images of things in the mind* being the only objects of thought.” “I think there is hardly anything that can be called *mine* in the philosophy of mind, which does not follow with ease from the detection of this prejudice.” (R. 22.) Reid was perhaps right in this; for this rejection of the current language of philosophers obliged him to re-state the facts of psychology. The Baconian philosophy, concentrated very much in the cry of “No hypotheses—plain facts,” was now ruling vigorously, and Reid himself was fully imbued with its spirit. (R. 97.) The refutation of definite hypotheses would have been comparatively a small matter. The whole body of language as applied to mind is more or less figurative, and implies, if used as scientific, a perpetual succession of hypotheses of the analogy of mind and matter. Descartes had, to be sure, signalized the fundamental antithesis between them, and it was generally admitted and stated; but in reading Locke, Berkeley, Hume, or Descartes, Malebranche, or Arnauld, it is easy to see that language is continually twisting their reason; “*verba vim suam super intellectum retorqueant*.” (Bacon, *Nov. Organ.*, i., 59.) There was no labour so needed in psychology as to go through the masses of observation which lay involved in figurative and ambiguous diction, and distorted with every extravagance of hypothesis and polemic bitterness, and restate in simple language the exact facts of consciousness. This work Reid did—did it with clearness, candour, patience, modesty, and good sense, and with an unfeigned piety, which reminds one always of Sir Isaac Newton. His writings are perhaps the most important contribution to Psychology ever made by one man, and he will never suffer in the minds of those who love truth better than search for truth—better than intellectual gymnastics (*Dis.* 46, 47; *Lect.* 9); by comparison with his brilliant successors, Brown and Hamilton, or with the greatest names of France or Germany.

The positive side of Reid's system rests on the doctrine, that, in addition to what Locke and his followers mean by the know-

ledge of ideas and their relations, we have certain "original and natural judgments" or beliefs; "the inspiration of the Almighty;" "the common sense of mankind;" "on which all the discoveries of reason are grounded;" "anything manifestly contrary to which is absurd;" a disbelief in which is lunacy. (*R.* 209, 108, 425, 791.) Such a belief is involved in Perception. Reid's statement is as follows. When certain impressions are made upon our organs, nerves, and brain, certain corresponding sensations are felt, and we have certain perceptions. Perception has two ingredients,—first, the conception of the object perceived, (*e. g.* Hume's table); secondly, an irresistible belief in its present existence. (*R.* 325, 326, also, 327, 258, 123, and *passim.*) "In this train of operations nature works in the dark, we can neither discover the cause of any one of them, nor any necessary connection of one with another." (*R.* 327.) The sensations are "a sort of natural signs," which "do suggest," or "conjure up as it were by a kind of natural magic," "the conception of the object," and "create a belief of it." (*R.* 122, 450.) When these impressions are made, by whatever cause, the sensation follows; and if the sensation is produced, the corresponding perception follows, even when there is no object, and in that case is apt to deceive us. (*R.* 320.) He further held that "our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities of matter, and inform us what they are in themselves; but of the secondary qualities our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion." (*R.* 313.)

Dr Thomas Brown was the first person, so far as we know, to shake the ascendancy of Reid in the Scottish schools. He re-affirms the Baconian method, and attempts to carry it farther by classifying all the phenomena of mind according to their antecedents or causes. He also re-affirms the existence, and the necessity to science and life, of "first truths" or "principles of intuitive belief," and lays down their characteristics, viz., they are "immediate, universal, and irresistible." He thinks, however, 1st, That Reid is mistaken in supposing that modern philosophers in general believe that there are ideas distinct from the mind. 2d, That Reid was mistaken in supposing that the refutation of such a theory of ideas would be a refutation of the idealism of Berkeley or the scepticism of Hume. 3d, That the sceptical reasonings apply as forcibly to Reid's doctrine of perception by *conceptions*, as to the doctrine of perception by *ideas*. The conceptions of which alone we are conscious, are states of mind, and the relation between these states of mind and any states of matter, is just as uncertain and inexplicable, and is exposed to just the same sceptical reasonings as the relation between ideas and matter.

4th, Reid's distinction between our knowledge of the primary and of the second qualities of matter is null. Our states of mind embrace all our knowledge, and anything else than a state of mind can be known only relatively, as the external cause or correlative of a state of mind. Brown's discussion of these four points has been called by eminence his attack on Reid. But he combated many other opinions of Reid and Stewart. We mention only the following points of difference, regarded by Hamilton as fundamental to the doctrine of perception, and in which Hamilton agrees with Brown. (1.) He rejects consciousness as a distinct faculty. (*B. Lect. xi., Dis. 53, R. 297.*) (2.) He asserts the relativity of all knowledge. (*B. Lect. xxv., Dis. 60.*) (3.) He affirms the representative character of imagination, memory, &c. (*B. Lect. xxxiii. xxxiv. Dis. 58.*) (4.) He rejects the doctrine of perception by a medium—*e. g.* we see light, not Hume's table. (*B. Lect. xix., R. 814.*) (5.) He holds the whole nervous system as a unit to be the organ of sensation, not that impressions are transmitted to the brain. (*B. Lect. xix., R. 821, 861.*) (6.) He holds extra-organic matter to be known as a resisting object, not by a special instinct. (*B. Lect. xxii.*) Hamilton similar only, *R. 882.*) How Brown and Hamilton stand in regard to the four first points—"the attack on Reid"—will soon be carefully considered.

Brown had early fixed on the relation of cause and effect as the true constitutive idea of genuine philosophy; and he attempted to rear by it the fabric of a truly scientific psychology. It is a brilliant conception, and his analysis and shaping of the great facts of mind are a splendid display of metaphysical genius. A young physician, wasting with consumption, his erudition could not be like that of Hamilton; but he played the same part in regard to the modern French philosophers, and the literary philosophic Latin writers, which Hamilton has since played towards the Germans, Greeks, and schoolmen, and the forgotten authors of all centuries and countries. He decorated his temple of mental science profusely with splendid ornaments from these abundant mines. The reception his writings met with may be judged from the following criticisms:—

Brown on Darwin's *Zoonomia* is "the perhaps unmatched work of a boy in the eighteenth year of his age." (*Sir Jas. Mackintosh, Prog. Eth. Phil. ed. 1851, p. 108.*)

"His first tract on Causation appeared to me the finest model of discussion in mental philosophy since Berkeley and Hume; with this superiority over the latter, that its aim is that of a philosopher who seeks to enlarge knowledge," &c. (*Same, p. 109.*)

"He very justly considered the claim of Reid"—"as a proof of his having mistaken their (philosophers') illustrative language for a metaphysical opinion." (*Same*, p. 112.)

"An inestimable book." (*Dr Parr, in Lowndes' Bib. Man.*)

"Neither Bacon, nor Hobbes, nor Berkeley, nor Locke, possessed powers of mind so splendid and so various. Brown is, beyond comparison, the most eloquent of philosophic writers. So much power and delicacy of intellect were never before united in an individual." (*Tait's Magazine, in Allibone's Dict. of Authors.*)

"The style is so captivating, the views so comprehensive, the arguments so acute, the whole thing so complete, that I was almost insensibly borne along upon the stream of his reasoning and his eloquence." "In the power of analysis he greatly transcends all philosophers of the Scottish school who preceded him." (*Morell's Hist. Mod. Phil.*, p. iii. 376.)

"That philosopher having, in the author's judgment, taken a more correct view than any other English writer on the subject of the ultimate intellectual laws of scientific inquiry, while his unusual powers of popularly stating and felicitously illustrating whatever he understood, render his works the best preparation which can be suggested for speculations similar to those contained in this treatise." (*J. S. Mill, Logic*, p. v.)

We add, also, the following from Mackintosh. It will explain one motive of the next few pages—we love this man:—

"The character of Dr Brown is very attractive, as an example of one in whom the utmost tenderness of affection and the indulgence of a flowery fancy were not repressed by the highest cultivation, and by a perhaps excessive refinement of intellect. His mind soared and roamed through every region of philosophy and poetry; but his untravelled heart clung to the hearth of his father [a Scottish minister], to the children who shared it with him, and, after them, first to the other partners of his childish sports, and then almost solely to those companions of his youthful studies who continued to be the friends of his life." "He was one of those men of genius who repaid the tender care of a mother by rocking the cradle of her reposing age. He ended a life spent in searching for truth, and exercising love, by desiring that he should be buried in his native parish with his 'dear father and mother.'" (*Prog. Eth. Phil.* p. 110.)

For twenty years from Brown's first delivery of lectures in 1808-9, and ten years from their posthumous publication, he seems to have been generally regarded as triumphant in his "attack on Reid," and to have worn the honours of a victor. But the avenger came in Sir William Hamilton. The article, which Hamilton's admirers speak of as having "annihilated"

Brown, can hardly be matched in all polemic literature for its fierceness (*δεινότης*), its art, its diction, its "inexorable march of ratiocination,"* its substantive importance as a contribution to the mastery of the theory of its subject. We do not think so highly of its equal and exact justice. Hamilton begins with charging Brown's posthumous lectures with "radical inconsistencies in every branch of their subject," "unacknowledged appropriations," "endless mistakes," "frequent misrepresentations," an "ignorant attack on Reid." (*Dis.* 50.)

He does not undertake to prove the "unacknowledged appropriations ; to establish the other charges he makes four points, which we purpose to examine, in order, first, to compare his statements, while annihilating Brown, with those he afterwards made while commenting on Reid ; and secondly, to air the incunabla of his own theory of perception.

First, Brown "has completely misapprehended Reid's philosophy, even in its fundamental position" (*Dis.* 52), for, (a) Reid's position is Natural Realism—*i. e.*, the doctrine that our knowledge of mind and matter is equally immediate and intuitive, (*Dis.* 60, 61) ; while (b) Brown, by "a portentous error," "a transmutation without a parallel in the whole history of philosophy," thought it Cosmothetic Idealism, *i. e.* (so far as Brown is concerned), the doctrine that our immediate knowledge is all embraced in consciousness or states of mind, and that knowledge of the external world is by means of states of mind to which it sustains some perceived relation, or of states which necessitate a belief in its existence. (*Dis.* 62, 63.) As to (a) we remark, 1st, Hamilton admits that neither Reid nor Brown had ever distinguished Natural Realism from Cosmothetic Idealism. (*Dis.* 63.)

2d. He admits, also, that Reid's doctrine must be relieved of errors as to consciousness, memory, imagination, &c., to make it a consistent system of Natural Realism. (*Dis.* 52.)

3d. Reid's statements of his doctrine (see above, page 796) are inconsistent with what Hamilton calls Natural Realism, and do constitute what he calls Cosmothetic Idealism. Hamilton is explicit, and in many places unqualified in making this statement. "Reid (and herein he is followed by Mr Stewart), in the doctrine now maintained, asserts the very positions on which this scheme of Idealism establishes its conclusions." (*R.* 128.) "In all essential respects, this doctrine of Reid and Stewart is identical with Kant's." (*R.* 128.) "It is to be observed that Reid himself does not discriminate *perception* and *imagination* by any essential difference. According to him, perception is only the conception (imagination) of an object, accompanied with a belief of its present existence ;

* Jeffrey, quoted in this Review, 1859, p. 655.

and even this last distinction, a mere 'faith without knowledge,' is surrendered by Mr Stewart. Now, as conception (imagination) is only immediately cognisant of the *ego*, so must perception on this doctrine be a knowledge purely *subjective*," a system of idealism. (*R.* 183.) He again and again speaks of this idealism in the notes without qualification as his (Reid's) doctrine (*R.* 209, 289), repeating Brown's proof that it is idealism, but, I think, never giving Brown any credit," ("unacknowledged appropriation.") "The doctrine of Reid and Stewart" "bears a close analogy to the Cartesian scheme of divine assistance." (*R.* 257.) "This appears to be an explicit disavowal of the doctrine of an intuitive or immediate perception" (*R.* 310), "a doctrine which cannot be reconciled with that of an intuitive or objective perception. (*R.* 321.) "On this point it is probable that Descartes and Reid are at one. (*R.* 269.)

4th. Dugald Stewart, Royer Collard, and the other philosophers of Reid's school before Hamilton, held, like Reid, a doctrine which Hamilton considers Cosmothetic Idealism. The quotations already given shew that Hamilton admits this in regard to Stewart; for further details of him and Reid, and for similar statements in regard to Collard and other philosophers, we refer to Hamilton's Reid. (*R.* pp. 882, 297.)

5th. Hamilton's attempt to shew that Reid was what he calls a natural realist is inconclusive. In the first place, his citations do not bear out his conclusions. He gives but two. He cites Reid's statement that we have the same reason to believe the existence of external objects, as philosophers have to believe the existence of ideas," to prove that Reid maintains that "perception of external things is convertible with their reality;" and as he finds in another part of the book that Reid says that philosophers do consider themselves certain of the existence of ideas, because they perceive them, the march of ratiocination seems to be inexorable. But what does such ratiocination amount to against Reid's positive, detailed, and illustrated statement found in the treatise containing his maturest views, and mentioned above (page 796), "that whenever the sensation is produced, the corresponding perception follows, even when there is no object, and in that case is apt to deceive us." (*R.* 320.)

The second citation seems to be what Hamilton would call a "misrepresentation." It is quoted as though it were a classification made by Reid himself (arranging all the vulgar on one side for Natural Realism, and the philosophers on the other for Cosmothetic Idealism, in order that he might take his stand with the vulgar). But Reid is speaking of Hume's statement referred to above (p. 794), about seeing the table.

(*R.* 302.) The statements are Hume's. Again, when Reid takes his place among Hume's vulgar, who think they see a table, or a tree, he takes arms against Hamilton and Hamilton's natural realism; for they say that we never see any such thing.

(*R.* 303.)

In the second place, if we admit the reasoning, it does not go to the point. The conclusion is only that the aim of Reid's philosophy was a doctrine of intuition, not at all that it did not wholly miss its aim. If Reid's aim was a doctrine of common sense, and his doctrine actually was Cosmothetic Idealism, the logical conclusion would seem to be clear that Reid, as well as Brown, thought Cosmothetic Idealism to be the genuine doctrine of common sense.

But (b) Brown thought Reid's doctrine to be Cosmothetic Idealism. 1st. It is not true that he thought it a simple and consistent doctrine, and that it distinctly held that we have no immediate knowledge except of mind. On the contrary, Brown charges Reid with thinking that there is something mysterious in knowledge by perception, as though perception could be something more than a state of mind, and argues at length against Reid's statements. Dr Reid's view of perception involves, he says, "a false conception of the nature of the process." (*Lect* xxv.) "Dr Reid was not sufficiently in the habit of considering the phenomena of the mind merely as the mind affected, but as something more mysterious." (*Lect.* xxvii.)

2d. Hamilton represents (misrepresents) Brown's arguments against these views of Reid as a "vindication of his interpretation," implying that the arguments are an appeal to the consistency of Reid as an avowed Cosmothetic Idealist. But we find nothing of that sort. They are addressed to common reason on the supposition simply that Reid believed mind and matter to be different things. To say that Brown interprets Reid to hold a doctrine, because Brown seems to think that every reasonable man must hold it after it is clearly stated, and then, as he attacks Reid for not holding it, to call that a "vindication of his interpretation," seems to us more skilful than just. We shall again take up the arguments here referred to, as they are the turning point from Reid's theory of perception, to Hamilton's.

We are now prepared to judge how far the first charge, that of completely misunderstanding Reid's philosophy, is valid. Hamilton himself announces the triumphant conclusion that Brown has been proved guilty of an absolute reversal of its "unambiguous import." But we have now seen that the plausibility of Hamilton's "ratiocination" flows from his obtruding a classification of theories of perception, which neither Reid nor Brown had ever thought of, and which their systems will

not fit into at all without destructive stretching and lopping, deciding from their inferential aim where they would have chosen to go, and inexorably crushing them in ; and from his representing Brown as having treated Reid in the same way ; as though Brown represented Reid to actually hold a doctrine, because Brown thinks that as a reasonable man he must have held it, if he had heard the arguments. We have also seen that Hamilton, the annotator, himself states Reid's actual doctrine to be the very doctrine which Hamilton, the reviewer, considers its unambiguous opposite, and that he only argumentatively, and by inferences of the second degree, decides for himself what he admits to be a point not without difficulty ; that Reid "intended" a doctrine of Natural Realism. (*R.* 820.) Under these circumstances it is not strange that in republishing the Review, he appends to the word "unambiguous" in his announcement of Brown's guilt, the note, "this is too strong." (*Dis.* 66.) The following *is* rather strange, "This admission does not, however, imply that Brown is not from first to last—is not in one and all of his strictures on Reid's doctrine of perception, as there shewn, wholly in error." (*R.* 820.)

We know little of Hamilton except his writings ; but we do know a class of men of whom nothing could be more characteristic than these two notes. Their views may be modified, as they word it, of some particular statement of a truth, but never of their personal relations to absolute truth. To find themselves to-day holding the opinion which they last year denounced as monstrous, does not ruffle for an instant their constitutional prepossession, that any one they have attacked is wholly in error, and that they themselves are, and always were, wholly right—only a little too strong. We cannot bestow unqualified confidence on such men.

Secondly, Hamilton charges that Brown's own theory of perception is Cosmothetic Idealism, and as such is an unnecessary hypothesis (*Dis.* 68), annihilates itself (*Dis.* 69), is a see-saw between hypothesis and fact (*Dis.* 70), destroys and re-creates the phenomena for which it would account (*Dis.* 71), attempts to explain a mere hyperphysical chimera (*Dis.* 71), and needs subsidiary miracles to eke it out (*Dis.* 72).

1st. It takes the chill from the contempt which is poured over Brown for all these absurdities to learn, that, except a few sceptics and idealists, Reid is the first "among not forgotten philosophers," who has tried to embrace any other system (*Dis.* 73), and that Hamilton is the first who has actually escaped this one.

2d. The cosmothetic process has two parts, (*a*) "mind can form a representative conception of external objects." This power is no hypothesis. It is a fact. The phenomena of

dreams, of ocular spectra, of tangible and audible illusions as in mania a potu; more unquestionable still, the facts of memory and imagination prove it. So in perception;—in listening to a familiar language, for example, our true perceptions are pieced out by conceptions so nicely that they cannot be accurately distinguished. We learn the fact when we hear a foreign language. Would they match so, if they were totally unlike? Hamilton calls space an *a priori* form of imagination, see p. 295. (b) “An external world does exist, and is perceived through our conceptions of it.” It exists, and we have no doubt, that if a world of minds having conceptions such as Cosmothetic Idealism says, and no reliance on belief except as a fact to be accounted for, were to be left to reason (we do not suppose, or suggest, that mankind have been so left), to find out the causes and relations of the mental phenomena, a scientific system of the world would in due time be established exactly as it is now, with just the same conclusiveness as the Copernican astronomy is established. Nothing else will explain the facts. General assertions that externality cannot be inferred from knowledge of mental states, are null. We must look at the nature and relations of the mental states. Again, is the external world perceived by conceptions? The mind must be in some state in perception. What objection is there to supposing that this state is like the state in conception; and if so, should not reflection inform us of it? It certainly seems to clear up many things to suppose that in perception the mind is forcibly put in a state like that which it afterwards voluntarily assumes in conception.

3d. Most of the alleged absurdities of the doctrine grow out of its alleged assertion that consciousness is a liar. At every turn, it, like all other systems, has to rely on consciousness, and at every turn Hamilton shews up this reliance as a contradiction. The alleged lie is, that we have an *immediate* knowledge of the external world. We deny that consciousness stakes its character for veracity on the *immediateness* of the knowledge. *Immediateness* is not a direct object of consciousness; knowledge begins in the indefinite. The mind may be conscious of no mean, while yet there is one. Hamilton himself advocates the doctrine of unconscious mental acts (*Lect.* 235). Brown does not assert that consciousness is deceptive any more than Hamilton, as we shall shew by and by.

4th. Much of the talk does not apply at all to Brown, whose theory is not one of representation, properly so called. He holds that we know the external world as the cause (correlative) of certain states of mind, not that there is any ratio of representation between the two. But this is Hamilton's favourite mode of refutation—to draw up a classification of all possible

systems, argue the system he is attacking to be number three, say, in the classification, and then refute his own description of number three.

Thirdly. Hamilton charges that Reid is right, Brown always wrong, as to Reid's opinion that modern philosophers in general—"all modern philosophers" (*R.* 210)—believe that there are ideas distinct from the mind.

Brown says that before Reid's day this old hypothesis had ceased to be distinctly held, and that the language implying it would have been admitted figurative by most of the philosophers to whom Reid imputes the theory. He mentions six authors in whom the statement is to be found, that ideas are perceptions merely, or states of mind—Descartes, Arnauld, Hobbes, Locke, Le Clerc, Crousaz. We will give a few words to each.

DESCARTES: Hamilton, reviewing Brown, says that "to determine what Descartes' doctrine of perception actually is, would be difficult, perhaps impossible." (*Dis.* 76.) Hamilton, the commentator of Reid, has determined it to be exactly what Brown says, and, moreover, that it is less ambiguous than Reid's own doctrine. (*R.* 207, 272, 273, 296, 297.)*

ARNAULD: Hamilton admits Brown to be right as to Arnauld's doctrine, but says the question is, whether "Reid admits Arnauld's opinion on perception and his own to be identical?" If he does, Hamilton gives up the whole argument. (*Dis.* 80.) Hamilton the commentator says: "On this point (perception) it is probable that Descartes and Reid are at one." (*R.* 269.) And further, "I am convinced that in this interpretation of Descartes' doctrine, Arnauld is right." Arnauld claimed his own doctrine to be that of Descartes. (*R.* 296.) Notice, also, that Stewart approves Arnauld's doctrine. (*R.* 297.)

HOBBS: Hamilton admits that he did hold idea and perception to be one; but poor Brown, notwithstanding, is more wholly wrong than if he had not been right. (See *Dis.* 79.)

LOCKE says, as quoted by Brown, that "having ideas" and "perception" is "the same thing." (*Hum. Underst.*, B. II., chap. i., § 9.) So also—"our ideas being nothing but actual

* Hamilton states that the cardinal point of Descartes' system is, that mind and matter are *naturally* to each other as zero; but we find no such statement in Descartes. On the contrary, he explains at length the mutual action of mind and matter, stating in so many words that they act immediately on each other (agens immediate), being of that nature (*quæ talis est naturæ*). (*De Pass.* xxxiv. xxxv.) Hamilton being perhaps aware of this fact, adds a note, in which he proves that his cardinal point must be involved, by a choice bit of ratiocination, in our language and with our exposition, as follows: Descartes considers extension the essence of matter, and that its motions are due to the ordinary concurrence of God; but if extension (not being a force) cannot move extension without ordinary concurrence, *a fortiori* mind (being more like God than extension) cannot move it, but must have *supernatural* concurrence. (*Dis.* 77.)

perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them." (*Same*, II. x. 2.) Hamilton does not seem to have made up his mind to anything about Locke, except that Brown is wholly wrong. (*Dis.* 33, *R.* 210, 273.)

LE CLERC, CROUSAZ: Brown says the doctrine that *ideas* are states of mind, is to be found in the text-books of schools and colleges, and cites these two. Hamilton admits they have the doctrine, but commenting on Brown's language, asserts that "Reid exploded it (the doctrine) altogether." (*Dis.* 86.) And this language he republishes, without note or comment, after he had printed in his Reid, that "Reid, unfortunately, did not accomplish—did not attempt" what it was "incumbent on him," "indispensably necessary for him" to do, in order to establish Natural Realism against Idealism (*R.* 842, 824); and also, after having asserted over and over again, that Reid's doctrine is not to be distinguished from the one he is here said to have exploded. (*Former citations*, and *R.* 824.) He adds, secondly, "It is false that this doctrine of perception (Arnauld's) had long formed part of the elementary works of the schools." (*Dis.* 86.) Now compare the following citations from Hamilton's Reid.

"It (the opinion of Arnauld and Brown) is found fully detailed in almost every systematic course or compend of philosophy, which appeared for a long time after its first promulgation, and in many of these it is the doctrine recommended as the true. Arnauld's was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian school. From this it passed into other schools. Leibnitz, like Arnauld, regarded Ideas, Notions, Representations, as mere modifications of the mind, . . . and no cruder opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems." (*R.* 297, 207.) "This" (a great unanimity as to the existence of ideas), "as already once and again stated, is not correct." (*R.* 373, 140.)

With this we finish what we have to say on this third charge. No one, who reads what we have adduced, will think the critical opinions of Brown contemptible. On the contrary, it seems plain that he had a remarkable power of seizing the points of a philosophic system, in comparison with his predecessors (whom Hamilton perpetually corrects), and that he had penetrated those systems here discussed more deeply than Hamilton himself had at the time of writing this review.

Fourthly, Hamilton charges that Brown totally misconceived Hume's sceptical reasoning, and Reid's argument against Hume.

We have already stated Hume's argument (pp. 794, 795). In order that it may be seen in its application, we will give the following colloquy, re-written from Hume (*Phil. Ess.*, vol. ii. 169),

and Hamilton's attack on Brown (*Dis.* 99):—"Do you follow," says Hume, "your instinctive beliefs in assenting to the veracity of sense?" "I do," says Hamilton (*Dis.* 90, and elsewhere). "But these," continues Hume, "lead you to believe that the object of perception is the very table which remains unchanged in size and figure by our change of situation, and is white, whether we look at it or not. Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion?" "It is certain," says Hamilton, "that whiteness is no quality of the table; it is in the strictest sense a passive affection of the sentient ego (*R.* 858); and it is a fundamental article of my system that the mind must be present in space to what it perceives. (*R.* 809.) The table cannot be an object of perception at all. (*R.* 814.) I must so far recall my admission (*Dis.* 61, *comment first*), and give the lie to this natural belief." "Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" (*Dis.* 92), proceeds Hume; "you renounce all reliance on your natural beliefs. Can you now bring me any convincing argument from experience, to prove the existence of an external world?" "I cannot," says Hamilton; "the reality of our knowledge cannot be inferred. It is to be presumed from the veracity of our constitutive beliefs." (*Dis.* 90.) "Since then," concludes Hume, "you admit that you cannot answer me by reasoning, and since you have given up all reliance on natural belief, you must either admit that I am right in my scepticism, or refuse your assent on no ground whatsoever—Pyrrhonism or absurdity?—choose your horn."

Brown is charged with not seeing that this reasoning turns on the destructive nature of a denial of any single fact of consciousness. Hamilton says that Brown thought he could deny one fact of consciousness, and still appeal to its veracity as to other facts; and that he supposed Reid to admit that reason teaches that consciousness deceives us in perception, and yet to assert that we must believe our consciousness because we cannot help it. 1st, We cannot find anything in Brown which gives probability to this statement.* What gives it its little plausibility is, that Brown and Hamilton differ as to the precise nature of our belief in an external world. Brown thinks it a belief in the existence of external causes of our sensations, while Hamilton "enounces" it to be "*I immediately know in perception an external world as existing.*" Surely to differ with Hamilton in his interpretation of consciousness is not to give the lie to consciousness itself. 2d, Hamilton seems to treat Brown's remarks on the idealistic portion of Hume's argument—namely, the argument against inferring an external world from ideas—as though they were remarks on Hume's

* Note also that Brown argues against Kant, that having denied consciousness in one point, he can no longer appeal to it. (*Ed. Rev.* vol. i., pp. 266, 267.)

Pyrrhonism as a whole. 3d, Hamilton, though he attacks Brown for applying the idealistic argument to Reid, does yet admit its validity, adopt it as his own, and repeat it again and again in his notes on Reid, and without giving Brown credit for it. (*R.* 128, 129, 183, 282, 290, 318, 446, 820, &c.)

We here finish our special criticism of Hamilton's treatment of Brown, with one remark. It seems to us not only that Hamilton did Brown injustice in holding him up to contempt as an ignorant blunderer, but that admirers of Hamilton who love his reputation as a lover of truth, and who themselves love truth more than they admire intellectual gymnastics, should not exult over the dialectic skill, which, in such a state of facts, could "annihilate" the object of its attack, but should rather regret that the amiable prejudices of affection for Reid and Stewart, or other prejudices, could have so blinded or warped the great logician.

We now proceed to develop the progress towards a theory of perception from Hume onwards.

REID saw that to answer Hume's sceptical argument he must adhere to the instinctive beliefs. He, therefore, held to it that he verily saw the white table. The general point he made good in a general way, and it may be considered a solid acquisition to psychology. He purposed further to state the facts of perception free from all hypothesis. The danger which he saw, however, lay in asserting that something else than mind and matter are concerned in perception. He did not see any contradiction of our beliefs, or foundation for Idealism in the statement, that in connection with certain sensations, a conception of extension is suggested, which is accompanied by an instinctive belief in the existence of an extended substance, the object of our perception.

BROWN demonstrated that Reid's description of perception by conceptions affords as firm a basis for Idealism, as perception by ideas. Yet he accepted the description. His relation to Reid is like Hume's to Locke. He also attempted a demonstration that no state of mind can give more than a relative knowledge of matter, against Reid's statement that we know the primary qualities, as they are in themselves. The gist of it follows.

A perception (conception and belief) of extension is a state of mind. We know nothing of the way in which it is caused. God could have so made us that it would have been suggested on other occasions than those on which it is now suggested. He could make it arise if there were no matter in existence. Matter cannot be necessary to the existence of any other phenomenon than a state of matter. To assert then that matter is necessary to a perception of extension, is to assert that a per-

ception is a state of matter. (It is a state of matter, says Hamilton, see page 293.) But Reid holds that states of matter and states of mind are totally unlike and incompatible; therefore Reid could not consistently hold that perception of extension is a state of matter (therefore Reid must have held it, says Hamilton) (*Dis.* 66); nor, therefore, that matter *in any given state* is necessary to a perception of extension; *i. e.*, he could not hold that matter *as it is in itself* is the necessary external correlative of a perception of extension; *i. e.*, he could not hold that matter *as it is in itself* is known in the perception of extension. (He could not hold it, says Hamilton, repeating the reason.) (*R.* 313.)

HAMILTON then it behooved, (1) *To state the precise extent of our fundamental belief in respect to the external world*; (2) *To re-state the process of perception, so as to afford no basis for idealism*, shewing, one would think, where Brown's argument is weak against our knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, as they are in themselves.

We have found that a statement can often be made about material facts, which, if not exactly illustrative, will yet be suggestive of the central idea of a psychological theory, and aid even clear minds in readily thinking out its details. We throw out the following:—

Reid's idea of the mind in perception may be suggested by thinking of a plain mirror endowed with consciousness. When brought face to face with an external object, it sees it just as it is. Sight was the sense his thought most turned to.

Brown had dwelt much on cause and effect in the material world. His favourite illustrations are drawn from attraction, magnetism, &c. His idea of the mind in perception may be suggested by thinking of a conscious pile of steel-filings affected by the action and motions of a remote and invisible magnet. The filings know themselves and their own motions, and that there is some external cause of all the motions. All they know of the magnet is how it moves them. Feeling is his sense.

Hamilton, too, had been worried by cause and effect. He conceives an effect as a result of two or more causes. (*R.* 625.) Allow us to define a burning lamp as oil and so much luminiferous ether as pervades it; then (discounting other conditions) the flame is a phenomenon of the lamp and the oxygen of the air—a phenomenon of ether, oil, and oxygen equally—of any one just as truly as of either of the others. Hamilton's idea of man (mind and body) in perception may be suggested by thinking of a burning lamp which is conscious of its flame, and in that consciousness knows at once a phenomenon of ether (mind) and oil (body) directly, and of oxygen (external world) in relation to them. Feeling is his sense also. Knowledge is

limited to phenomena, each of which is the joint product of substances within the sphere of our personal presence.

He addressed himself first to the fundamental belief. He was to make it the contradictory of materialism, and of all idealism overt or implied, especially of Brown's Cosmothetic Idealism. The result is as follows, in his own words, but brought together and arranged. In the act of sensible perception I am conscious of two things; of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an extended external reality in relation with my sense as the object perceived, *i. e.*, known immediately in itself as existing—each apprehended at once as independent, out of, and in direct contrast to the other. (*R.* 745, 747.)

1st. *Conscious of the object* contradicts the idealism lurking in saying that perception is a conception and belief, and that we are conscious of them, but not of their objects. 2d. *Immediately, i. e.*, with no intervening thing which might exist, though the object did not—so that there is no mistake possible, no consciousness of perceiving possible, unless the object actually exists. (*R.* 805.) This position also requires, it should be added, that the perception should not be regarded as an effect of any antecedents in time. Reid asserts an intervening conception, and an antecedent sensation, both of which may be grounds of illusive perception. See page 796. 3d. *In itself as existing*, this involves the *when* and *where* of the object—its presence to the mind both in space and time. (*R.* 809.) Reid asserts immediate perception of remote objects by sight, and immediate knowledge of remote objects in time. As he places the mind in immediate connection only with the brain, all perception is of remote objects. 4th. *Extended*, against Brown's denial of knowledge of extension as it is in the external object itself. But see above. (*R.* 745.) 5th. *Each apprehended, &c.*, contradicts materialism. (*R.* 747.) Having in this way, as a good logician, injected his whole system into the fundamental belief, the next step was to restate the facts of sensation and perception by our several senses, into agreement with the assumed belief. Reid's statements contradict it at every step. Let us see what Hamilton makes of it. We may be permitted for convenience of statement to suppose that Hamilton saw the following connections of thought. He probably did.

1st. To answer to the statement that we are "*conscious of mind and matter at once*," he asserts that a sensation is a state of mind, and equally a state of matter." (*R.* 884, 881.)

2d. To answer to the word "*immediately*," as explained above, he asserts that the mind is present to all sensations, and knows them in their several places (as phenomena of parts of the body) (*R.* 821, 2; 880, 16; 884, 39; 809, 11),

so that knowing must be convertible with reality (*R.* 810, 18 ; 811, 25) ; and that sensation and perception are co-existent states of mind, perception being only the consciousness of two or more sensations as phenomena of body in their relation in space. (*R.* 880, 17 ; 881, 21 ; 882, 31 ; 833, 34.)

3d. To answer to "*in itself as existing*," he asserts that the mind is present at the periphery of the nerves—the outside of the body, and so present at once to the nerves and to the external object touching them (*R.* 821, 2 ; 861 ; 319, 320), and that it is only then and there that we have perceptions. (*R.* 145, 302.) All our senses are modifications of touch. (*R.* 247.) Nothing else is perceived than our bodies and things touching them. (*R.* 247.)

4th. To answer to "*extended*," he asserts that we know our bodies to be extended by being consciously present in sensation to different parts of them at once, and perceiving the relations in space of the sensations, and so of the parts of the body of which they are phenomena (*R.* 884, 39 ; 883, 31), and that we perceive the extension of external objects by knowing where they touch the body. (*R.* 881, 26.)

5th. That the mind apprehends matter as independent of, and in contrast with itself, rests as affirmation. Hamilton has written a volume of elaborate distinctions on the generals of his theory ; but has never given detailed statements of the operations of the several senses, and it is very hard to make out what he thought actually occurs, in sight, for example. We know no better way to shew distinctly what his system is, and display it as justly exposed to strong objections, than by a discussion of vision.

The true philosophy of realism and of common sense rests on two capital facts, which must be accepted as ultimate on the authority of consciousness. We ask attention to the statement that they are given as *indefinite*, as Comparative Philology shews (all) other human knowledge to have been, and brought to precision by the action of our faculties. Sensations and their external correlatives are given indefinitely, *e.g.*, heat, and the hot iron ; pain, and the tooth ; reflection, by making our knowledge more precise, separates them. So distance and size are given indefinitely in sight, but made definite. (See after.)

FIRST. WE PERCEIVE SPACE IMMEDIATELY. (*a*) *We* ; all conscious minds in the act of consciousness, recognising self as finite. (*b*) *Perceive* ; know as real existence, different from, and out of self ;—a simple act incapable of explanation. On being confronted with an object, the mind perceives the object as it is :—not its effect on the mind, nor a joint phenomenon of it and mind. Space actually exists, and we know it to

actually exist;—know it as it actually exists;—*perceive* it. (c) *Space*; extension such as it really is in respect to limit and quality. *Space* is one thing; *perception* of space a totally different thing; a *conception* of space, were it possible, would also be totally different from space. (d) *Immediately*;—not by means of any special sense; in connection with all the senses, and with other acts of consciousness. We are posited in space, and directly know it, as well when the eyes are shut as when they are open. We cannot get out of it, or imagine ourselves out of it.

We think it impossible to have a consistent scheme of real perception without this first principle. The object of perception is perceived in space. No mode of mind can sustain such a relation to extended objects, as we see space sustain. Objects known as *in* a state or mode of mind, as bodies are in space, or any way like it, or analogous to it, must be admitted to be mental states, as Kant supposes, or we are involved in an inextricable tangle of words without thoughts.

HAMILTON PRONOUNCES SPACE “AN A PRIORI FORM OF IMAGINATION”—“a mere subjective state.” (R. 841.) Kant’s analysis of space into a form of mind is to him conclusive. (Lect. 346.) He admits, however, that it is essential to realism that we *perceive extension* in objects. (Lect. 346, R. 126, 882, 30.) His *a priori* conception is a mere *obiter* conception, a fifth wheel, as far as perception is concerned; but it will turn up again in his philosophy of the Conditioned, where it works wonders.

SECOND. WE PERCEIVE THE EXTERNAL CORRELATIVES OF OUR SENSATIONS (AND MUSCULAR EFFORTS) AS ACTUALLY OCCUPYING POSITIONS IN SPACE.*

These external correlatives are different for different sensations. 1st, Some sensations are intended to give us knowledge of our own bodies chiefly. The correlatives of these are those parts of the body to which they call instinctive attention. They vary greatly in definiteness of location, from toothache to hunger. 2d, Others are intended chiefly to give us notice

* We add to complete this view: *Conception*, or *imagination*, whenever an actual phantasm of an extended body is a direct object of thought, involves, 1st, The distinguishing some part of this space with imagined qualities. A geometrician draws a diagram in the air with his finger, letters it, and demonstrates upon it, as though it were chalked on a board before him. His object of thought is a part of space dressed in imaginary colours, but as different from a mental mode as the perception of a chalk diagram of the same size.

Fact. The organism of any sense is essential to conceptions of the objects of that sense. *Hypothesis*, (1.) the nerves in a state like that in sensation; (2.) mind in a state like sensation; (3.) space *perceived*; (4.) state of mind like perception; *i. e.*, external correlatives of sensation are now *conceived*, *i. e.*, imagined as located in space under laws like those governing perception.

of the relations of external objects to our physical well-being. These are mostly modifications of touch. The external correlative is two-fold, the body and the object touching it, to which attention is instinctively called. These, too, vary greatly in their definiteness. Smell, so far as use in location is concerned, seems in man to be a sort of rudimental sense, meant for animals of prey. 3d, Two senses we have whose eminent office is communication of mind with mind, and knowledge of material things as they are in themselves, and of their relations to each other; the senses of love and reason, music and beauty;—hearing, namely, and sight. Of these, hearing deals chiefly with the sensations, and its perfection lies in the precision of its distinctions in time—not space. In its higher uses it locates its correlatives but indefinitely. Music, dilating the soul into its highest capacity for worship and the infinite, has something of the infinite in its pervading presence. The perfection of sight, on the contrary, lies in precise distinctions of the correlatives in space.

We may sum up our knowledge of the material world by perception thus: We know that there are objects occupying particular parts of space, which are correlative to certain sensations, or muscular efforts. 2d, Memory being implied in perception, we perceive motion or change of place among these bodies, and can learn its laws, and all other facts and laws which depend upon, or are connected with motion in bodies or their parts. We perceive also change of qualities—brightness, colour, savour, smell, force; the last is generally ascertained by instruments in which motion indicates it. Hamilton would say of this statement, that, after all, matter is only the *unknown* correlative of certain sensations; that being a logician's way of saying that all we know of it is that it is the correlative of certain sensations, and has certain laws of motion, and change. Having dubbed it an *unknown* correlative, he considers it as labeled for limbo. So might we dispose of gravity, as a name for an unknown cause, and yet there is perhaps nothing in nature more thoroughly and exactly known than gravity. The knowledge we have of matter is by no means slight, though it is limited, as we have stated, in its original elements.

HAMILTON'S STATEMENT IS THAT WE PERCEIVE OUR SENSATIONS AS ACTUALLY OCCUPYING DIFFERENT POSITIONS IN SPACE.

We proceed to consider sight. The known facts may be classed as (1) sensation and its antecedents, or (2) facts of perception.

Sensation and its antecedents. 1st. A luminous object.

2d. The forming, by rays of light from the object, of an inverted picture of it on the nervous fibrils which stand in the

back of the eye, separate like the hairs of a brush, and receive the rays on their ends, and which run separate to the brain.

3d. Some definite effect on the brain through the action of each fibril ; or, possibly, some mutual action of brain and fibrils. The 2d and 3d antecedents are unknown to consciousness.

4th. A sensation of colour for each nervous fibril affected.

Facts of perception. We perceive the external correlative of the sensation for each fibril, as a coloured point, in its true direction from the fibril. A number of coloured points, corresponding to the number of fibrils affected, all seen in their true direction, and, by the action of the entire apparatus of vision, seen instinctively in their true distance and size (indefinitely), constitutes a perception of the object emitting the rays, in its true colour, size, shape, and distance. Direction, distance, and size, are all seen, but indefinitely, and to be mutually adjusted by the judgment. Judgment adds no elements, but brings to precision.

The *antecedents of sensation* should not be identified with the *objects of perception*. The mind may, perhaps, not have to travel back the same route to the object. They serve to put the mind in relation (*en rapport*) with the object ; then it sees directly.*

Hamilton identifies sensation and the 3d antecedent ; or, perhaps, separates this antecedent into a double affection, of which one part is identified with the sensation, and the other is not, and he supposes the mind present to the 2d, and unconscious of the 1st. He holds that the sensation of colour (state of mind) is at the external end of the fibril, and is a state of matter as well—*i. e.*, a phenomenon of (light + nerve ;) (nerve = matter + mind). (*R.* 160, 299, 861.)

Perception is the knowledge by the mind present at the end of several fibrils at once of its sensations as arranged in space just *as*, and just *where*, the ends of the fibrils are. (See above.)

A common-sense man, who was no metaphysician, would get about as near the thought as he ever could, from being told that the mind is spread out behind the eye, and has a feeling just the shape, and size, and colour of the picture on the

* The elaborate and exact machinery of our organs, which might be used in perception, but of which we are unconscious, strongly suggests some relation equivalent to use between the mind and organs—the latent mental modifications of Leibnitz. Such a doctrine would agree substantially with the perception by intentional species of the schoolmen. (*R.* 814.) A true eye might note a ray in more than one place, as it moves through it, and so give direction (the superficial eye-spots of some lower animals seem sensitive to light, without giving distance) ; but the received law of direction is adverse.

retina. We do not see the image on the retina (*R.* 160), but have a bunch of feelings there just the shape of it.

To this theory of perception we make the following objections, placing first those which apply specifically to the sense of sight.

1st. It is untrue as a statement of facts. It is not true that colour is seen at the end of the nervous fibrils. We know nothing, from consciousness, of the fibrils or the pictures in our own eyes, and colour is seen outside the eye. (*a*) If the coloured points seen were at the ends of the nervous fibrils, the forms seen as the result of the combination of points would be inverted, as compared with the forms felt; but this is not the fact—the coloured object is right side up. (*b*) We see coloured points with each eye, as the phenomena of double vision prove. If these points were seen at the ends of the fibrils, we never could see an object single, with both eyes open on it. It is only by seeing the coloured points at a certain fixed distance from the eyes that these points can coincide and we can have single vision; but consciousness assures us of single vision.

2d. It is an abuse of the word *perception* to call by that name the recognition of light as present at the eye and tattooing it in figure. The perception of a white table was the problem of Hume. Such was also that of Descartes, Locke, Reid, and Brown; so that if it could be admitted that we perceive the ends of our optic nerves, the problem of the table still remains, and we have still the real difficulty left, to explain what then truly becomes, as Swift called sight, the art of seeing things that are invisible.

Hamilton seems to have been so devoted to his refutation of all possible idealisms, that perception came to mean with him nothing but a fact that contradicts Idealism. But other philosophers in discussing perception were not seeking the special point where we so come in contact with matter that its existence is most incontestable, but were treating all the knowledge which we have in using the senses.

3d. As a solution of the general problem of sight (*e. g.*, seeing a table), Hamilton's theory would seem to be what he stigmatizes as the grossest form of the representative hypothesis, *i. e.*, the perception of the external object by means of a material image present to the mind. That he in effect asserts that the direct object of sight is a material image of the table present to the mind is to us certain. He only escapes "the grossest form of representation" by asserting that we do not perceive the table at all.

4th. Denying the perception of the table, his theory does not give us data for any knowledge of it corresponding to con-

sciousness. He says it is a belief, the result of judgment, and the like: but it seems plain that when we look at the table, we do not contemplate a belief, or a judgment, or any combination of either. It is either a white space-filling table, or something that looks amazingly like one. The passages which bear on this general problem are hard to reconcile.

(a) Some imply perception of the table.

He defends the propriety of saying that he is conscious of an inkstand which he sees. (*Lect.* 158.) Now, as he could be conscious of it only if immediately known, the ratiocination would be inexorable, which would convict him of holding that inkstands are perceived by sight, in opposition to his hundred-times-repeated assertion to the contrary. He describes the perception of a book by sight. (*Lect.* 103.) So he quotes Hume as assenting to his statement of perception in saying that we see a white table. (*Lect.* 201.) So a rose is seen (*R.* 129), and a wall is known as the subject in which colour inheres. (*R.* 805, 301.)

(b) Some imply the table to be a subject of inference, or a cause of the perceived object.

He generally lets it go with, "all else" (but what is in immediate contact with its organ) "is something over and above perception" (*R.* 145); but we find "it is only reached by reasoning" (*R.* 186); "by inference" (*R.* 247); "only the causes of the object we immediately perceive" (*Lect.* 375); "by inference, acquired, mediate, and at best always insecure" (*R.* 177); "only known through something different from itself in a reproductive or a constructive act of imagination" (*R.* 810).

(c) Now what are the data on which inferences are to proceed? What the materials which are to be constructed in imagination?

We find but three passages that give us any light on these points. "We always see in a particular direction," &c. (*R.* 160.) Vision is "a perception by which we take immediate cognizance of light in relation to our organ"—"and likewise as falling on it in a particular direction." (*R.* 160.) "This natural perception of outness, which is the foundation of our acquired knowledge of distance, seems given us in the natural perception we have of the direction of the rays of light." (*R.* 177, *Lect.* 393.) These passages seem to contradict Hamilton's principles. What is it we see in a particular direction from the eye?—a ray of light?—but that is known only by its sensation of colour, and is seen only as a luminous point. Is the luminous point seen in a particular direction from the eye?—but Hamilton says it is seen in its true *where*, *i. e.*, where the mind is present to it at the end of the nerve; it is a sensation,

and cannot be outside the eye. To perceive the direction of a ray is to perceive a relation between two perceived points of the ray, and involves an immediate knowledge of the ray before it arrived at the organ of sense, "which is a contradiction in terms." (*R.* 305.) It presupposes the perception of outness, which is the unambiguous contradictory of contact; and, sure enough, here is *outness* asserted. Outness of what? Can we perceive outness, and nothing out? Hamilton goes on to say that in the case of the blind boy couched by Cheselden, "the objects seemed to touch his eye, as what he felt did his skin;" "but," adds Hamilton, "they did not appear to him as in his eyes, far less as a mere affection of the organ." This would seem a distinct statement that the objects of sight are seen at a distance.

The materials for imagination to construct the remote object in this case must be either our sensations, or copies of these sensations. To suppose the first contradicts Hamilton's theory that the sensations are known where they are. To suppose the second contradicts consciousness, which knows nothing of a double object.

We do not find these views of outness repeated, and the notes in which they occur are embarrassed and unsatisfactory in other respects; neither, though Hamilton has notes on single vision, and classifies in his fashion all possible modes of explaining it, does he give the slightest hint of his own views (*R.* 163, 814); nor, though the occasion presents itself often, does he shew how his inverted direct object is yet seen right side up—except so far as these statements just quoted may go to explain it.

If, under these circumstances, we may hazard "a wide solution," it is, that Hamilton never could make his theory of perception agree with the admitted facts of vision, and that he never made up his mind what is the true account of seeing a table. He might have called his essays on Perception, as well as his remarks on the relations of Consciousness to mind and matter, what he does call his essays on the Conditioned—"Hints of an Undeveloped Philosophy." (*Dis.* 587.)

OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY AS A WHOLE.

5th. In limiting knowledge to objects present to the mind in space and time, it reduces knowledge to an infinitesimal—to nothing. The mind is unextended; but perception is a knowledge of the remote. To obtain any knowledge by perception, Hamilton has (contradictorily) to extend the mind over the body. Time present is a vanishing point between past and future; but consciousness is a knowledge of the identical. To obtain knowledge by consciousness he has (contradictorily) to declare memory essential to consciousness. (*Lect.* 141.)

6th. It is untrue as a statement of facts.

(a) The mind is not present at the periphery of the nerves, having immediate knowledge—*i.e.*, knowledge convertible with fact—of sensations as *there*. Impressions on any part of the nerves of touch may be located at the periphery. In disease the pain is often located at a part remote from the part affected. A person who has lost a limb still locates sensations in the non-existent member. The elaborate machinery which connects the brain with all parts of the body, and the effects on consciousness of disordering it, are satisfactory evidence to most men that the mind is not an organism, but uses remote organs, and communicates with them through the nerves, as the telegraph operator communicates through his wires.

But when we admit that the mind is primarily present in space only to some sensorium, all perception, except possibly of the unknown sensorium, becomes representative, and Hamilton's immediate knowledge dislimns into judgments and images.

(b) Perception is not dependent on the presence of the mind in space to the thing known. That would involve either that the mind is extended, or that extension cannot be *perceived*. As long as knowledge is thought of as the consciousness of a joint phenomenon of two contiguous substances, one of which is unextended, the sphere of perception cannot embrace extension; but consciousness assures us that it does embrace it—that the sphere of knowledge is very different from the sphere of personal presence in space.

7th. It is contradictory in placing the nervous organism both within and without the mind. Hamilton himself propounds this difficulty, re-affirms the fact, makes no attempt to explain it, and pronounces it "the mystery of mysteries to man." (R. 880.) It is a single illustration of the results of placing mind under the category of quantity. Let it go for what it is worth!

8th. It is sceptical: for, by denying the testimony of consciousness that the objects of sight are perceived at a distance from the eye, it destroys the veracity of consciousness, and so establishes Pyrrhonism. (See above.)

9th. It compares unfavourably with Cosmothetic Idealism. The statement that knowing sensations of colour (states of mind) in space (a form of mind) constitutes perception, is, so far, pure idealism. Hamilton makes this statement. (R. 881, 21; 885, 48.) If now he had added to it this other statement—that the consciousness now described is accompanied by, or involves the necessary belief that these states of mind arranged in this form of mind are the correlatives of external forces (matter) analogously arranged in an external space, that would have been Cosmothetic Idealism—Cosmothetic Idealism, that

complex of all absurdities ; since any phenomena of an extended substance in an external space are wholly unlike, and incompatible with any mental states, so that to suppose any ratio even of representation between them is absurd.

Observe now how Hamilton avoids this absurdity. He affirms that these two totally unlike and incompatible sets of phenomena are identically one and the same ; they are not simply thought as one—they positively are, and are positively known and felt to be one : the mind is immediately present in time and space to the whole thing, and embraces it as one in its consciousness.

Surely this may be characterised in the "matchless style of Hamilton," by saying that "in place of simply originating from the incomprehensible, it ostentatiously departs from the absurd."

10th. It will promote materialism, or, more accurately, Spinozism, or monism.

(a) The proof of the independent and contrasted nature of mind and matter has been, since the time of Descartes, rested on the incompatibility of their phenomena.

"To mark the boundaries of physiology, and psychology, we must simply inquire—what are the phenomena which we learn by *consciousness*, and what those which we learn by outward *observation* ? These two regions lie entirely without each other ; so much so, that there is not a single fact known by consciousness, which we could ever have learned by observation, and not a single fact known by observation of which we are ever conscious. A sensation, for example, is known simply by consciousness ; the material conditions of it, as seen in the organ, and the nervous system, simply by observation. No one could ever see a sensation, or be conscious of an organic action ; accordingly, the one fact belongs to psychology, the other to physiology." (*Morell's Modern Philosophy*, 304.)

But Hamilton makes all sensations phenomena of both mind and matter.

Consciousness is to be the sole authority as to what are the objects of thought. The object of perception, for example, is that, and only that, which is perceived. But Hamilton *seems* to use *observation* instead. He says that the direct object of sight, for example, is the light and nerve in relation ; but consciousness knows nothing of either ; it rests on the luminous object. Such an obtrusion destroys psychology.

(b) The philosophy of a portion of the followers of Descartes, founding on the independent and contrasted existence of mind and matter, had held that there are two parallel series of phenomena, one in matter, the other in mind ; any connection or mutual intercourse between which is maintained by the con-

course of the Deity. Spinoza, taking up this system, welded the two series together by the simple statement, that they are phenomena of one substance viewed under different relations. "*Et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quæ jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur*" (*Eth.* II. 6), and, applying the statement to man, "*quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit, quæ jam sub cogitationis, jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur.*" (*Eth.* III. 2.) The consequences of this doctrine may be there seen, drawn out with a ratiocination as inexorable as that of Hamilton.

Now when Hamilton affirms that the mind is present to the whole body (nervous organism), and that our sensations are known in self-consciousness to be states of mind, and the same sensations known in perception to be states of body—especially when it is added that the sphere of our perceptions is limited by that of our bodily presence, and coincident in time and space with that of our sensations, he holds a doctrine which could not become common without making Spinozism common.*

Hamilton is indeed an emphatic dualist. He even holds that his doctrine is the only one on which dualism can stand, as strongly as Berkeley did that his doctrine was a vindication of the external world of common sense. He is emphatic in the assertion that the mind is unextended, the external world extended; and that they are known as independent of, out of, and in contrast to each other; their relation in sensation is the mystery of mysteries. But we feel sure that to most persons, who should receive his views as we have set them forth, it will appear an easy solution of the mystery to say that consciousness is the interior experience of the same substance of which perception gives the exterior appearance.

(c) One of the best services of Reid is his adopting, and bringing into use, entirely different sets of terms for our knowledge of mind and our knowledge of matter—consciousness, &c., on the one hand, opposed to perception, &c., on the other; stamping with his approval what the common sense of mankind had indefinitely asserted in language, that consciousness is limited to mental states, and does not embrace external objects. This use has not arisen, as Hamilton says, from the prevalence of the ideal system, but because our knowledge of self is different in kind and in certainty from that of matter. We all feel our liability to mistake an object of perception. We

* Hamilton's doctrine that consciousness gives only a relative knowledge of self, coupled with that of latent modifications of mind, also strongly favours the monistic conception of the conscious Ego as an observer who sees some portion only of the phenomena of a great power or substance (mind, God); of which it is thus only a mode.

have been mistaken a thousand times ; but we are sure that we *think* we perceive. Consciousness is not, in the English speech, a general name for all our states of mind and their objects. It is a light in which our mental states go on,* varying in intensity with different degrees of attention, and, perhaps, in quality with the character of the Ego. Unless we believe with Hamilton that the sphere of knowledge is confined to that of our personal presence in space, we must admit, on his principles, that objects of knowledge may be outside the sphere of consciousness. He does not claim that the objects of representative knowledge are within it. The strength of the popular hold on a doctrine varies almost exactly as the extent to which language conforms to it. Materialism will never gain so much ground among the people as long as the English idiom will not let us say that we are conscious of matter. We cannot bear to be taught to say that we are conscious of inkstands. (*Lect.* 158.)

11th. Reid and Stewart take pleasure in referring the succession and adjustment of the facts of perception to the arrangement of the all-wise and good Framer of man. Hamilton thinks this *mystical* and *hyperphysical*. (*Lect.* 355.) He wishes to postulate statements which shall logically involve the facts. This leads him to make immediate knowledge a different thing from instinctive knowledge. The lower animals, for example, have an instinctive perception of distant objects by sight (*R.* 182) ; but this could not be true perception in man, for that can only exist where the mind is present to the object. He must assert of phenomena instinctively connected that they are one and the same phenomenon, or connected only by inference. It leads him also to decline the argument from the veracity of God (*R.* 130, &c.) as distinguished from the veracity of consciousness. But when the sceptic throws doubt on the existence of matter by an appeal to the power of God to produce our present states of mind though there were no matter in existence, it is certainly not only a legitimate, but *the* legitimate argument to appeal to the veracity of God, which is as sure as his power.

This feature seems to us objectionable. The constitution of man will be best understood by him who looks at it as the workmanship of infinite wisdom, and who delights to refer what he cannot, as well as what he can understand, to the power and wisdom of God—*Deus in machina*.

Finally. We remark, as an *argumentum ad hominem*, that a doubt is thrown on the whole theory as the only possible statement of real perception, by the alleged facts of animal mag-

* Hamilton holds that states of mind may go on without consciousness. (*Lect.* xviii.)

netism, which Hamilton affirms to be in themselves "certain and even manifest" (*Dis.* 600); since these would seem to shew that perception may take place in other ways—since, in Hamilton's own language, it is proved that "*perceptions are possible through other than the ordinary channels of the senses.*" (*R.* 246.)

Hamilton's theory, on the whole, seems retrograde from Reid's. His fundamental principles—every phenomenon (*e. g.*, knowledge) involves two causes—knowledge of opposites (*e. g.*, mind and matter) is one—give no sure footing here. In moving the sphere of perception from the external world to our own bodies, he has moved from the clear to the obscure; from the field of science to that of use; from the most definite of knowledge to the most indefinite, where consciousness least protests against confounding mind and matter. Reid, perhaps, did not guard every point against the idealist; Hamilton must "distinguish and divide," and *affirm* strenuously, to keep us from believing that in perception and consciousness we are looking at the outside and the inside of the same substance. Monism is a more fascinating doctrine than idealism. Spinoza and Hegel have a more comprehensive and inexorable grasp than Berkeley.

The relations between mind and matter are little known. Hamilton's theory may be the true explanation of some of our perceptions—of those in which we are most certain of the existence of a *non Ego*; while in other unlike perceptions we learn most of the properties, qualities, and notions of this *non Ego*. The final judgment may even be that he has succeeded in touching the very heart of truth in this matter; but the authority of his great name ought not so radically to change the old views without a thorough discussion. In another article we purpose to examine the Philosophy of the Conditioned.

ART. IV.—*Are the Phenomena of Spiritualism Supernatural?*

Footfalls on the Boundary of Another World, with Narrative Illustrations. By ROBERT DALE OWEN. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

It is a striking illustration of the prominence gained by the modern school of *Spiritualism*, that its newly coined use of that term is recognised in the latest editions of the two rival Anglo-American dictionaries. Ten years ago the term Spirit-

ualism was confined to a theory of mental philosophy, and was hardly known to the unscientific world. It was vaguely used as the opposite of Sensationalism, and more particularly to denote the Idealism of Berkeley, or the Egoism of Fichte. Cousin gives the term a somewhat wider range. He speaks of opposing the "modern Sensualism" of Locke, with the "modern Spiritualism" of Reid and Kant; and he characterises the philosophy of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and their successors, in general terms, as "the Spiritualistic school" of the seventeenth century.* Chalybaeus speaks of Descartes,— "the originator of a Platonising view of the doctrine of innate ideas,"—as having adopted "the Spiritualistic tendency in philosophy."† Cudworth styles those "Spiritualists" who "allegorise away the facts of Christianity." Brande limits the term Spiritualism to the idealistic refinements of Berkeley and Fichte.

Thus restricted, and indeed hardly legitimated by usage, "Spiritualism" was, till recently, a technical term of mental science. Now, however, the new edition of Dr Worcester's Dictionary authorises the use of this word for "the doctrine that departed spirits hold communication with men." And the appendix to the new edition of Webster's Dictionary states that "this term is now often applied to the doctrine that a direct intercourse can be maintained with departed spirits through the agency of persons called *mediums*, who are supposed to have a peculiar susceptibility for such communications." A doctrine which has thus early won for itself a place in the vocabulary of psychological science, and which has given a new and almost exclusive meaning to a dormant term of philosophy, can hardly be treated as ephemeral or insignificant. Whatever pretensions and impostures may have been put forth in connection with modern Spiritualism, the system presents phenomena that demand thorough scientific investigation, and it has also theological and practical bearings that cannot be disregarded. The Mythical theory—which would resolve the miracles of the New Testament into popular legends, or into "unconscious fictions" of the Evangelists, whose imaginations were kindled by "religious enthusiasm,"‡—does not more directly assail the authenticity and authority of the Bible as a revelation from God, than does the tendency of modern Spiritualism to refer non-natural and unexplained phenomena to supernatural interference; or the mechanical theory of Supernaturalism, which regards such ultra-mundane interference as periodical, if not systematic, and in accord-

* Cousin, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Sec. 11th, 12th, and 25th.

† Chalybaeus, *History of Speculative Philosophy*. Introd.

‡ Strauss.

ance with some *law* of variations, which, though it cannot be defined, is as real as that which appears in Babbage's calculating machine. The last is the theory that Mr Owen favours in the volume which we propose to review.

Mr Owen's work is divided into six books, but consists really of four principal parts. Of these the first is devoted to the question of the possibility of "ultra-mundane interference," which the author argues with much apparent candour, but with more of subtle ingenuity, through a hundred pages. The second part consumes the next hundred pages in a discussion of certain phases of sleep, especially somnambulism and remarkable dreams. The third part consists mainly of narratives touching mysterious disturbances, hallucinations, and apparitions of the living and the dead, with their physical and mental consequences. These are classified in three books, and cover one hundred and fifty pages. The fourth part, which is the author's sixth book, presents the results of his discussion in his theory of "the change at death," and the nature and occupations of the future state. We shall not attempt to follow him minutely over all the ground thus traversed in five hundred closely printed pages, but shall confine the discussion chiefly to certain fundamental principles of supernatural agency, and the philosophical tests of the facts alleged in his narrative.

In discussing the relations of man to the supernatural world and of supernatural agencies to man, it is of the utmost importance to define terms with accuracy, and to lay down the principles of evidence by which the supernatural must be tested. This Mr Owen attempts to do in his first book. In the first place he distinguishes between the supernatural and the miraculous, and meets Mr Hume's objection to miracles by rejecting the common notion of a miracle, that it is "a temporary suspension, by special intervention of the Deity, of one or more of the laws which govern the universe." In other words, Mr Owen does not believe that a miracle, in the common understanding of the term, has ever occurred; but regards the phenomena called miracles as ultra-mundane events projected into the sphere of our world by some law of the spiritual world, which first manifests itself to our apprehension through these phenomena. And, secondly, he distinguishes between the supernatural and the ultra-mundane; or rather, if we understand him, he rejects entirely the idea of the *supernatural*, in any proper sense of that term, and believes simply in "appearances or agencies of an ultra-mundane character." After alleging that "Spiritual agency, if such there be, is not miraculous," he affirms that its phenomena "are as much the result of natural law as is a rain-

bow or a thunder-clap ;” and that “believers in their existence should cease to attach to them *any inkling of the supernatural*,” (p. 88). Again, he says, that “if the Deity is now permitting communication between mortal creatures in this stage of existence and disembodied spirits in another, He is employing *natural* causes and general laws to effect his object ; not resorting for that purpose to the occasional and the miraculous,” (p. 89). To provide for such phenomena, Mr Owen argues that “there may be laws not yet in operation,” and also, “change-bearing laws,” or “laws self-adapted to a changeful state of things,” (p. 80). His reply to Hume’s sophism with regard to human testimony is in some points admirable ; but when he goes to the extent of making almost any alleged marvel credible by the supposition that it is *not* supernatural but only some new phase of universal law, Mr Owen as really denies the *miracles* of the Bible and their testimony to a Divine Revelation, as does Mr Hume himself. Mr Hume rejects the miracle as *un-natural* ; Mr Owen sinks it in the merely natural. Our discussion at the outset, therefore, concerns the fact of the Supernatural, and the nature and characteristics of a miracle.

We hold that nothing is more natural to man than a belief in the Supernatural. Hardly does the soul awake to consciousness, when it begins to question itself as to its possible relations to a spiritual world. And deep and earnest are those questionings, even in the rudest minds. The thinking essence within us, the conscious *ego*, early learns to distinguish itself from the body through which, and the material objects upon which, it acts. Finding in its own properties the proof of a substance distinct from matter, it argues the existence of a spiritual Power superior to matter, the Author of the material universe and its laws. Knowing that its own existence is not self-derived, but is proof of a superior Power, it knows also that that Power must be Spiritual. Paul reasoned thus with the Athenians, from their own philosophy. “Certain of your own poets have said, We are also his offspring. Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like to gold or silver, or stone, graven by art and man’s device.” In an important sense it is true that “we can know God only as we know ourselves,”* that is, “it is only through some general analogy of the human with the divine nature” that we come to even an approximate conception of the Deity. “It is the knowledge which we have of ourselves, as spiritual beings, which suggests the idea of God, who is a Spirit.”† But this conception the soul

* Hamilton.

† M’Cosh, *Intuitions*, p. 435.

gives as one of the first results of the analysis of its own existence, properties, and powers. Hence the idea of a supernatural being or power is developed in all minds; and theology—the doctrine of God—is almost the first form of all literature.

Beyond this partly intuitive and partly inferential conviction by which the soul is inspired with a belief in the existence of something above the sphere of itself and of the world of matter, Imagination is at play in the sphere of the invisible, peopling that with spiritual existences and powers, and clothing with a supernatural character those natural phenomena which reason cannot explain. Thus in the ruder ages of the world, and in the primitive stage of any people, the wind, the forest, the stream, the thunder, the stars, and all unusual phenomena become voices of invisible spirits to the soul of man. As the child loves to personify inanimate objects—as a doll or a toy—so the mind of the race, in its infancy, affected by external appearances; conversing mainly with the outward world, many of whose phenomena are mysteries; “mistaking physical effects for independent or voluntary powers;” supposing that everything in nature must possess some principle of life like that in man; “ascribes every unusual appearance or agency to a distinct being or power operating directly or immediately in that event.*” Hence the general belief of the ancients in *demons*, in good and evil spirits encompassing the earth, producing events beyond the power of man, influencing the minds of men, and guiding their destinies for good or evil, holding direct intercourse with men, and officiating as messengers between men and the gods—in a word, directing and controlling all the unexplainable events and forces in nature.

But this belief, though more prominent in the infancy of a people than in an advanced stage of intellectual culture, is by no means confined to ignorant minds. Socrates believed that his genius, or demon—a supernatural being having him in special charge—prescribed for him his lot, whether pleasant or adverse, and told him what to do and what not to do.

Germanicus, as Tacitus narrates, was bewitched by means of images and billets on the wall, into the idea that he was doomed to die, and under that fatal impression expired in agony. Even the exhumed remains of human bodies seemed to haunt his chamber with presages of a doomed soul.† Thus a general, distinguished alike for his valour on the field and his calm and equable temper in private affairs, was vanquished

* See this illustrated in Eschenberg's *Manual of Classical Literature* (Fiske), p. 84, seq.

† Tac. *Annals*, ii., 69, 70.

by the images of his own fancy. Lord Bacon shared in superstitious fantasies which his philosophy could not explain.

This power of the Imagination to vivify the belief in supernatural agency, is seen also in the phenomena of *dreams*. Mr Owen regards these as of so much importance to his argument for ultra-mundane interference, that he occupies nearly a hundred pages of his book with the mere narration of remarkable dreams, from which he does not even attempt to draw a philosophical conclusion. He implies, however, that the Biblical doctrine that "in the visions of the night men occasionally receive more than is taught them throughout all the waking vigilance of the day," is verified by the experience of modern dreams. Nothing is more common in that experience than incongruous combinations of material forms and substances; and also the sensation of being uplifted, as it were, from the body, and of performing acts such as flying, which are impossible in the flesh. Indeed, in sleep the mind seems often to come into direct contact with the spirits of the absent or the departed. Virgil's "two gates of sleep" still open in our dreams—"true visions" flying heavenward, while the "infernal gods" send false dreams into the soul, through "a shining portal of ivory."* The Egyptians regarded dreams with a religious reverence, as communications from the gods. Even Bishop Taylor refers some dreams to demons, good or bad. And every one has felt at times a strange power over his nervous system, proceeding from his last night's dream, or has marked some coincidence as its fulfilment.

" This trow I, and say for me,
That dremes significance be
Of good and harm to many wights
That dreme in their sleep o' nights
Full many things covertly,
That fall after all openly."—CHAUCER.

Of the same class are mysterious mental suggestions or forebodings, and sudden coincidences of events with our thoughts, our wishes, or our fears; as when while thinking of an absent friend one suddenly meets him; or while unaccountably troubled on his behalf receives news of some catastrophe to him. These occurrences, so frequent in our experience, give to the imagination a wide sphere of activity in the spirit world, and foster in many a belief in a supernatural agency concerning the minutest affairs of life.

The death of a friend sometimes clothes these impressions of the supernatural with a living presence and power. When a loved one has passed into the invisible, the heart's affections torn out by the roots, like the tendrils of plants that live on

* *Æneid*, vi., 895.

air, shoot forth eagerly upon every side, that they may imbibe some exhalation from that spirit world, and fasten themselves again upon the now impalpable object of earthly love. In such a frame the mind becomes in a measure lost to the material world around it, and absorbed in that spiritual world to which its dearest hopes and affections have been transferred. Tennyson, in his matchless lament for his lost friend, gives utterance to the cherished thought of grief, that the lost one is still nigh.

No visual shade of some one lost,
But he, the Spirit himself may come,
When all the nerve of sense is numb,
Spirit to Spirit, Ghost to Ghost.

Thus that belief in the supernatural which is common to mankind, becomes intensified through the influence of imagination, of visions, and of grief, until in certain phases of experience or emotion the mind is prepared to look upon everything outside the pale of present knowledge as a manifestation from the spirit world. Priestcraft and jugglery, taking advantage of this tendency, have in all ages found credulous adherents and unconscious victims. In particular, this tendency to a belief in the supernatural has been turned to account by the priests of idolatry, in impressing the vulgar with their own sanctity as the confidants of the gods. The Egyptians were accustomed, when any part of the body was afflicted with disease, "to invoke the demon to whom it was supposed to belong, in order to obtain a cure. In cases of greater moment oracles were consulted." An old papyrus found in Egypt mentions divination through a boy who acted as a *medium*, and who practised his art by means of "a bowl, a lamp, and a pit," as do the modern magicians of the country. It also contains recipes for obtaining good fortune, for discovering theft, and for causing misfortunes to an enemy. It is supposed also by some that the ancient Egyptians had a knowledge of animal magnetism, and used this in their magic.*

With the ancient Orientals, the magician and the soothsayer were regular attendants at court. The Israelites were forbidden to tolerate "one that used divination, or an observer of times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer." To pervert the belief of mankind in the supernatural into an agency of superstition, falsehood, and idolatry, was an "abomination to the Lord." Yet this offence has been repeated in almost every age of the Christian era.

Christ himself predicted that pretenders to his name and power would "shew great signs and wonders, and, if possible, deceive the very elect." Paul describes the apostate Anti-

* Wilkinson and Lane.

christ as coming with "signs and lying wonders." Passing over the legendary miracles of the early Christian centuries, we trace the rise and growth of the Papal delusions and the Mahomedan imposture; we find the most civilized nations of antiquity conducting wars and other enterprises according to omens in the heavens or voices from the gods through the augurs; we find in the Middle Ages astrology deciding the fortunes of individuals and of empires; we find our Saxon ancestors in England holding communication with the invisible world through witches and mysterious symbols; we find the clergy using supposed supernatural agents as a means of intimidating and governing the laity; and in Puritan New England we find, according to Cotton Mather, examples of "witch" agency that surpass even the marvels of modern spiritualism. It is evident, therefore, that a belief in the Supernatural is one of the strongest influences affecting human thought and action. Perverted as this has been to subserve the vagaries of Fanaticism and the terrors of Superstition, it becomes of the highest importance to the philosopher and the divine to restore this faith to its normal action:—to mark the boundary between a rational belief in the Supernatural and that fanciful or superstitious interpretation of mere natural causes and effects which has made religion itself the minister of fear or of lust.

We cannot set aside the phenomena of modern Spiritualism by ignoring its alleged facts, or by denying the possibility of a supernatural event. The absolute disbelief of the Supernatural is contrary to man's nature. Goethe describes himself as "destitute of faith, yet terrified at scepticism." "Scepticism," says Mazzina, "is the suicide of the soul." Man must believe or his soul dies. The invisible world surrounds us as an atmosphere, and the soul can no more exist in perpetual unbelief than the body can exist in a perpetual vacuum. To shut up the soul within its material confines, giving no vent to imagination and faith, compelling its heaven kindled fires to feed upon grosser objects of sense, is like shutting up the body in a cabin without a flue, to warm it with the fumes of charcoal. A delicious calm steals over the senses; care and trouble are forgotten; the subtle vapours close the ear against the noise of the tempest without; and all that could stir the activities of nature is hushed in the stupor of approaching death. Activity is the law of life to the soul. The stupor of scepticism is not the antidote it needs for wayward fancies and superstitious fears. That which is alleged to be Supernatural must be tested by laws of evidence which reason can apply. It is the aim of this article to lay down such laws or principles as shall fairly test the phenomena of Spiritualism in comparison with the miracles recorded in the Bible.

1. We must agree with Hume, that the uniformity of the course of nature creates a strong presumption against the occurrence of a miracle, and therefore any testimony to a supposed supernatural event should be subjected to the most careful scrutiny. But when Mr Hume goes beyond this, and affirms as a maxim of philosophy, that "no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle," he begs the whole question by assuming the *impossibility* of a miracle, which is the very point in dispute. To prove that there never has been a miracle, he stoutly *asserts that there never has been a miracle!*

True, he limits the remark by adding that "a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion." But that does not alter the question of fact; for if the miracle can be proved *at all*, it certainly can be made to serve as the foundation of religion, quite as well as any other fact *not* miraculous. To take his own illustration.

"I own," he says, "that otherwise there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony. . . . Thus, suppose all authors, in all languages, agree that from the first of January 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: that all travellers who return from foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction; it is evident that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived.

"But suppose that all the historians who treat of England should agree that on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the Parliament; and that, after being interred for a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed England for three years; I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that followed it; I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it neither was, nor possibly could be real. You would in vain object to me the difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgment of that renowned Queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice: all this might astonish me; but I would still reply that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature."*

* Hume's Inquiry on Human Understanding, Sec. x.

Now the fallacies of this position are manifold. Foremost of all is the assumption that there can be nothing in the universe that David Hume does not understand ; that nothing is possible to Almighty power that does not fall within the range of his philosophy.

Next is the fallacy of making the non-experience of one man a test of the experience of another. "No amount of testimony," says Mr Hume, "could make it credible that one rose from the dead, since that would be contrary to the universal experience of mankind." But the very point in dispute is whether such a fact *has* fallen within the experience of those who testify that they have seen it. The testimony of a thousand men that they did *not* witness a certain phenomenon cannot silence the testimony of ten men that they *did* witness it, unless the thousand were present at the same time and place with the ten, and with the same facilities of observation. No amount of testimony from people who were asleep in their beds, could weigh against the testimony of watchmen and others as to the fact of a great meteoric shower in the year 1833. The question, in such cases, is not one of non-experience against a strange experience, but one of *the credibility of the witnesses* and their competence to judge of that to which they testify. And here comes in a consideration which Mr Hume entirely overlooks, but which is vital to the whole question, viz., Does the occasion warrant the alleged miracle? The reasons for incredulity, in the supposed case of the resurrection of Elizabeth, are valid, not because human testimony could not prove such a miracle, but because there is no object that should call for such an act of Divine power ; and God does not trifle with his creatures, or amuse them with shows. If we believe in *God*, as Mr Hume professed to do, then He who created man has power to raise a dead man to life ; and if God should do this, the fact would be capable of being testified to ; the difficulty, therefore, in believing the supposed resurrection of Queen Elizabeth would not lie in the impossibility of such an event—for it is clearly within the power of God—nor in the impossibility of supporting it by *testimony*, if it did occur ; but in the absence of any reason comports with the Divine nature that should seem to warrant the miracle, and therefore the suspicion of some deception, or of a trance or other state simulating death. But the miracles recorded in the Bible were wrought upon occasions and for objects grand enough to warrant such direct interference of Divine power, to challenge attention to the event or the truth, and to certify it as from Him. The *moral* reason for the miracle, which appears in the nature of the circumstances, so far removes the antecedent improbability, that the miracle is as fair a subject of testimony as any other event.

Mr Owen's reply to Hume, while in some points quite forcible, fails through his attempt to reduce the miraculous within the sphere of general laws. He contends that "no human experience is *unalterable*;" and that it is hazardous to say that in any given particular, human experience "has hitherto been *unaltered*." He denounces as "monstrous" Hume's assertion of the infallibility of his own experience. But at the same time he affirms that "accumulating experience discredits the doctrine of occasional causes and the belief in the miraculous." Hume rejects the miracles of the Bible as incredible; Owen accepts as facts the events recorded as miraculous, but refers them to a general law, which he seeks to establish as well for the phenomena of modern Spiritualism. The moral argument just stated, corrects both these extremes; but while it maintains the Scriptural miracles in their integrity as *miracles*, it precludes the idea of supernatural agency in the phenomena of Spiritualism.

II. Our second canon or criterion is this: When the manner, the substance, or the object of a professed revelation is unworthy of the dignity of the Divine character, or of the proper dignity of man himself, as a religious being, there is good reason to suspect that the communication is not supernatural. In the miracles recorded in the Bible there is nothing that strikes one as beneath the character of the Supreme Being. These miracles are never frivolous in themselves, and are never performed for an insignificant object. But the moment we pass beyond the canon of the Scriptures, we find in the marvels adduced to confirm any so-called revelation an air of the puerile and the ridiculous. In the legends of heathen mythology respecting gods and heroes, in the legends of the Jewish rabbins respecting Adam, Abraham, and Moses, in the legends of Mahomet, his birth, his visions, his miracles, and his death, and in the legends of the saints in the Church of Rome, there is a combination of the marvellous with the frivolous which contrasts strongly with the simple yet sublime and awe-inspiring impression of the miracles narrated in the Bible. In the Scriptures, when God communicates with men, it is by visions grand and startling, or beautifully simple; by a bodily appearance of resplendent majesty; by fire from heaven, or light more effulgent than the sun; and the communication is made in an audible voice, and with articulate sounds, or by the inspiration of thought, of which the subject is made conscious by the miraculous power attending it. But in modern instances, where Mr Owen regards the spirit world as in communication with the physical, this is revealed by "ultra-mundane" knocks, or by "ultra-mundane" antics of the furniture, or by impalpable and unverified apparitions.

Indeed, upon first view, the contrast between these classes of phenomena is like that between Moses and the Adrians, the Blitzes and the Andersons of his time. According to the Scriptures, when God would communicate with men he writes his law upon tables of stone, that all may read it—his glory, the meanwhile, visible to assembled thousands—or he makes known his will by a vision, or other special revelation, to some prophet whom he clothes with miraculous power, in proof of his commission, and that prophet speaks openly and intelligibly in the name of the Lord. But in other systems where man claims to have received a communication from God, or to have established a connection between himself and the spirit world, he goes to an obscure place, without witnesses, and there digs up plates covered with mysterious characters ; or he puts somebody into an artificial sleep, and by a series of well-ordered questions elicits sundry cabalistic and oracular responses.

According to the Scriptures, when God makes a special communication to man it has respect to something of sufficient importance to justify an interposition by miracle ; the destruction or salvation of a city or a nation—the success of a conflict in which the honour of Jehovah as the representative Deity of the nation is concerned—the fulfilment of promises or predictions already made, or the utterance of some new promise of yet higher moment to mankind ; or chiefly it relates to the deliverance of man from sin and misery, and to his future and eternal blessedness. For such reasons has God at times interrupted the course of nature, and by miracles arrested the attention of the giddy, pleasure-loving world. But in later “ultra-mundane” manifestations, disembodied spirits are brought into communication with men, that they may answer such inquiries as are within the compass of mountebanks and strolling fortune tellers ; such as how old one is, what was the age of one’s grandmother, or his great grandaunt when she died—whether she died of influenza or the gout—whether one has been or is to be married—or whether there shall be a storm to-morrow. Communications which so belittle both man and the world of spirits, have been fitly styled, by a great satirist, “a rat-hole revelation.”

III. A third criterion by which to test supernatural communications, is that they should not conflict with antecedent revelations which have been attested by miracle and confirmed by experience. God must always be consistent with himself. Truth revealed from God must always be consistent with itself. But what is the character of the revelations that are spelt out, syllable by syllable, or, rather, letter by letter, from the alleged rappings of visible spirits ? A mongrel jargon made

up by combining the book of Revelation with the fantasies of Swedenborg. Where they accord with the Bible they fall vastly below its sublime conceptions ; but they often contradict the Bible, and equally contradict each other. The new revelations do not advance upon the Bible as the New Testament is an advance upon the Old ;—they contradict its explicit teachings ; they cannot be reconciled with its philosophy of a future state and its principles of morality. Either these are false, or the Bible is false. Either these are false, or God is a deceiver ; for he cannot deny himself. What new idea or truth fitted to reform and elevate mankind, what view of God, of moral purity, of the future state, of the world of spirits, *in advance of what the Bible reveals*, has come to light through any “medium” of Modern Spiritualism ? Much of the reported conversation of spirits would be a bore in any respectable company, and would cause them to be sent to the lowest form in a *Grammar* school. How contrary is all this to the style and subject-matter of the Scriptures !

If we apply these three canons to the alleged supernatural communications of Spiritualism, we find that they cannot bear such a test. There is nothing in the nature or the occasion of these communications to remove the antecedent presumption against supernatural interference in the affairs of this world. There is nothing in the manner or the tenor of these communications which answers to the dignity of a revelation from God to men. And the general purport of these communications is not in harmony with antecedent revelations from God, whose claims are authenticated by miracle and experience.

In criticising more narrowly the phenomena of Spiritualism, we notice,

1. Their remarkable *uniformity*. They all lie within a limited range of physical effects ;—knockings and rappings from unknown causes, the mysterious moving of tables and other articles of furniture, the spelling out of words, sentences, questions, and answers by responsive knockings ; an irresistible impulse to write upon some “ultra mundane” theme, or in an “ultra-mundane” style ;—these and similar phenomena, varied by an occasional apparition or mesmeric vision, or “second-sight,” recur in all the records of modern Spiritualism. This uniformity—provided the phenomena are real—points toward some law, to be ascertained by induction—whether, as Owen argues, an “ultra-mundane” law, or one developed in due course of nature, remains to be seen. But the Supernatural events recorded in the Bible cover a wide range of effects both in the physical and the spiritual world. Seldom

do these repeat themselves. They do not run in cycles, nor follow any apparent law. Each miracle has its own immediate occasion, as well as a general connection with the whole chain of evidences for a Divine Revelation. Each miracle is complete in itself as a Supernatural event apart from any series of such events; and the miracles taken as a whole contravene in almost every particular the course of nature—the laws of fire, air, and water, of bodily sustentation and disease, of dew and rain, of day and night and the annual seasons, of planetary motion, of growth and decay, of life and of death. The miracles of Christ prove him to have been Master of the worlds of matter and of mind, of all living organisms, of all physical laws and occult causes, and of a power superior to these, and able to modify, to suspend, or to direct each in its own sphere. These phenomena of Spiritualism are the merest parody upon the Supernatural element in the Bible.

2. There is nothing in these phenomena at all parallel to the effect of a miracle upon the course of nature. Hume defines a miracle to be “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.” Mr Owen justly criticises this definition as failing to express the ordinary conception of a miracle, and proposes to amend it in these terms: “A miracle is a suspension, in a special emergency and for the time only, of a law of nature, by the direct intervention of the Deity.” At the same time he discards the notion of any such direct and extraordinary supernatural intervention, and refers all “ultra-mundane” manifestations to cyclical or to “change-bearing” laws. He quotes approvingly the saying of Archbishop Tillotson, that “it is not the essence of a miracle (as many have thought) that it be an immediate effect of the Divine power. It is sufficient that it exceed any natural power that we know of to produce it.” This tendency to depreciate the singularity of Biblical miracles by referring them to general laws, has been quite evident in the tone of some modern Christian apologists. A writer in the *Quarterly Review** affirms that “the Christian miracles are not—properly speaking—violations of the laws of nature, but departures from the *present* ordinary course of nature, in conformity with an arrangement originally so made as to let these be *signs* evidencing a divine mission.” Hase, in his “Life of Jesus,” admits the historical evidence of the miracles of our Lord, and remarks,—

“The means which Jesus used may have stood in some relation to magnetic phenomena. But the miraculous power of Jesus appears far more like intelligent mastery of nature by the soul. The soul of man originally endowed with dominion over the

earth, recovered its old rights by the holy innocence of Jesus, conquering the unnatural power of disease and death. Here, there was no violation of the laws of nature, but, on the contrary, the disturbed order of the world here recovered its original harmony and truth. Even the wonderful power exercised over external nature may be reduced under the same law, and be understood according to the analogy of an accelerated process of nature.”*

Such a view of miracles divests them of authority as the distinct seal of God to a Revelation. Unless we maintain that “an extraordinary divine causality belongs to the essence of the miracle,”†—that a miracle is an effect which arrests, suspends, or contravenes all known laws of nature within the sphere of the miracle, and, therefore, an effect which only the immediate power of God could produce—there is no longer any force in the appeal of Christ to his miracles as a final proof of his divine mission. If miracles are only an opportune conjunction of “ultra-mundane” laws with the course of Nature as known to us, or the manifestation of some higher law in the cycle of events,—as the great clock of Strasburg not only points out the hours, but also at long intervals tells the signs and motions of the heavenly bodies—then the whole idea of the active personality of God in human affairs is lost from our theology. Uniformity of sequence in the natural world argues a *law* of Nature. But God is neither “a part of nature, nor a personification of the powers of nature;” and, therefore, if God should at any time suspend or interrupt the known course of nature, this would not be, as Trench unhappily concedes, merely “a higher and purer *Nature*, coming down out of the world of untroubled harmonies into this world of ours”—“the lower *law* neutralized, and for the time put out of working by a *higher*”‡—but the immediate *power* of God—his direct volition as distinguished from the laws which he has ordained—visibly suspending or counteracting all the known *laws* of Nature within the sphere of that interposition. *All* the miracles of the Bible will stand this test. *None* of the phenomena of Spiritualism can abide it. Christ three times raised the dead, under most diverse circumstances;—once from the bed of death, once from the bier, once from the grave—in each instance by his own *volition* counteracting all the *laws* of death and decay. Spiritualism can produce nothing parallel to this control over Nature, which argues the direct interposition of the Divine Will. The miracles of Christ “form no coherent cycle of phenomena, but were distinct, immediate, occasional acts of Divine Power.

* Life of Jesus, Sec. 48.

† Trench on Miracles, cap. 2.

‡ *Miracles*, Chap. IV., *Olshausen* says, “The real miracle is *natural*, but in a higher sense;” yet he finds its cause in “the *immediate* act of God.”

3. The alleged supernatural phenomena of Spiritualism are often exhibited for mercenary ends or to gratify curiosity; but neither imputation lies against the Supernatural in the New Testament. Who could conceive of Peter and Paul as giving exhibitions of "ultra-mundane" power at two shillings a-head; or inviting a select circle to observe the "ultra-mundane" phenomena of which they were the accredited Mediums? Their treatment of Simon Magus, of Elymas the sorcerer, and of the Pythoness at Philippi, shews what attitude they would assume toward modern miracle-mongers. No air of mystery is thrown over the supernatural events recorded in the New Testament; no declaration makes them conspicuous; the miracle is never an ultimate object, but always has a benevolent or moral end. In the miracles of Christ, "there are no thaumaturgical displays, such as we always find with professed wonder-workers. There are no marks of violent effort. He never, in performing a miracle, seems to go out from his usual and normal condition. So far as his methods of action are concerned, there is nothing to separate these from his other works."* The phenomena of Spiritualism shrink from comparison here.

4. Besides, these phenomena and their results are insignificant and unavailable for good. We have already characterised the narrow and really mundane cycle in which they move. They serve no purpose beyond the wonder of the hour. Mr Owen admits, touching a large class of these phenomena, that "whether coming to us from another world or from this, not a few of them contain a large mingling of falsehood with truth, and a mass of puerilities alternating with reason," p. 38. But who would dare affirm of any miracle of the Bible that it was either trivial or worthless?

5. The "ultra-mundane" developments of Spiritualism produce no permanent, useful impression; but the system itself has led to gross immoralities of life. "By their fruits ye shall know them" is a test of moral systems as well as of personal character. The legitimate tendency of the Bible is always to produce intellectual enfranchisement and moral purity. This is because its system is the truth of God certified as only God could certify it. But Mr Owen admits, concerning the manifestations of Spiritualism, that—

"It is one thing to determine the ultra-mundane origin of a communication, and quite another to prove its infallibility, *even its authenticity*. . . . At times communications alleged to be ultra-mundane disclose evil passions; occasionally they are characterised by profanity; and some of them, even where no fraud or conscious agency is presumable, exhibit unmistakable evidence of a mundane

* Morison, *Notes on Matthew*, p. 127.

origin or influence ; as all candid, sensible advocates of the spiritual theory, after sufficient experience, freely admit. Hence, under any hypothesis, great danger to the weak-minded and the over-credulous. This danger is the greater, because men are wont to take it for granted that, when we shall have demonstrated (if we can demonstrate) the spiritual character of a communication, there needs no further demonstration as to the truth of the facts alleged and the opinions expressed therein." Pp. 38, 39.

The effect of a system which is authenticated from such doubtful sources and by such exceptionable evidences, and yet which claims a supernatural or ultra-mundane origin and sanction, must be demoralizing to the intellect, the conscience, and the life. Upon this point we have the emphatic testimony of a most philosophical and eloquent expounder of Spiritualism, Rev. T. L. Harris of New York. In a sermon preached in London—which was erroneously reported as a recantation of Spiritualism—Mr Harris thus enumerates "some of the avowed teachings of latter-day spirits, received, avowed, and practised by some of their associates."

"First, that nature is God. Second, that God is an undeveloped principle in process of evolution. Third, that the Jehovah of the Bible was an unprogressed, ferocious human Spirit, who deceived ancient media. Fourth, that the Lord Christ was but a natural man, possessed of the ordinary mediumistic faculty of spiritual clairvoyance. Fifth, that our Lord's theological and psychical teachings were but the reproduction of false mythologies. Sixth, that he held His power, great or little, because under the influence of spirits of departed men.

"Shall we go farther in this catalogue ? We open, then, another series of spiritual teachings. First, that all things originate in nature. Second, that man is a development of the animal. Third, that the first parents of the human race, born of brutes, were themselves but savages of the most degraded type. Fourth, that all things and beings are governed by natural necessity ; that man possesses no freedom in the moral will. Fifth, that there is no retrogression, through moral disorders, either of the individual or of the species. Sixth, that vice is virtue in its unprogressed or germinal condition ; that sin is an impossible chimera. Seventh, that self-love is the very centre and fountain-head of all human affections, the chief inspirer of all human or spiritual actions. Eighth, that the Spiritual World is but a theatre for the continued evolution of human spirits, under the perpetual force of nature working through self love.

"Or again, turn to another series :—First, that the Scriptures are not the Word of God, and that the Divine Spirit never vouchsafed utterance to man. Second, that the Messiah, our Redeemer, is not in any sense a Saviour of the soul from sin, death, and hell. Third, that He never met in combat our spiritual foe ; that he never over-

came or cast out destroying spirits from their human slaves; that He never made an atonement or expiation for sin; that he never rose in His reassumed humanity from the grave; that he never ascended, glorified, to Heaven; that He never communicated the Holy Ghost.

"Or again, to another :—that there is no judgment to come beyond the grave, wherein the Lord shall adjudge the departed according to their deeds, the good to eternal life, the evil to everlasting punishment and the second death; that all men, irrespective of formed character for evil here, become the delighted and immortal inhabitants of a perpetual elysium; that broad is the way and wide is the gate that leadeth unto life eternal, and that none can help to find it.

"Or again :—and now as touching a moral point of social interest. Spirits declare that there is no marriage, as a natural law, but that polygamy, or bigamy, are as orderly as the monogamic tie. But, if this be not frequently inculcated, what shall we say to the broadly put forth declaration of spirits, that the marital tie is the result of natural affinity, and that where two are legally conjoined, and the wandering inclinations of either rove to another object, the new attraction becomes the lawful husband or the lawful wife.

"Now, as a man of honour, I pledge myself, and stand committed to the assertion, that, through mediumistic channels, all these things are taught as emanating from the spirits; and worse is taught, if possible, to those who penetrate the inner circles of the gloomy mysteries, where the old magic is born again.

"If I strip the veil from this horror, I have a right, as a Christian teacher, so to do. I but reiterate matters which the best informed of Spiritualists are as fully acquainted with, as that media speak, or that tables move. I do it, not for the purpose of exciting prejudice against the spiritual movement of the age, but rather because I view these things as the confused shapes and images of darkness, rolled up from Infernus, to delude as many as possible into a corrupt and ruinous belief in spiritual sorceries and delusions; and so to disgust all, whom they cannot thus infatuate, as to induce them to remain *neutral* in the great coming fight between the Spiritualites of Heaven and the Spiritualites of Hell. Murder, adultery, suicide, and the most revolting blasphemies, may be traced directly to the communications and puttings forth of impure spirits, both in ancient and in modern times. But those which the most external observer can thus trace, serve merely as the visible bubbles that shew the current of the dark, deep stream."

This is no caricature of modern Spiritualism, no slander upon it from an enemy. Mr Harris has not renounced his belief in "physico-spiritual manifestations from the spirit world." On the contrary, he goes to the extent of asserting, from his personal knowledge, that through angel-messengers the seemingly dead are kept from being buried alive, and mariners saved from shipwreck on the wide ocean, and travel-

lers preserved from equal perils—from fire, or from explosions, or from the fall of buildings, or the infection of pestilences, on land; that *invisible hands strike from the grasp of the physician unsuitable medicines that might affect the life*; and the sick are healed through the presence and influence of angels. He believes that “there is a Divine element in the spiritual manifestations of our day,” and that God is restoring to believers the apostolic gifts of miracles and of disarming spirits. And yet, with this firm faith in the system as a whole, Mr Harris says, expressly, “Within my own observation, *by far the greater portion of physico-spiritual manifestations have been connected with a very palpable dishonesty on the part of the spirits.*” He fully believes in demoniacal influence, and that this is chiefly exercised through the medium of the Spiritual “circle,”

“And, so far as I am able to judge, the majority of such instances are traceable to the habit of attending *séances*. I earnestly call attention to this point. The man of iron nerves may say that he feels no change of state. He may laugh down the idea of peril. With him it is but a question of time. The vitriol that eats in a day through iron wire, has but to continue the process to eat through the iron bar. It is slow, this poison, but it is sure. I lift the alarm cry of danger. It is not safe, unless there is a divine use and value in the act, and so unless it is in the order of Providence, either to submit to a spirit’s influence, or to participate in circles for spirit manifestations. . . .

“As with a voice from the secret chambers, where the fair, the young, the virtuous, the unsuspecting, from the mere habit of attending the *séance*, have felt the foul contact of the larvæ from perdition, I cry to all, ‘Shun the *séance*, where the unregenerate, or giddy, or worldly, or volatile and careless medium, officiates as the middle stander and opener of the door between the natural and unseen worlds. If you do not wish to become yourselves demoniacs, shun the place and shun the occasion.’ To the pure, to those who would remain pure, I can hint such reasons as, if uttered, would make every ear tingle. From what Heathen Spiritualism, before Christ, was, we may infer what modern spiritual intercourse, pursued in an irreverent, or curious, or worldly spirit, is liable to become.”

Of the class of spiritualists who frequent the *séance*, Mr Harris declares that “the vast majority of them have been morally injured and degraded by the practices of their faith.” This testimony is unprejudiced and unimpeachable. Mr Harris insists that all spiritual manifestations must be tested by the “Biblical doctrines of the fall, and of the redemption through the incarnation of a Redeemer.” He maintains “the absolute Divinity of the Christian religion.” And yet he adduces these doubtful and pernicious manifestations to illustrate and con-

firm the Divine Word This eloquent Irvingite—for such he seems to be—appears to lose himself in the “fire-rainbows and opalescent gleams of his own inner nature.” He tells us that while he would not deny “the possibility of communications through media, beings of a high, pure, and truthful character,” yet, that wit, humour, the love to mystify and torture, fondness for dramatic display, huge self-esteem, and ever-changing states of chimerical speculation, often distinguish them; that gossip and small talk, with the perpetual desire to intermeddle in human relations, are also characteristics; that those spirits whom results prove deceptive, are able to simulate virtue and give advice to a good life—which is often the case on earth; and that spirits profess every shade of religious doctrine, whether Pagan or of the various denominations in Christendom; while *no profession is a guarantee for the purity of their aims or the sincerity of their declarations.* This testimony relieves us from the responsibility of pronouncing upon the moral character of the system.

IV. It only remains that we should suggest some possible modes of accounting for the phenomena of Spiritualism without resorting to the theory that they are supernatural. First of all, it should be noted that the alternative does not lie between explaining how these phenomena are produced and recognising them as products of a supernatural agency. The unexplainable is not necessarily supernatural. Mystery and miracle are not synonyms. Mr Owen himself condemns the unphilosophical habit of “talking of wonders and miracles, when there is a question only of natural, even if ultra-mundane phenomena; and the indiscriminate mixing up of the reliable with the apocryphal,” p. 22. Many of the feats of Houdin, the French magician, were mysterious and marvellous, even to the most acute and vigilant spectators. But he has now revealed, in his autobiography, not only that these were mere tricks—which every intelligent person knew before—but also how, in many instances, the trick was performed. Some of his feats were the result, namely, of astonishing power of memory, and calculations in which Houdin and his son had exercised themselves most studiously. They had studied all manner of coins, the alphabets of all languages, the names of all principal characters, the dates of all important events, and had acquired the power of taking in at a glance all the objects in a room in their relative positions; then by some secret communication between themselves, which Houdin admits but does not explain, he and his son were enabled to perform feats of “second sight” which rival all the marvels of clairvoyants and mediums. The unexplainable is not of

necessity supernatural. We would not class the alleged phenomena of Spiritualism indiscriminately with Houdin's performance; but we know of nothing among these phenomena which cannot be referred either to *Imagination*, to *Trickery*, or to *Occult Causes in Nature*.

The power of imagination to invest the Supernatural with a seeming presence, and to associate the Supernatural with unexplained phenomena, has been sufficiently adverted to. One notable illustration will suffice. Hardly any body in this age doubts that the Salem witchcraft was a sheer delusion, fostered by imposition; or that the judges and divines who dealt with it as a supernatural phenomenon took leave of common sense under an excited imagination. One who should now declare his belief that the madcap doings of the Salem witches were the result of supernatural agency, would himself deserve to be condemned as a witch and consigned to Bedlam. But what were the phenomena which were then ascribed to supernatural agents? Cotton Mather gravely narrates such as the following:—

“Bricks, sticks and stones were often thrown at the infested house by some invisible hand; a long staff danced up and down in the chimney; and when two persons laid it on the fire to burn it, it was as much as they were able to do, with their joint strength, to hold it there. An iron crook was violently, by an invisible hand, hurled about; and a chair flew about the room until at last it lit upon the table, where the meat stood ready to be eaten. A chest was by an invisible hand carried from one place to another, and the door barricaded, and the keys of the family taken, some of them from the bunch where they were tied, and the rest flying about with a loud noise of their knocking against one another. While a man was writing, his ink horn was by the invisible hand snatched from him; and being nowhere able to find it, he saw it at length drop out of the air down by the fire. A woman went down into a cellar, when the trap-door was immediately, by an invisible hand, shut upon her, and a table brought and laid upon the door, which kept her there until the man removed it.”

Thus the very performances which are now adduced to prove the agency of spirits were in vogue among the witches of Salem two hundred years ago. Indeed, the craft do not seem to have made any progress in two centuries. We would not affirm that all these alleged occurrences were figments of the imagination; some of them probably took place by the skill of impostors; but the terrific power of imagination and of nervous excitability shewed itself in persons who fancied themselves possessed of a devil, and who reported as actual occurrences what were shewn to be only the excited fancies of their own brains. And the credulity of the age is seen in

the testimony of judges and divines to such facts as proof of the devil's agency. The present generation look upon the Salem witchcraft as a miserable imposture and delusion. Yet "the thing that hath been, it shall be." Mr Owen forbears to cite the Salem witchcraft in evidence of his theory of "ultra-mundane interference;" yet there is nothing so complete and pertinent as a parallel to Spiritualism, and nothing that is better accredited by the number and character of the witnesses.

The power of imagination and of nervous sympathy to engender or simulate extraordinary appearances, is strikingly displayed in the physical phenomena of the Irish revival. Ignorant and excitable persons, wrought up to an intense pitch of emotion by powerful exhibitions of truth, or by a pungent sense of guilt, shew symptoms of hysteria, or, in the vividness of their conceptions, behold Christ and Satan as engaged in a personal struggle for the soul. Bystanders find themselves strangely affected by these phenomena, and sometimes become subjects of a nervous influence which they were regarding merely as spectators. The contagiousness of belief so frequent in spiritual "circles," *en rapport* with a well-trained medium, may often be explained upon the same principle of nervous sympathy. Some bodies seem to be strung with "ultra-mundane" nerves.

The power of imagination to enact its own conceptions is shewn in some of the dreams recorded by Mr Owen—especially in Smellie's vision of his friend Greenlaw upon the anniversary of his death;—"the longing of the day having engendered the vision of the night." Many of the cases of "apparitions," "hauntings," "reappearances after death," &c., cited by Mr Owen, rest upon the authority of a single witness, and are certified only by the pertinacity of his belief. Few of them are better attested than that recent phenomenon familiarly known as "The Ghost of the Astor Library." That the staid and unimaginative Bibliopole who has charge of that institution should have encountered at midnight, in an unfrequented alcove, the shade of a deceased physician, almost a stranger to the library and the librarian, and that the apparition should have been thrice repeated, on successive nights, may be a question either of optics, of psychology, of pneumatology, or of mere indigestion. No one but an avowed Spiritualist would think of treating this optical personification of the deceased Doctor as a genuine apparition from the spirit world. Yet not one-half of the facts adduced by Mr Owen in proof of "ultra-mundane interference" have so respectable a sponsor as the custodian of the Astor Library, or so much claim upon our faith as has the spectre of its alcoves. We do

not doubt that there are scores of persons of a certain temperament, who, if led silently and timidly through those gloomy corridors, could now be made to see the very apparition which thrice confronted the undaunted librarian.

Coincidence is a feature upon which the imagination seizes with avidity. The occasional correspondence of an event with a dream, a mental suggestion, or the revelation of a Medium, is remarked as a proof of some mysterious if not supernatural connection between the two ; while the lack of correspondence, or even the positive contradiction, in the majority of cases is quite overlooked. This is a consideration of much importance in comparing the phenomena of Spiritualism with the supernatural events recorded in the Bible. Paley calls attention to the fact that the alleged miracles of Paganism and of Romanism are *tentative*; "that is, where, out of a great number of trials, some succeed ; and in the accounts of which, although the narratives of the successful cases be alone preserved, and that of the unsuccessful cases sunk, yet enough is stated to shew that the cases produced are only a few out of many in which the same means have been employed ; as in ancient oracles and auguries, in which a single coincidence of the event with the prediction is talked of and magnified, while failures are forgotten, or suppressed, or accounted for."* Many of the phenomena of Spiritualism belong to this class.

That there is *trickery* connected with some of the alleged manifestation from the spirit world, will not be denied. Messrs Harris and Owen both admit this ; and the impostures of professed Mediums have often been detected and exposed. We are far from affirming that *all* the alleged phenomena of Spiritualism are deceptions, or that all who are concerned in the exhibition of these phenomena are in collusion with the Medium. On the contrary, we concede that even the professors and actors in spiritual *séances* may be as honest and sincere in their faith as we claim to be in ours. Nor can we doubt that if Judge Edmonds, for example, should become satisfied that Spiritualism is but a systematic imposture, he would be as forward to renounce the system and expose it to the world, as was Cicero to abjure the college of Augurs, when he found there tricks and deceits that his noble nature spurned. We cannot impeach the veracity of so many independent witnesses to the same class of facts. *Some* of these effects, doubtless, are produced by causes other than the collusion of interested parties to impose upon the spectator. But a large proportion of the alleged phenomena of Spiritualism shrink and disappear before a truly scientific investigation.

* Evidences, Part I., Prop. 2, chap. 1.

When a Committee of the French Academy investigated the claims of the wonderful Medium, Angelique Cottin, she utterly failed to meet the tests of science. Chairs and tables which had frisked about the room in the presence of a common class of spectators, became suddenly decorous when the Committee proposed to scrutinize their movements. The needle that had vibrated to her invisible magnetism, refused to stir. A like result appeared upon the scientific investigation of Spiritualism in Cambridge. In well-attested instances persons have feigned a leaden sleep, and by sheer force of will have endured without a sign of sensation the test of ammonia applied to the nostrils, and the surgeon's probe puncturing the hand. Such well-sustained impostures warrant us in moderating our faith in a class of phenomena produced only in certain circles, and commonly in the dark. With respect to very many of the spirit communications of these times, the simple tests proposed by the poet Saxe are all sufficient:—

“If in your new estate you cannot rest,
But must return, Oh, grant us this request;
Come with a noble and celestial air,
And prove your titles to the names you bear.
Give some clear token of your heavenly birth;
Write as good English as you wrote on earth;
And, what were once superfluous to advise,
Don't tell, I beg you, such egregious lies.”

Occult natural causes offer still another explanation for the phenomena of Spiritualism. This theory admits the reality of certain phenomena, but refers them to unknown laws of nature. That certain physical effects are produced without any assignable cause must be admitted. And to admit such facts and to confess our ignorance of their solution, is the part of true philosophy. In the world of matter and in the world of mind “there are phenomena which, though unable to refer to any known cause or class, it would imply an irrational ignorance to deny. Yet some have obstinately disbelieved phenomena in themselves certain and even manifest, if these could not at once be referred to already recognised causes, and did not easily fall in with the systems prevalent at the time. . . . There are two sorts of ignorance; we philosophise to escape ignorance, and the consummation of our philosophy is ignorance; and the pursuit of knowledge is but a course between two ignorances, as human life is itself only a travelling from grave to grave. . . . The highest reach of human science is the scientific recognition of human ignorance. The grand result of human wisdom is only a consciousness that what we know is as nothing to what we know not, an articulate confession, in fact, by our natural reason, of the truth declared in revelation, that *now* we see through a glass darkly.”*

* Sir W. Hamilton.

Had Prof. Morse or Prof. Henry, with his knowledge of magnetism and its powers, lived in the Middle Ages, when a belief in supernatural appearances was well-nigh universal, how easy would it have been for him to have worked upon the superstitious fancies of the ignorant ; to have run a telegraphic-wire around a cathedral, and have made this indite messages from the spirit world ; and thus to have kept up a correspondence between the faithful on earth and their friends in purgatory ! How such a contrivance would have replenished the coffers of Leo. X. ! Any natural philosopher who had discovered a law of nature unknown to the multitude, might impose *ad libitum* upon their fancies and their fears. And so there may be *occult* causes, causes which no philosophy has yet discovered, but which some future Franklin or Morse may detect, which will explain phenomena that now perplex men of science, and that some call supernatural. We should not be in haste to bring in elements from the invisible world to solve the passing events of this. It is more philosophical to suspect a natural law than a supernatural interposition. Only when the moral reason is great enough to demand such intervention, may we trouble ourselves to sift the testimony as to an alleged miracle. Mr Owen himself has well discriminated between the belief of facts and the acceptance of theories. "It is one thing to refuse credit to the reality of the phenomena, and quite another to demur to the interpretation put upon them. We may admit the existence of comets, yet deny that they portend the birth or death of heroes." We may admit the phenomena of Spiritualism without thereby admitting that they are the result of a spiritual agency exterior to our world. Mr Owen does not pretend to have established his theory of "ultra-mundane interference" by the philosophical method of induction. After wandering through so many pages we are led to this impotent conclusion—"As to the proofs of the agency upon earth of these Invisibles, I rest them not on any one class of observations set forth in this volume, not specially on the phenomena of dreaming, or of unexplained disturbances, or of apparitions whether of the living or the dead, or of what seem examples of ultra-mundane retribution or indications of spiritual guardianship, but upon the aggregate and concurrent evidence of all these. It is strong confirmation of any theory that proofs converging from many and varying classes of phenomena unite in establishing it." Pp. 508, 509. But Mr Owen's facts, many of which are most feebly attested, fall far short of his theory. Others may already be classed under known physical or psychological laws. How much of the mystery of animal magnetism is dispelled by recent experiments in hypnotism by means of a

shining substance, holding the eyes steadily asquint toward the ridge of the nose? Some equally simple experiment may solve much that appears mysterious in Spiritualism. For the rest, we shall not invoke the Supernatural, even under this lucid exposition from Mr Harris.

"Divinely given vision is not to be confounded with the faculty of perceiving odylie emanations of the magnet or of the human body. The latter is merely natural sight, carried to a finer degree. The magnetic and electric emanations, which play, with corruscating flash and sparkle, around all natural objects, are themselves a finer quality of diffused matter. But this refined and diffused matter, however brilliant, is not of the quality of spiritual substance; therefore, when the Holy Spirit opens the eyes of the spirit-man, these fire-rainbows and opalescent gleams of inner nature are still below the visual plane: he sees over them, past them, and through them—nor is he bewildered by the intervening substances."

We fear that we are doomed to abide in "the visual plane" of mundane realities. The reticence of the Bible upon all details of the future state and the spirit world is worthy both of our respect and of our imitation. The Scriptures never address themselves to mere curiosity, nor attempt to interpret the "unutterable things."

When Lazarus left his charnel-cave,
And home to Mary's house returned,
Was this demanded—if he yearned
To hear her weeping by his grave?
Where wert thou, brother, those four days?
There lives no record of reply,
Which telling what it is to die
Had surely added praise to praise.
From every house the neighbours met,
The streets were filled with joyful sound;
A solemn gladness even crowned
The purple brows of Olivet.
Behold a man raised up by Christ!
The rest remaineth unrevealed;
He told it not; or something sealed
The lips of that Evangelist.—TENNISON.

We cannot break that seal of silence by knocking at the door of death, nor can we believe that it is given to spirits to break it by knocking on the other side. God has spoken, and if we hear not Moses and the prophets, neither would we be persuaded though one rose from the dead. The belief that Mr Owen derives from the spirit world would obliterate those sharp distinctions of moral character upon which the Bible so much insists; would efface from the calendar of the Future the Day of Judgment and retribution; and would leave all men to a progressive law of development through Hades into Heaven. The moral lessons of his theory would alone condemn it as not of God.

ART. V.—*New England Theology Historically Considered.*

WHAT has come to be called New England theology has some special claims to a careful examination. It is not a provincialism, but a Biblical, and, historically considered, a broad and truly Catholic theology. No period of equal length, since the apostolic, has been marked by more earnestness in the ministry, or higher mental and moral culture. None has been distinguished by more thorough Biblical study, or profounder theologic thought. None has been at a greater remove from vassalage to the schools, except to that in which Christ is the Teacher ; less wedded to a dead logic, or more at one with the divine reason,—the living Logos in the theopneustic Word, and the believing heart of the Church. Further, the materials for a constructive hand are ample and within reach, though fast being consumed by the teeth of time. There are many works of more or less value on the general church history of New England ; but besides a few pamphlets and periodical essays, there is not, we believe, a single treatise on the history of its doctrines. The limits of this article will allow us only a glimpse of the earlier portion of this history.

But what is meant by New England theology? By what logical and chronological termini is it bounded?

For the most expanded definition which we have met, we are indebted to a distinguished theological writer in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. "It signifies," he says, "the formal creed which a majority of the most eminent theologians in New England have explicitly or implicitly sanctioned, during and since the time of Edwards. It denotes the spirit and genius of the system, openly avowed or logically involved in their writings." "It includes not the peculiarities in which any one of his followers differed, as some of them did, from the larger part of the others ; but it comprehends the principles, with their logical sequences, which the greater number of our most celebrated divines have approved expressly or by implication." "It was first called New-light Divinity, then New Divinity, afterwards Edwardean, more recently Hopkintonian or Hopkinsian."*

Parts of this definition are just, and tend to free the subject from the confusion and mistakes in which it is often involved. It is certain that New England theology does not consist in what is *peculiar* to Pres. Edwards, or any one of his followers, as what is *peculiar* cannot also be common. Nor for the same reason can it consist in those points in which any one of his followers differed from the others, although these idiosyncrasies

* *New England Theology*. -By Edwards A. Park. *Bibliotheca Sacra*. Vol. 9, p. 174.

are sometimes mistaken for that substance of doctrine, of which they are often only unseemly excrescences. But it is equally evident that "the formal creed" which goes back only to "the time of Edwards," comprehends historically but a fraction of the New England theology, and therefore allows only a partial view of the subject. It includes less than half of the historic period of the New England churches, and leaves out of account some of their noblest divines. These churches had a theology in their earlier as well as in their later history, substantial, Biblical, and well defined. And the definition that shuts out the one hundred and thirty years of the earlier, and limits New England theology to the one hundred of the later history, is essentially defective.

We cherish Jonathan Edwards with reverent respect as an acute metaphysician—a profound Christian thinker. The great truths of the Gospel, as he found them in the Bible and the Christian consciousness, became in his personal experience a living realism. God wrought them as life-forces into the very centre of the soul, and they subdued and fashioned into the divine likeness his whole mental and spiritual being. Then, by the grasp of his giant intellect, he lifted them up from under the feet of trampling foes, separated them from corrupting accretions, and in the fervour of his warm heart breathed them forth afresh to the world in new forms of logic and of love. But we cannot accept him as the *father* or founder of New England theology. It is older than Edwards, and made him, and not he it. It is the parent and he the offspring.

Upon this restricted view of the subject rests the statement that New England theology "was first called New-Light Divinity, and then New Divinity." When the Pilgrim Fathers came to New England they brought their theology with them, which they first called, sometimes the Reformed, sometimes the Puritan, and sometimes Calvinistic. And nearly a hundred years before the term "New-Light" was applied to it, the churches and ministers adopted the Westminster Confession as the symbol of their theology, and its witness both as to its Biblical and historical character.

Accepting, however, what aid the above definition brings us, we suggest the following as briefer, and perhaps better meeting the demands of the subject.

New England theology is that system of Christian doctrine which has been continuously held by the congregational churches of New England generally, and been taught by a majority of their pastor and teachers.

This gives the entire historic period, and lays open the whole field. It indicates the precise nature of the inquiry as simply a question of fact. It leaves nothing to conjecture or

speculation. There is little room for logic and less for originality. We are not required to *make* a New England theology, nor permitted even to mend it, should that seem practicable. As historians we are to shew what it is, how it came to be what it is, and how it has operated. This will require us carefully to separate from the system, not only what is heterogeneous, but what is simply incidental to it. It also demands the impartial historic conscience, lest the results should be vitiated by dogmatic preferences.

A reference to two or three preliminary principles will facilitate our more full entrance upon the subject.

First, *Development in Theology.* We refer to none of those processes of spontaneous generation by which theological systems are produced out of the nebulous matter, which revolves confusedly in the brain of seers, revelators, and speculatists. All true development starts from a given doctrine in the infallible Scriptures, and nothing can be evolved which is not there involved. The legitimate church doctrine is all in the Bible, and has been always there. "The true idea of Scriptural development," says Trench, "is that the Church, informed and quickened by the Spirit of God, more and more discovers what in the Holy Scriptures is given her. She has always possessed what she now possesses of doctrine and truth, only not always with the same distinctness of consciousness. She has not added to her wealth, but she has become more and more aware of that wealth; she has consolidated her doctrine, compelled thereto by the provocation of enemies, or induced to it by the growing sense of her own needs."* With this idea of development and progress in theology, the fathers of New England were perfectly familiar. They held it as fundamental. It was their main motive to thorough study of the Bible. It constituted the reason for their separation from those who trusted more to the magic of forms, and prelatical dicta, than to the divine word. Theology is developed, as each generation brings out into more regenerative fulness and force the purely Bible doctrine, as it takes to itself more and more the genuine outgrowths of the Christian Scriptures, and casts away the noxious accretions and *misgrowths*.

2. The use of theological *terms.* The same truths are sometimes expressed in such different language, that they seem like different doctrines, and opposing doctrines are often presented in a diction so similar that they appear identical. Arius and Pelagius gave striking examples of versatility in a refracted and equivocal use of theological language; while Athanasius and Augustine, Luther and Calvin, taught the Bible doctrines of the Trinity, divine sovereignty, and man's dependence, in

* *Hulsean Lectures*, p. 76.

terms which have been erroneously taken to imply Tritheism, that God is a tyrant, and man a machine. And why? Partly because those who thus judged did not well know what tritheism and fatalism are, and partly because they did not take into account the changes which language undergoes in the progress of the ages. They failed to observe that the contents of the earlier theologic language is, without loss, transferred into the forms of the later; a process by which old truths, and even Christianity itself, passes down through the successive generations in vehicles that change, while itself is changeless. In disregard of this, the free will which Augustine opposed has been mistaken for that freedom of the will which Edwards maintained; while it was only another term for that plenary ability to good which they both were agreed in discarding. For the same reason, the phrases, "the guilt of Adam's first sin"—"sinned in him," and the term *imputation*, as employed in the Calvinistic system, have been construed as teaching the literal transfer of Adam's sin, as a personal *act*, to his posterity; while it was the sinful *nature* induced by that "act" which, according to the divine covenant and the law of reproduction, was transmitted from father to son "by ordinary generation." The framers of that admirable compend, the Shorter Catechism, held no such pantheistic absurdity as the *personal* unity of the human race—the identity of the progenitor and the progeny, that they acted in him before they existed; though they did teach the Pauline doctrine of a generic unity of the race, and the representative position and character of the first man. Calvin explicitly denies that the personal guilt of Adam, as an individual, pertains to his posterity. He says, on the contrary, that they "are rendered obnoxious to punishment by their *own* sinfulness, and not, as if they were innocent, by the sinfulness of another;" that "Adam's sin is imputed to them, because he infected all his descendants with the corruption into which he had fallen."* God imputed Adam's sin to his posterity, says Edwards, by giving them a sinful nature like his. That nature was reckoned to him, because by his sin it came upon him; and to them, because, for the same reason, it came upon them.

3. The *derivative* character of theology. There are certain patronymics which, when applied to a doctrine or system, denote its pedigree and family relations, and hence its derivative character. For this reason, with nothing of the *odium theologicum*, the best writers speak of some doctrines as Arian or Sabellian, some as Pelagian or Arminian, and of others as Augustinian, Lutheran, or Calvinistic. The history of doctrines discloses the existence of two great families in theology, the

* *Institutes*, Book ii., Chap. 1, Sec. 6 and 8.

Pistis and the *Gnosis*, the believing and the speculative. The one does not embrace all the truth, nor the other all the error. There is some faith among the speculative, and some idealism among the believing. The derivative character of the one leads along the line of an illustrious descent, to its origin with the apostles and their Lord. The lineal branches of the other came to an end some centuries this side of the apostolic age, in Sabellius or Socinus, Arius or Arminius, whose substantive doctrine, so far as not derived from Scripture, was original, and because original, erroneous. A desire to be the originator of essentially new Christian doctrines has ever been a leading cause of corruption in theology. It is the great practical error, the original sin, by which the race fell. Hence the propagators of *such* original theology must be reputed as in regular succession from that distinguished preacher whose first converts were made in Eden.

It is with respect to its derivative character, that the term Calvinian or Calvinistic has been so generally applied to New England Theology. It has acknowledged the Genevan divine as a clear, faithful, and, at his time, greatly-needed expounder of the Bible doctrines. Luther opened the door of the Reformation. He assailed the veteran errors of the Romish Church, which had cast down the more veteran truths. He took the divine Word out of the dead languages, and from under the ban of Papal interdiction, and gave it to the people in their own tongue, free as the air they breathed. He made catechisms for the children, and hymns for the aged, and called men back from the Pope to Christ. "Everything in the Lutheran movement proceeded," says Neander, "from Christ as the central point." But he lacked constructive skill. He was mercurial in temperament, sometimes rash; and in matters of ecclesiastical reform, went only half-way from the Breviary to the Bible.

Calvin took up the Reformation where Luther left it. His first work was to give an apologetic statement of the Bible doctrines. But his great work was to obtain correct principles of exegesis, and by these a pure interpretation of Scripture. He examined the various hermeneutical systems, from the *three* senses of the sacred books, held by Philo and Origen, to the theory of seven, taught by Angelome, and found them fanciful. They were in his judgment only so many processes of *eisegesis*, by which the Bible can be made to have as many senses as its interpreter wishes, and to give out just the meaning which he puts into it. He eschewed all this as putting man's mind in the place of God's. If God has buried his will in three, four, or more occult senses of Scripture, which must be successfully stripped off as husks from corn, or as resinous

dressings from a mummy, before it can be reached by his erring children, the Bible is not so much a revelation of that will, as its concealment. Calvin's common-sense decided against all this as reflecting on the paternal wisdom and love of God. He tried the simpler and easier method of supposing that the Bible has a meaning—a definite, divine content, easily apprehended by those who are willing to take it as a rule of faith and guide to heaven. Hence, in ascertaining that meaning, he sought for the genuine, *native* import of the language. He combined the grammatical and the historical construction, the literal and the figurative. He took into account the subject-matter of revelation, its drift, and the necessity of a similarity of moral state between the author and the students of the Book. Then applying the rule of Melancthon, "*Cœlestis veritas simplissima est, quam collatis Scripturis e filo ductuque orationis licet assequi*," he made the Bible its own interpreter. This was Calvin's key to the Scriptures, and a critical examination of his voluminous commentaries will shew with what scrupulous care he applied it. He bent nothing to suit a philosophy; he twisted nothing in support of a dogma; he forced nothing, but took for his doctrine and philosophy just what the Bible and the whole Bible gave him. "This great merit," says an honest but not over-friendly critic, "lies in a comparative neglect of dogma."

The *Institutes*, though apologetic at first, as matured, was constructed on the idea of a pure interpretation of Scripture. He drew out the divine contents of the Word, and placed them in such life-relations of harmony, logical, moral, and æsthetic, as evinced the doctrines of revelation, like every thing else which God has given, to be subject to heaven's first law of order. And it is the purely Biblical elements which gave it such an attractive and formative influence over thinking minds and loving hearts in that period of struggle for the higher life, and has given it the same influence in similar struggles. It is the judgment of history, approved by no partial arbiters, that Calvin "seized the idea of reformation as a real *renovation* of human character;" "that the moral purification of humanity, as the original idea of Christianity, is the guiding idea of his system; that it was "strong in the possession of the exalted idea of moral duty and purity of life," and hence "tended to take up into itself all the moral worth existing any where in Protestantism."*

It is in this broad view that New England theology takes John Calvin into its genealogical line, as also the more conveniently to distinguish itself from the various laxer branches of the theological family. But it endows him with no super-

* *Westminster Review*, No. 137.

natural illumination, except as regeneration is supernatural; and it invests him with no Rabbinical authority, but places all authority in matters of faith where he placed it, in the Word of God. It holds him as a man, and no more; erring, and, as having actually erred, in many things; yet not so grossly as his enemies aver, the formula of whose antipathetic faith is, "Calvin burnt Servetus." This, however, he did not do. Nor did he even approve of it. When he heard that the Assembly had decided upon it, he made the most strenuous efforts to prevent it by the substitution of a milder form of punishment. It was the error of the age, and not any special severity of the individuals, from which the Reformer had not at that time wholly escaped, but from which, later, his principles effected an entire deliverance in that religious tolerance of which the Calvinists of Holland made the first experiments.

In regard to the derivative character of New England theology, the following particulars will disclose its relation to the Calvinistic family, and lead to its rise as New England.

1. The influence of the school at Geneva, and of the *Institutes*, became a formative force in no small part of the Protestant communion. In Switzerland and large portions of Germany, in Holland, Scotland, and England, it awakened the interior life of religion against an oppressive external rule. It presented a living divine Word as the regenerative instrument, instead of a code of dead papal decrees. It developed God's truths in the hearts of the people, to the ejection of man's lies. So repressive was it of the reactionary vigour of the Romish Church, which followed the Reformation, and so wakeful at the watch-fires of freedom, that even its enemies admit that "Calvinism saved Europe."

2. The English Reformers were of the Calvinistic school in theology. The Thirty-Nine articles drawn up by the Convocation in 1562, were framed, in some parts almost *verbatim*, from the catechism of the Genevan teacher. The *Institutes* was adopted as a text-book in the Universities, "being read," says Neal, "publicly in the schools, by appointment of the Convocation." "The Articles of the Church of England were thought by all men, hitherto, to favour the explication of Calvin."* In the reign of James I., Peter Heylin represents two divines who had embraced the Arminian doctrines, as like Elijah, who regarded himself as left alone to oppose a whole world of idolaters.

Unfortunately, the English Reformers were obliged to establish their doctrinal system in a church, that was not only under episcopal jurisdiction, but so wedded to the state that the temporal prince was equally the head of both. The strong tendency of the reformed doctrine to civil and religious free-

* Neal's *History of the Puritans*, i. pp. 109, 110.

dom brought it into conflict with the royal and prelatical assumptions of despotic power. James said in the Hampton Court Conference: "If the Non-Conformists are allowed, I know what will become of my supremacy; for, no bishop, no king: I will therefore have one doctrine, one discipline, one religion, in substance and ceremony. I will *make* them conform, or I will harry them out of this land, or else worse."*

3. The Puritans were in doctrinal harmony with the English Reformers and the standards of the English Church. "All the Protestant divines in the church," says Neal, "whether Puritans or others, seemed of one mind hitherto, about the doctrines of faith."† It was not from the doctrines of the established church that the Puritans dissented, but from a politico-priestly dictatorship, which decided the garb of the preacher to be more important than the Gospel, forms to be more vital than faith; which placed the decrees of the king above those of the King of kings. Against this they maintained a living and most salutary protestation.

4. The settlers of New England were in theological agreement with the Puritans who remained in Old England. They were of that branch called Independents or Congregational Brethren.

Robinson, a part of whose church came in the May-Flower to Plymouth in 1620, abandoned the established church and his fellowship in the university in 1604. During his residence in Holland, the Arminian controversy arose. He was at Leyden when the States-General, in 1609, attempted to secure a conference with Arminius, and an open avowal of his opinions. On the election of Episcopius, the distinguished disciple of Arminius, to the professorship in the Leyden University, Robinson attended his lectures, and made himself thoroughly acquainted with his system. Then he brought both sides to the tests of Christian experience and the Word of God, and became more than ever convinced of the correctness of the Calvinistic doctrines. His acquaintance with Biblical and historical theology, and his power of clear and conclusive reasoning, called him into a kind of leadership. A man was needed who could stand up in oral debate with the corypheus of the new theology. At the earnest solicitation of his friends in the university he consented to meet Episcopius in a public discussion. For three days the old and the new theologies tried their forces on the field of Biblical and philosophic conflict, and with such results as proved the inexpediency of attempting to put new wine into old bottles, and kept many who had drunk old wine from straightway desiring the new, for they said the old was better.

* Neal, i. p. 232.

† Neal, i. p. 209.

It has been claimed that John Robinson belonged to the progress-party in theology, was "extremely liberal in his ideas," and that, had he lived in the nineteenth instead of the seventeenth century, he would have been a Unitarian. That he was "liberal" in the sense of large-minded and of a truly catholic and charitable spirit, and made some advance upon his age in matters of church government and religious toleration, is readily admitted. But his discussion with Episcopius and his *Defence of the Doctrine of the Synod at Dort*, in historical fairness, remove all doubt respecting the complexion of his theology. They place him in direct antagonism to the Pelagian and Arminian tendencies of that and of every other age. They shew that he regarded all movement in that direction as retrogressive, and that the further light, which he taught the Plymouth pilgrims might break from the Scriptures, would be confirmatory of that which, for sixteen centuries had been shining out from them—in short, that it would be *light*.

Brewster, Bradford, and Carver, the leaders of the Plymouth movement, were of one heart and mind with Robinson. They received the doctrines of the Gospel generally as presented by Calvin and the Synod of Dort, with an intelligent and practical earnestness. Thus the first of the New England churches stands out distinctively as Congregational and Calvinistic.

The second company that arrived at Salem, 1629, with Higginson, Skelton, and Endicott at their head, symbolized in doctrine with the Puritans whom they left in Old England and the Pilgrims whom they found in New England. So did their successors who settled in Boston and vicinity, and those who went on into Connecticut. The Confessions of Faith adopted by the first churches in Connecticut, says Trumbull, were "strictly Calvinistic."

We are thus brought by a simple historical process to what we may call the derivation, or rise of New England theology. Two events will disclose the provisions made for its preservation and purity—the endowment of a *College* and the adoption of a common *Creed*.

Education, in the sense of a thoroughly liberal culture, is a natural outgrowth of the Puritan theology, as it is of the Christian Scriptures. It tends to develop the primal and higher elements of human nature, by the moral forces of the divine.

The polity of Calvin, it is admitted by the Anti-Calvinistic *Westminster Review*, "was a vigorous effort to supply what the revolutionary movement wanted—a positive education for the *individual soul*. Government, at Geneva, was not police but *education*—self-government mutually enforced by

equals upon equals.”* And Cotton Mather states, that “the primitive Christians were not more prudently careful to settle schools for the education of persons to succeed the more immediately inspired ministry of the Apostles, and such as had been ordained by the Apostles, than the Christians in the most early times of New England were to form a college, wherein a succession of a learned and an able ministry might be educated.”†

Hence, as early as 1636, the General Courts of the Massachusetts Colony appropriated four hundred pounds “towards the building of something to begin a college.” Two years later, John Harvard, a minister of Charlestown, died, from whom the college took its name, because he left the larger part of his estate, about eight hundred pounds, for the same purpose. *Christo et Ecclesiæ* was the motto given to the new institution, and “the promotion of piety and godliness” its main end. And the founders firmly believed that a sound Scriptural theology was the fittest means to this end. President Quincy, in his *History of Harvard College*, intimates that they did not establish it, as we may suppose they would have done, on the distinctive Puritan theology. “We should expect,” he says, “on opening its several charters, to find it with certainty, anchored, head and stern, secure against wind, tide, and current, more firmly on all the points which at that day were deemed fixed and immutable.” A professor in Yale College, reviewing the book, pertinently remarks: “And on inquiry, no disappointment follows. The most unqualified Calvinism was introduced into the College for the purpose of promoting ‘piety and godliness;’ and the whole institution was placed under the care of a clergy thoroughly Calvinistic. Calvinism may have gradually vanished from Harvard, but the founders, notwithstanding, may have done whatsoever they thought necessary, or whatsoever they could have done, to perpetuate it.”‡

New England’s free schools, equally with its colleges, are the product of its theology. The minister and the school-master, the meeting-house and the school-house, from the beginning have been coincident, often identical in its history. Its theology has ever maintained a persistent war with ignorance, as the mother of error and vice, and therefore it places an open Bible in the hands of the people. It lays its account with intelligence, and creates both demand and supply, particularly in the ministry.

Hence the theological institutions of New England, as well as its free schools and colleges, are the product of its theology. It taxes largely the reflective and rational powers, and by the

* No. 137. † *Magnalia*, i. p. 6. ‡ *Biblical Repository*, No. 44, p. 387.

sublimest problems of ethical and theologic science stimulates and develops them into the most successful activities. By restricting the human processes to achievements fairly within the province of the finite powers, it prevents the waste of these powers; and by subordinating its processes to the divine reason, it is in the highest degree rational, yet at a great remove from Rationalism. It is not a pool within which lazy pilgrims may bathe, and part with nothing but "the filthiness of the flesh," but a spring of clear, running water, ever fresh and full for thirsty souls. Nor is it a dead dogma, a stereotyped *summa theologiæ*, but the living product of the earlier ages, not inapposite to the latter; a *via vitæ*, in which each soul must walk for itself; a divine science which every disciple must learn by living it. By making a new life its starting point in education, and moral perfection its goal, the New England theology puts the whole man into the process, and continues him in it till old things have passed away and all things have become new.

As a truly catholic theology, its history takes in the most divinely patient sufferers and the most heroic actors. It has produced, as well the most effective workers in the vineyard of the Lord, as the most humble and spiritual worshippers in his temples. The dark ages came on as the light of Christ's primal doctrines was eclipsed by the miasms of the speculative philosophy, and of a sensuous, self-aggrandizing unbelief. As these great truths have shone out again, the ages have become bright in their divine lustre.

The formal *installation* of this theology as New England, took place in the adoption of the Westminster Confession of Faith by the Synod at Cambridge in 1648. This Confession had just been issued in England, combining the results of the best exegetical, historical, and experimental theology of the seventeen preceding centuries. They tried it thoroughly by the Scriptures, as the only authoritative source of doctrine. They also tested its principles by antiquity, and found them no older than the New Testament, and no newer than the New. Its chief doctrines they discovered to be grounded on the great facts of history, and the laws of divine Providence. Starting from the most ancient times, they had taken up into themselves, of the good and true, the best contributions of the successive periods. The streams of Christian life which have been deepening and widening in their course, had flowed mainly through channels which these principles had laid open. The moral greenness, fertility, and beauty which have gladdened the earth, had sprung up along their banks; while the opposite principles led the student of history, through the stagnated life-blood of the church, to its grave-yards and

charnel-houses, and employed him with dismal post-mortem examinations.

The result of this careful scrutiny is stated in the preface to the Cambridge Platform. "This Synod, having perused and considered, with much gladness of heart and thankfulness to God, the Confession of Faith published of late by the reverend Assembly in England, do judge it to be very holy, orthodox, and judicious in all matters of faith; and do therefore freely and fully consent thereunto, for the substance thereof. Only, in those things which have respect to church government and discipline, we refer ourselves to the Platform of Church Discipline, agreed upon by this Assembly. And being likewise called upon by our godly magistrates to draw up a public confession of that faith which is constantly taught and generally professed among us; we thought good to present unto them, and with them to our churches, and with them to all the churches of Christ abroad, our professed and hearty assent and attestation to the whole Confession of Faith (for substance of doctrine), which the reverend Assembly presented to the religious and honourable Parliament of England."*

This symbol becomes now the accredited exponent of the New England Theology. It was taken as a public confession of that faith which was then "constantly taught and generally professed in New England," and as "very holy, orthodox, and judicious." As such it was adopted by the General Court and the churches. It is not indigenous, but after the sojourn of a quarter of a century it was formally naturalised. Its generation lies back among the facts of primal history; but its regeneration here, as evinced in the Christian faith and life of our fathers, constituted it a native of New England, as by such re-births it is yet to become cosmopolitan. It is identical with the standards of both branches of the Presbyterian Church in America, and in substantial agreement with the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Episcopal Church in this country and in England.

The adoption of this formula of faith in 1648 closed what may be regarded as the first period in the history of New England theology. Though the churches were harmonious in recognising the digest of Christian doctrines as the practical and living faith that governed them, and through the period was distinguished by a degree of social purity and public morality, as the result of its doctrines, exceeded in no age or community, yet some disturbing elements appeared in it, growing out of the lingering errors of the past, or the prejudices and the passions of men. Three of these, from their

* Cambridge and Saybrook Platform, pp. 13, 14.

connection with the theology of New England, and the character of the early churches, deserve a passing notice.

1. The seditious movements of Roger Williams. Mr Williams came to Plymouth in 1630 ; and after remaining there two or three years, and producing disturbance, he removed to Salem and became minister of the church there. His offences, for which he was banished, were not religious, as is often represented, but political, and struck at the very existence of the body politic. He denied the validity of the charter from which the government derived its being, and which gave legal authority to its acts. He refused the oath of allegiance, and taught others to do the same. He instigated Endicott, a magistrate and a member of his church, to cut the cross out of the national flag, which waved as a sign of the authority of the Colonial Government and of its loyalty to the sovereign. These were the crimes, for persistency in which he was removed from the colony. And according to the most enlightened sentiments of that age or this, was there not, in his offences and their infantile weakness, a cause ? “Can we blame the Massachusetts colony,” says the Honourable John Quincy Adams, “for banishing him from within their jurisdiction ?” In the annals of religious persecution is there to be found a martyr more gently dealt with by those against whom he began the war of intolerance, whose authority he persisted, even after professions of penitence and submission, in defying, till deserted even by the wife of his bosom ; and whose utmost severity of punishment upon him was only an order for his removal as a nuisance from among them ?”

Connected with these political heresies, were various religious notions and practices, which verify Cotton Mather’s representation of him as “a preacher that had less *light* than *fire* in him.” He demanded that the Colonial churches should renounce all communion with the English Church ; and when they would not, he enjoined upon his church to refuse fellowship with them. And when crossed here, he excommunicated his own church so far as he had power, by refusing to administer to it the Lord’s Supper, or to commune with it. And because his wife would not follow him in all this, but continued to worship with the church, he renounced fellowship with her also. He withdrew himself from all Christians of the age as having lost the grace of faith and love, and he conceived, says Hubbard, “that God would raise up new apostles, and expected to be one himself.”

2. The Antinomianism of Mrs Anne Hutchinson.

Mrs Hutchinson was the wife of Mr William Hutchinson, and for a time was in good repute. She established a meeting

in her own house, at which she repitched the sermons she heard from the ministers at the Thursday lecture and on the Sabbath, with her improvements and applications. Gradually her sense of the importance of her mission increased, and of her qualifications for accomplishing it, until it grew into the claim of a divine commission and of supernatural revelations. Her errors were of the Antinomian type—that sanctification or personal holiness is no evidence of justification; that assurance is by immediate revelation, or the conscious indwelling of the Holy Spirit; that there is no such thing as inherent righteousness in believers, but only a putative one; and that revelations were given to her, and might be expected by those who receive her doctrines; and that these are of equal authority with the Scriptures.

As Mr Cotton, and the majority of the church in Boston of which she was a member, at first, from misapprehension, agreed with her in the main, the theological questions were referred to a General Council, which met at Newtown, in August 1637. In the result, various opinions of Mrs Hutchinson and others were condemned as erroneous and injurious. All signed it but Mr Cotton, who, however, disliked them all, except two or three, and regarded some of them as absurd and even blasphemous.

Mrs Hutchinson continued persistent and progressive in her course. She left the meetings of the church, and set up what she regarded as a purer doctrine and worship in her own house. At length she was put on trial before the court, where she declared her revelations, in which it was made known to her that she "should be delivered and the court ruined with their posterity." She was then pronounced "unfit for their society," and required to leave the colony. The trial by the church, which followed, was protracted, and marked by great leniency, and attended by the personal efforts of some of the most excellent ministers and laymen in the colony, but with no satisfactory results.

In obedience to the injunction of the court, she removed to Rhode Island. There she remained two or three years, when, after the death of her husband, from discontent with the people or the place, or with both, she went to the Dutch country beyond New Haven. The next year, she and all her family, which were with her, being sixteen in number, were killed by the Indians, except one daughter, who was carried into captivity."*

It was a sad termination of the earthly career of one whose introduction to the colony was so full of promise, but whom

* Hutchinson's History, i. p. 72.

unwomanly ambition and the adulation of the weak made mutinous against the wisdom of the ancients, and desirous of theological leadership. The abundance of her revelations exalted her above measure. But the issue is impressively cautionary to those who cry, "Revelation!" "The Spirits!" and set these up against the lessons of history and the Bible. It pronounces her imprecatory utterances respecting the court and the Church mere fantasies—only the expectations and *desires* of the revelator. It places them with like minatory visions and revelations of Manes, Montanus, Münzer, George Fox, Swedenborg, and the seers of modern spiritism, who say, "The Lord saith, and the Lord hath not sent them," who "follow their own spirit and have seen nothing." The ruin which she denounced against the court and the churches, in the course of divine Providence, came upon herself and her family; and the deliverance which she expected, was signally bestowed upon them, in a history of two centuries of almost unexampled divine favour.

Time, the trier of all things, proves how perilous to one's reputation for intellectual and moral soundness are all such revelations and predictions concerning the expiration of the old doctrines and the destruction of the old church. There have been very many of them during the Christian centuries, from those who have said:—"That which they build, if a fox go up, he shall even break down their stone wall." But they have always failed, and discredited the head or heart of their authors, and signally disproved their claim to divine commission. The church meanwhile has lived on. It extends itself every year with its time-tried doctrines into a diviner beneficence and beauty. It takes stronger hold of the fallen race of man. It roots itself deeper and deeper in the heart of humanity, vitalizing it more and more with faith and love, and lifting it up to heaven and God.

3. The last of the three causes of disturbance, which arose in the first period of New England theology, was more protracted in its duration and pernicious in its effects—the principle of *church membership*, as essential to the rights of freemen.

It was ordered by the Court of the Massachusetts Colony, in 1631, that none but church members should be admitted to the freedom of the body politic. The effect of this order was hardly so much to unite the Church and State as to make them identical. The reasons for this order are found, partly in their idea of government as a theocracy, according to which the civil and spiritual powers were brought into organic unity. Our fathers wished to have a Christian State, as well as a Christian Church. But they did not see that a corporate

union, an identical membership, would defeat rather than secure their object. They were led to this course in part, also, by a class of malecontents who were displeased with the constitution and government, both of the church and the state, and who, had they been admitted to either, might have sought a reconstruction of both, after the model of Charles I. and Archbishop Laud in England.

In 1646, those who were aggrieved by this law petitioned to the Court to be admitted to the rights and privileges of citizenship, or to be released from taxation. The petition was not granted. But when, a little later, the baptized children, if unregenerate at their majority, found themselves ineligible, not only to office, but even to membership in the state, the real difficulties began to appear. The next movement was made from this point of view. It was claimed that all baptized persons, not scandalous in life, were members of the church, and therefore entitled to the rights of freemen. The Court looked upon this with more favour; and, as it was an ecclesiastical question, assembled a council of the churches for its consideration. The Council, which met at Boston in June 1657, allowed the claim as reasonable, and proposed to repair the wrong by letting the aggrieved into the state through the door of the church. But their judgment was not approved by the churches, and the question continued unsettled till the Synod of 1662. Then it was decided that "confederate, visible believers in particular churches, and their infant seed, are church members"—that the "infant seed, when grown up, continue members of the Church, and under its watch, discipline, and government." And further, that, if understanding the doctrine of faith, they gave their assent to it, and owned the covenant, and were not scandalous in life, they could claim baptism for their children, and thus secure membership in the church for them also.* In this manner they shut themselves up logically to baptismal regeneration, or to the legitimacy of church membership for the unregenerate.

In these early proceedings originated what is known as the Half-Way Covenant. To mitigate the evils of a political mistake, in 1631, the fathers of New England made a far more serious ecclesiastical one in 1662. They virtually removed the door of the church from its hinges, to make a highway for men of the world into the state. It was a backward step towards the Romish idea that baptism constitutes church membership. It transferred the work of the church from the conversion of men to the regulation of their manners. It reversed the order of all life-processes, and sought to change the nature of the evil tree by chemical experiments upon the fruit. As a conse-

* Mather's *Magnalia*, ii. pp. 339-40.

quence, conversions decreased, both of the baptized and the unbaptized, and the unregenerate membership came at length to exceed the regenerate. Baptism was administered with increasing frequency to the children of those whose only claim to church membership was that they owned the covenant and were not openly immoral. Meanwhile, as this class did not come to the Lord's Supper, the number of those in the church who received that ordinance was constantly diminishing.

This was felt to be an alarming evil, and to require a speedy removal. How shall these unregenerate members become regenerate—these dead branches be quickened into life and fruitfulness? Some saw the remedy, and gave themselves to more earnest preaching of the Word, and to prayer for a fresh baptism of the Spirit. But others were led along on the sliding-scale of error from the mistake of the Half-Way Covenant to another not less injurious—the converting efficacy of the Lord's Supper. Mr Stoddard of Northampton, Mass., settled in 1670, was among the first of the ministers who openly inculcated this doctrine. This broke down the only visible distinction that remained between the church and the world. The plea for it was, that the thorn tree will produce grapes by being planted in the vineyard of the Lord, and the thistle, figs; that goats will be changed into sheep, if they are permitted to feed with them in their pastures, and to lie down in the same fold. The number of communicants was, indeed, increased by this measure, but through a process that brought the disease which needed to be removed much nearer the heart of the suffering patient. The duty of professing faith and piety naturally ceased with men who knew that they could not profess either without perjury. And yet, by a logical necessity of this theological error, such men were urged to come to the communion as a means of obtaining both. Thus the Half-Way Covenant ran into a way of taking the whole covenant, by those who did not profess to keep any part of it.

But those who expected that this second error would correct the evils of the first, were disappointed. The thorn still brought forth only thorns, and the thistle only thistles. The lion did not become a lamb by feeding on its food. The dead could only bury their dead. The unregenerate were in nothing improved by becoming communicants, while the condition of the churches was, in many respects, made worse by it. For the non-professing church members were now admitted to an equal voice with the regenerate in the choice of the pastors; and from these also, as from the others, the churches drew their supply of candidates for the ministry.

One step more in this downward direction brings us to the

last of the three practical errors, the germs of which are found in the first period of New England history. This was termed "the acceptableness of unregenerate doings," the doctrine that unrenewed men, from the impulses of self-love, can use the means of regeneration in a manner pleasing to God, and suited to secure their salvation. This, with the other two, constitutes that trinity of error which first secularised a part of the New England churches, and then corrupted their theology. Their developments required time and space. But their logical connection is a matter almost of intuition. The first brought into the churches a class of unconverted men. The second ascribed a converting efficacy to the Lord's Supper, and administered the ordinance to them as a means of their regeneration. This failing, the third imputed a recuperative power to self-love, placed its stimulated activities among the means of grace, and pronounced them acceptable to God. These all grew in the same field with the New England theology, but it was as the tares among wheat, from the sowings of "an enemy." They were in direct opposition to the Puritan theology, and to the formulas adopted by the Synod in 1648.

In respect to the first of these errors, John Owen says—"The letting go this principle, that particular churches ought to consist of regenerate persons, brought in the great apostasy of the Christian Church."

The Cambridge platform teaches that "the matter of a visible Church are saints by calling," "such as have not only attained to the knowledge of the principles of religion, and are free from errors and open scandal, but also do, together with the *profession* of their faith and repentance, walk in blameless obedience to the Word, so that in charitable discretion they may be accounted saints by calling," chap. 3. The Confession of Faith holds, in regard to the second of these errors, that our Lord substituted the Sacrament of the Supper for "the shewing forth of the sacrifice of himself in his death, the sealing of all benefits thereof unto true believers, and their spiritual nourishment and growth in him," chap. 30. And concerning the works of the unregenerate, the third, the Confession is very explicit, that "because they proceed not from a heart purified by faith, nor are done in a right manner according to the Word of God, nor to a right end, the glory of God, they are therefore sinful, and cannot please God, nor make a man meet to receive grace from him, yet their neglect of them is more sinful and displeasing to God," chap. 16.

Against these clear principles of the established theology, the development of the Half-Way Covenant, though favoured by a strong political interest, was slow, and met with much opposition. It received a powerful check in the great awaken-

ing during the time of Edwards and Whitefield, and from the practical and polemical treatises of Edwards, Bellamy, and Hopkins, which followed it. It was a noble protest that these three heroic men entered against the withering, wasting evil, a valiant fight in which they engaged. Edwards, in consequence, was driven out of Northampton, as, in defence of the same principles, two hundred years before, Calvin and Farel were out of Geneva.

But the evil had taken too deep root to be easily eradicated. It had strengthened with a century's growth, and came to its blossoming time in the dissent from New England theology, which began near the close of the last century. And it is bearing ripe fruit in that "Suspense of Faith" which is completing itself in the Unitarianism of the present century. When churches come to include a major part of unregenerate communicants, they naturally set aside the formulas of faith, to whose verity and value only the life of faith can give a positive testimony, or appreciate it when given. Between a spiritually dead soul and the living truths of the Christian system there can be only antagonism. If the doctrine does not transform and vitalize those who profess it, the incongruity of the profession, together with their natural repugnance to the doctrines, will first express themselves in painful doubts, and then seek relief in denial. Thus a few have been occasionally going out from the Evangelical churches of New England and from the living church in every land, because they were not of it.

ART. VI.—*Zwingle, and the Doctrine of the Sacraments.*

It is a very common practice of Popish writers, to represent Protestantism and the Reformation as thoroughly identified with Luther, with his character, opinions, labours, and achievements. Protestantism, according to a mode of representation in which they are fond of indulging, and which is not destitute of a certain measure of plausibility, is a new religion never heard of till it was invented by Luther, and traceable to him alone as its source and origin. Having thus identified the Reformation and Protestantism with Luther, they commonly proceed to give an account of him whom they represent as the author of our faith, bringing out, with great distortion and exaggeration, everything about his character and history, about his sayings and doings, which may be fitted to excite a prejudice against him, especially as contemplated in the light in which *they*, not *we*, represent him, viz., as the author and foun-

der of a new religious system. Independently of the utterly unfounded and erroneous assumptions in point of principle and argument, on which this whole representation is based, it is altogether untrue as a mere historical fact, that Luther occupied any such place in regard to the Reformation and Protestantism as Papists for controversial purposes are accustomed to assign to him. He was not the only person who was raised up at that period to oppose the Church of Rome, and to bring out from the Word of God other representations of apostolic Christianity than those which the Papacy inculcated and embodied. It is quite certain that, in different parts of Europe, a considerable number of persons, as early as Luther, and altogether independently of him, had been led to deduce from the sacred Scriptures doctrines substantially the same as his, even the doctrines which may be said to constitute the fundamental principles of Protestantism. In France, Le Fevre and Farel, of whom so very interesting an account is given by Dr Merle D'Aubigné in the 12th book of his "History of the Reformation," vol. iii., had been led to adopt, and to promulgate to a certain extent, the leading doctrines of the Reformation, before Luther appeared publicly as a Reformer; and they certainly stand much more in the relation of something like paternity to Calvin, and to all that he was honoured to achieve, than Luther does. And if an open breach with the Church of Rome, and the organisation of a Protestant Church, previously to and independently of Luther, are insisted upon as necessary to the character and position of a Reformer, we can point to Zwingle and his associates, the Reformers of German Switzerland.

Zwingle indeed was honoured to perform a work both as a reformer and as a theologian, which entitles him to special notice; and we intend at present to take an opportunity of laying before our readers a brief account of the doctrines which he taught, the place which he occupied, and the influence which he exerted, in regard to theological subjects.

The important movement of which he might be said to be the originator and the head, was wholly independent of Luther; that is to say, Luther was in no way whatever, directly or indirectly, the cause or the occasion of Zwingle being led to embrace the views which he promulgated, or to adopt the course which he pursued. Zwingle had been led to embrace the leading principles of Protestant truth, and to preach them in 1516, the year before the publication of Luther's Theses; and it is quite certain that all along he continued to think and act for himself, on his own judgment and responsibility, deriving his views from his own personal and independent study of the Word of God. This fact shews how inaccurate it is to identify the

Reformation with Luther, as if all the Reformers derived their opinions from him, and merely followed his example in abandoning the Church of Rome, and organising churches apart from her communion. Many at this time, in different parts of Europe, were led to study the sacred Scriptures, and were led further to derive from this study views of divine truth substantially the same, and decidedly opposed to those generally inculcated in the Church of Rome. And, more particularly, it is certain that Luther and Zwingle, the two men who, in different countries, may be said to have originated the public revolt against Rome, and the organisation of Protestant churches, were wholly independent of, and unconnected with, each other, in the formation of their opinions and their plans, and both derived them from their own separate and independent study of God's Word.

We need not dwell upon Zwingle's general character as distinguished from his theological opinions, for, indeed, it has never been subjected to any very serious or formidable assaults. He was in a great measure free from those weaknesses and infirmities, which have afforded materials for charges in some degree true, and to a much greater extent only plausible, against both Luther and Melancthon. He usually spoke and acted with calmness, prudence, and discretion, and, at the same time, with the greatest vigour, intrepidity, and consistency. He gave the most satisfactory evidence of being thoroughly devoted to God's service, and of acting under the influence of genuine Christian principle; and his character was peculiarly fitted in many respects to call forth at once esteem and affection.

He has been sometimes charged, even by those who had no prejudice against his cause or his principles, with interfering too much in the political affairs of his country, and connecting religion too closely with political movements. And, indeed, his death at the battle of Cappell has been held up as an instance of righteous retribution, as an illustration of the Scriptural principle, that he that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword. Though this view has been countenanced by some very eminent and influential names in the present day, we are by no means sure that it has any solid foundation to rest upon. We do not know any Scriptural ground which entitles us to lay it down as an absolute rule, that the character of the citizen and the patriot must be entirely sunk in that of the Christian minister, anything which precludes ministers from taking any part whatever, in any circumstances, in promoting the political wellbeing of their country, or in seeking, in the use of lawful means, to have the regulation of national affairs directed to the advancement of the cause and kingdom

of Christ. Ministers certainly shew a spirit unworthy of their office, and indicate the low state of their personal religion, when they ordinarily give much time or attention to anything but the direct and proper business of their office, and when they act as if they believed that the success of Christ's cause was really dependent upon political changes, upon results to be accomplished by human policy and human laws; and scarcely anything short of downright immorality tends more powerfully to injure their usefulness, than engaging keenly in the ordinary contentions of political partizanship which may be agitating the community. But since they are not required to abandon wholly the discharge of the duties, or the exercise of the rights, which devolve upon them as citizens, or to become indifferent to the temporal welfare or prosperity of their country; and since it can scarcely be disputed that, in point of fact, the way in which national affairs have been regulated and national laws framed, has often materially contributed to the obstruction or the advancement of Christ's cause, it seems scarcely fair at once to condemn the conduct of those who may have done something directed to the object of securing the right regulation of national affairs, by means of vague allegations about the spirit of Christianity and the use of carnal weapons, &c., &c., without a careful examination of the particular things done, viewed in connection with the whole circumstances in which they took place. Many countries were so situated at the time of the Reformation, that it was scarcely possible to keep political and religious matters entirely distinct, and scarcely practicable for men who were interested in the welfare of true religion to abstain from taking part in the regulation of national affairs; and the narrower the sphere of action, the more difficult, or rather impracticable, did such separation and abstinence often become. What John Knox did, was compelled to do, and did with so much advantage to his country, in Scotland, it was at least equally warrantable and necessary for Zwingle to do in the small canton of Zurich, and in the Helvetic confederation. And while this may be said generally of his taking some part in the regulation of the public affairs of his country, we are not aware that any evidence has been produced, that he either recommended or approved of any of the public proceedings of Zurich and her confederate cantons, which were clearly objectionable on grounds of religion, equity, or policy. It is well known that he disapproved, and did what he could to prevent, the steps that led to the war in which he lost his life; and it was in obedience to the express orders of the civil authorities, and in the discharge of his duties as a pastor, that, not without some melancholy forebodings, he accompanied his countrymen to

the fatal field of Cappell. We cannot dwell upon this subject, but we have thought it proper to express our doubts, whether the disapprobation which some eminent men in the present day have indicated, of Zwingle's conduct in this respect, is altogether well founded. We confess we are inclined to regard this disapprobation as originating rather in a narrow and sentimental, than in an enlarged and manly, view of the whole subject, and to suspect that it may have been encouraged by an unconscious infusion of the erroneous and dangerous principle of judging of the character of Zwingle's conduct by the event, of regarding his violent death upon the field of battle as a sort of proof of his Master's displeasure with the course he had pursued. But we cannot dwell upon historical and biographical matters, and must proceed to notice Zwingle's theology.

Though he preached the gospel, and inculcated the leading principles of Protestantism in 1516, it was not till 1519 that he was called to come forth publicly in opposition to the Church of Rome, and it was in 1522 that his first works were published, so that, as his death took place in 1531, when he was only forty-seven years of age, his public labours as a Reformer extended only over a period of twelve, and as an author over a period of nine, years. And when we attend to the multiplicity and abundance of his public labours, and the character of the four folio volumes of his works produced in this brief space, we are constrained to form the highest estimate both of his ability and his industry. His works are chiefly occupied with the exposition of Scripture, and with unfolding and defending the doctrines which he had deduced from the Word of God, in opposition to the errors of the Papists and the Anabaptists, or, as he commonly called them, the Catabaptists, and in opposition to Luther and his followers, on the subject of the presence of Christ's flesh and blood in the Eucharist. It is deplorable, indeed, to find, that through Luther's error and obstinacy, so large a portion of the brief but most valuable life of Zwingle was of necessity occupied in exposing the unintelligible absurdity of consubstantiation.

Zwingle was not endowed with the fire and energy, with the vigorous and lively imagination, or with the graphic power of Luther, but his understanding upon the whole was sounder, and his mental faculties were better regulated and more correctly balanced. He had not been led either by the course of his studies, or by his spiritual experience, that is, God's dealings with his soul in leading him to the knowledge and belief of the truth, to give such prominence as Luther did, to any particular departments or aspects of divine truth. He ranged somewhat more freely over the whole field of Scripture for

truths to bring out and enforce, and over the whole field of Popery for errors to expose and assail; and this has given a variety and extent to his speculations, which Luther's works do not perhaps exhibit in the same degree. And as he was eminently distinguished for perspicacity and soundness of judgment, he has very generally reached a just conclusion, and established it by judicious and satisfactory arguments from Scripture. There are errors and crudities to be found in Zwingle's works, but they are not perhaps so numerous as in Luther's; and several instances occur in which, on points unconnected with the sacramentarian controversy, and without mentioning Luther's name, he has corrected some of the extravagancies and over-statements in which the great Saxon Reformer not unfrequently indulged. Indeed, considering the whole circumstances in which Zwingle was placed, the opportunities he enjoyed, the occupations in which he was involved, and the extent to which he formed his views from his own personal independent study of the sacred Scriptures, he may be fairly said to have proved himself quite equal to any of the Reformers, in the possession of the power of accurately discovering divine truth, and establishing it upon satisfactory Scriptural grounds.

His theology upon almost all topics of importance, derived from his own independent study of the word of God, was the same as that which Luther derived from the same sacred and infallible source, as was fully proved by the articles agreed upon at the conference at Marburg, in the year 1529. This conference is one of the most interesting and important events in the history of the church, both in its more personal and in its more public aspects. It was a noble subject for the graphic pen of Dr Merle D'Aubigné, who has certainly done it ample justice, and whose narrative of it in the 13th book of the "History of the Reformation" (vol. iv.), is singularly interesting, and admirably fitted to exert a useful and wholesome influence. We do not know that ever, on any other occasion in the history of the church, four such men as Luther and Melancthon, Zwingle and Ecolampadius, met together in one room, and sat at the same table discussing the great doctrines of theology. Luther's refusal to shake hands with Zwingle, which led that truly noble and thoroughly brave man to burst into tears, was one of the most deplorable and humiliating, but at the same time solemn and instructive, exhibitions of the deceitfulness of sin and of the human heart the world has ever witnessed.

The importance of the Marburg conference, in its more public aspects, lies in this, that it was the first formal development, both of the unity and the divergence of the two

great sections of the first Reformers, who had, independently of each other, derived their views of divine things from the study of the Word of God. At this conference, the leading doctrines of Christianity were embodied in fifteen articles, and both parties entirely agreed with each other in regard to fourteen and two-thirds of the whole—comprehending almost everything that could be regarded as fundamental in a summary of Christian truth. Even in regard to the Lord's Supper, they agreed upon most matters of importance, and differed only on this question, "Whether the true body and blood of Christ be corporally present in the bread and wine?" and in regard to this question of the corporal presence, they promised to cherish Christian love towards one another "as far as the conscience of each will allow"—"*quantum cujusque conscientia feret.*" Luther's conscience, unfortunately, would not allow him to go far, in the way of Christian love, towards those who denied the unintelligible absurdity which he defended so strenuously; and the mischiefs that arose from this controversy, and from the way in which it was conducted, especially by Luther and his followers, including its indirect and remote consequences, have been incalculable in amount, and are damaging the cause of Protestantism, and benefiting the cause of Popery, down to the present day. Luther and his followers are the parties responsible for this controversy, and for all the fearful amount of mischief which, directly and indirectly, immediately and remotely, it has occasioned, 1st, and principally, because they were palpably and wholly wrong on the merits of the question; and, 2d, because they also displayed a far greater amount of the injurious influences which controversy usually exerts upon the spirit and conduct of men, than their opponents did. How many have there been in every age who, while destitute of all Luther's redeeming qualities, have displayed largely the grievous infirmities which he exhibited in the sacramentarian controversy, and like him have laid all the responsibility of this upon their *conscience*, which compelled them to stand fast for the truth; and how great the mischief which persons of this stamp have done to the Church, by their number and audacity, notwithstanding their insignificance individually!*

The subjects on which the orthodoxy of Zwingle has been chiefly assailed are the doctrine of original sin and the salvation of the heathen; and on the ground of statements which he made on these subjects, the Papists have been accustomed

* The articles of the Conference at Marburg are given entire in Hospinian's "*Historia Sacramentaria*," Pars altera, p. 77; Hottinger's "*Historia Ecclesiastica*," tom. viii., p. 444. They are also given, but not quite so fully and accurately, in Melchior Adam's *Vitae Germanorum Theologorum, Vita Zwinglii*," p. 32.

to accuse him of Pelagianism and Paganism. In regard to the first of these topics, viz., the doctrine of original sin, on which Bossuet and other Papists have adduced heavy charges against Zwingle's orthodoxy, as if he denied it altogether, it has, we think, been proved that when a full and impartial view is taken of his whole doctrine, he does not materially deviate from the standard of Scriptural orthodoxy on the subject of the natural and universal depravity of man; and that the peculiarities of his statements, upon which the charge is commonly based, really resolve into differences about the precise meaning and the proper application of words. He seems to have been anxious to confine the proper meaning of the word *peccatum*, to an actual personal violation of God's law, and to have been disposed to call the natural depravity of man, the source or cause of actual transgression, by the name of a disease, *morbus*, rather than of a sin or *peccatum*. But though he attached unnecessary importance to this verbal distinction, he has clearly defined his meaning, explained in what sense men's natural propensity to violate God's law is, or is not, *peccatum*, he has fully expressed his accordance in the great Scriptural doctrine, that all men do in point of fact bring into the world with them a depravity of nature, a diseased moral constitution, which certainly, and in every instance, leads them to incur the guilt of actual transgressions of God's law, and which but for the interposition of divine grace would certainly involve them in everlasting misery. The Marburg articles were prepared by Luther, who had been led to entertain suspicions of Zwingle's orthodoxy upon other points than the real or corporal presence, and among others on original sin, and were no doubt intended by him to test Zwingle's soundness in the faith. Yet Zwingle had no hesitation in subscribing the proposition which Luther prepared upon this point, viz., "*credimus peccatum originis, ab Adamo in nos carnali generatione propagatum, tale peccatum esse, quod omnes homines condemnet, et nisi Christus opem nobis suâ morte et vitâ tulisset, æternâ morte nobis in eo moriendum fuisset, neque unquam in regnum dei et beatitudinem æternam pervenire potuissimus,*" Art. iv. This in all fairness must be held to establish Zwingle's substantial orthodoxy in regard to the universality, and the fatal consequences, of man's natural depravity; and the suspicion *afterwards* expressed by Luther as to Zwingle's soundness upon this subject, without any new cause having been afforded for the suspicion, should be regarded merely as a specimen of the unjust and ungenerous treatment which he too often gave to the sacramentarians, and others who opposed him. It is proper to mention that Milner has given a very defective and unfair representation of Zwingle's views upon this subject, as if he were

anxious to establish a charge of error against him, and that the unfairness of Milner's statements has been pointed out, and Zwingle satisfactorily vindicated from the imputation, by Scott in his excellent continuation of Milner.

Zwingle's adoption of this article upon original sin also proves, that he did not deviate quite so far from sound doctrine, in his views about the salvation of the heathen, as might at first sight appear from some of his statements upon this point. He has indeed plainly enough intimated, as some of the Fathers have done, his belief that some of the more wise and virtuous heathen were saved and admitted to heaven, and in specifying by name some of the individuals among them whom we might expect to meet there, such as Hercules and Theseus, he has certainly not shewn his usual good sense. But he never meant to teach, and his subscription to the above-quoted article, as well as the whole tenor of his writings, proves it, that men may be saved "by framing their lives according to the light of nature, and the law of the religion they profess," (Westminster Confession, c. x.) On the contrary, he constantly taught that men, if saved at all, were saved only on the ground of Christ's atonement, and by the operation of God's grace. But he thought, without any sufficient Scriptural warrant, that the benefits of Christ's death might be imparted to men, and that their natures might be renewed by God's agency, even though they were not acquainted with any external supernatural revelation; and that some of the heathen did manifest such moral excellence as to indicate the presence of God's special gracious agency. This was certainly seeking to be wise above what is written. We are not called upon to be making any positive affirmations as to what God can do or may do, in extending mercy to individuals among men. But the principle is clearly revealed to us in Scripture, that the general provision which God has made for saving men individually from their natural guilt and depravity, is by communicating to them, through the medium of an external revelation, and impressing upon their hearts by his Spirit, some knowledge of the only way of salvation through a Redeemer and a sacrifice; and this truth, solemn and awful as it is, we are bound to receive as the ordinary rule of our opinions and practice, abstaining from all unwarranted speculations, and resting satisfied in the assurance, that the Judge of all the earth will do right. Still there may be said to be less of error and presumption in the notion, that a knowledge of divine truth has been communicated extraordinarily to some men who were not acquainted with an external supernatural revelation, than in the notion, that men may be saved merely by framing their lives according to the light of nature, and the particular reli-

gion, whatever it may be, with which they may happen to have been acquainted; and to the benefit of this difference in degree, such as it is, Zwingle is entitled, though his mode of discussing the subject cannot be vindicated.

There is nothing in the articles of Marburg bearing very directly and explicitly upon the doctrines which are usually regarded as the peculiarities of the Calvinistic system, though we are persuaded that none but Calvinists can hold with full intelligence and thorough consistency the great Scriptural doctrines which are there set forth, concerning the natural guilt and depravity of man, the way of salvation through Christ, gratuitous justification, and the production of faith and regeneration by God's immediate agency. Still, as some men do not perceive and admit the necessary connection between these great doctrines and what they call the peculiarities of Calvinism, the question may still be asked, whether Zwingle agreed with Calvin in those peculiar doctrines with which his name is usually associated? And in answer to this question, we have no hesitation in saying, what is equally true of Luther, that though Zwingle was not led to dwell upon the exposition, illustration, and defence of these doctrines so fully as Calvin, and although he has not perhaps given any formal deliverance on the irresistibility of grace and the perseverance of the saints, in the distinct and specific form in which these topics came to be afterwards discussed, yet in regard to the universal foreordination and efficacious providence of God, and in regard to election and reprobation, he was as Calvinistic as Calvin himself.

It is rather singular that both Mosheim and Milner have denied this position, though it can be most fully established. Mosheim says, that "The celebrated doctrine of an absolute decree respecting the salvation of men, *which was unknown to Zwingle*, was inculcated by Calvin," (Murdock's translation by Reid, p. 664); and Milner says, "On a careful perusal of Zwingle's voluminous writings, I am convinced that certain peculiar sentiments afterwards maintained by Calvin, concerning the absolute decrees of God, made no part of the theology of the Swiss Reformer," (Cent. xvi. c. 12). This statement of Milner's is very cautiously expressed, and contains no specification of the precise points upon which Zwingle and Calvin are said to have differed. But it is quite plain, from the whole scope of the passage where this extract occurs, that Milner just means in substance to say, as Mosheim does, that while Luther, as he admits, though Mosheim denies this too, was, on the subject of predestination and the decrees of God, a Calvinist, Zwingle was not. Scott, however, whose representations of the theological sentiments of the Reformers are very full and accurate, and whose Continuation of Milner is,

on this account, peculiarly valuable and deserving of the highest commendation, has fully proved that the representations of Mosheim and Milner upon this point are perfectly erroneous. It is indeed scarcely possible that they could ever have read Zwingle's "*Elenchus in Strophas Catabaptistarum*," or his treatise "*De Providentia Dei*." In these treatises he has clearly and unequivocally expressed his sentiments upon this subject, in full conformity with those afterwards taught and expounded by Calvin, while it cannot be alleged that he has contradicted them in any part of his writings. It may be worth while to give one or two brief extracts from these works in confirmation of this position. In his "*Elenchus*" (*Opera*, tom. ii., p. 34, *a*), he gives the following statement as a summary of Paul's argument in the Epistle to the Romans:—"Fide servamur, non ex operibus. Fides non est humanarum virium sed dei. Is ergo eam dat iis quos vocavit, eos autem vocavit quos ad salutem destinavit, eos autem ad hanc destinavit quos elegit, elegit autem quos voluit, liberum enim est ei hoc et integrum, perinde atque figulo, vasa diversa ex eadem massa educere. Hoc breviter argumentum et summa est electionis a Paulo tractatæ." And, in his commentary upon this summary of Paul's argument, he makes it clear beyond all possibility of reasonable doubt, that he believed, upon Paul's authority, that God by an absolute decree chose some men to everlasting life, and made effectual provision that *they* should be saved, a choice or election made without regard to anything foreseen in them, but solely according to the counsel of his own will. And in his treatise "*De Providentia Dei*," he has a chapter, the 6th, on "*Election*," in which he fully explains his views in such a way as to leave no room for doubt as to their import, and makes some statements even about reprobation, quite as strong as any that ever proceeded from Calvin. Indeed he here expressly tells us that, in his early life, when he was engaged in the study of the Schoolmen, he held, as most of them did, what we should now call the common Arminian doctrine of God's electing men to life because he foresaw that they were to repent and believe the gospel, and that they would persevere in faith and good works. "*Quæ mihi sententia, ut olim scholas colenti placuit, ita illas deserenti et divinorum oraculorum puritati adhærenti, maxime displicuit*" (tom. i., p. 366, *b*). And then he proceeds to shew, with a clearness and a force not unworthy of Calvin himself, that this Arminian doctrine is utterly inconsistent with the perfections and moral government of God, and necessarily makes men, whatever its supporters may profess to maintain about the divine sovereignty, the absolute arbiters of their own everlasting destiny, the true authors of their own salvation.

Many other extracts of a similar kind will be found in Hottinger and Scott.* They are amply sufficient to establish, that Zwingle concurred with Luther in teaching those great doctrines which have brought so much odium on the name of Calvin, before that great man had been led even to form his views of divine truth; for Luther's treatise "*De Servo Arbitrio*" was published when Calvin was seventeen, and Zwingle's treatise "*De Providentia Dei*" when Calvin was twenty years of age.

These misstatements of Mosheim and Milner about the theological views of Zwingle, are rather remarkable specimens of the "*humanum est errare*," and are fitted to remind us of the little reliance that should be placed upon second-hand authorities. Mosheim further lays it down, that Zwingle and Calvin differed from each other, not only in regard to predestination, but also in regard to the power of the civil magistrate in religious matters, and the doctrine of the sacraments. On the first of these points, Mosheim is right in saying of Calvin, "that he circumscribed the power of the magistrate in matters of religion within narrow limits, and maintained that the church ought to be free and independent, and to govern itself by means of bodies of presbyters, synods or conventions of presbyters, in the manner of the ancient church, yet leaving to the magistrate the protection of the church, and an external care over it." These were the views of Calvin, and they have been the views ever since of the great body of those who have usually been ranked under his name, as opposed to Erastianism on the one hand, and to Voluntarism on the other. But Mosheim falls into inaccuracy and exaggeration when, in contrast with these views of Calvin, he alleges, that "Zwingle assigned to civil rulers full and absolute power in regard to religious matters, and, what many censure him for, subjected the ministers of religion entirely to their authority." There is no warrant for ascribing such extreme views upon this subject to Zwingle, who, though he did not restrain the power of the civil magistrate within such narrow bounds as Calvin assigned it, was not nearly so Erastian as Mosheim himself and the generality of Lutheran writers. There is no ground indeed for believing that Zwingle ever attained to a distinct conception of the great Scriptural principle, which has been generally held by Calvinists, viz., that Christ has appointed in his church, a government in the hands of ecclesiastical office-bearers, distinct from, independent of, and not subordinate in its own sphere to, the civil magistrate. But he certainly shewed that he was decidedly in advance of Luther and Melancthon on this question, and that he was altogether opposed to the leading principle which chiefly Erastus

* Hottinger, tom viii. p. 616-650. Scott, vol. iii. p. 142-152, and 194-231.

laboured to establish, by ascribing fully and unequivocally the power of excommunication solely to the church itself, and not to the civil magistrate. And in regard to the wider and more general subject of the province and function of the civil magistrate in regard to religion, Zwingle may perhaps be regarded as holding the main substance of what sound principle demands, in maintaining, as it can be proved that he did, that all the powers conceded to the civil authorities of Zurich in religious matters, were exercised by them as representing the church, and only with the church's own consent. We do not believe that the church can lawfully concede or delegate to the civil authorities any power which Christ has conferred upon her. But still there is a fundamental difference between this principle of Zwingle's, and the proper Erastian tenet, which ascribes to the civil magistrate jurisdiction or authority, not merely *circa sacra*, but *in sacris*, as inherently attaching to his office.*

But, perhaps, the most interesting topic of discussion connected with the investigation of the opinions of Zwingle, is his doctrine on the subject of the Sacraments. A very general impression prevails, and it is certainly not altogether without foundation, that Zwingle held low and defective views upon this subject. He is usually alleged to have taught, that the sacraments are just naked and bare signs or symbols, emblematically and figuratively representing or signifying Scriptural truths and spiritual blessings; and that the reception of them is a mere commemoration of what Christ has done for sinners, and a profession which men make before the church or one another, of the views which they have been led to entertain upon the great doctrines of Scripture concerning the way of salvation, as well as a public pledge to follow out consistently the views thus professed; and there are undoubtedly statements in Zwingle's writings which seem fairly enough to imply, that this was the whole doctrine which he taught concerning the sacraments. This doctrine was generally regarded by Protestants, especially after Calvin had published his views upon the subject, as being defective, and, though true so far as it went, yet coming far short of bringing out the whole truth taught in Scripture regarding it. And as the Papists were accustomed to bring it as a serious charge against the Reformers, that they explained away the whole mystery and efficacy of the sacraments, the Protestant churches became anxious to disclaim the view which Zwingle had sanctioned. Accordingly, in the original Scottish Confession, prepared by

* On this subject see Zwingle, *De vera et falsa Religione*. De magistratu, tom ii. p. 232-3, and *Subsidium sive Coronis de Eucharistia*, p. 248. Gerdes's *Historia Reformationis*, tom. i. p. 286-7, and Supplement to Preface. Scott iii. p.p. 32 and 91.

John Knox, and adopted by the church in 1560, it is said, "We utterly condemn the vanity of those who affirm sacraments to be nothing else but naked and bare signs," (c. 21). Similar disclaimers are to be found in many of the other Confessions of the Reformed Churches, and in the writings of the generality of the Protestant divines of that period, though there is some good reason to doubt, whether there be adequate grounds for alleging that Zwingle held the sacraments to be nothing else but naked and bare signs, and though there is considerable difficulty in ascertaining, in some cases, what those meant to affirm who were anxious to repudiate this position. It is very manifest that Zwingle, disgusted with the mass of heresy, mysticism, and absurdity, which had prevailed so long and so widely in the church on the subject of the sacraments, leant very strongly to what may be called the opposite extreme of excessive simplicity and plainness. It is not wonderful that he did not succeed perfectly in hitting the golden mean, or that the reaction against the monstrous and ruinous system which had been wrought out and established in the Church of Rome, tempted him to try to simplify the subject of the sacraments beyond what the Scripture required or sanctioned. We believe that he did to some extent yield to this temptation, but we are persuaded, at the same time, that he rendered services of the very highest value to the church, by the light which he threw upon this important and intricate subject.

There is some difficulty in ascertaining precisely what Zwingle's views upon the subject of the sacraments were, and there is some ground to think that, towards the end of his life, he ascribed a higher value and a greater efficacy to these ordinances than he had once done. In his great work, "*De Vera et Falsa Religione*," published in 1525, he admits that he had spoken of the sacraments somewhat rashly and crudely, and indicated that his views were advancing in what Protestants generally would reckon a sound direction. It is true, indeed, that, in a later work published in 1530, his "*Ratio Fidei*," he continued to assert, *sacramenta tam abesse ut gratiam conferant, ut ne adferant quidem aut dispensent*. But many Protestants who were far enough from regarding the sacraments as naked and bare signs, have denied that the sacraments confer grace;* and, indeed, it is only in a very

* We may give a specimen of what is a common mode of speaking among Protestant authors, from Willet's *Synopsis Papismi*, Cent. xi., q. ii., p. 559:— "The sacraments have no power to give or confer grace to the receiver, neither are they immediate instruments of our justification; instrumental means they are to increase and confirm our faith in the promises of God; of themselves they have no operation, but, as the Spirit of God worketh by them, our internal senses being moved and quickened by those external objects. Neither do we say that the sacraments are bare and naked signs of spiritual graces, but they

limited and carefully defined sense, that any persons intelligently opposed to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, admit this position. In a work published in the same year, in defence of his "*Ratio Fidei*," he declared, that he was quite willing to concur in anything that might be said in commending and exalting the sacraments, provided, that what was spoken symbolically was understood and applied symbolically, and that the whole honour of whatever spiritual benefit was derived, was ascribed to God, and not either to the person administering them, or to any efficacy of the outward elements or actions. And in the last work which he wrote, and which was not published till after his death, the "*Expositio Fidei*," he gave some indications, though perhaps not very explicit, of regarding the sacraments not only as signs but as seals, as signs and seals not only on the part of men, but of God, as signifying and confirming something then done by God through the Spirit, as well as something done by the receiver through faith. This is the great general principle which has been usually held by Protestants upon the subject, and is commonly regarded as constituting the leading point of difference between what is often represented as the Zwinglian doctrine of the sacraments being only naked and bare signs, and that generally held by the Protestant churches. We cannot assert that Zwingle has brought out very distinctly and explicitly this important principle, that the sacraments are signs and seals on the part of God as well as of men; and, therefore, we cannot assert that his doctrine, though it is true so far as it goes, brings out the whole of what Scripture teaches upon this subject, or deny that he leant unduly and excessively to the side of plainness and simplicity in the exposition of this topic. But we are persuaded that he manifested very great strength and vigour of mind in his speculations upon this matter, and that he aided greatly the progress of Scriptural truth upon the point.

It was in the highest degree honourable to Zwingle that he so entirely threw off the huge mass of extravagant absurdity and unintelligible mysticism which, from a very early period, had been gathering round the subject of the sacraments, and which had reached its full height in the authorised doctrine of the Church of Rome. This was an achievement which Luther never fully reached, either in regard

do verily exhibit and represent Christ to as many as by faith are able and meet to apprehend him. So to conclude; look how the Word of God worketh, being preached, so do the sacraments; but the word doth no otherwise justify us but by working faith at the hearing thereof, so sacraments do serve for the increase of our faith; faith is not a servant and handmaid to the sacraments, but faith is the more principal, and the sacraments have no other use or end than as they are helps for the strengthening of our faith. Grace of themselves they can give or confer none."

to baptism or the Lord's Supper. Zwingle's rejection of the whole of the erroneous and dangerous doctrine in regard to the sacraments which had been inculcated by the schoolmen, and sanctioned by the Church of Rome, was, in the circumstances in which he was placed, one of the most arduous and honourable, and, in its consequences, one of the most important and beneficial, intellectual achievements which the history of the church records. The great general principles by which Zwingle was guided in the formation and promulgation of his views in regard to the sacraments were these:—1st, That great care should be taken to avoid anything which might appear to trench upon the free grace of God, the meritorious efficacy of Christ's work, and the almighty agency of his Spirit in bestowing upon men all spiritual blessings; and, 2d, That whatever external means of grace may have been appointed, and in whatever way these means may ordinarily operate, God must not be held to be tied or restricted in the communication of spiritual benefits to the use of anything of an external kind, though he has himself appointed and prescribed it; and, 3d, That the most important matter connected with the subject of the sacraments, is the state of mind and heart of the recipient; and that, with reference to this, the essential thing is, that the state of mind and heart of the recipient should correspond with the outward act which, in participating in the sacrament, he performed. Zwingle was deeply persuaded, that the right mode of investigating this subject was not to follow the example of the Fathers, in straining the imagination to devise unwarranted, extravagant, and unintelligible notions of the nature and effects of the sacraments, for the purpose of making them more awful and more influential, but to trace out plainly and simply what is taught and indicated in Scripture regarding them. By following out this course conscientiously and judiciously, he was led, in the first place, to repudiate the whole huge mass of absurdity and heresy which the fathers and the schoolmen had accumulated around this subject; and, in the second place, to lay down and to apply the three great general principles above stated, which were fitted not only to exclude much grievous error, but to bring in much important and wholesome truth. Zwingle, in these ways, rendered invaluable service to the church, and has perhaps done more than any other single person to put the general subject of the sacraments upon a sound and safe footing.

Zwingle's mental constitution gave him a very decided aversion to the unintelligible and mystical, and made him lean towards what was clear, definite, and practical. He had a strong sense of the great injury that had been done to religion by the notions which had long prevailed in regard to the sacra-

ments. And under these influences, it is not surprising that, while discarding a great deal of dangerous error, he should have left in abeyance some portion of wholesome truth. He leant to the side of what was clear, palpable, and safe, and in the circumstances in which he was placed, this was the right side to lean to. It is not surprising that he did not stop precisely at the right point, and that he carried the work of demolition somewhat too far. And when we consider what a mass of unintelligible and incredible absurdities, to the deep degradation of the human intellect, and what a mass of heresies, perverting the way of salvation and tending to ruin men's souls, had been invented by the fathers and the schoolmen, and sanctioned by the Church of Rome on the subject of the sacraments, we cannot but sympathise with Zwingle's general spirit and tendencies in regard to this matter, and rejoice in the large measure of success which attended his investigations. It is indeed a matter of fundamental importance, and perhaps more indispensable than any thing else towards preparing men for a rational, intelligent, and beneficial reception of the sacraments, and guarding against self-deceit and danger in the use of them, that they have distinct and accurate conceptions of what the outward elements and actions signify or represent, and of what is professed or implied in the reception of them, that is, of what is the state of mind and heart on the part of the recipient which the reception of them indicates or proclaims. It is in a great measure from inattention to this fundamental point, that so many in every age have been led to participate in the sacraments, who were thereby making a false profession, and of course injuring their own souls, while they were entertaining unfounded expectations of getting spiritual blessings without having any anxiety or concern about what is ordinarily necessary with a view to that result. Zwingle rendered a most important service, by bringing out this great principle, which had been almost entirely buried, and pressing it upon the attention of the church. He came short indeed of the truth in his doctrine as to the nature and efficacy of the sacraments, by not bringing out fully what God does, or is ready and willing to do, in connection with them, or through their instrumentality, in offering to men and conferring upon them, through the exercise of faith, spiritual blessings. But he laid a good foundation, on which the whole truth taught in Scripture might be built, when he directed special attention to the true significance and import of the outward elements and actions, and pressed upon men the paramount necessity of seeing to it, that the state of their mind and heart corresponded with the outward signs which they used, with the outward actions which they performed.

To all this amount of commendation in connection with the exposition of the sacraments, we believe Zwingle to be well entitled, while the true amount of his shortcoming or deficiency it is not very easy to estimate. Indeed, in regard to this latter point, it should not be forgotten, that of the important document commonly called the "*Consensus Tigurinus*," in which was embodied a statement of the fundamental principles about the sacraments, which were held in common by the churches of Geneva and Zurich, as represented by Calvin and by Bullinger the successor of Zwingle, Calvin declared his conviction, that "if Zwingle and *Æcolampadius*, these most excellent and illustrious servants of Christ, were now alive, they would not change a word in it," (*Niemeyer's "Collectio Confessionum*," p. 201).

We do not consider it necessary to dwell longer upon the examination of the opinions of Zwingle in regard to the sacraments. Indeed we do not intend to bring forward any thing farther that is connected with the personal history of the great Reformer of German Switzerland. We propose now to take the opportunity of giving some exposition of the general doctrine or theory of the Sacraments, as it has been held by the Reformed churches, and especially as it has been set forth in the Confession of Faith and Catechisms which were prepared by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, and which are still received as symbolical by the great body of Presbyterians over the world.*

A grievous corruption of the Scriptural doctrine of the

* There are lives of Zwingle in Melchior Adam's "*Vitae Germanorum Theologorum*," p. 25, and in *Chaufepie's Continuation of Bayle's Dictionary*, tom. iv. Hess's Life of Zwingle, which was translated into English, and published in this country in the early part of this century, is not a work of much value. Much better is "*Ulrich Zwingli et son Epoque*," translated from the German of J. J. Hottinger, and published, at Lausanne in 1844; and still better and much more complete is Christoffels "*Zwingli, or the Rise of the Reformation in Switzerland*," translated from the German, and published by Messrs Clark at Edinburgh in 1858. There is a full discussion of the principal charges which have been adduced against Zwingle, and of the leading misrepresentations which have been put forth of his life and doctrines, in the "*Apologia pro Zwinglio et ejus Operibus*," prefixed by his son-in-law Gualther, to the folio edition of his works, published in 1581, and in "*Hottingeri Historia Ecclesiastica*," tom. viii. p. 285-400. Much interesting matter concerning Zwingle's life and labours will be found in Ruchat's "*Histoire de la Reformation de la Suisse*," tom i. and ii., Gerdes's "*Historia Reformationis*," tom i. and ii., and Scott's continuation of Milner, vols. ii. and iii. Of Zwingle's own works, several, having a symbolical character, are given in Niemeyer's "*Collectio Confessionum*," viz., *Articuli sine Conclusiones* lxxvii., occupying a similar place to Luther's Theses, but exhibiting a much fuller view of Scriptural antipapal truth, his "*Ratio Fidei*" presented to the Emperor at the diet of Augsburg in 1530, and his "*Expositio Christianae Fidei*" written in 1531 and published after his death. Of his other works those which are perhaps the most important, as giving within a comparatively brief compass most information as to his doctrines upon points which are still interesting, are the Explanation of the sixty-seven articles, the "*Commentarius de vera et falsa Religione*," and the treatise "*De Providentia Dei*."

sacraments appeared very early in the church, it spread far and wide, and exerted a most injurious influence upon the interests of true religion. Confusion and exaggeration very early appeared in speaking of these ordinances, or the "tremendous mysteries," as some of the Fathers called them; and this confusion and exaggeration soon led to a substitution of the mere observance of outward rites for the weightier matters of the law, for the essential features of Christian character and conduct. Even in the second century, we find plain indications of a tendency to speak of the nature, design, and effects of the sacraments, in a very inflated and exaggerated style, a style very different from anything we find in the New Testament. We have a striking instance of this in the famous passage on the Eucharist, occurring near the end of the first Apology of Justin Martyr, the very earliest of the Fathers who was not cotemporary with the Apostles. Romanists contend that this passage teaches the doctrine of transubstantiation; Lutherans, that it teaches consubstantiation; and most other men, that it teaches neither the one nor the other. All men of candour admit that the passage is obscure and ambiguous, and all men of sense should have long ago come to the conclusion, that it was not worth while to spend any time in investigating its meaning.* It holds true of this, as of many other passages in the writings of the Fathers, which have given rise to much learned discussion in modern times, that it really has no definite meaning, and that if we could call up its author, and interrogate him on the subject, he would be utterly unable to tell us what he meant when he wrote it. This tendency to exaggeration and extravagance, to confusion and absurdity, upon the subject of the sacraments, increased continually, in proportion as sound doctrine upon matters of greater importance disappeared and vital religion decayed, until, in the middle ages, Christianity came to be looked upon by the great body of its professors, as a system which consisted in, and the whole benefits of which were connected with, a series of outward ceremonies and ritual observances. The nature, design, and effects of the sacraments occupied a large share of the attention of the schoolmen; and, indeed, the exposition and development of the Romish and Tractarian doctrine upon this subject, may be justly regarded as one of the principal exhibitions of the antisciptural views and the perverted ingenuity of the scholastic doctors. An exaggerated and unscriptural view of the value and efficacy of the sacraments was too deeply engrained into the scholastic theology, and was too much in accordance with the general policy of the Church of Rome,

* Semisch's Justin Martyr, vol. ii. pp. 330, 340. Biblical Cabinet, No. 44.

and the general character and tendency of her system, to admit of the Council of Trent giving any sanction to the sounder views which had been introduced by the Protestants, especially by that section of them who have been called the Reformed, to distinguish them from the followers of Luther.

The doctrine of the Church of Rome upon this subject is set forth in the first part of the decree of the 7th Session of the Council of Trent, which treats *de Sacramentis in genere*, and in statements made in treating of some of the other sacraments individually. The leading features of their doctrine on the general subject of the sacraments are these, that "through the sacraments of the church all true righteousness either begins, or, when begun, is increased, or, when lost, is repaired;" "that men do not obtain from God the grace of justification by faith alone without the sacraments, or, at least, without a desire or wish to receive them;" "that the sacraments contain the grace which they signify or represent, and confer it always upon all who receive them, unless they put a bar or obstacle in the way" (*ponunt obicem*); that is (as they usually explain it), unless they have at the time of receiving the sacrament a deliberate intention of committing sin; and that they confer or bestow grace thus universally *ex opere operato*, that is, by some power or virtue given to them and operating through them. The application of these principles, which constitute the general doctrine or theory of the sacraments in the Romish theology, to the sacrament of baptism, and to the fundamental blessings of forgiveness and regeneration which it signifies or represents, plainly implies, what indeed the Council of Trent expressly teaches—viz., that baptism is the instrumental cause of justification, which with Romanists comprehends both forgiveness and regeneration, that all adults receive when baptized, unless they put a bar in the way, these great blessings, that all infants, being unable to put a bar in the way of the efficacious operation of the sacrament, receive in baptism the forgiveness of original sin and the renovation of their moral natures, and that no sin of unbaptized persons, not even the original sin of those who die in infancy, is forgiven without baptism. This is in substance the doctrine in regard to the sacraments, which is taught by the modern Tractarians of the Church of England, and which, indeed, in its main features, may be said to have been always held by High Churchmen. Some of them shrink, indeed, from speaking so plainly on some points as the Council of Trent has done, especially on the *opus operatum*; but there is no difficulty in shewing that all High Churchmen must concur in substance with the general sacramental theory of the Church of Rome. The essential idea of

the Popish and Tractarian doctrine upon this subject is, that God has established an invariable connection between the sacraments as outward ordinances, and the communication by himself, the possession by men, of spiritual blessings, of pardon and holiness; with this further notion, which naturally results from it, that He has endowed these outward ordinances with some sort of intrinsic power or inherent capacity of conveying or conferring the spiritual blessings with which they are respectively connected. This is what is, and, indeed, must be, meant by the sacramental principle, about which High Churchmen in the present day prate so much; and notwithstanding their efforts to wrap it up in vague and indefinite phraseology, it is plainly in substance just the doctrine which was established by the Council of Trent. It is a necessary result of this principle, that the want of the outward ordinance—not the neglect or contempt of it, but the mere want of it—from whatever cause arising, deprives men of the spiritual blessings which it is said to convey or confer. Romanists have found it necessary or politic to make some little exceptions to this practical conclusion; but this is the great general result to which their whole scheme of doctrine upon the subject leads, and which ordinarily they do not hesitate to adopt and to apply.

In opposition to all these views, Protestants have been accustomed to maintain this great principle, that the only thing on which the possession by men individually of the fundamental spiritual blessings of justification and sanctification is, by God's arrangements, made necessarily and invariably dependent, is union to Jesus Christ, and that the only thing on which union to Christ may be said to be dependent, is faith in him; so that it holds true, absolutely and universally, that wherever there is faith in Christ, or union to him by faith, there pardon and holiness—all necessary spiritual blessings—are communicated by God and received by men, even though they have never actually partaken in any sacrament, or in any outward ordinance whatever. Scripture, we think, plainly teaches this great truth, that as soon as, and in every instance in which, men are united to Christ by faith, they receive justification and regeneration; while without or apart from personal union to Christ by faith, these indispensable blessings are never conferred or received. Every man who is justified and regenerated is certainly admitted into heaven, whether he have been baptized or not; and there is no ground in Scripture for maintaining, either, that every one who has been baptized has been forgiven and regenerated, or that those who have not been baptized have not received these great blessings.

If this great general principle can be established from Scripture, it must materially affect some of the views which Romanists and Tractarians hold in regard to the sacraments, and especially in regard to their necessity and importance. Romanists, indeed, are in the habit of charging Protestants with holding, that the sacraments are unnecessary or superfluous. But this is a misrepresentation. In perfect consistency with this great doctrine, which represents the possession of spiritual blessings and the ultimate enjoyment of heaven, as dependent absolutely and universally upon union to Christ through faith and upon nothing else, we maintain, that the sacraments which Christ instituted are of imperative obligation, and that it is a duty incumbent upon men to observe them when the means and opportunity of doing so are afforded them; so that it is sinful to neglect or disregard them. Upon the subject of the necessity of the sacraments, Protestant divines have been accustomed to employ a distinction, which, like many other scholastic distinctions, brings out very clearly the meaning it was intended to express, viz., that the sacraments are necessary, *ex necessitate præcepti non ex necessitate medii*, necessary *ex necessitate præcepti*, because the observance of them is commanded or enjoined, and must therefore be practised by all who have in providence an opportunity of doing so, so that the voluntary neglect or disregard of them is sinful; but not necessary *ex necessitate medii*, or in such a sense, that the mere fact of men not having actually observed them, either produces or proves the non-possession of spiritual blessings, either excludes men from heaven, or affords evidence that they will not in point of fact be admitted there. Regeneration or conversion, as implying a thorough change of moral nature, is necessary, both *ex necessitate præcepti* and *ex necessitate medii*. It is necessary, not merely because it is commanded or enjoined, so that the neglect or omission of it is sinful, but also because, from the nature of the case, the result cannot be attained without it; inasmuch as it holds true, absolutely and universally, in point of fact and in the case of each individual of our race, that except we be born again we cannot enter the kingdom of heaven. No such necessity can be established with respect to the sacraments, though Romanists and Tractarians assert this, and must do so in order to carry out their principles consistently.

But while this great general principle about spiritual blessings and eternal happiness being dependent upon union to Christ, and upon nothing else, is inconsistent with the Popish and Tractarian notions of the necessity of the sacraments, and furnishes a strong presumption against the higher views of the importance and efficacy of these ordinances, it does not of

itself give us any direct information as to what the sacraments are, as to their nature, objects, and effects. Protestants profess to have a certain theory or doctrine in regard to the sacraments as well as Romanists and Tractarians. A definition of the sacraments, or, throwing aside the technical scholastic meaning of the word definition, a description of the leading features of the sacraments, a statement of the main positions held concerning them, is properly the sacramental principle, although that phrase has been commonly employed in the present day in a more limited and specific sense. At the time of the Reformation the name Sacramentarian was applied by Luther to Zwingle and his followers, to convey the idea, that they explained away or reduced to nothing the value and efficacy of the sacraments, while Zwingle, throwing back the nickname, protested that it might be applied with more propriety to those who made great mysteries of the sacraments, and ascribed to them a value and importance beyond what Scripture warrants. The justice of this statement of Zwingle has been confirmed by the aspect which the discussion of this topic has assumed in the present day. The Tractarians seem to think that none ought to be regarded as really believing in sacraments, except those who concur with the Church of Rome in holding, that there is an invariable connection between the outward sign and the spiritual blessing signified, and that the outward ordinance exerts a real efficacious influence in producing the internal result. This, accordingly, is what they mean by the sacramental principle, on which they are fond of enlarging, and of which they claim to themselves a sort of monopoly. And this is the sense in which the phrase is now commonly used. But the sense in which the expression ought to be employed, is just to designate the fundamental idea of the general doctrine of Scripture on the subject of the sacraments; and in this sense, of course, Protestants have their sacramental principle as well as Romanists and Tractarians.

We believe that Scripture furnishes sufficient materials for giving a general definition or description of the sacraments, or of a sacrament as such, and we call this the sacramental principle, or the true doctrine of Scripture concerning the sacraments. The Reformers put forth their sacramental principle, or their general doctrine concerning the sacraments, in opposition to the views which prevailed at the time in the Church of Rome, and were afterwards established by the Council of Trent. Definitions and descriptions of the sacraments were in consequence introduced into all the Confessions of the reformed churches, and the investigation of the nature, the objects, and the effects of the

sacraments has continued ever since to hold a place in theological discussions. Since the time when Calvin succeeded in bringing the churches of Geneva and Zurich to a cordial agreement upon this subject, in the adoption of the Consensus Tigurinus in 1549, there has been no very great difference of opinion concerning it among Protestant divines, though there have occasionally been individuals who shewed an inclination, either, towards the Popish and superstitious, or towards the Socinian and Rationalistic, doctrine, and although the Church of England, from her unfortunate baptismal service, has been repeatedly placed in a most deplorable and degraded position. But though there is no great difference of opinion among the reformed churches, and among Protestant divines, concerning the general doctrine of the sacraments, there seems to have sprung up in modern times a great deal of ignorance and confusion in men's conceptions upon this subject. While the sacraments individually, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, have been a good deal discussed in some of their aspects, the general doctrine of sacraments, as equally applicable to both, or to any other ordinances for which the designation of a sacrament might be claimed, has been very much overlooked. Even the boasting of the Tractarians about the sacramental principle, has not led to much discussion about the nature and design of the sacraments in general. The two latest works, so far as we know, which have been published under the title of the Doctrine of the Sacraments, contain nothing whatever on the general questions to which we have adverted. In the year 1838 a work was published, entitled "*The Doctrine of the Sacraments*," extracted from the Remains of Alexander Knox, who was the friend and correspondent of Bishop Jebb, and whose writings seem to have contributed in no small degree to the rise and growth of Tractarianism; and this work discusses, with no little ability, many questions about baptism and about the Lord's Supper, but it contains nothing about the sacraments in general, or about a sacrament as such. This statement likewise applies to a recent work of Archbishop Whately, the latest, we believe, he has published. In 1857, he put forth a work, entitled "*The Scripture doctrine concerning the Sacraments, and the Points connected therewith*;" and it contains some able discussion on some points connected with baptism, and on some points connected with the Lord's Supper, but nothing whatever on the general nature, objects, and effects of the sacraments.

The disregard of this topic has tended to produce a great deal of confusion and error in men's whole conceptions upon this subject. We are in the habit of seeing baptism and the Lord's Supper administered in the church, and are thus

led insensibly and without much consideration, to form certain notions in regard to them, without investigating carefully their leading principles and grounds, and especially without investigating the relation in which they stand to each other, and the principles that may apply to both of them. We believe that there is scarcely any subject set forth in the Confessions of the reformed churches, that is less attended to and less understood than this of the sacraments; and that many even of those who have subscribed these Confessions, rest satisfied with some defective, confused, and fragmentary notions on the subject of baptism, and on the subject of the Lord's Supper, while they have scarcely even a fragment of an idea of a sacramental principle, or of any general doctrine or theory on the subject of sacraments.

We are persuaded that it would tend greatly to enable men to understand more fully what we fear many subscribe without understanding, if they took some pains to form a distinct and definite conception of what is taught in the Confessions of Faith in regard to sacraments in general, and then applied these views to the two sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper separately. It is quite true that the Scriptures can scarcely be said to contain any statements which bear very directly and explicitly upon the topics usually set forth in Confessions of Faith, and discussed in systems of theology, under the head *de Sacramentis in genere*, or to give us anything like full and formal information about the general subject of the sacraments as such. But the New Testament plainly sets before us two outward ordinances, and two only, the observance of which is of permanent obligation in the Christian church, and which manifestly resemble each other in many respects, both in their general character as emblematic or symbolical institutions, and in their general purpose and object as means of grace—that is, as connected in some way or other with the communication and the reception of spiritual blessings. As these two ordinances evidently occupy a peculiar place of their own, in the general plan of the Christian system and in the arrangements of the Christian church, it is natural and reasonable to inquire, whether there are any materials in Scripture for adopting any general conclusions as to their nature, design, and efficacy, that may be equally applicable to them both. And, accordingly, what is usually given as the definition or description of the sacraments, or of a sacrament as such, is just an embodiment of what it is thought can be collected or deduced from Scripture, as being equally predicable of baptism and the Lord's Supper. Of course nothing ought to be introduced into the definition or description of the sacraments,

which cannot be proved to be equally and alike applicable to all the ordinances to which the designation of a sacrament is given ; and the less men find in Scripture that seems to them equally applicable to both ordinances, the more meagre is their sacramental principle, or their general doctrine in regard to the nature and design of the sacraments.

The Reformed Confessions and Protestant divines, in general, have agreed very much in the definition or description of the sacraments, though there is a considerable diversity in the clearness and distinctness with which their doctrine upon this subject is unfolded. It can scarcely, we think, be denied that the general tendency, even among the Reformers, was to exaggerate or overstate the importance and efficacy of the sacraments. Zwingle's views were a reaction against those which generally prevailed in the Church of Rome ; but the extent to which he went rather reacted upon the other Reformers, and made them again approximate somewhat in phraseology to the Romish position. This appears more or less even in Calvin, though in his case there was an additional perverting element—the desire to keep on friendly terms with Luther and his followers, and with that view to approximate as far as he could to their notions of the corporal presence of Christ in the Eucharist. We have no fault to find with the substance of Calvin's statements in regard to the sacraments in general, or with respect to baptism, but we cannot deny that he made an effort to bring out something like a real influence exerted by Christ's human nature upon the souls of believers, in connection with the dispensation of the Lord's Supper—an effort which, of course, was altogether unsuccessful, and resulted only in what was about as unintelligible an absurdity as Luther's consubstantiation. This is, perhaps, the greatest blot in the history of Calvin's labours as a public instructor ; and it is a curious circumstance, that the influence which seems to have been chiefly efficacious in leading him astray in the matter, was a quality for which he usually gets no credit—viz., an earnest desire to preserve unity and harmony among the different sections of the Christian church.

But, independently of any peculiarity of this sort, we have no doubt that the general tendency among Protestant divines, both at the period of the Reformation and in the seventeenth century, was to lean to the side of magnifying the value and efficacy of the sacraments, and that some of the statements even in the symbolical books of some churches, are not altogether free from indications of this kind. But while this is true, and should not be overlooked, there is not nearly so much ground for the allegation, and in so far as there is ground for it, it does not apply to points of nearly so much importance,

as persons imperfectly and superficially acquainted with the history of theological discussion have sometimes supposed. Indeed, blunders have occurred in connection with this subject which are perfectly ludicrous.

Dr Phillpotts, the present Bishop of Exeter, a man of very considerable skill and ability in controversy, and respectably acquainted with some departments of theological literature, asserted, in a charge which he published in 1848, that several of the Confessions of the reformed churches—specifying “the Helvetic, that of Augsburg, the Saxon, the Belgic, and the Catechism of Heidelberg”—agreed with the Church of Rome and the Church of England in teaching the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. Mr Goode, now Dean of Ripon, who has done most admirable service to the cause of Christian Protestant truth, by his crushing and unanswerable exposures of Tractarianism, and who, in point of learning and ability, is one of the most creditable and successful champions the Evangelical party in the Church of England has ever had, thoroughly exposed this “astounding statement,” “this most extraordinary blunder.” He shewed that it arose from a very imperfect and superficial acquaintance with their theology as a whole; and proved that the construction thus put upon some of their statements was, in the first place, not required by anything they had said, and, in the second place, was precluded, not only by the views set forth in some of these documents on the subject of election, but by the views taught in all of them on the general character and objects of the sacraments, and the persons for whom they are intended, and in whom alone they produce their appropriate effects. The exposure of the blunder was so conclusive, that Dr Phillpotts felt himself constrained to withdraw the statement in the second edition of his charge, but tried to cover his retreat by an unfounded allegation, that the documents to which he had referred were self-contradictory.*

It was upon the same grounds which misled the Bishop of Exeter, that the same allegation has recently been adduced against “the deliverance of the Westminster divines in the Shorter Catechism on the subject of baptism.” On a recent public occasion in Edinburgh, the Rev. Dr William Anderson, Glasgow, amid a great deal more of most reckless and offensive folly, declared of that deliverance, that he had “never seen or heard a satisfactory attempt to vindicate it from the charge of teaching baptismal regeneration.” It is very certain that the Westminster divines did not intend in this deliverance, or in any other which they put forth, to teach baptismal regeneration; a contradiction is not to be imputed

* See Goode’s “Vindication of the Defence of the Thirty-nine Articles,” p. 9; and his “Effects of Infant Baptism,” chap. iv. pp. 143 and 160.

to them, if by any fair process of construction it can be avoided ; and it is in the highest degree improbable that they should have contradicted themselves upon a point at once so plain and so important. The truth is, that Dr Anderson's statement exhibits an amount of ignorance and confusion that is truly deplorable. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration, whatever else it may include, is always understood to imply, that all baptized infants are regenerated. Now there is nothing in the Shorter Catechism which gives any countenance to this notion, or, indeed, conveys any explicit deliverance as to the bearing of baptism upon infants. Dr Anderson's notion that the Shorter Catechism teaches baptismal regeneration, must, we presume, be based upon the assumption, that the general description given of the import and object of baptism, is intended to apply to every case in which the outward ordinance of baptism is administered. But there is no ground for this assumption. The general description given of baptism must be considered in connection with the general description given of a sacrament, and it is the disregard of this which is one main cause of the ignorance and confusion so often exhibited upon this whole subject. In accordance with views which we have already explained, the description of a sacrament is intended to embody the substance of what is taught or indicated in Scripture, as being true equally and alike of both sacraments. Of course, all that is said about a sacrament not only may, but must, be applied both to baptism and the Lord's Supper, as being in all its extent true of each of them.

The definition or description given of a sacrament in the Shorter Catechism, is that it "is a holy ordinance instituted by Christ, wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers." In order to bring out fully the teaching of the catechism on the subject of baptism, we must in the first place take in the general description given of a sacrament, and then the special description given of baptism, and we must interpret them in connection with each other as parts of one scheme of doctrine. Upon this obvious principle, we say, that the first and fundamental position taught in the Shorter Catechism concerning baptism is this, that it (as well as the Lord's Supper) "is an holy ordinance instituted by Christ, wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers." It is of fundamental importance to remember, that the catechism does apply this whole description of a sacrament to baptism, and to realize what this involves. In addition to this general description of baptism as a sacrament, common to it with the Lord's Supper, the catechism proceeds to give a more specific description of baptism as distinguished from the other sacrament. It is this,

"baptism is a sacrament, wherein the washing with water, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, doth signify and seal our ingrafting into Christ, our partaking of the benefits of the covenant of grace, and our engagement to be the Lord's." Now the only ground for alleging that this teaches baptismal regeneration, must be the notion, that it applies in point of fact to all who have been baptized, and that all who have received the outward ordinance of baptism are warranted to adopt this language, and to apply it to themselves. But the true principle of interpretation is, that this description of baptism applies fully and in all its extent only to those who ought to be baptized, those who are possessed of the necessary qualifications or preparations for baptism, and who are able to ascertain this. And the question as to who these are, must be determined by a careful consideration of all that is taught upon this subject. Much evidently depends upon the use and application of the pronoun *our* here, that is, upon the question, who are the persons that are supposed to be speaking, or to be entitled to speak, here, that is, to employ the language in which the general nature and object of baptism are here set forth? The *our*, of course, suggests a *we*, who are supposed to be the parties speaking, and the question is, Who are the *we*? Are they all who have been baptized? or only those who ought to have been baptized, who, moreover, are capable of ascertaining that they have been legitimately baptized, *and who, being satisfied on this point, are in consequence able to adopt the language of the Catechism intelligently and truly?* Now this question is similar to that which is often suggested in the interpretation of the apostolical epistles, where the use of the words *we*, *us*, and *our*, raises the question, who are the *we* that are supposed to be speaking? that is, who are the *we*, in whose name, or as one of whom, the apostle is there speaking? And this question, wherever it arises, must be decided by a careful examination of the whole context and scope of the passage. In the catechism, we have first a general description given of a sacrament, intended to embody the substance of what Scripture is held to teach or indicate, as equally and alike applicable to both sacraments. One leading element in this description is, that the sacraments are for the use and benefit of believers, and this principle must be kept in view in all the more specific statements afterwards made about either sacrament. This consideration, as well as the whole scope of the statement, clearly implies, that the description given of baptism proceeds upon the assumption, that the persons who partake in it are possessed of the necessary qualifications, that is, that they are believers, and do or may know that they are so.

This principle of construction is a perfectly fair and

natural one. It has always been a fundamental principle in the theology of Protestants, that the sacraments were instituted and intended for believers, and produce their appropriate beneficial effects, only through the faith which must have previously existed, and which is expressed and exercised in the act of partaking in them. This being a fundamental and recognised principle in the Protestant theology of the sacraments, it was quite natural that it should be assumed and taken into account in giving a general description of their objects and effects. And the application of this principle of interpretation to the whole deliverances of the Westminster divines upon the subject of the sacraments, in the Confession of Faith and in the Larger Catechism as well as in the Shorter, introduces clearness and consistency into them all, whereas the disregard of it involves them in confusion, absurdity, and inconsistency.

On the grounds which have now been hinted at, and which when once suggested must commend themselves to every one who will deliberately and impartially examine the subject, we think it very clear and certain, that the *we*, suggested by the *our* in the general description of baptism, are only the believers who had been previously set forth as the proper and worthy recipients of the sacraments, and that consequently the statement that "baptism signifies and seals *our* ingrafting into Christ," &c., must mean, that it signifies and seals the ingrafting into Christ of THOSE OF US who have been ingrafted into Christ by faith. This construction, of course, removes all appearance of the catechism teaching baptismal regeneration.*

The truth is, that the only real difficulty in the case is precisely the reverse of that which Dr Anderson has started. The difficulty is, not that the catechism appears to teach, that infants are all regenerated in baptism, but that it appears to teach, that believers are the only proper recipients of baptism, as well as of the Lord's Supper, while yet at the same time it also explicitly teaches, that the infants of such as are members of the visible church are to be baptized. This is the only real difficulty, for Dr Anderson's allegation, that the catechism teaches baptismal regeneration, has not plausibility enough to raise it to the rank of a difficulty. But the opposite difficulty we have stated will require some explanation, while at the same time the investigation of it will bring us back again to the main subject which we wished to

* We know that much ignorance and confusion on the subject of the sacraments, prevail among the older ministers of the two largest bodies in Scotland who adopt the Westminster symbols, the Established Church and the Free Church. We have no means of knowing how this matter stands in the United Presbyterian Church, except from this extraordinary exhibition of Dr Anderson. If he be a fair specimen of his brethren in this respect, which, however, it would be very uncharitable to assume without evidence, that church must be at least as deficient in intelligent acquaintance with the subject of the sacraments as the other two.

consider, viz., the true doctrine of the reformed churches, and especially of the Westminster standards, in regard to the nature, objects, and effects of the sacraments in general.

The general view which Protestants have commonly taken of the sacraments is, that they are signs and seals of the covenant of grace, that is, of the truths which unfold the provisions and arrangements of the covenant, and of the spiritual blessings which the covenant provides and secures, not only signifying or representing Christ and the benefits of the new covenant, but sealing or confirming them, and in some sense applying them, to believers. As the sacraments are the signs and seals of the covenant, so they belong properly to, and can benefit only, those who have an interest in the covenant, the *fœderati*; and there is no adequate ground for counting upon their exerting their appropriate influence in individual cases, apart from the faith which the participation in them ordinarily expresses, and which must exist before participation in them can be either warrantable or beneficial. These are the leading views which Protestant divines have usually put forth in regard to the sacraments in general, that is, their general nature, design, and efficacy. In looking more closely at the doctrines of Protestant churches upon this subject, it is necessary to remember, not only that, as we have already explained, they usually assume in their general statements, that the persons partaking in the sacraments are duly prepared, or possessed of the necessary preliminary qualifications, but also that, when statements are made which are intended to apply equally to baptism and the Lord's Supper, or when the general object and design of baptism are set forth in the abstract, they have in their view, and take into their account, only adult baptism, the baptism of those who, after they have come to years of understanding, ask and obtain admission into the visible church by being baptized.

This mode of contemplating the ordinance of baptism is so different from what we are accustomed to, that we are apt to be startled when it is presented to us, and find it somewhat difficult to enter into it. It tends greatly to introduce obscurity and confusion into our whole conceptions on the subject of baptism, that we see it ordinarily administered to infants, and very seldom to adults. This leads us insensibly to form very defective and erroneous conceptions of its design and effects, or rather to live with our minds very much in the condition of blanks, so far as concerns any distinct and definite views upon this subject. There is a great difficulty felt, a difficulty which Scripture does not afford us adequate materials for removing, in laying down any distinct and definite doctrine as to the bearing and efficacy of baptism in the case of infants, to whom

alone, ordinarily, we see it administered. A sense of this difficulty is very apt to tempt us to remain contentedly in great ignorance of the whole subject, without any serious attempt to understand distinctly what baptism is and means, and how it is connected with the general doctrine of sacraments. And yet it is quite plain to any one who is capable of reflecting upon the subject, that it is adult baptism alone which embodies and brings out the full idea of the ordinance, and should be regarded as the primary type of it, that from which mainly and principally we should form our conceptions of what baptism is and means, and was intended to accomplish. It is in this aspect that baptism is ordinarily spoken about, and presented to our contemplation, in the New Testament, and we see something similar in tracing the operations of our missionaries who are engaged in preaching the gospel in heathen lands.

Adult baptism, then, exhibits the original and fundamental idea of the ordinance, as it is usually brought before us, and as it is directly and formally spoken about in the New Testament. And when baptism is contemplated in this light, there is no more difficulty in forming a distinct and definite conception regarding it than regarding the Lord's Supper. Of adult baptism, we can say, just as we do of the Lord's Supper, that it is in every instance, according to the general doctrine of Protestants, either the sign and seal of a faith and a regeneration previously existing, already effected by God's grace, or else a hypocritical profession of a state of mind and feeling which has no existence. We have no doubt that the lawfulness and the obligation of infant baptism can be conclusively established from Scripture, but it is manifest that the general doctrine or theory just stated, with respect to the import and effect of the sacraments, and of baptism as a sacrament, cannot be applied fully in all its extent to the baptism of infants. The reason of this is, because Scripture does not afford us materials, either, for laying down any definite position as to a certain and invariable connection between baptism and spiritual blessings, that is, for maintaining the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, or, for stating such a distinct and definite alternative with respect to the efficacy of the ordinance in individuals, as has been stated above in the case of adult baptism and the Lord's Supper. But notwithstanding these obvious considerations, we fear it is a very common thing for men, just because they ordinarily see infant, and very seldom see adult, baptism, to take the baptism of infants, with all the difficulties attaching to giving a precise and definite statement as to its design and effect in their case, and to allow this to regulate their whole conceptions with respect to this ordinance in general, and even with respect to the

sacraments in general. This is a very common process, and we could easily produce abundant evidence, both of its actual prevalence, and of its injurious bearing upon men's whole opinions on this subject. The right and reasonable course plainly is just the reverse of this, viz., to regard adult baptism as affording the proper fundamental type of the ordinance, to derive our great leading conceptions about baptism from the case, not of infant, but of adult, baptism, viewed in connection with the general theory or doctrine applicable to both sacraments, and then, since infant baptism is also fully warranted by Scripture, to examine what modifications the leading general views of the ordinance may or must undergo, when applied to the special and peculiar case of the baptism of infants.

These views were acted upon, though not formally and explicitly stated, by the reformers in preparing their Confessions of Faith, and in their discussions of this subject. It is impossible to bring out from their statements about the sacraments a clear and consistent sense, except upon the hypothesis, that, in laying down their general positions as to the nature, objects, and effects of the sacraments, they proceeded upon the assumption, that those partaking in these ordinances were duly qualified and rightly prepared, and more particularly, that the persons baptized, in whom the true and full operation of baptism was exhibited, were adults, adult believers. The Council of Trent, in their decrees and canons on the subject of justification, which in the Romish system comprehends regeneration, and of which they asserted baptism, or the sacrament of faith, as they call it, to be the instrumental cause (Sess. vi. c. 8), dealt with the subject on the assumption, that they were describing the process which takes place in the case of persons who, after they have attained to adult age, are led to embrace Christianity and to apply for baptism. And we find that the Reformers, in discussing these matters with their Romish opponents, accommodated themselves to this mode of putting the case; and having thus adult baptism chiefly in their view, were led sometimes to speak as if they regarded baptism and regeneration as substantially identical. They certainly did not mean to assert or concede the Popish principle, of an invariable connection between the outward ordinance and the spiritual blessing, for it is quite certain, and can be conclusively established, that they rejected this. They adopted this mode of speaking, which at first sight is somewhat startling, 1st, because the Council of Trent discussed the subject of justification chiefly in its bearing upon the case of those who had not been baptized in infancy, and with whom, consequently, baptism, if it was not a mere hypocritical pretence destitute of all worth or value, was, in the judgment of Protestants, a sign and seal of a faith and regenera-

tion previously wrought and then existing; and 2dly, because it was when viewed in this aspect and application, that their great general doctrines, as to the design and efficacy of the sacraments in their bearing upon the justification of sinners, stood out for examination in the clearest and most definite form. This was the true cause of a mode of speaking sometimes adopted by the Reformers, which, to those imperfectly acquainted with their writings, and with the state of theological discussion at the time, might seem to countenance the doctrine of baptismal regeneration.

It was very important to bring out fully and distinctly the nature and character of the sacraments as signs and seals of the covenant of grace and its benefits, the import of the profession implied in partaking in them, and the qualifications required for receiving them rightly; *and then to connect the statement of their actual effects with right views upon all these points.* This process was at once the most obvious and the most effectual way, of shutting out the erroneous and dangerous notions upon the subject of the sacraments that prevailed in the Church of Rome. It was very important with this view, to give a compendious and summary representation of what was set forth in Scripture as the sacramental principle or theory, as being equally applicable to both sacraments, and to keep steadily before men's minds the consideration, that this could be held to be fully realized and exhibited only in those for whom the sacraments were mainly intended, and who were duly prepared for receiving and improving them aright. Their minds were filled with these principles, and they were anxious to set them forth, in opposition to the great sacramental system which had been excogitated by the schoolmen, and sanctioned by the Church of Rome. And it was because their minds were filled with these principles that, though strenuously opposing the tenets of the Anabaptists, they yet saw clearly and admitted the somewhat peculiar and supplemental position held by infant baptism. They held it to be of primary importance to bring out fully the sacramental principle as exhibited in its entireness in adult baptism and the Lord's Supper; and in aiming at accomplishing this, they were not much concerned about putting forth definitions or descriptions of the sacraments or even of baptism, which could scarcely be regarded as comprehending infant baptism, or as obviously and directly applying to it. They never intended to teach baptismal regeneration, and they have said nothing that appears to teach it, or that could be supposed to teach it, by any except those who were utterly ignorant of the whole course of the discussion of these subjects as it was then conducted. They never intended to discountenance infant baptism; on the contrary, they strenuously defended its lawfulness and obligation. But they

certainly gave descriptions of the general nature, design, and effects of the sacraments, which, if literally interpreted and pressed, might be regarded as omitting it, or putting it aside.

It is impossible to deny, that the general description which the Shorter Catechism gives of a sacrament teaches, by plain implication, that the sacraments are intended only for believers, while no Protestants, except some of the Lutherans, have ever held that infants are capable of exercising faith. It also teaches by plain implication, in the previous question, the 91st, that the wholesome influence of the sacraments is experienced only by those who "by faith receive them." All this is applied equally to baptism and the Lord's Supper. Its general import, as implying a virtual restriction of these ordinances to believers, is too clear to be misunderstood or to admit of being explained away. And then, again, the apparent discrepancy between this great principle, and the position that "the infants of such as are members of the visible church are to be baptized," is too obvious to escape the notice of any one who deliberately examines the catechism with a view to understand it. These considerations would lead us to expect to find, that the discrepancy is only apparent, and that there is no great difficulty in pointing out a mode of reconciliation. The mode of reconciliation we have already hinted at. It is in substance this, that infant baptism is to be regarded as a peculiar, subordinate, supplemental, exceptional thing, which stands, indeed, firmly based on its own distinct and special grounds, but which cannot well be brought within the line of the general abstract definition or description of a sacrament, as applicable to adult baptism and the Lord's Supper.

The Westminster divines, then, have given a description of a sacrament, which does apply fully to adult baptism and the Lord's Supper, but which does not directly and *in terminis* comprehend infant baptism. This, which is the plain fact of the case, could only have arisen from their finding it difficult, if not impossible, to give a definition of the sacraments in their great leading fundamental aspects, which would at the same time apply to, and include, the special case of the baptism of infants. This, again, implies an admission that the definition given of a sacrament does not apply fully and in all its extent to the special case of infant baptism; while it implies, also, that the compilers of the catechism thought it much more important, to bring out fully, as the definition of a sacrament, all that could be truly predicated equally of adult baptism and the Lord's Supper, than to try to form a definition, that might be wide enough and vague enough to include infant baptism, a topic of a peculiar and subordinate description. This is the

only explanation and defence that can be given of the course of statement adopted in the catechism, if it be indeed true, that it teaches by plain implication the general position, that the sacraments are intended for, and really benefit, believers only. And it seems to us impossible, upon any plausible grounds, to deny that this general position is clearly and certainly implied in the statements we have quoted.

It may possibly occur to some, that since it is certain that the compilers of the catechism held, that it was the children of believers only that were to be baptized, and that they were to be baptized on the ground of their parents' faith, and the general principle of covenant relationship based upon this, the word *believers*, in the definition of a sacrament, might include infants, viewed as one with their believing parents, and virtually comprehended in them. But, besides that this leaves untouched the statement which implies, that spiritual benefit is derived from the sacraments only by "those who by faith receive them," we think it quite plain and certain, from the whole scope of the statement given in answer to the question, What is a sacrament? that the *believers* to whom the sacraments represent, seal, and apply Christ and his benefits, are those only, who themselves directly and personally partake in the sacraments, and not those also who, though not believers themselves, may be admitted to one of the sacraments because of their relation to believers.

A similar doubt might be started about the meaning and application of the parallel passage in the Larger Catechism, Q. 162. A sacrament is there described as "an holy ordinance instituted by Christ, in his church, to signify, seal, and exhibit *unto those that are within the covenant of grace*, the benefits of his mediation, to strengthen and increase their faith," &c. Now there can be no doubt that, according to the prevailing opinions and the current *usus loquendi* of the period, and, as we believe, in accordance with Scripture, the expression, "those that are within the covenant of grace," might include the children of believers, who were regarded as *fœderati*, and as thus entitled to the *signa et sigilla fœderis*. But it is quite certain that the expression is not used here in this extended sense, or as including any but believers. For the sentence goes on immediately, without any change in the construction, and without any indication of any alteration or any restriction in regard to the persons spoken of, to say, that the sacraments were instituted "to strengthen and increase *THEIR* faith," implying, of course, that the persons here spoken of had faith before the sacraments came to bear upon them, or could confer upon them any benefit.

There can, then, be no reasonable doubt that the Shorter

Catechism teaches, by plain implication, that the sacraments were intended for and actually benefit believers only; and the only way of reconciling this with its teaching on the subject of infant baptism, is by assuming, that though this is a great principle of fundamental importance in treating of the sacraments, it is not to be applied absolutely and without all exception, and that infant baptism, though fully warranted by Scripture, does not correspond in all respects with the full sacramental principle in all its extent and clearness, as exhibited in adult baptism and the Lord's Supper, and must therefore be regarded as occupying a peculiar, subordinate, and supplemental position. We know no other way of shewing the consistency with each other of the different statements contained in the catechism. The principle we have explained refutes the allegation of inconsistency or contradiction, and resolves the whole difficulty into a certain concession on the subject of infant baptism, a concession not affecting the Scriptural evidence for the maintenance of the practice of baptizing infants, but merely the fulness and completeness of the doctrinal explanation that should be given of its objects and effects.

The explanation we have given upon this point is in full accordance with the views set forth in the Westminster Confession of Faith, and in the Confessions of Reformed churches generally. They all of them assert the Scriptural authority of infant baptism, while at the same time most of them, though with different degrees of clearness, present statements about the sacraments or about baptism, which do not very fully and directly apply to the baptism of infants.* We have been the more disposed to give some time to the explanation of the peculiar position and standing of the topic of infant baptism, because it is not merely indispensable to the intelligent and consistent exposition of the Shorter Catechism, but also because ignorance or disregard of it produces much error and confusion in men's whole views with respect to the sacraments in general. Men who have not attended to and estimated aright this topic of the peculiar and subordinate place

* Strange as it may seem, this holds true, to some extent, even of the articles of the Church of England, though, perhaps, somewhat less fully and explicitly than in the case of any other of the reformed churches. In the general statements about the sacraments in the 25th article, and in the chief portion of the 27th, on baptism, there is nothing to suggest that infant baptism is comprehended in the description; and, indeed, the general scope and spirit of the statements rather seem to ignore or pretermit it, though there is not the same explicit and restricting reference to *believers* and *faith* which occurs in the Shorter Catechism. And then, again, the only express mention of infant baptism, which occurs in the end of the 27th article, and which simply asserts that it "is in anywise to be retained in the church as most agreeable to the institution of Christ," brings it in very much in the same supplemental, exceptional sort of way, in which the Westminster standards deal with it.

held by the subject of infant baptism, are very apt to run into one or other of two extremes, viz., 1st, that of lowering the true sacramental principle, as brought out in the general definition of a sacrament, and as exhibited fully in the case of adult baptism and the Lord's Supper, to the level of what suits the special case of infant baptism; or, 2d, that of raising the explanation propounded of the bearing and effect of infant baptism, up to a measure of clearness and fulness which really attaches only to adult baptism and the Lord's Supper. And as error is generally inconsistent, and extremes have a strong tendency to meet, cases have occurred in which both these opposite extremes have been exhibited by the same persons, in connection with that one source of error and confusion to which we have referred. The truth, as well as the importance, of some of the points which have been referred to in the course of the preceding statements, will appear more clearly, as we proceed to explain more fully and formally the general doctrine of the sacraments, as set forth in the Westminster symbols, in accordance with the other Confessions of the Reformed churches.

The doctrine of the sacraments, or the sacramental principle, in the proper import of that expression, is intended, as we have explained, to embody the sum and substance of what is taught or indicated in Scripture, as equally and alike applicable to both the ordinances to which the name of a sacrament is commonly given. Of course, nothing ought to be introduced into the definition or description of a sacrament, but what there is sufficient Scriptural ground, more or less direct and explicit, and more or less clear and conclusive, for holding to be predicable equally and alike of baptism—that is, adult baptism, and the Lord's Supper. Besides the Scriptural statements that bear directly upon these two ordinances separately, there are views suggested by their general character and position, taken in connection with general Scriptural principles, to which it may be proper in the first instance to advert. There is not a great deal in Scripture that can be said to bear very directly upon the question, What is a sacrament? but there is a good deal that may be deduced from Scripture by good and necessary consequence.

There are two different aspects in which the sacraments are to be regarded, 1st, Simply as institutions or ordinances whose appointment by Christ stands recorded in Scripture, and whose celebration in the church, according to his appointment, may be contemplated or looked at by spectators, and, 2d, as acts which men perform, transactions in which men individually take a part; that is, they may be regarded either as mere in-

stituted symbols, or also, and in addition, as symbolic actions which men perform.

Viewed, in the first of these aspects, as symbols, they merely signify or represent (these two words are generally used synonymously in this matter) spiritual blessings, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant, and the Scriptural truths which make known, unfold, and offer these blessings to men; while in regard to the second aspect of them, this much at least must be evident in general, that the participation in the sacraments by men individually, is on their part an expression or profession of a state of mind and feeling, with reference to the truths which the outward symbols represent, and the blessings which they signify. Viewed, in the first of these aspects, as mere symbols which have been instituted and described in Scripture, and which may be contemplated or looked at, it is evident that the sacraments are merely, to use an expression which Calvin and other Reformers applied to them, appendages to the gospel, that is, merely means of declaring and bringing before our minds in another way, by a different instrumentality, what is fully set forth in the statements of Scripture. In baptism viewed in this light, God is just telling us, by means of outward symbols instead of words, that men, in their natural condition, need to be washed from guilt and depravity, and that full provision has been made for effecting this, through the shedding of Christ's blood and the effusion of his Spirit. In the Lord's Supper, in like manner, he is just telling us, that Christ's body was broken, and that his blood was shed for men; and that, in this way, full provision has been made, not only for restoring men to the enjoyment of God's favour, and creating them again after his image, but for affording them abundance of spiritual nourishment, and enabling them to grow up in all things unto him who is the head. The sacraments, as symbols, thus teach, by outward and visible representations, the leading truths which are revealed in Scripture concerning the way of salvation, and teach them in a manner peculiarly fitted, according to the principles of our constitution, to bring them home impressively to our understandings and our hearts.

And it is important to notice that, even in this simplest and most elementary view of the sacraments, they may truly and reasonably be called seals as well as signs, they may be said not only to signify or represent, but to seal. A seal is something external, usually appended to a deed or document, or impressed upon a substance which forms the subject of negotiation or arrangement, and it is intended to strengthen or confirm conviction or faith, expectation or confidence. A seal, in this sense, the only sense in which it can apply to the sacraments, is a thing of no real intrinsic value or importance. Its use and efficacy are

purely conventional. They are based, indeed, upon a natural principle in our complex constitution, in virtue of which external objects or actions connected with, or added to, declarations, engagements, or promises, are regarded as tying or binding more strongly those from whom these deeds or documents proceed, and as thus tending to strengthen and confirm the faith and the hope of those to whom they are directed. It is this principle in our constitution which is the source and origin, the *rationale* and defence, not only of the sealing of deeds and documents, that is, of the practice of appending a seal to the signature of the names attached to them, but of the whole series of outward significant rites and ceremonies, which in all ages and countries have been associated with covenants and treaties, with bargains and barterings. These sealings, and other similar rites and ceremonies, which in such variety have prevailed in all ages and countries in connection with transactions of this sort, have been always regarded and felt as somehow binding the parties more strongly to their respective statements and engagements, and as thus strengthening their reliance upon each other, in reference to everything that had been declared or promised. And yet it is quite plain, that these sealings and other rites and ceremonies usually connected with compacts and bargains, can scarcely be said to possess any intrinsic value, or to exert any real influence in effecting any important result. The only essential things in transactions of this sort, are the deeds or documents, embodying a statement of the things arranged or agreed upon with all their circumstances and conditions, and the signatures of the parties, binding themselves to the terms set forth in the deed. Everything beyond this, including seals, and all other outward rites and ceremonies, must be comparatively insignificant and useless, serving, no doubt, a good purpose in the way of somewhat confirming confidence in the arrangements contemplated and agreed to being carried out, but not certainly making the provisions and conditions of the compact more clear and certain, or in substance bringing the parties under any more firm and imperative obligation than was imposed by their deliberate consent to the transaction as attested by their signature. The essential, the only essential, things in these matters, are a correct apprehension of the import of the document, and satisfactory evidence of the concurrence of the parties, or of the genuineness of their signatures. Other things may be useful, or convenient as auxiliaries, in carrying out fully the whole purposes of the compact or arrangement, but nothing else can be of fundamental importance or should materially affect the result.

Applying these obvious principles to Christianity and salvation, it is plain that the essential things as bearing on the

practical result, are arrangements and proposals, made and revealed by God, understood and accepted by men. It is indispensable that men understand the import of the offers and proposals made to them, be satisfied that they come from God, and then accept and act upon them. The covenant of grace is thus substantially a proposal made by God to men, which is accepted by them; and the essential things are, the substance of the proposal set forth as in a deed or document, and the concurrence of the parties, as if attested by their signatures. The sacraments, according to the views which have generally prevailed among Protestants, are signs and seals of this covenant, that is, as signs they embody in outward elements (for we are not speaking at present of the sacramental actions) the substance of what is set forth more fully and particularly in the written word, and this additional superadded external embodiment of the provisions and arrangements, is regarded as occupying the place, and serving the purpose of a seal appended to a signature to a deed; not certainly as if it possessed any intrinsic importance, or could very materially affect the result, so long as we had the deed and the signatures, but still operating, according to the well-known principle of our constitution, in giving some confirmation to our impressions, if not our convictions, of the reality and certainty, or reliability of the whole transaction. These obvious considerations may illustrate how it is that, even in this most simple and elementary view of the sacraments, they may be regarded as seals as well as signs, while they are also fitted to suggest the anticipation, that when we come to consider them in their higher and fuller development as symbolical actions which men perform, their character as seals may not really involve anything so important and so mysterious as many seem to suppose, but will be found to be in entire accordance with the place which Calvin assigned to them, as merely appendages to the gospel.

But we proceed to advert to the second and higher view that must obviously be taken of the sacraments. They were intended not so much to be read about or to be looked at, as to be participated in. Men are individually to be washed with water, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and they are individually to eat bread and to drink wine at the Lord's table, in remembrance of Christ. This being the case, the questions naturally arise, What is the meaning and what the object of those acts which they perform? Why did God require these things at their hands? What is the effect which the doing of these things is intended to produce? and, What are the principles which regulate and determine the production of the resulting effects? Now, as bearing upon the answer to these questions, there are some

positions which are generally admitted, and are attended with no difficulty. The two leading aspects in which the sacraments, viewed as actions which men perform, are represented in Scripture are, first, as duties which God requires of us, and, second, as means of grace or privileges which he appoints and bestows. And again, under the first of these heads, viz., commanded duties, there are two views that may be taken of them, 1st, as acts of worship; and 2d, as public professions of Christianity. It is, of course, men's duty to render to God the acts of worship, and to make the professions, which he requires of them. The sacraments seem plainly to possess these two characters. In participating in them, we are rendering an act of worship to God, and we are making a public profession by an outward act, and all this he has required at our hands, or imposed upon us as a duty. If this be so, then it follows that any general principles which are indicated in Scripture, or involved in the nature of the case, as being rightly applicable to acts of worship and to public professions, must be applied to them. Whatever is necessary to make an act of worship reasonable and acceptable to God, and whatever is necessary to make a public profession intelligent and honest, must be found in men's participation in the sacraments, in order to make it fitted to serve any of its intended purposes. And this most simple and obvious view of the general nature and character of the sacramental actions ought not to be overlooked or forgotten, as it is well fitted, when remembered and applied, to guard us both against error in doctrine and delusion in practice.

It is the second of these views of them, however, that which represents them as outward public professions, which bears more immediately upon their mode of operation and their actual effects, as privileges or means of grace. All admit that the sacraments embody or involve a public profession of a certain state of mind and feeling. And, indeed, this is plainly implied in their character as symbolical or emblematic ordinances. We cannot conceive that it should have been required as a duty of those to whom the gospel is preached, that they should be baptized and should partake in the Lord's Supper, unless this washing with water, and this eating bread and drinking wine, symbolized and expressed some state of mind, some conviction, or feeling, or purpose, bearing upon their relation to God, and the salvation of their souls. That participation in the sacraments is a discriminating mark or badge of what may be called, in some sense, a profession of Christianity, and that it involves an engagement to perform certain duties, is admitted by all, even those who take the lowest views of their nature and design. And all orthodox divines hold that this constitutes one end and object of the institution of

these ordinances, though they regard it only as a subordinate one. In the very important document formerly referred to, called *Consensus Tigurinus*, prepared by Calvin, and embodying the agreement among the Swiss churches on the whole subject of the sacraments, while it is admitted that there are various ends and objects of the sacraments, such as, that they may be marks and badges of a Christian profession and union or brotherhood—that they may be incitements to thanksgiving and exercises of faith and a pious life, and engagements binding to this, it is laid down, “that the one principal end of these ordinances is, that God by them may attest, represent, and seal his grace to us” (Niemeyer, p. 193). This mode of statement is in accordance with the views generally entertained by the reformed divines, and it is adopted in the Westminster Confession (c. 27, s. 1), where, after describing it as the end or object of the sacraments “to represent Christ and his benefits, and to confirm our interest in him,” it adds, evidently in the way of suggesting some additional points of less fundamental importance, “as also to put a visible difference between those that belong unto the church and the rest of the world, and solemnly to engage them to the service of God in Christ.” These subordinate ends of the sacraments, connected with their character and functions as badges of a public profession and solemn engagements to duty, do not in themselves require much explanation, as they are simple and obvious, and have not given rise to much discussion, except in so far as the question has been raised, as to the precise import and amount of the profession which participation in the sacraments involves.

This is a question of some difficulty and importance, and it is intimately connected with the investigation of the great leading primary end or object of the sacraments, and with their character and function as means of grace. It is generally admitted by Protestant divines, that the sacraments are signs and seals of the covenant of grace, that is, of the truths and promises setting forth the provisions and arrangements which may be said to constitute the covenant, and of the spiritual blessings which the covenant offers and secures; and these terms accordingly are applied to them in almost all the Confessions of the reformed churches. But even where there is a concurrence in the use of these epithets, there is still room for error and confusion on some important topics connected with this matter. The leading questions connected with the sacraments may be ranked under two heads—1st, What are their objects or ends, comprehending the purposes for which they were instituted, and the effects which they actually produce? And 2d, Who are their proper subjects, the parties for whom they were intended, those who are qualified to partake in them lawfully and beneficially? These two heads of inves-

tigation, which may be briefly described, as respecting, the first the objects, and the second the subjects, of the sacraments, are very closely connected with each other. The settlement of either of these questions would go far to determine the other. If we had once ascertained what is the leading primary object of the sacraments, there would be no great difficulty in deducing from this, viewed in connection with other doctrines plainly taught in Scripture, what kind of persons ought to partake in them; and if we once knew who are the parties that ought to partake in them, we might from this infer a good deal, positively as well as negatively, in regard to the purpose they were intended to serve. On some grounds it would seem to be more natural and expedient to begin with examining the objects or ends of the sacraments. But as we have been led in the arrangement we have adopted, to advert to the view of the sacraments as badges of a public profession, and as the consideration of this topic, which has not yet been completed, is connected rather with the examination of the subjects than the objects of the sacraments, we shall consider, in the first place, in contemplating them as means of grace, the question, who are the parties for whom they were intended? We are the less concerned about following what might seem to be the more strictly logical order, because our object in the present article is rather explanation than defence—it is rather to bring out what the doctrine of the Reformed Confessions, and especially of the Westminster symbols on the general subject of the sacraments, is, than to establish its truth and to vindicate it from objections, having in view chiefly the case of those who have professed to believe these symbols, but who still exhibit a great deal of ignorance in regard to their meaning and import.

We have mentioned as the first and most general division that obtains on the subject of the sacraments, that they may be regarded either, first, as duties which God requires; or, second, as means of grace. The difficulties which have arisen, and the discussions which have been carried on concerning them, have turned chiefly upon their character and functions as means of grace. It is universally admitted that the sacraments are means of grace; and the great general idea involved in this position is this, that they are institutions which God intended and appointed to be, in some sense, the instruments or channels of conveying to men spiritual blessings, and in the due and rightful use of which men are warranted to expect to receive the spiritual blessings they stand in need of. In this wide and general sense, even those who hold the lowest view of the sacraments admit that they are means of grace; while it is also true that the great differences in doctrine which have been maintained by different churches on the whole subject of the sacraments

resolve very much into the different senses in which the position, that they are means of grace, may be explained. In the wide sense above stated, the position that the sacraments are means of grace, may be conclusively inferred from the fact, that God has appointed them, and required the observance of them at our hands. As the outward acts which constitute the observance of the sacraments are in themselves not moral, but merely positive or indifferent, we are warranted to believe that God appointed them solely for our benefit, and because he intended them to be in some way instruments or channels of conveying to us spiritual blessings.

The Romish doctrine upon this subject is, that the sacraments contain the grace which they signify; that they confer grace always and certainly, where men do not put an obstacle in the way; that they do this *ex opere operato*, or by some sort of physical or intrinsic power bestowed upon them, apart from the state of mind of the recipient; that baptism is the instrumental cause of justification as including both remission of sin and regeneration; and that the Lord's Supper invariably conveys spiritual nourishment. There are some points, however, involved in the exposition of these doctrines, which have not been explicitly settled by the authority of the church, and in regard to which some latitude is left for a difference of opinion. Among Protestants, High Churchmen, and men disposed to exalt the value and efficacy of the sacraments, have generally adopted, or, at least, approximated, to, the Romish doctrine as explained by its more reasonable defenders, and have been disposed to allege that the controversies with the Church of Rome upon this subject, resolve very much into disputes about words or points of no great importance; while sounder Protestants have in general met the Romish doctrines with decided opposition. At the same time, it must be admitted, that it is not easy to fix upon any definite modes of statement, which can be said to be distinctively Protestant as opposed to Romanism, about the true character and functions of the sacraments as means of grace, viewed apart from the doctrine held with regard to their subjects and objects. It is generally supposed that the strongest statement to which the Church of Rome is pledged on this point, is, that the sacraments "contain the grace which they signify or represent," implying, that the grace resides or is laid up in them, and that they give it out; and yet Calvin, in his "Antidote to the Council of Trent," 7th session, admits that there is a sense in which it is true "sacramentis contineri gratiam quam figurant." He asserts also that those who allege, that by the sacraments grace is conferred upon us when we do not put an obstacle in the way, overturn the whole power of the sacraments; while he distinctly admits

that the sacraments are instrumental causes of conferring grace upon us, though the power of God is not tied to them, and though they produce no effect whatever apart from the faith of the recipient. And, moreover, we find, upon a principle formerly explained, that in dealing (6th session) with the position, that baptism is the instrumental cause of justification, he rather objects to the omission of the Gospel or the truth, and to the high place assigned to baptism, than meets the position of the Council with a direct negative. His statement is this—"It is a great absurdity to make baptism alone the instrumental cause. If this be so, what becomes of the Gospel? Will it not even get into the lowest corner? But, they say, baptism is the sacrament of faith. True; but when all is said, I will still maintain that it is nothing but an appendage to the Gospel (*evangelii appendicem*). They act preposterously in giving it the first place; and this is just as if one should say that the instrumental cause of a house is the handle of the workman's trowel. He who, putting the Gospel in the background, numbers baptism among the causes of salvation, shews thereby that he does not know what baptism is or means, or what is its function and use." (*Tractatus Theologici*," pp. 389 and 413.) It would be easy to shew, that there are many other eminent divines who have differed from each other as to the phraseology that ought to be employed in explaining the position, that the sacraments are means of grace, some asserting and others denying, that they are causes of grace, that they confer, or convey, or bestow spiritual blessings, while yet there is no very material difference of opinion among them, as is evident from their agreement in regard to the two important questions, as to the persons for whom the sacraments are intended, and the purposes they were instituted to serve. And on this ground we shall now, as has been intimated, consider—1st, the subjects, and, 2d, the objects, of the sacraments; assuming only, in the meantime, that the position, universally admitted, that the sacraments are means of grace, implies that, in some way or other, they are employed by God as instrumental or auxiliary in bestowing upon some men some spiritual blessings.

1. Let us first advert, then, to the subjects of the sacraments, or the persons for whom they were intended. We have already seen that, both in the Larger and the Shorter Catechism, the Westminster Assembly have distinctly laid down the position, that the sacraments, baptism and the Lord's Supper, are intended for believers, for men who had already and previously been led to embrace Christ as their Saviour; and that they were not in the least deterred from the explicit assertion of

this great principle by its appearing to exclude or ignore the practice of infant baptism, which they believed to be fully sanctioned by Scripture. This great principle is not set forth in the Confession of Faith quite so explicitly as it is in the Catechisms, but it is taught there by very plain implication. The Confession, c. xxvii. s. 1, lays it down as the first and principal end or object of the sacraments, of both equally and alike, "to represent Christ and his benefits, and to confirm our interest in him," this last clause implying, that those for whom the sacraments were intended, have already and previously acquired a personal interest in Christ, which could be only by their union to him through faith. It further (sec. 3), in speaking still of the sacraments, and, of course, of baptism as well as the Lord's Supper, asserts that "the word of institution contains a promise of benefit to worthy receivers;" and worthy receivers, in the full import of the expression, are, in the case of baptism, adult believers. In the next chapter, the 28th, the description given of baptism manifestly applies only to believing adults. It is there described as "a sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ, not only for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible church, but also to be unto him a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his giving up unto God through Jesus Christ to walk in newness of life." It is quite true that infants, as well as adults, though incapable of faith, must be ingrafted into Christ, and must receive regeneration and remission; and that without this, indeed, they cannot be saved. But the statement in the Confession plainly assumes, that each individual baptized not only should have the necessary preliminary qualifications, but should be himself exercised and satisfied upon this point, and should thus be prepared to take part, intelligently and consciously, in the personal assumption of the practical obligations which baptism implies.

This is sufficient to shew that the teaching of the Confession is quite in harmony with that of the Catechisms, though upon this particular point it is not altogether so explicit. It holds true, indeed, generally—we might say universally—of the Reformed churches, as distinguished from the Lutheran, and of almost all the Reformed theologians, that though firm believers in the divine authority of infant baptism, they never hesitate to lay down the general positions, that the sacraments are intended for believers; that participation in them assumes the previous and present existence of faith in all who rightly receive them; and that they produce their appropriate, beneficial effects only through the operation

and exercise of faith in those who partake in them. The Reformed divines, not holding the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, did not regard the baptism of infants as being of sufficient importance, to modify the general doctrine they thought themselves warranted to lay down with respect to the sacraments, as applicable to adult baptism and the Lord's Supper. And it is interesting and instructive to notice, that the adoption by the Lutherans of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, led them to be much more careful of laying down any general statements, either about the sacraments or about baptism, which virtually ignored the baptism of infants. They are much more careful than the Reformed divines, either, expressly and by name to bring in infant baptism into their general definitions or descriptions, or, at least, to leave ample room for it, so that there may be no appearance of its being omitted or forgotten. It may be worth while to give a specimen of this. Buddæus, one of the best of the Lutheran divines, a man whose works exhibit a very fine combination of ability and good sense, learning and evangelical unction, in treating of the effect of baptism, which, he says, may also be regarded as the end or object of the ordinance, lays it down, that it is "with respect to infants, regeneration, and with respect to adults, the confirming and sealing (*confirmatio et obsignatio*) of the faith of which they ought to be possessed before they are admitted to baptism," ("Theolog. Dogmatica," lib. v. c. i. s. 7. p. 1127). In contrast with this, many of the Reformed divines asserted, without any hesitation, that the great leading object and effect of the sacraments, and, of course, of baptism as well as of the Lord's Supper, was just the *confirmatio fidei*, that is, the confirming and strengthening of the faith, which must, or, at least, should, have existed before either sacrament was received.

This, however, bears rather upon the objects than the subjects of the sacraments. And in returning to the latter of these topics, we would lay before our readers, what we regard as a very complete and comprehensive summary of the doctrine of the Reformed churches upon this point, in the words of Martin Vitringa, in his Adnotationes to the "*Doctrina Christianæ Religionis per Aphorismos summamim descripta*" of Campegius Vitringa.

"From these quotations, it clearly appears, that the common doctrine of our divines concerning the proper subjects of the sacraments amounts to this :—

1st. That the sacraments have been instituted only for those who have already received the grace of God—the called, the regenerate, the believing, the converted, those who are in covenant with God ; and also that it is proper for those to come to them who have true faith and repentance.

2d. That they who receive the sacraments are already, before receiving them, partakers through faith of Christ and his benefits, and are therefore justified and sanctified before they take the sacraments.

3d. That faith is the medium, the mouth, and the hand, by which we rightly receive and perceive the sacraments.

4th. That the faith of those who lawfully receive the sacraments is confirmed and increased by them, and that they are more closely united to Christ.

5th. That those only who receive the sacraments in faith have, in the use of them, the promise of the remission of sins and of eternal life bestowed, sealed, and applied in a singular way, just as if God were addressing them individually, and were promising and sealing to them remission of sins and eternal life; and thus believers are rendered more certain about their communion with Christ and his benefits, so that they can certainly determine that Christ belongs to them with his gifts.

6th. That by the sacraments the promises of the covenant of grace are offered and sealed, under the condition of true faith and penitence.

7th. That only true believers and true penitents, using the sacraments worthily, receive not only the signs, but also the things signified, which are sealed to them, and also that they only receive them with benefit and advantage.

8th. That God wishes the sacraments to be administered to those who are possessed of true faith and unfeigned repentance, but that the ministers of the church ought to admit to the sacraments those who make a profession of faith and penitence, and do not openly contradict it by their life and conduct, and that they before coming to the sacraments ought to be admonished to try themselves, whether they have true faith and repentance, lest being destitute of faith and repentance, they should receive the sacraments to their condemnation.

9th. That unbelieving and impenitent persons receive only the naked signs but not the things signified; that nothing is sealed to them; that, moreover, they profane and condemn the sacraments; and that from this profanation and contempt the sacraments not only do not benefit but hurt them, and bring to them condemnation and destruction; and then, that the sacraments when administered to unbelieving and impenitent persons, remain sacraments so far as God is concerned, but so far as concerns the unbelieving and impenitent, lose the nature and power of a sacrament.

10th. That the sacraments do not, in the first instance, bestow grace, faith, and penitence, and are not the instruments of producing the beginnings of faith and penitence, but only confirm, increase, and seal them." (C. xxiv. tom. vi. p. 489.)

It will be observed, that all these important doctrinal statements are made concerning *the sacraments*, and of course are intended to apply equally and alike to baptism and the Lord's

Supper ; and that the sum and substance of what is here asserted equally and alike of both these ordinances, is, that they were intended only for persons who have already been enabled to believe and repent, and that it is believers only who do or can derive any benefit from partaking in them, all others using them only to their own condemnation. We do not adopt every expression in this summary just as it stands. But we have no doubt that in its whole sum and substance, it is in full accordance with the teaching of Scripture, and of the Reformed as distinguished from the Lutheran churches. Upon the second of these points, indeed, the historical question of the identity of these views with those of the Reformed churches and of the leading reformed divines of the 16th and 17th centuries, Vitringa has produced his evidence at length. His quotations fill above twenty pages, and are certainly amply sufficient to establish his position. To prove that the quotation we have produced, contains a correct summary of the doctrine of the Reformed churches in regard to the proper subjects of the sacraments, Vitringa gives extracts from eight or ten of the Confessions of the Reformation period, and from above fifty of the most eminent divines of that and the succeeding century. He has thus brought together a vast store of materials, abundantly sufficient to establish his position, so far as authority is concerned, and although we have not room for quotations, we think it may be worth while to give the names of the divines from whom he produces his extracts. They are Zwingle, Œcolampadius, Bucer, Musculus, Bullinger, Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Ursinus, Olevianus, Sadeel, Whitaker, Aretus, Sohnius, Polanus, Chamier, Junius, Perkins, Bucanus, Kuchlinus, Acronius, Trelcatius, Scharpius, G. J. Vossius, Maccovius, Walaeus, Rivetus, Amyraldus, Altingius, Forbes, Voetius, Wendelinus, Cocceius, Hottinger, Heidanus, Maresius, Venema, Burman, Mastricht, Witsius, Turretine, Heidegger, Leydecker, Braunius, Marckius, Roell, Meyer, Gerdes, Wyttenbach ; in short, all the greatest divines of the 16th and 17th centuries. Here is a storehouse of names and quotations, which might enable any one to set up as an erudite theologian by means of a stock of second-hand authorities.

We are dealing at present only with the historical and not with the Scriptural view of the case, but we may briefly advert to the kind of proof by which it can be shewn, that the proper subjects of the sacrament are only believing and regenerated men. The general place or position of the sacraments seems plainly to indicate that they were intended only for those who had already been led to embrace Christ, and had been born again of his word. It is evident, from all the representations given us on this subject in the inspired account of the labours of the

apostles, that men first of all had the gospel preached to them, were warned of their guilt and danger as sinners, and were instructed in the way of salvation through Christ, and that thus, through the effectual working of God's Spirit, they were enabled to believe what they were told, to embrace Christ freely offered to them, and to receive him as their Lord and Master. They were told, among other things, that it was Christ's will that they should be baptized, and should thereby publicly profess their faith in him, and be formally admitted into the society which he had founded. When, in these or in similar circumstances, and upon these grounds, a man asks and obtains the administration to him of baptism (of course we speak at present only of adults, for, upon grounds formerly explained, we *must* form our primary and leading conceptions of the import and object of this ordinance from the baptism of adults, and not of infants), the application seems plainly to carry upon the face of it, a profession or declaration, that he has been led to choose Christ as his Saviour and his Master, and is determined in every way to follow out this profession of entire dependence and of implicit subjection. If faith and regeneration are necessary preparations and qualifications for baptism, they must of course exist in all who come to the Lord's table, which, from its nature, and from the place it occupies in the apostolic history, must manifestly come after baptism.

These obvious general considerations tell in favour of the position, that the sacraments were instituted and intended only for believers, and this view is confirmed by a closer examination of the particular features and provisions of the ordinances themselves. In regard to the Lord's Supper, it is generally admitted, that it is intended for, and can be lawfully and beneficially partaken of only by, those who have already been received into God's family, and are living by faith in his Son. An attempt, indeed, was made in the course of the Erastian controversy, as conducted at the time of the Westminster Assembly, to set up the notion, that the Lord's Supper is a converting ordinance, and may therefore be rightly partaken of by those who have not yet believed and been regenerated. But this notion, manifestly got up merely for the purpose of undermining ecclesiastical discipline, was unanswerably exposed by George Gillespie, in the 3d Book of his "*Aaron's Rod Blossoming.*" And when a similar notion was, with a similar purpose, promulgated about a century later among the Congregationalists of New England, it was again put down with equal ability and success by Jonathan Edwards, in his *Inquiry into the Qualifications for Communion*. The notion has not again, so far as we are aware, been revived in any such circumstances as to entitle it to notice. It is other-

wise in regard to baptism. Some men seem to shrink from laying down the position, either that the sacraments, or that baptism, should be held to be intended for believers, and, of course, to require or presuppose faith and regeneration, because this leaves out and seems to exclude the case of infant baptism, a difficulty which neither the Reformers nor the compilers of the Westminster standards, though decided paedo-baptists, allowed to influence or modify their statements. Others take wider and more definite ground, and endeavour to establish a great disparity between baptism and the Lord's Supper as to their import and objects, and to disprove the equal applicability to both these ordinances, of the definition and description usually given of a sacrament. No one, indeed, can deny, that there are some points in which baptism and the Lord's Supper stand alone, and resemble each other. All admit that both these ordinances are emblems or symbolical representations of Scriptural truths, fitted and intended to embody and to impress the great doctrines revealed in the word of God concerning the salvation of sinners. This description is undoubtedly true of these ordinances so far as it goes. It is admitted by all Protestants, that this description applies equally and alike to baptism and the Lord's Supper, and that there are no other institutions under the Christian economy to which it does apply. But the question is, Can we not get materials in Scripture for giving a more complete and specific account of what is equally true of these two ordinances, and may, therefore, be set forth as the full and adequate description of the sacraments? and more especially, have we not materials for making statements of a more precise and specific kind, both about the subjects and the objects of these ordinances, that shall apply equally to both of them? This, at least, is what has been generally maintained and acted upon by Protestant divines. They have embodied the substance of these materials in their description of a sacrament, and the leading features of this description as set forth in the Westminster standards are, that both ordinances equally and alike are intended for believers, and represent, seal, and apply to believers Christ and his benefits.

So far as concerns the subjects of the sacraments, the topic with which at present we have more immediately to do, it is generally admitted, that partaking in the Lord's Supper implies a profession of faith in Christ, and is, therefore, warrantable and beneficial only to believers. But many, and, we fear, a growing number, refuse to admit this principle as applicable to baptism. It is contended, not only that infants who are incapable of faith ought to be baptized, a position which all the Reformers and all the Confessions of the reformed churches decidedly maintained, though they did

not allow it to affect their general definition of a sacrament, but also that adults may be admitted to baptism, though they are not and do not profess to be believers and regenerate persons, baptism, it is alleged, not expressing or implying a profession of believing in Christ, but only a profession of a willingness to be instructed in the principles of Christianity. This notion is flatly opposed to the leading views with respect to the sacraments, which have always prevailed in the Protestant churches, and been embodied in the Reformed Confessions. But it seems now to prevail to a considerable extent among the congregationalists of this country. And we fear that it is likely to continue to prevail, because while it can be defended with considerable plausibility in argument, it has also this important practical advantage, that it furnishes a warrant, or an excuse, for baptizing the infants of persons who could not be regarded as qualified to be members of the Christian church in full standing, or as admissible to the Lord's table. There is a very elaborate and ingenious defence of this view of the import and object of baptism, and of the absence of all similarity in these respects between it and the Lord's Supper, in Dr Halley's work, entitled, "Baptism the designation of the Catechumens, not the symbol of the members, of the Christian Church," which Dr Wardlaw, in reply to whom chiefly it was written, did not answer, and which Dr W. Lindsay Alexander has pronounced to be unanswerable. We think it can, and it certainly should, be answered. But this we cannot attempt at present, our object being chiefly explanation rather than defence. The attempt to make so wide a gulf between baptism and the Lord's Supper, and to extend the application of baptism beyond the range of the membership of the church, so as to include all who are placed, by their own voluntary act, or that of their parents, under the church's superintendence and instruction, while neither in connection with their own baptism nor that of their children, are they held to make a profession of faith and regeneration, is, of course, flatly opposed to the definition or description of a sacrament, given in the Confessions of the Reformed churches as applicable to both ordinances. It is also, we are persuaded, inconsistent with every consideration suggested by the symbolic or emblematic character of the ordinance as an outward act, implying a declaration or profession of a certain state of mind and feeling on the part of the person baptized, and with all that is asserted or indicated in Scripture as to the connection between baptism on the one hand, and remission and regeneration on the other.

It is, as we have explained, of fundamental importance in judging of these symbolical ordinances, to attend to the

profession implied in the outward act, and to the correspondence between the outward act and the state of mind and heart of the recipient. When a man asks, in obedience to Christ's command, to be solemnly washed with water, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and when, in compliance with this request, he has baptism administered to him, he seems as plainly and as explicitly to make a profession of faith in Christ, as when he applies for and obtains admission to the Lord's table. Baptism, indeed, may be said to be merely a formal and solemn entering into Christ's service, implying a promise to be thereafter governed and guided by him. And it surely is this, *at least*, that is, this is just about as low a view as can be taken of the ordinance, and of the act of engaging in it. But even this view of it implies, that in the honest and intelligent reception of baptism, such views of Christ are professed as prove the existence of saving faith. Men cannot honestly and intelligently enter Christ's service and profess their unreserved submission to his authority, unless and until they have been led to adopt such views of what is revealed in Scripture concerning him, as imply and produce true faith in him as a Saviour. Why should any man desire and ask to be washed with water in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, unless he has already been led to adopt such views of the three persons of the Godhead, and of the way of salvation, as must have led him to embrace Christ as all his salvation and all his desire? In short, an application to be baptized, and the being actually baptized as the result of the application, plainly imply a profession, that the person so acting has been already led to believe in Christ, to receive and accept of him as his Saviour and his Master, and that he intends to profess or declare, by being baptized, the views he has been brought to entertain concerning Christ, and the relation into which he has been led to enter with respect to Him, and to pledge himself to the discharge of all the obligations which these views and that relation impose. When this state of mind and feeling has not been produced, we cannot conceive that the baptism of an adult can be an honest and intelligent act. The nature of the act itself, and the almost universal consent of the Christian church, in every age and country down till the present day, attach this meaning and significance to the baptism of an adult; and, if so, the baptism of any one who has not believed and been born again, must be a hypocritical mockery, a profane and daring farce.

This view of the matter is confirmed, we think, by all that is said in the New Testament, whether in explicit statement or in indirect allusion, concerning the relation between baptism and

the great spiritual blessings which are invariably connected with faith in Christ, viz., remission and regeneration. The relation subsisting between baptism and these fundamental blessings involves a discussion of the whole topics comprehended in the controversy about baptismal justification and regeneration, and on this we cannot enter. We would merely remark, that it seems to us pretty plain, that the Scriptural statements which are usually brought to bear upon the settlement of this controversy, and which are founded on by the advocates of baptismal regeneration, imply, that some connection subsists between baptism, in the legitimate use of it, and these fundamental blessings, while the view which has been devised by modern congregationalists, and is defended by Dr Halley, seems to deny any connection whatever between them. The texts referred to seem to imply *either*, that baptism, in the right and legitimate use of it, is a sign or symbol, a seal and a profession of remission and regeneration, *as previously conferred and then existing in the party baptized, or else* that regeneration is produced or bestowed in baptism, and through the instrumentality of that ordinance. The first of these views is, we are persuaded, that which is sanctioned by Scripture, and certainly it has been generally taught by the Reformed churches. The latter is the common Popish and Tractarian doctrine, and though it has no solid Scriptural ground to rest upon, it can be defended from Scripture with some plausibility, and this is more, we think, than can be said, so far as concerns this branch of the argument, in favour of the notion, that baptism may be rightly and honestly applied for and received by men who have not already and previously received faith in Jesus Christ, the forgiveness of their sins, and the regeneration of their natures. But we cannot at present discuss this subject. We would only say, before leaving it, that we cannot but regard the serious error to which we have adverted, as affording another illustration of a danger formerly mentioned, that, viz., of allowing the notions or impressions which the special exceptional case of infant baptism is apt to suggest, to influence unduly our views about baptism in general, and even about the sacraments as a whole. The giving undue prominence to the special case of infant baptism, is very apt to blind men's eyes to the strength of the evidence, that baptism in its general import and object, that is, adult baptism in its legitimate use, implies a profession of faith in Christ, and can therefore be rightly received and improved only by believers; while, at the same time, the temptation to reject this great Scriptural principle, which is so explicitly set forth in almost all the Confessions of the Reformed churches, is strengthened by the opening thus made, for giving baptism to the children of those who do not make a profession of faith,

and who would not, or should not, have been admitted to the Lord's Supper.

2. We must now proceed to advert to the second leading division of the subject, viz., the objects of the sacraments, or the purposes for which they were instituted, and which they are fitted and intended to serve, or what is virtually the same thing, the beneficial effects which men are warranted to expect, and do receive, from the right use of them. There is, as we have mentioned, a very close connection between this topic and that which we have already considered. If the sacraments were intended for believers, if their proper subjects are those only who have already been united to Christ, and been born again of his word, then it follows, that they could not have been fitted or intended to be auxiliary or instrumental in bestowing or producing anything which is implied in the existence of saving faith, or in effecting anything which is involved in, or results from, saving faith, wherever it exists. Upon the ground, then, of what has been already set forth under the former head, it follows, not only that justification and regeneration are not bestowed or produced in or by baptism, but that they must have been already bestowed and produced before baptism can be lawfully or safely received. This is a principle of fundamental importance, and it is confirmed by all that is taught us in Scripture, both with respect to the subjects and the objects of the sacraments. There is, indeed, no principle more important with reference to this whole matter, whether viewed theoretically or practically, whether regarded as an exposition of truth, or as a security against corruption and abuse, than that the sacraments are intended for believers, and of course must have been fitted to aid them in some way or other, in the great work of carrying on the life of God in their souls, in promoting their growth in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. The sacraments are means of grace, that is, they are ordinances or appointments of God, which are intended to be in some way auxiliary or instrumental in conveying to men spiritual blessings. The blessings conveyed by the sacraments, and to be expected from the right use of them, cannot of course be those which, according to God's arrangements, are conveyed to men, and must exist in and be possessed by them, before the sacraments can be lawfully and honestly received. It is a fundamental principle of Scriptural doctrine, that justification and regeneration are necessarily and invariably connected with faith, and that they are contemporaneous with it, whatever may be the precise relation subsisting among them in the order of nature. Whoever has been enabled to believe in Jesus Christ has been justified and regenerated; he has passed through that great ordeal on which

salvation depends, and which can occur but once in the history of a soul. And if these principles are well founded, then the spiritual blessings which the sacraments may be instrumental in conveying, can be those only which men still stand in need of, with a view to their salvation, after they have been justified and regenerated by faith. And these are the forgiveness of the sins which they continue to commit, a growing sense of God's pardoning mercy, and grace and strength to resist temptation, to discharge duty, to improve privilege, and to be ever advancing in holiness, or, to adopt the language of the Shorter Catechism, in describing the blessings which accompany or flow from justification, adoption, and sanctification, they are "assurance of God's love, peace of conscience, joy in the Holy Ghost, increase of grace and perseverance therein to the end." There is nothing asserted or indicated in Scripture to preclude the conveyance of *any or all of these blessings*, through the instrumentality of the sacraments, as well as of the other means of grace. On the contrary, there is good Scriptural ground, why believers should expect to receive in the right use of the sacraments, any or all of these blessings, according as they may need them. And, accordingly, it is the general doctrine of the Reformed Confessions, that the great leading object of the sacraments, the main purpose which they were designed and fitted to accomplish, is just to be instrumental or auxiliary in conveying these blessings to those who have believed through grace, in producing these results in those who have already been renewed in the spirit of their minds, and to do this mainly, if not solely, by strengthening and confirming their faith.

We have already had occasion to quote the principal passages in which this doctrine concerning the great leading object or design of the sacraments, is set forth in the Westminster symbols, but it may be proper to advert to them somewhat more formally in this connection. In the Confession of Faith, c. 27, the main position laid down regarding the sacraments is this, that they "are holy signs and seals of the covenant of grace, immediately instituted by God, to represent Christ and his benefits, and to confirm our interest in him, as also," &c. Here the general nature and character of the sacraments is declared to be that they are holy signs and seals of the covenant of grace, and the principal object, the leading design, on account of which they were instituted by God, is said to be "to represent Christ and his benefits, and to confirm our interest in him." The "representing Christ and his benefits" applies more properly to the sacraments in their character and functions as signs, "the confirming our interest in him," in their character and function as seals. The representing or signifying Christ and his bene-

fits, that is, the blessings of the covenant of grace, and the doctrines or promises which unfold and offer, and which, when believed and applied, instrumentally convey or bestow them, applies more immediately to the mere symbols or elements, and to the preaching of the gospel to all without distinction or exception, which is involved in the selection and appointment of such symbols, as recorded in the New Testament. The "confirming our interest in him" brings under our notice the more limited and specific object of the sacraments, as brought out in the actual individual participation in them by persons duly qualified and rightly prepared. This latter statement suggests at once as a fundamental point in the doctrine of the sacraments, and, of course, as true of baptism as well as the Lord's Supper, that they are intended only for those who have already obtained an interest in Christ by faith, and that they are designed to benefit these persons mainly by confirming this interest in Christ, which they have already acquired, and which they must have possessed before they could lawfully and beneficially partake, even in the initiatory sacrament of baptism. This important principle is also explicitly declared in the 19th chapter of the Confession, which treats of Saving Faith. Concerning saving faith, it says, that "it is ordinarily wrought by the ministry of the word, by which also, and by the administration of the sacraments and prayer, it is increased and strengthened." Here the increasing and strengthening of saving faith, previously produced and already existing, is ascribed to the administration of the sacraments, and of course is predicated equally and alike of baptism and the Lord's Supper; and this incidental, though most explicit, assertion of the principle, that the sacraments were designed to increase and strengthen saving faith, shews how familiar the minds of the compilers of the Westminster Confession were with a doctrine, which is now very much ignored by many who profess to follow in their footsteps.

The same doctrine as to the objects of the sacraments is very explicitly set forth in the Larger Catechism, where, in answer to the question (162), What is a sacrament? it is said, that "a sacrament is an holy ordinance instituted by Christ in his church, to signify, seal, and exhibit unto those that are within the covenant of grace, the benefits of his mediation, to strengthen and increase their faith and all other graces, to oblige them to obedience, to testify and cherish their love and communion one with another, and to distinguish them from those that are without." We have already shewn that, according to the strict grammatical construction of this sentence, the expression, "those that are within the covenant of grace," is used simply as synonymous with believers, and not in the wider sense in which it might

include also the children of believers ; and that, therefore, the Larger Catechism agrees with the Confession of Faith and the Shorter Catechism, in setting forth this great doctrine in regard to the subjects of the sacraments, viz., that they are intended for believers, for those who have already received the gift of faith ; not meaning to exclude the baptism of infants, which was regarded as fully sanctioned by Scriptural authority, but virtually conceding, 1st, that the full and adequate idea of a sacrament, as exhibited in adult baptism and the Lord's Supper, does not directly and thoroughly apply to the case of infant baptism ; and 2d, that it is of more importance to bring out fully and explicitly the sacramental principle, the true and full doctrine of the sacraments as applicable to adult baptism and the Lord's Supper, than to attempt to lay down some more vague and diluted view upon this subject, which might include the special and peculiar case of the baptism of infants. This being assumed, we see that the Larger Catechism, in entire accordance with the Confession of Faith, gives it as the true account of the general nature and character of the sacraments, that "they signify, seal, and exhibit" the benefits of Christ's mediation to believers, and that their primary leading object is to strengthen and increase faith and all other graces, where these have been already produced. The three other objects here assigned to the sacraments, viz., "to oblige them to obedience, to testify and cherish their love and communion one with another, and to distinguish them from those that are without," all, be it observed, applicable only to believers, are usually described by theologians, and were, no doubt, regarded by the Westminster divines, as the secondary or subordinate objects or ends of the sacraments. And it is plain that, in respect of intrinsic importance in their bearing upon the salvation of sinners, they do not stand upon the same level with the great object and result of strengthening and increasing faith and all other graces, and thereby signifying, sealing, and exhibiting the benefits of the covenant of grace.

The general definition or description of a sacrament given in the Shorter Catechism is very explicit in declaring, that the proper subjects of the sacraments are believers, though it does not bring out so formally and fully what are their objects or ends, except in so far as the truth upon this point is implied in their general nature and character. But as the statement in the Shorter Catechism is that with which most people in Scotland are familiar, though in many cases, we fear, familiar only with the words, without understanding the meaning, it may be proper to give a somewhat full and formal explanation of it, even though this may involve some repetition. It is this : "A sacrament is an holy ordinance instituted

by Christ, wherein by sensible signs Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers."

1. This statement explicitly asserts, as we have shewn, that the sacraments, baptism as well as the Lord's Supper, are intended for believers, and produce their appropriate beneficial results only in those who by faith receive them, while it assumes or takes for granted, that those who partake in them are duly qualified for doing so, by the possession of that faith which, in receiving them, is professed or declared.

2. The things which are represented, sealed, and applied to believers in the sacraments are, "Christ and the benefits of the new covenant," not some of the benefits of the covenant, however important and fundamental, but these benefits as a whole, everything, including both a change of state and of character, which is invariably connected with saving faith; not the covenant of grace, regarded merely as a statement or exposition of a certain compact or transaction revealed in Scripture and bearing upon the salvation of sinners, but the grace of the covenant, or the blessings which the covenant offers, conveys, and secures. Any attempt to represent baptism, or the water the application of which constitutes baptism, as representing or signifying remission apart from regeneration, or regeneration apart from remission, and any attempt to explain the difficulty about sealing by distinguishing between the covenant of grace and the grace of the covenant, and alleging that sacraments are seals of the covenant, but are only signs or symbols of spiritual blessings, is precluded by the terms of this statement, and still more explicitly by the further explanation given in the Confession of Faith and Larger Catechism.

3. "Christ and the benefits of the new Covenant" are here declared to be equally and alike "represented, sealed, and applied," and this one complex position being predicated of them, it cannot in consistency with this statement be alleged, that these benefits, or any of them, are either represented and not sealed, or sealed and not represented, in reference to any class or section of legitimate and worthy recipients. The admission of the accuracy of this description of a sacrament implies, that there is a sense in which Christ and his benefits are, in baptism and the Lord's Supper, not only represented and signified, but also sealed and applied to believers.

4. The "signify, seal, and exhibit" of the Larger Catechism are evidently identical with the "represented, sealed and applied" of the Shorter, "signify" being synonymous with "represent," and "exhibit" with "apply." And in considering these expressions, we have first to advert to the question of the

consistency of this account of the nature and character of the sacraments, with the view which, as we have seen, is given in these symbols, of their main object, their principal design. There is no difficulty in perceiving how the signifying and sealing here ascribed to the sacraments, accord with the doctrine which represents their leading object to be, to confirm or strengthen a faith previously existing, and thereby to contribute to convey the blessings which believers still need. Signifying and sealing naturally suggest the idea, that the things signified and sealed not only exist, but are actually possessed by those to whom they are signified and sealed. Whatever may be the precise kind of influence and effect indicated by these words, they assume or imply, that the things of which they are predicated have been already bestowed or conveyed, and are now held or possessed. The sacraments are for believers. In describing their general nature and character, it is usually assumed that the persons who receive them are duly qualified by the possession of faith; by receiving the sacraments, they express and exercise their faith; they thus have all the great fundamental blessings, the possession of which is invariably connected with the existence of faith, signified and sealed to them; and the tendency and effect of this are to strengthen and increase their faith, and thereby to convey to them more fully and abundantly those other blessings of which they still stand in need.

But while the signifying and sealing ascribed to the sacraments are plainly, whatever may be their precise meaning and import, quite accordant with the general doctrine taught concerning their objects, there seems to be more difficulty about "exhibiting" or "applying." Do not these words convey the idea of conferring or bestowing what was not previously possessed? Do they not thus sanction the notion, that Christ and his benefits are conveyed or bestowed, not previously to the lawful reception of the sacraments, but in and by the use of them? Now, in opposition to this notion, we take the position, that the doctrine that the sacraments are for believers, and assume the previous existence in worthy recipients of the great spiritual blessings with which saving faith is invariably connected, is far too explicitly and too fully set forth in the Westminster symbols, in accordance with the general doctrine of the Reformed churches, to admit of its being set aside or involved in uncertainty, on the ground of a single vague and ambiguous expression, even though there were greater difficulty than there is, in interpreting that expression in harmony with the general strain of their teaching. The proof of this in the statements of the Confession and Catechisms, is too clear to leave room for the application of any collateral and subordinate evi-

dence. But it so happens, that we have evidence of this sort, which would be conclusive as to what was the doctrine which the Westminster divines intended to teach upon this point, even though the language of their symbols, taken as a whole, had been much more ambiguous than it is. This evidence we find in statements contained in Samuel Rutherford's "Due Right of Presbyteries," and in George Gillespie's "Aaron's Rod Blossoming." Rutherford and Gillespie are, literally and without any exception, just the two very highest authorities that could be brought to bear upon a question of this kind, at once from their learning and ability as theologians, and from the place they held and the influence they exerted in the actual preparation of the documents under consideration. That Rutherford held the views about the sacraments which we have ascribed to the Westminster standards, is quite certain from the following quotations from the work above referred to:—

"All believers as believers, *in foro Dei* before God, have right to the seals of the covenant; those to whom the covenant and the body of the charter belongeth, to those the seal belongeth; but *in foro ecclesiastico*, and in an orderly church way, the seals are not to be conferred by the church upon persons because they believe, but because they profess their believing; therefore, the apostles never baptized pagans, but upon profession of their faith." "Certainly, God ordaineth the sacraments to believers as believers, and because they are within the covenant, and their interest in the covenant is the only true right of interest to the seals of the covenant; profession doth but declare who believe and who believe not, and consequently who have right to the seals of the covenant, and who not; but profession doth not make right, but declareth who have right." (P. 185 and 258.)

There is no great difficulty connected with the Lord's Supper, so far as concerns the point now under consideration. The difficulty applies only to baptism, and in regard to baptism the following statements of Rutherford are conclusive:—

"1. Baptism is not that whereby we are entered into Christ's mystical and invisible body as such, for it is presupposed we be members of Christ's body, and our sins pardoned already, before baptism come to be a seal of sins pardoned. But baptism is a seal of our entry into Christ's visible body, as swearing to the colours is that which entereth a soldier to be a member of such an army, whereas, before his oath he was only a heart friend to the army and cause.

"2. Baptism as it is such, is a seal, and a seal as a seal, addeth no new lands or goods to the man to whom the charter and seal is given, but only doth legally confirm him in the right of such lands given to the man by prince or state. Yet this hindereth not, but baptism is a real legal seal, legally confirming the man in his actual visible profession of Christ, remission of sins, regeneration, so, as though before baptism he was a member of Christ's body, yet, *quoad*

nos, he is not a member of Christ's body visible, until he be made such by baptism." (P. 211.)

Gillespie, in like manner, has the following explicit statement upon this subject:—

"The Papists hold that the sacraments are instrumental to confer, give, or work grace, yea, *ex opere operato*, as the schoolmen speak. Our divines hold that the sacraments are appointed of God, and delivered to the church as sealing ordinances, not to give, but to testify what is given, not to make, but to confirm saints. And they not only oppose the Papist's *opus operatum*, but they simply deny this instrumentality of the sacraments, that they are appointed of God for working or giving grace where it is not. This is so well known to all who have studied the sacramentarian controversies, that I should not need to prove it, yet, that none may doubt of it, take here some few, instead of many testimonies." (B. iii. c. 12., p. 409.)*

Nay, what is somewhat remarkable, and singularly pertinent to our present purpose, we find that the same difficulty which we are now considering, is stated and answered by Gillespie, and that his answer to it is virtually a commentary upon the passage we are examining, and establishes the sense in which it was understood by those who may be regarded as its authors, thus not only proving that the doctrine we have asserted is to be maintained, notwithstanding its apparent discrepancy, with one expression, but at the same time shewing in what way this apparent discrepancy is to be explained. This remarkable passage of Gillespie is as follows:—"You will say, peradventure, that Protestant writers hold the sacraments to be, 1, Significant or declarative signs; 2, Obsignative or confirming signs; and 3, Exhibitive signs, so that the thing signified is given or exhibited to the soul." Now these three points are manifestly identical with the three words employed in the catechisms, "signify, seal, and exhibit," in the Larger, and "represent, seal, apply," in the Shorter. The main question is, What is meant by the third point, exhibit and apply, or exhibitive signs? and Gillespie's answer is this:—

* Gillespie's quotations in proof of his position are from the old Scotch Confession, the Synod of Dort, and the Belgic Liturgy, Calvin, Bullinger, Ursinus, Musculus, Bucer, Festus Hommius, Aretius, Vossius, Paræus, Walæus, &c. We give one of his quotations from Ursinus, who was the principal author of the Heidelberg or Palatine Catechism, because it is a very brief, terse, and comprehensive statement of the substance of the doctrine of the Reformed churches, in regard both to the subjects and objects of the sacraments, as contradistinguished from the word or the truth, and because we wish to mention that there is no divine of the sixteenth century, who has brought out more clearly and fully the great principle, that the leading object of the sacraments is the *confirmatio fidei*. "Quasi non pueris jam notum sit, verbum et conversis et non conversis esse annunciandum, quo illi quidem confirmantur hi vero convertantur; sacramenta autem iis esse instituta qui jam sunt conversi et membra populi dei facti." Judicium de disciplina ecclesiastica. Oper. tom. iii., p. 809, and not p. 89, as it is printed in Gillespie.

"I answer, that *exhibition*, which they speak of, is not the giving of grace where it is not (as is manifest by the aforequoted testimonies), but an exhibition to believers, a *real, effectual, lively application of Christ, and of all his benefits, to every one that believeth, for the staying, strengthening, confirming, and comforting of the soul*. Our divines do not say that the sacraments are exhibitivè ordinances, wherein grace is communicated to those who have none of it, to unconverted or unbelieving persons.

"By this time it may appear, (I suppose) that the controversy between us and the Papists concerning the effect of the sacraments (setting aside the *opus operatum*, which is a distinct controversy, and is distinctly spoken to by our writers, setting aside also the *causalitas physica* and *insita*, by which some of the Papists say the sacraments give grace, though divers others of them hold the sacraments to be only moral causes of grace), is thus far the same with the present controversy between Mr Prynne and me, that Protestant writers do not only oppose the *opus operatum* and the *causalitas physica* and *insita*, but they oppose (*as is manifest by the testimonies already cited*) all causality or working of the first grace of conversion and faith in or by the sacraments, supposing always a man to be a believer and within the covenant of grace before the sacrament, and that he is not made such, nor translated to the state of grace in or by the sacrament." (P. 496-7.)

We have very little space for quotations, but we think it of some importance to shew, that these views of the sacramental principle, or of the doctrine of the sacraments, which, though so clearly and fully set forth in the Westminster standards, have been so much lost sight of amongst us, were openly maintained by the leading divines of the Church of Scotland during last century. Principal Hadow and Thomas Boston may be regarded as the heads of two different schools of theology in Scotland, in the early part of last century, and as happens not unfrequently in theological discussions, they divided, we think, the truth between them in the points controverted. They have both left very explicit statements of their views upon this subject of the sacraments, especially in regard to baptism, about which alone there is any difficulty, so far as concerns the points we have been considering. Principal Hadow lays down this position, that the commonly received doctrine of the Reformed churches does not "ascribe any other virtue or efficacy to baptism, than what is moral and objective, in representing and signing the promises, confirming of faith, and exhibiting or applying the promised benefits of the covenant unto believers, by way of a sign and seal, which still supposeth grace already conferred on those in whom this sacrament hath its due operation;" and he supports this and one or two other positions of a similar import and tendency, by quotations from Zwingle, Bullinger, Peter Martyr, Musculus, Polanus, Wollebius,

Aretius, Calvin, Beza, Spanheim, Turretine, Heidegger, Bucer, Zanchius, Ursinus, Paræus, Wendelinus, Rivet, Walæus, Hoornbeck, Essenius, Leydecker, Maastricht, Witsius, Alting, Maresius, Gomarus, Maccovius, Ames, Arnoldus, Danaeus, Chamier, Amyraut, Du Moulin, thus furnishing, like Vitrina, a great storehouse of materials for a theological display. (The doctrine and practice of the Church of Scotland anent the Sacrament of Baptism, p. 23. Published anonymously in 1704.)

Boston's views are brought out in the following extract from his *Miscellany Questions in Divinity*, Q. vi., works in folio, p. 384 :—

“The sacraments are not converting but confirming ordinances; they are appointed for the use and benefit of God's children, not of others; they are given to believers as believers, as Rutherford expresses it, so that none other are subjects capable of the same before the Lord. Either must we say they have no respect at all to saving grace, or that they are appointed as means of the conveyance of the first grace, that is, to convert sinners, or finally, for confirmation of grace already received. If it be said they have no respect at all to saving grace, then baptism cannot be called the baptism of repentance, nor are persons baptized for the remission of sins, nor can it be looked on as a seal of the righteousness of faith, all which is evidently against Scripture testimony. If it be said they are appointed as means of the conveyance of the first grace, then, first, either there are none converted before baptism, which is manifestly false, or else baptism is in vain conferred on converts, which is no less false. But surely in vain are means used to confer on any that which they had before. Second, it were unfaithfulness to Christ and cruelty to men to withhold the sacraments from any person whatsoever. Were it not soul murder to withhold the means of conveyance of the first grace from any, and unfaithfulness to him who will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth. But that the sacraments, and particularly baptism, are not to be conferred on all promiscuously, none can deny. Wherefore it remains that they are indeed appointed for confirmation, which doth necessarily suppose the pre-existence of grace in the soul, seeing that which is not cannot be confirmed.”

These quotations confirm every thing we have said, as to the doctrine which has been regarded by the most competent judges as taught in the Westminster standards. We have room only for one other short quotation, from Dr John Erskine, probably the greatest divine in the Church of Scotland in the latter part of last century.

“Scripture sufficiently proves that the sacraments of the New Testament are signs and seals of no other covenant than that covenant of grace which secures eternal happiness to all interested in it. And the partaking of them manifestly implies a partaking of covenant blessings on the one hand, and the exercise of faith on the other.

To begin with baptism, John baptized for the remission of sins, and so did Christ's disciples. We are told that baptism saves us, and by baptism we are said to put on Christ, to die, to be buried, and to rise with him, because the water in baptism represents and seals that blood of Jesus which cleanseth from the guilt of sin, and purchases for us the sanctifying influences of the Spirit, and all other needful blessings. Baptism, then, is a seal of spiritual blessings. And spiritual blessings it cannot seal to the unconverted." (Theological Dissertations, Diss. ii., p. 94.)

We have now explained as fully as our limits would allow, the doctrine taught in the Westminster standards concerning the subjects and the objects of the two sacraments of the Christian church, that is, the persons who can lawfully and beneficially partake in them, and the purposes which in these persons they are fitted and intended to accomplish. Another question still remains to be considered, viz., Have we any further information as to the way and manner in which the sacraments produce their appropriate effects, or as to the principles which regulate the production of the results? So much mischief has been done to the souls of men by the perversion or abuse of the sacraments, that we consider it necessary, in connection with this branch of the subject, to state again distinctly what is, of course, obviously implied in the views we have explained, viz., that men who outwardly partake in the sacraments without having been previously led to believe in Christ Jesus, can derive from them no benefit whatever. Persons who are still unbelieving and impenitent, do not, in receiving baptism or the Lord's Supper, discharge a duty, or perform an acceptable act of worship, or enjoy and improve a privilege or mean of grace. On the contrary, they are only committing a sin, because they are presumptuously engaging in a sacred service, while destitute of the qualifications which God has required, and because, in the very act of outwardly receiving the sacraments, they are making a false and hypocritical profession, they are declaring by deeds the existence of a certain state of mind and heart, corresponding to the outward act they are performing, while it has really no existence. The sacraments can be expected to become the means of grace, or the channels of conveying spiritual blessings, only when men rightly receive them, that is, when they are duly prepared for the reception of them, and when they faithfully improve them for their intended objects. With respect to the due preparation, there are required what the old divines used to call an habitual and an actual, or a general and a special, preparation. The habitual or general preparation is, of course, faith, without which already existing there can be no warrant for participating in the sacraments, and no capacity of benefiting by them; and the actual or

special preparation is just faith in exercise, under the influence of right views and suitable impressions of our own wants and necessities at the time, and of the nature, character, and objects of the ordinance, whether it be baptism or the Lord's Supper, in which we are about to engage. It is only in these circumstances that the sacraments can be expected to prove means of grace.

The question thus becomes limited to this, In what way, or through what process, do the sacraments become instrumental in conveying spiritual blessings to those persons, who, having previously believed in Christ, and been justified and regenerated, receive these ordinances under a due sense of regard to Christ's authority, and from a sincere desire to share more abundantly in the blessings of which they still stand in need, and which are all treasured up in him? Now as to the way and manner, the process and regulating principles, according to which these men derive benefit from receiving the sacraments, the Word of God has certainly not given us much direct or explicit information. And this, indeed, is just a part or a consequence of a more general truth, viz., that Scripture does not ascribe to the sacraments any such prominence or influence in the way of contributing to men's salvation, by conveying to them spiritual blessings, as the Popish or Tractarian theory does. There are, indeed, some important negative truths bearing upon this subject which are clear and certain, and which it is important to remember and to apply, as the great securities against error and abuse. Most of these have been referred to already, but it may be proper now to state them together, and in this connection. They are chiefly these—

1st, That the sacraments do not occupy any such place in the scheme of God's arrangements, as to make the participation in them or in either of them, necessary to the possession and enjoyment of any spiritual blessing, or to entire meetness for heaven.

The grounds on which this position rests are chiefly these, that the only thing on which these results universally and invariably depend is union to Christ by faith, and that there is no spiritual blessing, not one of those things which accompany salvation and prepare for heaven, which may not be, and has not often been, enjoyed by persons, both infants and adults, who never in point of fact received either sacrament.

2. That no spiritual blessings are derived from the sacraments, without the previous existence and the present exercise of true saving faith.

3. That the sacraments become effectual means of grace and salvation, not from any virtue—that is, any power or worth, personal or official—in him who administers them, nor from any

virtue in them—that is, from any intrinsic efficacy inherent in them, and resulting *ex opere operato*—and that they do not operate certainly and invariably in conveying any spiritual blessings.

4. That the sacraments are not seals of spiritual blessings, in any such sense as implies, that they are attestations to the personal character or spiritual condition of those who receive them, or, that the mere reception of the sacraments is to be held as of itself furnishing a proof, or even a presumption, that those receiving them are true believers, and may be assured that they have reached a condition of safety. This is a point about which much ignorance and confusion prevail, and which it may be proper to explain somewhat fully. It is the almost universal practice of divines to apply the word “seal” to the sacraments, and to call them “sealing ordinances.” But what they usually mean by the application of this term to the sacraments, it is not easy to determine. Indeed, we can scarcely resist the impression, that many divines, in professing to explain the function or influence of the sacraments as seals, have recourse to what is little better than an intentional ambiguity of language, as if they were anxious to insinuate, that there is something very important and mysterious in this sealing, while yet they carefully avoid giving any clear and definite explanation of what it means, as if from a lurking apprehension that the attempt to do so would make the whole mystery evaporate in their hands. We have already adverted to the general habit, from which the Reformers did not wholly escape, of speaking in a somewhat inflated and exaggerated style about the importance, value, and efficacy of the sacraments, especially in connection with the subject of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. The same tendency has ever since continued to be exhibited, more or less, in the Protestant churches, varied occasionally by a slight reaction towards the opposite extreme. And among Protestant divines this tendency to exalt and magnify the sacraments, has been very generally exhibited in connection with the topic of their function and use as seals, a view of them which Romanists generally repudiate.

It may be proper to advert, in the first place, to the origin and ground of the application of this word “seal” to the sacraments. The ground of it is, that the Apostle Paul (Rom. iv. 11) says that “Abraham received the sign (σημεῖον) of circumcision, a seal (σφραγίδα) of the righteousness of the faith which he had, yet being uncircumcised.” It has been inferred, that since the Apostle calls circumcision a seal as well as a sign, the same designation may be extended, first to baptism, and then to the sacraments in general. This may be regarded as a fair enough ground for the application of a word, but it furnishes rather a meagre warrant for the maintenance of a doc-

trine. Few men would refuse to admit, upon this ground, that the sacraments may be properly enough called signs and seals, but many might hesitate about basing upon such a foundation, a definite doctrine concerning the efficacy of the Christian sacraments, or the way and manner in which they operate. Even about circumcision, the only sacrament concerning which the Apostle speaks directly, it is not very certain, either, that it was a sign and seal to Abraham's descendants precisely in the same sense as it was to him, or, that the word "seal" is used in any sense materially different from the word "sign," and not simply as exegetical of it. And if the Apostle's statement leaves these two points somewhat doubtful even about circumcision, it is scarcely possible that it can furnish any certain ground, for a definite theory as to the import of the word "seal," when applied to the Christian sacraments. And yet there is nothing else in Scripture which bears upon this question, so that we are left for the decision of it very much to inferences or deductions, as to what the words "sign" and "seal" are fitted to suggest, when considered in connection with general views of the sacraments as a whole, estimated by the standard of Scripture, reason and experience.

This matter of sealing is left very much on the same vague and indefinite footing in the Westminster symbols. They explicitly sanction, indeed, the application of the word and the idea to the Christian sacraments; but they wisely give no definition or explanation of what it means, and leave this to be deduced inferentially, from what is taught about the objects and ends of the sacraments. In addition to the declarations, that the sacraments are signs and seals of the covenant of grace, and that Christ and his benefits are signified and sealed by them to believers, the only thing in the Westminster Confession or Catechisms which throws any light upon this subject, is the statement, that the sacraments are designed "to represent Christ and his benefits, and to confirm our interest in him," *confirmation* being undoubtedly the leading idea which is suggested by the word "seal." Our position is, that, whatever this sealing ascribed to the sacraments may mean, and whether or not it be practicable to explain it very definitely, it is not to be held as implying, that the act of participating in the sacraments affords any proof or evidence that those so participating are true believers, and have fairly entered upon the way which leadeth to heaven. We have scarcely ever felt more perplexity about any point than this, of what it is that Protestant divines in general really mean to teach, in regard to the function and use of the sacraments as seals of spiritual blessings. Few have ventured distinctly and unequivocally to pronounce the sacraments to

be seals, in the sense of their being *ipso facto* attestations to the good personal character and the safe spiritual condition of those who receive them, from a sort of feeling, apparently, that this is too absurd and preposterous a notion to be openly propounded and deliberately maintained; while yet many seem very unwilling plainly to repudiate it, as if afraid that, by doing so, they might be held to be lowering the dignity and value of the sacraments. We have turned over a good many books by eminent divines, in which this topic is treated of, and yet we have found scarcely any in which the position we have laid down is, openly and unequivocally, either asserted or denied. And yet we think it of the last importance, as fitted to bear influentially upon the welfare of men's souls, that the truth upon this point should be fully stated and enforced, in order that men may be delivered from the ruinous delusion which, we fear, many are disposed to cherish, viz., that the reception of the sacraments is somehow a valid attestation to the excellence of their character and the safety of their condition.

The arguments which expose this delusion are at once of the most obvious and the most conclusive kind. From the nature of the case, the notion that the sacraments are personal attestations to character could not reasonably be entertained, unless it had been declared in Scripture in the most direct and explicit terms, while, in fact, it has no foundation whatever to rest upon, except that there has been a pretty general consent to transfer to the Christian sacraments the word "seal," which the apostle applies to circumcision. In considering the notion of the sacraments being seals, in the sense of personal attestations to character, we have, first of all, to strike off and put out of view, all those cases in which the sacraments are received by men who are not qualified and prepared for receiving them aright by the possession of faith. To such persons nothing is sealed, on them nothing is bestowed. They certainly derive no benefit from partaking in the sacraments; by doing so, they only commit sin and incur the divine displeasure. In their case everything like sealing, regarded as implying any beneficial or gracious result, is out of the question. And yet the outward act is, in their case, the same as in the case of believers. The outward act of partaking in the sacraments, the being baptized and the joining in the Lord's Supper, may be regarded either as acts performed by the parties themselves, or as events which have occurred, results which have come about, under God's superintending providence. Viewed as acts of the parties themselves, they are professions of faith, and, of course, should be actual exercises of faith, based upon a substantial conviction already existing in their minds, that they have been led to believe in Christ. A man who applies to be baptized,

declares in doing so that he is already substantially convinced, that he has been enabled to repent and believe, and that he desires and expects, through God's blessing attending his baptism, to be enabled, among other things, to realize this conviction more fully, and to act more habitually under its influence. If he is really a believer, it may be expected that this result will indeed be produced ; but if so, this will not be because the fact of his being baptized is, or could be, reasonably regarded as being, on God's part, anything like an attestation to the soundness of the view, which, in applying for baptism, he professed to entertain concerning his own character and condition. His actual reception of baptism is a mere providential result, which cannot in itself be regarded as conveying or implying any intimation of God's mind, any declaration or indication on the part of the Searcher of hearts, as to the character of the person baptized. The same providential result takes place in the case of those who are utterly unqualified from the want of faith, and also in the case of those who, though qualified for baptism by the possession of faith, have failed to derive from it any spiritual benefit whatever, because of their own sinful coldness and negligence. In all these three cases, the outward act, viewed simply as a providential result, was the same, appointed or permitted by God, and could not therefore be an attestation or certificate of any thing concerning the parties baptized.

The same considerations apply *mutatis mutandis* to the Lord's Supper. A person applying for admission to the Lord's Supper must be held to declare thereby, his substantial conviction, that he has already been enabled to feed upon Christ by faith, and that he desires to be enabled to feed upon him more fully, and to share more abundantly in the blessings which he still needs. If he be, indeed, a true believer, and be duly careful to improve this ordinance aright, he is warranted to expect from it, by God's blessing, an increase of grace, and more especially a growing strength of conviction, that he does possess that faith which enables him to feed on Christ, and is the earnest and the pledge of heaven. But this result is not produced because the partaking in the Lord's Supper is directly and in itself an attestation on God's part, or an evidence furnished by Him, that he is a true believer ; and the proof that it is not so, is because one event in this, as in ordinary temporal providences, happens to the righteous and to the wicked, that is, because the act of communicating as an actual result, occurs equally in the case of those who are unqualified for the ordinance, and, of course, derive from it no benefit, and of those who are qualified for it by their faith, but who, upon some occasions may, through their sinful negligence, have de-

rived from it no spiritual benefit whatever, as well as of those who were qualified and benefited communicants. This is sufficient to prove, that there is nothing in the act of communicating, viewed directly and by itself, which can be regarded as having anything of an attestation, on God's part, to the actual personal character and condition of the communicant, while it leaves us abundant room for the conviction, that God's Spirit employs the process of communicating as a whole, that is, as including the views and feelings which may have been called forth in connection with it, for supplying more abundantly "assurance of God's love, peace of conscience, and joy in the Holy Ghost."

The process by which men may be legitimately assured, that they have attained to a condition of safety, and that they may rely on attaining to heaven, involves an argument, which may be put in the form of a syllogism, and there is nothing about the outward act of receiving the sacraments which can be introduced legitimately and validly into any of the steps of this argument. We are very far indeed from saying, that assurance of God's love and peace of conscience are usually produced, in point of fact, by processes of argumentation, terminating in the conclusion that we shall be saved. We believe that the possession of these, as of all other spiritual blessings, is dependent upon the indwelling and operation of the Holy Ghost, and that he often, in his gracious sovereignty, sheds abroad in the hearts of believers, according to their necessities, a sweet sense of God's favour, and a foretaste and certainty of heaven, without the intervention of any process of argument to prove, that this state of mind is right and warrantable. But, while this is true, it is not the less true that, when doubts are raised, whether from without or from within, about the grounds of our hope and confidence in relation to God and eternity, we should be ready to shew, that they do rest upon a solid foundation of argument,—argument which must be constructed out of materials derived both from the word of God and from ourselves. The process, in that case, must be substantially to this effect: Whosoever believeth, or, whosoever is born again, or, is animated by love to God, or, possesses true holiness, shall be saved. I believe, have been born again, love God, am holy, and therefore, &c. Now, the essential thing in any argument of this sort, is, that the particular quality or circumstance about the individual on which the conclusion is based, be really a thing which Scripture teaches to be an invariable accompaniment of salvation, and which is, therefore, when its existence is satisfactorily established, or warrantably believed, a certain test of a condition of safety. And while this holds true of faith, regeneration, love, and holiness, it does not hold true of the act of partaking in the sacraments;

→ It is not often an act of holiness, or an act of love.
→ It is not often an act of holiness, or an act of love.

and this, therefore, cannot constitute a valid element in any alleged attestation on God's part to the character and condition of the recipient. No one, simply on the ground, that he has been baptized, or has partaken in the Lord's Supper, that in God's ordinary providence these things have come about as results, is warranted to regard it as certain, or even probable, that he has obtained precious faith, and has passed from death to life. And no believer is authorised to deduce directly from the mere fact that he has actually partaken in the sacraments, any confirmation to the conviction, which alone would warrant him to partake in them, viz., that he is a believer. To say that those who are enabled to partake in the sacraments duly qualified and rightly prepared, are warranted to entertain good hope through grace, is nothing to the purpose, for here, manifestly, everything is thrown back upon the state of mind, which must be ascertained by appropriate means and evidences, and which, when once ascertained, is of itself sufficient to authorise the conclusion, irrespective altogether of sacraments. The actual participating in the sacraments by persons qualified for it by their faith, is indeed to be regarded as a gracious providence, a favour or kindness which God has vouchsafed, and for which we ought to thank him. But, regarded in this aspect, as a providential occurrence, it stands upon the same footing, and is to be judged of by the same principles, as any other outward mean of grace, such as an opportunity of reading or hearing the word; while it is but too certain that many believers, through their own sinful negligence and shortcomings, often fail to derive any spiritual benefit from the sacraments as well as from the word.

These considerations, taken in connection with the utter want of evidence on the other side, while, at the same time, the position we are controverting is of so peculiar a kind, that it could be received only on the ground of evidence of singular force and explicitness, seem to us amply sufficient to prove, that the sacraments are not seals of the covenant of grace, or of the spiritual blessings it imparts and secures, in any such sense as implies, that they are attestations to the personal character and condition of the recipients. The mere participation in the sacraments does not of itself furnish any proof or even presumption, that those who do so are warranted to regard themselves as having attained a condition of safety, while, at the same time, it is also true, that the sacraments are intended to be instruments or channels of conveying or imparting to believers stronger faith, increase of grace, and fuller assurance, and that, when rightly used and duly improved, they are ordinarily made the means, in the hand of the divine Spirit, in accomplishing these important results.

Sufficient yes but not necessarily efficient returns +

It is of the highest importance, both theoretically and practically, that all these *negative* views concerning the sacraments, their nature and necessity, their proper subjects and objects, and the way in which they produce their appropriate results, should be distinctly understood and habitually remembered and applied. We are persuaded that they furnish the only adequate security against gross error in doctrine, and ruinous delusion in practice. The whole history of the church shews how powerful and deep-seated are the tendencies in human nature, to exaggerate the importance, the value, and the efficacy of the sacraments, to ascribe to them effects or results which they are not fitted or designed to accomplish, and to encourage to partake in them persons, who not only cannot derive from them any benefit, but who are guilty of sin in receiving them. The practical result of these erroneous and exaggerated notions about the sacraments, which have prevailed so widely, and which seem to spring up so readily in the minds of professing Christians, is not only to involve men, that is, all who partake in them without faith, in a direct act of aggravated sin, but to harden them in their state of guilt and impenitence, by deluding them into the belief, that all danger is past, and that they have reached a condition of safety. The tendency of these confused, erroneous, and exaggerated notions of the sacraments, is to lead men into the belief, more or less distinctly developed, that they are justification and regeneration, or, that they furnish evidence of the presence of these indispensable blessings, or, that they may serve as a sort of substitute for them. And, in one or other of these ways, we cannot doubt that the sacraments operate powerfully, in point of fact, in wrapping men in utter delusion about their spiritual condition, and in sending them down to destruction with a lie in their right hand.

It is true that these notions about the sacraments are plainly and distinctly brought out only by Romanists and high churchmen, but we are persuaded, that in their germs or elements, they prevail extensively, though in an obscure, confused, and latent form, among Protestants and professing Christians in general. It is at least as true of the doctrine of the sacraments as of any other department of Romish theology, that it has a deep foundation in the tendencies of depraved human nature, and that its germs or elements spring up spontaneously in the hearts of unrenewed men. We have no doubt, that if the vague and confused notions concerning the sacraments, which float undeveloped in the minds of the great body of the more careless and ill-informed persons who are in the habit of attending Protestant places of worship, could be gauged and estimated, it would be found that they embody, however obscurely and im-

perfectly, the sum and substance of what is fully and explicitly brought out in the Council of Trent, and in the Tracts for the Times. We would find plain traces of the germs at least of the notions, that the sacraments in some way or other produce, or imply, or prove, the existence and possession of the great blessings necessary to salvation, viz., justification and regeneration, and are thus fitted, directly and of themselves, to lead men to rest satisfied in the conviction, that they need entertain no serious apprehension about their eternal destiny.

We believe that the notion of sacramental justification and regeneration, more or less distinctly developed, has always been, and still is, one of the most successful delusions which Satan employs for ruining men's souls, and that there is nothing of greater practical importance than to root out this notion from men's minds, and to guard them against its ruinous influence. This can be done only by impressing on them right views of the sacramental principle, or the general doctrine of the sacraments, and applying it fully both to baptism and the Lord's Supper; and especially by bringing out the great truths, that the sacraments are intended for believers, that they can be lawfully and beneficially received only when faith has been already produced, that they imply or suppose the previous existence of the great fundamental blessings of remission and regeneration; while, at the same time, they do not, simply as external acts or providential results, afford any proof or evidence of the possession of these blessings, or of the existence of the faith with which it is invariably connected. These views go to the root of the matter, and if fully and faithfully applied, would prevent the fearful mischief, which cannot, we fear, be reached in any other way.

These truths, it will be observed, are to a large extent negative. They consist mainly of denials of certain notions, about the nature and necessity, the subjects, objects, and effects of the sacraments, which are very apt to spring up in men's minds, and which have been openly maintained by Romanists and High Churchmen. And when we reflect upon the extent to which these unwarranted and extravagant notions about the sacraments have prevailed, and upon the fearful amount of injury they have done to the souls of men, we feel much disposed to remain contented with a theology on this subject which might be characterized as negative, and are not inclined to take much trouble in trying to bring out a very full and detailed account of how it is that the sacraments produce their appropriate effects. We reckon it about sufficient to know, that they are *not* intended for those who have not already faith and regeneration; that they do *not* produce any beneficial results which may not be comprehended under

the general head of aiding and assisting believers in carrying on the work of sanctification in their hearts; and that they do *not* directly and of themselves furnish any evidence, that faith and regeneration have been produced, and that the work of grace has been begun. Let men firmly believe and carefully apply these negative doctrines, and they will thus be preserved from error and delusion, and at the same time will be able, if they carefully improve what they know, and wait upon God for his blessing, to derive from the sacraments all the spiritual benefits they were ever fitted and intended to be the means of conveying.

For in truth, as we have said, there is scarcely any additional information given or suggested in Scripture, as to the way in which the sacraments operate, and produce their beneficial results. The substance of what is indicated in Scripture upon this subject, both negatively and positively, is thus expressed in the Shorter Catechism:—"The sacraments become effectual means of salvation, not from any virtue in them, or in him that doth administer them, but only by the blessing of Christ, and the working of his Spirit in them that by faith receive them." Here, while faith is required as an indispensable previous condition, the whole beneficial result, in its bearing upon men's salvation, is resolved into "the blessing of Christ and the working of his Spirit." This implies the exercise of the divine sovereignty in making the sacraments means of grace, shuts out the idea that the enjoyment of any spiritual blessings is tied or restricted to the reception of these ordinances, and reminds us that we have no more certain grounds for counting as a matter of course, on deriving spiritual benefit from partaking in them, than from waiting on the reading and hearing of God's word. We are to wait upon God in this matter by abounding in prayer for the outpouring of his Spirit, and by seeking to have our minds, in all respects, rightly and suitably exercised in connection with the dispensation of the sacraments; and in these circumstances, we have ordinarily good ground to expect, that God will make them the means or instruments of "confirming our interest in Christ," by "increasing and strengthening our faith and all other graces."

There is really nothing more declared or defined upon this point in Scripture, or in the Westminster symbols, except what may be implied in or deducible from their general character as signs and seals of the covenant of grace. And if this does not imply, that they are directly and of themselves declarations or attestations on God's part of the existence of faith and regeneration, then it cannot with certainty suggest anything of a very precise and definite kind, though the leading general idea that is indicated is obvious enough. We

have already had occasion to mention, that the views suggested by the application of the name and the idea of a seal to the sacraments, do not really involve anything so important, or intrinsic, or mysterious, as many seem to suppose. Seals, apart from deeds and signatures, are nothing, and even when duly appended to these, they are very small and insignificant things. The general idea suggested by the word is that of *confirming*, and there is no great difficulty in seeing how this idea may be applied to the sacraments, without imagining that they are in themselves attestations on God's part to men's individual character and condition, or that they involve anything very exalted or mysterious. There is, first of all, the general consideration, that Christ having expressly appointed these two special ordinances to be instruments or channels of conveying to men spiritual blessings, in addition to what may be called the more ordinary means of grace, the Word and prayer, we have in this very circumstance special grounds for confidently expecting his special blessing when we receive and use them aright. This consideration is well fitted to confirm us in our determination to improve the sacraments to the uttermost, and in our confident expectation of deriving spiritual benefit from doing so.

And when we look more particularly to the character of the sacraments as outward actions of a symbolic import, we see plainly, that they have an individualizing, appropriating bearing or tendency, which fits them specially for being made the instruments in the hand of the Spirit of guiding us to a personal application of divine truth to our own condition and circumstances, and thus sealing or confirming our faith, love, and hope. A believer, in partaking of the sacraments, stands forth, plainly and palpably, as making a personal profession of his faith in Christ, and giving a personal promise and pledge to persevere in faith and obedience. The natural tendency of this is to lead him to realize more fully his actual position, obligations, and prospects as a believer, and this warrants the confident expectation that the Spirit will actually employ it for accomplishing this result. But the sacraments are to be regarded as signs and seals on the part of God as well as of man. And in this aspect their sealing or confirming character comes out in this way: God, by giving to a believer, in the ordinary course of his providence, an opportunity of partaking in the sacraments, does not indeed thereby attest or indorse his personal character and standing as a believer, but He may be said to single him out and to deal with him in his individual capacity, addressing to him personally, and in a manner and circumstances peculiarly fitted to come home with power to his understanding, heart, and conscience, the great truths of Scrip-

ture, with the knowledge, belief, and application of which all spiritual blessings are connected, and thus intimating his readiness and willingness to bestow, in connection with these ordinances, all needful spiritual blessings, in accordance with all that he has revealed in his word, as regulating his conduct in such matters. Viewed as signs and seals on God's part, the sacraments may be fairly regarded as signifying or intimating this, and the declaration of all this in such circumstances, and with such accompaniments, is well fitted to exert a sealing or confirming influence upon the minds of believers.

The substance of this matter may be embodied in these two positions, 1st, That the Holy Spirit ordinarily employs the sacraments, when received by persons duly qualified and rightly prepared, as means or instruments of conveying to them clearer views and more lively and impressive conceptions of what he has done and revealed in his word, with respect to the provisions and arrangements of the covenant of grace, and their special application to men individually. And, 2d, That the Holy Spirit, acting in accordance with the principles and tendencies of our constitution, ordinarily employs the sacraments, as means or instruments of increasing and strengthening men's faith with reference to all its appropriate objects, and thereby of imparting to them in greater abundance all the spiritual blessings which are connected with the lively and vigorous exercise of faith, that is, all those subordinate blessings, as in a certain sense they may be called, which accompany and flow from justification and regeneration.*

We have now stated the substance of what is suggested by Scripture, and set forth in the Westminster Standards, concerning the way and manner in which the sacraments become means of grace and produce their appropriate beneficial effects, and, indeed, more generally, concerning the nature and character, the subjects and the objects, the end and the effect, of these ordinances. And we have done so under the influence of a strong desire and determination to avoid the very common and very injurious tendency, either, directly to overrate the value and efficacy of the sacraments, or to furnish facilities and encouragements to others to overrate them, by leaving our statements on these subjects in a condition of great vagueness and confusion. Any attempts to assign to them greater dignity, value, and efficacy than we have ascribed to them, or to invest them with a deeper shade of mystery, are, we are persuaded, not only unsanctioned by Scripture, but inconsistent with the

* Beza explains *sealing* in this way:—*Q. Quid obsignationem appellas? R. Applicationem efficaciorē per fidei incrementum, siquidem quo fides major est, eo præstantius est ejus effectum, ut Christus cum suis donis magis ac magis nobis ipsis velut insculpatur. (Quæstionum et Responsionum Christianarum, Pars Altera, quæ est de Sacramentis, p. 24.)*

fair and legitimate consequences of what it teaches, and are fitted to exert an injurious influence upon the interests of truth and holiness. The strong natural tendency of men to substitute the tithing of mint, anise, and cumin, for the weightier matters of the law, to substitute the observance of outward rites and ceremonies for the diligent cultivation of Christian graces and the faithful discharge of Christian duties, is strengthened by everything which, professedly upon religious grounds, either adds to the number of the rites and ceremonies which God has prescribed, or assigns even to prescribed rites and ceremonies an importance and an efficacy beyond what He has sanctioned. In the second of these ways, as well as in the first, the truth of God has been grievously perverted, and the interests of practical godliness have been extensively injured. Almost the only rites and ceremonies permanently binding upon the Christian church are baptism and the Lord's Supper; and these have been in every age so distorted and perverted by exaggeration and confusion, as to have proved, in point of fact, the occasions of fearful injury to men's souls. It is true that men have sometimes exhibited a tendency to go to the opposite extreme, to depreciate instituted ordinances, and to reduce their importance, value, and efficacy below the standard which the word of God sanctions. But the tendency to overvalue the sacraments, and to make the observance of them a substitute, more or less avowedly, for things of much greater importance, is far more common and far more dangerous; more dangerous, at once, because it is more likely to creep in and to gain an ascendancy in men's minds, and because, when yielded to and encouraged, it exerts a more injurious influence upon the highest and holiest interests, by wrapping men in strong delusion in regard to their spiritual condition and prospects, and leading them to build their hopes of heaven upon a false foundation.

We have confined ourselves, in this article, to an explanation of the sacramental principle, or the general doctrine or theory of the sacraments as applicable to both these ordinances—a subject greatly neglected and misunderstood. We have referred to baptism and the Lord's Supper, only, in so far as this was necessary, for illustrating something connected with the exposition of the general doctrine. We have had no occasion to dwell upon the Lord's Supper, because the application of the general doctrine of the sacraments to it is plain enough, and because there is no serious difficulty connected with it, unless we had gone into the discussion of the kind and manner of the presence of Christ in this ordinance, which we regard as one of the most useless, senseless, preposterous controversies that ever was raised. We have been obliged to dwell

at some length on baptism, and especially infant baptism, chiefly because of the peculiar place which infant baptism holds, a peculiarity, the ignorance or disregard of which has introduced much error and confusion into men's views upon this whole subject. The peculiarity is, that infant baptism really occupies a sort of subordinate and exceptional position; while, at the same time, this peculiarity being overlooked, and infant baptism coming much more frequently under our notice than adult baptism, we are very apt to allow the specialities of this peculiar case to modify unduly our views, not only of baptism in general, but even of the sacraments in general.*

The views we have set forth upon this subject may at first sight appear to be large concessions to the Anti-pædobaptists,

* We had collected some materials to illustrate the injurious tendency of the practice of giving undue importance and prominence to infant baptism. We have not now space to make use of these materials, but we may give a specimen or two. It has been very common for divines to lay down positions, in regard to infant baptism, much more strong and sweeping, and much more precise and definite, than Scripture affords us materials for maintaining, and then drawing inferences or deductions from them concerning baptism in general, and concerning the sacraments in general. Cardinal Bellarmine's leading position, in discussing the efficacy of the sacraments, is, that they are the true causes of justification, or that they confer grace *ex opere operato*, and more particularly, that they cause or bestow justification or grace, in a very different way or sense from that in which the word or the truth may be said to do so, Protestants maintaining, he says, that they do this by stirring up faith and not otherwise, while he contends, that they truly justify, not by stirring up faith like a sermon, but by immediately effecting holiness. And his leading general proof of this is, that the sacraments are rightly administered *non intelligentibus*, and the proof of this again is the baptism of infants. (De Sacramentis in genere, Lib. ii. c. 8, tom. iii. p. 62.)

Le Blanc, in treating *de usu et efficacia sacramentorum*, attempts, as usual, with great learning and ingenuity, to shew that Romanists and Protestants approach much nearer to each other upon this subject than is commonly supposed. He defends the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, and maintains the necessity of ascribing to the sacraments a power and efficacy beyond anything that comes under the description of objective and obsignative or sealing, and his principal argument in support of these substantially Popish views is derived from infant baptism. We give a brief specimen of his mode of discussing this subject:—"Quamvis autem Sacramenta objectivè in fideles agant, nec aliam habeant efficaciam quam quæ signis competit, planè tamen existimo efficaciam aliam eis esse tribuendam, quam quæ sit merè objectiva, id est, quæ sic pendeat a conditione ejus in quem efficacia sunt, ut absque illâ se exerere non possit. Cujus rei mihi est argumentum evidens Baptismus infantum, perpetuo Ecclesiæ Orthodoxæ consensu probatus, et apud Christianos penè omnes receptus, ac firmum et validum in Scripturâ fundamentum habens. Abhorret enim à sanâ doctrinâ, ut dicamus Baptismum in infantibus, qui post illum susceptum, ante rationis usum ex hoc vita rapiuntur, prorsus esse inefficacem. Quum enim Baptismus illis administratur ritè et secundum Christi institutum, necesse est ut in illis sit efficax; Siquidem Sacramenta signa practica atque activa sunt, et effectum aliquo salutari non carent in omnibus qui illa debite suscipiunt. Et certè ad quid, et quo fine, infantes etiam statim et certè morituros baptizamus, secundum perpetuum Ecclesiæ Christianæ morem, si nulla est in eis Baptismi efficacia? Sed quæcunque tandem illa sit, Baptismus erga infantes objectivè nihil efficere potest: ac proinde Sacramenta aliter quam objectivè agunt." (Theses Sedanenses De usu et efficacia Sacramentorum, pp. 675-6.)

Jurieu supported Le Blanc in his views about baptismal regeneration, and this gave rise to some very interesting controversial discussion.

those who deny the lawfulness of the baptism of infants, and to affect the solidity of the grounds on which the practice of Pædobaptism, which has ever prevailed almost universally in the Christian church, is based. But we are firmly persuaded, that a more careful consideration of the whole matter will shew, that these views, besides being clearly sanctioned by Scripture, and absolutely necessary for the consistent and intelligible interpretation of the Confessions of the Reformed churches, and especially of the Westminster symbols, are, in their legitimate application, fitted to deprive the arguments of the Anti-pædobaptists of the plausibility they possess. It cannot be reasonably denied, that they have a good deal that is plausible to allege against infant baptism. But we are satisfied, that the plausibility of their arguments will always appear greatest, to men who have not been accustomed to distinguish between the primary, fundamental, and complete idea of this ordinance as exhibited in the baptism of adults, and the distinct and peculiar place which is held by infant baptism, with the special grounds on which it rests. We would have liked to have explained and illustrated this point, and two or three other topics connected with baptism, to which we have referred incidentally in the course of this article, but our space is already more than exhausted, and we must conclude. We cannot do so, however, without simply stating what we regard as the leading positions that ought to be maintained and set forth, in order to guard against error and delusion on the subject of infant baptism.

Our chief object in this article has been, to contribute something in aid of dispelling the ignorance, error, and confusion which prevail in regard to the sacraments in general, that is, adult baptism and the Lord's Supper, by bringing out certain positions, concerning their general character, their subjects, objects, and effects, which have been too much lost sight of. And, in like manner, we believe that ignorance and confusion, error and mischief, on the subject of infant baptism, are to be guarded against, chiefly by maintaining and establishing the following positions:—

1st. That Scripture, while furnishing sufficient materials to establish the lawfulness and obligation of infant baptism, does not give us much definite information concerning it, does not furnish materials for laying down any very precise or definite deliverances as to its proper effects in relation to individuals, and that the whole history of the church impresses the lesson, that, upon this subject, men should be particularly careful to abstain from deductions, probabilities, or conjectures, beyond what Scripture clearly sanctions.

2d. That while believers are under the same obligation to

present their infant children for baptism as to be baptized themselves, if they have not been baptized before, no infants ought to be baptized, except those of persons who ought themselves to be baptized as adults upon their own profession, and who, being thus recognised as believers, are not only entitled, but bound, to be habitually receiving the Lord's Supper.

3d. That while believers are warranted to improve the baptism of their children in the way of confirming their faith in the salvation of those of them who die in infancy, and in the way of encouraging themselves in a hearty and hopeful discharge of parental duty towards those of them who survive infancy, neither parents nor children, when the children come to be proper subjects of instruction, should regard the fact that they have been baptized, as affording of itself even the slightest presumption that they have been regenerated; that nothing should ever be regarded as furnishing any evidence of regeneration, except the appropriate proofs of an actual renovation of the moral nature, exhibited in each case individually; and that, until these proofs appear, every one, whether baptized or not, should be treated and dealt with in all respects as if he were unregenerate, and still needed to be born again of the word of God through the belief of the truth.

ART. VII.—*Commentary on the Gospel of St John.* By Dr AUGUSTUS THOLUCK, Professor of Theology in the University of Halle. Translated from the last German Edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

IN reading this rich volume we have been forcibly reminded of an incidental remark made by Hugh Miller, in his "Old Red Sandstone," on the sharp contrast presented by the brief record of the results of thought in writing, and the long, intricate, toilsome processes of years through which they may have been reached.

"There are the remains," he says, "of two several creations at once before us. The shore, too, is heaped with rolled fragments of almost every variety of rock—basalts, ironstones, hyperstones, porphyries, bituminous shales, and micaceous schists. In short, the young geologist, had he all Europe before him, could scarcely choose for himself a better field. I had, however, no one to tell me so at the time, for geology had not travelled so far north; and so, without guide or vocabulary, I had to grope my way as I best might, and find out all its wonders for myself. But so slow was the process, and so much

was I a seeker in the dark, that the facts contained in these few sentences were the patient gatherings of years."

Of Dr Tholuck's Commentary on John, the first edition reached the public in 1826. On July 2. 1857, the preface to the seventh, or last German, edition, of which an excellent translation has been recently issued by the Messrs Clark of Edinburgh, was written. The entire volume, including several Prolegomena and Appendices to the Commentary, consists of only 440 pages. And though, as compared with the peculiarly instructive experience of our illustrious expositor of the marvels of the "Old Red," the most illustrious of all foreign expositors of the divine Word in modern times, had less of merely pioneer-work to encounter, and greatly more in the way of suitable lights and aids to encourage him in his progress, the contrast, in the case of the latter, between the palpable results embodied in words, as shewn by this volume, and the silent, secret toils of years, discloses to the thoughtful student of literary life an experience, in many respects, more memorable than that of the former.

We select, in partial illustration of our meaning, the following observations on John viii. 46. Of the philological and dogmatical value, however, we express no opinion.

"Chrysostom, Augustine, Luther (Th. xii. p. 1721), Grotius, Hermann, take ἀμαρτία in the sense of 'sin,' while, on the other side, a large majority, induced by the connection, have preferred taking it in the sense of Ψῆδος, in its various shades of meaning, 'lie, error, deceit;' thus Origen, Cyril, Erasmus, Schmid, Beausobre, Bengel, Kypke, Mosheim, Tittmann, Küinöl, Lücke. 1st ed., Hase (Leben. Jesu, 3d ed. sec. 32). Since, however, in the theology of Schleiermacher, the doctrine of the sinlessness of Christ has taken the place of the church's doctrine of his deity, a new effort has been manifest to retain for the doctrine of the sinlessness of the Redeemer, this grand *dictum probans*. Ullmann (Sündlosigkeit, 3d ed.) would only maintain, as at an earlier period Crell and Lampe had done, the general idea, 'fault,' that is, practical *and* theoretical; but, for the meaning 'sin,' *in specie*, we have the judgment of Olshausen, Lücke, 2d and 3d ed., De Wette, and even Ullmann, in the 4th ed. p. 67; against *his* exposition particularly, Christ. Fr. Fritzsche has protested in the programmes which are now collected in the Opusc. Fritschiorum. After a renewed investigation, I must confess, that for the present I cannot agree with the expositors last named. I have consulted all the expositors to whom I could have access, who defend the meaning 'sin,' but have not been able to convince myself that a satisfactory connection can be made out if their view be adopted. Let us examine Lücke, for instance:—'As Christ elsewhere says in *positive* terms: If ye will not believe my words, yet believe my works; so here he says, in *negative* terms: Ye do not believe me, though I speak the truth; wherefore do ye not? Can you perchance

demonstrate that, instead of doing the ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ (the works of God), I have been doing the works of sin; if ye cannot do this, why then do ye not believe when it is truth which I speak to you? But against this stands the fact, that this very thought, 'if ye cannot do this,' is not expressed, and that, if this were meant, we would look for an εἰ δὲ μὴ instead of εἰ δὲ ἀλήθειον λέγω. Chrysostom and Enthy-mius apprehend it in a manner which grasps the connection with yet more clearness and acuteness: 'The reason why do ye not believe me, is none other than downright hatred of the truth, εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἴπατε τὸ ἔγκλημα (if this be not so, bring your accusation);' but were this the meaning, would we not expect γὰρ after τίς, and as there is none, must not the second be taken as antithetical to the first? We are forced, therefore, to look for some other mode of apprehending it. Ἀμαρτία has, in classic usage, the meaning of 'error' (see Rapheleng. Annotat. ex Herod., and Kypke, in loc.); and Bretschneider, Lexic., 3d ed., cites from the New Testament itself, several places, as properly belonging to this definition: Fritzsche makes special reference to 1 Cor. xv. 34. But the meaning, 'fault, error,' will not answer at all, since in that sense it would give an appearance as if the ἀλήθεια of Christ were the product of meditation and of reflection, while it is in fact rather the immediate emanation of the unity of his self-consciousness with God, (v. 28, ch. vii. 17). We believe that Melancthon and Calvin have hit the true point, when they retain indeed the signification of 'sin,' but comparing 1 Cor. iv. 4, interpret the expression only of transgression only within the sphere of his office, and 'so far' only of error. If, as Tittmann especially does, we might take the ἀλήθεια in specie of the doctrina Christi de Christo (cf. 55), the expression would be rendered yet more clear; but embracing the practical Messianic activity, it may also be interpreted, 'Have I in any case acted in conflict with the ἐντολή of the Father?'"

Nor is the full expenditure of mental energy, of which such an extract as this is the slight and feeble index, to be duly estimated by the months or years which may have passed away during its elaboration, or by the most adequate conception that we can form of the rigid strain of the abstract intellect which was requisite to its production, or the manifold special references to authorities at all times that occur within it. Greatly more by contemplating the amount of *conscience* which is ever at work in the labours of the godly interpreter, of whom Dr Tholuck is so fine an instance, shall we in any right measure determine what the qualifications requisite to a truly scientific disclosure of the divine meaning of the Holy Ghost really are, or duly admire such qualifications when exemplified in any special production.

"Aristotle," remarks an intelligent but anonymous critic of "Augustus Böckh de metris Pindari," "whose works are a mine of practical wisdom, in his Nicomachian Ethics, makes the remark that the

best and shortest way to understand moral science is to be a good man ; for, if we begin by a living experience of the *what*, the *how* and *why* will follow of themselves, and the facts of our moral existence will by degrees assume a scientific shape in the natural workings of a speculative mind. *Αρχή γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρχοῦντας, οὐδὲν προσδεχάσκει τοῦ ΔΙΟΤΙ.* . . . So also Quintilian, in the same tone of high moral health, will not allow that even an orator can be formed out of any other materials than those which virtue supplies. ‘Orator perfectus nisi vir bonus esse non potest.’ So sound and sensible in all ethical matters, that even a doctor of theology could not speak more properly. Arts and sciences, with all their pride and parade, are viewed as merely the outward limbs and flourishes of an inward soul ; ratifications growing out from a substantial and abiding nucleus of humanity, the essence of which is expressed in these significant words—a good man. And what is this other than we are taught in that most pregnant passage of the Gospel of St John, ‘If ye do my will, ye shall know of the doctrine.’ Faith and philosophy, which sometimes seem made only to quarrel, agree here ; they both teach one and the same great truth ; which, when reduced to its most general scheme (for it is by no means confined to ethics), may be expressed thus—all knowledge of things within us, and therefore most peculiarly human, presupposes a living experience of the thing attempted to be known ; all science of human emotions, or of the acts that are the expression of these emotions, can only proceed out of the fruitful soil of a soul which has been deeply stirred by these emotions ; a man must be the thing before he can know it.”

In grateful sympathy with the wisdom thus expressed, we must also be persuaded, that whilst in a truly scientific understanding and explanation of God’s words, which postulates a loving heart towards Jesus Christ, childlike dependence on the promise of the Holy Ghost, and such an anxious reverence for the honour of the written word of God, as tends to secure the mind of the interpreter against the inroads of fanatical brutishness, self-satisfied ignorance, and vanity, with all the other intellectual and moral vermin that have so often laid waste the fair and fertile vineyard of divine truth, sacred hermeneutics imply many a weary conflict with manifold selfishness, constant self-denial, and unwearied self-forgetfulness. If accordingly we can duly estimate the cost and worth of an interpreter of the noble type of Tholuck, who “trembles at the word of the Lord,” and in all whose labours a tender conscience vigilantly superintends the activities of his intellect, and the use of his almost boundless resources, we shall be prepared also to recognise in “*Philologia Sacra*,” a department of theological learning, the real possession and faithful use of which demands the very highest qualifications, both spiritual and intellectual, that the Church of Christ can at any time secure.

No weak efforts of intelligence, no small shallow scholarship, no stinted sympathies with broad, profound, recondite forms of thought, no feverish impatience of minute research, no lazy, desultory dreamy guesses at meanings, above all, no impetuous embrace or tenacious grasp of the novelties of half truths, and no proud, carnal, worldly aspirations after place or renown, will make a trustworthy interpreter of the divine word. Because, while it has been graciously given both to bring down every high thought of man's righteousness, and to teach and enable him to submit unreservedly to the righteousness of God in Christ, it is also better fitted by far, if regarded simply in the light of an ancient writing, a portion of the world's religious literature, to test the real qualities of human effort, chasten and regulate the applications of scientific skill, and call forth, in order to its adequate elucidation, the accumulated treasures of human knowledge, than any other product whatever of the human intellect.

"To transfer," says Landerer, "such a book from a dead to a living language, from the past to the present, from the relations and surroundings of its own origin to the different circumstances of other countries and times, demands, it is easy to see, a very large amount of science." Now, without a parallel in modern times is Tholuck's compliance with this demand. In him, Augustine's conditions, when he says, "*Duæ res, quibus nititur omnis tractatio Scripturæ, modus inveniendi quæ intelligenda sunt, et modus proferendi quæ intellecta sunt,*" are most rigorously fulfilled. Not only on the great highways of learning that are accessible to every scholar, but in the most upland, sequestered, recluse paths of ancient lore, may his venerable form be met, reminding us greatly of that dear old man of whom a loving heart, wielding a most musical pen, has so sweetly said,—

"There, as I think, thou wilt behold the eyes,
And hear the voices, of those ancient saints,
Whose few, yet precious pages, once the sport
Of gusty winds, became thy pious care :
The Sardinian Melito—Polycrates—
Papias the Phrygian—Pinytus of Crete—
Julius—and Hegesippus—and the rest ;
Who lived before those seven, to whom St John
Spake words of warning, gave their souls to God."

In the highly spiritual tone of his work, however, above every other excellence legitimately demanded of the exegetic mind, is Tholuck deserving of affectionate regard and worthy of imitation. In earnest sympathy with the sacred books, he freely yet reverentially appreciates their distinguishing character and life, and thus has acquired a familiar and close, because friendly, understanding of the proper meaning. Fully acknowledging that deeply solemnising law of Immanuel's kingdom, "*ὁτι δὲ*

πολλῶν θλίψεων δεῖ ἡμᾶς εἰσελθεῖν εἰσελθεω εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ," the acquirement of scientific hermeneutics has been to him a profound discipline, that, strictly ordered by the laws of conscience and demanding severe self-denial in the exercise of intellect, has been at the same time sweetened by the spirit of love, and ennobled by the dominion of genuine submission.

Shall we, then, enjoy the sympathy of the reader as we now proceed to indicate in some detail, what appear to us to be the essential notes of the mind and position of Dr Tholuck, as a highly instructive *hermeneute*, as these have been more especially impressed on our admiring attention by the latest and highest form of his Commentary on St John?

Let us pause for a moment, in the first place, in the study of our author's peculiar emotional temperament, as the auxiliary of his thinking—his strong susceptibility of resting with affectionate interest on simple and common events and sayings, and tracing them up to lofty springs in the human soul,—his almost womanly tenderness in contemplating displays of gentle love and lowly endurance, and that swift evolution of analogies equally soothing and severe in their practical meaning, that ever accompanies a nature of so much warmth and sprightliness as his. Are not such elements of character in themselves in no small degree pledges of excellence in interpretation? And do we not behold Tholuck himself as much at least as he saw Claudius, when quoting from the "Wandsbecker Bote," Th. 1, p. 9 A, of the latter, the following charming words: "I love best of all to read in St John. There is in him something so perfectly wonderful—dusk and night—and the quick lightning throbbing through them! The soft clouds of evening, and behind the mass the big full moon bodily!—something so sad, so high; so full of presage, that one can never weary of it. When I read John, it always seems to me that I see him before me, reclining at the Last Supper on the bosom of his Lord, as if his angel held the light for me, and at certain parts would place his arm round me, and whisper something in my ear. I am far from understanding all I read, yet often John's idea seems to hover before me in the distance; and even when I look into a place that is entirely dark, I have a presension of a great, glorious sense, which I shall some day understand, and hence I catch so eagerly at every new exposition of the Gospel of John. 'Tis true most of them only ruffle the evening clouds, and never trouble the moon behind them."

Into the simple elements of John's character our author is naturally well fitted to enter with a loving concern, and so, in the masterly use of his science, he is peculiarly qualified to interpret his thoughts.

"This disciple, then," he remarks at page 2, "by the whole course of his life, is a representative of that class of Christians who, by a gentle and gradual unfolding of their inner life, have become what they are, as Paul, on the other hand, is a representative of those who have been transformed by a sudden conversion. In his intercourse with the Redeemer, John now revealed such a tenderness of heart, a disposition so susceptible of moulding, an attachment so profound, as to render him peculiarly dear to Christ, to which John himself alludes, though without mentioning his own name, John xiii. 23, xix. 26, xx. 2, xxi. 7."

"If we connect the image of John which his Gospel and Epistles give of their author, with certain traits of his life which antiquity has preserved to us, he appears to us as a tender, affectionate, rather feminine character, which already displays itself in the diffident and hovering recital, and especially in the passages where, with elegiac sadness, he speaks of the unbelief of the world, chap. i. 10, xi. 3, xix. 32, xii. 37. Originally, this tenderness was not destitute of a certain susceptibility to sudden flashes of anger, as is by no means rarely the case in this class of feminine dispositions; they are repelled as vehemently as they are attracted.

"At a recent date, Neander, and especially Lücke, have designated 'vehemence and choler' as 'the individual temperament' of the apostle; but certainly no other vehemence is supposable than one which stands to tenderness as the opposite pole in the one orb of character."

In Tholuck's high oriental culture is another special property of thought and association, which, to use a painter's term, has had an eminently *toning* effect on his intellectual sympathies with the fourth Gospel, when viewed on its human side, as the special fruit of the idiosyncrasy of John's thinking.

Is it needful, here, to recall to the memory of the reader the fact that an Aramaic tincture has strongly dyed the Hellenism of John's style and diction? After no classical fashion, for example, are his propositions distributed, or his thoughts connected. He stands in these respects at a distance—equally remote and trenchant—from the subtle elaboration of clauses, the exquisite equipoise of sentences, the profound interpenetration of the inward with the outward, that in pure Greek diction fuse thought and word into a living unity of form and matter. How obviously, for example, are his constantly recurring *καὶ* and *οὖν* dictated by the movements of Jewish thought, and foreign to the compact spirit of occidentalism! Nor could this be the simple result of the Evangelist John having had fewer opportunities of becoming initiated into the prevailing forms of Hellenism which Paulus, Hug, and Credner, with our own accomplished countryman Roberts, have, we think, shewn to have had considerable prevalence in Palestine. Because, if duly attending to the social and eco-

nostic position of his parents, we cannot but believe that John must have enjoyed the advantages at least of an ordinary education. It must, on the contrary, be traced, as we believe, to something deeper and stronger amidst the simple elements of his character, and to his special aptitude for acquiring, in his intercourse with others, the stronger forms of Jewish thought and feeling. And in illustration of this view, we ask the attention of the reader to the following words of Dr Tholuck. "In Palestine, as we learn from Gal. ii. 9, the Apostle still had the stricter legal tendency. Even the Apocalypse, at least, rests decidedly on an Old Testament background, and several men who sprung from John's school (if that expression be allowable), Papeas, Hegesippus, and Irenæus were Chiliasts; Hegesippus, in fact, had Ebionitish tendencies."

An expositor, accordingly, of St John's Gospel, in whom the ready perception of the Semitic genius in forms of thought and expression that is not only there but throughout the New Testament so distinctly traceable, does not partake almost more of the nature of an instinct than of reflective effort, will, in our judgment, be but meagrely fitted for doing his work successfully. His logical intellect may be equal to the task of turning his knowledge of grammar, historical and geographical connections, and the *analogia fidei*, to the best account. A serious defect, however, there must be in his methods of work, so long as, through ignorance of the modes and spirit of orientalism, but especially of the Semitic character of thought, in the Old Testament, which has for so long and so fearfully prevailed in the churches of this country, and is even now contemplated by many within their pale without either shame or remorse, the discerning faculty—the eye to detect the best points of view with the true colours of things—is greatly absent. To the hermeneute as to the poet, "fine issues" come not but to "spirits finely touched," who have learned, it may be, almost unconsciously, to know what to look for, and where to find it. Shall we be judged to be unwisely desultory and digressive if, in order to express our strong sense of the need of cultivating, by enlarged and earnest study, the Oriental *instinct*, in order more especially to an adequate feeling of St John's Gospel, we borrow what we know to be no very remote image of our meaning from Sir John Herschel's Treatise on Astronomy:—

"There are cases," remarks that most accomplished writer, "in the application of mechanical principles with which the mathematical student is but too familiar, where, when the data are before him, and the numerical and geometrical relations of his problems all clear to his conception, when his forces are estimated and his lines mea-

sured, nay, when even he has followed up the application of his technical processes, and fairly arrived at his conclusion, there is still something wanting in his mind—not in the evidence, for he has examined every link, and finds the chain complete—not in the principles, for those he well knows are too firmly established to be shaken—but precisely in the *mode of action*. He has followed out a train of reasoning by logical and technical rules, but the signs he has employed are not pictures of nature, or have lost their original meaning as such to his mind; he has not seen, as it were, the processes of nature passing under his eye in an instant of time, and presented as a whole to his imagination. A familiar parallel or an illustration drawn from some artificial or natural process, of which he has that direct and individual impression which gives it a reality and associates it with a name, will, in almost every case, supply in a moment this deficient feature, will convert all his symbols into real pictures, and infuse an animated meaning into what was before a lifeless succession of words and signs.”

In his keen oriental sense, Dr Tholuck enjoys a power of discernment, in which, perhaps, he is at the present day unrivalled among sacred interpreters. Some scholars, indeed, may excel him in a wider range of eastern literature, though even that is in no small degree a thing of doubt, but in that refined discrimination of forms of thought and transitions of opinion which is so potent in philological criticism, his name as an orientalist is pre-eminent. Enjoying in early life the successive instructions of Kosegarten, Von Dietz, Ideler and Wilken, his high aptitude for oriental study soon became known. When only twenty-two years of age, he gave to the world “Hints for the study of the Old Testament,” and his “Sufismus,” a treatise on the Pantheistic system of the Persians. Four years afterwards, in 1825, he published an anthology of the Oriental Mystic Poetry, with prefatory notices of the character of mysticism generally, and that of the east in particular. In 1826, his Speculations of the later orientalists respecting the doctrine of the Trinity appeared, and in 1830, a paper on the Egyptian or Indian origin of the name Jehovah. Instead, however, of extending our list of his works on eastern literature, we shall now, by one or two extracts from his Commentary on St John, exemplify the influence of these studies on his exegetical labours. It will, however, conduce in some measure to the more full appreciation of the following passages, if we add the remarkable testimony afforded by the illustrious Hegel to their author’s talent for the interpretation of eastern modes of thought and forms of belief. “The rich contributions which Tholuck has given us in his Anthology of the Oriental Mystics, from the Poems of Dschelaleddin, and others, were produced with views like those which we have

here presented. In his introduction, Tholuck shews what a thorough comprehension he has of the mystic philosophy; he there determines very accurately the Eastern, and that of the Western and Christian writers in reference to this system."

Let our first extract be from section I. of the author's discussion of the "Doctrine of the Logos in its Historical Aspect." In speaking of the use by the Old Testament writers of the word מֵלָאךְ, he says:—

"Most concur in the view, that there exists a certain indeterminateness, that sometimes (as the word does not properly designate a personal being, signifies *legatio* not *legatus*), they entitle a concrete appearance of God מֵלָאךְ, at others give the name to a personal created being (Hitzig on Isaiah, p. 622, v. Coelln's Bibb. Theol. i. p. 190, seq. Baumgarten-Crusius Bibb. Theol., p. 307). But in the former case even, God, in as far as he reveals himself to men, is distinguished from God *in himself*; he speaks of him, refers to him, he is his representative. The expression, Isa. lxiii. 9, 'the angel of his face, is peculiar, a name given even to an angel who is the Mediator of what does for Israel. We could hardly explain the term as Steudel does, by Matt. xviii. 10; rather, 'the angel in whom I am by my active providential presence.' We must consider, also, the exceedingly remarkable passage, Exod. xxxiii. 12–23. Here, first of all, Moses implores the Lord to make known to him who is to be sent with him. The answer, ver. 14, is, 'My face shall go with thee;' and he adds, 'I will bring thee to rest.' Thereupon Moses repeats his request, 'Yea, thy face, yea, thou must go with us;' and God replies, 'The very thing thou askest I will do.' Moses now emboldened desires to see the *glory* of God. The answer is, 'My beauty (טִיבִי) thou shalt see. I will pass by thee; when I am by, thou shalt look after me (אַחֲרַי), but my face (פָּנַי) thou canst not see.' First of all, it is necessary to remark, at this point, that the פָּנַי is used here in different senses. For where it stands in opposition to אַחֲרַי, it designates the profundity of the Godhead, as the face is the nobler part of men. Where, on the contrary, the face of God is said to go with them, it is a circumlocution for *person*, as in many other places. There is, besides, a distinction made here between an inner and an outer side of God, his essence and his appearance; the former remains closed to man, the latter is opened. It is called the glory, the beauty of God. This glory of God, at other times, appeared also to the people (פָּבַררַי, Exod. xvi. 10, xxiv. 16, xl. 34; 1 Kings viii. 11. The word of God is also mentioned as mediating the *creation of the world*, Psa. xxxiii. 6 (see 2 Pet. iii. 5); and in Psa. cxlvii. 15, Isa. lv. 11, as mediating the *government of the world*, the *manifestation of the divine energy*. (See the Festprogramm of Olshausen on Heb. iv. 12, in his Opuscul.) The Spirit of God, from the very beginning of the world, appears as the fructifying, motive principle, and is, furthermore, the principle

by which all animated creatures have *life* (Psa. civ. 29, 30, Job xxxiv. 14), and by which men have *wisdom* and *sanctifying power* (Psa. li. 13, cxliii. 10). *Wisdom* also, that is, the attribute of God which *assigns to things their objects*, appears in the Old Testament with a certain independency, even in Job xxviii. 12, seq., more distinctly Prov. viii. 22, seq. She is called the daughter of God, who arose as the firstling of his work (ראשית ררכו), before the foundation of the earth, she was anointed queen of the world; at the creation of the world, she was by God's side as the artificer by whom he arranged the whole. 'The relation between God and the world, and between wisdom and the world, is contemplated as that of a tender parental love.' (Ewald, Poet. B.B. d. A.T. iv., p. 76.)

But once again, because of our intense admiration of Tholuck's deep-toned orientalism, by which, as by an arch of widest human sympathies, he links together the most distant modes of thought, we invite the reader's earnest regard to the following sentences:—

"Ch. i. v. 29. From the solitude in which Jesus, after his baptism, had abode, he comes again to the Jordan. Of the object of Jesus' coming, nothing specified is mentioned, since the evangelist is concerned only with *the testimony of the Baptist*. If the words be not, as most regard them, a sudden prophetic inspiration, they are yet uttered with a design presupposed, especially v. 36, of directing the disciples to Jesus. The grand significancy of Jesus, he finds in his propitiatory office. In the expression of 'Ο ἀμνὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, it is an obvious inference from the article 'Ο, that a designation already well known is alluded to, somewhat like ἡ ἑξίς τοῦ Ἰεσσαί (Isaiah xi. 10, Romans xv. 12), and it is most natural to think of Isaiah liii. 7. By the genitive τοῦ Θεοῦ, this Lamb is more particularly characterised, either as *destined* by God, or as *well-pleasing* to God, cf. ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ, (vi. 28). Ἀγεῖν ἁμαρτίαν = נִשְׂאֵעוֹן is, in many connections, equivalent to ἀφαιρῆν, 'to take away sins.' But ἄγειν also means, in the Septuagint, to bear (Lam. iii. 27), hence ἄγειν ἁμαρτίαν for כָּבַל עוֹן. If the Baptist had in his eye the prophecy in Isaiah liii., we must adopt the latter meaning, since, in Isaiah liii. 11, we have expressly עֹנֵתָם, הוּא יִכְבֵּל, καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν ἀνοίσει. The bearing of the sins of the world, is therefore the *suffering* for the sins of the world, which indeed is the basis on which the taking away is accomplished. It is true, lambs were only used under circumstances for sin-offerings; but the more readily could the Baptist designate Christ as the expiating *lamb*, if he intended at the same time to direct attention to the feature of patient suffering, which had been held up by Isaiah. That the words of the Evangelist are to be explained in the mode mentioned, is confirmed, too, by this, that in Rev. v. 6, 12, xiii. 8, Christ, with reference to his expiatory death, is called ἀγνίον ἑσχαγμένον, cf. also, 1 Pet. i. 19. The difficulty, however, now arises, that the Baptist, on this view, must have known something of a suffering Messiah; and yet this idea was one which remained wholly unknown

to the most intimate disciples of Christ, in fact, to those very ones also who, like John, had had intercourse with the Baptist (Matt. xvi. 21-23). Strauss and Bauer draw the inference that the Evangelist here also imputes his own creed to the Baptist. Were we compelled to concede that Jewish antiquity knew absolutely nothing of a suffering Messiah, yet even then he who concedes to the Baptist an extraordinary inspiration, such as ver. 33 expressly testifies of, can have no difficulty in allowing a similar one here. Do we not find a similar prophetic glance of the Spirit in Simeon, Luke ii. 25? (Krabbe *Leben Jesu*, p. 155.) Had not the Baptist already announced that the Messiah would establish his kingdom only by conflict with the portions of the people whose minds were alienated from God (Matt. iii. 12; Neander, *Leben Jesu*, 3d ed. p. 66; M'Clincktock and Blumenthal's Tr., sec. 40). Even though he speaks here of redemption in its widest extent—*τοῦ κόσμου*—yet this cannot appear strange upon the lips of one who had declared that God could raise up children to himself from the stones that lay by Jordan. But the position which has been taken anew by De Wette, and falsely grounded on John xii. 34, that the times before the Christian era were wholly unacquainted with a suffering Messiah, cannot, by any means, be conceded. Numerous passages from the Rabbins argue the very opposite. See Martini, *Pugio fidei* ed. Carpzov, p. 852; Hulsius, in his instructive work, with which few are acquainted, *Theol. Judaica*. Bredæ, 1653, p. 309; Schmidt, *Bibl. f. Krit. u. Excq.* i. p. 43-49; Hengstenb. *Christol.* I. i. p. 252-292, I. ii. p. 291, *seq.* It is true that the age of the Rabinnical authors, from whom these testimonies are adduced, is uncertain; yet, supposing that the whole of them wrote subsequent to the birth of Christ, would this doctrine, so hateful to a carnal Judaism, be brought out at the very period when the Christians everywhere were proclaiming a crucified Messiah in that preaching, which was unto the Jews a stumbling-block? Would the Jews have taken refuge in the figment of a twofold Messiah, one a suffering, the other exclusively a glorious one, if the doctrine of a suffering Messiah had not found confirmation in their ancient exegetical tradition? The opinion defended formerly by many (Herder, Gabler, Paulus), that the Baptist only meant to allude to the gentleness with which the innocent martyr bore the sinful treatment of the world (cf. *ἐχθραν ἀγειν*, 1 Maccab. xiii. 17), need no longer be confuted, as it has been universally abandoned."

When will the evangelical churches of Great Britain—on which the eye of the great Taskmaster has, alike in melting love and august authority, been providentially fixed, in expectation of every "burning and shining" example in active and passive witness-bearing for the truth arising within their pale—fully realize and practically acknowledge the obligation of knowing, with the highest possible certainty, what the New Testament really means, viewed as the manifold extension and the consummate disclosure of all that the Old Testament

implicitly contains? Forget not we may, because believe we must, that the Word of God, in any language, is sufficient of itself to make even the child, alike in years and intellectual growth, wise unto salvation. Forget we cannot, because we would not, that a child may die a hundred years old, and dying, exemplify the glorious spectacle of intense human frailty, outwardly overshadowed by the awful presence, and inwardly quickened and glorified by the tender love and un-failing sympathy of the Holy Ghost. At the same time, no more can we forget that the sense of the written word of God, like that of any other writing, is simply a matter of historical fact, and that the outward in language is so joined with the inward in thought, that the religious element, which saves the souls of old and young, can never be fully—that is, securely—comprehended apart from the help of philological science, in the widest and most profound sense of that term.

Is there, then, not a special blessing in the fact that Dr Tholuck, whose spirit and life is so conspicuously evangelical, exemplifies alike the consciousness of what the faithful interpretation of God's word demands, and the large literary and theological accomplishments that alone can ensure their faithful and successful enforcement? Nor in referring to his special oriental culture, and its highly serviceable uses in interpretation, can any extract, however definitely manifesting its power as an auxiliary, afford an adequate conception of its salutary influence on his labours. Oftentimes, as a vital leaven secretly yet deeply transforming and adjusting the mass of his materials, than anything more palpable and striking to the eye, is its true place and dominion to be recognised. And more or less in every page, but more especially when treating of Jewish opinions and customs that arise out of and mark the peculiarly Eastern structure of Jewish character and life, it is present and powerful.

In a fine *equipoise of intellect*, we note another instructive mark of Dr Tholuck's pre-eminence as an interpreter. All his faculties are in as good working order as his command of his resources is prompt and familiar. Nor do we by this sort of description affect any low esteem of that strong peculiarity which sets on high and apart a select few among their fellows, and receives the enigmatical name of *genius*, as if our author had not his own, and that a goodly share of it. It is simply meant that he possesses, in a high degree, that class and subordination of powers without which no man, however exalted by any unique function of invention or embellishment, can ever prove a trustworthy or successful expositor of Scripture. It is not by the startling effulgence of the forked lightning, which but condenses to the eye of the nervous beholder the

surrounding gloom, but by the steady, tranquil light of ordinary day, that the divine pages of creation can be faithfully perused. A well-tempered and suitably-adjusted light is requisite to all sustained and exact researches in the physical world, be they in things great or small. And so to the devout use of a naturally sound judgment, which has been invigorated and refined by adequate methods of discipline, and enriched by appropriate instruction, will the deep, far-winding mines of revealed truth surrender their glorious treasures. Now, by the possession and use of this most indispensable instrument, the great divine of Halle is peculiarly distinguished. Not that we agree with him in all his results, for in several things we widely differ from him; as, for example, in some minute linguistic criticisms; nor that we can appreciate the extent to which he carries his metaphysics within the territory of revealed truth; for here he sometimes seems to leave nothing in our hands but mere husks and sand: nor that we can find a quiet anchorage for either head or heart in the doctrinal beliefs, considered as a logical scheme, that satisfy him; because we confess that, in proportion as the solemn conflict of daily life, through the lessening distance of eternity, acquires a more intense and accumulated interest, we feel that no system of theological truth, no creed, can supply the needful edge and momentum of spirit, or the due nutrition of all our deeper emotions, as well as the adequate repose of our speculative faculties, but the Calvinism of the Westminster Confession of Faith. Whilst, however, in these respects, our convictions materially differ from those of the author, we would be sadly oblivious of what we owe, both to truth and to him, did we not acknowledge his valuable possession of a finely-proportioned and highly-refined intellect, the illustrious result of superior natural endowments, which have been most conscientiously cultivated.

In illustration of this aspect of Tholuck's claims to respect as a hermeneute of Scripture, we now submit the following extract from his interesting discussion of the "Design and Plan of St John's Gospel:"—

"In the question in regard to object, we must distinguish the general design from the subordinate one. Everything which the gospel history has recorded, has the general design of extending and establishing faith in Christ and his saving doctrine. With this view Luke prepared his narrative for Theophilus, as he mentions at the beginning of his Gospel. This was also John's general purpose, as he says himself, xx. 31. The question now rises, whether we are obliged, besides this, to suppose a special design? This Gospel is of such a nature as to lead us readily to that supposition. It has throughout a special didactic character, offers a different circle from that of the synoptical gospels, and continually recurs to it. It

would seem from this that he had a distinct, heterogeneous dogmatic tendency to oppose. The arrangement and matter of his history differ from those of the other evangelists in respects which are not without significance. This might lead us to suppose that his design was to furnish a supplement to the other evangelists. The idea of a polemical dogmatical design besides the general one is held by Irenæus (adv. haer., l. iii. c. 12), who says it was John's purpose to confute the errors of the Gnostic Cerinthus. Many of the ancient and modern theologians concur in the view of this ancient father; some of them, however, suppose a more general polemical aim against Gnostic and Docetic errors at large, whilst many think that they discover in the Gospel, besides this, a polemical aspect towards the sect or disciples of John or Zabians (Baptizers). So the Socinians, Schlichting and Wolzogen; so, too, Grotius, Herder (Erlautzum N. T. aus einer neueröffn morgenb Quelle, p. 11), Overbeck (Neue Vers. üb. d. Ev. Joh.), who regard the aim as specially polemic toward both Gnostics and Zabians. Some, as for example, Kleuker, and more recently L. Lange (Beiträge zur ältesten Kircheng.), think they can detect a polemical purpose against carnal Judaizers. The most recent negative criticism of Lützelberger returns to the idea of a polemic aim against the disciples of John the Baptist (p. 275), and that of Schwegler (see § 6), which grants that the Gospel was written toward the end of the 2d century, discovers in it a relation partly irenic, partly polemical, toward the Gnosis, and also towards Ebionism. If now the question be, whether in the Gospel of John expressions occur which can be employed in confuting Gnostic, Zabian, or Judaic errors, no one will deny it. This, however, is not sufficient to establish a distinctively polemic aim on the part of John, for a pure Christianity, constantly and in its own nature, is in conflict with those errors. The characteristics of the Gospel can force us to the idea of an aim so definitely polemic, only in case the didactic character peculiar to it can be accounted for in no other way than by equally definite considerations, grounded on the history. This is, however, not the case. As to the opinion of Irenæus, it is well known that the Fathers, in their contests with the heretics, were ready to imagine things of this sort, to represent the Apostles as distinctly opposing the particular heresies of their day. Irenæus, in the same passage, maintains that John designed to combat the errors of the Nicolaitans, which is certainly not the case. Irenæus, moreover, from the fact that several passages in John could be employed against the Gnostics, might, without being led to it by any historical data, come to the *conclusion*, that it was the distinctive *object* of the Evangelist to controvert the Gnostic views. To this may be added, that those places which are regarded as polemic against Cerinthus (ὁ λόγος σαφὲς ἐγένετο, &c., Storr über den Zweck des Ev. Joh., § 43, *seq.*), and those which are supposed to have a controversial aspect towards the disciples of John the Baptist (John i. 8, iii. 28, *seq.*), do not strictly answer their polemical intent, as Dr Paulus has shewn in his *Introd. in N. T. capita selecta*, Jenæ, 1799; in fact, that Cerinthus might employ for his

own purposes certain passages in John, cf. *same*, p. 112. It cannot, moreover, be shewn at all that this polemical character pervades the whole Gospel. Under these circumstances, we cannot concede that John, in the composition of his work, had a distinct polemic dogmatic aim before his eyes, still less that this was his grand aim. It is, nevertheless, probable, that cursorily here and there (xix. 34, 35), especially in the introduction, he has an eye to erroneous opinions and doubts, which just at that time were current. (This is Rettberg's view, *An Jesus in exhibenda*, &c., p. 9.) It is natural to all authors to have an occasional regard of this sort to their relations to their own times. This tendency is more obvious in John's first Epistle than in his Gospel, about which the judgment of Lücke, in his introduction to the first Epistle of John, is very just."

But we go on to notice, though with some hesitancy, another salient characteristic of Tholuck's mind and writings, viz, his true poetic feeling—a hesitancy arising from the fear of a certain amount of antipathy to anything imaginative, æsthetic, or artistic, which is sometimes displayed by a certain class of readers, for whose intense sobriety of mind and solid respectability in all theological matters, we have the most unbounded respect.

But to be true to ourselves, and to the claims of what we believe to be true and apposite, is no less our duty than our intellectual birthright. Let us, therefore, speak justly of this untoward prejudice. Generically, it is one-sidedness. And of the many ill-favoured growths of that unwholesome stem, it is, perhaps, in some respects, the most disagreeable. It is specially incongruous with sound views of the full cultivation and development of the theological intellect, viewed as the instrument whereby the words of Scripture, the many concrete forms of divine truth that occur alike in later and earlier books of the sacred canon, its vast treasures of imagery, the pictorial descriptions of outward nature, and picturesque allusions to human life and manners, may be made intelligible to the understanding, and both impressive and alluring to man's active and responsible nature. And for the simple reason, that it is at entire variance with anything like an intelligible system of that auxiliary and harmonious action of the manifold energies of the mind, which constitutes the high purpose of a true education, and of which we have so fine a delineation in the following words of Sir John Davies, on the "Immortality of the Soul," as slightly altered by an illustrious critic in application to the poetic genius:—

"Doubtless, this could not be, but that she turns
Bodies to *spirit* by sublimation strange,
As fire converts to fire the thing it burns—
As we our food into our nature change!

From their gross matter she abstracts their forms,
And draws a kind of quintessence from things,
Which to her proper nature she transforms
To bear them light on her celestial wings!

*Thus doth she when from individual states
She doth abstract the universal kinds,
Which when re clothed in divers names and fates
Steal access through our senses to our minds."*

In our author, there is happily an exquisite sense of beauty in poetic as well as abstract truth. In speaking, for example, of the various influences that in early life tended to mould the spirit of Salome's son, he briefly adds—"And this would be fostered in John by his mode of life as a fisherman, which often led him to pass the quiet watches of the night on the waters (bei welcher Johannes oft mals stille Nächte am wasser durch wachen musste), amid the enchantments of a region resembling that which encircles the lake of Lucerne." Lighting up, as by a single touch of sweetest colour, the scene of the evangelist's earliest acquaintance with toil, where twilight had so often deepened into night around him, and the sea, when roughened by the rising breeze, and refusing to him the rest that darkness brings to the weary on the land, became to his heart a school of earnest vigilance and solemn self-reflection.

And what can be more striking than when he says of Bengel—"The pointing of his fingers are sunbeams, and his hints gleams of lightning. When he treads the beaten path, what others employ wearisome pages in saying, he compresses into two or three words, often, too, through crag and forest he opens up new prospects?"

Nor will those who are familiar with his work on the Hebrews be slow to recall the æsthetic enthusiasm of the following words to his friend Bunsen :—"Noch steht das Capitol, noch stehen Frascati's und Albano's heitere Hohen in unvergänglichem Andenken vor meiner Seele. Wonne Stromte die Herrlichkeit der Natur, Wonne die Herrlichkeit der Kunst: aber wie viel ärmer wäre aller Genuss geblieben, härte er nicht im Heiligthume ienes Familienkreiser seine Verklärung gefunden, welcher die Erde, aus den Himmel knüpfte."

Is there not some reason almost to weep a few honest tears over the fact, that in this respect Dr Tholuck's example is not more anxiously followed by some of those persons who propose themselves to the world at large as its authoritative guides in the exposition of Scripture? Now we have a work on parables, then, in inordinate velocity of succession, are volumes on types, prophecy, biblical emblems, botany, zoology, cast up, as by a deep ground-swell of vexed and competing authorship, on the dusty highways of life, each one more modestly than

another invoking the gracious attention of the comparatively few men who have the time, capacity, and temper that are requisite to read them. And then, again, there is the common, though not inviting spectacle, of one literary growth after another, the most universal mark of which is not its transparent conception of the spiritual fact in the figurative form, or the vivid translation of antique imagery into modern outline, tone, and colour, or any thing whatever of artistic definition or grouping, gravely announced as the best existing antidote to the too prevailing evil of a dull repetition of meagre truisms, or to the still worse mischief of some perilous novelty in opinion, decently disguised in unctuous rhetoric, every word of which announcements is at once seen by every true man who has a whole eye in his head, to be a mere matter of pleasant comity, the extracts that are too often given and pressed upon the world as noble specimens of the doctrinal truth, literary power, and spiritual value of such productions, having apparently been almost unconsciously selected, and not uncommonly proving exactly the reverse. Now in the free, healthy, truthful exercise of the æsthetic judgment alone, can evils such as these be remedied. In the genial activities of a valid perception of what is essential to poetical forms of apprehension and expression, can the lustrous glory and emphasis of the imagery of Scripture, whether of facts or words, historical types or simple forms of speech, be truly appreciated and successfully unfolded? And of this method of treatment, Tholuck supplies a fine example.

Another note of our author's eminence as an interpreter, is his large though independent use of cognate literature, both ancient and modern. Having been specially attracted by his ripe knowledge and generous estimate of the Fathers, we are strongly tempted to ask, How long must any man who has some small tendency toward an honest dealing with history, wait for any thing like a full welcome by the church at large, of an earnest protest against partial and unfair estimates of these early Christian writers? Is there no honourable escape from all sorts of extremes of opinion respecting those minds, who, though of various ages and schools of thought, have been so frequently huddled together in one heterogeneous group, as if they were all, or all equally, entitled to implicit trust, or as if not one of them, in any degree whatever, could be relied upon?

Deal we ought with these men as we would have ourselves dealt with. Do we regard them as witnesses to facts in ecclesiastical or civil history? Let us, according to the ordinary rules of historical judgment, put them to the test. Do we try their doctrines? There is the law and the testimony as a cri-

terion for them as for us. In so far as they are competent judges of fact, or opinion, let us be thankful for their views, and make a relevant use of them.

Now Dr Tholuck has not only expressed himself clearly regarding the historical and theological value of such of the Fathers as he required to consult, but has also throughout his exegesis most consistently exemplified his estimate. Of the extant portions, for example, of Origen's immense commentary on John's Gospel, he has the following remarks, in the simple yet severe truth of which the impartial student will fully concur:—"Important as this commentary is for Origen's doctrinal views, and beautiful as are passages of its matter having a general bearing on Christianity, those which in the stricter sense subserve the exegesis of the gospel are but meagre." [Rather speculative *emanationes script.* than exposition].

And with what marked discrimination he speaks of Chrysostom, whose lively piety and broad, glowing rhetoric have so commonly tempted his many admirers to overlook his manifold defects in doctrine and accuracy of interpretation, with his constitutional proneness to exaggeration, alike in opinion and diction! "These homilies," he says, "are specially distinguished by great richness in practical observations. Chrysostom, in addition, explains the text in accordance with a sound grammatico-historical mode of apprehension. Even here, however, the purely exegetical value is diminished, by an undue propensity on the part of Chrysostom to give the text a polemic direction against heretical views."

Specially welcome, however, to the many grateful admirers of the marvellous wisdom, spiritual penetration, and heroic spirit of the noble Augustine, will be our author's testimony regarding his Homilies on St John. "These are homilies in which Augustine explains the text very diffusely, with many digressions. They present only here and there a gleam of light in the exposition of the Gospel itself, on the principles of grammatico-historical interpretation, but as a compensation for this, they offer a treasure of profound Christian thoughts, which has not been sufficiently drawn upon."

Nor, in descending to a later age of exegesis, can we omit Tholuck's saddening picture of the dreadful bondage in which the elaborate tyranny of the Latin Church has, at all times, detained so many men of superior intellect and large theological acquirements, in the language which he employs regarding Maldonatus, "one of the best expositors of the Romish Church. His erudition, especially, in *patristics*, is great, as is his exegetical talent, which reluctantly endures the shackles of the Church, yet wears them nevertheless."

But in illustration of the shrewd judgment formed by him

alike of the strength and weakness of the copious literature that has, in the lapse of ages, grown up around John's Gospel, and of his strong independence in the use of it, we will now make one or two extracts. At page 279 of the English translation, we have the following exposition of chap. xi. 32-34:—

“ With the same words which her sister had used, she meets Jesus, casts herself reverentially at his feet, and weeps, in silence. What is the meaning of ἐνεβριμήσατο—ἑαυτον? Ἐμβριμάομαι, like βριμῶ, βριμῶμαι, means in the predominant usage, ‘to be moved with indignation, to threaten vehemently’ (Suidas, Hesychius, Etymol. Magn., Passow), and is so used in the New Testament, Mark xiv. 5, i. 43, Matt. ix. 30. Retaining this signification, taking a wrong view at the same time of the true human nature of Jesus, Chrysostom and Euthymius interpret: ‘he reprov’d his own rising emotion’ (τῷ πνεύματι); Cyrill, Theophylact: ‘through his divine nature he chided the human;’ Theodore of Mopsuestia, Lampe: ‘he was angered at the unbelief of the Jews (ver. 38), and of the sisters also.’ Reverting to this latter way of taking it, the most recent critics, Strauss and Fritzsche, maintain, that it is entirely in keeping with Christ, as John delineates him, that as a thaumaturgus easily aroused, he should fly into a passion at every exhibition of a refusal to believe, in fact, should quiver with indignation (cf. Fritzsche, in the Allg. Litteraturz, 1840, Nro. 100, and 1841, Nro. 115). Jesus, it is true, weeps, and asks sadly, Where have ye laid him? but his question, according to Fritzsche, is rather put in anger; his tears, according to Strauss, prove no more than that the passion of anger had passed over into that of sorrow. The Jews, according to verse 36, see in the tears of Jesus a token of his love; but Strauss sees in this only an illustration of the type of John's representation, according to which the enemies of Jesus put a false interpretation on *all* his actions. In this case, the ancient enemies of Christ made no such misrepresentation; that was reserved for his enemies of modern times, and they have made it with a perverseness to which we shall not pay respect, so far as to involve ourselves in a controversy with it. We proceed to a more particular examination of the meaning of ἐμβριμάομαι: the analogy of the language, if not the *usage*, justifies the adoption of the meaning, ‘to be moved with grief.’ Βριμάομαι designates the noisy manifestation of emotion, not only of indignation, but also of *fervour*; βριμάσσω, which is related, designates a shaking with *petulance*; βράσσω, when intransitive, means ‘to ferment;’ when transitive, ‘to shake violently’—ἐμβριμάομαι could therefore be used of the shaking, of the groaning produced by grief. It is related to *fremere*, which is also used in speaking of sorrow (Virgil, CEn. vi. 175, Ovid, Metam. iii. 628). Gesenius, Thesaurus, takes fremo as the primary denifition of *ἔρημι*, and as special senses, ‘with indignation,’ ‘with sorrow.’ Τῷ πνεύματι, may be considered parallel with ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ver. 38, and we compare in addition, Mark viii. 12, ἀναστενάζας τῷ πνεύματι, that is, internally, though perhaps accompanied by a suppressed sound. Ταράσσω

with *ἑαυτον*, paraphractical or the middle *ταράσσειν*, yet with a prominence of the spontaneity (Winer, p. 234); according to Lücke, it is *spiritual* agitation, as in chap. xiii., 21, *ἐπταραχθὴ πρὸ πνεύματος*, but the reflexive form would then be less easy to explain; let the fact rather be recalled, that it is this vehement, deep-seated, inward sorrow, by which, more than by any other, an agitation of the upper part of the body is produced (Euthymius). If, then, the language marks the profoundest emotion of sound, the question arises, What was its object? According to Augustine, Olshausen, sorrow over death, in general, over the mouthful features of human life; according to De Wette, it was, 'that the sister whom he loved could not have been spared this sorrow' (compare, however, verses 4, 15, 42). By Calvin and Maldonatus was already made the just observation, that the reason is clearly expressed in verse 33, the tears of Mary drew forth the tears of the Jews who followed her, and the sympathising Saviour enters into this sorrow."

But to what we regard as blemishes, more or less inherent in our author's thinking and mode of handling his topics, we would now, in the same spirit of affectionate respect for his personal character and noble powers as a public teacher that we have already so fully expressed, briefly advert.

To the intrusiveness of his metaphysics into Scriptural theology we have already incidentally referred. A little more fully, however, we would speak of it now. And we would chiefly mark the fact, as, in our judgment, tending in several parts of this volume to reduce the edge and enervate the force of his exegesis. Not that we regard this tendency to transgress the due limits of speculative thought as a special feature in Dr Tholuck's mind, in contradistinction to other theological writers of his nation and times, or that even in England itself, where a high reputation for the practical observance of the science of limits generally prevails, many rather pungent instances of the speculative intellect running itself aground on the *terra firma* of Scripture, together with sundry unhappy efforts of self-extrication, to the no small upheaval and confusion of the latter, do not rather frequently occur. On the contrary, we regard Dr Tholuck's deviation in this respect, from his customary shrewdness, as being, on the whole, rather a development of the subjective spirit of German philosophy, than any special idiosyncrasy of his. And we refer to it now, mainly, because of its exceptive character, viewed in connection with his admirable balance of intellect, of which we have already spoken. We would not, moreover, at all depreciate a well-ordered alliance between sacred hermeneutics, viewed strictly as a science, and the application of a sound philosophy. Because, in the latter, we recognise the repository of those laws of thought, and the fountain-head of those methods of

guidance and restraint, by the aid of which alone we can reduce the materials of the former into anything like an intelligible system of theological beliefs.

But by apposite extracts from Dr Tholuck's volume, we shall perhaps most clearly indicate the true form of this exception to his exegetical methods. In treating of "The dogma contained in the doctrine of the Logos," Dr Tholuck's words are:—

"The view widely embraced at the end of the eighteenth century, and defended by Teller, Löffler, Stolz, Eichhorn, Ammon, and others, that the Logos in this place is but a personification of the divine reason; as in the Wisdom of Solomon, ch. vii. 27, x. 16, 17, may be regarded at this day as superseded; a confutation of it may be found in an essay by Süsskind, in Flätt's Magazin f. Dogmatik u. Moral St. 10. As at this time a dogmatic hypostatizing is acknowledged in the Wisdom of Solomon itself, there is the less hesitation in conceding it here. It is now the problem of theology to grasp the relation of this hypostasis to God, or rather *in God*. Exegesis cannot well avoid linking itself here to the results of Dogmatik." "In place of the term *ὑπόστασις*, abstractive *τρόπος υπάγωγης, ιδιότης*, commonly employed in the East, the Western Church used the term *person*. Yet this term is not applied to the hypostases of the Godhead in the sense in which it is used of human individuals. The unsatisfactory character of the expression was felt, in fact, very strongly already, by Augustine, who says, 'Tres—quid tres?' (three—three what?) and elsewhere, 'personæ, si ita dicendæ sunt,' (persons, if they may so be called). *Person*, applied to men, designates the human individual as an impress of the conception of the human species under an incommunicable modification of being in the single one. In *this* sense, the term cannot be applied to the Godhead, partly because Godhead is not a conception of a species, but exists once only, and partly because the same essence belongs to all the persons, and the formula of the church runs: *una essentia in tribus personis*. It is very certain that the Aristotelian Boethius, whose definition became the current one in the Occidental Church, '*Persona est naturæ rationalis individua substantia*,' by no means proposed in that way to define the *divine* persons, but designated the divine Trinity as *diversitas relationum* (de trinitate, c. 5, p. 159, seq.). And thus the speculative theologians of the west commonly used the expression, *subsistentiæ, relationes subsistentes* (Thomas, Summa, qu. 40, art. 2). The persons then of the Godhead, are, *real distinctions, having a necessary basis in the essence of the Godhead, and at the same time are relations*. God had knowledge of himself in a triple action of self-consciousness; he knows himself as subject, as object, and at the same time as the identical in subject and object. As an analogy, the human spirit may be referred to in its self-distinguishing as *thinker*, and as *thought of itself*, and again, as act of thinking, God as object of himself is the Word, for in the Word (that is, regarded as an internal thing), the Spirit becomes objective to itself.

The Word is consequently the principle through which God is revealed to himself. The Word is distinct from him, and at the same time the distinction is taken away, for God would not have perfectly rendered himself objective, had not (so to speak) his thought of himself been as great and substantial as he is."

Now, a more admonitory passage than this, as regards the dark vagrancy of human speculation when exceeding its own proper bounds, or of the organic connection of all error, however widely separated in outward form it may be viewed, as the birth of various ages and tendencies of thought, we have rarely met. Nor is it less instructive when carefully reviewed in historical connection with what may be regarded as the specially polemical crises of the great doctrine in question. Because, while thankfully acknowledging such testimonies as were more or less directly given in successive ages to the proposition that, in one divine essence, are three persons, God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, and which were fitted to rectify any such treatment of its truth, as really or apparently involved the use of contradictory terms, or to expose anti-scriptural conceptions of the divine nature, as when it was set forth as merely that of one person under three different names, or as three Gods in three persons, we have no evidence that the church has attained to any higher skill in defining the doctrine, or diminishing by a more luminous disclosure of the reality taught in it, the great mystery involved in it. Anything more confounding to ordinary minds than the *Quæstio* in Thomas Aquinas's "*Summa*," referred to by Tholuck, or anything more dreary than its context, is perhaps impossible, even in what Archbishop Whately has called the "magic-lantern" style of our own day. And how can it be otherwise? For great and manifold as are the uses, both doctrinal and practical, of this high belief in relation both to man's consciousness of personal redemption and the revelation of the divine methods of its blessed accomplishment, it is obvious that in language which, even in its highest function, can never surmount the finite boundaries of man's thought, there can be no conveyance of the knowledge of the inward properties of any nature which is revealed merely as a matter of faith, and in no sense as an object of perception or of strict thought. We, accordingly, cannot but regard our author's language, as but one of the many instances in which even the ablest men, with the best purposes, have used words which, if they have any meaning at all, are words that are neither wise nor profitable.

That Dr Tholuck deviates not from the ancient and orthodox faith of the church on this point, we freely and fully believe. Equally with ourselves, we are assured he can say,

“Tales personæ in Deo tres sunt, à se invicem, qua tenus personæ sunt, vere distinctæ, ut alius et alius; omnes tamen *ἑκαστος*, eandem numero essentiam habentes, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus.”

And, therefore, when, as if in explication of this incomprehensible life of Jehovah in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he says—“God has knowledge of himself in a triple action of self-consciousness; he knows himself as subject, as object, and, at the same time, as the identical in subject and object”—we are loath to interpret his words as anything more painfully significant than as the congenital forms of his Teutonic intellect—an inveterate passion to resolve all mysteries by imagining their parallel forms in man’s own consciousness.

As we have already said, we cannot but regard such language as equally irrelevant, inadequate, and vain. Nor is it at all reduced from its transcendental altitude to the level of even the highest efforts of the logical understanding by the analogy which Dr Tholuck has adopted, when he says—“As an analogy, the human spirit may be referred to in its self-distinguishing, as *thinker*, and as *thought of itself*, and, again, as *art of thinking*. God as object of himself is the Word, for in the Word (that is, regarded as an internal thing) the Spirit becomes objective to itself. The Word is consequently the principle through which God is revealed to himself.”

Are we incompetent to receive such dark transfigurations of the divine objective into the human subjective, if we confess that we cannot now logically define to ourselves wherein Dr Tholuck’s words differ from a not unfair expression of Sabellianism?

Being tranquilly satisfied with the simplest generalization of the facts disclosed by the divine word on this most profound of all divine mysteries, and having no relish for controversy regarding it, we refuse to accept a phalanx of mere words—the signs of human conception—as credible representatives of the august secrecies of the divine nature; and in the judicious language of the venerable Mästricht we gratefully find refuge:—“*Altera differentia est inter personas invicem. Circa quam, ante omnia, cautè declinandus est, ab unà parte Sabellianismus, nullam inter personas admittens differentiam, quam rationis ac nominis, quatenus una persona, a diversis operationibus, jam Pater, jam Filius, jam Spiritus S. appelletur: ab altera parte Tritheismus Valentini Gentilis, tres fingens spiritus æternos, et inæquales, quorum primus sit essentiator, reliqui essentiati. Sabellianismum declinaturi, quidam personas dicunt differre realiter; sed quod videtur vergere ad Tritheismum: Rursus Tritheismum declinaturi, alii statuunt differre modaliter, tanquam modus a modo, non*

quidem per solam *ratiocinationem* ; sed revera ; quam *duabus* *vocibus* conjunctis exprimunt, dicendo differre, *realiter modaliter*, h. e. tanquam modum à *modo*, non per *rationem* tantum, sed *reverà*. Quod quidem mihi maxime satisfacit. Sunt tamen, quibus nihil horum placet ; sed dicendum existimant, personas differre personaliter : verum quid hoc est dicere, nisi personas differre ut personas ? dum nihil dicitur, quo modo *persona* differt à *persona*. Quod si tamen aliquis, cothurnis hisce Scholasticis non possit incedere ; dicat, se Scripturis edoc-tum, credere personas differre, ut tres, 1 John v. 7, sed quo distinctionis genere, se ignorare, non aperiante Scriptura : aut differre *supranaturaliter*, non *naturaliter*."

How sadly aberrant from the spirit of a modest induction—which as regards Scripture mysteries is, in our view, identical with humble faith in and reverence for the authority of Jehovah—the most devout and reasonable men may be, if in bonds to a prevailing spirit of national thought, or seduced by any vehement predetermination of individual character !

Not otherwise shall we explain our author's temptation to rationalize the doctrine of the Triune God, as already indicated by his own words ; or to popularize, by scientific phraseology, the miracle of water converted into wine at Cana in Galilee.

"Augustine," says he, "had already applied in this sense to the miracle before us, the category of '*an accelerated process of nature*.' The change of substance of the water, which year by year is taken up into the vine, appears here only in an accelerated form ; thus Hase, *Leben Jesu*, sec. 8, 2d ed., Olshausen. The more rational and insinuating this formula sounded, the more energetically did Strauss direct his ridicule against it, and it actually seemed as though its glimmer of philosophy had been at once extinguished by the dry remark, that in the transmutation of water in Cana, it was just the most important thing of all that was wanting, to wit, the *vegetable agent, the vine*. Nevertheless, this objection of his has not prevented Hase, in the 3d ed., p. 92, nor Olshausen, 3d ed., from persisting in what they had said, without, indeed, making any reply to the objection of the critic. If the apologists, by their analogy, intend the *identity* of the process, they are certainly wrong ; if, on the other hand, they mean, as in fact the expression seems to imply, only the similarity, if they mean a smaller and yet similar miracle (this plus and minus need not seem strange, even Strauss has not only spoken of degrees of the miraculous, of degrees of the impossible itself, ii., p. 155, 1st ed.), they are right. Can, then, Strauss deny the transmutation of inorganic matter into organic by the organic process ? Must we not, in the assimilation of nutriment, speak of *transmutation* in the case of the plant, and of the transmutation of the elementary matter of water (more strictly of carbonic acid and nitrogen) in the plant ! The critic, indeed, speaks as though the elementary matter did nothing more than excite an activity in the plant ; but in this he will find nobody to agree with

him. In his fencing, his hardest *coup* is that the accelerated process of nature will not answer, because not *must* but *wine* was made, that there must be an accelerated artificial process of the wine-press also, &c., as though a process of nature could not produce results like, or identical with, those of art. In general, nothing compels us, in the case before us, to assume a transmutation of substance. The miracle becomes intelligible on the supposition of such a change in the chemical qualities of the water as would impart to it the colour and taste of wine; so Neander, who refers to instances mentioned by Athenæus and Theopompus, of springs of water which had the intoxicating property of wine, to which may be added the example in Vitruvius viii. 3, which Lampe quotes from Casaubon."

Now of the argumentative force of statements such as these, in vindication of the reality of a miracle, *i. e.*, a supernatural deviation from the familiar sequences in nature, in order to a special ethical end, we confess our inaptitude, because of our intense logical recoil from everything of the kind, to form a judgment.

Is not our rational position this? We receive the second chapter of John's Gospel as an inspired revelation, and though alike on psychological and Scriptural grounds, we cannot but regard verbal inspiration as the only compatible and consistent theory of the divine disclosure of what is contained in the sacred canon, at the same time, in so far as the divine authority of this part of the canon demands it, we do not need to controvert the distinction sometimes made between the *ipsis-sima verba* and the *ipsum corpus* of the divine revelation, as a subject of *inspiration*, and consequently have simply to keep in view that, as a simple matter of historical fact, for our belief in the reality of which the truth of God is our warrant, *water was made wine*.


Is there any difficulty in the mind of any man now, who can distinguish between these two substances, or should there be any difficulty, where one admits the possibility of miracle at any time, in simply admitting, that when our Lord superseded the water by the wine, he produced an effect that entirely leaves our best acquaintance with chemical processes at an infinite distance of ignorance and imbecility? Surely, it would have been something worse than the worst pedantry and the most frivolous impertinence, if any one of that marriage party, whose impression of a superhuman power was equally vivid and resistless, should have sought to discourse in chemical phraseology, and attempt to popularise the mighty work of God away into some mysterious succession of elementary combinations and metamorphoses of matter, organic or inorganic.


Why, therefore, should we now require anything more than what we have in this inspired record, of what was palpable to

the common sense of the men and women before whose eyes this wonderful work was done? Is Strauss—most plausible magician in the service of intellectual contradictions and negations though he be—to enjoy the special privilege of imposing, even for a moment, the obligation on the venerable Tholuck of gravely replying to all his most fatuous objurgations of the truth of God, or is any other person equally bigoted in the enforcement of the credulities of unreason, to escape with impunity from the indignant recoil of outraged common sense, and the impassioned comminations of insulted honesty?

If *miracle*, in the ordinary familiar sense of the term, be possible at all, and who, knowing the legitimate conditions of thought and evidence, will deny the proof of such possibility, and if the story of the miracle at Cana, in its plain acceptation, even as it might be talked over the next day by those who were witnesses of all that renders it so memorable, be above all suspicion of inaccuracy or untruth, why so far trifle with it as to rest, even in the faintest degree, its vindication as historically real, on an explanation of the chemistry either of water or wine, or any *process* whatever of a material kind? What more emphatic in its testimony—and what more instructive in its teaching than—"This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee, and manifested forth his glory; and his disciples believed in him?" To a close, however, we must now bring these observations, though, in exhausting our pages, we are conscious of having far from fully vindicated our high estimate of our author's merits, or satisfied ourselves with our effort to convey our judgment to our readers. More especially, it would have been of no small interest to indicate his trustworthiness, in handling minute questions of synonymy—Semitic and Hellenistic—in the definition of tenses, especially those of the manifold past, and in the just appreciation of the force of the prepositions. But to our readers we can only suggest a thoughtful study of these points, on an exact knowledge of which the satisfactory exegesis of the New Testament must, in so large measure, depend.







SERIAL

